Falklands Wars

Timeline History of the Falkland Islands

Vol.3
1900 to 1981

Antarctica
United Nations
Negotiations

Roger Lorton

"Not so much a timeline as a blow-by-blow account"



Falklands Wars - Timeline History of the Falkland Islands: Vol.3 1900 to 1981

Roger Lorton 2025

Long-time Falklands activist and researcher, Peter Pepper, once described this work as a “Research Resource”, and so it is. Please feel free to dip in and use whatever you please. If appropriate, a reference or citation would be most appreciated. If anything here leads to new information, sources or discoveries, it would be good to hear of them. Messages can be left at https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/

1900 — February 20th, Dr. Severo Salsedo, a Chilean, applies to the Falklands Governor for a twenty-year lease of the Island of South Georgia; for 2% of any net profit. [1]

February 24th, in the Falkland Islands, William Harding is appointed Consul for Chile. [2]

March 21st, from Stanley, Governor Wilson reports the offer from Dr. Salsedo to the Colonial Office.

> *"I have read this despatch to the Executive Council and they are of opinion that the intention to lease South Georgia Island should first be published in the Colony so that Colonists may have an opportunity of tendering upon similar terms ..."* [3]

"Demonstrating its lack of knowledge of the island, the government considered these activities appropriate. Nonetheless it rejected the application, preferring to give Falkland residents the first opportunity to implement such initiatives...." [4]

The Falklands' postal contract held by the German business, the Kosmos Steam Company, is taken over by the Pacific Steam Navigation Company, operating between Liverpool and Valparaiso. [5]



July 16th, in the Falkland Islands, at Stanley, W. A. Harding is recognised as Consul for Norway.

July 29th, at Fitzroy, in the Falklands, Charles McLeod is shot dead by Joseph Jenkins in a dispute over racial taunts.

August 2nd, from London, the Colonial Office signals its approval for the leasing of South Georgia Island. [6]

August 7th, in the Falklands, William Harding is appointed Consul for both Italy[7] and Sweden.

September 17th, at Stanley, having been found guilty of the crime of murder, Joseph Jenkins is executed.

> *"One lesson to be learned from the whole sad occurrence is:- That conduct and language in the Islands needs much reformation; the standard of the sealers and whalers, who frequented the Colony in by-gone times, has too much influence on our day."* [8]

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1 *PRO CO 78/99*. First sighted by Englishman, Anthony de la Roché in 1675. Claimed for the Kingdom of Great Britain by James Cook in 1775.

2 *The London Gazette No.27155.* The appointment of a Consul is generally accepted as recognition of a territory's status by the appointing country. The first Consul for Chile had been appointed in 1870; indicating Chilean acceptance that the Falkland Islands were British. The US government is notable in that it does not accept that the appointment of a consul is recognition of a territory's sovereignty.

3 *Gov. Wilson to Joseph Chamberlain MP* March 21, 1900. See August, 1900 below.

4 *Seal Fisheries of the Falkland Islands & Dependencies: A Historical Review* A. B. Dickinson 2007 p.129

5 *A display to The Royal Philatelic Society, London of The Postal History of the Falkland Islands between the years 1827 and 1945* Michael J. Y. Roberts 2015

6 *Despatch No.597* August 2, 1900

7 *The London Gazette No.27205*

8 *Falkland Islands Magazine* September 1900

October 2nd, in *The Falkland Islands Gazette,* a 'Mining and General Lease of South Georgia' is advertised.

> *"The Government of the Falkland islands is prepared to grant a mining and general lease of South Georgia for the term of 21 years (renewable) to any responsible individual or Company on the conditions set below .... 1. The Lease granted will be for the term of 21 years, with the right to apply for a renewal for a second term of 21 years ... 2. The sum of Ten Pounds to be paid annually by the Lessee for a Sealing Licence. 3. The sum of Two Hundred Pounds to be deposited in the Colonial Treasury as security for compliance with the terms of the lease. 4. A percentage on the net annual profits to be paid annually to the Colonial Government, provided that the percentage shall not in any one year be less than the Royalties on Seal skins laid down in the Sealing Ordinance 1899. Each applicant to state the percentage he is willing to pay (a) On the net profits each year during the first Ten years, and (b) On the profits in each subsequent year. ... 5. The Lessee to state what amount he will undertake to expend upon works of any description in the Island or upon Stock during the first five years. ..."* [9]

November 12th, at Stanley, Louis Williams is appointed Vice-Consul for the USA.

December 7th, in the Falklands, H. Schlottfeldt is provisionally recognised as Consul for Germany.

Both HMS *Flora* and HMS *Basilisk* visit the Falkland Islands.

The Falklands end of year statistical report notes:

"During the year six vessels put into the port in distress. Of these, three (two American and one British) required repairs owing to damage sustained from heavy weather off Cape Horn; one, a Chilian (sic) vessel, had a cargo of coke and sulphuric acid carried in iron drums. The acid had eaten through the drums, and had, consequently, all leaked out. The drums were packed in chalk, and the sulphuric acid acted chemically on this, forming carbonic acid gas. During the voyage the hatches blew off. Eventually, most of the acid remained at the bottom of the ship and damaged the iron frames so seriously that she could not continue her voyage. Another barque, a German, put in on account of an outbreak of beri-beri, to which disease four of the crew had succumbed. The last, a British ship, put in with cargo of coals heated. A steam tug, fitted with salvage pumps, was imported by the Falkland Islands Company to be in readiness to render assistance to disabled vessels." [10]



GENERAL.

35. The year may be said, generally, to have been fairly prosperous, except for the fall in the price of the staple product of the country—wool. The price of labour ruled high, perhaps higher than it should, and the large savings bank deposits and money order remittances testify to the well-being of the people.

36. The rates of wages are about as follows:—

Shepherds—£60 to £72 a year, with free lodging, horses, and mutton.
Labourers—£6 to £7 a month, or, if on daily pay, 8*d*. an hour and 1*s*. an hour.
Boys in training—£3 to £5 a month.
Shearers—15*s*. per 100 sheep.
Shipwrights—1*s*. an hour, and 16*s*. 4*d*. a day for shipwork.
Joiners—1*s*. an hour, and 16*s*. 4*d*. a day for shipwork.
Blacksmiths—1*s*. an hour, and 16*s* 4*d*. a day for shipwork.
Sailmakers—1*s*. an hour, and 10*s*. a day for shipwork.
Stonemasons—1*s*. an hour, and 10*s*. a day for shipwork.
Mariners on Coasting Trade—£5 a month.
Domestic Servants—30*s*. to 40*s*. a month.

37. The labour market cannot be said to be over-stocked, and the Admiralty have found it necessary to import Italian labourers from Argentina for work on the coaling depôt. Some owners of property also import Italian labour, on short contracts, for sheep-shearing.

9 Perhaps unsurprisingly, there was no rush of applicants. However, see July, 1905 below. *cf.* Dickinson 2007 p.129

10 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1900.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1887 to 1910.pdf

1901 — in a Falkland Islands census, 2,043 people are noted as resident in the Islands, of which 1,940 (94.7%) are British subjects. 60% of those have been born in the Islands. The *Stanley Comet* newspaper is established.

Hugo Schlottfeldt is confirmed as German Consul. [11]

August 6th, from the UK, an expedition to Antarctica sails in *Discovery*. Some 50 expedition members, including Ernest Shackleton, are led by Robert Scott. The expedition's aims include an attempt to reach the South Pole. [12]

October 16th, from Goteburg in Sweden, a Swedish Antarctic Expedition sails in *Antarctic* (Capt. Carl Anton Larsen), led by Otto Nordenskjöld. [13]

In Argentina, rumours circulate in Buenos Aires that the government intends to send a gunboat to the South Shetland Islands. [14]

"No action was taken at Buenos Aires on this occasion, and correspondence with the Colonial Office, Admiralty and Board of Trade showed that there was little ground for moving in the matter. The Colonial Office were unaware of the extent to which British subjects resorted or were likely to resort to these islands for fishery or other purposes, ... The Admiralty were in no way interested in the control of the islands, which did not possess any navigational or strategical advantages. The Board of Trade were unable to ascertain that sealing and whaling vessels starting from the United Kingdom made use of these islands." [15]

December 15th, *Antarctic* arrives in Buenos Aires. The Argentine Government offer to supply food and fuel if the expedition takes on an Argentine officer - José María Sobral. Underfunded, the offer is taken up.

December 21st, from the Rio de la Plata, *Antarctic* sails for Graham Land.

December 23rd, in the Falklands, at Port Stanley, Canadian pelagic sealer *Beatrice L. Corkum*, anchors. Bound for "*Cape Horn and the South Shetland Islands*" to hunt seals, she is joined by the *Edward Roy*. [16]

"They were able to take some 7700 skins before returning to Halifax in May 1902. This began an industry which continued from Nova Scotia for the next decade." [17]

December 30th, *Antarctic* arrives at in the Falkland Islands. 2nd Lt. José María Sobral steps ashore; *"Today at 6 a.m. we anchored in Port Stanley. To think that I am a foreigner in my own land!"* [18]

The Falkland Islands end of year statistical report notes 68 births and 15 deaths during 1901: a total population of 2,076. [19]

> "*The volunteer rifle corps numbered three officers and 97 non-commissioned officers and men, the capitation grant earned was £100. The corps made considerable strides in numbers and efficiency under the able instruction of Sergeant-major Watt, who arrived from England in the early part of the*

11 *The London Gazette No.27304.* Albeit, only for a few months.
12 Known officially as the British National Antarctic Expedition. The attempt to reach the Pole was thwarted by sickness and insufficient supplies.
13 For a biography of Larsen, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/larsen_carl
14 Claimed for Britain by Capt. William Smith in October, 1819. See 1819, 1893, 1894, 1895 and 1896.
15 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908* at para.20
16 Pelagic sealing involved taking seals in the ocean rather than at their breeding grounds.
17 Dickinson 2007 p.96
18 *Department of Naval Historical Studies (DEHN), Buenos Aires, Fondo Sobral, Diary of Ensign Sobral's voyage to Antarctica, December 31, 1901*, p.13. The ships sailed the following day.
19 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1901.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1887 to 1910.pdf

year. On account of their occupations many men cannot attend drills as often as is desirable. Their shooting is generally good, and during the year the War Office presented the corps with two 2·5 field guns and 100 Lee-Enfield rifles, in place of the old Martini-Henrys. …

Were there more houses and a good hotel in Stanley, and if the Pacific Company could be induced to lower their rates of passage money between the Colony and Montevideo, it is probable that many residents of the latter place, or of Buenos Aires, would visit Stanley in the summer months as a health resort. The fares are at present—first class, £14 to £16; return, a fare and a half; second class, £10; return, double fare; and the voyage only takes four days" [20]



1902 – in **February**, parties from the Swedish Antarctic Expedition are dropped off at sites around Graham Land. Argentine member José María Sobral, is landed at Snow Hill Island. *Antarctic* (Larsen) moves away for the winter.

March 4th, in the Falkland Islands, at Port Stanley, W. C. Girling is appointed as Consul for Germany, Norway and Italy. Also as acting-Consul for both Chile and Sweden.

March 27th, at Stanley, *Antarctic* (Larsen) anchors in the port.

From Patagonia, two Welsh colonies – Y Wladfa (founded 1865) and Cwm Hyfryd (founded 1889) – petition the British Colonial Office for annexation by Britain. [21]

"In 1899 (sic), two colonists went to Britain to request that the Chubut be admitted to the British Empire as a self-governing Dominion. The Colonial Office took no action, but it soon became clear that the Welsh in Chubut were restless and unhappy." [22]

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20 *Ibid.*

21 *Britain and Latin America in historical perspective* Leslie Bethell 1989 in *Britain and Latin America: a changing relationship* Victor Bulmer-Thomas (ed.) 1989. A party of some 250 Welsh immigrants had departed the UK in 1865, eventually settling in the Chubut Valley of what was then Patagonia. Despite not actually having sovereignty over Patagonia, the Argentine Government had given its consent. *cf.* 1863, 1864, 1865 & 1875

22 *The Role of Symbol & Myth in the Welsh Settlement of Patagonia 1865-1911* William Iain Stevenson 1972 (Thesis) citing *Britain and Argentina in the Nineteenth Century* H.S. Ferns 1960

April 22nd, at South Georgia, *Antarctic* (Larsen) seeks a harbour to over-winter. [23]

May 14th, Larsen takes *Antarctic* into a sheltered cove, which he names Grytviken.

"Larsen, a Norwegian who had previously visited South Georgia during a pioneer whaling voyage in the Jason in 1893-94 ... recognised the possibilities of the island as a whaling base." [24]

"Larsen, whose previous Antarctic voyages had given him the idea of establishing a shore-based whaling operation in the southern ocean, wrote to the Royal Geographical Society in London in February 1896 and asked about leasing a site on South Georgia Island." [25]

"In 1901-3 Larsen captained the Swedish Nordenskjöld expedition, which visited the Falklands and South Georgia – on South Georgia a shore party named a bay "Grytviken" ["The Pot Bay"] after some old trypots they found there." [26]

May 22nd, from Chubut in Patagonia, some 250 people depart the Welsh settlements for Canada.

"As many more will, we believe, follow this first detachment shortly. ... The exodus of the Chubut colonists must act as a strong deterrent to immigration to this Republic. After many years of a severe struggle against the natural defects of the strip of Argentine territory which the original settlers selected in the hope of being free to live their own way, without the harassing control of a superior government, the succeeded, by their own enterprise, perseverance and self-denial, in converting a desert into fruitful soil. But this brought upon them the very evil they had left their homes to avoid. The Chubut colony had become too prosperous and valuable to be left to its own devices. A government was bestowed upon it which was not in sympathy with the Welsh customs and prejudices. An expensive bureaucracy also necessitated heavy taxation for its support... The news will now spread far and wide among the emigrating classes of the old world that the industrious, orderly and God-fearing inhabitants of an Argentine colony had been obliged to sacrifice the fruit of 35 years trial because they found existence in Argentina no longer endurable." [27]

May 28th, Chile and Argentina sign the *Pactos de Mayo* – brokered by Britain. [28] Boundary disputes are to be arbitrated by either Britain or Switzerland.

"It would have been contradictory to appoint a territorial arbitrator with whom Argentina had a territorial dispute,.." [29]

In **October**, in the UK, details of a proposed Scottish expedition to Antarctica, are laid out in *The Scotsman*.

> *''The leader and all the scientific and nautical members of the expedition are Scots; the funds have been collected for the most part on this side of the Border; it is a product of voluntary effort, and unlike*

23 Larsen had first seen South Georgia in 1893; recognising the possibilities for a shore-based whaling operation. He appears to have used this opportunity to survey the island for a suitable site.

24 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908* at para.20. See also 1894 & 1896

25 *The Fate of Louise: A Maine-built 'down-easter' at Grytviken Harbor, South Georgia Island* Charles Lagerbom 2012 in *The Mariner's Mirror* Volume 98, no.3 August 2012. Also *The Island of South Georgia* R. Headland 1992 p.62. See *Falklands Wars* vol.2

26 *Falklands Facts and Fallacies: The Falkland Islands in History and International Law* Graham Pascoe 2020 p.270

27 *Falkland Islands Magazine* August 1902 quoted in *Penguin News* October 29, 1983. Religious nonconformists, the Welsh emigrants were particularly affected by a new Argentine military law which required the young men to take part in military exercises on a Sunday. To the Welsh, this was the sin of Sabbath-breaking *cf.* 1863 & 1865

28 There were actually 4 pacts: 1. Renouncement of interference with Chilean affairs in the Pacific; 2.A framework for the resolution of territorial controversies; 3. An arms control treaty; 4. Agreement requesting that King Edward VII of the UK head a demarcation arbitration panel. *cf.* 1977

29 Pascoe 2020 p.263

the expedition which will be simultaneously employed in the exploration of the Antarctic, it owes nothing to Government help."[30]

November 5th, from South Georgia, *Antarctic* (Larsen) sails for Graham Land.[31]

"Upon return of the austral spring, the Antarctic went south again. After exploring for some time on the east side of the Peninsula, on December 5, 1902 she set course for the Antarctic Strait (named after the ship) to retrieve the Snow Hill party. Barring delays, expected travel time was two to three days. The ship"s company immediately found the strait blocked by ice. Landing on the nearby shore and climbing to the top of a hill, they saw that the way to the wintering-station was entirely blocked, with the exception of some leads near Joinville Island. The ship"s captain, C.A. Larsen, an experienced whaler who had explored the area back in the 1890s (and had extensive experience in ice conditions), thought that the pack-ice was thin enough to attempt ramming the ship through. After less than a day, he gave up the effort and rammed the ship back out to the east for an attempt to go around Joinville Island to the north. However, that effort also quickly ran into extensive pack-ice Fields." [32]

December 29th, unable to reach Swedish expedition sites due to sea ice, Larsen drops off two crew members to attempt to make contact on foot.

December 30th, in the Falklands, at Stanley, *Scotia* anchors in the port.

The Falkland Islands end-of-year statistical report for 1902 notes 57 births and 19 deaths during 1902. Total population now estimated to be 2,146.

1903 – January 26th, from the UK, *Scotia* sails for the South Orkney Islands with the Scottish expedition.

February 12th, in the Weddell Sea, *Antarctic* (Larsen) is crushed by sea ice.

"... on January 10 she was caught in between two floes, as in a vise, and significant damage done. The rudder was ripped off and many hull planks were found to be missing. The crew was unable to see if more extensive damage had been done to the ship"s bottom because of the ice. Pumping by the crew was able to keep up with the water coming in, but they prepared themselves for the possibility of having to abandon ship at a moment"s notice. The ship, now firmly encased in ice, drifted until February 12. On that date, the crew was clearly able to see that one-third of the keel had been ripped away by the actions of the ice the previous month. The night of February 12-13 the ship found itself momentarily free from the ice (which had been, when not crushing the ship, holding it up out of the water) in a newly opened lead and immediately began to founder. She stayed afloat as long as she kept moving forward, but eventually ran into more ice. The crew abandoned ship and she sank." [33]

From *Antarctic*, twenty men set out on foot for one of the previously identified wintering sites at Paulet Island. [34]

30 Organised by Dr. William Spiers Bruce, a ship, *Hekla*, was purchased and fitted out; then renamed, *Scotia*. Bruce took six scientific staff; including David Wilton (zoologist), Robert Rudmose-Brown (botanist), James Harvie Pirie (geologist/medical officer), and Robert Mossman (meteorologist). *Scotia*'s captain was Thomas Robertson. Unusually, this expedition did not have the approval of the *Royal Geographical Society,* which therefore offered no finance. Dr. William Spiers Bruce had previously visited Stanley in 1893.

31 The Antarctic peninsula

32 *Lessons from the Swedish Antarctic Expedition (1901-1904) for Manned Spaceflight* Phillip Scott Wallace 2010

33 Wallace 2010

34 Reached on February, 28, 1903, Now spread around three different locations, it would be nearly eight months before they would be rescued. Only one fatality during this sojourn, a seaman with a heart condition.

March 26th, in the South Atlantic, after venturing as far as the Weddell Sea, the Scottish expedition returns to Laurie Island (South Orkney Islands – right), where a pre-fabricated meteorological station is erected - '*Ormond House.*'

In **August**, in the Falklands, at Stanley, work on navy depot and repair facilities ceases. Coal supplies are to be reduced; *"... when the existing stock of coal maintained by them at the Falkland Islands is used up, no more will be kept for naval purposes."*[35]

"The appointment of Admiral Sir John Fisher as Second Sea Lord in June 1902 resulted in a naval revolution which greatly diminished the perceived military value of the Falklands. In August 1903 the Admiralty ceased work on the coaling depot ... The decision reflected Fisher's redistribution of the fleets to meet the threat from Europe. ... The South American station was disbanded and its area of responsibility absorbed into the South Atlantic station with its base at Freetown – 5,000 miles from the Falklands." [36]

In **September**, with no sign of, or word from, the Swedish expedition, Argentina's government fits-out a vessel, *Uruguay*, for a search and rescue mission.

"Argentina made its debut in the Antarctic in 1903, when the government sponsored a mission to relieve a Swedish expedition stranded at Hope Bay in the Palmer Peninsula." [37]

October 31st, in Argentina, the first of a two-part consideration of the Falkland Islands - *Relación abreviada de la cuestión de las islas Malvinas (Abridged Account of the Question of the Malvinas Islands)* – is published in *Boletín del Centro Naval* under a pseudonym 'GA'. [38]

"One of the reasons for the article was the "imperfect understanding" of the issue, both within and outside the Navy, ... The author warned that, since Manuel Moreno's claim to the United Kingdom in 1833, the issue had lost ground, while England was busy establishing new titles of possession, investing considerable capital in the Islands, ..." The usurpation, which at one point seemed "brand new" and "open to discussion," was then presented as an act diminished by the years, something that would eventually make the claim more difficult and with "less hope of success." G. A. asserted that it was easy to understand England's reasons for turning the Falklands into a colony, "possessing them with everything and equipping them with fortifications." They were one of the most important links in the chain of interoceanic routes that sustained English maritime power. ... For the author, the usurpation of the Malvinas Islands demonstrated that the right of the strongest prevailed over justice and reason, and he denounced the fact that the issue was almost paralyzed, because while the British crown remained silent, the national government was inactive in its demands. This was due, in part, to the "political disorganization" and the economic and commercial subjugation that Argentina had to Great

35 Quoted in *British Interests in the Falkland Islands: Economic Development, the Falkland Lobby and the Sovereignty Dispute, 1945 to 1989* C. R. Ellerby 1990 pp.53-54. The Panama Canal changed British strategic thinking.

36 Ellerby 1990 pp.53-54.

37 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp08c01297r000800090022-3

38 *Boletín del Centro Naval* vol. 21 no.235/236. Part two followed in issue 237 of November 30, 1903. GA was most likely to have been Gabriel Albarracín, an Argentine writer and intellectual.

Britain. In fact, the capital and influence that the "industry of the great Saxon people" had over the Argentines were "overwhelming."” [39]

November 8th, at Graham Land, members of the Swedish expedition are rescued by *Uruguay* (Irizar).

“On November 8, they were pleasantly surprised when the Argentinean naval ship, the Uruguay arrived. Larsen had left notes the previous year, before he left the Falklands, indicating where Nordenskjold was and requesting a rescue party if he did not come back before winter set in. The Argentines had complied by specially outfitting the Uruguay to serve in the Antarctic. In addition another relief expedition had been prepared back in Sweden after word had reached Europe that the Antarctic had not returned. The captain of the Uruguay, Julian Irizar, though naturally anxious to be out of the icy waters, agreed to search for the missing ship"s crew in the places where they most likely would be, including Hope Bay and Paulet Island. The need for a search was obviated, however, when, miraculously, on the same day that the Uruguay arrived, Larsen himself showed up with five men. Back on the last day of October, when the ice had broke up at Paulet Island, Larsen had taken a whaleboat and rowed his way through the Antarctic Strait to Hope Bay, arriving on November 4 (having been delayed by weather). There he found a note saying the three men had set out for Snow Hill Island, which is where Larsen went next, setting out on November 7 and arriving late the next day, to considerable rejoicing. With the location of the remaining Antarctic castaways now known, the Uruguay headed directly for Paulet Island, arriving on November 11. With all 28 surviving expedition members on board, the Uruguay then returned uneventfully to Argentina and the adventure that had been the Swedish Antarctic Expedition came to an end.” [40]

November 18th, from Stanley, HMS *Nymphe* is sent to investigate allegations of illegal sealing at New Island.

“Although Canadian sealing was primarily pelagic, the crews were not averse to taking animals onshore and illegally on both the Falkland and Lobos Islands when the opportunity arose. … The sealers were often able to carry out poaching with impunity since the Royal Navy and its Uruguayan counterpart only provided sporadic protection for the breeding animals. The improbability of surprising illegal sealers and the high cost of fuel were given by the Colonial Office as the main reasons for not stationing a vessel at the Falkland breeding sites; "the value of the property is hardly equal to the cost of protection."...” [41]

At Buenos Aires, on his return, Capt. Carl Anton Larsen presents his ideas about a whaling venture to members of the local business community; *“Thus began the activity of Argentina in Antarctica! .., Captain Carl Anton Larsen asked why Argentina was not dedicated to hunt cetaceans in the vicinity of its coasts. From there was born the initiative to create a company...”* [42]

December 2nd, in the Falkland Islands, after 9 months making weather observations on Laurie Island in the South Orkney Islands, members of the Scottish expedition return to Port Stanley.

December 8th, Dr. Bruce sails for Buenos Aires aboard *Orissa*.

December 25th, *Clarence S. Bement*, with its cargo of coal on fire, is wrecked off Fox Bay, on the south-east coast of West Falkland. [43]

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39 *Los oficiales de la Armada Argentina y las Islas Malvinas: Del territorio “imperfectamente conocido” a la construcción de un discurso irredentista (1900-1945)* Agustín Daniel Desiderato 2022 in *Malvinas y las Guerras del Siglo XX* María Inés Tato & Germán Soprano (directores) pp.17-54

40 Wallace 2010

41 Dickinson 2007 p.101

42 *Ocupacion de las Islas Georgias del Sur (San Pedro) y Sandwich del Sur* Alfredo Bruno Bologna 1982

43 *Cambridge Expedition to the Falkland Islands 1977: Report to the National Maritime Museum*. The crew got to shore.

December 29th, in Buenos Aires, Dr. Bruce approaches the British Legation requesting that they; *"... bring before the Argentine Authorities the suggestion that they should continue the work in the ensuing year, of the observatory established in the South Orkney Islands."* [44]

Minister Haggard immediately writes to Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs with Bruce's suggestion. [45]

"... on December 29th, 1903, the Argentine Government were invited by this Legation to take over the meteorological Station established on Laurie Island in South Orkneys by Mr William Bruce. ... My impression is that Mr Bruce arranged all details previously with the meteorological Department, but that the Argentine Authorities requested him to make the offer officially..." [46]

"In passing on this offer Mr Haggard acted without instructions." [47]

"The object of these conversations, in which Dr. Bruce took the initiative, was to arrange for the establishment of a permanent meteorological observatory on Laurie Island. As a result of the enthusiastic support of Mr. Walter G. Davis, the head of the Argentine Meteorological Service, it was agreed that the Argentine Government should take over the maintenance and staffing of the observatory, and that the Scottish Expedition would be responsible for transporting the observers and training them..." [48]

The end-of-year statistical report for the Falkland Islands notes 68 births and 31 deaths, resulting in an estimated population of 2,044. [49]

1904 – January 2nd, Argentine Presidential decree *3,073* authorises the 'Oficina Meteorologica Argentina' to maintain the weather station on Laurie Island.

> *"In view of the Note from the Director of the Meteorological Office and of the documents and other antecedents relating to the establishment of new meteorological and magnetic Stations in the seas South of the Republic and,:- considering that it is of great scientific and practical importance to extend the observations which are being made in the observatory on New Year Island and in the South of the republic to the said regions – The President of the Republic Decrees that: Art 1 The Director of the Argentine Meteorological Office is authorized to take over the installation offered by Mr William S. Bruce in the South Orkney Islands and to establish a meteorological and magnetic observatory thereon. Art.2 The staff shall be composed of the employees whom the Ministry of Agriculture appoints and of those who later on may be appointed by the Ministry of Marine. ..."*

"The plans Mr. Bruce had cherished of making at Ormond House, South Orkneys, a permanent meteorological station were now happily fulfilled. The Argentine Government, through its Meteorological Office, agreed to undertake the upkeep of the station for the following year... W. H. Haggard, C.B., the British Minister,.. gave all his weighty influence to the furtherance of the project." [50]

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44 *FO 371/4/456. cf.* 1906

45 William Haggard was Britain's Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary (one rank below Ambassador). The British Legation would be elevated to an Embassy in 1927.

46 *Harford to Bart February 14, 1906* in *FO 371/4/454.*

47 *Robertson to Lord Cushendun November 9, 1928* in *FO 371/12736/365*

48 *The Antarctic Problem* E. W. H. Christie 1951 p.178

49 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1903.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1887 to 1910.pdf

50 *The Voyage of the Scotia: being the Record of a Voyage of Exploration in antarctic Seas by Three of the Staff* R. N. Brown, R. C. Mossman & J. H. Harvey Pirie 1906 p.193. The invitation was, on the face of it, for a period of just one year. Argentina, however, would continue to maintain the Laurie Island Station after that time had elapsed without any further authority from the UK. As a result, Argentina laid the basis of its current and continuing claim to the South Orkney Islands; albeit in an area subject to the Antarctic Treaty, which recognises no sovereignty claims.

"Argentina was left in no doubt by Great Britain that the transfer to the Argentine Meteorological Office, of the meteorological station previously established on Laurie Island in the South Orkneys by a British expedition, did not also involve the transfer to Argentina of the sovereignty either of the South Orkneys group or of Laurie Island itself." [51]

"On that date the Argentine Republic established the first observatory in Antarctic territory, a real and uninterrupted occupation, before any (other) foreign establishment, it constitutes another "indisputable reason to assert rights in this frozen geographical area."..." [52]

"... (of) the laws of major importance we must cite the decree of President Julio Argentino Roca 1904, by which the meteorological observatory is established in the Orkney Islands, with which our country began the permanent occupation in the white continent to this day." [53]

January 5th, from Buenos Aires, Minister Haggard reports his actions to the Foreign Office in London.

> *"Mr. Bruce seemed to me not to have made up his mind whether they (South Orkneys) were likely to be of any use whatever, or not, to Great Britain."* [54]

January 21st, three Argentines are appointed to go to Laurie Island – L. H. Valette (naturalist), and E. Szmula (meteorologist) and H. Acuña (postmaster).

January 31st, from Buenos Aires, *Scotia* returns to the Falkland Islands.

February 9th, from Port Stanley, *Scotia* sails for the South Orkney Islands. One member of the Scottish expedition, Robert Cockburn Mossman, volunteers to remain at the station to supervise the survival training of the three Argentines. Supported by one of the *Scotia's* crew, William Smith; *"... until relieved by an Argentine cruiser."* [55]

February 22nd, at Laurie Island, *'Ormond House'* is handed over to the men from Argentina.

Hugo Alberto Acuña raises the Argentine flag alongside those of Great Britain and the expedition's Scottish Lion.

> *"Often, among the various topics brought forward in the cabin in the long winter evenings, arose the question of the ownership of the South Orkneys. And after many long discussions we arrived at the pleasing conclusion that even in this age of imperialism the South Orkneys has escaped the grasp of any country, and that we enjoyed the privilege of living in No-man's Land. But I fear it is no longer so. Not that we claimed them for Britain, for even if we had been seized with desire to widen the confines of our empire, we could not lay claim to new territory in our country's name without having a Government mandate, and as for claiming them for Scotland, I fear that still less would have been recognised, ... However, when the Scotia returned to the island in February 1904, with an*

51 *Antarctica Cases: United Kingdom v. Argentine; United Kingdom v Chile* International Court of Justice 1956 p.25
52 *Textos escolares: Las Malvinas y la Antártida para la "Nueva Argentina" de Perón* Amelia Beatriz Garcia 2009. Completely missing the reality that the Argentines had taken the base over from the British.
53 *La Cuestion del Atlantico Sur y la Antardida* Edith V. Fernandez 2012 p.16. An Antarctic island.
54 Quoted in *Robertson to Lord Cushendun November 9, 1928* in *FO 371/12736/365*
55 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1904.*

Argentine staff to take over the meteorological observatory at Ormond House under the auspices of the Argentine Government, the Argentine naval flag was hoisted on the cairn where formerly the Scottish Lion flew; and I presume the South Orkneys are looked upon as a possession of that power; the nucleus of an empire, perhaps, they may even seem to ambitious Argentine expansionists." [56]

"... the Argentine flag replaced the Scottish Lion which the Bruce Expedition had flown. Nothing in the correspondence can be construed as a recognition either express or implied of Argentine sovereignty ..." [57]

"(Señor Acuña arrived) ... fully accredited by the Argentine postal authorities as a postmaster." [58]

"There was no ceremony of taking possession. One of the new staff came provided with a supply of Argentine postage stamps and a specially designed post mark. 'Orcadas del Sud. Distrito Rio Gallegos', but this is believed to have been in the interests of philatelists. The first mail to Buenos Aires was taken north in the Scotia and posted from Cape Town... (fn) ... neither the second nor any of the subsequent parties until 1941 included an accredited postmaster." [59]

"... the (Argentine) government accepted from a Scottish expedition the offer of its equipment and a weather station at Laurie Island in the South Orkneys, and has continued since that time to maintain a year-round station on the Island. Although occupation of this island subsequently has become an important element in Argentine claims, the government originally made no formal claim of sovereignty..." [60]

"... in February, 1904, the Argentine Government established a Post Office on the "Orcadas del Sud" and appointed a 19- year-old Argentinian, Rugo A. Acuna, as Postmaster. He travelled on the "Scotia" and on February 22 the Scottish flag was lowered, the Argentine flag raised, and the Post Office opened for business."[61]

"... the legitimate claim of our province on the Argentine Antarctic Sector is based on the effective and uninterrupted occupation exercised by the national State since 1904, consolidating itself with exploration, scientific and technological activities,.." [62]

February 29th, in Buenos Aires, a new whaling company is registered – 'Compañía Argentina de Pesca Sociedad Anonima' (Compañía Argentina de Pesca). Its directors, all foreign residents, are listed as P. Christopherson, the Norwegian Consul[63], E. Tornquist, a Swedish banker, and H. Schlieper, a German-American businessman. Carl Larsen is employed as manager.

"... the first formal activity related to South Georgia was the establishment in Buenos Aires of the Compañía Argentina de Pesca, in 1904, ... organised under the laws of Argentina. ...(and) Argentine warships supplied fuel for the island for decades, without British reaction." [64]

"In 1904 Larsen tried to raise capital to found a whaling company in Norway, but failed. He obtained the capital in Buenos Aires, where he founded a whaling company, the "Compañia Argentina de Pesca" (known as

56 Brown, Mossman & Pirie 1906
57 *Memorandum* (*A6503/128/2*?) in *FO 371/12736/356*
58 *South African Philatelist* April, 1935.
59 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908. cf.* 1935, 1947 & 1955
60 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See link above.
61 *Antarctica: A News Bulletin* New Zealand Antarctic Society September, 1964 p.505
62 Argentine Congress August 3, 2006 *Document 4302-D-06*
63 Pedro (Peter) Christophersen was a Norwegian who had emigrated to Argentina in 1871; variously, Consul for Norway, landowner, successful businessman and, apparently, lottery winner.
64 *Las Malvinas Entre el Derecho y la Historia* M. G. Kohen & F. D. Rodriguez 2016 p.260. An implication distorting reality. With few ships operating so far south, Argentine naval vessels were available for charter in those seas. A commercial arrangement, rather than an official one. See February, 1905, below.

"Pesca" for short), which was constituted by Argentine government decree on 29 February 1904 and registered in Buenos Aires on 8 April 1904." [65]

March 16th, in the Falkland Islands, William Harding is gazetted as German Consul. [66]

March 26th, in London, the Admiralty gives its opinion regarding the South Orkneys. [67]

> *"... relative to the suggestion made by the Argentine press that the Argentine Government should take possession of the South Orkneys... (the Lord Commissioners) ... did not attach any importance to the possession of these islands from a naval point of view..."* [68]

April 16th, the Colonial Office also provides its opinion.

> *"... no importance should be attached to the possession of the group of islands in the South Atlantic known as the South Orkneys."* [69]

April 22nd, a Falkland Islands Company boat, *Fair Rosamond,* is wrecked off Lively Island. [70]

April 26th, from London, copies of the Admiralty and Colonial Office opinions regarding the South Orkney Islands are sent to Minister Haggard at the British Legation in Argentina.

"Lord Lansdowne ... referring to the suggestion by the Argentine press that the Argentine Government should take possession of the South Orkneys, stated that in view of the opinions expressed by the Admiralty and the Colonial Office, "it will be unnecessary for you to take any action in the matter."..." [71]

May 19th, in Argentina, an administrative decree is issued by President Julio Roca establishing Ushuaia as the capital of Tierra del Fuego.

> "*Art.15. The Territory of Tierra del Fuego is divided into four departments, ...*
>
> *IV – Isla de la Estados includes the islands of the same name and all the others that are in the Atlantic under the* ***sovereignty of right*** *of the Argentine Republic*." [72]

In the Falklands, the *Seal Fishery Amendment Ordinance* provides a power of arrest for illegal sealing. [73]

June 6th, following the submission of a boundary dispute between Brazil and the UK to an arbitration panel overseen by the King of Italy, the award favours the British. [74]

> *"... to acquire the sovereignty of regions which are not in the dominion of any State, it is indispensable that the occupation be effected in the name of the State which intends to acquire the sovereignty of those regions; That the occupation cannot be held to be carried out except by* ***effective, uninterrupted, and permanent possession*** *being taken in the name of the State, and that a simple affirmation of rights of sovereignty or a manifest intention to render the occupation effective cannot suffice; That the effective possession of part of a region, although it may be held to confer a right to the acquisition of*

65 Pascoe 2020 p.270
66 *The London Gazette No.27660*
67 Who made the request isn't clear, as the only references date from 24 years later. Britain's Minister at Buenos Aires would seem the likely candidate
68 Quoted in *Robertson to Lord Cushendun November 9, 1928* in *FO 371/12736/367*
69 *Ibid*
70 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1904.* No lives were lost. Replaced by a former Mersey pilot boat – *Lafonia.*
71 *Robertson to Lord Cushendun November 9, 1928 in FO 371/12736/367*
72 My emphasis. Vague enough to avoid comment by Britain? I cannot find a number for this decree.
73 Dickinson 2007 p.87
74 The dispute concerned the border between Brazil and British Guiana which had been unresolved since 1842.

the sovereignty of the whole of a region which constitutes a single organic whole, cannot confer a right to the acquisition of the whole region which, either owing to its size or to its physical configuration, cannot be deemed to be a single organic whole …" [75]

June 21st, from the Falklands, Governor Grey-Wilson leaves the colony for the Bahamas. [76]

September 1st, a new Governor, William Lamond Allardyce, arrives at Stanley. [77]

In **October**, at the port of Buenos Aires, *Louise* (Thorsen) anchors after sailing from Sandefjord in Norway. With a crew of 15, she also carries 65 workers for Larsen's South Georgia enterprise. At Buenos Aires, they await the arrival of a steam whale-catcher, *Fortuna*.

"Louise also carried provisions for 20 months, nearly 800 tons coal, 30 whaling harpoons, 300 grenades and nearly 2,000 empty barrels. Her cargo also included two prefabricated buildings and all the components for the whaling factory plant. One of the structures was to house factory workers, while the other was intended for factory equipment." [78]

November 16th, at South Georgia Island, Carl Larsen arrives at Grytviken in three ships, *Louise, Rolf* and *Fortuna*. With enough material to build a factory. [79]

"An early photo appears to be from that year and shows Louise and Fortuna in an otherwise empty Grytviken harbour. The men stayed aboard Louise while shore accommodations were built. With no available dock, the material on board Louise had to be ferried ashore on improvised rafts, until a proper pier was built. When Fortuna caught her first whale on 27 November 1904, the humpback was brought alongside Louise. When construction of on-shore housing was complete, Larsen used Louise (referred sometimes by the Argentines as Luisa) as a storage hulk." [80]

December 25th, at Grytviken, the first oil is produced. From a whale harpooned on November 27th. [81]

December 31st, at Laurie Island, the Argentine corvette, *Uruguay*, reaches the weather station with supplies.

The Falkland Islands end-of-year statistical report notes 65 births and 22 deaths, with an estimated total population of 2,009. [82]

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75 *Reports of International Arbitral awards: Guiana Boundary case (Brazil, Great Britain)* June 1904 vol.11 pp.11-23. My emphasis.

76 Appointed Governor of the Falkland Islands in 1897. Governor of the Bahamas 1904-1912

77 *The London Gazette No.27681* May 28, 1904. For a biography see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/allardyce_sir

78 Lagerbom 2012

79 *Pesca: the history of Compañia Argentina de Pesca – an account of the pioneer modern whaling and sealing company in the Antarctic* I. Hart, 2001. Claimed by Britain since 1775, sovereignty of South Georgia was not in dispute in 1904. Britain's *Colonial Office Yearbook* had listed South Georgia as a Dependency of the Falkland Islands in 1887; without comment or objection by any other nation. Britain's ownership was clearly understood by Carl Larsen, as he had sought a lease of the Island from the British authorities in 1896 - although he would later deny knowing this. There has never been any suggestion that the Argentine registered company applied for a lease from Argentina or any other nation. Seemingly, they were treating the island as *res nullius* (without owner). In 1904, without British permission, the 'Compañía Argentina de Pesca Sociedad Anonima' was trespassing.

80 Lagerbom 2012

81 *Ibid*.

82 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1904.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1887 to 1910.pdf

1905 – January 15th, in South Georgia, on the mountain above Grytviken, Carl Larsen founds a meteorological station with equipment loaned by the Servicio Meteorological Nacional of Argentina. [83]

February 1st, an Argentine navy transport ship, *Guardia Nacional,* arrives at Grytviken with supplies. [84]

"... that there were Argentine Navy ships in Grytviken is a proof of Argentina's interest in the islands." [85]

In Buenos Aires, following the circulation of rumours that a further meteorological station is to be founded by Argentina on South Georgia, Commodore Sir A. Paget speaks to the head of the Argentine Meteorological Service to emphasise that the permission of the British Government would be required. [86]

"Argentina also installed a telegraph station and Argentine military crews conducted various relays on the island without ever being disturbed by any British authority." [87]

From Laurie Island, Robert Mossman, the last member of the Scottish expedition, departs the South Orkneys.

"... in Mossman they certainly had a Scotsman for their first governor." [88]

In early **March**, Grytviken's first cargo of whale oil arrives in Argentina in *Rolf*. Initially taxed as an import, the 'Compañía Argentina de Pesca' argues that the oil is an Argentine product; as the whales are caught in international waters by Argentine flagged ships.

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83 Built and operated by the 'Compañía Argentina de Pesca'. The equipment was on loan. Carl Larsen took the readings until August, 1905, when the work was taken over by Eric Nordenhaag (Sweden) until 1907. These readings were sent to both Buenos Aires and Stanley. After 1907, the station appears to have been operated by another whaling company, licensed by the British government. See below.

84 With few vessels equipped to sail the southern Atlantic, it was not unusual for Argentine and Chilean military vessels to be hired out to private individuals or companies when the need arose. A practice still operating in 1982, when Argentina's navy leased one of its ships to the scrap metal workers headed for South Georgia in the weeks before the Falklands' War.

85 *The Malvinas, the South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands: the conflict with Britain* L. H. Destefani 1982. The ship had been chartered by the Pesca company. A commercial arrangement, not an official visit.

86 *FO 371/4/455.*

87 Kohen & Rodriguez 2016 p.260. A falsehood by these nationalist lawyers. There is no evidence that any meteorological station on South Georgia was ever staffed by Argentine military personnel. These authors offer no evidence.

88 Brown, Mossman & Pirie 1906. No mention of William Smith, who presumably left at the same time.

"... our vessels fish on the high seas under the aegis of the Argentina flag, and only use those islands, ... to shelter from the severe storms ... this island therefore (is only) a place of transit for our products." [89]

March 27th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Government announces that 165 tons of whale oil, from the Compañía Argentina de Pesca, will be admitted free of duty.

> *"X. — Ministry of Agriculture. Considering a cargo of whale oil to be a national product. Buenos Aires, March 22, 1905. — Having seen the preceding file, and considering that the cargo of 165 tons of whale oil, originating from the national barque "Rolf," belonging to the Argentine Fishing Company, is* ***a product of deep-sea fishing****, and therefore assimilated to national products for import purposes;*
>
> *The Minister of Agriculture, DECREES: Art. 1° The Customs of the Capital shall proceed to the entry into warehouse of the aforementioned cargo as a national product for import purposes. Art. 2° Communicate to the Customs of the Capital and publish in the Official Gazette."* [90]

" This wording is not perhaps devoid of significance." [91]

"It seems at any rate to be clear from the Decree published in the Argentine 'Boletin Oficial' of the 27th March 1905 that the Argentine Government did not then regard the Island as Argentine territory." [92]

Argentina publishes a map of its military regions. [93]

July 16th, at South Georgia, fuel supplies are delivered to the Grytviken factory by the Argentine warship, *Guardia Nacional*. [94]

"Neither the company nor the Argentine Government vessel Guardia Nacional hoisted the Argentine flag on the island (though one of the four ships of the company flew it)." [95]

"Argentina continued to exercise acts of authority ... by the presence of their ships of war." [96]

July 24th, at Stanley, the 'South Georgia Exploration Company' is granted a licence for farming, mining and sealing at South Georgia by the Governor of the Falkland Islands; following negotiations with Ernest Swinhoe. [97]

"... It was not until 1905 that the first lease was granted to the South Georgia Exploration Company of Punta Arenas. It was also required to buy annual sealing licences." [98]

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89 Argentina's Minister of Finance, Norberto Piniero, March 29, 1906 quoted in Bologna 1982. Clear recognition that the Island of South Georgia did not belong to Argentina.

90 *Boletín Oficial de la República Argentina marzo 27 1905*. My emphasis.

91 *Haggard to Lansdown June 28, 1905* quoted in *Allardyce to Lyttelton November 28, 1905* in *FO 371/4/45.* The decision applied to all subsequent cargoes.

92 *FO 371/4/156.* See March, 1906

93 *Mapa de la Division del Territorio de la Republica en Regiones Militares* 1905. No Atlantic islands were shown.

94 Bologna 1982. There is some evidence that officers from this ship surveyed the port at Grytviken. See below.

95 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

96 Kohen & Rodriguez 2016 p.260. The vessel had been chartered commercially. A mere temporary presence is quite insufficient for the purposes of sovereignty; otherwise any naval vessel from any country would be claiming rights when visiting any foreign port. A ridiculous suggestion.

97 *Chronological List of Antarctic Expeditions and Related Historical Event*s R. Headland 1989. Headland notes that the 'South Georgia Exploration Company' was founded in Punta Arenas on March 20, 1905, with a sheep farmer, Richard Lion, as its president and that it was Lion that visited the Falklands to negotiate a pastoral licence. In Headland's 1992 work (*The Island of South Georgia)*, however, it was Ernest Swinhoe that negotiated the licence and for more than just sheep grazing. Swinhoe was aboard *Consort* when she arrived at South Georgia in the August of 1905 and all subsequent reports came from him. I can find no other references to a Richard Lion. Later reports suggest that when Swinhoe negotiated the first lease, he was assisted by a Mr. Henry Velway. *cf. FO 371/4*

98 Dickinson 2007 p.129. See October, 1900 above.

July 27th, at the Falklands, a Danish barque, *Sixtus*, is wrecked at Volunteer Rocks. The crew are rescued. [99]

August 9th, at South Georgia, Ernest Swinhoe lands 24 sheep and 4 horses at King Edward Cove before setting out to explore.

August 22nd, after an encounter with a whaling ship flying the Argentine flag, Swinhoe makes his way to the whaling factory at Grytviken. [100]

> *"The men there are all from Norway or Sweden, thirty-two in all, and have signed a contract for three years before the Argentine Consul in Norway. The Manager is a brother of the Captain Larsen of the 'Antarctic' who was with the Swedish South Pole Expedition in 1905… I told him we had taken out a lease of the Islands from the Falkland Islands Government to prospect &c., for minerals or farming, also had leased the seal fishing of the Islands,…"* [101]

"Swinhoe hoped to start a mineral and farming enterprise on the island and visited Larsen's brother Lauritz at Grytviken in August 1905. Lauritz Larsen was in charge at the time and Swinhoe reported finding 32 men at the new station hard at work." [102]

September 19th, at the Falklands, a steamer, *Kirkhill,* is wrecked on Wolf Rocks.

September 27th, on South Georgia, Swinhoe visits Grytviken once again to formally protest the unlicensed whaling operation. [103]

> *"I read out our lease to him and did not see why we should pay for the Islands and let them reap the benefit and kill sea-elephants… I told them they would have to get out, but he is just the manager here and will have to consult his Company in Buenos Aires, so I put it on paper about our claims and said they would have to withdraw from here…*
>
> *We flew the English flag during our three months on the Islands, which is a British possession whereas the Company at present occupying the Islands have had the harbour surveyed by Argentine Officers from the transport 'Guardia Nacional'* ***with the intention of flying the Argentine Flag after the period of one year, to end this November 1905****, also having sign boards made to put up in all the bays or harbours around the Island for the purpose of renting to any other Company that may want to start whaling there."* [104]

"Their reception by the Norwegians was not cordial. On being shown the lease of the South Georgia Exploration Company, Captain Larsen disputed the authority of the Falkland Islands Government to grant it, and ordered the intruders off the island." [105]

September 28th, at Grytviken, Swinhoe hands over a letter addressed to *'Mr. Larsen, Cumberland Bay'*.

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99 *Cambridge Expedition to the Falkland Islands 1977: Report to the National Maritime Museum.* Some reports give the name of the vessel as *Sixeus*

100 Dickinson 2007 p.129 gives the date as August 14, 1905

101 *Swinhoe Report to Allardyce November 14, 1905* in *FO 371/4/48*

102 Lagerbom 2012

103 *The History of Modern Whaling* Johan N. Tonnessen 1982

104 *FO 371/4/50.* My emphasis. This information from Ernest Swinhoe suggests some collaboration between the government in Buenos Aires and the Compañía Argentina de Pesca. Possibly to deny British sovereignty, which Argentina had not attempted to do before. Swinhoe's arrival was both fortuitous and timely.

105 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

"Dear Sir, Having 'leased' from the Falkland Islands Government these Islands named South Georgia, which you at present occupy as a Whaling station, and, as we hold the Legal Rights for the same, issued to us by the above named Government, we wish to notify your Company to withdraw from these the South Georgia Islands."

November 2nd, in Buenos Aires, Compañía Argentina de Pesca director Pedro Christophersen, accompanied by an Argentine naval officer, Captain Guillermo Núñez, visits the British Legation. Following the conversation, Britain's *charge d'affaires* reports to Governor Allardyce at Stanley.

"Captain Nunes explained that Captain Larsen,.. had been engaged in whaling in the South Atlantic since 1893, and … he had been employed by the Argentine Fishing Company (Compañía Argentina de Pesca) for whaling. He had established a depot at South Georgia for boiling down the whale oil and had not thought it necessary to apply to anyone for permission, ***not realising that that uninhabited island was under your jurisdiction****. …*

Captain Nunes and Mr. Christophersen explained that the Fishery Company caught all their whales on the High Seas, and that all the Company wanted was a depot for boiling down the oil and for stores, etc. That would not, they said, interfere with any rights the Exploration Company had acquired under the lease from you to fish for seals in the territorial waters of the Island or to work minerals. …

I informed these gentlemen that I thought the proper course for the Company to pursue was to apply to you for a licence to establish a depot at South Georgia and it is their request that I now approach you for that purpose…" [106]

"… on 2 November 1905 the president of Pesca, Hermann Schlieper, and Capitán Guillermo Nuñes, Director of Armaments of the Argentine ministry of marine, applied through the British Legation in Buenos Aires for a whaling licence from the Governor of the Falklands." [107]

November 28th, from Stanley, Governor Allardyce reports the South Georgia issue to London.

"I do not know the status of Captain Nunes in the Office of the Ministry of Marine, but I presume that he is a high official of the Argentine Republic, and should this be so his action in coming forward to support Captain Larsen's statement that he "had not thought it necessary to apply to anyone for permission not realizing that that uninhabited island was under your jurisdiction" is all the more surprising as it is difficult to believe that he was not aware that the Argentine transport 'Guardia Nacional' had proceeded to South Georgia, that a survey of Cumberland Bay had been made by Argentine Officers from this vessel, and that sign boards – according to Mr. Swinhow – were "made and put up in all the bays and harbours around the island."

One is more particularly led to believe that Captain Nunes did know when one remembers that the Argentine 'Official Gazette' of the 27th of March last published a decree of the Argentine Minister of Finance admitting, free of duty, "165 tons of whale oil conveyed to Buenos Aires by the barque 'Rolf' belonging to the Argentine Fishing Company." … had it not been for the appearance at South Georgia of the South Georgia Exploration Company Ltd., and the flying of our Flag during the three months the party was there, the Argentine Flag would have been hoisted in our Dependency with proportionate complications." [108]

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106 *FO 371/4/56.* My emphasis. Larsen had been sufficiently aware of British sovereignty to enquire with the Royal Geographical Society in London about a Falkland Islands Dependencies lease in February, 1896. *cf.* Headland 1992 p.62

107 Pascoe 2020 p.270

108 *Allardyce to Lyttelton November 28, 1905 FO 371/4/44*

Allardyce requests that HMS *Sappho* investigates the whaling establishment at Grytviken.

November 30th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Legation informs the Colonial Office in London that the Argentine Republic have retained a vessel to maintain contact with the meteorological station in the South Orkney Islands.

In London, the Colonial Office contacts the Foreign Office with a suggestion:

> *"… that it should be intimated to the Argentine Government that the South Orkney's were British territory; that His Majesty's Government assumed that it was in ignorance of this fact that the Argentine meteorological station had been maintained there since February 1904 without any notification having been made to His Majesty's Government, but that it was hoped that the Argentine Government would not discontinue the use of the islands for this useful scientific purpose…"* [109]

"His Majesty's Chargé d'Affaires at Buenos Aires, who had been instructed to make representations in this sense to the Argentine Government, pointed out that the Colonial Office seemed to be unaware that the Argentine Government had been officially invited, through His Majesty's Legation, to take over the observatory. In reminding the Colonial Office of this, it was suggested that the fact that the Argentine Government had taken over the observatory at the invitation of His Majesty's Government, made the British claim all the stronger…" [110]

December 11th, in Buenos Aires, the terms of a proposed lease for a plot of land at Grytviken is handed to the 'Compañía Argentina de Pesca' by the British Legation. Pesca's directors object to a clause requiring that a share of the profits is paid to the Falkland Islands Government. [111]

December 12th, *charge d'affairs* Frederic Harford informs Governor Allardyce of the difficulty.

> *"… to pay this share out of the profits would necessitate their applying to the Argentine Government for permission to alter their Statutes accordingly. This would give a publicity to the matter which was perhaps not desirable, and might lead to the withdrawal of their present privilege of importing whale oil free of duty into this country…. It would be a very serious matter if the Argentine Government adopted the system of a percentage of profits of English Companies working in the Argentine…*
>
> *Mr. Schlieper said his company would be willing to buy the land in question, some 500 acres, if they could deal directly with your Government, … He pointed out the advantages which were likely to accrue to His Majesty's Government from the Fishery Company's operation, viz: (1) a stock of coal and stores always available for ships, (2) the meteorological observations made, (3) the beacon lights they proposed to maintain on South Georgia, (4) the facilities for landing by means of the pier erected by them in Grytviken harbour, (5) the introduction of acclimatized cattle and sheep."* [112]

December 24th, in the Falklands, two whalers and a factory ship, *Admiralen,* licensed by the Governor, arrive off New Island. *Admiralen* anchors for a month before moving off for the South Shetlands with 40 whales to process.

"Mr. Alexander Lange, the Manager of the whaling steamers "Admiralen", "Hanken", and "Omen", applied for and obtained permission in December to capture whales in the territorial waters of the Colony, under certain conditions." [113]

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109 Noted in an internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8th, 1930 *A 4733/1437/2/1930*
110 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
111 2%, in line with the lease proposal suggested in 1900 by Dr. Severo Salsedo. See above.
112 *Frederic Harford to Governor Allardyce December 12, 1905.* Copied to London.
113 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1905.*Published May, 1906

"In 1905 Mr Alexander Lange was given permission to conduct whaling operations in Falkland Islands waters. The first season that he fished he was charged only royalty on whales caught in territorial waters. But the following season it was arranged between him and the Governor that he should pay royalty on all whales caught by him whether within or without territorial waters. This arrangement was made to avoid the difficulty of determining the precise locality where the whales he took had been caught, and the royalty was fixed at a specially low rate accordingly." [114]

"In the seasons 1905-06 and 1906-07 the Governor of the Falkland Islands demanded royalties on all whales caught from (the Falklands and South Georgia), but not for operations in the South Shetlands, which, it is alleged, he stated to the Norwegian whalers in 1905 were not British possessions. The South Orkneys, South Shetland Islands and Graham Land were then regarded as terra nullius." [115]

December 30th, from Buenos Aires, British *charge d'affaires* Harford reports a further discussion in which Hermann Schlieper had emphasised his concern that; *"... the company might be deprived of their privilege of importing whale oil (into Argentina) free of duty in virtue of its being derived from whales caught on vessels under the Argentine flag."* [116]

> *"In the two conversations I had with the representatives of the Fishery Company, the right of His Majesty's Government to South Georgia was never questioned, ..."* [117]

"By the end of 1905 British concerns about this Argentine enterprise necessitated a review of the possible illegal establishment of this shore-base." [118]

The Falkland Islands end-of-year statistical report notes 59 births and 11 deaths; estimated population 2,009. Eight marriages have taken place during the year. [119]

> "*The public health, owing mainly to an epidemic of influenza, followed by one of measles, was not so good as in previous years; but, apart from diseases of an epidemic character, there was more than the usual amount of sickness in the Colony, especially in Stanley, where the sanitary conditions are primitive and unsatisfactory.*
>
> *The question of improved sanitation in Stanley is engaging the attention of the Government, and, during the year under review, progress in that direction was marked by the construction of a new main drain.*
>
> *Small-pox having broken out at Punta Arenas and Valparaiso, prompt and effective measures were taken to prevent the introduction of the disease into the Colony. Quarantine was maintained against the infected ports, and the Vaccination Ordinance actively enforced. The Colony escaped. "* [120]

114 *Colonial Office to Foreign Office October 25, 1907* at the University of Tasmania ref. *AU AU ATADD 1-BB-GB-356*
115 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908. cf.* 1908, 1917, 1947, 1955 & 1959.
116 *FO 371/4/79.*
117 Frederic Harford quoted in *FO 371/4/76*
118 Lagerbom 2012
119 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1905.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1887 to 1910.pdf
120 *Ibid.*

1906 – January 9th, in London, the Colonial Office comments on the Grytviken negotiations.

> *"Lord Elgin would suggest that Mr. Harford should be instructed, as soon as a lease is granted to the Argentine Fishing Company, to inform the Argentine Government of the rumours which have reached him of the desire to establish a Meteorological Station in South Georgia, and to say that His Majesty's Government will be pleased to grant them facilities, on the understanding that copies of the reports will be communicated to them. This will be a convenient way of informing the Argentine Government that the Island is British Territory."* [121]

In Santiago, Chile, on the same day, a petition is submitted by Enrique Fabry and Domingo de Toro Herrera for a tenancy of "*the area of the national territory south of the Isla Grande of Tierra del Fuego*." [122]

"Chile has neither acquired Antarctica by treaty nor by conquest. It was given to it by nature, uti possidetis, polar possession and fishing. And it is ratified by Chile's honest and constant intention of full dominion." [123]

"Chile's leading Antarctic authority, Oscar Pinochet de Barra, concedes that Chile had only an "imperfect" (ie. not perfected) title to a part of the Antarctic until 1906. In that year the government granted a fishing concession to two Chilean citizens, Fabry and Toro Herrera, under the terms of which the concessionaires were authorized not only to exploit but to "assure Chilean dominion over" the Diego Ramirez, South Shetland, and South Georgia islands, and Graham Land." [124]

"... that first Decree did not go unnoticed in Argentina, whose ambassador handed in a formal protest to the Foreign Office in Santiago, Chile." [125]

January 11th, from South Georgia, Swinhow sends rock samples to London's Imperial Institute for analysis.[126]

January 31st, at Grytviken, HMS *Sappho* (Hodges) anchors near the Pesca factory.

> *"Neither Mr. Swinhoe's nor Captain Hodges' reports mention that the Argentine flag was flying..."* [127]

"When HMS Sappho duly arrived to investigate and report on the situation for the Falkland Islands Government, Captain M. M. Hodges reported that 'in the bay we found the Louise, a dismantled barque which is used as a general store ship and has about a thousand tons of Welsh coal aboard.' ..." [128]

February 2nd, Capt. Hodges inspects the whaling station, accompanied by Carl Larsen.

> *"The station consists of Captain Larsen's house which was brought from Norway in sections and put together here, some huts for the men, the Boiling factory, a slip fitted with powerful winches for heaving whales up on shore, blacksmith's shop, etc; in fact everything is most complete and Captain Larsen has now brought down a dynamo, and the factory will soon be lit with Electric light."* [129]

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121 *FO 371/4/40*

122 *Application from Enrique Fabry and Domingo de Toro Herrera for a concession for sealing and other purposes January 9, 1906* held at the University of Tasmania ref: *AU AU ATADD 1-BB-CL-8*

123 *Antártida* Antonio Huneeus Gana 1948

124 *National Interests and Claims in the Antarctic* Robert E. Wilson 1964 in *Arctic* vol.17 no.1 (March 1964) pp.15-31. See August, 1906, below.

125 *Notes from the backyard: Representations of Antarctica in narratives from Argentina and Chile (1886-2023)* Pablo Wainschenker 2023 (Unpublished thesis)

126 *FO 371/4/168*. On examination the samples were found to have no commercial value.

127 *Ibid.*

128 Lagerbom 2012

129 *Report on visit to South Georgia Island by HMS Sappho 11 February, 1906* in *FO 371/4/395*

Records produced to Hodges reveal that in the course of 14 months, Larsen's team have caught 189 Humpback whales, 22 Fin whales, 18 Blue whales and 7 Right whales; resulting in 7,434 barrels of oil. Larsen tells the British captain that when they were unable to hunt whales, they had taken a few Elephant Seals.

> *"... the Directors of the Fishery Company told me that Captain Larsen had killed some Sea Elephants in winter, when he could not go out whaling, but they had long since given him orders not to kill any more until the Government of the Falklands gave them a licence to kill seals generally."* [130]

February 3rd, Larsen and Hodges visit Fortuna Bay and Antarctic Bay; agreeing on locations for two beacons.

"Discussion certainly took place between Captain Hodges and Larsen concerning the licensing of Compañía Argentina de Pesca's whaling station, which was then being arranged through the British Legation in Buenos Aires and the Government at Stanley. Some conflicting accounts describe this as difficult. These suggest that there was either a Norwegian or Argentine flag flying over Grytviken to which Hodges objected, that Hodges gave Larsen a time (said to be either 15 or 30 minutes) to remove the flag before Sappho's guns, trained on the flag pole, would open fire to the same effect, and that Larsen lowered the offending flag. Neither the official account prepared by Captain Hodges nor the Norwegian histories refer to this and no supporting contemporary reports include it. ... All other accounts indicate that relations between Captains Hodges and Larsen were amicable and cooperative." [131]

February 5th, after surveying King Edward Cove, HMS *Sappho* sails for Montevideo.

"The main result of the visit of HMS Sappho was an ordinance of the Falkland Islands Government making it unlawful to take whales without a licence, and imposing royalties on each whale caught." [132]

At Port Stanley, Ernest Swinhoe renews his lease for the South Georgia Exploration Company. [133]

February 14th, a Mr. M. Rothenborg, representing Compañía Argentina de Pesca, arrives in Stanley.

February 26th, Governor Allardyce writes to the Colonial Office.

> *"... the time has I think arrived when the question of the establishment of British Sovereignty over the Groups of Islands known as the South Shetlands and the South Orkney's ... might very well be considered. As far as I have been able to ascertain these Islands are at present a sort of "no man's land" and the present juncture therefore offers a favourable opportunity in view of the valuable seal and whale fisheries which are known to exist in and around these archipelagos to consider the question before the adjacent South American Republics move, as they are pretty certain to do, in the same direction."* [134]

February 27th, in London, Norway's *charge d'affaires* questions the Foreign Office as to the ownership of islands in the South Atlantic. [135]

March 8th, a South Georgia lease for Compañía Argentina de Pesca is finally settled at £250 *per annum*. [136]

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130 Harford note dated February 14, 1906 in *FO 371/4/405*
131 Headland 1992 pp.67-68
132 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
133 21 years at £100 *per annum*; later sold to Norwegian whaling company *Bryde & Dahl.*
134 *FO 371/4/275*
135 *FO 371/4/269*
136 Backdated to January 1, 1906.

"With reference to the Dependency of South Georgia I may explain that the negotiations referred to in the report have resulted in the issue of two leases to the Argentine Fishery Company Limited, and the South Georgia Exploration Company, Limited, respectively, of portions of that Island. The establishment of whaling depots there means a start in the development of the most southern portion of His Majesty's Dominions. The whaling industry, for which the South Atlantic used to be noted, has not restricted itself to the immediate vicinity of South Georgia, for during last December, January, and March one hundred and twenty-five whales, mostly of the Sei variety, as also a few Sperm whales, were caught within and close to the territorial waters of the Colony, thus demonstrating that the industry is one which might advantageously be developed. ...the Argentine Fishery Company of Buenos Aires ... has, amongst other things, undertaken to erect and maintain two lights, one of which will be on an island in Cumberland Bay, and the other at the entrance of Grytviken Harbour. Detailed meteorological observations will also be kept, copies of which will be furnished to the Government of the Falkland Islands. " [137]

"... nor does the passivity shown by the government of the Nation offer any mitigating circumstances ... there are no excuses for what happened..." [138]

"In addition to the main text of the agreement were two annexes: one specifying the boundaries of the lot (of) the lease with a sketch; the second mentioned restrictions by which the Compañía Argentina de Pesca could not take products and animals on the island and forced (the company) to build two lighthouses, maintain a permanent deposit of coal, provide assistance and supplies to the needy boats and keep a weather station." [139]

"HMS Sappho was sent to South Georgia to sort matters out; Captain Hodges of Sappho had cordial relations with Larsen, and Britain granted the lease to Pesca. That gave the island its first residents – some 60 Norwegians including some wives and Larsen's five daughters and two sons." [140]

"Ernesto Fitte roundly criticises "Pesca" for acting in an "unpardonable, submissive manner" on 12 (sic) March 1906 in accepting British jurisdiction over its activities, and confirms that the Argentine government knew what was going on but still failed to protest." [141]

March 19th, in London, Britain's Colonial Office considers the ramifications of the Pesca lease.

"Having regard to the fact that the Company have now taken out a British lease, with the certain knowledge of the Argentine Government, that Captain Nunes, a high official of that Government, was one of the gentlemen who waited upon the British Charge d' affairs to prefer, on behalf of the Company, a request for a British lease, that neither the Company nor the Argentine Government vessel "Guardia Nacional" hoisted the Argentine flag on the island, and that no protest has been received from the Argentine Government to the grant of the lease to the South Georgia Exploration Company or to their constant flying of the British flag on the Island, or to their request to the Argentine Fishing Company to desist from further operations, ***Lord Elgin thinks that His Majesty's Government may now definitely assume that the Argentine Government do not question the British title to the Island***.

It seems at any rate to be clear from the Decree published in the Argentine 'Boletin Oficial' of the 27th March 1905 that the Argentine Government did not then regard the Island as Argentine territory.

137 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1905*, published May, 1906, pp.3 & 22

138 *La disputa con Gran Bretaña por las islas del Atlántico Sur* Ernesto Fitte 1968 p.114. Complaining that the Argentine government did not protest or challenge Britain's sovereignty over South Georgia.

139 Bologna 1988 p.46

140 Pascoe 2020 p.270

141 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.221

The Report which forms the Preamble to the Decree points out that the Company cannot be authorised to fish in the territorial waters of the Coasts and Islands of Patagonia or install themselves on land while the law of 1880 is in force and the recommendation which it makes in favour of the free importation of the Company's consignment of whale-oil is based upon the consideration that the Company had not infringed that law, in other words upon the consideration that ***by installing themselves on South Georgia the Company had not installed themselves on Argentine territory.*** *"* [142]

March 29th, in Buenos Aires, reviewing the Compañía Argentina de Pesca's lease, Argentina's Minister of Finance, Norberto Piniero, records; *"... recently, the company received a communication in which the British government demanded payment of a sum in respect of an annual lease for the right to hold a port on the island. As a result of this requirement the Company has agreed to pay a lease for use of the port and land, which lease must (be) submitted annually to the British government..."* [143]

April 2nd, in London, the Colonial Office considers the South Orkney Islands.

"Lord Elgin would suggest, should Sir E. Grey see no objection, that the Argentine Government should be informed that the South Orkneys are British territory and that His Majesty's Government assume that it was in ignorance of this fact that the Argentine Government have maintained a Meteorological Station there since February, 1904." [144]

May 7th, the Colonial Office respond to Norway's February request for information.

"His Majesty's Government have a claim to the following territories within the limits mentioned in Mr. Irgen's note, viz: South Georgia, the South Shetlands, the South Orkneys, and Graham's Land." [145]

"... the South Shetland Islands were not international, as had been supposed by the Norwegian Government, but were British territory, that the other British possessions in the same region were South Georgia, the South Orkneys and Graham Land,..." [146]

"The South Shetland Islands comprise a number (of islands), of which the most important are King George Island, Livingstone Island and Deception Island... The Shetland Islands were also included in the letters Patent in 1908. A whaling licence was first granted by the Falkland Islands Government in 1907. Up to this time, approximately, the islands were we think, res nullius." [147]

May 19th, in the Falklands, *Fortuna* grounds on a reef in Fox Bay. Passengers and crew are saved by *Lafonia*.

June 20th, at Bleaker Island, in the Falklands, *Cassard*, a French steel barque built in 1899, is wrecked on Driftwood Point. [148]

July 3rd, at Stanley, W.C. Girling is appointed acting-Consul for Sweden.

In Santiago, Chile, President Riesco issues a decree founding the *Sociedad Ballenera de Magallanes; "... a whaling company that put together Chilean money and the expertise of Adolf Amandus Andresen, a*

142 *FO 371/4/156.* My emphasis.
143 Quoted in Bologna 1982
144 *FO 371/12736/371. cf.* 1903, 1904 & 1906
145 *FO 371/4/269.* Surprisingly, no mention of the South Sandwich Islands. See below.
146 *Memorandum Respecting the Falkland Islands and Dependencies* J. W. Field 1928 (Internal Foreign Office *memo*) paras.269 & 270. *cf.* 1947, 1955 & 1959
147 Opinion of the Law Officers 1947 in *LCO 2/4908.* Original emphasis. *cf.* 1947
148 *Cambridge Expedition to the Falkland Islands 1977: Report to the National Maritime Museum.* The wreck was sold at public auction on the 29th for £355; her cargo of wheat for £20.

Norwegian from Sandefjord who had settled in Punta Arenas. Andresen established the operational base of the company on Deception Island and it remained active until 1914." [149]

July 12th, from Stanley, Governor Allardyce raises the question of the sovereignty of the South Sandwich Islands with the Colonial Office. [150]

"In 1905 the Argentine Government developed plans for observatories in South Georgia, Booth (Wandel) Island, in the Palmer Archipelago, one of the South Sandwich Islands, and possibly also in West Falkland. That these plans did not come to fruition was principally due to the lack of trained meteorologists willing to undertake the work." [151]

August 2nd, from Buenos Aires, *charge d'affairs* Harford telegrams Sir Edward Grey.

> *"Local paper states that Argentine Government is about to inform Powers that they have established permanent Observatory on South Orkneys. Shall I inform Argentine Government they are British territory?"* [152]

August 16th, in Chile, following an earthquake, a proposed expedition to the South Shetland Islands is canceled.

".., an official expedition to the South Shetland Islands had been planned in 1906, but was canceled because of the earthquake of August 16. However, in the official note to the Chilean Navy Department about the proposed expedition Foreign Minister Antonio Hunneus stated that one of the purposes was to "make effective by all means at the government's disposal the sovereignty vested in it over the Shetland Islands and over the southern continent, ... establishing firmly by means of occupation its title to the dominion of the Antarctic region, preventing other foreign flags from ruling regions that are connected with or adjoining the continent"."[153]

August 21st, in London, the Colonial Office respond to a Foreign Office request for an opinion regarding Laurie Island in the South Orkneys.

> *"Lord Elgin would suggest that Mr. Harford might be instructed when making this intimation to explain to the Argentine Government that the intervention of His Majesty's Government in the matter of the transfer of the observatory was based not less on the British ownership of the Group than on the British status of the Expedition which originally established it."* [154]

August 22nd, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Legation is instructed to assert UK sovereignty over the South Orkneys.

"In 1906 certain administrative acts of the Argentine Government seemed to show that Argentina claimed sovereignty over the Islands, and in these circumstances His Majesty's Minister was instructed to present a note to affirm that the group was British territory." [155]

August 23rd, from the Legation, Minister Haggard addresses a formal *Note* to Argentina's Foreign Ministry stating that the South Orkney Islands are British territory.

149 Wainschenker 2023

150 Eight of the South Sandwich Islands were discovered by Capt. James Cook in 1775. Cook named them, but there is no evidence that he claimed them. The remaining three islands, were discovered by a Russian, Fabian Gottlieb von Bellingshausen, in 1819.

151 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

152 *FO 371/4/460*

153 Wilson 1964. It would be 1947, before another expedition was organised.

154 *FO 371/4/469*

155 *Memorandum* (*A6503/128/2*?) in *FO 371/12736/357*

In **September**, the Falklands Governor is authorised to treat the South Sandwich Islands as a Dependency of the Falklands for the purposes of leases and licensing. [156]

"In September 1906 the Governor of the Falkland Islands was authorised to include them as Dependencies of the Falkland Islands. In December of the same year, when the question of including this group in the Colonial Office list as a Dependency of the Falkland Islands arose, the Colonial Office were told that the British claim to these islands was very slender, but... there would be no objection to including them in the Colonial Office list, which, being an unofficial publication, would be no bar to the consideration of any duly authenticated claim should such be subsequently advanced in another quarter." [157]

"This group of islands must, in our view, either be res nullius or British territory. There has been no effective claim made to them by any other power. They are practically speaking uninhabitable, affording so far as is known, no more than an anchorage where vessels may obtain shelter. Landing is difficult, and on some islands practically impossible, and it is unlikely that any of the islands will become of any value.... If Great Britain has no title, the South Sandwich Islands are clearly still terra nullius." [158]

"The Argentine Republic has a particular interest in the location of these islands of the South Atlantic, not only for strategic reasons, but especially the South Sandwich Islands which are located 2,400 km from the Argentine city of Ushuaia in Tierra del Fuego, they set the western boundary of the claim of the Argentinean Antarctic sector which extends from 25° to 74° west longitude..." [159]

September 22nd, from Buenos Aires, Haggard informs London that he has heard that the Argentine Government are intent upon claiming the South Orkney Islands; but that he has not yet received an official reply to his note of August 23rd. [160]

"Argentina was the country that established the first permanent settlement in the area of Antarctica. ... it has never abandoned this valuable observatory, outpost of civilization in the inhospitable southern regions." [161]

October 5th, in Stanley, the *Whale Fishery Ordinance No.3* is brought into effect, providing for the licensing of whale fishing around the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.

> *"1. It shall not be lawful for any person to kill, take or hunt, or attempt to kill, take, or hunt any whale* ***in Colonial Waters*** *unless he shall have first been duly licensed, and shall have entered into a bond to the Colonial Government, with one sufficient surety, in the sum of one hundred pounds* - [162]
>
> *(a) to pay into the Colonial Territory, the royalties specified on the Schedule...*
>
> *(b) to render to the Government an accurate account of the number and description of whales taken by him under his licence."*

156 Field 1928 para.275
157 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
158 Opinion of the Law Officers 1947 in *LCO 2/4908.* Original emphasis. *cf.* 1775 & 1947
159 Bologna 1982
160 *FO 371/4/472*
161 Argentine 4th Grade text book, quoted in Garcia 2009
162 My emphasis. The term "Colonial Waters" was not defined. See - https://sparc.utas.edu.au/uploads/r/antarctic-documents-database/3/0/e/30e73803accefe16229491bf6cbc943e6fe603536d7223d9b0cc2198bffc2a32/7100dedf-4b80-4d48-a29b-a74890b57d0e-AU-ATADD-1-BB-GB-350.pdf?token=f6ba2ad4ed215bb796b1eaaff0be2fe97d5137ca1128107945f7948e480a52a2

"Norwegian whaling companies should (therefore) apply to the Governor of the Falkland Islands for any facilities they might desire in those territories. The whale fishery was accordingly dealt with by law under FI Ordinance No.3 of 1906, which made it unlawful to take whales without a licence, and imposed royalties on each whale caught." [163]

November 10th, off South Georgia, Norwegian whaler, *Fridtjof Nansen*, is wrecked; as is *Lyn* belonging to the Compañía Argentina de Pesca.

December 7th, in Buenos Aires, President Jose Figueroa Alcorta issues a decree appointing Argentine '*Commissioners*' for the Orkney Islands.

> *"... and the rest of the islands and Antarctic lands claimed by Argentina, under the dependency of the Government of Tierra del Fuego."*

December 15th, another Argentine decree determines salaries for staff at the meteorological stations on Laurie Island and Booth (Wandel) Island, referring to them as - *"Stations in Southern Argentine lands."* [164]

The Falkland Islands end-of-year statistical report notes 56 births and 17 deaths. Estimated population 2,065. Eight marriages have taken place during the year. [165]

> "*The Government nurse rendered valuable services, attending 57 cases, and paying 1,159 visits. She also frequently assisted at the Colonial Surgery. The need for a properly trained nurse and midwife in Stanley has been amply demonstrated. ...*
>
> *A new memorial tablet was placed over the grave of the late Mr. Matthew Brisbane at Port Louis, the former capital of the Colony, on the 3rd April. His Excellency the Governor delivered an address on the occasion. The inscription on the old tablet (which notwithstanding the ravages of over 60 year of Falklands weather was still decipherable) was reproduced on the new. It runs as follows : —*
>
> > *"To the memory of Mr. Matthew Brisbane, who was barbarously murdered on the 26th August, 1833. In the command of the Beaufoy cutter, he was the zealous companion of Captain James Weddell, during his enterprising voyage to beyond the 74th degree of South Latitude, in February, 1823. His remains were removed to this spot by the crews of H.B.M. Ships "Erebus" and "Terror", on the 25th August, 1842. Commodore Onslow, in His Majesty's Ship "Clio" hoisted the British flag at Port Louis, on the 2nd January, 1833, and left the Settlement in charge of Mr. Dickson, the Agent of Mr. Lewis Vernet, of Buenos Aires, who had colonised the East Falkland. Mr. Matthew Brisbane had been despatched by Mr. Vernet to Port Louis, to take charge, in April of the year in which he was murdered."* [166]

163 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908.* Licences cost £25. *cf.* 1947, 1955 & 1959

164 *Goodhart to Grey December 20, 1906 FO 371/4/488.* Booth Island is adjacent to the Antarctic Peninsula (Graham Land). An expedition set out on December 20, 1906, to install an observatory on Booth Island, but the vessel ran aground and the attempt was abandoned.

165 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1906.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1887 to 1910.pdf

166 *Ibid*. For Brisbane, see *Falklands Wars* vol.2

1907 – January 4th, in Buenos Aires, with no response to the earlier correspondence, another formal diplomatic *Note* is presented to Argentina's Foreign Ministry by Britain's new Minister, Walter Townley;[167] emphasising that the South Orkney Islands are a British possession; *"... in order to remove any possible misconception as to the legal basis on which operation of the meteorological station on Laurie Island in the South Orkneys had been transferred to the Argentine Meteorological Office..."* [168]

"Mr Townley, who had replied to the Minister,... asked, in reporting home the matter, that he might be furnished with further evidence in support of the claim. The Admiralty, of whom enquiry was made, pointed out that no Spaniard had ever explored or discovered anything in that region; that the land in question was far outside any territorial limits to which the Argentine Government could lay claim; and, further, that the South Orkney's had been formally taken possession of by British subjects long before the Argentine Government had ships to visit the locality." [169]

"The Minister for Foreign Affairs, in replying to Mr. Townley's note, asked for time to consider the question, but in conversation he expresses his surprise that His Majesty's Government claimed this group. No further communication from the Argentine Government at this period is recorded." [170]

January 14th, in Stanley the newly erected Government school takes in its first pupils. [171]

In **March**, in London, Norway's Minister requests further details regarding British territorial rights over the South Orkney Islands, the South Shetland Islands and Graham Land (Antarctic Peninsula).

April 30th, a formal reply is handed to the Norwegian Minister.

"... that the British claim to the South Shetlands rested on the fact that Captain Foster of HMS Chanticleer took formal possession of the lands about the islands on the 7th January, 1829, landing at Cape Possession, Hoseason Island, and that Sir John Ross landed on Cockburn Island in the South Shetland group on the 6th January, 1843, and took formal possession of this and contiguous lands, ... The Norwegian Minister was further informed that no question as to title had hitherto been raised by foreign Governments, that the only notification made in any quarter was that to himself on 16th May, 1906, and that it was not the practice of His Majesty's Government to notify foreign Governments additions to British territory made by annexation, occupation or otherwise." [172]



167 Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary (one rank below Ambassador).

168 *The Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice at the Hague, May, 1955*

169 Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8, 1930 *A 4733/1437/2/1930.* The first known landing on the South Orkney Islands was by a British sealing ship on December 7, 1821. Capt. George Powell claimed the island group for the UK. Named by James Weddell in 1823.

170 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

171 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1907.*

172 Field 1928 paras.271 & 272. The South Shetland Islands had first been seen by Capt. William Smith in February, 1819. Smith returned and claimed the group for the UK in October, 1819; and then again on January 22, 1820 with Edward Bransfield, who had been ordered to survey the group. Quite why Capt. Foster repeated the claim in 1829, is not clear. Possibly due to the interest in the area by American sealing vessels.

"The Norwegian Government did not lodge any protest against the British claim." [173]

May 14th, at Stanley, a Chilean company, the 'Sociedad Ballenera de Magallanes', based in Punta Arenas, takes out a Falklands whaling licence for the South Shetland Islands and Graham Land (Antarctic Peninsula).

In **June**, negotiations between Chile and Argentina take place in Santiago. Although no final agreement is reached, there is a general understanding that the South Shetlands archipelago will be divided between the two countries. Argentina taking the eastern islands of Elephant, Clarence, King George, Nelson, Roberts and Greenwich; Chile claiming Livingston, Snow, Deception, Smith and Low. [174]

August 11th, from England, an expedition to Antarctica, led by Ernest Shackleton, sails in *Nimrod*. [175]

August 25th, in the Falkland Islands, the Very Reverend, Lowther E. Brandon, Dean and Colonial Chaplain retires after 30 years.

> "*On Dean Brandon's retirement the office of Colonial Chaplain was abolished, and the amount of the annual ecclesiastical vote revised. The Government grant of £400 a year hitherto made in respect of the salary of the Colonial Chaplain (£300) and as an allowance for an assistant clergyman (£100) was reduced to £200. This grant is made on the understanding that it is subject to revision hereafter, and is paid to the Trustees of Christ Church Cathedral for the purpose of augmenting the salary of one or two clergymen as they may decide, in their discretion, to appoint, on the condition that the Incumbent or his assistant will, without additional remuneration from the Government, perform such educational work as the Government may desire, and as they may be able to undertake without interfering with their clerical duties."* [176]

September 25th, Governor Allardyce returns to the Falklands following a period of leave; carrying a message from King Edward VII.

> "*His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to command me, on returning from England to the Falkland Islands, to express his deep personal interest in the prosperity and progress of all his subjects in this far outpost of his dominions, and to convey to them his greeting and good wishes."* [177]

October 5th, from Buenos Aires, the Legation of Norway writes to the Governor of the Falkland Islands regarding a lease of land on South Georgia for a Mr. Erling Lund of Kristiania, Norway.

"Mr Lund hopes that similar conditions may be given him as previously granted to Mr. Lange on the Falkland Islands and to an Argentine company at Grytviken, South Georgia. He would therefore be prepared to an amount of £250 per annum for the lease, this amount covering such whaling licence as would be necessary to him without further payment." [178]

The Swedish Scientific Expedition arrives at Port Stanley. [179]

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173 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

174 *Negociaciones antarticas de Chile en un mundo cambiante* Oscar Pinochet de Barra 1987 in *Estudios Internacionales* no.78 (April-June 1987) pp.210-222

175 Amongst a number of scientific objectives was another attempt to reach the South Pole. Not attained, but Shackleton came within 97 nautical miles of the Pole. Rather closer than Scott had achieved during his 1901-1904 expedition.

176 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1907*

177 *Ibid.*

178 *Fridtjof Nanse to Governor of the Falkland Islands October 5, 1907* at the University of Tasmania reference *AU AU ATADD 1-BB-GB-355*

179 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1908*

October 18th, in the Netherlands, at the Hague Conference, international agreement is reached to expand the conventions of 1899 regarding the pacific settlement of disputes. Signatories include Chile and Argentina. [180]

Chile immediately submits a proposal to Argentina that they negotiate an agreement as to a division of sovereignty over South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands, the South Shetlands and the Antarctic lands, within the spirit of the Treaty of 1881. Argentina's Foreign Minister, Estanislao Zeballos, responds; *"Chile ought to know that England claimed all these lands."* [181]

November 23rd, at the Falklands, *Baden Powell* is wrecked on Elephant Jason. [182]

"That Canadian crews were hunting on the islands was further suggested after Baden-Powell was wrecked ... blown ashore on the way from Halifax to the South Shetlands. Entries in its log, which fortuitously washed ashore at Port Stanley, provided confirmation but were insufficient for prosecution..." [183]

December 12th, in South Georgia, Joachim Peterson arrives at Grytviken as the first commissioned police officer.[184]

The Falkland Islands end-of-year statistical report notes 53 births and 21 deaths; with an estimated population of 2,266. Ten marriages have taken place during the year. [185]

> "*The itinerant schoolmasters continue to carry on their most difficult work in a satisfactory manner. In every case where parents have co-operated with the schoolmaster, by seeing allotted tasks are performed between each visit of the schoolmaster, the results have been satisfactory. In Lafonia, the Falkland Islands Company continue to employ a resident schoolmaster at Darwin and two itinerant schoolmasters in the camp. Every child in the Colony, between the age of five and thirteen, not mentally or physically incapacitated, is under instruction ...*
>
> *The general health of the Colony during the year 1907 was good, except in Stanley. Stanley was visited by an epidemic of dysenteric diarrhoea, followed by one of whooping-cough. There were no complications in the former outbreak, and attacks subsided in from 7 to 10 days. The cases treated numbered 145. The epidemic of whooping-cough was one of moderate severity, the attack lasting, on an average, 12 weeks. The children known to be affected numbered 279, but there were, in addition, mild cases, to which no medical aid was sum moned. The disease claimed five deaths of children under two years of age. ...*
>
> *A message from His Majesty the King to the people of the Falkland Islands specially marked the year 1907. The Governor was entrusted with the delivery of it on his return to the Colony from leave of absence, and, on the anniversary of His Majesty's Birthday, His Excellency made public the following gratifying announcement:— "His Majesty the King has been graciously pleased to command me, on returning from England to the Falkland Islands, to express his deep personal interest in the prosperity and progress of all his subjects in this far outpost of his dominions, and to convey to them his greeting and good wishes".*" [186]

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180 Commenced June 15, 1907. See - https://docs.pca-cpa.org/2016/01/1907-Convention-for-the-Pacific-Settlement-of-International-Disputes.pdf

181 *ICJ 1956. Pleadings. Antarctica Cases, UK v. Argentina, UK v. Chile, 63*

182 *Cambridge Expedition to the Falkland Islands 1977: Report to the National Maritime Museum*

183 Dickinson 2007 p.102

184 Commissioned by the Falkland Islands Governor but employed, apparently, by the 'Compañía Argentina de Pesca'

185 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1907.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1887 to 1910.pdf

186 *Ibid.*

1908 – February 5th, in London, in the House of Commons, Josiah Wedgwood MP asks a question. [187]

> *"I beg to ask the Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, whether he is aware that the public lands in the Falkland Islands are being sold off at the rate of about £50,000 a year; and whether he will consider the advisability of changing the method of sale into that of leasing at periodically revised rents."*

Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Mr. Winston Churchill, responds: *"The proceeds of the sale of land in the Falkland Islands are invested separately, and form a capital asset of the Colony. The average receipts of the Sale of Lands Fund amounted to about £5,000 a year for the five years 1902–1906, the highest amount in any one year being £12,783."*

February 17th, in Buenos Aires, Italy's Minister – in a communication regarding the *Rome Postal Union Convention* – includes the Falkland Islands among those British Colonies which had adhered to that convention with regard to registered letters. Argentina's Minister for Foreign Affairs promptly protests to Italy, asserting that the Falklands' archipelago belongs to his nation, not Britain. [188]

In the Falkland Islands, HMS *Sappho* visits Stanley. [189] Commander Hodges inspects the Volunteer Force which has a strength of 94, and recommends that; *"... Falklanders participate in the annual Bisley Trophy competition and the Commonwealth Games to encourage shooting skills."* [190]

February 25th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Minister, Walter Townley, informs London of the Argentine protest to Italy. Townley says that he will not mention the issue unless it is raised by Argentina's Foreign Ministry, but, if it is, he would confirm that there was nothing to discuss. [191]

March 12th, in London, aware of the Argentine complaint to the Italian Minister, the British Government decides not to respond should a similar protest be received in the UK. [192]

"Nothing whatever came of it; Argentina did not raise the affair with Britain, and continued to tolerate the presence of the Falklands in the UPU, as she had done since April 1877 (and still does; the Falklands are still listed on the UPU's website as an overseas territory of Great Britain). So there was in 1908 no protest to Britain over the possession of the Falklands,.." [193]

April 1st, in the Falklands, *Helene Blum* is wrecked on Seal Rock, Cape Pembroke. [194]

Messrs. Salvesen & Co of Leith, Scotland, obtain a lease for a whaling station on New Island, off West Falkland.

"Salvesen & co... built a whaling station on New Island in 1908 using materials brought from a defunct station in Iceland." [195]

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187 *Hansard, Commons: 5 February 1908 col.858*
188 *Townley Telegraphic No.4 February 25, 1908 6787/08.* There was no protest by Argentina to the UK.
189 *The Wilds of Patagonia* Carl Skottsberg 1911
190 Ellerby 1990 p.53. For Ellerby see - https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2018/01/ellerby-thesis-1990.pdf
191 A policy adopted in April, 1888 when Britain's *charge d'affairs* informed the Argentine Government *"... that Her Majesty's Government declined to enter into any discussion of the right of Her Majesty to the Falkland Islands which, in their judgement, was not open to doubt or question."* See Vol.2
192 *The Falkland Islands as an International Problem* Peter J. Beck 1987 p.90. No protest was received.
193 Pascoe 2020 p.264. For a protest to have any effect, it must be from government to government. Not to third parties.
194 *Cambridge Expedition to the Falkland Islands 1977: Report to the National Maritime Museum*
195 Dickinson 2007 p.88

May 11th, the Victoria Cottage Home is established at Stanley for the purpose of relieving the poor. [196]

May 26th, a French barque *Hélène Blum* founders on the seal rocks at the entrance to Port William. The crew are saved.

In **June**, at Stanley, US Consul John E. Rowan announces his departure from the Falkland Islands; the US Secretary of State having determined that the Consulate would be better placed in Punta Arenas, Chile. [197]

July 1st, from Port Stanley, *Progreso* sails for Carcass Island (to the NNE of West Falkland Island).

"*The cutter "Progreso"" of Stanley (23 tons), belonging to Mr. L. Williams, was lost under tragic circumstances. She left Stanley on the 1st July, bound for Carcass Island, but losing all her sails in a gale off Volunteer Rocks, she became the sport of wind and wave for nearly two months, during which time no land was seen. Two of the crew died from exposure and privation. A sight of the Patagonian coast was at length gained. Owing to light winds and a scarcity of water, the master and one remaining member of the crew abandoned the cutter and took to the boat. When about three miles from Chubut they were rescued by the Argentine authorities, from whom they received every care and attention. The master was subsequently drowned accidentally when engaged in an expedition by boat to a neighbouring place on the coast."* [198]

July 21st, in London, *Letters Patent* are issued with regard to British possessions in the South Atlantic.

> *"Whereas the group of islands known as South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, and the Sandwich Islands, and the territory known as Graham's Land, situated in the South Atlantic Ocean to the south of the 50th parallel of south latitude, and lying between the 20th and the 80th degrees of west longitude, are part of our Dominions, and it is expedient that provision should be made for their government as Dependencies of our Colony of the Falklands.*
>
> *I. Now We do hereby declare that from and after the publication of these our Letters Patent in the Government "Gazette" of our Colony of the Falkland Islands the said group of islands known as South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, and the Sandwich Islands, and the said territory of Graham's Land shall become Dependencies of our said Colony of the Falkland Islands.*
>
> *II. And We do hereby further declare that from and after such publication as aforesaid the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Our Colony of the Falkland Islands for the time being (herein-after called the Governor) shall be the Governor of South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Shetlands, and the Sandwich Islands, and the territory of Graham's Land (all of which are herein-after called the Dependencies); and We do hereby vest in him all such powers of government and legislation in and over the Dependencies as are from time to time vested in Our said Governor in and over Our Colony of the Falkland Islands, subject, nevertheless, to any instructions which may from time to time be hereafter given him under Our Sign Manual and Signet, or through one of Our Principal Secretaries of State, and to such laws as are now or shall here after be in force in the said Dependencies. …"* [199]

"It had been the rising importance of the whaling industry that first directed attention to the question of political sovereignty in the Antarctic and it was in order to establish British control over whaling that the

196 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1908*

197 Rowan had been complaining for some time that, as a result of regulation by the Falkland Islands Government, few American whalers called at Port Stanley.

198 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1908*

199 *British and Foreign State Papers, 1907-08 v*ol. 101 (London, 1912), pp. 76-77. See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/1908-1917-letters-patent.pdf

further deliberate annexation of the Falkland Islands Dependencies was carried out in 1908. ... Owing to the fact that the geographical co-ordinates mentioned in the Letters Patent of 1908 included a large section of the southern extremity of South America, the Letters Patent were erroneously interpreted in some quarters as meaning that His Majesty's Government claimed this section of the continent. ..." [200]

"Although occupation of this island (Laurie Island) subsequently has become an important element in Argentine claims, the government originally made no formal claim of sovereignty and when the British Government by Letters Patent of 1908 annexed a large Antarctic area including the South Orkneys, the Argentine Government failed to protest this assertion of sovereignty." [201]

"No objection was put forward by any other power to the terms of the Letters Patent of 1908..." [202]

"From the outset it was made clear that title to these territories was not the same as to the Falkland Islands themselves, but that this was only a matter of administrative convenience. It was likewise stated that this merely established definite limits over territory that had been under the effective control and sovereignty of Britain for many years." [203]

"The most extraordinary thing about this unprecedented declaration of sovereignty is that it covered an enormous area and it had been done so unscrupulously that it included part of our territories of Tierra del Fuego and Santa Cruz and the Chilean province of Magallanes." [204]

"British title to the Dependencies "does not derive from the Falkland Islands" and "these territories have been treated as Dependencies of the Falkland Islands only for reasons of administrative convenience." ... in Argentinian eyes, the express linking of the Dependencies with the Falkland Islands has no doubt been perceived as a way of legalistically bolstering what might otherwise be a weak claim..." [205]

"The Letters Patent, however, did not "necessarily bring into force in the Dependencies the whole of the existing legislation of the Colony, and some difficulties might arise as to the applicability of certain Ordinances if no further provisions were made". In remediation, statutes in force in the Falkland Islands were extended to the Dependencies by the 1908 Dependencies Ordinance ... The 1881 Seal Fishery Ordinance could now be applied to regulate the new and growing industry. The 1908 Ordinance empowered the Falkland Islands government to locate a Stipendiary Magistrate on South Georgia to administer the Dependencies directly, especially the growing whale industry and population." [206]

"... in July 1908 the United Kingdom issued a Letter Patent decree claiming for Britain the region south of 50°S all the way to the South Pole between 20°W and 80°W. ... At around 1.7 million square kilometres, the Falkland Islands Dependencies would turn out to be the largest territory under the control of the Colonial Office. For the officials drafting the Letters Patent, however, the total size of the new territory was entirely unknown. Although the northern parts of the Antarctic Peninsula region had been explored and mapped, much of this territory had never been seen. Nobody knew for certain whether Antarctica was a single continent, two large landmasses, or just a collection of islands. The Letters Patent was largely an assertion of sovereignty over blank space." [207]

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200 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
201 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See link above (1903).
202 Christie 1951 p.240
203 Wilson 1964 p.19
204 Destefani 1982
205 *Who owns the Falkland Island Dependencies in International Law? An Analysis of Certain Recent British and Argentine Official Statements* C. R. Symmons 1984
206 Dickinson 2007 citing Scott Polar Research Institute MS 240/1
207 Wainschenker 2023

August 8th, in the Falkland Islands, *Ordinance 3* of October, 1906, is replaced by *Ordinance 5* of 1908.

"When the whale fishery of the Falkland Islands was first dealt with by law a few years ago the Government adopted a system of charging royalties on each whale caught. This was considered to be objectionable from the point of view of international law, as it involved a claim to control fishing on the high seas. The Ordinance was repealed and the fishery is now regulated by Ordinance 5 of 1908. This Ordinance forbids the taking of whales in the Colonial waters without a licence from the Colonial Secretary (paragraph 1)." [208]

"The system of control of the whale fishery instituted in 1906 was by now considered unsuitable. Accordingly, the Ordinance was repealed and replaced by Ordinance No.5 of 1908, and amending Ordinances, and by separate regulations for South Georgia and the other Dependencies. The policy of 1908 aimed at limiting the extent to which pursuit of whales might be carried on and reducing the amount of waste involved ... To secure the first of these objectives it was decided to issue no further leases or licences... the shooting of whale calves, or of female whales accompanied by calves, was prohibited." [209]

September 1st, Britain's *Letters Patent* are published in the Falkland Islands Gazette.

"The Letters Patent vested all powers of Government and legislation in the Governor of the Falkland Islands, and provided that "the Governor is, and shall be deemed always to have been, authorized and empowered to make and execute, in Our name and on Our behalf, grants and dispositions of any Lands which may lawfully be granted or disposed of by Us within the Dependencies."..." [210]

"... (the) question of title to the Falkland Island Dependencies is legally distinct from the question of title to the Falkland Islands themselves", being based on different facts..." [211]

In Port Stanley, a South Orkneys Whaling Licence is issued to the 'Newfoundland Steam Whaling Company'.

"In 1908 a licence to take whales in South Shetland and Orkney waters was granted to the Newfoundland Steam Whaling Company. In the same year another company applied for a licence for the latter area and similar applications were received from various companies in each of the three following years." [212]

In **November**, the Compañía Argentina de Pesca applies to the Falklands Governor for a sealing licence.

"A provisional licence was issued for 1909 on the condition that if sealing was successful the company would either take out a licence in 1910 or face a £10 fine. It was not satisfied with this and asked to take out a long-term licence. This was rejected by the government since quantitative information on the size and distribution of the elephant seal stock was unavailable. ... The company was required thereafter to apply for the licence annually. ... Nonetheless, it did enjoy a virtual monopoly until the industry ended. At least 260,950 animals were killed." [213]

November 13th, Argentina's Foreign Minister asks to be informed as to the terms of the "*declaration*" of July.

> *"On the issue of the Letters Patent the Argentine press announced that His Majesty's Government had issued a declaration of sovereignty over the islands. The Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs enquired of Mr. Russell (His Majesty's Charge d'Affaires at Buenos Aires) as to the terms of this*

208 *Whaling Leases and Licences in the Falkland Island Dependencies Appendix IV, Report to the Finance and Concessions Committee of the sub-committee appointed to consider the question of Licences granted to occupy Uninhabited Islands for various purposes* 1910 filed at the University of Tasmania ref: *AU AU ATADD 1-BB-GB-364*
209 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
210 *Ibid.*
211 Symmons 1984 citing *Antarctic cases 1955. cf.* 1955
212 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
213 Dickinson 2007 p.131

declaration of sovereignty. Mr. Russell was instructed to supply him with a copy of the Gazette in which the Letters Patent had been published. He did so and the Argentine Government acknowledged the receipt of his note without comment." [214]

"No evidence can be found that either Argentina or Chile protested against an inclusion of their territory under British jurisdiction." [215]

Argentina's Government also approaches Chile.

"... the governments of Argentina and Chile met in 1906 and again in 1908, to discuss the question of Antarctica and the possibility of defining a common border in the far south. These talks, however, broke down without agreement. The main reason for this failure was their overlapping ambitions: both countries wanted the South Shetland Islands and the tip of the Antarctic Peninsula, which were the most strategically useful and economically viable part of the region due to their accessibility. The two countries did, however, agree upon a vague notion of an 'American Antarctica,' based, in part, on the apparent geological continuation of the Andes Mountains into the Antarctica Peninsula." [216]

December 29th, from the Falklands, Governor Allardyce reports his concerns regarding conservation of sealing stocks following a raid on a fur seal rookery at Volunteer Point. [217]

"If the British and Norwegian whalers arc required to pay for licences, they will naturally expect the Government to prevent American whalers from taking seals without a licence. It is to be feared that, when the Government tries to do this, its difficulties will begin. At present Americans, Canadians and Chileans raid the seal rookeries in the Colony itself, as they have always done. There is no trouble in consequence, but that is merely because neither the Government nor the private owners have any means of enforcing the laws against poaching and no attempt is made to interfere with the poachers." [218]

Stanley Sports Association is founded.

The Falkland Islands end-of-year statistical report notes 58 births and 12 deaths; an estimated population of 2,289. Nineteen marriages have taken place during the year. [219]

"A jetty in connection with the Stanley sanitation scheme was erected to the east of the township, and suitable accommodation provided at the shore end for horses, sanitary carts, &c. The Government steam launch "Penguin", and two sanitary punts, to be employed in carrying out the scheme, arrived towards the end of the year."

214 Internal FO *memorandum* in *FO 371/12735* at *97*

215 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

216 *Reluctant collaborators: Argentina and Chile in Antarctica during the International Geophysical Year, 1957–58* A. J. Howkins 2008 in *Journal of Historical Geography* 34 (2008) 596–617

217 Palmer in *The Dictionary of Falklands Biography (including South Georgia): From Discovery up to 1981* D. Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.39

218 *Whaling Leases and Licences in the Falkland Island Dependencies Appendix IV, Report to the Finance and Concessions Committee of the sub-committee appointed to consider the question of Licences granted to occupy Uninhabited Islands for various purposes Colonial Office May,* 1910 filed at the University of Tasmania ref: *AU AU ATADD 1-BB-GB-364*. Interesting to see that there were still concerns regarding potential US claims to rights in the Falklands archipelago more than 60 years after the archipelago had become a British Colony (prior to which they had been a Crown Possession). For a detailed account of the various considerations of how to enforce whaling and sealing restrictions in the Falkland Islands after 1853, see Vol.2

219 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1908.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1887 to 1910.pdf

1909 — in **January**, from London, the Falkland Islands Governor is authorised to apply sealing regulations to the South Sandwich Islands. [220]

"The Argentine Company made an exploring expedition to the Sandwich Islands, but found that it was impossible to carry on whaling there for lack of suitable harbours. Dr. Bruce, of the Scottish National Antarctic Expedition, has been in negotiation with the Government for a lease of the group. A lease was offered to him, but has not been accepted. Seals are found in these islands." [221]

February 20th, in Buenos Aires, a copy of the 1908 *Letters Patent* is forwarded to Argentina's Foreign Ministry.

March 18th, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Victorino de la Plaza, acknowledges receipt of a copy of the Falkland Islands Gazette*; "... it is to be concluded from the terms of their reply that in 1909 Argentina did not dispute the British title to South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands, the South Shetlands and Graham Land, which territories were also covered by the communication sent to the Argentine Government,..."* [222]

"Argentina acknowledged receipt of it on 18 March 1909, but did not protest or take any other action. A copy was also sent to the Chilean foreign ministry, which likewise acknowledged receipt but took no action." [223]

On South Georgia, with British leases, new whaling stations are established at Leith Harbour and at Ocean Harbour (Lauritz Larsen).

May 11th, at Stanley, Louis Williams is appointed as Consular Agent for France.

July 22nd, from Buenos Aires, the Compañía Argentina de Pesca takes on a further lease for Jason Harbour on South Georgia.

"... the Compañia Argentina de Pesca... A company... which recognises a concession granted by the British government... the Argentine government, through that company's compromising, appears to recognise British sovereignty. That is deplorable." [224]

"Britain discovered South Georgia, the South Orkneys, the South Sandwich Islands and the South Shetlands and administered them with magistrates and other officials from 1909, with Argentina's knowledge and without protest. There is no possible Argentine claim to have inherited South Georgia from Spain, since the Treaty of Tordesillas "allocated" it to Portugal, and Spain never had any presence there." [225]

August 19th, at Stanley, a sailing ship *Lonsdale*, anchors in the port.

> *"The British sailing ship "Lonsdale" (1,685 tons), bound from Hamburg to Mazatlan, put into Port Stanley for water on the 19th August. She dragged anchor and got foul of the hulk "Glengowan's" bowsprit, sustaining some damage. On the 15th September a fire broke out on the ship; on the 30th September a second fire broke out and the vessel became a constructive loss;..."* [226]

August 25th, Governor Allardyce sails to inspect the new 'Salvesen & Co' whaling factory at New Island.

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220 Field 1928 para.277. See July, 1908

221 *Whaling Leases and Licences in the Falkland Island Dependencies Appendix IV, Report to the Finance and Concessions Committee of the sub-committee appointed to consider the question of Licences granted to occupy Uninhabited Islands for various purposes* Colonial Office May, 1910 filed at the University of Tasmania ref: *AU AU ATADD 1-BB-GB-364*

222 *Antarctica Cases: United Kingdom v. Argentine; United Kingdom v Chile* International Court of Justice 1956 p.23

223 Pascoe 2020 p.270

224 Miguel Ángel Zavala Ortiz to the Argentine Congress, April 20, 1950 in *Diario 1950* pp.1178-1179

225 Pascoe 2020 p.272

226 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1909.*

"In the Colony of the Falkland Islands, annual licences to take whales are issued to all applicants. One firm, Messrs. Salvesen & Co., have a shore establishment, but, as it is built on private land, there is no question of prescribing conditions for the factory. Of course, no one would build on the strength of an annual licence, and Messrs. Salvesen have been formally assured that it will be renewed for a term of 20 years. In spite of their having five steam whalers at work, Messrs. Salvesen report that the last season in the Falklands was unprofitable." [227]

October 20th, at Port Stanley, a *Seal Fisheries (Dependencies) Ordinance* is enacted rendering it unlawful; *"for any person to kill, take, or hunt, or attempt to kill or take any seal in the Dependencies or the Colonial waters thereof unless he shall first have been duly licensed."* [228]

"The Canadian pelagic sealers argued, albeit unsuccessfully, that this did not apply to them since they had taken the skins at sea outside colonial waters. ... as a result some 70,000 skins may have left the colony duty free until 1908. ... If the royalty had been paid, about £14,000 would have been generated for the treasury." [229]

November 9th, in Stanley, a Falklands Museum is formally opened by the Governor. [230]

November 30th, at South Georgia, James Innes Wilson arrives at Grytviken on-board a 'Christian Salveson & Co.' ship, *SS Coronda*, as the newly appointed Stipendiary Magistrate and Postmaster. A South Georgia post office is established in the manager's house.

> "*The appointment of a Magistrate, who is also Postmaster, in South Georgia, marks another step in the advance of the Dependencies of the Colony. Seven whaling companies now occupy sites in South Georgia, where the whole carcass of the whales is converted into oil and fertilisers. Six companies fished in the waters of the South Shetlands, pursuing the whale through Pelgica Strait to the icy shores of Graham's Land."* [231]

"At the opening of the last whaling season, ... a magistrate was sent, with two constables, to South Georgia to maintain order. ... So far as is known there has not been any trouble between the employees of different companies, but there have been labour difficulties. A "grog-ship" attempted to anchor at South Georgia, and if the magistrate had not been there to order her off there might well have been disturbances. ... South Georgia is now in effect a Colony with a rudimentary administration. It has a system of law, and the Supreme Court of the Falkland Islands has jurisdiction there." [232]

"... British administrative authority has been in continuous occupation ever since." [233]

"Much credit for the subsequent success of both industries must go to this first representative of the Crown in the Dependencies as well as to the then-Governor William Lamond Allardyce. Both recognised that the economy of the colony and Dependencies would benefit significantly from the import, export and oil production duties generated by a long-term industry." [234]

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227 *Whaling Leases and Licences in the Falkland Island Dependencies Appendix IV, Report to the Finance and Concessions Committee of the sub-committee appointed to consider the question of Licences granted to occupy Uninhabited Islands for various purposes* 1910 filed at the University of Tasmania ref: *AU AU ATADD 1-BB-GB-364*

228 A similar Ordinance (No.7 1909) was enacted for the preservation of penguins in the Dependencies.

229 Dickinson 2007 p.104

230 An initiative of the Governor's wife, the original collection was eclectic, if not downright eccentric.

231 Dickinson 2007 p.104.

232 *Whaling Leases and Licences in the Falkland Island Dependencies Appendix IV, Report to the Finance and Concessions Committee of the sub-committee appointed to consider the question of Licences granted to occupy Uninhabited Islands for various purposes* 1910 filed at the University of Tasmania ref: *AU AU ATADD 1-BB-GB-364*

233 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

234 Dickinson 2007 p.131

December 31st, on South Georgia, 720 people are recorded as present, with 93% shown as '*Scandinavian.*'

"During December 1909 Wilson inspected all the South Georgian whaling stations... the population of Grytviken was 150." [235]

The Norwegians introduce eleven reindeer onto South Georgia as a food source for the whalers. [236]

The Falkland Islands end-of-year statistical report notes 54 births and 20 deaths; estimated population of 2,323.

> *"Stanley is built on the side of a hill; drainage into the sea is very easy, but a few houses are in bad repair without any drainage arrangements. Building, unfortunately, is so expensive that many houses are somewhat overcrowded, containing more than one family. The public health of Stanley would be improved if a pure water supply could be provided. At present, everyone is dependent on the water caught from the roofs of the houses, which, from the prevailing high winds, must contain much dust and other objectionable matter."* [237]

1910 — January 1st, in the South Atlantic, a further *Seal Fisheries (Dependencies) Ordinance* comes into force; abandoning the royalty system but doubling the fee to £20. The legislation requires the establishment of seal reserves as well as providing a 'closed season' from October 1 to December 31 each year.

January 16th, Norwegian, Carl Anton Larsen, applies to the South Georgia Magistrate for British citizenship.

> *"I have given up my Norwegian citizens rights and have resided here since I started whaling in this colony on 16 November 1904 and have no reason to be of any other citizenship than British, as I have had and intend to have my residence here still for a long time."* [238]

January 26th, HMS *Amethyst* visits Port Stanley.

In Buenos Aires, a book considering at the history of the Falkland Islands from Argentina's perspective, is published – *Les îles Malouines: nouvel exposé d'un vieux litige* by Paul Groussac. [239]

> *"The Argentine Republic does not expect England to consider its case won: It asks that its dispute be judged by judges, refusing to accept as such the English officers and functionaries who have imposed on it the brutal law of the strongest."* [240]

"This was a bitterly anti-British and one-sided book which misinterpreted some of the events of 1770 and 1771 – the Spanish seizure and restoration of Port Egmont. Groussac paid minimal attention to the American

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235 Pascoe 2020 p.271

236 Nine females and two males. By 1958, the herd had grown to some 4,000. Ironically, in 2013, it was Norway that was asked to employ its expertise at culling reindeer numbers.

237 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1909.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1887 to 1910.pdf

238 Quoted in *Wrecks, Hulks and Other Vessel Remains at South Georgia, Falkland Islands Dependencies* R. Headland 1984. Larsen appears to have been successful. At the time, his wife, three daughters and two sons were also living on South Georgia, and it seems likely that they also took British citizenship. However, the available records do not state when citizenship was granted other than in 1910. It seems possible that Larsen was the first British citizen naturalised in South Georgia.

239 Groussac was born in France but moved to Argentina in 1866 when he was 18. He served as Director of the National Library of Argentina from 1885 to 1929. Strangely, his book was published in French. In a country where Spanish was the national language and where illiteracy rates were over 75%. See 1934 and 1936, below.

240 Paul Groussac quoted in *Recuperar Malvinas: Las disputas por los significados de la guerra y su tardía inclusión en el campo de los derechos humanos* Alejo Ramos Padilla 2025. This author dates this quote to 1936, despite the death of Groussac in 1929.

involvement in the events of 1831 to 1833, which in fact he knew all about. … His book was written before the Vernet papers were donated to the Argentine archives and Groussac makes no mention of them or to Vernet's pro-British sentiments. Nor did he consult the British State papers." [241]

"Paul Groussac … gives a seriously faulty account of Falklands history: he misinterprets the events of 1770-71, he understates the involvement of American sealing ships and the foreign recognition of Britain's possession of the islands, he says hardly anything about Louis Vernet, who played such a central part in the story, and he omits the vitally important Convention of Peace. Groussac's work is therefore of little value, though for some time it was the only full-length book on the Falklands dispute, …" [242]

February 4th, an Argentine newspaper reports.

> *"… correspondence recently brought back from the (South Orkney) islands had an Argentine stamp with a postmark placed on it by the official of the observatory charged with the correspondence, bearing the designation "Southern Argentine Territories, Orkneys Station… the maintenance of the observatory on the islands must in itself constitute in time an act of sovereignty which would entitle Argentina to claim possession of the islands by right of undisputed occupation…."* [243]

March 31st, Britain signs a general arbitration agreement with Argentina. [244]

"It is signed in London on March 31 of that year to settle "all the differences between the Contracting Parties that it would not have been possible to settle through diplomatic channels" resorting to the Permanent Court of Arbitration in The Hague, established by the 1899 Convention. "Provided, however, that they do not affect the vital interests, independence or honor of the two Contracting States, and that they do not concern the interests of third parties." The islands are not mentioned." [245]

April 7th, from Buenos Aires, Minister Townley writes to London in support of a cession of the South Orkney's to Argentina. He argues, *inter alia*, that the meteorological site there allowed Argentine farmers to know if the season would be wet or dry at least six months ahead.

Responding, Britain's Colonial Office requests the views of the Falklands' Governor.

> *"… there can be no doubt that this colony would be a serious loser should Mr. Townley's recommendation be hereafter given effect to."* [246]

241 Peter Pepper in Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.254
242 Pascoe 2020 pp.267-268
243 *FO 371/12735/55*
244 See 1899 & 1907
245 *La cuestión Malvinas en los tratados anteriores a 1966* E. Aramburu 2014

May 9th, in the Falklands, *Malvina,* carrying a cargo of wool, is wrecked on Saunders Island. [247]

May 25th, Argentina celebrates the centennial of the Primera Junta of 1810 with the publication of a map (previous page).[248] The Chart identifies the Falkland Islands as Argentine territory whilst naming them as *Islas Malvinas o de Falkland*. [249]

"He reminds me that the rights of Sovereignty are not established by the colouring on a map,..." [250]

"The British representative in Buenos Aires was instructed not to take notice of its existence." [251]

"The May Centennial had led the Argentine State to seek to reconstruct the history of the country's first hundred years and to promote a patriotic liturgy that had the purpose of strengthening national consciousness." [252]

June 15th, from Cardiff, *Terra Nova* sails for the Antarctic with an expedition led by Capt. Robert Falcon Scott.[253]

In **September**, in London, on being made aware of Groussac's book, the American Department of the British Foreign Office requests a review of historical correspondence. Gaston de Bernhardt, an assistant librarian, is tasked with the research and given just three months to complete it

"Bernhardt's brief was not to analyse the rights and wrongs of the case but only to summarise the ***correspondence*** *on the dispute, which of course is only part of the picture. He fulfilled that limited task competently enough..."* [254]

October 5th, from Argentina, Minister Townley writes to the Foreign Office again, regarding the South Orkneys.

> *"I would respectfully venture to submit that the disputed ownership of the barren rocks may possibly some day lead to an unpleasant incident. ...*
>
> *The possession of the Falkland Islands is always dragged in as to what Argentina will do when she has a large fleet and one hundred and fifty million inhabitants, but reasonable people have given up hope that Great Britain will ever consent to a discussion of this question."* [255]

At Port Stanley, Governor Allardyce issues seven South Orkney whaling licences for the 1910/11 season. [256]

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246 *Governor Allardyce to Mr. Harcourt December 24th, 1910 in FO 371/1288*

247 *Cambridge Expedition to the Falkland Islands 1977: Report to the National Maritime Museum*

248 Formed on May 25, 1810, in response to the news of Napoleon's invasion of Spain, the junta (committee) declared for Spain's imprisoned King Ferdinand. Hardly an act of independence.

249 The importance of maps, official or unofficial, had led to a series of exchanges between Argentina and the UK in 1884. However, at that time, Argentina had argued that maps had little, if any, relevance to questions of sovereignty under international law. Britain accepted this and stopped protesting at these minor affronts. For a larger version, see - https://collections.lib.uwm.edu/digital/collection/agdm/id/568

250 Britain's Minister Monson quoting Argentina's Foreign Minister Ortiz in *Monson to Granville, December 31, 1884* in *FO 6/503/97. cf. Falklands Wars* vol.2

251 Kohen & Rodriguez 2016 p.246

252 *Malvinas en la historiografia nacional. La Nueva Escuela Historica y el caso de Ricardo Caillet-Bois* Francisco N. Novas Lo Coco 2024

253 Another attempt to reach the South Pole. See January, 1912, below.

254 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.227

255 *Townley to Sir Edward Grey 5 October 1910* in *The Falkland Islands/Malvinas: The Contest for Empire in the South Atlantic* B. Gough 1992

256 *Governor Allardyce to Mr. Harcourt December 24, 1910* in *FO 371/1288.* I am unable to find any Argentine protests with regard to the issue of such licences. Or any attempt by Argentina to issue its own licences.

November 11th, in London, a Foreign Office *memo* raises the possibility of a cession of the South Orkneys.

"... the proposal to cede the islands is not a new one. It originated with Mr. Townley, then Minister at Buenos Aires, who suggested in 1910 that they should be ceded in the form of a free gift as they were useless to us and valuable to Argentina on account of the observatory. The Admiralty had no objection to the proposal but the Colonial Office turned it down on the grounds that the islands were valuable as a base for the whaling industry in which many of the Falkland Islanders were interested, and that they provided a small but useful revenue for the Government of the Falkland Islands." [257]

"... Allardyce became alarmed at a discussion which was taking place in the Colonial Office about appeasing Argentine claims to sovereignty. ... in reply to a secret despatch from London dated 11 November 1910 about a possible cession of the South Orkneys to the Argentine Republic, Allardyce strongly opposed the proposal..." [258]

December 2nd, *Wavertree*, out of Cardiff, is towed into Stanley by *Samson*, after being damaged in a storm.[259]

December 7th, Gaston de Bernhardt's limited research – *Memorandum respecting the Falkland Islands* – is circulated within the Foreign Office. [260]

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Printed for the use of the Foreign Office. January 1911.

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(9755.)

Memorandum respecting the Falkland Islands.

" Encyclopedia Britannica." Colonial Office List.: Memoir on the Falkland Islands by R. Greenhow, 8vo. 836. " South America Pilot." Part I. "Revue des Deux Mondes," September 1843. " Anecdotes of the Earl of Chatham " (7th edition)

THE Falkland Islands called by the French Isles Malouines, and by the Spaniards Islas Malvinas, are situated in the South Atlantic about 350 miles from the nearest point of the mainland of South America. They consist of two large islands, East and West Falkland, separated by the Falkland Channel, and surrounded by about 200 other very small islands. All the islands lie together within a space of 120 by 60 miles, between the 51st and 53rd parallels of south latitude, and between the 57th and 63rd meridians of longitude west of Greenwich.

The Falkland Islands possess excellent harbours and anchorages, and good fisheries.

These islands were discovered on the 14th August, 1592, by John Davis the commander of one of the vessels of the squadron sent to the Pacific under Cavendish.

They were seen by Sir H. Hawkins on the 2nd February, 1594.

In 1598 Sebaldus or Sebald van Weerdt, a Dutchman, visited them, and called them the Sebald Islands, a name which they still bear on some of the Dutch maps.

Captain Strong in the "Welfare," sailed through between the two principal islands in 1690, and called the passage Falkland Sound, in memory of the well-known Royalist Lucius Gary, Lord Falkland, killed at the battle of Newbury in 1643; and from this the group afterwards took its English name of "Falkland Islands," although this name does not appear to have been given to it before 1745.

In 1748, in consequence of the representations made by Commodore Anson, on his return from the Pacific, the British Government resolved to establish a colony and military post at some point near the Straits of Magellan, in order to afford the means of refuge, refreshment, and

[915] B

***December 12th**, a clerk at the Foreign Office, Gerald Spicer, adds his opinion to Bernhardt's review.*

> *"For more than 60 years we have refused to discuss the question with the Argentine Gov., but from a perusal of this memo, it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that the Argentine Govt.'s attitude is not altogether unjustified and that our action has been somewhat high-handed. If the alleged secret understanding between the Spaniards and ourselves could be traced our claims would probably be found to be weaker than they are. ... the Argentine Govt. do not regard this question as closed."* [261]

"With a subject as complicated as the history of the Falkland Islands, it is inevitable that individual officers will have differing and in some cases conflicting views. This is natural, but it is also irrelevant." [262]

"Read without further investigation or analysis, de Bernhardt's account must have seemed to Spicer to be pretty damning to the British case. No one at the Foreign Office at the time was interested enough in the Falklands to undertake any criticism of it, and it was taken at its face value. ... For 18 years until John Field's memo of 1928, it remained

257 *FO 371/12735/101*

258 Palmer in Thatham (ed.) 2008 p.39

259 *Falkland Islands Magazine and Church Paper* January 11, 1911

260 *FO 881/9755.* Published for internal use by the Foreign Office in 1911. Click on the image for a hyperlink to the work. See also *The Anglo-Argentine Dispute Over Title to the Falkland islands: Changing British Perceptions on Sovereignty since 1910* Peter J. Beck 1983 and *When the English doubted their rights* Juan A. Lanus 2010.

261 Quoted in Gough 1992. There was no "secret" understanding with the Spanish in 1771. *cf.* Vol.1

262 Foreign Office submission to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee in 1983. *cf. The Falkland Islands, 5th Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 1983-1984 HC 268 25.10.1984*

the standard Foreign Office paper on the Falklands, and no doubt strengthened the characteristic diffidence and reserve of that department. … It is also important to realise that de Bernahardt's account has some glaring weaknesses, which are mainly explained by his limited brief, which only required him to summarise the correspondence." [263]

December 24th, from Stanley, responding to the question of ceding the South Orkney Islands, Governor Allardyce notes the potential financial losses for the Falkland Islanders. He also comments on the attitude that Argentina is likely to adopt.

> *"… almost certain to be misunderstood in South America, and might hereafter form an unfortunate precedent for other demands, and be used to materially weaken our claim to possessing any territory in these seas."* [264]

"The cession was proposed as a free gift, and appears to have been contemplated as a complimentary gesture on the occasion of the Argentine centenary celebrations. The Admiralty had no objections. The Board of Trade could not suggest a quid pro quo. The Colonial Office vetoed the proposal on the ground that the South Orkney's were valuable as a base for the whaling industry,…" [265]

The Falklands end-of-year statistical report notes 45 births and 16 deaths; an estimated population of 2,356. [266]



263 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.228
264 *Governor Allardyce to Mr. Harcourt December 24, 1910* in *FO 371/1288.* Also David Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.39
265 Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8, 1930 *A 4733/1437/2/1930*
266 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1910.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1887 to 1910.pdf

1911 — March 3rd, at Stanley, the Japanese training ship *Taisei Maru* anchors in the port. [267]

March 30th, in London, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Edward Grey, provides a written answer in Parliament - regarding the negotiation of arbitration agreements with other nations.

> *"There are thirteen which have been concluded for a period of five years, most of which have been renewed for a further period of five years. In addition to the above, treaties have been signed with the Argentine Republic and Brazil which have not as yet been ratified by the King."* [268]

April 2nd, in the Falkland Islands, a population census identifies 2,272 people as present. [269]

In **May**, from South Georgia, the Magistrate reports that 5,521 whales have been caught, yielding 150,457 barrels of oil valued at £394,898. Governor Allardyce complains that the revenue to the Falkland Islands' Government is less than 1% of the value of the catch and recommends an export duty of 3d per barrel be imposed.

Norwegian whalers release another five reindeer at Stromness Bay. [270]

At Port Stanley, a 5 kilowatt wireless telegraphy station is installed, enabling telegrams to be sent to Uruguay.

June 6th, at South Georgia, *Bayard* is wrecked in Ocean Harbour.

June 22nd, in the Falklands, the coronation of King George V and Queen Mary is celebrated.

In London, the US *charge d'affairs* approaches the British government to ask if there would be any objection to a US citizen, Capt. Benjamin Cleveland, hunting sea-elephants at South Georgia; *"... he was informed, in reply, that the Governor of the Falklands would be authorised to grant Captain Cleveland a licence to take a limited number of sea-elephants in South Georgia in the 1912 season."* [271]

In **July**, in London, Foreign Office Assistant-Secretary, Robert Campbell, submits a *minute* regarding de Bernhardt's 1910 research.

> *"Who did have the best claim when we finally annexed the islands... I think undoubtedly the United Provinces of Buenos Aires. We cannot easily make out a good claim and we have wisely done everything to avoid discussing the subject."* [272]

"Research Department have also discovered a Foreign Office minute of 1911 setting out the weakness of our claims, which has somehow found its way through the safety net and into the Public Records Office. Apparently its nature is clearly apparent from the index. I enclose a copy. We must keep our fingers crossed that the Argentines do not take it into their heads to start hunting around in the PRO." [273]

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267 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1911 (Blue Book)* p.19. Believed to be the first Japanese ship to visit the archipelago.

268 These were as a result of the *2nd Hague Convention*. *cf.* 1907. More than 70 arbitration treaties had been registered at the Hague by 1911. Britain's agreement with Argentina appears to have stalled following changes made to the agreement by the Argentine Senate. See September 15, 1911.

269 Published in the *Gazette* March 1, 1912

270 All killed in a snowslide.

271 *The United States and the Question of the Falkland Islands* A. F. Orchard Sept, 1928 *in FO 371/12736/324.* Exact date not stated, See November, 1912 below.

272 Quoted in *Notas sobre documentos del Foreign Office referentes al conflicto Malvinas* Enrique Ferre Vieyra in *La política internacional, el derecho y el territorio nacional* 1999. Another minor official with an opinion based upon limited research. What is really amazing, is that Argentine authors manage to find these obscure archives. Clutching at straws.

273 *Fearn to Williams November 26, 1981* in *AW 040/325/1.* They had.

"As to the question of doubts which may have been expressed by officials from time to time, it is inevitable in a matter such as this, involving consideration of complex historical and factual questions, that doubts may have been expressed... It depends very much on the time at which they were expressed. The law has developed over the years. ***Anything, for example, prior to 1928 would not have taken account of a major arbitration in that year****, bearing upon the question of 'acquisitive prescription' in the Palmas arbitration. Anything prior to that certainly has to be considered in that light."* [274]

At South Georgia, *Camana* is scuttled at Husvik Harbour. [275]

> *"Whaling round the Falkland Islands was not so successful as in former years, one Company established in the islands only producing a total of 7,400 barrels of oil and 50 tons of whalebone. This compares unfavourably with the large amounts obtained in the Dependencies of the Colony.*
>
> *13. In South Georgia eight Companies are now established. They employ 1,000 men in their factories ashore and afloat. During the 1910-1911 whaling season oil and guano were produced, valued at £534,715. The South Orkneys and the Sandwich Islands were each visited by one Company, and ten Companies held licences for the South Shetlands and Graham's Land. The total catch from these Dependencies was 156,770 barrels of oil and 400 tons of whalebone, together worth over £468,500.*
> *14. The total value of the products of the industry during 1911 was £1,026,415."* [276]

In **September**, in London, the internal debate within the British Foreign Office regarding a cession of the South Orkney Islands to Argentina, continues.

> *"Our title to the South Orkneys is much stronger than it is to the Falklands, but we should of course be much more unwilling to give up the latter. It seems probable that if we make any offer to the Argentine Govt., in connection with the South Orkneys they will be encouraged to raise the question of the Falklands."* [277]

September 15th, Colonial Secretary Harcourt adds his view

> *"... he regrets that he is unable to concur with the views of Secretary Sir E. Grey as to the policy of offering to cede the South Orkneys... even if it were possible to come to an understanding with the Argentine Government on the matter, it is to be feared that the Senate would be unwilling to accept the terms agreed upon or to consent to waive the claim of the Argentine Republic to the Falkland Islands."*[278]

"Harcourt presumes that it is with a view to raising the question of the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands that the Argentine Senate has eliminated the clause restricting the scope of the proposed arbitration treaty..." [279]

September 27th, the Foreign Office responds to the Colonial Office.

> *"Secretary Sir E. Grey ... observes that Mr. Harcourt's objections to any offer to cede the South Orkneys to the Argentine Government are based mainly upon the assumption that such a step might fail to secure recognition of the British title to the Falkland Islands, and would weaken the British*

274 Sir Ian Sinclair quoted in *Little Platoon* M. Charlton 1989 p.3. Sinclair was a Foreign Office Legal Adviser from 1976–1984. My emphasis.
275 Headland 1984. As whaling became less profitable, old equipment was abandoned rather than maintained.
276 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1911 (Blue Book)*
277 *FO 371/1288.* This note, one of a series, is initialled *R.S.* Who R.S. was, is not clear.
278 *Colonial Office to Foreign Office September 15th, 1911* in *FO 371/1288*
279 *Ibid*

case if His Majesty's Government were compelled to submit the matter to arbitration under a general treaty. I am to explain that Sir E. Grey does not propose to proceed with general arbitration treaties with any country pending the conclusion of the treaty recently under negotiation with the United States, nor does he propose the conclusion of a treaty with the Argentine Government until the British title to the Falkland Islands has been recognised." [280]

"The Colonial Office agreed to this proposal, and after informal enquiry of the Argentine Government as to whether the cession of the islands on the terms proposed would be agreeable to them, Sir R. Tower was instructed to arrange with them an 'exchange of courtesies' in the form of a convention under which the South Orkneys would be ceded in return for a suitable site for a Legation house." [281]

October 21st, at Grytviken, Germany's Antarctic (Wilhelm Filchner) Expedition anchors in *Deutschland*. [282]

December 3rd, a Norwegian barque, *Havfruen*, out of South Georgia and owned by the Kosmos Whaling Company, is crushed by sea ice. The vessel sinks, but no lives are lost. [283]

December 22nd, at Port Stanley, a Russian four-masted barque, *Albyn*, arrives leaking badly.

The Falkland Islands end-of-year statistical report notes 42 births and 11 deaths. [284]

"On the East Falkland the winter was very wet, with little sunshine or frost, and diarrhoea was common in Stanley. On the other hand, the almost total absence of this disease on the West Falkland and the general improvement in public health on that island was probably associated with a higher mean winter temperature and a lower rainfall. There was an outbreak of German measles in Stanley, which probably affected 50 per cent, of the houses in the settlement; infection from Stanley probably accounts for the twelve cases reported from the West Falkland. On the latter island there were two cases of diphtheria and one on the East Falkland. Five cases of beri-beri were imported by a whaler and a Canadian sealer. There were four cases of insanity, a large number in a population (East Falkland) of 1,600. Three were sent to England; one was due to alcohol. 33. The Assistant Colonial Surgeon reports considerable improvement in personal hygiene and also in the greater variety of food consumed on the West Falkland. The tooth-brush is becoming a comparatively common object, and fish and vegetables are being added to the universal diet of mutton. ...

In Stanley good progress has been made with the reorganization of the Telephone Exchange. Besides the linking up of Government buildings with those of business houses, provision has been made to install telephones in private houses at a fixed annual rate. The new system will include the long-distance line between Stanley, and Darwin (60 miles) and the lines to Port Louis and Fitzroy, recently erected by the Honourable Vere Paeke.

The strength of the Volunteer force on the 31st December, 1911, was two officers and 117 non-commissioned officers and men, increase of four on the numbers in 1910." [285]

280 *FO 371/1288*
281 *Ibid cf.* 1914
282 The expedition's objective was to ascertain whether the Antarctic was a single land mass, or comprised of separate elements. In the event, after reaching the Weddell Sea, the *Deutschland* became trapped in sea ice for 8 months and the expedition was abandoned.
283 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1911* p.12
284 *Ibid.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1911 to 1930.pdf
285 *Ibid.*

1912 — January 17th, Robert Falcon Scott, leading a five-man expedition, reaches the South Pole. [286]

February 19th, in the Falklands, HMS *Glasgow* visits Stanley; remaining until March 7th.

On South Georgia, a house is built for the magistrate at King Edwards Point. Grytviken is designated a '*port of entry*' for South Georgia. [287] The South Georgia Post Office is moved to King Edwards Point. [288] A geological survey of South Georgia is conducted by Davis Ferguson for Christian Salvesen's.

Six Norwegian companies take out Dependencies licences to hunt the South Sandwich Islands. [289]

March 11th, the Falklands switch from Stanley Mean Time (UTC -3:51:24) to Falkland Islands Time (UTC -4). [290]

March 27th, construction of a new wireless station at Hookers Point commences.

> "*The wireless installation was supplied by the Marconi Wireless Telegraph Company, Limited, London, and consists of a 5 K.W. set, with low frequency alternator and rotary spark discharger: the prime mover being a 15 B.H.P. oil engine. The two masts measure 220 feet each. The aerial is of the twin T-type, having six wires on either side. The station is situated on the top of a ridge at the east end of the Murray Heights, about two miles from Stanley."* [291]

"In 1912 a wireless station was organised at Port Stanley. The Argentine Government was formally told of the fact; but some official pointed out that if the notification were acknowledged British occupation of the Malvinas would be recognised! So, instead of acknowledging receipt of the Note, all direct communications, by wire or post, with the islands, were deprecated." [292]

"... without assistance from either the Home Government or the Admiralty." [293]

March 28th, Alexander Lange applies for a whaling licence for Graham Land. [294]

"... in 1912, it was decided:- (1) That separate licences should be issued for: (a) The South Shetlands and Graham Land; (b) The South Orkneys; (c) The South Sandwich Islands; and . . (2) That the number of licences issued in any one year for the South Shetlands with Graham Land should not exceed ten, and that not more than seven licences should be issued annually for either the South Orkneys or the South Sandwich Islands." [295]

July 4th, in the South Shetland Islands, land at Factory Bay, Foster Harbour, Deception Island is leased by the Falkland Islands Government to the 'Hektor Whaling Company' of Tonsberg, Norway, for a term of 21 years commencing October 1, 1912. [296]

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286 Beaten to the pole by a Norwegian, Roald Amundsen, who had arrived there just five weeks before Scott. Neither Scott, nor any of his men, survived the journey back.

287 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908. cf.* 1982

288 An early suggestion that South Georgia should issue its own stamps was squashed for political reasons, resulting in the South Georgia Post Office using Falkland Islands stamps for the first 35 years of its existence. With a 'South Georgia' over-stamp.

289 *The Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice at the Hague, May, 1955*

290 Converted Universal Time (UTC) is the successor to Greenwich Mean Time (GMT). UTC -4 is four hours behind UTC.GMT. Not all countries automatically follow the UTC system. *cf.* 1983 & 2010

291 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1912* p.19

292 *The Times* August 12, 1928. *cf.* July, 1928

293 *The Battle of the Falklands, 1914: A Falklands perspective* Graham Pascoe 2014

294 The application was declined.

295 *Appendix V: The Whaling Industry of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands* (undated) at the University of Tasmania ref: *AU AU ATADD 1-BB-GB-388*

296 *Falkland Islands, Lease to the Hektor Whaling Company at Deception Island* University of Tasmania ref: *AU AU ATADD 1-BB-GB-369.* Also *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/490*

"By 1912-13 there were 12 factory ships and 32 catchers working in the South Shetlands area, all holding licences issued by the Falkland Islands Government." [297]

July 22nd, in the Falkland Islands, near the Cape Pembroke Lighthouse, survivors of *Criccieth Castle* get ashore.

> "*The "Criccieth Castle", a sailing ship of 1,877 tons register, owned by the Ship Criccieth Castle Company, Limited, under the command of Captain Robert Thomas, bound to Antwerp, and laden with 2,850 tons of guano, had to be abandoned on the 15th July in the South Atlantic, 54 S. and 61 W., about 110 miles from the Falkland Islands, owing to having been struck by a tremendous sea which broke the rudder shaft. After the accident, the ship leaked badly at the stern post, the pumps when tried were found to be choked and would not work. The master, his wife and child, and fourteen hands took to the lifeboat, while the remainder of the crew embarked in the long boat, which was in charge of the mate. The two boats kept together for some hours; the long boat was then lost and never seen again. The lifeboat made for the Falklands and reached Cape Pembroke Lighthouse after seven days and nights of the most terrible exposure, during which three of the crew succumbed. The survivors, who were all badly frost-bitten, were brought to Stanley the same evening and accommodated in the Victoria Cottage Home, where two subsequently died."* [298]

September 24th, at Hookers Point, the new Falklands Wireless Station is formally opened by the Governor.

September 28th, the *'Wild Animals and Birds (South Georgia) Ordinance'* comes into effect, offering protection to reindeer, the Upland Goose, and other bird species. Kristen Loken becomes the first resident clergyman on South Georgia.

In the South Shetland Islands, on Deception Island, a seasonal post office is established; with Port Foster designated as the "*port of entry*".

"A post office was maintained by the stipendiary Magistrate from 1912 to 1928. Falkland Islands stamps were used, at first bearing an overprint 'Port Foster,' but from 1913 onwards this overprint was replaced by a rubber cancellation date stamp with the words 'Deception Island, South Shetlands.' ..." [299]

Wreck of S. S. "Oravia".
The Pacific Steam Navigation Company's mail steamer "Oravia" sinking off Port Stanley, Falkland Islands, on November 15th 1912. Help was summoned by wireless, and a fleet of whalers came to the rescue landing passengers and crew together with the mails. No lives were lost owing to the admirable working of the boat drill. The passengers were given shelter for a fortnight by the inhabitants of the islands.

November 12th, in the Falklands, the mail ship *Oravia* is wrecked on Billy Rock. Crew and cargo are saved by local tugs *Penguin*, *Plym* and *Samson*.

November 15th, *Oravia* sinks. Postcards of the wreck are sold (above).

In Stanley, construction of the King Edward Memorial Hospital begins; "*The hot-water system would have been introduced but the material was lost in the S.S. Oravia. The east section of the hospital will form the new Victoria Cottage Home.*" [300]

297 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
298 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1912* pp.11-12
299 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
300 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1912* pp.19-20

November 24th, at South Georgia, American whaling brig *Daisy* (Benjamin D. Cleveland) arrives; *"... and, to her captain's indignation, he was forced to take out a licence to hunt sea-elephants."* [301]

"The tiny, land-locked haven of Grytviken ... finally greeted us through the sense of smell even before we had rounded the point that hides its entrance. The odor of very stale whale then increased again as we entered the cove, which might be likened to a great cauldron so filled with the rotting flesh and macerated bones of whales that they not only bestrew its bottom but also thickly encrust its rim to the farthest highwater mark. At the head of the cove, below a pointed mountain, we could see the whaling station, its belching smoke, several good-sized steamers, and a raft of whale carcasses. Fragments of entrails and other parts [sic] of whale were floating out to sea." [302]

December 24th, around the Falkland Islands, seal conservation areas are identified.

"In a further attempt to increase the stock, South, Flat, and Elephant Jason Islands and North and South Fur Islands were declared Crown Reserves... The Jason Islands were central to the industry, generating forty-five per cent of the fur seal harvest during 1910-1912." [303]

The Falkland Islands end-of-year statistical report notes 53 births and 38 deaths. [304]

> "*In the majority of cases inhabited houses are well built, give quite adequate accommodation, and are maintained in repair. A few notable exceptions, however, are badly kept or so small as to readily give rise to overcrowding, especially at certain times of the year. A list has been compiled of houses where "nuisances" exist within the meaning of the Public Health Ordinance, and notices will be served to secure their abatement. It is recommended that a fit and proper person be appointed as inspector of inhabited dwellings, and that he make a periodic round and report to the Board of Health. Such duties could be performed by an existing official."* [305]

301 Christie 1951.In 1911, Capt. Cleveland had initiated inquiries through the US *charge d'affairs* in London who was made fully aware that a licence would be required. See June, 1911 above.
302 *Logbook for Grace: Whaling brig Daisy 1912–1913* Robert Cushman Murphy 1965
303 Dickinson 2007 p.89
304 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1912.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1911 to 1930.pdf
305 *Ibid.*

1913 – March 14th, at Stanley, a crippled iron barque, *Lady Elizabeth*, limps into the port in a poor condition after suffering damage at Cape Horn. She is condemned and sold as a coal hulk. [306]

March 22nd, at Grytviken and Leith whaling stations on South Georgia, workers go on strike.

From the Falkland Islands, an officer is sent to the South Orkneys to supervise observance of the whaling laws.

"Mr. Moyes, Customs Officer to the Orkney Islands, spent over two months in the group in 1913." [307]

"... and, while there, (Moyes) acted as auctioneer for the sale of the wreck of the floating factory Tivga at the request of the Norwegian owners." [308]

In **September**, in Argentina, following local negotiations, a draft-agreement is drawn up exchanging the South Orkney Islands for land in Buenos Aires.

The land to be used for the site of a new British Legation to replace the existing Legation. [309]

October 8th, on South Georgia, Solveig Gunbjørg Jacobsen is born. [310]

December 25th, at Grytviken, a Lutheran church is consecrated for the Norwegian sealers working there (right).

The Falkland Islands end-of-year statistical report notes 48 births and 19 deaths. Also 10 marriages. Estimated population is 2,213

> *"The construction of the Stanley Town Hall proceeded steadily during the year and by 31st December all the roof supports had been placed in position. Extensive alterations and additions were made to the police cottages, which are now in a good state of sanitation and repair. Consulting rooms were erected for the use of the Colonial Dentist. New roads were constructed to the peat banks to the south of the town; the nature of the ground rendered this work both lengthy and expensive. ...Over 38,000 live sheep were exported to South America during the season. This is the largest number yet exported from the Falklands, but in all probability will be exceeded next year, for it is possible that in the near future negotiations will be entered into with certain companies in South America for exporting sheep of a suitable weight in a frozen condition. ... Some discontent arose among the farmers about the prices offered; it appears that in some cases as much as 12s. per head was offered for 60 lb. wethers, while other farmers were offered three or four shillings less per head for sheep of the same weight. In a colony of this size it seems a pity that a standard price cannot be arranged for sheep of a uniform weight. Until something in this way is done I feel sure there will always be a certain amount of discontent which will not be beneficial to either buyer or seller "* [311]

306 Launched in June, 1879, the *Lady Elizabeth* occupied various moorings at port Stanley until a gale in 1938 grounded the ship at the east end of Stanley Harbour. Her remains, are there still.

307 Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8, 1930 *A 4733/1437/2/1930*

308 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

309 *International Court of Justice, Application instituting proceedings April 5, 1955 Doc. No. 026-19550504-APP-1-00-EN Antarctic cases United Kingdom v. Argentina.* See - https://www.icj-cij.org/node/104084

310 The first born on the Island.

311 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1913.* Not including South Georgia. See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1911 to 1930.pdf

1914 – January 10th, in Buenos Aires, the South Orkney's draft-agreement is amended.

> *"... the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr Ernesto Bosch, ... (found) it difficult to accept the phrase "the sovereignty is ceded."..."* [312]

"Unless Sir R. Tower withheld such a vital piece of information, which is hardly imaginable, no objection of this sort was raised at all." [313]

"A draft convention was submitted by Sir R. Tower in which the word "cession" was used. The Argentine Government replied with a counter-draft in which they made use, without any comment, of the expression "S.M. Britanica da por incorporadas al dominio argentino las Islas Orcadas" (His British Majesty declares the Orkney Islands incorporated into Argentine dominion)." [314]

March 6th, explorer Ernest Shackleton applies to the Falklands governor for a monopoly over the fur seal rookeries around the archipelago.

"Although Shackleton had announced on 13 January 1914 that he had obtained funding for his proposed 1914-1917 Trans-Antarctic Expedition, he may have been thinking of income for the future." [315]

On South Georgia, a football match takes place between a team from Grytviken, and a team from *A/S Ocean*.

"*The team from Grytviken consists of Englishmen, Danes, Swedes and Norwegians and an impressive Irish player in defence. The team from Ocean is made up of nine solid built boys from Larvik and two Swedes."* [316]

March 20th, in Argentina, the South Orkney draft-agreement is abandoned. [317]

> *"Both President Peña and Dr. Bosch were, I believe, genuinely desirous of giving effect to the exchange of courtesies with His Majesty's Government. That generation has passed away and the present Administration shows no favour to anything that will entail expense."* [318]

"... in the absence of any reply to his note of the 10th of January, His Majesty's Minister asked the new Foreign Secretary whether he might expect an expression of the views of the Argentine Government on this matter. He was informed in reply that "Dr. Plaza (Acting President) had given his opinion that the present was an inauspicious moment to put forward any suggestion entailing expenditure by the Argentine Government, and that he felt that the contemplated purchase of a site for a British Legation house in Buenos Aires would prove onerous at a moment when every endeavour was being made towards effecting economies"..." [319]

"By 1914, the final text of a treaty of cession had been agreed between the two countries but, on a change of Government in Argentina, the new Government declined on financial grounds to complete the trans-action." [320]

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312 *FO 371/12735/109*

313 Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8th, 1930, in *A 4733/1437/2/1930*, footnote to para.23. This suggests that the amendment had been made locally in Buenos Aires, but not notified to the UK.

314 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 Part III p.42 in footnote to para.23 in *LCO 2/4908*

315 Dickinson 2007 p.92. A lease was drawn up, but Shackleton never established a company.

316 *Dag Ingemar Børresen, Sandefjordmuseene* in *"Sophus",* a Larvik Museum publication, April 2004. *Ocean* won 9:2

317 *FO 371/12735/102. cf.* 1912 & 1927

318 Sir R. Towers despatch quoted in *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 p.42 (fn) in *LCO 2/4908*

319 Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8, 1930, in *A 4733/1437/2/1930*. Footnote to para.23.

320 *International Court of Justice, Application instituting proceedings April 5, 1955 Doc. No. 026-19550504-APP-1-00-EN Antarctic cases United Kingdom v. Argentina.*

From the Falkland Islands, Whaling Officer Spencer is sent to the South Orkneys to liaise with the local magistrate and inspect the licensed whaling vessels operating there.

Further whaling licences are issued by the Falkland Islands Governor for ships operating at the South Shetlands.

"In 1914 licences were held by eight Norwegian companies, one British company and one Chilean company. All these licences, except that of the Hektor Whaling Company, were subject to annual renewal. Most of the factory ships were moored at Deception Island, but some used Admiralty Bay. … A Norwegian maintenance party remained at Deception Island over the winter and a British Stipendiary Magistrate was resident on the island during each summer season from 1910 to 1930." [321]

March 31st, in Buenos Aires, the only overseas branch of Harrods opens on Florida Street. [322]

May 9th, at Stanley, G.I. Turner is appointed as Consular Agent for France.

August 4th, in Europe, Britain declares war on Germany. [323]

"The war came as no sudden surprise, as by wireless we were kept in very close touch with the trend of events in Europe. Being a British colony, precautions had to be taken against attack, so the local Volunteer force was mobilised, forming perhaps one of the smallest forces in existence." [324]

"During the 1914-18 War the Argentine authorities proved obstructive regarding wireless communication between the British Legation and the Governor of the Falkland Islands." [325]

August 5th, at Stanley, Governor Allardyce informs the Islanders that Britain is at war with Germany.

> *"I formally promulgated the Proclamation at 11am on the 5th before the citizens of Stanley, and called upon all loyal Colonists to become Volunteers … In reply to my wireless messages to London, I was informed that no assistance could be rendered and that I must do the best I could."* [326]

"In 1914 Stanley was a rather run-down frontier town of eight stores, five pubs and three churches..... the majority of the inhabitants of Stanley were carpenters, storekeepers, mechanics, mariners, labourers and shipwrights; the population of the town was 905 which, because of a severe housing shortage, was crammed into 186 dwellings, most of which were of rusting corrugated iron in a poor state of repair..." [327]

The Falkland Islands people pay for and donate three aircraft for the Royal Flying Corps.

August 15th, the newly completed Panama Canal has its official opening. [328]

August 26th, at South Georgia, Falkland Islander, Edward Binnie, arrives as Magistrate. [329]

September 14th, Rear-Admiral Sir Christopher Cradock, in command of the South American Station, is ordered to make the Falkland Islands the coaling base for his squadron.

October 1st, in the Falkland Islands, at Port Edgar, HMS *Glasgow* and HMS *Monmouth* take on coal.

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321 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
322 Recognition that there were some 30,000 British nationals living in the Republic.
323 During the course of WWI, 36 Islanders enrolled in H. M. Forces. Ten lost their lives.
324 *Wireless in the Falkland Islands* W. D. Lacey in *The Wireless World* December 1916
325 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
326 Quoted in Pascoe 2014
327 *The battles of Coronel and the Falklands in the making* Mensun Bound in *Penguin News August, 2014*
328 An event that would have dramatic consequences for the Falkland Islands, as European shipping no longer had to go the long way around Cape Horn to get to the Pacific Ocean.
329 For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/binnie_edward

"... it was decided that after the 1st October, 1914, no further licences or leases for whaling purposes in the Dependencies, other than South Georgia, should be issued, with the exception of renewals of existing licences."[330]

Falkland Islands Defence Force 1914

October 7th, at Port Stanley, Rear-Admiral Cradock arrives on HMS *Good Hope*. Cradock informs the Governor that a German squadron under Admiral Graf Maximilian von Spee has been reported near Cape Horn; the squadron consisting of *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig*, *Nurnberg* and *Dresden*.

"Early in October the gallant Admiral Cradock with his squadron visited Port Stanley, and left shortly afterwards. Upon Admiral Cradock's advice the women and children were sent away from Stanley to the outlying settlements. The exodus was such that local transport facilities could not stand up to, and every means of transport was resorted to. My wife had the unpleasant experience of spending the night on the tiny bridge of a steam whaler swept by seas every few moments... others preferred to go on horseback, and I am inclined to think they had the better bargain." [331]

October 26th, from Buenos Aires, Ernest Shackleton's *British Imperial Trans-Antarctic Expedition* sails on *Endurance*, bound for Grytviken in South Georgia. [332]

November 1st, off the coast of central Chile, at the Battle of Coronel, Germany's East Asia Squadron, led by Vice-Admiral Von Spee, sinks HMS *Good Hope* and HMS *Monmouth*. HMS *Glasgow* is damaged. [333]

November 5th, from the Admiralty in London, Winston Churchill telegrams a warning to Governor Allardyce.

> *"German cruiser raid may take place. All Admiralty colliers should be concealed in unfrequented harbours, Be ready to destroy supplies useful to enemy and hide codes effectively on enemy ships being sighted."* [334]

330 *Appendix V: The Whaling Industry of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands* (undated) at the University of Tasmania ref: *AU AU ATADD 1-BB-GB-388*

331 Lacey 1916

332 Arriving November 5th. See - https://www.amnh.org/exhibitions/shackleton/the-expedition

333 A clear victory for the German squadron, however, Von Spee's ships used up half of their ammunition, which could not easily be replaced.

334 *The World Crisis 1911-1914* W. Churchill 1923 vol.1

November 8th, at Stanley, HMS *Glasgow* and HMS *Canopus* anchor in the harbour for only a few hours. Governor Allardyce notes; *"The Glasgow had a huge hole in her port side large enough to admit a large dining table also several smaller holes, and one right in the stern about a foot square."*

November 12th, HMS *Canopus* (Grant) returns with instructions to defend the town.

"Canopus is to remain in Stanley Harbour. Moor ship so that your guns command the entrance. Extemporise mines outside the entrance... No objection to your grounding ship to obtain good berth." [335]

Grant sets up four shore-batteries and equips the Islands' Volunteer Force with a 12-pounder gun. Mines improvised from oil drums are strung across Port William from Yorke Point to Arrow Point.

November 29th, at Stanley Cathedral, a memorial service is held for those officers and crews lost at Coronel.

December 5th, from Grytviken in South Georgia, *Endurance* sails for the Weddell Sea.

December 6th, Admiral von Spee informs his squadron of a decision to attack the naval station at Stanley.

> *"If the harbour is clear of enemy ships, Nurnberg will reconnoitre northwards, including Berkeley Sound, while outside Port William Gneisenau will lower boats to sweep for mines in the entrance. Following those boats Nurnberg is to enter Port Stanley and carry out the work of procurement and destruction. Gneisenau is to follow as far as the connecting channel between Port William and Port Stanley, anchor there and send armed cutters, to be covered by Nurnberg, to the town side of the harbour under the command of Sub-Lieutenant Kotthaus, who is to hand the Governor an ultimatum and attempt to bring him on board."* [336]

Port Stanley 1914

December 7th, at the Falklands, arriving in Port William are Admiral Sturdee's British squadron – *Invincible*, *Inflexible*, *Carnarvon*, *Cornwall* and *Kent*. *Glasgow* and *Bristol* enter the harbour at Stanley, while an armed merchantman, *Macedonia,* patrols outside in Berkeley Sound.

335 Instructions quoted in Pascoe 2014

336 *Ibid*. This was a raid, not an invasion; contrary to suggestions from German prisoners. An intention to capture the Governor was, apparently, in revenge for the seizing of a German Governor in Samoa.

December 8th, Germany's squadron approach the Falkland Islands. At 5am *Nurnberg* and *Gneisenau* break away to carry out their orders. From Sappers Hill, Falkland Islander, Cristian Andreasen, sees the German ships and telephones *Canopus*. Sighting smoke, the Germans assume that the islanders have seen them and are burning the stores; not suspecting the presence of British warships.

> *"One thing we are sure of, and that is that they never saw us – never knew we were there, till we fired, and what is absolutely certain is that they never knew the Fleet was here... or they would have kept thousands of miles away…"* [337]

HMS *Canopus* signals "*Enemy in sight*"

At the last minute, Admiral von Spee realises the danger, turns and flees; pursued by the British navy.

Engaged during the afternoon, the German squadron is virtually destroyed. *Scharnhorst*, *Gneisenau*, *Leipzig* and *Nurnberg* are sunk. Admiral von Spee is killed together with more than 1,900 German seamen. British dead amount to eight. [338]

> *"The victory off the Falklands terminated the first phase of the Naval War by effecting a decisive clearance of the German flag from the oceans of the world….. when Admiral von Spee's powerful squadron, having been unsuccessfully though gallantly engaged off Coronel, was brought to action and destroyed on 8th December by Sir Doveton Sturdee. Only two small German cruisers and two armed merchantmen remain at large of all their formidable preparations for the attack on our trade routes, and these vessels are at present in hiding… That is a very remarkable result to have been achieved after only a few months of war. I am sure, if we had been told before the War that such a result would be so soon achieved, and that our losses would be so small, we should not have believed it for a moment."* [339]

Funeral Ceremony of those killed in the Naval action off the Falkland Islands. December 8th 1914.
Three of the leading Coffins.

"After the battle we looked for some relaxation from such arduous duties as we had been doing, but owing to the British squadron remaining in the vicinity to hunt the Dresden we were obliged to keep the watches as

337 Midshipman Robert Dickson quoted in Pascoe 2014, p.33

338 The wreck of *Scharnhorst*, Admiral von Spee's flagship, was located in December, 2019. See *Discovery of WW1 German Battlecruiser SMS Scharnhorst in Falklands waters* in *MercoPress* December 26, 2019

339 First Lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill speaking in the Commons. *Hansard HC deb 15.2.1915 vol. 69*

before. ... After the Dresden was accounted for, the majority of the Volunteers were allowed to resume their civilian employment, but the watches on the wireless station were not diminished in any way." [340]

December 22nd, from Buenos Aires, the US c*harge d'affaires* writes to his Secretary of State in Washington.

> *"The battle of the Falkland Islands has considerably improved the situation from the point of view of Argentine neutrality as there does not appear to be any further occasion at present for acts on the part of Germans which might infringe the country's neutrality. On the other hand that battle has once more brought to prominence the long drawn out question of the sovereignty over those islands.*
>
> *As the Department is probably aware, the Argentine Government at the end of every year has addressed a protest to the British Government against the occupation of the islands which are considered a part of Argentine territory. These annual protests have always been drafted in a formal manner and no replies or even acknowledgements to them have ever been received or were expected.* [341]
>
> *It appears that the protest which will be made the last week of this year will be of a slightly different character and will ask that the British Government agree to compensate Argentina in case the German Government should demand an indemnity from this Government for allowing the British Fleet to violate the neutrality of its territory (Falkland Islands).* [342]
>
> *It is stated in some quarters that the British Government will also be asked to return the islands to Argentina at the close of the war. I do not believe, however, that such a request is contemplated."* [343]

December 23rd, in Buenos Aires, following reports in the local newspapers, Britain's Minister has a conversation with Argentina's Foreign Minister, Jose Murature. The Argentine Minister confirms that his country has not made any protest over the issue of the Falklands since 1888. [344]

"On 23 December 1914 the British ambassador to Argentina, Sir Reginald Tower, reported to the Foreign Office that the local press in Buenos Aires had announced that on 24 December the Argentine Minister in London: "... would, by instructions from Dr. Murature, Minister for Foreign Affairs, present a protest against the occupation by Great Britain of the Falkland Islands."..." [345]

December 30th, William Douglas Young is gazetted Governor of the Falkland Islands. [346]

The Falkland Islands end of year statistical report notes 45 births and 32 deaths; and 21 marriages.

> *"On the outbreak of war the Falkland Islands Volunteers were called out on active service under the command of Major (honorary) H.M.S. Turner. ... Eight members of the force were accidentally drowned in the performance of military duty on the 1st December."* [347]

340 Lacey 1916

341 Confusing. Quite what 'annual protests' were being referred to is not very clear. There were no annual protests, end of year or otherwise. See below.

342 See below

343 *Papers Relating to the Foreign Relations of the United States, 1914, Supplement, The World War – The Charge d'Affaires (Lorillard) to the Secretary of State, American Legation, Buenos Aires, December 22, 1914*

344 *Tower to the British Foreign Secretary, Sir Edward Grey, March 20th, 1915* in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs Part II* quoted in *Getting it Right: the real History of the Falkland/Malvinas: A reply to the Argentine seminar of 3 December 2007* Graham Pascoe & Peter Pepper 2008

345 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.312. No formal protest by Argentina to the British government was made in 1914 or 1915.

346 For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/young_sir

347 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1914.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1911 to 1930.pdf

1915 – January 18th, some 25 miles from Vahsel Bay (white dot) on the Luitpold coast of Antarctica, *Endurance*'s route is blocked by sea ice. [348]



February 24th, realising that the ship is ice locked, *Endurance* is treated as a shore station. Shackleton's expedition prepares for a long wait.

"Endurance slowly drifted northwards with Shackleton exercising his powers of leadership to maintain morale during the long Antarctic night and as the pressure of the ice-floes started to batter Endurance." [349]

In Panama, the newspaper *Star and Herald*, publishes a report that Argentina is to officially protest Britain's occupation of the Falkland Islands.

"Stories of a recrudescence of Argentina claims to the Falklands Islands have been circulated here and in other parts of South America, but, as I have been personally assured by Dr. Murature, and as he authorised the Argentine consul-general in Panama on 20th February to state officially, ***the last Argentine protest in regard to the Falkland Islands was dated 1888****..."* [350]

In **May**, in the Falkland Islands, the new Governor, William Douglas Young, arrives at Stanley. He is the first to travel on the Camber Line; a narrow gauge railway running 3.5 miles between the Royal Navy depot and the Moody Brook Wireless Station. [351]

In Stanley, the King Edward Memorial Hospital is officially opened.

May 28th, Captain Newnham is appointed Commandant of the Falkland Islands Volunteer Force. [352]

348 Vahsel Bay had been the planned starting point of the overland expedition.
349 *Shackleton, Sir Ernest Henry (The Boss)* Robert Burton in Tatham (ed) 2008
350 *Sir Reginald Tower to Sir Edward Grey March 20, 1915* in Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.312. My emphasis.
351 The railway link lasted until 1927 when it fell into disuse.
352 *The London Gazette No.29174*

A British Government Whaling Officer, Bennett, is posted to the South Orkney Islands for three months. [353]

"Licences for whaling in the South Orkneys were held ... in the 1915-15 season by four companies, namely the Rethval and Thule, Hektor, Normanna, and Hausgesund Companies, all of which were Norwegian. This outburst of whaling activity came to an end with the 1914-15 season." [354]

August 29th, from Stanley in the Falkland Islands, the first message via an undersea telegraph cable link with Montevideo is sent by Governor Young.

In **October**, the crew of *Endurance* move on to the pack ice.

"Each man was issued warm clothing and a sleeping bag: Shackleton quietly ensured that the warmer reindeer skin bags went to the sailors, while the officers took the less desirable woolen ones. Their most valuable clothing, their Burberry tunics, were the weight of umbrella fabric and windproof but not waterproof. Their five tents were made of linen so thin the moon could be seen through them. With no communication system, no one in the outside world knew where they were." [355]

November 21st, *Endurance,* trapped in sea ice for 9 months, finally sinks (right).

The Falkland Islands end of year statistical report notes 46 births and 28 deaths. Also 16 marriages. [356]

> *"Living is, it is true, fairly expensive, but the pay of the various classes of artisans and labourers is such that it is in nowise severely felt. A shepherd in the camp districts of the Colony receives from £72 to £80 a year, the farm hand from £60 to £70, and the farm boy from £36 to £48, besides which each receives free housing and mutton. In Stanley skilled labourers (joiners, carpenters, blacksmiths, &c.) receive 1s. 1½d an hour, with 1s. 8d. overtime, and in many cases free housing; the. wage for unskilled labour is 9d. an hour and 1s. 3d. Overtime. ... The Colony stands entirely outside the much discussed vicious circle of crime and poverty, happy in being free from both. There is no necessity for any institution in the nature of a "workhouse", and the gaol is almost always empty, except when tenanted by some recalcitrant sailor oft a ship in the harbour. The large amount of money available in the pockets of the people is clearly shown by the heavy takings at bazaars, the expenditure at the annual race meeting at. Christmas, and on similar occasions. The easy circumstances of the colonists have made it possible for them to show their patriotism by very considerable subscriptions to the various funds connected with the War. There was little outward sign of the War during 1915, as far as the daily life of the Colony is concerned. A few men left for England to enlist, but the smallness of the population and the necessity for the retention of those engaged in the wool industry make it impossible for the Colony to assist much in the way of providing men. The large quantities of wool and whale oil sent to the United Kingdom were a more important contribution to the present needs of the Empire."* [357]

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353 *Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, May, 1955.* Also *A 4733/1437/2/1930.* Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8, 1930.

354 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 p.43 in *LCO 2/490*

355 *The Shackleton Expedition* American Museum of Natural History

356 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1915.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1911 to 1930.pdf

357 *Ibid.*

1916 – from the Falklands, the New Island whaling operation moves to South Georgia.

March 11th, at South Georgia, the floating whaling factory *Horatio*, catches fire with 1,820 tonnes of whale oil aboard. The vessel is towed out to sea and left to burn.

April 9th, in the South Atlantic, Ernest Shackleton and 28 men sail for Elephant Island in three life boats rescued from *Endurance*.

April 24th, from Elephant Island, Shackleton and five men sail for South Georgia in the largest of the life boats – the *James Caird*.

"From Elephant Island, Shackleton set out in the 22 foot James Caird with Worsley, Crean, McNish, McCarty and Vincent on one of the most famous boat journeys in history. Battling high seas and ferocious storms and suffering immense privations they took 16 days to reach King Haakon Bay on the south-west coast of South Georgia." [358]

May 10th, at South Georgia, after 16 days and 800 miles, the *James Caird* arrives at King Haakon Bay on the uninhabited south-west coast.

May 19th, Shackleton, Worsley and Crean set out for the east coast whaling stations, 22 miles across uncharted South Georgia.

May 14th, at Hope Point in South Georgia, Carl Larsen's original whale catcher, *Fortuna,* sinks.

May 20th, on foot, Shackleton, Worsley and Crean reach Stromness whaling station.

> *"With two of the five, Captain Worsley and Petty Officer Cream, he had then crossed South Georgia on foot to Stromness Bay on the north east coast. This is the first time the interior of the Dependency of South Georgia has been crossed from sea to sea."* [359]

May 23rd, from Stromness, *Southern Sky* sails for Elephant Island to rescue the remaining men of the expedition but is thwarted by sea ice.

May 31st, in the Falkland Islands, Ernest Shackleton, arrives in Port Stanley.

June 3rd, at Stanley Town Hall, Shackleton addresses a large audience of Islanders with details of his voyage and the travails that befell his expedition.

"At the end of his account, a simple and unvarnished story, Sir Ernest was heartily cheered in recognition of the pluck exhibited by him and his intrepid companions." [360]

June 16th, a Uruguayan fisheries vessel, *Instituto Pesca*, arrives at Port Stanley to pick up Shackleton for a further attempt to rescue his men on Elephant Island. [361]

August 4th, at South Georgia, in Ocean Harbour, *Montebello* sinks.

August 11th, from Portsmouth in England, *Discovery* sails for the Falkland Islands to assist Shackleton. [362]

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358 Robert Burton in Tatham (ed) 2008
359 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1916*
360 *Falkland Islands Magazine & Church Paper July, 1916*
361 *Return of Shackleton from Weddell Sea* in the *Geographical Review* vol.2 no.1 July, 1916 pp.55-57
362 *The New York Times* Aug 12, 1916.

August 30th, at Elephant Island, Ernest Shackleton, finally succeeds in rescuing the remaining members of his expedition.

"The stranded party was rescued by the Chilean Government ship Yelcho (Captain Luis Pardo), which on this occasion was commanded by Sir Ernest Shackleton, at whose insistence the expedition was organised." [363]

"The saving left a legacy in Chile's Antarctic identity. Even today, Pardo's feat has a prominent role in Chilean representations of Antarctica..." [364]

December 24th, in the Falkland Islands, at Port Stanley, HMS *Lancaster* anchors in the harbour.

The Falkland Islands end of year statistical report notes 52 births and 23 deaths. Also 29 marriages.[365]

1917 – with glycerine required for the armaments industry, the Falkland Islands Governor bans all whale product exports from the Dependencies, other than to the UK. All licences are subject to review.

January 19th, in the Falklands, two 6 inch guns are positioned on Sapper Hill and Mount Lowe to protect Stanley's wireless station; *"HMS Lancaster landed two officers and five men for each gun. To complete the gun crews Captain Segrave requested twenty five men and two signallers from the Falkland Islands Volunteer Force ..."*

March 2nd, at Stanley, James Houston is provisionally recognised as Consul for Chile, Italy and Norway.

March 28th, in London, new *Letters Patent* clarify the area claimed by Britain in its 1908 *Letters Patent*. [366]

> *"Whereas doubts have arisen as to the limits of the groups, of islands known as South Georgia, the South Orkneys,; the South Shetlands, and the Sandwich Islands, and the territory of Graham Land otherwise known as Graham's Land; and whereas it is expedient that provision should be made for the government, not only of these islands and territory but also of certain other Our islands and territories adjacent thereto as Dependencies of Our Colony of the Falkland Islands: I: Now We do hereby declare that from and after the publication of these Our Letters Patent in the Government Gazette of Our Colony of the Falkland Islands, the Dependencies of Our said Colony shall be deemed to include and to have included all islands and territories whatsoever between the 20th degree of West longitude and the 50th degree of West longitude which are situated south of the 50th parallel of South latitude; and all islands and territories whatsoever between the 50th degree- of West longitude and the 80th degree of West longitude which are situated south of the 58th parallel of South latitude. II. And We do hereby vest in the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of Our Colony of the Falkland Islands all such powers and authorities in and over the lands hereby included in the Dependencies of Our said Colony as are exercised by him over the Dependencies in virtue of certain Letters Patent bearing date at Westminster the Twenty-first day of July, 1908."*

363 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 p.43 in *LCO 2/4908.* In 1940, Chile would claim that this rescue amounted to an '*act of sovereignty*' over Antarctica.

364 Wainschenker 2023

365 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1916.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1911 to 1930.pdf

366 See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/1908-1917-letters-patent.pdf

"The Dependencies of the Falkland Islands are designated as follows in Letters Patent given under the Great Seal on the 28th March, 1917 :— "All islands and territories whatsoever between the 20th degree of West longitude and the 50th degree of West longitude which are situated south of the 50th parallel of South latitude, and all islands and territories whatsoever between the 50th degree of West longitude and the 80th degree of West longitude which are situated south of the 58th parallel of South latitude". Thus, such islands and territories include South Georgia, South Shetland Islands, South Orkney Islands, South Sandwich Islands, Graham's Land, and the territory extending southwards therefrom to the Pole." [367]

"Due to the astonishment and protests presented by Argentina and Chile, the British Government corrected the text in 1917 limiting the area... leaving out the Malvinas because they were already occupied, and the Argentine and Chilean mainland. Once again force prevailed over law." [368]

"In 1908, by Letters Patent, the five original territories comprising the Dependencies were set up: in 1917 amending Letters Patent were issued to clarify the extent of the claim to Graham Land. These "important State acts" appear not to have been protested against by Argentina at the time. They have, before and since, been supplemented by other administrative acts which are of importance in evidencing "effectiveness" of occupation in international law, in particular the Whaling Ordinance of 1906 which, together with amended subsequent versions, has in the past regulated the issue of whaling licences in the Dependencies' waters. These ordinances have in general been respected by the nationals of other States including those of the two claimants, Chile and Argentina." [369]

"New Letters Patent were issued on 28 March 1917, defining the extent of the Dependencies so as to exclude any possibility that they might have referred to Patagonia (as had been wrongly asserted in Argentina), and to include all islands and territories south of 58° South and between 50° and 80° West." [370]

June 10th, in Buenos Aires an anonymous flyer circulates. [371]

> *"England, driven by that love of respect and freedom for weak nations with which it had formed its immense empire, entered the Malvinas with blood and fire, cruelly murdering the Argentines who defended them, and lowered our flag to raise the one under whose shadow the filibusters wrote their dark history and which, in vain, they had tried, without any provocation, like seasoned pirates, twenty-six years earlier to fly over Buenos Aires. [...] today [...] British and Argentine agents, in the pay of the English government, intend to sell our blood for thirty pieces of silver [...] While England repays us for the insult of retaining the Falklands, every sincerely Argentine heart must consider England an enemy of its homeland!!"* [372]

"In 1917, the Malvinas issue gained renewed momentum following the diplomatic crisis caused by the Luxburg incident and the sinking of several Argentine-flagged ships by German submarines. Argentina's strictly neutralist stance became strained, and the mobilization of public opinion reached enormous intensity. Fearing that the government would join the Allies, supporters of the German cause intensified their propaganda, and

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367 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1918* p.3
368 Destefani 1982 p.101. Which law, was not stated.
369 Symmons 1984
370 Pascoe 2020 pp. 270-271
371 Probably German in origin.
372 Quoted in *Entre la "cuestión Malvinas" y la "causa Malvinas": las relaciones argentino-británicas antes de 1982* María Inés Tato 2025 in *Argentina y Gran Bretaña: 200 años de historia (1825-2025)* Paula Seiguer & Alina Silveira (eds) 2025 citing *Tower to Balfour June 21, 1917* in *TNA FO/118/428*

neutralist sectors revived the Malvinas issue, exclaiming that Argentina could never align itself with Great Britain, after the latter had taken the islands from it." [373]

July 2nd, the new *Letters Patent* are published in the *Falkland Islands Gazette.* [374] Argentina does not protest.

October 8th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Reginald Tower reports to London regarding a *Pro-Malvinas Committee* flyer circulating in the city.

> *"The gold of some foreign nations has tried to confuse public opinion into believing that in this world war, Argentine honor and interests demand our entry on behalf of a group of belligerents. This is a sham. (...) There are currently no incentives for us to follow those who, under the guise of friendship, tried to crush us in 1806 and 1807 and then disloyally stole the Malvinas Islands from us."* [375]

"... the Great War provided a glimpse that the Malvinas cause was taking shape and that the main stereotypes usually associated with it—the denunciation of dispossession, territorialist nationalism that bases sovereignty on Hispanic heritage, irredentism—were already present." [376]

In Argentina, a book is published by the Faculty of Philosophy and Letters of the University of Buenos Aires - *Manual de historia de la civilización argentina.* [377]

The Falkland Islands end of year statistical report notes 61 births and 16 deaths. Also 17 marriages.

1918 – January 30th, at Stanley, James Houston is confirmed as Consul for both Italy and Norway.

January 31st, in Buenos Aires, *La Nacion* reports that the German Chancellor has made a speech in Berlin referring to the "*restoration*" of the Falklands to Argentina.

"Deputy Foreign Minister Diego Molinari remained the highest Argentine official known to be on the German payroll.... In 1918, he started assisting a German committee that was preparing propaganda about the disputed Malvinas, or Falkland Islands. He worked closely with another German agent of influence named Tjarks." [378]

"German propagandists urged the Argentines to seize the opportunity to recover their rightful possession. The Argentine provincial press reported that annual protests against the British occupation were being made in London, but the Argentine Foreign Minister denied the truth of these reports; the last Argentine representation had been made in 1888. German propaganda continued, in 1916 and 1918, to support the Argentine claim to the Falkland group, with the offer to secure "restitution" in the peace negotiations." [379]

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373 Desiderato 2022

374 *Falkland Islands Gazette, July 2, 1917* in *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908.* Also *British & Foreign State Papers 1917-1918* 1921 vol.3 pp.16-17.

375 *Tower to Balfour October 8, 1917* in *TNA FO/118/429* quoted in Tato 2025. For the events of 1806/07 (before Argentina existed) see Vol.2.

376 Tato 2025

377 Collaborators included Luis María Torres, Rómulo D. Carbia, Diego Luis Molinari (see 1918) and Emilio Ravignani. Discovery of the Falkland Islands was awarded to the Dutch (p.453 fn.4). Inaccurate. See *Falklands Wars* vol.1. Ravignani produced over 20 volumes of documents relating to Argentine history. One of his students was Ricardo Caillet-Bois (see 1948 & 1964).

378 *The Intelligence War in Latin America, 1914-1922* Jamie Bisher 2016. Molinari would remain a political activist throughout his life, also becoming a revisionist historian (see 1790 & 1801). Tjarks owned two propaganda newspapers.

379 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

July 4th, at Mount Vernon in the USA, President Wilson explains his views on the rights of peoples.

> *"What we seek is the rule of law, based upon the consent of the governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind. Peoples are not to be bartered from sovereignty to sovereignty – as if they were mere chattels and pawns of a game. Every territorial settlement involved in this War must be made in the interest and for the benefit of the population concerned. Self-determination ... is an imperative principle of action."* [380]

"Hailed by Wilson as a guiding principle (if not the linchpin) of the peace, self-determination in practice entailed complexities which Wilson, by his own admission, had never dreamed of." [381]

November 11th, in Europe, Germany surrenders. [382]

The Falkland Islands end of year statistical report notes 59 births and 20 deaths. Also 8 marriages.

> *"The year 1918 has, however, been marked by an accentuation of isolation as regards the Colony of the Falkland Islands. Steamer communication before the War was regular and frequent enough to satisfy all the requirements of the Colony; but, in consequence of the increasing demands for shipping necessarily made by the Imperial Government, diminished to such an extent that during the year under review, apart from the whaling vessels, the Colony was visited by no more than six vessels, these being cargo boats of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company, and arriving at very irregular intervals.*
>
> *Written communication between the Colony and the Mother Country has been difficult and exceedingly slow, while the importation of sufficient and suitable foodstuffs for consumption in the Colony has been a matter requiring considerable arrangement and foresight. ... there has been throughout 1918 a very noticeable tendency towards emigration from the Colony.*
>
> *The actual official figures for the year are, immigrants 15, emigrants 43, out of a total population of 2,252, but these figures do not adequately represent the tendency which is steadily growing towards emigration to South America ..."* [383]

380 Quoted in *Self-determination and the Falklands* Denzil Dunnett 1983

381 *The United States and Self-Determination: Perspectives on the Wilsonian Conception* Michla Pomerance in *The American Journal of International Law* 1976 vol.70 no.1 (Jan)

382 The First World War was formally ended by the Treaty of Versailles, signed on June 28, 1919.

383 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1918.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1911 to 1930.pdf

1919 – January 7th – 14th, in Buenos Aires, a labour dispute leads to strikers clashing with police and military forces resulting in hundreds of deaths, thousands injured and extensive property damage. [384]

January 16th, arising from the disturbances, a Patriotic League (*Liga Patriótica Argentina*) is formed. [385]

January 25th, the *Paris Peace Conference* approves the creation of a council, to consist of representatives from all the countries in the world – a *League of Nations*. [386]

> *"Art.12: Members of the League agree that, if there should arise between them any dispute likely to lead to a rupture they will submit the matter either to arbitration or judicial settlement or to enquiry by the Council,...*
>
> *Art.13: Members of the League agree that whenever any dispute shall arise between them which they recognise to be suitable for submission to arbitration or judicial settlement and which cannot be satisfactorily settled by diplomacy, they will submit the whole subject-matter to arbitration or judicial settlement."*

March 7th, in Buenos Aires, Foreign Minister Pueyrredon complains to Interior Minister Ramon Gomez regarding the issue of an identity card to an Ines Willes de Boe. This gives her place of birth and nationality as; *"Islas Malvinas. Nacion: Ingleterra."* [387]

In **June**, the Colonial Office initiates discussions with the Admiralty and the Foreign Office regarding Britain's intentions towards Antarctica. So that a definitive policy can be formulated. [388]

"No territorial discoveries in the Antarctic regions have been made by Argentina but it is understood that a claim is made on her behalf to South Georgia, on the analogy of her well-known and long-standing claim to the possession of the Falkland Islands; on the grounds of contiguity and of having succeeded to the sovereign rights of Spain in those regions." [389]

"In 1919 the Secretary of State for Colonies, Viscount Milner, and his Under-Secretary of State, Leopold S. Amery, reassessed Britain's ad hoc Antarctic policy. Amery concluded that the Colonial Office lacked a clearly defined policy. In June he recommended that, "... we ought quietly to assert our claim to the whole continent." Amery believed that all land was potentially valuable. He was, therefore, interested in the "immense potential value" of Antarctica's fisheries and mineral resources." [390]

June 28th, at Versailles, the *Covenant of the League of Nations* is signed; to become effective on January 10, 1920. Article 10 states: *"The Members of the League undertake to respect and preserve as against external aggression the territorial integrity and existing political independence of all Members of the League."* [391]

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384 Now known as the Semana Trágica (Tragic week), Jewish and anarchist communities were blamed for the unrest.

385 Described as nationalistic, xenophobic, anti-communist and anti-Semitic, the League was a paramilitary organisation and marked a swing towards fascism in South America.

386 Also known as the *Versailles Peace Conference*; the talks opened on January 18, 1919. Contrary to rumours circulating before the meetings commenced, there is no indication that Germany attempted to discuss the Falkland Islands.

387 *Protestas Por Malvinas (1833-1946)* Alfredo Becerra 1998

388 *The Foreign Office, Commerce and British Foreign Policy in the Twentieth Century* J. Fisher, E. Pedaliu & R. Smith (eds) 2016

389 *Territorial Claims in the Antarctic Regions* UK *(*Admiralty) 1919 (Hydrographic Department) p.19. Spain had never visited those regions. Contiguity is geography.

390 Ellerby 1990 pp.67-68 citing P. J. Beck's *'British Antarctic Policy in the early 20th Century'* in *Polar Record 21 (Jan. 1982), 477.*

391 Prior to this it could be argued that conquest, particularly during an aggressive war, was a legitimate means of territory acquisition; gains achieved by military victory would be recognised as legally valid. This change would be confirmed after 1945 by decisions of the United Nations.

June 30th, at Port Stanley, James Houston is recognised as Consul for Chile.

July 18th, the Falkland Islands Volunteer Force is renamed the Falkland Islands Defence Force.

August 20th, at Stanley, an Ordinance is passed to prohibit the landing in South Georgia of any alien considered dangerous to the peace and good order of the dependency.

September 19th, with the imminent retirement of Governor Sir Douglas Young, Reginald St-Johnston arrives aboard SS *Kenuta*, to act as caretaker. [392]

"In 1919 he was posted to the Falkland Islands as colonial secretary, and in effect acting governor as Sir Douglas Young was about to depart on retirement leave." [393]

The Falkland Islands end of year statistical report notes 66 births and 27 deaths. Also 17 marriages. [394]

1920 — January 10th, the League of Nations is founded with objectives to prevent wars, promote disarmament and resolve international disputes through negotiation and arbitration. To facilitate the latter, a 'Permanent Court of International Justice' is established. [395]

Both Britain and Argentina are founding members of the League of Nations. However, Argentina's membership is the result of a Presidential decree; not ratified by the Argentine Congress. [396]

"Maintaining, as they have, their indisputable rights to the Falkland Islands, the Argentine Government have not pressed the submission of the case to arbitration, although the idea was mooted by the Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Ortiz, in 1884. ..., the Argentine Government never brought the matter before the Council of the League of Nations, as being a dispute which, under Article XI or Article XV of the Covenant, would be likely to lead to a rupture or disturb peace." [397]

In the Falklands, a Reform League is formed; *"... through which the views of the general public on matters affecting local legislation could find expression."*

Conifer, Sycamore, Alder and Mountain Ash tree seedlings are planted on Mount Low in the Falklands. [398]

January 11th, on South Georgia, workers at Grytviken strike for higher wages. [399]

> *"I have the honour to report for the information of His Excellency the Administrator that on 11th. January 36 Russian labourers ceased work on the station of the Compania Argentina de Pesca at Grytviken, and refused to take orders from the foreman, In the evening a deputation approached the Manager and demanded higher wages, with new contracts, and the old contracts to be returned, wages to be 150 pesos gold per month without part of the catch, and eight hours work per day.*

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392 While in the Falklands, St.-Johnston conducted a census of trees. There were 54.

393 David Tatham in Tatham (ed) 2008. See - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/st_johnston

394 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1919.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1911 to 1930.pdf

395 Also referred to as the World Court, this operated between 1922 and 1946 when the new United Nations replaced it with the International Court of Justice (ICJ). When the UK recognised the jurisdiction of this tribunal, it did so with a caveat in that the UK would not recognise the court's jurisdiction for disputes predating 1920. To be reviewed every decade; a policy that Britain still applies today with the ICJ. *cf.* 1946

396 Argentina was absent from all sessions and all votes. See December, 1920, below. Rejoined, 1933.

397 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

398 *Bulletin of Miscellaneous Information* No.1 1927 Royal Botanical Gardens, Kew. None survived more than 3 years.

399 The strikers were mostly dock workers recruited in Buenos Aires. *cf.* Headland 1992. Other reports claimed that 36 of the rioters were Russian Bolsheviks. *cf.* Tonnessen 1982

The Manager offered to give them the wages asked for and change of contract, but was not prepared to take off the part of the catch as the men would lose interest in the work. This they did not agree to, and on the following day they massed together and went over the station and threatened the men who were working, forcing them to join the strike." [400]

"The number called out was 220, their demeanour was threatening, and there was only one policeman at the command of the civil authorities." [401]

January 16th, at South Georgia, HMS *Dartmouth* anchors.

"... the timely arrival of H.M.S. Dartmouth ... put an end to further proceedings. In the evening I called the Bolshevists up and told them that the Company would not accept their terms but that they could consider themselves discharged and would be fined according to the Summary Jurisdiction Ordinance, and sent back to Buenos Aires as deported aliens as soon as a whaler could be got ready. Notwithstanding the fact that the Dartmouth lay in the inner harbour within almost a stone's throw of the station, they immediately caused a repeated general strike. ... It was arranged that 60 of the strikers should be sent away and the boats were to be ready on Wednesday morning at 6am, when each man in turn would be charged with breach of contract and fined accordingly before going onboard, I made application to Captain Hope of H.M.S. Dartmouth to land a party of Marines and sailors to act as police in case of necessity, while the men were being fined and sent onboard." [402]

In London, the Foreign Office, concluding discussions commenced in June, 1919, decide that Britain's Antarctic policy should seek to include the whole of Antarctica within the British Empire.

"... while the time has not yet arrived that a claim to all the continental territories should be put forward publicly, a definite and consistent policy should be followed of extending and asserting British control with the object of ultimately making it complete." [403]

"In January 1920, without Cabinet or Treasury approval, Britain adopted a policy of extending imperial control over the entire continent "without undue ostentation". The Foreign Office advised caution to avoid international opposition. The Admiralty reported that Britain had only 15 indisputable claims to Antarctic territory outside the Falkland Islands Dependencies based on discovery and 10 disputable claims." [404]

During **February**, a census of fur seals in the Falklands, by Government naturalist J. E. Hamilton, concludes that there is a breeding stock of 15,000. [405]

In **July**, in Buenos Aires, the Head of Argentina's Meteorological Service informs Britain's Minister that, as no budget had been allocated for the upkeep of the meteorological station at Laurie Island, the station would have to close when the next relief ship went there.

"A strong press agitation which took the line that the closing of the station would involve the loss of sovereignty over the South Orkneys proved too strong for the Argentine Government,..." [406]

In London, the Interdepartmental Committee on Research and Development in the Falkland Islands Dependencies concludes its work and reports to Parliament; recommending further exploratory work.

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400 Report of the Stipendiary Magistrate E. B. Binnie, South Georgia, January 22nd, 1920.
401 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1920* p.5
402 *Ibid.*
403 *CO 532/160/1959*
404 Ellerby 1990 p.68 citing *'British Antarctic Policy in the early 20th Century', Polar Record 21 (Jan.1982), 477.*
405 Dickinson 2007 p.113
406 Field 1928 para.249

In **December**, at Stanley, the Falkland Islands Reform League meets in the Town Hall to discuss *"securing of an adequate form of legislative representation for the people of the Falkland Islands"*. [407]

A geologist appointed by the British Government, arrives in the Falklands.

Argentina stops sending representatives to the League of Nations; without formal notification of withdrawal.

December 25th, at Port Stanley, Governor Middleton arrives to a salute of guns from HMS *Weymouth*.

"After inspecting a guard of honour from the Defence Force, he took the oaths of office in the Council Chamber and then, according to an account in the Falkland Islands Magazine: 'made a short speech in the course of which he mentioned that it was his desire to administer the government in such a way as to promote the best interests of the Colony and its inhabitants'." [408]

The Falkland Islands end of year statistical report notes an estimated population of 2,271. [409]

1921 — January 12th, in Antarctica, on the Danco Coast of Graham Land, another British Imperial Antarctic expedition lands in Paradise Harbour. [410]

At South Georgia, HMS *Weymouth* anchors.

In **February**, from Buenos Aires, following an allocation of funds for the meteorological station on Laurie Island, the Argentine sloop *Uruguay* sails for the South Orkney Islands with supplies.

"The attitude of His Majesty's Government at the time of this incident was that no special steps should be taken to reassert British sovereignty until such time as the Argentine Government should protest. Suggestions that the position might be safeguarded by requiring the Argentine Government to pay a quitrent for the station, or by assuring them of the support of the Falklands. Government in the decision to retain the meteorological station in the interests of science, were both rejected on the recommendation of His Majesty's Minister at Buenos Aires." [411]

In the Falklands, *Guvernoren*, a Norwegian whale factory ship, is wrecked at Cape Carysford.

March 23rd, in the Falkland Islands, fur sealing is restricted in the colony and its Dependencies by the *Fur Seal (Consolidation) Ordinance 1921*. This repeals the 1899 legislation. [412]

> *"An attempt was made to establish the fur seal industry, under Government direction, in the latter part of 1921. There were several known rookeries in the group, and the killing of the seal was prohibited except under licence and during the sealing season. By the Seal Fishery Ordinance of 1899 a royalty of 4s. was exacted for each fur seal. There were no effective means of enforcing the provisions of the Ordinance; no licences being taken out in 1921 and no royalties received. It was known, however, that poaching was carried out by sealers from South American ports. The Government purchased an Admiralty drifter for service as an armed patrol boat, established a guard at the main rookery, and*

407 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.345 citing Bernhardson 1989.

408 Stephen Palmer in Tatham (ed) 2008. For a biography. see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/middleton_sir

409 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1920.* Link above.

410 A four-man expedition led by John Lachlan Cope who abandoned the expedition after six weeks, leaving with one other man. The remaining two stayed on until January, 1922; the smallest British expedition to overwinter in Antarctica. See *Two men in the Antarctic: An expedition to Graham Land* Thomas W. Bagshawe 1939

411 *British Foreign Office Memorandum concerning the Falkland Island Dependencies* (undated) held at the University of Tasmania ref: *AU AU ATADD 1-BB-GB-39*

412 Dickinson 2007 pp.114-115 citing *Proclamation No.1 March 23, 1921: Suspension of the Issue of Licences to Kill or Capture the Fur Seal Falkland Islands Gazette XXX no.5 1921*

passed new legislation giving full powers for the prevention of poaching. Preparations were at the same time made for the control and scientific exploitation of the rookeries by the Government, no private sealing licences being issued pending the development of the industry." [413]

"The government naturalist recommended that a 3-inch naval gun be placed on Elephant Jason Island to deter poachers." [414]

April 24th, in the Falklands, a population census identifies 2,087 people present in the archipelago. [415] The resident population of South Georgia is recorded as 1,337, of which three are female.

"Of the 2,087 residents in the Falklands, 712 were children under 15 years of age. Excluding children, 38 persons were found to be unemployed. This is only 3 in excess of the number of persons of over 70 years of age." [416]

May 25th, at Stanley, William A. Harding is appointed Consul for Chile.

An investigation into the potential for oil exploration around the Falklands archipelago is undertaken. [417]

September 12th, at Stanley, Herbert Henniker Heaton arrives as Colonial Secretary. [418]

September 17th, from London, Ernest Shackleton sails in *Quest*, en-route to South Georgia and the Antarctic. Shackleton's objective is to circumnavigate Antarctica.

From South Georgia, following an application for a South Orkney's lease by the 'Tonsberg Whaling Company' for the purpose or erecting a whaling station, Magistrate William Barlas, sails to the South Orkney's to survey the proposed area. [419]

"The site chosen was Borge Bay, Signy Island, and was 500 acres in extent. … The lessee bound himself not to take other animals than whales in the South Orkney Islands, and the ownership of any mineral ore found in the leased territory was reserved to the Crown…" [420]

"In 1921 a magistrate from the Falkland Islands again made a visit, when a land whaling station was established on Signy Island under a Crown lease granted by the Falkland Islands Government. … As to Signy island, we think Great Britain can establish a title." [421]

"… in the 1920s there were some 20 British government personnel permanently stationed on the island." [422]

In **November**, an ex-Royal Navy armed drifter, *Afterglow*, is purchased for the Falklands colony to aid with seal fishery protection; to be supplemented by armed sealing officers stationed on Elephant Jason Island.

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413 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1921*
414 Stephen Palmer in Tatham (ed) 2008
415 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1921* (link below). However, the separate *Report of Census 1921* (See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/People/Census Information Early Settlers/Report of Census 1921.pdf) gives the total as 2,094.
416 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1921*
417 *Final report on geological investigations in the Falkland Islands, 1920-1922* A. Baker 1924
418 Remaining until 1925. *cf.* 1934
419 Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8, 1930 *A 4733/1437/2/1930*
420 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
421 Opinion of the Law Officers 1947 in *LCO 2/4908. cf.* 1947 & 1959
422 Pascoe 2020 p.272

"... utmost discretion will be exercised dealing with raids, to prevent any serious international complications."[423]

December 18th, at Graham Land, the remaining two members of the British Imperial Antarctic expedition are relieved by the Falkland Islands' Dependencies Magistrate, A. G. Bennett, on the factory ship *Svend Foyn I* .

December 23rd, in the Falklands, *Ordinance 7* of 1921 prohibits persons not being in possession of a valid passport from landing in the Colony.

The Falkland Islands annual end-of-year report, notes;

> *"The cost of living in the Colony was comparatively low, despite the necessity in 1921 for paying high freights in addition to European prices for imported articles. There is no income tax and Stanley is a free port except for wines, spirits, malt liquors and tobacco. Agricultural wages were from £1 to £8 a month with quarters, fuel, meat and milk found. Town labourers were paid £11 per month, or 1s. an hour, and tradesmen £15 to £16, or 1s. 4½d. an hour. Mutton cost 3d. a lb., with bread 8d. a lb., milk 1s. a quart and eggs 3d. each. The ordinary cost of living in a boarding house in Stanley 30s. to 60s. a week. ..."* [424]

1922 – January 5th, at South Georgia, Sir Ernest Shackleton suffers a fatal heart attack. [425] A factory ship, *Professor Gruval*, is chartered to take Shackleton's body to Montevideo to facilitate an eventual transfer to England.

On Signy Island, a Whaling Officer spends three months ensuring that the terms of the 'Tönsberg Hvalfangeri Company' lease are being complied with; *"He reported in favour of the construction of breakwaters, and an iron slipway, and as to the month (January) at which the land station came into use in the season."* [426]

In **February**, at Montevideo, a message is received from Lady Shackleton requesting that her husband's body is returned to South Georgia for interment.

March 5th, on South Georgia, Sir Ernest Shackleton is buried in Grytviken cemetery. A ceremonial escort is provided by Uruguay.

"Captain Hussey reports from South Georgia by wireless that after being borne over piles of whalebone and little mountain streams the body of Sir Ernest Shackleton was laid at rest forever in a little hillside cemetery in South Georgia on March 5. His head lies to the southward, towards the Antarctic he loved so well. Over his resting place there is raised a simple wooden cross, bearing wreaths from Lady Shackleton and members of the expedition. Prior to the service in the church, which was of the simplest character, and which was conducted by a magistrate, Mr Binnie, Mrs Aderg, the only woman on the island, placed a bunch of freshly-gathered flowers on the coffin. One hundred whalers were present, the Norwegians singing funeral hymns and the company repeating the Lord's

423 Dickinson 2007 p.114 citing PRO CO 78/159 & 162
424 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1921.* Link above.
425 Shackleton had previously suffered a suspected heart attack while in Rio de Janeiro, but had refused treatment.
426 Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8, 1930 *A 4733/1437/2/1930*

Prayer. Then the coffin was borne on the stalwart shoulders of six Shetlanders, all ex-servicemen, up the hillside, followed by a cortege of islanders. The church bell solemnly tolled while the remainder of the service was conducted at the graveside, the Norwegians singing their funeral hymns. Magnificent wreaths from the Uruguay Government, French Maritime Society and other bodies in Uruguay were placed on the grave." [427]

At Elephant Jason Island, in the Falklands, a guardhouse is erected for three fishery protection officers, with a 12-pounder gun emplaced.

"Seal fishery officers were appointed in 1922 and armed officers were placed at major rookeries during the breeding season. Fur sealing was prohibited. HMCS Afterglow was purchased (at a cost of £8,800) to assist with protection of the rookeries." [428]

April 2nd, in Argentina, Marcelo Torcuato de Alvear is elected President.

May 1st, from Punta Arenas, Chile, Britain's Vice-Consul reports that a British subject, born in the Falklands, was refused a visa by the Argentine Consul on the grounds that he was *ipso facto*, an Argentine citizen. [429]

*"During the twentieth century the Argentine Government have pursued a policy of **pin-pricks** in connexion with their claim to the Falkland Islands... In 1922 the newly elected Argentine Government forbade their consuls to visa British passports of persons born in the Falkland Islands."* [430]

John Hamilton purchases Beaver Island and adjacent islets in the Falklands, from Richard Waldron Thornhill of Punta Arenas, who had inherited them.[431]

The Falkland Islands annual end-of-year report, notes 55 births during 1922, and 15 deaths. The estimated population at the end of the year is 1,205 males, and 937 are females. [432]

> *"The final report by the Geologist appointed by the Government to investigate the mineral resources of the Colony is not yet available, but in a progress report the Geologist stated that given the area under examination he had never seen a series of rocks so barren from the point of view of included minerals."*[433]

427 *Otago Daily Times* May 5, 2022 citing *Times* (no other detail provided)

428 Stephen Palmer in Tatham (ed) 2008. See also *Cambridge Expedition to the Falkland Islands 1977: Report to the National Maritime Museum.*

429 Field 1928 para.189. This appears to mark the beginning of a hardening of attitude by Argentine governments. I can find no specific policies regarding the Falklands in 1922, but what would become known as Argentina's "*pin-pricks*" (annoying, but mostly meaningless gestures) seem to date from this time.

430 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908.* My emphasis.

431 Wayne Bernhardson in Tatham (ed) 2008. An ex-employee of the Falkland Islands Company, Hamilton moved to Chile in 1885 and from there to Argentina. See - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/hamilton_john

432 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1922.* See link above.

433 *Ibid.* The government appointed geologist had arrived at the end of 1920. Photograph above is Grytviken circa 1922



1923 – from Stanley, the Falklands' Governor complains to London that Argentina is refusing to handle telegrams from the colony. [434]

"Enquiries showed that the complaint was justified, and that the telegraphic administration not only refused to forward incoming telegrams but also to accept messages from places in the Republic directed to the islands. It was believed that the orders emanated from the Director of Posts and Telegraphs, and that they were unsupported by any official action or decree of the Government, although possibly the Director was acting in accordance with instructions, or at least hints given by his superiors in pursuance of a definite policy. The matter was brought to the notice of the Argentine Government, who promised to make enquiries." [435]

In London, a Discovery Committee is appointed by the British Government, to be funded by whaling industry taxes; *"... to conduct research into the economic resources of the Antarctic and sub-Antarctic regions, with special reference to the Falkland Islands Dependencies."*

Argentina registers a complaint with the Universal Postal Union.

"Argentina's first claim to sovereign jurisdiction over Antarctic territory appears to have been made in 1923. In that year the Argentine Government registered a protest with the Universal Postal Union against the issuance of a British stamp for the Falkland Islands Dependencies which showed the British Claim as established in Letters Patent of 1917 amending the Letters Patent issued in 1908. Argentina, it was stated,

434 Roberto Laver (*The Falklands/Malvinas Case: Breaking the Deadlock in the Anglo-Argentine Sovereignty Dispute* 2001) states that an instruction by the government had been circulated in Argentina as early as 1919, but I am unable to confirm this. Problems seem to have been intermittent, suggesting that there was no coordinated policy.

435 Field 1928 para.192

exercised "territorial jurisdiction,.. de lure and de facto over its continental surface, its territorial sea and over the islands situated on its sea coast over part of the island of Tierra del Fuegol over...the Islands of Los Estados, Afto Nuevo, the South Georgias, the South Orkneys, and polar areas which have not been delimited".”[436]

July 23rd, at the Hague, the Permanent Court of International Justice gives its advisory opinion in the *Status of Eastern Carelia* case.

> *“It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement.”*[437]

In early **December**, Irish yachtsman Conor O'Brien sights the Falkland Islands in *Saoirse*, a 42-foot ketch. [438]

“The Saoirse struggled somewhat coming West into Port William, and looked with a mixture of relief and scepticism at the steam-launch that came out to tow them in, from Stanley ... O Brien wrote, "I need hardly add I was charged nothing for the tow, for this was a different sort of colony that I had come to..." With Christmas fast approaching, "I was overwhelmed with hospitality".” [439]

December 10th, at Stanley, Henry Herbert Gresham is appointed Consul for Norway.

The Falkland Islands annual end-of-year report, notes that the estimated population at the end of the year is 2,173; of which 967 are females. [440]

1924 – at Stanley, O'Brien assists the colonial secretary, Herbert Henniker-Heaton, in the design of a crest for the Falklands to be used on a new flag.



“Discovering a general preference for both landscape and climate as he headed West, they anchored outside settlements each night, as was the custom. "In a country with only 2,000 inhabitants all told everybody knows everybody else". He, too, seems to have been well-liked by the Islanders. He goes to San Carlos, ostensibly to get the Saoirse’s hull scrubbed (but mainly just to avoid putting back to sea), and, according to the Falkland Islands Magazine and Church Paper, the children of San Carlos were vastly amused to see a grown-up wearing shorts. The adults were pleased to see him because he’d been talked into bringing out their mail. He ends up bouncing up and down the coastline of East Falkland, and experiencing a somewhat "breathless performance" navigating—with advice from a local pilot—the nooks and crannies of the Darwin area. Even the government thought highly enough of O Brien to send him to Antarctica (the British chunk of which was then governed directly from Stanley) to report on the state of the whaling industry there. "Apart from whales", he reported back, "the South Shetland Islands have no excuse for existing". Before he finally departed on the last leg of his epic journey, yet another of his crew maintained tradition by jumping ship, to get married and settle down in Stanley.” [441]

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436 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp08c01297r000800090022-3
437 *Status of Easter Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 PCIJ (ser.B) No.5 (July 23) para.33.* See November, 1982
438 O'Brien had departed Ireland on June 20, 1923.
439 *The Forgotten Irishman* Ash Smyth in *The Emigre* June 2023. O'Brien seems to have remained for two months.
440 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1923.* See link above.
441 *The Forgotten Irishman* A. Smyth 2023

A postal service is inaugurated between South Georgia, the Falkland Islands and Uruguay. [442]

January 30th, at Stanley, Henry Herbert Russell Gresham adds the Consulate of Chile to his consular responsibilities. [443] Shortly after, Uruguay also opens a consulate in Stanley with Gresham as Consul. [444]

June 10th, in Argentina, newspaper *La Prensa*, publishes a list of notable events marking the day.

"Beginning in 1924, the icon of the liberal elite, the newspaper La Prensa, began publishing a discreet anniversary in its "Historic Dates" section, located at the end of the paper between obituaries and crossword puzzles. June 10th was doubly commemorated: that day marked the withdrawal of England from the Islands in 1770, and also in 1829, the government of the province of Buenos Aires created the Malvinas Command. The brief text published in 1924 and invariably repeated thereafter until the early 1940s makes no mention of what happened four years later, as if the British reoccupation of the Islands had never happened." [445]

October 14th, in the Falklands, work commences on the construction of a suspension bridge at Bodie Creek. [446] Designed to shorten the distance from Lafonia to Goose Green, the bridge is ordered in kit form from 'David Rowell & Co' of London, at a cost of £2,281. [447]

The Falklands annual end-of-year report, notes that the estimated population at the end of the year is 2,197. [448]

1925 – in **February**, on South Georgia, Britain establishes a base for scientists – Discovery House. [449]

"The Marine Biological Station at South Georgia is situated in the harbour of Grytviken, near the whaling station of the Compania Argentina de Pesca. It is a wooden house, designed to withstand a severe climate, and has accommodation for seven persons. In addition to the living rooms there is a large laboratory equipped for biological and chemical research, a small rough laboratory and a workshop." [450]

March 7th, *Swona* sinks off South Georgia.

April 1st, at Husvik Harbour, Britain erects a wireless station. Seven deer are released.

In the South Orkney Islands, on Laurie Island, Argentina establishes a wireless station at the meteorological facility.

June 23rd, from London, with regard to the Laurie Island wireless station, Britain's Minister at Buenos Aires; *"... was instructed to inform them that the necessary licence would be granted but they should have applied for it beforehand, and that they must make application for a call-sign through the Governor of the Falkland Islands, whereupon a call-signal from the list of groups reserved for stations in the British Empire would be allotted."* [451]

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442 Headland 1992

443 *The London Gazette No.32905, No.32892 & No.32999.* By the end of 1924, Gresham was the Consular representative for Chile, Italy, Norway, Sweden, and Uruguay. For a list of Foreign Consuls in the Falkland Islands, see - https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/foreign-consuls-in-the-falkland-islands.pdf

444 Not protested by Argentina until 1952. In November, Gresham added Sweden to his list.

445 *Erigiendo una causa nacional a partir de un reclamo desconocido. Malvinas durante el priodo de entreguerras* José Benciowicz 2025

446 See - https://bodiecreekbridge.com/index.html

447 See below.

448 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1924.* See link above.

449 Field 1928 para.232. Part of the Discovery Investigations. See below.

450 *Report on the progress of the Discovery Committee's investigations* 1937. See - https://www.nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Discovery Expeditions/R-DEP-DIS-1-9. Report on the Progree of the Discovery Committees Investigations.pdf

451 Field 1928 in *FO 371/12735/98*

Argentina's Foreign Ministry responds that; *"With regard to wireless stations constructed in Argentine territory the Republic would act in accordance with the provisions of the International Radiotelegraphic Conventions, of which they were signatories."* [452]

"The position with regard to the South Orkneys Islands is greatly complicated, in our view, by the meteorological station established by the Argentine in Laurie Island (1904) and by the wireless station established there later on by the Argentine in 1925. ... The wireless station established in 1925 by the Argentine was not established pursuant to any permission in that behalf by HM Government." [453]

"... from about 1925 onwards Argentina slowly began to suggest that it was raising a claim to all the Falkland Islands Dependencies,.." [454]

In the South Orkney Islands, at Bruce Bay, the Tönsberg Hvalfangeri Company*'s* lease of 500 acres is renewed for a five year period.

"The rent of the Tonsberg Company's lease is £250 per annum, the fee for an additional whale catcher is £100 per annum, and the dues are paid on barrelage at a rate which has fluctuated considerably, but at present is 2s 6d per barrel. The total revenue to the Government from last season's Orkney Islands whaling was £6,000 and during the last five years it totals £26,000." [455]

In the Falkland Islands, *Aliens Ordinance 1925* prohibits any foreigner from owning land without a licence.

July 31st, at Stanley, Albert Newing is recognised as Consular Agent for France.

Henry Herbert Russell Gresham is confirmed as Consul for Uruguay.

September 24th, from the port of London, the first *Discovery Investigations* team sails for Antarctica aboard RSS *Discovery*.

"The main purpose of the investigations undertaken by the Discovery Committee is to carry out research on the economic resources of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. Since whaling is at present the only industry which is carried on to any large extent in the Antarctic the work is primarily concerned with the biology of whales: and in view of this and of the migratory habits of whales it has spread in time over most of the Antarctic." [456]

October 1st, at Ice Fjord, South Georgia, *Granat* sinks. The crew are rescued by the whale catcher *Semla*.

In the South Orkney Islands, at Signy Island, a Whaling Officer arrives for 3 months to ensure that the terms of the 'Tonsberg Hvalfangeri Company' lease are being complied with. [457]

October 31st, in the Falklands, work on Bodie Creek Bridge is completed.

452 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908. cf.* 1926
453 Opinion of the Law Officers 1947 in *LCO 2/4908. cf.* 1903, 1904 & 1947
454 Pascoe 2020 p.272
455 Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8, 1930 *A 4733/1437/2/1930*
456 *Report on the progress of the Discovery Committee's investigations* 1937.

In **December**, Capitán Guillermo Nuñes, 'Compañia Argentina de Pesca' shareholder, visits Stanley. Nuñes, Commodore of the Buenos Aires Yacht Club, agrees to present a prize for a sailing race. [458]

"The behaviour of Nuñes, and of "Pesca" over several decades, together with the complete lack of any Argentine reaction to Britain's administration of South Georgia and the other Falkland Islands Dependencies, prevented any possible Argentine claim to those territories." [459]

The Falkland Islands annual end-of-year report, notes that the estimated population is 2,252. [460]

1926 – April 14th, in Buenos Aires, a further diplomatic *Note* is addressed to Argentina's Foreign Ministry regarding the issue of a telegraphic licence for the South Orkney Islands.

"His Majesty's Minister, acting on instructions, informed the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs, ... that, while the precise meaning of (Argentina's reply) was not clear, His Majesty's Government did not interpret it as an assertion of sovereignty over islands which were undoubtedly British on the grounds of discovery and formal taking of possession, and to which no Argentine Government appeared ever to have put forward a claim in any communication to His Majesty's Government." [461]

Argentina's government makes no response.[462]

April 26th, in the Falkland Islands, RSS *Discovery* arrives at Stanley.

"The coming of the Discovery to Port Stanley was for them an event, as was indeed the coming of any ship, for practically the only vessels that called were those of the six-weekly mail service from South America and Europe. But the Discovery was a special event; we flew the Falkland islands flag. It was largely for the benefit of the Falkland Islands Government that we were investigating the whaling and the people took us to their hearts." [463]

John Hamilton, a sheep farmer based in Argentina, secures permission from the Falklands government to introduce Patagonian (grey) foxes (*Dusicyon griseus*) on to Staats and Tea Islands. An attempt to control numbers of the Uplands Goose (*Cholephaga picta*).[464]

"In addition to foxes, Hamilton introduced into the Falkland Islands a myriad of Patagonian wildlife species: Austral parakeets or parrots (Enicgnathus ferrugineus), buff-necked Ibis (Theristicus melanopis), lesser rheas (Pterocnemia pennata) (incorrectly called 'ostriches' by local residents), hog-nosed skunks (Conepatus humboldtii), sea otters (Lutra felina), and guanacos. Rheas, a male and female, and several skunks were released on Staats Island." [465]

"Hamilton kept a close watch on the Falklands and, when opportunities arose, he began to acquire property there. ... he purchased Weddell Island and the Passage Islands, and attempted to buy the Jason Islands. Government objections prevented his buying the Jasons, which were Crown Reserves, but he managed to

457 Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8, 1930 *A 4733/1437/2/1930* .
458 *Falkland Islands Magazine* December 1925 p.6
459 Pascoe 2020 p.272
460 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1925.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1911 to 1930.pdf
461 *FO 371/12735/152.* See 1825
462 *Antarctica Cases: United Kingdom v. Argentine; United Kingdom v Chile* International Court of Justice 1956 p.25.
463 *To the Ends of the Earth* Francis K. Pease 1935 p.29
464 The foxes would eventually become a bigger pest than the geese. While living in Argentina, Hamilton (born Caithness) remained a British citizen and maintained a large sum in Stanley's Government Savings Bank. See 1922, above.
465 *The enigma of guanacos in the Falkland Islands: the legacy of John Hamilton* William L. Franklin & Melissa M. Grigione 2005.

acquire Saunders Island from the estate of W.D. Benney in the mid-1930s. He also owned property in Stanley."[466]

August 14th, at Stanley, Monsieur Beaudrier is appointed Vice-Consul for Belgium.

In Chile, Argentina's Consul-General at Valparaiso grants a visa for a Falkland Islander to enter Argentina – with a reservation; *"... the principle of Argentine nationality of these (islands) is maintained and they shall be included within the jurisdiction of the national territory."* [467]

October 19th, in London, the seventh Imperial Conference opens; bringing together the Prime Ministers of the UK, Australia, Canada, India, Irish Free State, Newfoundland, New Zealand and South Africa.

November 22nd, the Imperial Conference concludes, with the final statement confirming that all the dominions are equal and; *"... autonomous communities within the British Empire."* [468]

"The 1926 Imperial Conference ratified that, "The whole of the Antarctic should ultimately be included within the British Empire ... a definite and consistent policy should be followed of extending and asserting British control with the object of ultimately making it complete." [469]

December 20th, Argentina protests the inclusion of the Falklands within the Brussels Health Convention. [470]

"... even though it is a simple communication of notice, given by a third Power, I consider that, upon acknowledging receipt of the same, it is appropriate to inform the Minister of Belgium, so that he may inform his government, that the Argentine Republic maintains its protest against the undue occupation of the Malvinas Islands, carried out by Great Britain." [471]

December 22nd, Arnold Wienholt Hodson is gazetted as Governor of the Falkland Islands. [472]

The Falkland Islands annual end-of-year report, notes that the estimated population is 2,271.

> *"The Government of the Colony of the Falkland Islands and its Dependencies is administered by a Governor aided by an Executive Council composed of three official members and one unofficial member, and a Legislative Council composed of three official and two unofficial members. The unofficial members of the Legislative Council are appointed by Warrant under the Royal Sign Manual and Signet for a term not exceeding five years. ...*
>
> *The works under the Stanley Improvement Scheme, to which reference has been made in previous reports and which comprise a water supply and a drainage system for the town of Stanley as well as the reconstruction of the principal roads at a total cost of £35,000, made good progress during the year, and at the present rate there is little doubt but that they will be completed within the time anticipated, early in 1928. The drainage system was completed during 1926 and brought into use; the water supply, including mains and public fountains, was also completed with the exception of the reservoir; and Ross Road and other principal streets in the town were relaid and provided with a pavement or with a kerb and gutter.*

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466 Wayne Bernhardson in Tatham (ed) 2008. Following questions as to the property rights of his Argentine heirs (via his younger daughter), Hamilton's holdings were incorporated in Jersey. Sold off by the Hamilton estate in 1987.

467 Quoted in Field 1928 para.195

468 Known as the *Balfour Declaration*

469 Ellerby 1990 p.68 citing *A Cold War; Britain, Argentina and Antarctica* Peter J. Beck in *History Today* June 1987

470 Kohen & Rodriguez 2016 p.247

471 Dr. Isidoro Ruiz Moreno, legal advisor to the Argentine Foreign Ministry. No protest was made to the British Government.

472 *The London Gazette No.33241*. For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/hodson_sir

Further development was again observed during the year in the introduction and use locally of motor vehicles. In the country districts particularly it is becoming practicable by the extension and improvement of tracks to travel for increasing distances by motor-car." [473]

1927 – January 7th, at Stanley, *Ilen* (Conor O'Brien) anchors in the port, carrying the emblem of the Royal Irish Yacht Club.

January 17th, on South Georgia, Leith Harbour and Stromness Bay are surveyed.

From Port Stanley, a sealing licence for the South Sandwich Islands is taken out by the *Tönsberg Company*.

"... the expanding Whaling industry induced A/S Tönsberg Hvalfangeri to send one of their catchers, the Busen VII under captain H. Hansen, to prospect for whales in South Sandwich waters... The expedition reported that whales were plentiful, and notwithstanding the lack of anchorages and fresh water, the Tönsberg Company applied for a licence to work round the islands." [474]

In Geneva, Switzerland, Britain attends a meeting of the 'Whaling Committee of the International Council for the Exploration of the Sea' to discuss whaling regulations in all waters. Argentina is absent.

"Not, in 1927, although she was a member of the League of Nations and had recently formulated pretensions to the South Orkneys and South Georgia, did Argentina take any part in the Whaling Conference convened at Geneva in that year, under the auspices of the League, which, if she had had sovereignty over these territories, she might be expected to have done. Nor did she voice any objection to the fact that the United Kingdom took a leading part in that conference in its capacity as the State responsible for the regulation of whaling in the Falkland Island Dependencies." [475]

In **February**, at Signy Island, in the South Orkney's group, RSS *Discovery* encounters the Norwegian factory ship *Orwell*.

"The whaling industry had become the principal source of revenue and a major source of contention in the Falklands ... An unexpected development during (this) period was the abandonment of the old floating factories moored in harbours and subject to governmental control, and their replacement by new factory ships operating on the high seas with, at the time, no regulation. This caused the deliberations on preserving the whaling industry of the Islands and Dependencies, by conservation of whale stocks, to become increasingly complex." [476]

At Port Stanley, HMS *Capetown* anchors. [477]

March 22nd, from Berne, in Switzerland, the Universal Postal Union (UPU) circulates a letter to all its members requesting details of their territorial jurisdictions. [478]

April 6th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's *charge d'affaires* reports to London that the Argentine wireless station on Laurie Island has commenced operations, using the call sign – L.R.Z.

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473 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1926.* See link above.
474 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/490*
475 *Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, May, 1955.* In fact, Argentina had withdrawn from the League of Nations in December, 1920, and would not return until 1933.
476 *Hodson, Sir Arnold Wienholt* Robert Headland in Tatham (ed) 2008
477 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1927*
478 *International Law Documents: 1948 – 1949* Naval War College, Rhode Island 1950 vol.xlvi

"No application for a licence or a proper call sign had been made through the Governor of the Falkland Islands. ... Enquiry was at once made of the International Telegraphic Bureau at Berne as to whether any notification respecting a call sign for the station had been made by the Argentine Government, and, if so, in what terms. The reply of the Bureau showed that the Argentine Government had applied for a call signal two years before, and that their notification to the Bureau was of such a nature as to imply an assumption of Argentine sovereignty over the islands,.." [479]

Laurie Island Argentine radio crew May, 1927

"The Admiralty and Colonial Office held that the matter could not be allowed to rest where it was, and pressed for further action at Buenos Aires." [480]

May 17th, at Stanley, a four-masted barque, *Fennia*, is towed into the harbour; demasted in a storm.[481]

June 8th, Arnold Wienholt Hodson arrives in the Falklands, to be sworn in as Governor. [482]

July 9th, Britain's mission to Argentina is elevated from a Legation to an Embassy, with Malcolm Robertson rising from Envoy Extraordinary and Minister Plenipotentiary to Ambassador.

August 2nd, from Stanley, Governor Hodson sails to South Georgia in *Fleurus*. [483]

August 20th, the *Falkland Islands Reform League* claim that Falkland Islands Company wages have; *"... been kept as low as possible to allow Owners of farms to live in luxury abroad."* [484]

479 Field 1928 paras.253/254
480 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
481 Declared irreparable, *Fennia* was purchased by the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) and used as a coal hulk.
482 For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/hodson_sir
483 Headland 1992. This was the first visit by a Governor to the Dependencies.
484 *CO 78/207/25*

"The FIC was offended by the League's claim ... The Company's treatment of employees was a source of pride. For example the FIC established a Provident Fund and provided free housing, meat, fuel and milk, as well as a school and assembly hall in Darwin." [485]

August 22nd, Frederick Black Alison is appointed Magistrate and Postmaster at South Georgia. [486]

September 8th, in Berne, Switzerland, Britain formally protests to the International Telegraphic Bureau regarding Argentina's unilateral application for a call-sign for the Laurie Island wireless station.

"The notification to the Berne Bureau appears, ... to imply the assumption of Argentine sovereignty over the islands an assumption which, as Your Excellency will readily understand, His Majesty's Government could not admit though the meteorological station was, with their assent, handed over to the Argentine Government in 1904 by a British subject. I am, therefore, instructed by Sir Austen Chamberlain to point out to Your Excellency in the most friendly manner that the present position as regards the wireless station is quite irregular, and to express the hope that the matter may be placed upon a proper footing at an early date by application for a British Licence for the station." [487]

"... the Foreign Office decided that an official protest should be issued against the erection of an Argentine wireless station on Laurie Island. In this case the timing of the delivery of this protest was considered important. It was delayed until the Admiralty Director of Naval Intelligence advised that orders for the most valuable part of the Argentine naval programme would not be awarded to British companies either immediately or in the near future." [488]

In London, Britain's Foreign Office study a newly published book – *The Struggle for the Falkland Islands* – by an American, Julius Goebel. [489] Ambassador Robertson is asked to comment.

> *"The book has been quoted in the press here, but I abide by my view that we should take no notice. No-one seriously expects us to evacuate the islands."* [490]

"This book looks like a thesis prepared by a young lawyer for some examination. It may, however, have been produced as a recreation in the intervals of strenuous duty as 'legal adviser to the Legation of Switzerland' in Washington." [491]

"Julius Ludwig Goebel, jun. (1892-1973), son of a German immigrant to the United States, is mainly remembered for The Struggle for the Falkland Islands, which has had an influence out of all proportion to its content. ... Parts of it are still useful, especially some of the documents he quotes and his bibliography, but it has severe shortcomings: his account of the discovery of the islands has been superseded; he wrongly states that Spain knew more than Britain about the Falklands in the 1760s; he muddles the question of Spain's acquisition of France's rights; he wrongly assumes that there was a secret promise by Britain in the 1770s to vacate the islands; he wrongly states that Spain made a reservation of Spanish rights in 1771; he totally misinterprets the Nootka Sound Convention of 1790; he confuses Jewett's and Vernet's letters; he fails to

485 Ellerby 1990 p.37

486 Only in position for two months, it appears that his appointment was solely to organise a memorial service for Sir Ernest Shackleton. See - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/alison_frederick

487 *FO 371/12735/180.* Colonial Office and Admiralty proposals for a more robust protest were rejected. *cf.* January, 1928

488 *The Role of the Royal Navy in South America, 1920-1970: Showing the Flag* Jon Wise 2014

489 Influential, if inaccurate. It was only in the 1960's that Goebel's conclusions, and details of his research, were first subjected to academic scrutiny. Republished in 1982, Goebel's book has an introduction by Prof. Metford who clearly viewed the work with some disdain. It is still much referred to in Argentina; whose case regarding the Falkland Islands the work favoured.

490 *FO 371/12735/178*

491 *Memorandum* of Mr. V. A. L. Mallet April 2, 1928 *FO 371/12735/180*

mention the Spanish claim of 1822 to all South American possessions (though he had mentioned it in his doctoral thesis), or the Spanish protest in 1825 to Britain against the recognition of South American countries; he gives an inaccurate account of the Lexington raid of 1831-2, and he misrepresents Britain's motives for sending HMS Clio. ... The Swiss historian Jörg Fisch has analysed Goebel's accounts of several 17th and 18th century treaties, and concludes that Goebel confuses and conflates the treaties themselves and the Spanish intentions behind them." [492]

In the Falkland Islands, the *Penguin* daily newspaper is established. [493]

September 9th, in Buenos Aires, a circular issued by Argentina's Post Office, gives instructions that all postal relations with the Falkland Islands are suspended, "*by superior orders*." [494]

"... a despatch and a letter addressed to the Governor of the Falklands by the British Consulate-General in Buenos Aires were "returned by superior orders" in the one case, and refused in the other." [495]

September 14th, Argentina's Director of Posts and Telegraphs responds to the Universal Postal Union's request of March, 1927, regarding territory.

> *"With reference to your circular letter number 2.122/53 of last 22 March concerning a request for information concerning the territorial jurisdiction of each administration of the Postal Union, I have the honor to request you to inform the various offices of the Postal Union that Argentine territorial jurisdiction extends de jure and de facto to the continental area, to the territorial sea and the islands situated along the maritime coast, to a part of the Island of Tierra del Fuego, to the archipelagos of Los Estados, Ario Nuevo, South Georgia, and South Orkneys, and to polar territories which have not been delimited. De jure, the Archipelago of the Malvinas also belongs to this jurisdiction, but it cannot be exercised de facto because of the occupation maintained by Great Britain."* [496]

*"What appears to have been the **first claim of an official nature** advanced by the Argentine Government **to sovereignty over South Georgia** was made in 1927, when the Argentine Postal Administration notified the International Postal Union that Argentine territorial jurisdiction extended de jure and de facto over the South Orkney Islands and South Georgia. By the words de facto it can only be assumed that the Argentine Government referred to the concession granted to the .., Argentina de Pesca, which still maintained its whaling and sealing operation at Grytviken,.."* [497]

"His Majesty's Government determined not to overlook this further provocative action, especially as it was also rumoured that the Argentine Government intended to raise its claim to the Falkland Islands before the Pan-American Conference at Havana, with the alleged "unofficial" support of the Pan-American Union." [498]

"Argentina views the Falklands dispute as intrinsically involving all the British-claimed islands,.. in Argentinian eyes, the express linking of the Dependencies with the Falkland Islands (by Britain) has no doubt been perceived as a way of legalistically bolstering what might otherwise be a weak claim..." [499]

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492 Pascoe 2020 p.268
493 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1928*
494 Field 1928 para.202
495 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
496 *FO 371/12735/137*
497 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908.* My emphasis.
498 *Ibid.*
499 Symmons 1984

September 18th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Robertson reminds the Argentine Foreign Ministry of his note of April 14, 1926.

"... he had to point out that the present position as regards the wireless station was quite irregular, and to express the hope that the matter might be placed on a proper footing at an early date by an application for a British licence." [500]

October 5th, Ambassador Robertson writes to Governor Hodson regarding the obstructive practices being employed by Argentina's postal services; *".. most unfortunately, and to my mind, most foolishly the feeling of the Argentines on the subject of the Falkland islands is very strong, though they have not even a little toe on which to stand they maintain their claim... The whole position is most ridiculous. ... The Falkland Islands are to Argentine what Gibraltar is to Spain. One must not even mention them..."* [501]

October 6th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Robertson presents a copy of the September Post Office circular to the Under-Secretary of Argentine Foreign Affairs who; *"... at once said that the orders must have been issued by some over-zealous official and that he would have them withdrawn. He would shortly reply to that effect but putting in the phrase "without prejudice to Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands". He explained that, in view of public opinion in the country, no Argentine Government would ever dare formally to renounce that claim."* [502]

October 14th, in Switzerland, the Universal Postal Union publishes the declarations of jurisdictions supplied by its members. [503]

> *"Argentina's territorial jurisdiction extends, in law and in fact, over the land surface, the territorial sea, the islands situated on the coast, to a part of Tierra del Fuego and the archipelagos of Estados, Año Nuevo, South Georgia, South Orkney and the undelimited polar lands. Of right, being unable to exercise in fact because of the occupation held by Britain, the Malvinas archipelago also belongs [to Argentina]."* [504]

In Stanley, a South Sandwich Islands Whaling Licence is issued to the 'Tonsberg Company' of Norway, by the Governor of the Falkland Islands. [505]

November 4th, Governor Hodson responds to Robertson's intelligence about Argentina's postal policy.

> *"We could make ourselves extremely unpleasant if we wished to by stopping the mails going to them from this Colony and refusing to renew the whaling licence of any Argentine company operating in these waters. I hate being petty, but we shall be forced to do something to protect our own interests if they do not mend their ways..."* [506]

December 14th, from London, the Foreign Office instruct Ambassador Robertson to demand that Buenos Aires withdraws its submission to the Postal Union.

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500 *FO 371/12736/360*
501 *(Enclosure 2) Sir M. Robertson to Sir Austen Chamberlain December 19, 1927* in *FO 371/1273*
502 Field 1928 para.203
503 Declarations, not protests.
504 Quoted in *The Malvinas/Falklands Between History and Law* M. G. Kohen & F. D. Rodríguez 2017 pp.188-189. See also Field 1928 para.209
505 *Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, May, 1955*
506 *(Enclosure 3) Sir M. Robertson to Sir Austen Chamberlain December 19, 1927* in *FO 371/1273*

December 15th, in Buenos Aires, the Foreign Ministry responds to the British protest of September 8th, stating that Argentina's claim to the South Orkney Islands; *"... is derived apart from other inalienable rights, from first **effective occupation**, constantly maintained."* [507]

From the Embassy, displaying a dramatic reversal of opinion, Robertson answers Hodson's November 4th letter.

> *"... if you read with care the Foreign Office memorandum of 7 December 1910, you must surely have realised that the Argentine attitude is neither 'ridiculous' nor 'childish', as you describe it and I myself had thought it to be. I confess that, until I received that memorandum myself a few weeks ago, I had no idea of the strength of the Argentine case nor of the weakness of ours ... I freely admit that my attitude has changed since I wrote to you on 5th October. This has been caused by the Foreign Office memorandum. I had assumed that our right to the Falkland Islands was unassailable. This is very far from being the case."* [508]

December 16th, in London, British Foreign Secretary Sir Austin Chamberlain meets with Argentina's Foreign Minister, Angel Gallardo. Chamberlain raises the declaration by Argentina to the Universal Postal Union.

> *"2. I ... made use of the opportunity to speak to him on the subject of the Falkland Islands... I made it plain to Dr. Gallardo that I did not wish to embarrass the Argentine Government by forcing them to any embarrassing retraction of their claim, but this was a very different thing from being compelled by indiscretion on their part – i.e., by the action taken at Berne, which I would hope was only the result of an excès de zèle on the part of an irresponsible postal official – to rebut their ill-founded claim in a manner which might prove as embarrassing to them as detrimental to good relations on either side. I asked his Excellency... to desist from such useless and provocative action...*
>
> *3. **Dr. Gallardo said that he had been recently looking into the question of the Falkland Islands, and had come to the conclusion that our position and claim there were exceedingly strong**...*
>
> *4. Dr. Gallardo said that in any case he would at once telegraph to his Government urging that no action should be taken or contemplated with regard to the Falkland Islands pending his return..."* [509]

Chamberlain also raises a circulating rumour that; *"... some question of the matter (would be) raised at the Pan-American Conference to be held at Havana..."*

"Dr. Gallardo said ... He was sure that there was no question of raising the matter at the Pan-American Conference,..." [510]

December 19th, in Buenos Aires, Britain formally protests Argentina's pretensions made to the Universal Postal Union in a diplomatic *aide-memoire* delivered by Britain's Ambassador to Dr. Sagarna, Argentina's Acting-Foreign Minister.

> *"In a circular dated the 14th October last, the International Bureau of the International Postal Union circulated observations furnished by a number of participating Governments in regard to the extent of territories over which they claimed jurisdiction. His Britannic Majesty's Government note with surprise and sincere regret that among these observations was a formal declaration by the Argentine Postal*

507 Note by T. M. Snow, dated December 5, 1928 in *FO 371/12736/350.* My emphasis. See 1903 & 1904, above.
508 *(Enclosure 4) Ibid* in *FO 371/12735.* Quoted in Beck 1983. The terms 'ridiculous' and 'childish' had been used by Governor Hodson in his letter of November 4, 1927. The reference to the *memorandum* of 1910 is clearly a reference to the de Bernhardt research of that year. The fact that Robertson had only received it after being raised up to Ambassador would indicate that the 1910 internal *memo* had been limited in its circulation.
509 *A 7276/381/2*. My emphasis. Quoted in Pascoe 2020 p.266. Quoted in part in Kohen & Rodriguez 2016 p.249.
510 Field 1928 para.215

Administration that Argentine territorial jurisdiction extends de jure and de facto over the South Orkney Islands and South Georgia and de jure over the Falkland Islands, de facto jurisdiction over the latter being prevented by British occupation. It appears, therefore, that Argentine authorities have now gone out of the way to assert … a formal claim to the above islands, which have been in uninterrupted British occupation for a century.…" [511]

Ambassador Robertson reports.

"As I had anticipated, Dr. Sagarna did not have much to say, as he is not very familiar with foreign affairs. He … stated that Argentina felt she had a good claim to the islands. I replied that we were fully aware of that, and that the Argentine Government were constantly maintaining their claim to us in writing. This was, however, a wholly different matter from allowing their Postal Administration to go out of its way to assert the claim to an international body. The Argentine Government must surely realise that His Majesty's Government had not the smallest intention of evacuating the islands, and it seemed a pity that a Government Department should take action that could not but stir up ill-feeling... I told him that we should be compelled to reply to the circular if it were not withdrawn." [512]

December 27th, Argentina's Minister for Foreign Affairs responds to Britain's *aide-memoire* in a *Note*.

"... I find myself having to ratify the statements contained in the Note addressed to Your Excellency from this Department on November 30th, 1925, which reaffirm the sovereignty of the Republic over those (South Orkney) islands. This Government therefore regrets that they are unable to share the opinion of His Britannic Majesty's Government since all the antecedents of the case confirm the legal position of the Government regarding sovereignty, which is derived, apart from other inalienable rights, from first effective occupation, constantly maintained." [513]

Ambassador Robertson reports to London; *"This is the first time, to my knowledge, that such a definite claim has been put forward, and you may think it worth while that I should enquire when the "first effective occupation" took place. Though reference is made to the very vague Note from the Ministry … of November 30th, 1925, … my reply of April 14th, 1926… is completely ignored."* [514]

Accompanying the Argentine *Note*, is a suggestion that negotiations for a Legation site in exchange for the South Orkney Islands should be resumed, provided that use of the word '*cession*' can be avoided. [515]

"… At the same time, however, the Argentine Government in an accompanying memorandum showed itself conscious of the weakness of its position by suggesting the reopening of the negotiations for the exchange of the islands against the grant of a Legation site in Buenos Aires." [516]

December 28th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Robertson informs London that Argentina intends to resume the interrupted postal service to the Falklands; *"… provided the Ministry of the Interior makes a previous declaration that such fact does not lessen in the slightest degree the previously expressed right of Argentine sovereignty and that it cannot be invoked by any country to the detriment of such right."* [517]

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511 *FO 371/127*. The *aide-memoir* itself was dated the 17th.
512 *Ibid.*
513 *FO 371/12735/107.* Not received until the 27th, Argentina's *Note* was dated the 15th.
514 *FO 371/12735/104*
515 *FO 371/12735/105.* Robertson referred to this document as an '*unofficial suggestion*.' *cf.* 1914
516 *Antarctica Cases: United Kingdom v. Argentine; United Kingdom v Chile* International Court of Justice 1956 p.25
517 *FO 371/12735/117*

At the South Sandwich Islands, a whaling factory ship, *Anglo-Norse*, works under a British licence and with a *Discovery* biologist aboard. The islands of Bristol, Montagu and Thule are visited and examined.

At Signy Island, a Whaling Officer spends 3 months ensuring that the terms of the 'Tonsberg Hvalfangeri Company' lease are being complied with. [518]

The Falkland Islands annual end-of-year report, notes an estimated population 2,286. [519]

1928 – in **January**, South Georgia postal clerk Alfred Jones complains of shortages.

> *"... the two and a halfpenny denomination is the postage for letter rate to Norway and we have about 2,000 Norwegians engaged in the whaling industry, more or less 2,000 more Norwegians than two and a halfpenny stamps."*

January 20th, from Buenos Aires, responding to Britain's protest of September 8, 1927, regarding the wireless station on Laurie Island, the Argentine Government states that; *"... they could not admit the British position, and that they themselves laid claim to the South Orkneys, ..."* [520]

"On the 20th January, 1928, the Argentine Ministry for Foreign Affairs replied to (an) aide-memoire ... It stated that if it were true that from 1833 the Falkland Islands had been under British occupation, it was not the less true that from that date and on various occasions the Argentine Government had protested against such occupation and against the act that gave rise to it. As regards the South Orkneys the Argentine Government stated that all the antecedents confirmed the legal position of the Argentine Republic in the sovereignty over those islands, which she derived from other inalienable rights, from first effective occupation, constantly maintained." [521]

"Again in 1928 the Argentine Foreign Office reiterated this claim to the Universal Postal Union in connection with Argentina's establishment of a radio station at the South Orkney's base, and to the British Government which had protested the installation of the station. These protests and the exchange of notes with the British appear to have had no repercussions when made and there is no evidence that the Argentine Government made any serious attempt to develop its claims to sovereignty in Antarctica until more than a decade later."[522]

January 27th, Argentina forwards a *memorandum* to the British Government.

> *"... acknowledging the receipt of the Pro-Memoire sent by the British Embassy on December 17th last, regarding the declaration made by the Argentine Postal Administration concerning the territorial jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic over the Falkland Islands, the South Orkneys and South Georgia. With regard to the Falkland Islands, this Chancery must state, ... that if it is true that from 1833 those islands have been under British occupation, it is not the less true that from that date and on **various occasions** the Argentine Government protested against such occupation and against the act which gave rise to it. ..."* [523]

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518 Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8, 1930 *A 4733/1437/2/1930*
519 See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1911 to 1930.pdf
520 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908. cf.* 1927
521 *Falkland Islands and Dependencies* H. Godwin 1936 para.1 in *FO 371/22499.* For a link, see 1936, below.
522 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link
523 Copy in *FO 371/12736/374.* My emphasis. There had been no Argentine protest for more than 30 years following the Treaty of 1850; nor any direct Argentine Government to British Government protest after 1888. Protesting to third parties, does not qualify as a diplomatic protest. *cf.* 1849/50

January 30th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador receives a notification from the superintendent of the 'Western Telegraph Company' that it is to renew the telegraph service between Argentina and the Falkland Islands.

From Stanley, Compania Argentina de Pesca*'s* lease at Grytviken, South Georgia is renewed for a further 21 years. Under clause 4(c) the company is required to keep a record of meteorological observations taken at the weather station.[524]

February 2nd, Falkland Islands Governor, Arnold Hodson, sails on *SS Flearus* to visit the Dependencies.

February 24th, at South Georgia, Hodson unveils a granite memorial to Sir Ernest Shackleton purchased by public subscription – inscribed; *"I hold that a man should strive to the uttermost for his life's set prize."* The Governor also inaugurates the first South Georgia sports meeting, and opens a rifle range at Hope Point. Hodson then sails for Signy Islands in the South Orkney group.

At Stanley, a monument is unveiled commemorating the Battle of the Falklands 1914 (right).

> *"The memorial erected at Stanley by public subscription among Falkland Islanders in the Colony and in the United Kingdom to commemorate the Naval Victory of the 8th of December, 1914, was unveiled with due ceremony on the 26th of February, 1928, by the Acting Governor, His Excellency Lieut.-Colonel A. E. Beattie, C.B.E., M.C., and was dedicated by His Lordship the Bishop of the Falkland Islands, the Right Reverend N. S. de Jersey, D.D., in the presence of a landing party from H.M.S. " Capetown " present for the occasion and of the largest number of people believed to have assembled at once in the history of the Colony."* [525]

March 2nd, in London, an internal Foreign Office *memorandum* notes that; *"Sir Austen Chamberlain feels that the failure of the Argentine Government to comply with the request for the withdrawal of the notification made at Berne leaves HMG with no alternative but to take corrective action at Berne."* [526]

"As the Argentine authorities had gone out of their way to assert ... a formal claim to these islands, it was felt that this further provocative action on their part could not be overlooked." [527]

April 1st, at Stanley, a working day of eight hours is introduce.

> *"The new working day has not been applied to the Camp nor is it necessarily intended or desirable that it should so be applied by reason of the greatly differing conditions which obtain in the Camp and in Stanley."* [528]

April 4th, at the Hague, in the Netherlands, the Permanent Court of Arbitration declares its findings in the *Islas de Palmas* Case. In relation to sovereignty, the relevance of geography (contiguity) has been considered.

> *"Although states have in certain circumstances maintained that islands relatively close to their shores belonged to them in virtue of their geographical situation, it is impossible to show the existence of a rule of positive international law to the effect that islands situated outside territorial waters should*

524 A weather station was required to be maintained within the ground area of the lease, however it was actually situated at King Edward Point, about half a mile away. Nothing appears to have been done about this.
525 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1927.* Published 1929
526 *FO 371/12735/138*
527 *FO 371/18634* quoted in *Research Problems in Studying Britain's Latin American Past: The Case of the Falklands Dispute 1920-1950* Peter J. Beck 1983 (2)
528 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1928*

belong to a state from the mere fact that its territory forms the terra firma (nearest continent or island of considerable size). Not only would it seem that there are no precedents sufficiently frequent and sufficiently precise in their bearing to establish such a rule of international law, but the alleged principle itself is by its very nature so uncertain and contested that even governments of the same state have on different occasions maintained contradictory opinions as to its soundness.

The principle of contiguity, in regard to islands, may not be out-of-place when it is a question of allotting them to one state rather than another, either by agreement between the parties, or by a decision not necessarily based on law; but as a rule establishing ipso jure the presumption of sovereignty in favour of a particular state, this principle would be in conflict with what has been said as to territorial sovereignty ... Nor is this principle of contiguity admissible as a legal method of deciding questions of territorial sovereignty; for it is wholly lacking in precision and would in its application lead to arbitrary results...." [529]

At the Falkland Islands, Dr. Alfredo Palacios, an Argentine socialist politician, visits Port Stanley.

A Falkland Islands Sheep Owners Association is formed.

In **May**, HMS *Amazon* and HMS *Ambuscade* visit Port Stanley.

May 30th, Britain's Postmaster-General writes to the International Bureau of the Postal Union.

"I am now to inform you that the jurisdiction of (the Falkland Islands) extends to the dependencies of the Falkland Islands among which are included South Georgia and the South Orkney Islands. All these territories are and remain under British jurisdiction and the title of the Postmaster General to represent them in Postal Union matters cannot be regarded as qualified in any way." [530]

In **June**, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Robertson again protests Argentina's claims to the South Orkney Islands and questions the assertion that Argentina bases its claim upon *"first effective occupation."* Robertson points out that; *"... the observatory in question was first established by a British subject, Mr. Bruce, and that His Majesty's Government cannot admit that the subsequent transfer through the intermediary of His Majesty's Legation at Buenos Aires, of the ownership of the observatory from Mr. Bruce to the Argentine Government can in any way be regarded as affecting the territorial status of the South Orkney Islands."* [531]

In **July**, in the Falklands, HMS *Cornwall* visits Port Stanley.

July 27th, an Argentine decree authorises postal & telegraphic contact with the Falkland Islands, whilst reserving the country's position with regard to sovereignty. [532]

In **August**, at Port Stanley, HMS *Colombo* anchors.

August 12th, in the UK, *The Times* newspaper reports:

"Argentina claims the (Falkland) islands as her own by right of succession. For Argentina these possessions are the Malvinas, which are, like Gibraltar, "temporarily in the power of England". This claim of Argentina has just been put forward again. In 1912 a wireless station was organised at Port Stanley. The Argentine Government was formally told of the fact; but some official pointed out that if the notification were acknowledged British occupation of the Malvinas would be recognised!

529 *US v. Netherlands 2R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928)*
530 *FO 371/12735/174*
531 *FO 371/12737/208*
532 Kohen & Rodriguez 2016 p.250

So, instead of acknowledging receipt of the Note, all direct communications, by wire or post, with the islands, were deprecated. Until the end of July it was not legal for any Argentine to communicate direct with an inhabitant of the Falklands. The Government has just issued a decree authorising communications between the Malvinas and the mainland … The official isolation has been broken after 16 years." [533]

August 27th, in Paris, the Kellogg-Briand Pact is signed by 15 nations.

"After the severe losses of the First World War, the idea of declaring war to be illegal was immensely popular in international public opinion. Because the language of the pact established the important point that only wars of aggression – not military acts of self-defense – would be covered under the pact, many nations had no objections to signing it. If the pact served to limit conflicts, then everyone would benefit; if it did not, there were no legal consequences. … In the final version of the pact, they agreed upon two clauses: the first outlawed war as an instrument of national policy and the second called upon signatories to settle their disputes by peaceful means. On August 27, 1928, fifteen nations signed the pact at Paris. Signatories included France, the United States, the United Kingdom, Ireland, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, South Africa, India, Belgium, Poland, Czechoslovakia, Germany, Italy and Japan. Later, an additional forty-seven nations followed suit, so the pact was eventually signed by most of the established nations in the world." [534]

"In the case of the Falkland Islands question, the parties have made progress in various methods of dispute resolution, … However, since the end of the armed conflict, the United Kingdom has shown no willingness to comply with its obligation to resolve the dispute by peaceful means. In such cases, it is reasonable to assume that international law protects the legal position of the party fulfilling its international obligations and prevents the recalcitrant party, which controls the de facto situation, from benefiting from its immobility and non-compliance." [535]

September 4th, from Stanley, the Governor reports that; *"… he had been informed on credible authority that the Government of the Argentine continued to do everything in its power to impede the freedom of trade between Argentina and the Falkland Islands and that, although it professed to regard the Colony as part of such territory, it enforced, nevertheless, payment of the export tax on goods shipped for the Falkland Islands as for other foreign countries without differentiation of treatment."* [536]

September 6th, San Salvador's journal, *Diario Latino,* reports.

"Uneasiness continues to be felt in the Foreign Office due to the insistence of the Argentine, already manifested energetically on previous occasion in her claim to incorporate the famous Falkland Islands in Argentine territory, alleging that they belonged to her until England took possession of them by force in 1833. It appears that the opinion of the Foreign Office is inclined towards the return of the islands, agreeing to their becoming again Argentine property, on condition that a naval base be left for England in the locality mentioned. The matter presents features which lead to the belief that it will be difficult to settle." [537]

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533 Malvinas? Following the appearance of similar reports in French and American newspapers, the source of this story was revealed to be the Argentine Ambassador to Paris. Rather closer to 6 years than 16, this still suggests that some government policy lay behind the obstructiveness. With Montevideo acting as the hub for telegraphic and postal communication the effects of this, whilst annoying, appear to have been muted.

534 *Office of the Historian: Milestones: 1921-1936: The Kellogg-Briand Pact 1928*

535 *La conciliación como método alternativo para solucionar la disputa de soberanía respecto a la cuestión de las Islas Malvinas* Facundo Daniel Rodriguez 2025

536 Godwin 1936 in *FO 371/122499*

537 Quoted in *FO 371/12737/296*

October 15th, at Stanley, in anticipation of the arrival of the 'Hubert Wilkins Expedition' with its plans for an Antarctic flight, telegrams arrive from the Secretary of State for the Colonies for the attention of George Wilkins.

"There is reason to suppose that Byrd expedition may intend claiming for United States any undiscovered territory in King Edward VII area. Would it be possible without interference your plans for you to plant or drop British flags on any lands or Islands you may land or fly over in and between the Falkland Islands and Dependencies and Ross Dependency? Such action would be most helpful from the point of view of asserting British interests If you are able to comply it would be appreciated if you could forward proof and statement of action taken to His Majesty's Government as early as possible. Islands. Good luck... Please send reply through the Officer Administering the Government of the Falkland Islands." [538]

October 28th, in Argentina, Hipolito Yrigoyen becomes President.

October 29th, at Stanley, the Hubert Wilkins Expedition arrives on the whaling factory ship *Hektoria*.

October 30th, the Hubert Wilkins Expedition sails for Deception Island. Wilkins carries an authority on behalf of the British Government to make claims over any land discovered; *"... between the western limit of the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands and the eastern limit of the Ross Dependency, that is to say, between 80 degrees and 150 degrees west longitude."* [539]

November 3rd, from Buenos Aires, Minister Robertson objects to the Foreign Office plan to submit a further complaint to Buenos Aires regarding the South Orkneys.

> *"I do not want to make mountains out of molehills, but I have no hesitation in saying that, if I am to carry out my present instructions, we are going to raise a hornets' nest about our ears in this part of the world and even lead to serious trouble with the United States."* [540]

Robertson goes further.

> *"As regards the Falkland Islands, I have always considered, ever since reading the Bernhardt's Foreign Office memorandum of December, 1910, that our claim to the islands was very weak indeed. In point of fact, it is based upon force and upon very little else. ... I do not think that the Argentine Government will seriously raise the question unless we force their hands by taking umbrage at their periodical pin pricks, and their periodical reassertions of their claim."* [541]

"Sir Malcolm Robertson in effect asks if it is worth jeopardizing our strong position in Argentina for the sake of reiterating our frequently expressed claim to a few inhospitable rocks, the sole actual and potential value of which is a small revenue derived from whaling, and where we in any case commit acts of sovereignty by issuing whaling licences without objection from Argentina.. I think there is much to be said for this view." [542]

In London, an opinion is requested regarding the legal effect of not submitting a further protest to Argentina.

November 5th, *La Prensa* publishes an editorial based on an article in Brazilian newspaper *Correio da Manhã*.

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538 *Sec. of State for the Colonies to His Excellency the Acting Governor October 15, 1828* in C21/28. Wilkins appears to have been granted a knighthood in anticipation. See - https://www.nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Antarctic/ANT-GEN-1-7. Sir Hubert Wilkins. Proposal that he should be asked to receive possession in the name of.pdf

539 *Ibid.*

540 Quoted in *FO 371/12737* at 363. The date is given as the 9th in *LCO 2/4908*

541 See Lanus 2010. The legal theory of acquisitive prescription would appear to have been unknown to the Ambassador. See 1947, below.

542 *Minute by Makins November 9, 1828* in *FO 371/12736/350*

"It asserted Argentina's rights to the Malvinas Islands and denounced "the unjustifiable attitudes taken by England and the United States," as well as the imposture of the latter's government regarding the Monroe Doctrine. Finally, the article welcomed the mutual interest of the American peoples, especially in matters affecting international justice, adding, "This is how we understand Pan-Americanism and this is how we practice it"." [543]

November 6th, at Deception Island, in the South Shetland Islands group, work to construct an airstrip is commenced by the Hubert Wilkins Expedition. [544]

"Captain Sir Hubert Wilkins in command of the Wilkins-Hearst Antarctic Expedition passed through Stanley on board the whaling vessel s.s. Helctoria at the end of October bound for Deception Island in the South Shetlands. ... In November of the past year Captain Sir Hubert Wilkins, in command of the Wilkins-Hearst Antarctic Expedition, proceeded by whaling factory to the South Shetlands via Stanley with two aeroplanes and established his base at Deception Island, ..." [545]

November 9th, Robertson writes to Lord Cushendun, appealing that the Foreign Office's note regarding the South Orkneys should not be presented to Argentina.

"Our claim to the islands was, clearly, an afterthought and due merely to the fact that they promised to prove a source of revenue to the Falkland Islands.... To insist yet again and in the face of a definite Argentine refusal for an application for a wireless licence, can but precipitate a crisis. ... As a result of the publication of official correspondence... the Press has taken a renewed interest in the question. Hostile comments appear almost daily in the leading newspapers." [546]

November 21st, in the Falkland Islands, Monsieur Maylin is appointed Vice-Consul for Belgium. [547]

December 12th, in London, a legal opinion on the question of whether or not to respond to Argentina's note of December, 1827 is given; *"... the failure to answer the last note of the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs must, pro tanto, diminish the effectiveness of the advocacy of the British claim, although the merits of that claim may remain as they were."* [548]

December 20th, from Deception Island, Australian explorer, George Hubert Wilkins, makes the first recorded flight in Antarctica.

"Captain Sir Hubert Wilkins ... in December with Lieutenant L. Ben Eielsen as his pilot he flew south some 650 miles and made safely a non-stop return. He has recorded certain observations during this flight of primary importance and first and foremost has discovered that Graham's Land does not form part, as previously supposed, of the main Antarctic Continent, but is composed of two large islands and a number of smaller islands, the actual edge of the continent lying at the furthest point reached, about 650 miles south of Deception Island. To Captain Sir Hubert Wilkins' credit thus stands the dual achievement of having made the first flight in the Antarctic and having advanced considerably man's knowledge of these dim regions." [549]

"The morning of December 20 proved clear and calm; and Wilkins, with Eielson as pilot, took off on a course a little west of south, crossing Trinity Island and palmer Land and following the eastern border of the land. ...

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543 Benciowicz 2025
544 See December, 1928, below.
545 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1928*
546 *Robertson to Lord Cushendun November 9, 1928* in *FO 371/12736/369-370*
547 *The London Gazette No.33681*
548 *FO 371/12736/352.* Original emphasis.
549 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1928*

The southward flight lasted 5 hours and 25 minutes and was made for the most part at the rate of 120 miles an hour." [550]

The Falkland Islands annual end-of-year report, notes an estimated population 2,313 with 62 births and 38 deaths during 1928. [551]

> *"The cost of living remained on the high side as in preceding years, showing indeed a tendency rather to rise than to fall. In the country, as in any similar pastoral community, it was more moderate, but freight rates made imported provisions expensive, this being felt particularly in the town. The shortage of dwelling accommodation in Stanley, noticed in the Report for 1927, threatened to become acute during the year and measures to meet the situation in this regard are of urgent necessity, and are, in fact, shortly to be undertaken. At the present time it is very difficult to rent a house in Stanley, but for the occasional visitor there are several boarding houses which offer a reasonable degree of comfort and convenience. No hotels, however, exist in the accepted sense of the term.*
>
> *Three visits to Stanley were paid during the year by ships of His Majesty's Navy, namely, the destroyers Amazon and Ambuscade in May, and the cruisers Cornwall and Colombo, respectively, in July and August. As usual their visits were most popular and lent much life to the town. Captain Sir Hubert Wilkins in command of the Wilkins-Hearst Antarctic Expedition passed through Stanley on board the whaling vessel s.s. Helctoria at the end of October bound for Deception Island in the South Shetlands. An account of his discoveries is given later in this Report.*
>
> *On the economic side an important step was taken in the introduction in Stanley as from the 1st of April of the eight hours working day. The new working day has not been applied to the Camp nor is it necessarily intended or desirable that it should so be applied by reason of the greatly differing conditions which obtain in the Camp and in Stanley."*

1929 – January 31st, from Argentina, Ambassador Robertson refers to the Falklands in his annual report.

> *"We take refuge in silence. Argentina safeguards its claim by reaffirming at intervals. I suggest that our most intelligent course would be to allow this state of affairs continue. … If we take excessive notice of small periodic incidents, as seems to be the desire of the government of the islands, we may force the Argentine government to take a categorical and unpleasant action, such as insisting that the whole question be submitted to arbitration … My strong recommendation is that we should remain in silence."* [552]

In London, on the same day, at an inter-departmental conference held between the Colonial and Foreign Offices, a decision is made that, with regard to the issue of a British licence for Argentina's South Orkney's wireless station; *"… that the matter should not be pursued by replying officially to the Argentine Government's notes, but that Sir M. Robertson should enter orally a 'caveat' in regard to the Argentine claims."* [553]

"Sir M. Robertson made it clear that he was averse from raising the question with the Argentine Government, in any form, officially or otherwise." [554]

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550 *Antarctic Flights of 1928-1929* in the *Geographical Review* April, 1929 vol.19 no.2
551 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1928.* See link above
552 Quoted in Kohen & Rodriguez 2016 p.251 citing *CO 78 183/6 108880* (?)
553 Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8, 1930 *A 4733/1437/2/1930*
554 *Ibid* para.38

In **February**, from the Falkland Islands, Governor Hodson and Mr. Amedroz, Port Stanley's Harbour-master, sail for the South Orkneys.

"Sir M. Robertson's deprecation of such a proceeding as likely to precipitate the question of the sovereignty of the islands when the Foreign Office were trying to avoid raising it, was supported by the Colonial Office, and definite instructions were sent to the Governor that he should on no account visit these islands." [555]

At Port Stanley, HMS *Despatch* visits with Vice-Admiral Sir Cyril Full on board.

In the Falklands, a census of fur seals on Elephant Jason Island concludes that there are 6000 there. [556]

May 10th, in Buenos Aires, I. Ruiz Moreno, a legal counselor, determines that if the Falkland Islands are considered to be part of Argentine territory, customs charges should apply to parcels as they are not being re-exported.

At Stanley, Leonard William Hamilton Young is appointed Honorary Vice-Consul for Uruguay.

June 10th, in Buenos Aires, the paramilitary Patriotic League of Argentina demand the return of the Falklands. Newspaper, *La Prensa,* also calls for the surrender of the archipelago to Argentina.

> *"On Sept 10, 1832, since Commandante Vernet, by reason of health, could not return to re-establish Soledad, Major Mestivier was named in his stead; he proceeded to the Malvinas in the bark Sarandi and took possession in the name of the Argentine Republic on Oct. 10. But England had now decided upon the occupation of the islands by force, seeing that the United States had thrown over the Monroe Doctrine because it did not suit her to do police work on behalf of Argentina and to apply the Doctrine to the Malvinas... the British Navy took possession of the islands and obligated the Argentine colonists to abandon it ..."* [557]

In **August**, at Port Stanley, HMS *Durban* and HMS *Caradoc* anchor.

"During the visit of H.M.S. "Durban" the Falkland Islands Defence Force engaged in field manoeuvres with the crew of the vessel. The report on the operations carried out reflects great credit on the efficiency of the local unit." [558]

August 15th, at South Georgia, an avalanche occurs at Leith Harbour killing three people and destroying buildings belonging to the South Georgia Company.

December 14th, at Stanley, Leonard William Hamilton Young is appointed Consul for Sweden.

The Falkland Islands annual end-of-year report, notes an estimated population 2,375 with 57 births and 14 deaths during 1929. [559]

> *"The King Edward VII Memorial Hospital, Stanley, built in 1914, is maintained by the Government. It has two general, one maternity, and two private wards, comprising in all twelve beds. During the year the Hospital was reconditioned and new and up-todate equipment purchased, including a new X-ray apparatus, an artificial sunlight lamp, and a new operating table for the theatre."* [560]

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555 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 p.46 in *LCO 2/4908.* The suggestion is that the Governor did, in fact, visit the South Orkneys. The document paragraph refers to 1939, but this is a typing error.
556 Dickinson 2007 p.120
557 *La Prensa* quoted in the *The New York Times* Aug 25, 1929. *cf.* March 18, 1886 *Bayard to Quesada*
558 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1929*
559 *Ibid.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1911 to 1930.pdf
560 *Ibid.*

1930 – February 26th, in the South Sandwich Islands, RRS *Discovery II* arrives off Zavodovski Island.

> *"From that date until 17 March the ship worked constantly about the islands, circumnavigating them close inshore, making running surveys of the coasts, sounding in the adjacent waters, and obtaining numerous photographs, sketches and notes… it is unfortunate that only one landing, on Thule Island, could be made in this period..."* [561]

In London, Foreign Office legal adviser, Gerald Fitzmaurice, circulates a *memo*.

> *"The question of the South Orkneys is to a considerable extent bound up with that of the Falkland Islands, to which the Argentine Government also lay claim. The connexion between the two questions is, however, a political and not a legal one. The history of the Falkland Islands question is too involved for consideration in this statement. It will be sufficient to say that, after a variety of different occupations during the last half of the 18th century, British, Spanish and French, the islands were finally taken possession of, on behalf of the Crown, in 1832 (sic), and have been in effective British occupation ever since, a period close on 100 years.*
>
> *During this period the Argentine Government have consistently maintained a claim to the islands, and have from time to time presented His Majesty's Government with a reasoned statement of it.* ***The last occasion on which a detailed statement was put forward was in 1888****, and in reply His Majesty's Government contented themselves with declining to enter into any further discussion of the matter. Since that date the Argentine Government have, on more than one occasion, been told in the most unequivocal terms that His Majesty's Government would never in any circumstances contemplate renouncing any rights over or abandoning their possession of the Falkland Islands, but they have, nevertheless, persisted in their claim ...*
>
> *It should be mentioned that, from the purely legal point of view, the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands is probably less weak, or at any rate more plausible, than their claim to the South Orkneys. ...*
>
> *Since, however, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom cannot, .., contemplate renouncing any of their rights over the Falkland Islands or even going to arbitration on the matter, no direct solution of that question appears possible so long as the Argentine Government maintain their present attitude. ..."* [562]



In **March**, at Stanley, HMS *Delhi* visits the Falklands colony.

In **July**, HMS *Dragon* arrives at Port Stanley.

> *"Advantage was taken of the stay in harbour of H.M.S. Delhi and H.M.S. Danae to carry out tactical exercises between the local Defence Force and landing parties from the ships. It is gratifying to record that on both*

561 *British Antarctic Survey Scientific Reports No.91*
562 Quoted in Godwin 1936. My emphasis. Original in *FO 371/122499 Annex 1. cf.* 1832 & 1833

occasions the Defence Force acquitted themselves with great credit and were warmly commended by their opponents."[563]

At Stanley, Leonard William Hamilton Young is promoted to Consul for Uruguay.

July 16th, Guatemala and Honduras agree to take a border dispute to international arbitration. [564]

"It will be recalled that, in connexion with the dispute concerning British Honduras, the Attorney-General had occasion to deal with the doctrine uti possidetis juris and stated that according to this doctrine each new Latin American State acquired sovereignty over so much former Spanish territory in the new world ***as it in fact brought under its control****."* [565]

In England, at Bisley, a Falkland Islands team win the Junior Kolapore Cup for rifle shooting. [566]

September 6th, in Argentina, President Hipolito Yrigoyen, is replaced in a coup by General José Felix Uriburu.[567]

"On 6 September 1930, the first coup in Argentina's history took place, and ended the second government of Yrigoyen (1928–30). The military officers who assumed power were strongly influenced by the model of the German army of the time,…" [568]

In early **December**, in the Falklands, HMS *Danae* arrives at Port Stanley.

December 30th, at the South Sandwich Islands, RSS *Discovery II* completes its survey work.

The Falkland Islands annual end-of-year report, notes an estimated population 2,396 with 54 births and 20 deaths having occurred during the year. [569]

"The judicial system of the Colony is limited to a Supreme Court in which the Governor sits alone as Judge and a Magistrate's Court in Stanley. The majority of the farm managers are Justices of the Peace and as such have power to deal with petty offences. The local Police Force consists of four constables and a chief constable and is stationed entirely at Stanley.

The chief constable is also gaoler in charge of the gaol in Stanley which accommodates only short sentence prisoners. During 1930 no crime of a capital nature was brought before the Courts and in general the Colony shows a remarkable absence of crimes of violence while serious crime of any description is of rare occurrence. The problem of young offenders does not arise except in isolated cases each of which receives individual attention from the reformative rather than the punitive point of view. No instance is on record at any rate in recent years in which a child or young person has been committed to prison." [570]

563 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1930.*
564 *Treaty of Arbitration between Guatemala and Honduras, signed at Washington, on July 16, 1930*
565 Foreign Office *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908.* My emphasis.
566 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1930*
567 Political parties were banned and the 1853 Constitution suspended.
568 *State, national identity and power: a historical tour in search of the causes of the Falklands–Malvinas War* Guillermo Mira and Fernando Pedrosa 2021. This would imply that the authors date the existence of Argentina from circa 1860.
569 *Falkland Islands: Report for 1930.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1911 to 1930.pdf
570 *Ibid.*

1931 – January 28th, an arbitration panel headed by King Victor Emmanuel of Italy, announces its decision regarding the sovereignty of Clipperton Island. [571]

> *"It is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage having the force of law, .., the actual, and not the nominal, taking of possession is a necessary condition of occupation. This taking of possession consists in the act, or series of acts, by which the occupying state reduces to its possession the territory in question and takes steps to exercise exclusive authority there. ...*
>
> *Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was completely uninhabited, is, from the first moment when the occupying state makes its appearance there, at the absolute and undisputed disposition of that state, from that moment the taking of possession must be considered as accomplished, and the occupation is thereby completed."* [572]

April 26th, in the Falkland Islands, a census determines that 2,392 people are present in the archipelago. [573]

April 30th, in Stanley, Leonard William Hamilton Young is appointed Consul for Norway.

June 20th, James O'Grady arrives to be sworn in as the new Governor of the Falkland Islands. [574]

After the ceremony, Governor O'Grady addresses the Islanders.

> *"His Majesty the King has requested me to inform you of his kind interest in you. That may seem a rather far-fetched idea, but most of us follow His Majesty in that respect. We consider this Empire of ours a natural living reality. It is a body politic. It is just as real and just as living as my body is real and living. It is a personality: an entity, representative of our characters and all we stand for. Down in this far away Island in the Southern Atlantic the people of the Falklands have got just those same faculties and qualities that our forefathers had who went abroad for adventure and found it ...You are here in the Falklands and I want you to love the Falklands. To many of you it is your Homeland of the Empire. The more you love it the greater will be your love for the Empire of which it forms a part."* [575]

In **August**, Stanley has a new electrified system of street lighting, switched on by the Governor.

On Deception Island in the South Shetlands, the Hektor Whaling Company's station is abandoned.

"... and after that year the installations were allowed to become dilapidated. The Company went bankrupt in 1935 and left as bad debts £27,000 owing to the Inland Revenue and £10,700 to the Falkland Islands Government for export duty on whale oil. The Falklands debt was eventually written off." [576]

The Falkland Islands annual end-of year report, notes;

> *"A wireless station for external traffic is operated by the Government at Stanley under the style of the Falkland Islands Radio. Regular communication is maintained direct with London, Bergen, Montevideo, and Magallanes, while the South Georgia Radio at Grytviken provides a link between Stanley and that Dependency. Telegraph charges to the United Kingdom are 1s. 4½d.. a word."* [577]

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571 An uninhabited island in the Pacific Ocean.
572 *France v. Mexico (1931) 2 R.I.A.A. 1105*
573 Falkland Islands: Report of Census 1931. See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/People/Census Information Early Settlers/Report of Census 1931.pdf
574 This appointment did not appear in *The London Gazette.* For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/ogrady_sir
575 Quoted in Tatham (ed) 2008
576 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/490.*
577 *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Falkland Islands 1931.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1931 to 1938.pdf

1932 – on South Georgia, postal clerk Alfred Nelson Jones and Vera Riches are married by Deputy Registrar William Barlas.

February 19th, in Argentina, Augustín Pedro Justo becomes President following an election riven with accusations of electoral fraud.

In **July**, after a breakdown in diplomatic relations with Uruguay, Argentina's President, Agustin Justo, asks Britain to take over Argentine interests in Uruguay. [578]

"The fact that in such a diplomatic emergency Argentina asked Britain to represent Argentine interests, rather than, say, Switzerland or the United States, again calls into question Argentina's seriousness in maintaining a dispute with Britain over the Falklands." [579]

August 20th, in Canada, the Ottawa Conference concludes. One of the decisions taken is to establish limited tariffs within the British Empire, with higher tariffs applying to the rest of the world.

"The feeling of loyalty for the "informal empire", a long tradition of responsibility and hundreds of millions of pounds in investments did not stop Great Britain from sacrificing its interests in Argentina in favour of the Empire. The Ottawa Conference of 1932 left Argentina out of the British world.... accentuat(ing) the anti-British feelings of an increasingly influential group of Argentine nationalists. For the first time in almost 100 years the Falkland Islands became an issue again." [580]

In **December**, in Buenos Aires, following representations by Ricardo Caillet-Bois,[581] the descendants of Luis Vernet donate his extensive records relating to his time in the Falkland Islands, to the Argentine National Archives.

"This heritage of undoubted value for the defense of the titles that the Argentine Republic holds in favor of the sovereignty of these islands must be jealously guarded by the Nation, in the same way that the family has done until now." [582]

"I was far from believing, when I began studying the subject, that I would find in him such an absorbing, enterprising character (...) the silhouette of the spirited Hamburger native, with his incredible adventures [and] his indomitable spirit (...) the reader will thus find exposed, perhaps for the first time, the behind-the-scenes details of the project planned by Vernet and Pacheco, from which the new establishment of Puerto Luis or Puerto Soledad emerged." [583]

Britain's Embassy write to the Foreign Office in London with regard to the forthcoming centenary of Britain's assertion of control over the Island of Soledad (East Falkland Island) in January, 1833.

> *"I have the honour to report that until quite recently I had seen no reference to this Centenary in the Argentine Press. However, now the Sociedad Popular Educadora de Liniers has addressed a Memorial to the Minister for Foreign Affairs reminding him that in January next will occur the centenary anniversary of the day on which "the Falkland Islands" passed into the dominion of England under the pressure of force, since on January 2nd, 1833, Commander Onslow of the British Navy, in command of the corvette "Clio" took possession of the port Luis de Soledad obliging the Argentine schooner*

578 The cause of the breach was the harbouring by Uruguay of Argentine General Toranzi, a critic of the military government in Buenos Aires.
579 Pascoe 2020 p.267
580 *Falklands or Malvinas?* Conrado E. Bullrich 2000 p.149
581 Novas Lo Coco 2024
582 *Boletín del Instituto de Investigaciones Históricas* Tomo XVI 1933 p.539
583 *Una tierra argentina. Las islas malvinas* Ricardo Caillet-Bois 1948 1st ed.

"Sarandi" to return dismantled to Buenos Aires". The Memorandum proceeds: "this act of force is the only antecedent which, for lack of a legitimate title, England can produce to continue in possession of an island which juridically and by reason of its geographical position pertains to our territory, it having been proved moreover by incontrovertible historical reasons that these islands were discovered by Magallanes in 1520, long before they were surveyed by Davis in the name of His Britannic Majesty (1592), as was recognised by France when in 1764 the French subject M. de Bougainville founded the establishment of Puerto Luis and ordered its return to Spain in consequence of the claims presented in that epoch". In conclusion the Memorial says that "notwithstanding that the authorities (of the Sociedad Popular Educadora de Liniers) are able to demonstrate in a conclusive manner the unquestionable right of the Argentine Republic in her claim to the Falkland Islands, the Society considers it their duty to leave to the study of the Chancery the best means of securing the legitimate return to our Nation of this fragment of territory which has been for a century under foreign dominion". The Society announced its intention of organising a public campaign to secure its object, but though some days have now elapsed since this memorandum was reported in the press I have not seen further references to it." [584]

The Falkland Islands annual, end-of year report notes an estimated population as of December 31st, of 2,428.

"There is a difficulty in regard to food which is never one of quantity, while the quality of that which is available is excellent; nevertheless the diet is ill-balanced, a circumstance which is probably the chief cause of appendicitis and the invariable condition of bad teeth found accompanying it. Gardens are cultivated but insufficient attention is paid to the production and consumption of green vegetables. The necessity of adding lime to the soil must be emphasized. Fruit is not grown in the Colony; the supply is irregular and inadequate and the loss in importation inflates the cost....

The water-supply is wholesome and satisfactory. Water is brought by pipe-line a distance of three miles and stored in a reservoir and a tank with an aggregate capacity approximating to 500,000 gallons. Distributing mains have been extended so as now to serve practically the whole of Stanley. The improvements to the system of roads in like maimer have been almost completed and progress is at present being made with the construction of drains, gutters, and side-walks in the upper reaches of the town. ...

Bi-annual rat weeks are held and have achieved considerable success in clearing rubbish dumps, waste-lands, and the foreshore from rats. Owners and occupiers of private premises are obliged to take steps to exterminate rats and mice on their premises." [585]

584 Spain has never claimed discovery of the Falklands archipelago, only of the region. The Islands were certainly never seen by Magellan in 1520. For a detailed account of the events of January, 1833 and the warnings presented to Buenos Aires in 1829 and 1832, see Vol.2 For this letter, see - https://www.nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/People/Culture and Early History/CUL-CEN-1-11. Centenary of colony of Falkland Islands articles published in the Argentine press concerning.pdf

585 *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Falkland Islands 1932.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1931 to 1938.pdf

1933 – January 1st, in Argentina's *La Prensa* newspaper.

> *"Our nation never forgets that a foreign flag waves over a portion of the Argentine soil which belongs to us geographically and historically."* [586]

January 2nd, in the Falklands, the arrival of HMS *Clio* a century before is commemorated by the construction of a Whalebone Arch outside the Cathedral in Stanley; made from the jawbones of two blue whales. Local events include a stock fair, horse racing and a radio message to the Islanders from King George. A celebratory set of 12 stamps is issued.

"There were twelve stamps in the 1933 series with twelve very different designs, including a sheep, an iceberg, a whaling ship, a whale, a penguin, views of the Port Louis settlement, South Georgia, Government House, the Port Stanley World War I Battle Memorial, a map of the islands and the colony's coat of arms. The occasion and the centennial dates were bad enough in Argentine eyes, but the map stamp, the portrayal of the early British settlement at Port Louis, and the inclusion of South Georgia made it very clear that this was a pointed reminder of British possession..." [587]

"The celebrations of the Falklands Centenary in 1933 began with a tribute to the memory of Matthew Brisbane. The Lafonia carrying the Governor and 123 other passengers sailed from Stanley to Port Louis and a wreath was laid at Brisbane's grave where the weather beaten wooden marker was replaced with a new marble gravestone." [588]

"In 1970, [The St. Mary's Herald]... (published) an article about the colony's centenary in 1933. It reproduced the stamps that were printed in the United Kingdom to commemorate that anniversary and (included) an explanation about "the enormous agitation and displeasure" that the event had caused in Argentina, ..." [589]

January 20th, from Port Stanley, Governor O'Grady seeks advice from the Foreign Office on problems experienced by Islanders travelling to Argentina.

> *"They will not recognise our passports and insist upon our people when they arrive in the Argentine, taking out another passport. There are some other acts of theirs that while irritating need not be commented upon but the last of their pretensions – the matter of our Centenary Stamps – seems to be about the limit. Our stamps are declared to be invalid when the Falkland islands' people write to their friends in the Argentine; they are surcharged and a fine is imposed before delivery can be effected.*
>
> *Further than that, they have written to the International Postal Bureau at Berne informing them that in view of Argentina's 'Sovereignty Rights' they are to take notice that the Falkland Islands stamps are invalid. Incidentally, from the philatelists' point of view the stamps will become much more valuable as a result of this extraordinary attitude of the Argentine."* [590]

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586 Quoted in *Ronald Macleay (Ambassador) to Sir John Simon January 7, 1933.*
587 *Minature Messages: the semiotics and politics of Latin American postage stamps* Jack Child 2008 p.128
588 Diana Giles in Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.401
589 *Lo que no sabemos de Malvinas: Las islas, su gente y nosotros antes de la guerra* S. Carassai 2022 citing *The Centenary Issue of 1933* in *St. Mary's Herald* December 15, 1970 no.20
590 In 2006, a set of twelve stamps was valued at $4,508. *cf.* Child 2008

"Sir J. O'Grady continued that he could but feel that the position of his Government was, at the moment, somewhat ambiguous, and he asked for enlightenment, both as regards the passport question and that of general policy." [591]

January 24th, on South Georgia, a child, Iorwerth Nelson Arnold Jones, is born to Alfred and Vera Jones.

February 6th, from London, Britain's Secretary of State for the Colonies sends a telegram to the Governor of the Falkland Islands with a message from King George V.

> "*I have been greatly interested to hear of coming Centenary Celebrations in the Falkland Islands, and I take the opportunity of requesting you to convey to the people of the Colony my earnest good wishes for their happiness and welfare. I shall always follow with affectionate solicitude the fortunes of a Colony whose people, though separated from the mother country by wide tracts of ocean are nevertheless bound to it by the closest ties of kinship and loyalty."* [592]

The Falkland Islands are visited by HMS *Durban* and RSS *Discovery II*.

February 17th, at Stanley, a cruise ship, *Reina del Pacifico*, anchors in the harbour.

From Buenos Aires, the Argentine Foreign Ministry circulates an instruction to its consulates world-wide.

> *"On various occasions this Department has been consulted regarding the attitude to be adopted in the cases of persons born in the Falkland Islands who apply for visas for passports issued by the British Authorities. With a view to adopting a uniform procedure and by reason of the fact that persons born in the Falkland Islands are of Argentine nationality, Your Excellency should inform the officers under your jurisdiction that, as it is impossible to visa this class of passport, Argentine passports should be issued to such applicants."* [593]

In Argentina, a press campaign commences, with newspapers calling on their Government to act over the issue of the '*provocative*' centenary stamps issued in the Falkland Islands.

"The printing of these stamps compels our Authorities to do or say something that will make it clear that the British Government has no right whatever to do so; their action should be categorically disclaimed and a communication to that effect despatched to the International Office at Berne. ... We could have wished that the Executive had taken adequate steps to safeguard our rights without our having to call their attention to the matter..." [594]

March 10th, in Buenos Aires, reacting to the Falklands centenary celebrations, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Carlos Saavedra Lamas, instructs his Legation in Switzerland to deliver a message to the Universal Postal Union.

"... to the effect that the Argentine Government had been considering the matter for some time previous to the press campaign calling upon them to take action, and that a communication had, in fact, been sent to the Argentine Legation in Berne to notify the International Postal Union that the Argentine Post Office would refuse to recognise the franking power of the stamps. The result of this action would be that recipients in Argentina of letters bearing the stamps would be called upon to pay the postage plus the usual fine." [595]

"... the only dignified response to the repeated English insults against us in 1933." [596]

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591 Internal Foreign Office *memo* by H. Jones dated July 8, 1930 in *A 4733/1437/2/1930*
592 *CUL/CEN1#9*
593 Quoted in Foreign Office *memo* by H. Godwin dated February 3, 1936 at para.21
594 *La Prensa* March 11, 1933.
595 *FO 371/122499. cf.* Godwin 1936 and Hope 1983. Also Becerra 1998.
596 *La Argentina y el Imperialismo Britanico: Los eslabones de una cadena 1806-1933* Rodolfo & Julio Irazusta 1934

From Buenos Aires, Britain's Embassy notifies London.

> *"... the issue of the centenary stamps had undoubtedly taken place at an unfortunate moment in Anglo-Argentine relations, as it was bound to cause unfavourable comment and to reopen in the Argentine press the whole question of the sovereignty of the islands at a time when it was important that it should be forgotten..."* [597]

March 13th, Argentine postal services are ordered to regard letters and parcels carrying the Falkland Islands centenary stamps to be unfranked; requiring a further payment before they can be delivered. [598]

March 16th, in Berne, Switzerland, Argentina's letter is delivered to the offices of the Universal Postal Union.

March 17th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador Ronald Macleay informs the Colonial Office of the reaction in Argentina regarding the Falkland Islands centenary stamps; suggesting that the stamps are not used in any correspondence from the Islands to the Argentine. A suggestion that will, *"not for a moment, be entertained."* [599]

April 19th, in London, the British Foreign Office receives a message from its Consul at Riga in Lativia - that Argentina's Consul has received instructions to; *"... impound any Falkland Islands passports... with a request for an Argentine visa, and to issue in its place an Argentine passport."* [600]

May 1st, an *Additional Convention* to the *Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation 1825* (the *Roca-Runciman Pact*) between the UK and the Argentine Republic is signed, aiming to improve trade and commerce between the two countries.[601] The agreement guarantees Argentina a fixed share within the British meat market; also reducing tariffs on cereals and handing monopolies to British companies in Argentina.

"The Argentine Republic, due to its reciprocal interdependence, is, from an economic point of view, an integral part of the British Empire. [602]

"After the Roca-Runciman treaty, a profusion of new nationalist writers and factions began to appear. For a time the nationalist movement was largely dominated by historians who sought to fuel the campaign against the British. These historical "revisionists" began to re-examine the 19th century ... Britain's imperialist encroachments: the British invasions of 1806-1807, Britain's role in the foundation of Uruguay in the late 1820s, its seizure of the Falkland Islands in 1833, the blockades under Rosas ... Propaganda of this kind made a deepening imprint on public opinion and helped sustain nationalist sentiments ..." [603]

July 8th, in the Falklands, unwell, Governor O'Grady departs Stanley for Montevideo. [604]

September 5th, at the Hague, a case is heard at the Permanent Court of International Justice between Norway and Denmark over sovereignty of Eastern Greenland. The Court accepts that the requirements for *'effective occupation'* in cases of inhospitable regions are much lower than has otherwise been the accepted norm.

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597 *Ambassador Ronald Macleay to Foreign Office March 17, 1933* in *FO 371/122499. cf.* Godwin 1936
598 *Directive No. 41,611*
599 *Governor James O'Grady to Ambassador Ronald Macleay May 16, 1933*
600 Godwin 1936
601 For the original Treaty, see 1825.
602 Attributed to Argentina's Vice-President Julio Argentino Roca Jr. Most likely at a dinner in London when the Argentine delegation hosted the British Prince of Wales at the Argentine Club in Dorchester House.
603 *Argentina, 1516-1987: From Spanish Colonialism to Alfonsin* D. Rock 1987
604 From Montevideo, O'Grady sailed for England. He never returned, dying in London in December, 1934.

"The Eastern Greenland case (1931–33) is the only territorial dispute in the polar regions ever to have been decided by an international court. ... The Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) held that effective occupation in the polar regions requires relatively little actual exercise of sovereign rights... Since the 18th century, it has been a received principle in international law that settlement and extensive administrative acts by a state are required to establish its sovereignty over new lands. However, the PCIJ held that Denmark had sovereignty over all of Greenland even though Danish settlement and administration were confined to the southwestern coast of the island. The exacting requirements of international law were thus altered "to permit a flexible standard which depends upon the circumstances of the territory. The more isolated the territory and the fewer the inhabitants, the less stringent are the requirements of effective occupation."..." [605]

September 11th, Britain's Postmaster-General reminds the Universal Postal Union (UPU) that, Argentina's refusal to recognise the Falklands centenary stamps, puts it in breach of the UPU *Convention*.

September 26th, Argentina returns to take up its place at the League of Nations.

October 25th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's new Ambassador, Sir Henry Chilton, suggests to London that; *" .. the moment was propitious for a settlement, following the ratification of the new Anglo-Argentine Convention, and the conviction that would seem to exist on both sides that the close economic co-operation, not to mention closer cultural relations, would be to the mutual advantage of both countries. He also revived for consideration, the idea to exchange the South Orkneys for an Embassy House site in Buenos Aires..."* [606]

"The advisability of taking any, and if so what, political action upon Sir H. Chilton's letter was very fully explored, but it was eventually decided to let "sleeping dogs lie." ..." [607]

US polar explorer, Lincoln Ellsworth, attempting a flight across the Antarctic continent, requests permission from the Falkland Islands Governor for the use of a harbour in the South Shetland Islands. Approval under *Art.27(2)* of the *Air Navigation (Colonies, Protectorates and Mandated Territories) Order 1927* is given. [608]

November 13th, Britain's Foreign Office responds to Governor O'Grady's January request for directions.

"He was informed that His Majesty's Government fully appreciated the position and were anxious to relieve his Government from its embarrassments. They could not leave out of account the feeling which had been aroused in Argentina by the Falkland Islands Centenary Celebrations, and particularly by the commemorative issue of postage stamps. The latter measure had given rise to a communication by the Argentine Postal Administration to the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union. It was thought unnecessary at that stage to discuss in any detail the question of the validity of His Majesty's title to the Falkland Islands. The matter had formed the subject of discussion and correspondence for many years past. His Majesty's Government were advised that that title, while unquestionably strong, is based mainly upon the right of prescription and that the British thesis could not be considered as necessarily bound to succeed if the question were submitted to international arbitration. The relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina, which had recently been strengthened by the conclusion of a commercial convention, were normally of a sufficiently cordial character to enable the Argentine Government to restrain those sections of the press and of public opinion in the republic, which might otherwise be disposed to ventilate the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands. In those circumstances His Majesty's Government thought it important, on general grounds of policy, to maintain an attitude of such scrupulous correctness that no excuse would be offered for a revival of agitation over the Argentine claim, or for the Argentine Government to associate itself with popular opinion on

605 *Historical Evidence and the Eastern Greenland Case* Janice Cavell 2008 citing Triggs 1986.
606 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
607 *Ibid.*
608 *Ibid*

the subject, with consequential prejudicial effects on the relations between the two Governments. The Governor would clearly understand that His Majesty's Government do not admit any question whatever as to the validity of His Majesty's title to the islands. On that point they could make no concession to Argentine opinion, and would submit to no diminution of their material rights and interests. ..." [609]

"As the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Philip Cunliffe-Lister, pointed out, the British authorities "cannot fail to take into account the sentiment aroused in Argentina by the Falkland Islands Centenary celebrations and, in particular, by the commemorative postage stamp issue". Therefore, he recommended an attitude of political correctness that would not provide excuses for a revival of agitation over the Argentine claim or for the Argentine government to align itself with popular opinion on the issue, with the subsequent detrimental effects on relations between the two governments." [610]

December 12th, in Argentina, Britain's consular officials are instructed; *"... to watch for any further instances of a refusal on the part of the Argentine postal authorities to recognise Falkland Islands stamps ..."* [611]

December 20th, in London, at the Foreign Office, W. E. Beckett considers the legality of Britain's claims.

> *"The object of this minute is to submit some observations with regard to the South Orkneys, showing that the position with regard to them is not so clear as it is in regard to the Falkland Islands. In the case of the Falkland Islands, we not only have our long-established claim to sovereignty, but a century old physical occupation, which is so complete as to render it impossible for the Argentines to introduce any change in the situation...."*

In Montevideo, the Seventh International Conference of American States defines a *State,* as possessing - *"(a) a permanent population; (b) a defined territory; (c) government; and (d) capacity to enter into relations with the other states."*

> *"Article 3: The political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states. Even before recognition the state has the right to defend its integrity and independence, to provide for its conservation and prosperity, and consequently to organize itself as it sees fit, to legislate upon its interests, administer its services, and to define the jurisdiction and competence of its courts....*
>
> *Article 11: The contracting states definitely establish as the rule of their conduct the precise obligation not to recognize territorial acquisitions or special advantages which have been obtained by force whether this consists in the employment of arms, in threatening diplomatic representations, or in any other effective coercive measure. The territory of a state is inviolable and may not be the object of military occupation nor of other measures of force imposed by another state directly or indirectly or for any motive whatever even temporarily."*

"... the most widely accepted formulation of the criteria of statehood in international law." [612]

"The Montevideo Convention was interesting in not directly mentioning the concept of sovereignty, which is also considered to be an essential feature of statehood. This is because the Latin American governments drafting the Convention did not want to endorse the existing patterns of sovereignty. They affirmed the declarative theory of statehood that the "political existence of the state is independent of recognition by the other states", (Article 3). Such an approach is attractive to anti-colonial governments, as it allows claims to statehood to be made by rebels against colonial empires, before they are in full control of the colonised

609 *FO 371/122499*. *cf.* Godwin 1936. For acquisitive prescription see 1947. Also August, 1936.
610 Tato 2025
611 *FO 371/122499*
612 *International Law* M. Shaw 2008 (6th ed.) p.198.

territory and before they have been recognised. The alternative legal approach, the constitutive theory of statehood, asserts states do not exist until they are recognised by other states. Whatever position is taken on this controversy, it is necessary to go beyond the Convention and note that control over territory is the goal of those seeking recognition. Currently, international lawyers expand the criteria of the existence of a government to there being an effective government." [613]

The annual Falkland Islands end-of year report notes an estimated population as of December 31st, of 2,427 including 1,065 females. 52 births were registered during the year, and 27 deaths. [614]

> *"Seven cases of tuberculosis were notified in 1933. Three of these were pulmonary, and the remainder bone, joint and tendon affections. This is an increase over the number of cases reported in 1932 but it is hoped that improved sanitary and housing conditions will go far towards checking the progress of the disease. Malaria and other insect-borne diseases are unknown in the Colony. The incidence of coughs and severe colds during the last four months of 1933 was unusually high. A series of colds, associated in some cases with high fever, swept the Colony and caused a remarkable amount of debility. This high " cold " incidence is attributed to the very inclement climatic conditions, and lack of sunshine during the period in question. In several cases these colds were followed by broncho-pneumonia. With the exception of those from ships there were no cases of venereal disease....*
>
> *The staff of the Medical Department includes the Senior Medical Officer, two Medical Officers, one of whom is stationed on the West Falkland Island, a Dental Surgeon, a Nurse Matron and a qualified Nursing Sister in addition to Junior Nurses locally recruited and trained. ...*
>
> *Improvements to the system of roads in Stanley have been completed and they are now adequate to present needs. The drainage system of the town was further improved during the year. There are three licensed slaughter-houses in Stanley and these were inspected with reasonable frequency and were found to comply with the Board of Health by-laws. Meat for human consumption was also inspected at regular intervals. Dairies were inspected from time to time and samples of milk tested which showed that the standard of cleanliness has been maintained. No samples were found to contain the bacilli of tuberculosis.*
>
> *Bi-annual rat weeks were continued to be held with considerable success. Rats appear to have diminished as a result but they are still numerous enough to warrant periodical poison-baiting of rubbish dumps, waste lands and the foreshore."*

613 *Distributed Sovereignty and the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Dispute* Peter Willetts 2012 p.3. In 1816, an entity calling itself the United Provinces declared independence from Spain; almost immediately descending into internecine conflict resulting in no national government 1821 to 1826 and no effective control over any territory until 1824. The years 1826 – 1828 saw more conflict followed by a military dictatorship 1828-1829 that controlled little more than Buenos Aires city. This was followed by General Rosas in Buenos Aires province who spent much of his time (1829-1832 & 1835-1852) as a dictator; but still unable to unify all the provinces. Again, no central authority with any effective control over the territory claimed. Then, following the departure of Rosas, Buenos Aires declared itself an independent country - 1853 to 1859. Existence as a State requires unity and central control. The United Provinces/Confederation/Argentine Republic did not attain that until, at the earliest, 1860. Arguably 1863, when Spain finally recognised Argentina's existence as a separate nation – 47 years after the first declaration of independence. Political unity would have to wait until 1880. See *Falklands Wars* vol.2

614 *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Falkland Islands 1933.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1931 to 1938.pdf

1934 – January 22nd, Ronald Macleay, back from Argentina, speaks at the Foreign Office.

> *"There is no genuine irredentist movement for the recovery of the Falkland group, as all sensible Argentines realise that the islands would be useless to them … The question is really more than anything else a hobby-horse for a certain type of politician and jingle, which the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both on principle and for internal political reasons, are unable to ignore altogether;… It is therefore unlikely to become a serious political issue, …"* [615]

In Argentina, a Nazi affiliated newspaper, *Crisol*, begins a nation-wide campaign under the banner:

The Malvinas are Ours.

"Argentine rights in the Falklands had become a theme of renewed interest in 1934 in the backwash of nationalist and anti-British feeling from economic difficulties of the depression, …" [616]

February 17th, Argentina distributes a circular to its consulates world-wide.

> *"With a view to adopting a uniform procedure and by reason of the fact that persons born in the Falkland Islands are of Argentine nationality, your Excellency should inform the officers under your jurisdiction that, as it is impossible to visa this class of passport, Argentine passports should be issued to such applicants."* [617]

February 25th, in the UK, rumours circulate in the press that a decision has been made to fortify the Falklands. Argentine newspaper, *La Prensa,* reports that such; *"… would constitute a new affirmation of English pretensions never admitted by Argentina."*

In London, A. L. Blake, manager of the 'San Julian Sheep Farming Company', a Falkland Islander by birth and holder of a British passport, applies for an Argentine visa at the Consulate in London. He is told that; *"… under a recent Decree, British subjects born in the Falkland Islands had to apply for an Argentine passport before being permitted to enter Argentina;.."* [618]

"Mr. Blake then saw (Ambassador) Dr. Malbran personally. His Excellency, while personally sympathetic, confirmed entirely what the consul-general had said. Dr. Malbran added that, if Mr. Blake were prepared to take out an Argentine passport, he would give him at the same time an official document saying that Mr. Blake had only accepted an Argentine passport under protest and with full reservation of his rights as a British subject. Mr. Blake requested Foreign Office advice as to what he should do." [619]

"In 1934 three cases occurred of Argentine refusal to accept Falkland Islands passports; in each case separate diplomatic representations had to be made to the Argentine Embassy in London in order that the Falkland islander in question might acquire an Argentine visa." [620]

March 20th, in Cairo, Egypt, the British delegation to a Postal Conference identify the Falkland Islands and Dependencies as being British territory. Argentina, also present, makes no comment. [621]

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615 *FO 371/20508*
616 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland Islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.
617 *FO 371/122499*. The Falklands' Governor had first complained of such incidents in January, 1933.
618 *Ibid*
619 Godwin 1936 para.17
620 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
621 See 1938, below

In **June**, in Buenos Aires, Dr. Palacios urges Argentina's Congress to pass a law requiring all secondary schools to be supplied with a history of the Falklands; based on Paul Groussac's 1910 book – *Les îles Malouines: nouvel exposé d'un vieux litige*. [622]

> *"It being necessary that all inhabitants of the Republic should know that the Falkland Islands are Argentine and that Great Britain, without any title of sovereignty, took possession of them by force."* [623]

"The Falkland Islands dispute in its modern phase dates from the early 1930's, when national claims (of) "nuestras Malvinas" became a popular issue. The resentment caused by British demands for trade and financial concessions at this time furnished an especially favorable setting for the active renewal of the dispute. With Foreign Ministry approval, Dr. Alfredo L. Palacios, leader of the Socialist Party, inaugurated a campaign for the return of the Falklands in a series of speeches delivered during the 1934 sessions of Congress." [624]

June 10th, *La Vanguardia* includes a mention of the creation of the Comandancia in 1829 among its pages. As does *La Prensa* in its 'Historical Dates' section. [625]

June 21st, the Falkland Islands government grants permission for the introduction of guanacos, skunks and ostriches onto Sedge and Wreck Islands. [626]

August 9th, Britain's Ambassador in Buenos Aires, Henry Chilten, is instructed to raise the issue of Blake's visa.

> *"The Argentine Government had now... seen fit to introduce and rigorously enforce departmental regulations which amounted, in practice, to the complete exclusion of British subjects born in the Falkland Islands from Argentina. His Majesty's Government could only express the view that such an action on the part of the Argentine Government was in no way consonant with the friendly feelings which that Government had always professed..."* [627]

August 19th, Ambassador Chilten informs London that the Argentines have agreed to visa Blake's passport.

"... with the proviso that it did not prejudice the claim of the Argentina's government..."

"A similar procedure was followed in the case of Mr. F. G. Langdon, after Sir V. Wellesley had made further representations to the Argentine Ambassador, and again in the case of Mr. W. M. Dean. In fact a situation has arisen in which a separate diplomatic note has to be sent to the Argentine Ambassador in London every time a Falkland islander requires an Argentine visa. ... this case particularly... threw up in rather an acute form the major question of sovereignty over the islands. It was agreed, however, after much consideration in all quarters, that the risk of provoking a serious dispute with the Argentine Government on these matters should not be run." [628]

"... our policy in regard to the Falklands must be to maintain our rights while avoiding all incidents calculated to fan the always smouldering embers of Argentine resentment. There is absolutely no hope of our reaching any agreement on the question of principle involved, and our guiding principle must be to avoid dragging this century old controversy into the limelight..." [629]

622 See 1910 above.
623 Palacios quoted in *The New York Times* June 23, 1934
624 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp08c01297r000800090022-3
625 Benciowicz 2025
626 Franklin & Grigione 2005
627 *FO 371/122499. cf.* Godwin 1936
628 Godwin 1936 para.23
629 Sir David Kelly quoted in *The Falkland Islands and their Adjacent Maritime Area* Patrick Armstrong and Vivian Forbes 1997 citing *PRO A6065/1118/2*

In Argentina, to promote his campaign for Groussac's book to be translated from its original French for use in schools, Dr. Alfredo Palacios publishes a book of his own - *Las Islas Malvinas: Archipielago Argentino.*

> *"The right of our Argentina to sovereignty over the Malvinas is undeniable. Despite this, one of the most powerful nations in the world, abusing its force, maintains them in its power. It is imperative that the people know their right. We Argentines have never revered force and wealth, but rather justice. Justice was our endeavour. Our country is destined to begin a new direction in social evolution, based on collaboration and solidarity to overcome competition that is often brutal in nature; also on the exaltation of human values to ensure that they prevail over the power of things. It has been said that nations, as entities of reason, only move on impulses of national interests or conveniences: they lack the organ of the heart and have the instrument of calculation in excess. There is, however, an exception in history. It is Argentina."* [630]

At the same time, another book is published - *La Argentina y el Imperialismo Britanico: Los eslabones de una cadena 1806-1933* (*Argentina and British Imperialism: The Links in a Chain 1806-1933).*

> *"That the treaty of 1825 did not alter in the slightest (Britain's) plans for maritime expansion is proven by the careful preparations for the assault of 1833. ... Mr Woodbine Parish, ... showed he knew us very well, taking advantage of the crisis of authority in 1829 to protest against the decree reorganizing the command of the Falklands."* [631]

"Shortly before the translation into Spanish of the work of Groussac, in 1934, was published one of the founding books of Argentine historical revisionism: 'Argentina and British Imperialism. The Links in a Chain 1806-1933', written by brothers Rodolfo and Julio Irazusta, which focuses on the Roca-Runciman treaty of 1933. This work, withdrawn from publication by the publisher due to pressure from English diplomacy, would give the Malvinas Islands a much broader insertion into domestic politics as it expressed that the recovery of the archipelago was part of a struggle against a liberal, oligarchic, and foreignizing elite, which condoned the dispossession and surrender of natural resources." [632]

September 26th, in Argentina, law *11,904* orders that Paul Groussac's 1910 book be translated into Spanish. [633]

"In 1934, Law 11904, an initiative of Socialist Senator Alfredo Palacios, passed by a unanimous vote of Congress, had ordered the Commission for the Protection of Popular Libraries to translate this book — published in French in 1910 by the then director of the National Library — and to prepare a compendium for free distribution to all educational institutions and libraries in the country and abroad. Its objective was to contribute to ensuring that "all inhabitants of the Republic know that the Malvinas Islands are Argentine and that Great Britain, without title to sovereignty, seized them through an abuse of force." This measure entailed the mass dissemination of the arguments on which the Argentine claim was based and, in this sense, constituted a fundamental milestone in the construction of the Malvinas Islands as a national cause." [634]

Yet another book is published in Buenos Aires expanding on Argentine rights over the Falkland Islands – *La Tercera Invasion Inglesa* (The Third English Invasion) by Antonio Gomez Langenheim. [635]

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630 *Las Islas Malvinas: Archipielago Argentino* Alfredo Palacios 1934
631 Irazusta 1934
632 Padilla 2025
633 Published 1936 (see below). See also 1910, above, and 2015.
634 *Malvinas y las Guerras del Siglo XX* María Inés Tato y Germán Soprano 2022
635 The first two 'invasions' presumably being 1806/07 and 1845.

December 29th, Herbert Henniker-Heaton is appointed Governor of the Falkland Islands. [636]

> *"The inhabitants of the Falkland Islands are of European and chiefly of British descent, in which Scottish blood is marked. There is no indigenous or native population. The estimated population on 31st December, 1934, was 2,437, made up of 1,366 males and 1,071 females. ... The number of births registered in 1934 was fifty-four, and of deaths twenty-eight... Twenty-seven marriages were celebrated during the year."* [637]

The Falkland Islands annual, end-of year report notes an estimated population as of December 31st, of 2,437. [638]

> *"The Medical Officer made periodical tours of outlying districts in the East Falkland. Satisfactory reports on health conditions were received. It is to be observed in this connexion that the Falkland Islands Company, Limited, maintain their own Medical Officer at Darwin. The out-patient department of the hospital provides ante-natal and post-natal services. Maternity nursing services are provided for Stanley and outlying districts.*
>
> *During the year 1934, 102 persons were admitted as in-patients. The out-patients showed an increase in number over the previous year. Five deaths occurred in the hospital. Ninety-three operations were performed with uniformly good results and many minor operations were carried out in the out-patient department.*
>
> *The medico-electrical section of the out-patient department has carried out successful work during the year with radiant heat, vapour and Turkish baths, especially valuable in skin disease and muscular rheumatism. Artificial sunlight treatment has been carried out in cases of adenitis and anaemia in children, and also in cases of tubercular bone and joint diseases.*
>
> *Communication between Stanley and the outside world is effected principally through Monte Video to which port a service is maintained by the s.s. Lafonia, a vessel of some 600 tons dead weight, belonging to the Falkland Islands Company, Limited, and running on a mail contract for a period of five years from October, 1931. In addition, calls homeward and outward are made at Stanley at irregular and infrequent intervals by cargo vessels of the Pacific Steam Navigation Company, Limited. The calls made in 1934 totalled seven homeward and outward.*
>
> *The distance from Stanley to Monte Video is rather more than a thousand miles and the time taken on the voyage by the s.s. Lafonia averages four and a half days, and by other vessels from three to five days according to the class of vessel. The average time occupied in the transit of mails to and from the United Kingdom, via Monte Video, is 26 days ; by the direct route passenger vessels complete the journey in the same time and the cargo vessels require upwards of a month to five weeks on the voyage home, which is performed almost invariably from Stanley to London without intermediate stop, and on the outward voyage upwards of five weeks dependent on the number of intermediate stops. On the average, opportunities for the receipt and despatch of mails are available every four to five weeks."*

636 Colonial Secretary at the Falklands 1821-1825. For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/henniker_heaton

637 *Colonial Reports – Annual No.1749: Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Falkland Islands 1934.* See - https://archive.org/details/b31412142/page/n1/mode/2up

638 *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Falkland Islands 1934.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1931 to 1938.pdf

1935 – January 23rd, in London, a *minute* by John Vyvyan of the Foreign Office's American Department notes; *"It is our settled policy to avoid any discussion of the Falkland Islands question."* [639]

February 10th, at Port Stanley, Herbert Henniker-Heaton arrives aboard *Reina del Pacifico* and is sworn in as Governor that same day.

> "*The aim and purpose of Government is the happiness of the governed and with your assistance I shall endeavour to do my best to contribute towards that end."* [640]

February 11th, in Rio Gallegos, following a petition for naturalisation by Carlos Gleadell Watson, Argentina's Federal Court gives its judgement.

> "*Facts: This was a petition for naturalisation by a person born in Stanley, Falkland Islands (Malvinas), in 1908, of parents who were not Argentine nationals. Held: that the petition for naturalisation be denied, on the ground that the petitioner was already an Argentine citizen by birth.*
>
> *The Court said: "The lands included within the Malvinas archipelago, which formed part of the territory subject to our national sovereignty until twenty-three years after the declaration of independence, were occupied by forces of the British navy in January 1833, as is well known.*
>
> *Since then, when the first protest against the assumption of sovereignty by the British Crown was made by Manuel Moreno, the Argentine Minister in London, a protest coupled with a demand for reparation of the injury and loss thereby suffered, as well as for all consequent acts, the Argentine government has constantly maintained its protest over that occupation, calling attention at all times to its rights and jurisdiction over the islands.*
>
> *This is the information given the court by the Ministry of Foreign Relations."It follows that the lands in question continue to form de jure part of the territory of our State, and that accordingly the petitioner, born there, needs no naturalisation, since he has acquired the natural-born citizenship which Article 1 of Law 346 recognises in all who have been born on the national territory or its legal extensions."... "*[641]

February 22nd, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Minister of the Interior cancels a police identification certificate issued to Falklands' born Francis Lewis, as the ID states that Lewis is a *"British subject"*.

"The case of Mr. Lewis and the similar case of Mr. De Boe were reported by His Majesty's Ambassador at Buenos Aires, when they occurred in February of this year. His Excellency raised the matter with the Argentine Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the time, and was informed that the Argentine authorities considered themselves entitled to revoke, for whatever reason, identity cards issued by themselves. I understand that the documents in question, apart from specifying the holders as British subjects, contained an inaccuracy in stating that their place of birth was the United Kingdom and not the Falkland Islands." [642]

In **March**, in Montevideo, Uruguay, Argentina's Consul-General stops issuing permits for Falkland Island passport holders to enter Argentina, alleging; *"... that all persons born in the Falkland Islands are Argentine citizens and, as such, must travel on Argentine passports. Dr. Viñes wrote for instructions from Buenos Aires, and received a reply supporting him..."* [643]

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639 *FO 371/18834*
640 Opening address quoted in Tatham (ed) 2008
641 *Report: 49 Revista de Jurisprudencia Argentina, 188.1*
642 *Hansard: Commons July 25 1935 Oral answers to Questions col.2014*
643 *FO 371/20597*

In **April**, during an exchange concerning the issue of licences to pilots of civil aircraft, the USA challenges British title to the South Shetland Islands.

"The schedule of territories attached to your note includes the 'Falkland Islands and Dependencies.' It has come to my notice that the term 'dependencies' as used in this connection is considered by your Government to include South Georgia, the South Sandwich and South Shetland groups, and other islands, and also certain Antarctic territories extending to the South pole. In the circumstances, I desire to have it made a matter of record that the acceptance by the Government of the United States of the terms of the pilot arrangement, ... cannot in any way be implied to have any bearing on the question as to what country or countries may validly claim ownership of or title to the various territories embraced within the term 'dependencies'..." [644]

July 24th, in London, in a further internal Foreign Office *memorandum* regarding sovereignty, John Vyvyan considers the possibility of arbitration.

> *"... we can have no confidence in our claim to the Falklands succeeding in the event of it being submitted to arbitration and we do not therefore wish to press the question to extremes since this might lead Argentina to appeal to third party arbitration such as the International Court."* [645]

".. it is inevitable that individual officers will have differing and in some cases conflicting views. This is natural, but it is also irrelevant." [646]

Argentina issues a set of 10 stamps, one of which (right) purports to show the country's borders. Chile, Peru and Britain protest. [647]

July 25th, in Britain's Parliament, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden is asked whether Britain will make representations to Argentina about Francis Lewis. Eden responds that the British Ambassador had; "*.. raised the matter with the Argentine Ministry for Foreign Affairs at the time, and was informed that the Argentine authorities considered themselves entitled to revoke, for whatever reason, identity cards issued by themselves. ..."* [648]

"... this decision of the Argentine Government unfortunately appeared to offer further evidence of their intention to pursue a policy of pin-pricks in connexion with the dispute ..." [649]

September 25th, in Buenos Aires, an ministerial resolution determines that income earned in the Falkland Islands is to be considered for income tax purposes as accruing within Argentina.

"... it was considered that Sir. N. Henderson should not approach the Argentine Government officially in connexion with the ministerial resolution, unless and until an attempt was actually made to tax a British subject, on the basis of the resolution. At the same time Sir Nevile, if he saw no objection, was to take an opportunity of bringing the question informally to the attention of the Minister for Foreign Affairs." [650]

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644 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/490.* No reply was sent to this note.
645 Quoted in Laver 2001 p.263
646 Foreign Office submission to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee in 1983. *cf. The Falkland Islands, 5th Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 1983-1984 HC 268 25.10.1984*
647 The stamp was reprinted but still showed the Falkland Islands as Argentine territory.
648 *HC Deb 25.7.1935 vol.304 cc.2013 – 4*
649 Dispatch to the Embassy in Buenos Aires, dated December 10, 1935
650 *Falkland Islands and Dependencies* H. Godwin 1936 para.24 in *FO 371/122499.*

December 6th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Sir Nevile Henderson writes to Sir Robert Craigie to suggest that Britain should perhaps recognise Argentina's "*legal*" claim to the Falklands in return for Great Britain's undisturbed occupation thereof. [651]

The Falkland Islands annual, end-of year report notes an estimated population as of December 31st, of 2,432 including 1,034 females. 50 births were registered during the year, and 19 deaths. Twenty-two marriages have been celebrated during the year. [652]

> *"In the town of Stanley sewage is disposed of partly by the water-carriage system and partly by the earth-closet method. It is satisfactory to record that the number of inhabitants taking advantage of water-carriage facilities is steadily increasing. The night soil from earth closets is removed by means of special carts under the control of the Public Works Department. The disposal of sewage, which is deposited in the harbour, is efficient, as it is carried out to sea by the strong tidal currents. In accordance with the Public Health by-laws, all ashes and household refuse must be stored in properly constructed bins which are required to be emptied once a month at least. This system is found to work satisfactorily. The water supply is wholesome and satisfactory. Water is brought by pipe-line from a distance of three miles and stored in a reservoir and a tank with an aggregate capacity approximating to 500,000 gallons. Distributing mains have now been extended so as to serve the whole of Stanley. The inhabitants have taken advantage of the facilities offered, and the use of rain water from tanks and barrels is gradually disappearing"*



651 Henderson was transferred to Germany in 1937 where he became known as; *"Our Nazi Ambassador in Berlin."*
652 *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Falkland Islands 1935.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1931 to 1938.pdf

1936 – February 2nd, in London, Gerald Fitzmaurice, legal advisor at the Foreign Office, is asked for an opinion regarding whether; *"... any international convention exists to prevent the issue of misleading stamps..."*

February 3rd, an internal *memorandum*, *'Falkland Islands and Dependencies'* is circulated within the Foreign Office; considering the Orkney Islands and possible effects regarding the Falklands' claim. [653]

> *"The Falkland Islands have been in effective British occupation for nearly a century and have a considerable British population together with extensive British fishing and whaling interests. From the naval point of view the islands are also of considerable strategic importance..."* [654]

February 6th, Gerald Fitzmaurice gives his legal opinion regarding postage stamps.

> *"... there is no general rule of international law which would prevent a country from issuing stamps of this nature if they consider they have a good claim to the territory concerned. The United States did something of the same sort not long ago ... We can of course argue with the Argentine Government for issuing the stamps on the ground that they have no valid claim to the Falkland Islands, but in the last resort the only way in which we could prevent them from issuing the stamps ... would be by going to arbitration and obtaining a decision that their claim was bad in law. But in point of fact we are not particularly anxious to go to arbitration,* and I think our correct policy is to sit tight in the Falkland Islands and to refuse to discuss the matter, beyond intimating from time to time that we do not admit the Argentine claim and resent their continued insistence on it. ...*
>
> **Our case has certain weaknesses. But we have been in effective (...) occupation for over a century; and for strategical reasons we could never give up the islands. So it seems best to take a strong line. ..."*[655]

February 11th, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden writes to Lord Apsley regarding Argentina's stamp.

> *"In so far as the issue by the Argentine Government of the stamp in question is based on the assertion of an Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands, I welcome the opportunity of stating that His Majesty's Government cannot admit any such claim to the Islands, which are British territory. ... but His Majesty's Ambassador at Buenos Aires has been instructed once more to draw the attention of the Argentine Government to the fact that no useful purpose can be served by such actions as the issue of the stamp in question, which can only be detrimental to good relations between the two countries."*

February 13th, in Buenos Aires, Mr. J. H. Leche, counsellor at the British Embassy, speaks to Sr. Garcia, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs on the issue of the Falklands. Garcia tells Leche that; *"... in his opinion, too much importance had been attached to the recent issue of Argentine stamps, ... and blamed public opinion in his country for stirring up agitation on this vexed question."* [656]

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653 See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2023/07/falkland-islands-dependencies-february-1936.pdf

654 Godwin 1936 para 7

655 *FO 371/19763* quoted in Beck 1983 (2). The note appertaining to the asterisk was penned in the margin of Fitzmaurice's typed response. This was about the peak of wavering at both the Foreign and the Colonial Offices during the first third of the twentieth century. Due, in no small part, to Groussac's nationalist history of 1910; Bernhardt's limited survey of correspondence from later that same year; and Goebel's 1927 book. What was lacking, was a serious British examination of both the history of the South Atlantic, and the state of international law. This would finally appear in 1947, although before then clearer heads would appear (see August 1936, below).

656 *A 335/192/2.* Foreign Office *memo* by A. Cairncross dated January 12, 1937

"In February 1936 it was officially stated by the Argentine Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs that his Government had reverted to the practice of granting Argentine visas on passports of Falkland Islanders, although the saving clause, which declared that the Argentine claim was not thereby prejudiced, was retained." [657]

"... in 1936 another Argentine foreign minister, Ibarra García, had a series of meetings with J. H. Leche, a British embassy official, and said the last thing he wanted was a sovereignty dispute with Britain over the Falklands, adding that Argentina could never publicly abandon its claim because some politicians were able to exploit public opinion on the subject." [658]

February 17th, in the Falklands, a coal hulk, *Lady Elizabeth*, breaks her mooring lines and beaches in Whale Bone Cove. [659]

In Argentina, Paul Groussac's 1910 book is published in the Spanish language for dissemination through the National Commission of Public Libraries; and to facilitate a shortened version for compulsory use in schools. [660]

"In 1934, Socialist Senator Alfredo Palacios introduced a bill that mandated the Commission for the Protection of Popular Libraries to translate Groussac's book and publish a condensed version to be distributed free of charge to all educational institutions and libraries in the country and abroad. The initiative, which aimed to ensure that "all inhabitants of the Republic know that the Malvinas Islands are Argentine and that Great Britain, without title to sovereignty, seized them through an abuse of force" (Palacios, 1984: 15), obtained unanimous support in Congress and resulted in the publication of Las Islas Malvinas (The Malvinas Islands) (Commission for the Protection of Popular Libraries, 1936). This work marked a key milestone in the development of the Malvinas cause, as it made the foundations of Argentina's diplomatic claim accessible to a wide audience." [661]

"The first edition of the book and compendium of Groussac's work was published in 1936, two years after the law was passed. From then on, distribution began in schools and public libraries, although this did not appear to have been rapid or a priority for the body in charge of doing so, the Commission for the Protection of Public Libraries. The following year, the Commission ultimately delegated this task to a private enterprise, the magazine Figuritas." [662]

February 20th, Argentine newspaper *Tribuna Judicial* publishes a draft resolution of the Traditionalist Association; *"reaffirming Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas Archipelago and establishing the Argentine Malvinas Day."* [663] The Association proposes that June 10, the anniversary of the 1829 decree creating the Buenos Aires Commandancia over the Islands, be a day of celebration. [664]

657 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/490* citing *A 1527/889/2 of 1936*
658 Pascoe 2020 p.267
659 During the Falklands War of 1982, an SAS reconnaissance team managed to hide inside the vessel.
660 See 1834, above.
661 María Inés Tato 2025 in Paula Seiguer Alina Silveira (eds) 2025 p.72
662 Benciowicz 2025
663 *Tribuna Judicial* February 20, 1936 no.1506. Seemingly in response to a Statement by Britain's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, in the House of Commons asserting ownership of the Falkland islands by the UK.
664 See June 10, 1829.

April 6th, in Buenos Aires, after lodging a complaint with the Argentine Government with regard to the stamp set, Ambassador Henderson writes to Anthony Eden. He repeats his earlier suggestion of; *"... the recognition by His Majesty's Government of her legal right to the Falklands in return for Great Britain's actual undisturbed occupation thereof."* [665]

April 13th, Ambassador Henderson sends a further recommendation suggesting; *"... the cession to (Argentina) of the single island of the South Orkney group on which a meteorological station is situated, ... He further proposed a formal reassertion of the British title to the South Orkneys."* [666]

"(His)... view that British rights to the South Orkneys should be affirmed was endorsed, and he was informed that it was being arranged for the Discovery II to call at some port in the group for that purpose." [667]

April 22nd, Argentina's Post Office expresses its concerns about changing the stamp set.

"... the withdrawal of the stamp could lead to the belief that the Argentine Republic was backing off from its rights to the Malvinas Islands." [668]

May 7th, at Stanley, Ernesto Rowe is confirmed as Consul for Chile.

June 10th, in Argentina, only *La Prensa* still references the creation of the Comandancia in 1829 among its 'Historical Dates'.

"... alongside this column, a map of Argentina was included where the Malvinas Islands appeared." [669]

July 17th, in Argentina, the first edition of a magazine designed for schools is published – *Figuritas*.

"*... published in Buenos Aires between 1936 and 1946. For much of its existence, the magazine was known for its tireless and committed campaign to promote the Malvinas era in schools. ... the magazine appeared weekly on Fridays, costing 20 cents and remaining virtually unchanged throughout its existence. ... The magazine's main peculiarity was its broad audience. Instead of targeting children exclusively, it also targeted parents and, especially, teachers. ... Figuritas was a novel and dynamic publishing initiative that served the interests of the entire school community through its pages and a wide range of complementary resources covering classroom experience and leisure time. The magazine reached the farthest reaches of Argentina and became a reference for primary school teachers and students. Throughout its decade of existence, Figuritas targeted this vast readership with various campaigns. Undoubtedly, the most intense, prolonged, and enduring would be the one focused on the reaffirmation of Argentine rights to the Falklands. ... Although it was a collective undertaking, the most persistent driving force and promoter of Figuritas's Malvinization campaign was "Professor Plin". ... ultimately, "La Página del Profesor Plin" ... was the linchpin of the magazine's Malvinas campaign."* [670]

"In response to a request for materials for several school and classroom libraries across the country from Figuritas, the Revista Argentina del Escolar (Argentine School Magazine), the Commission for the Protection of Popular Libraries decided to donate two copies of Groussac's book to each library, one of the complete version and one of the abridged version, and delegated the distribution of copies to new applicants to the magazine." [671]

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665 *FO 371/20597*
666 *Ibid.*
667 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/490*
668 Child 2008
669 Benciowicz 2025
670 Tato y Soprano 2022. 'Professor Plin' was the pseudonym of Vicente Cacuri.
671 María Inés Tato 2025 in Paula Seiguer Alina & Silveira (eds) 2025 PP.73-74

August 28th, from London, Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden responds to Ambassador Henderson's letter of April 6th, noting; *"... you should be aware that the legal basis of the (British) claim is **far less weak** than at one time supposed..."* [672]

> *"In the first place, **100 years possession, whether disputed or not, should found a perfectly sound title to sovereignty over the islands in international law**, and there should be very little danger of such a title failing of recognition by the Permanent Court of International Justice or an international tribunal. Meanwhile, each year that passes, and in addition the celebration of the centenary of British occupation, strengthen His Majesty's Government's case. At the same time there is reason to doubt whether, in fact, Argentina ever had any grounds of claim to the islands at all.*
>
> *In the diplomatic exchanges of 1833 the case would seem to have been argued upon the wrong grounds by both sides. It would seem that the events in the 18th century were irrelevant, that the islands had become completely unoccupied in 1811, and that they had to be considered at that time as 'res nullius' open to the occupation of any State. Further, unless the occupation of the privateer Vernet, whom the Argentine Government tried rather unsuccessfully to clothe with their authority, can be considered to have been an Argentine occupation, the islands were 'res nullius' at the time of the British reoccupation in 1832.*
>
> *To sum up, His Majesty's Government's case may be considered to rest upon two alternative grounds -*
>
> *(i) The islands were res nullius at the time of the British occupation in 1832, and therefore it was possible for Great Britain (as for any other State) to obtain a sovereignty there by occupation, which it did.*
>
> *(ii) If (i) is wrong, and if, in 1832, Argentina had possessed sovereignty, Great Britain has been in peaceable, though not undisputed, possession for 100 years, and has therefore acquired a title by **prescription**. ...*
>
> *The only other method of solution that suggests itself is arbitration. Here too, however, I consider that the risk involved, slight though it may be, would not be justified, since an adverse decision would cost His Majesty's Government no less than their whole strategic position in the south Atlantic. ...*
>
> *The Argentine Government could, of course, bring the matter before the League of Nations, but there is no indication that any such action is likely, nor is it probable that it would be effective even were it to be taken. All they can do, therefore, is to continue creating minor incidents, against which protest can be made as and when necessary, but otherwise there seems to be nothing to prevent the indefinite British occupation of the islands."* [673]

672 *Foreign Office Despatch No.354* quoted in *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire* Klaus Dodds 2002. My emphasis.

673 *Eden to Henderson August 28, 1936* in *FO 371/10763.* My emphasis. A few historical inaccuracies highlighting the lack of serious research. Worthy of note, that an attempt by the UK, in 1955, to take the question of the Falkland Islands Dependencies to the League of Nations' successor court – the International Court of Justice (ICJ) – was rejected by Argentina (see below). As of 2025, Argentina has never attempted to have any of its claims – to the Falklands, South Georgia, or the South Sandwich Islands – considered by the ICJ. The South Orkney Islands fall under the protections afforded by the Antarctic Treaty in 1959 (see below).

"Prescription is a well-recognised concept in international law, deriving initially from principles of Roman Law. There has been no occasion, comparable to that of the making of the unilateral application to the ICJ concerning the Dependencies, when this or other detailed legal arguments have been formally advanced by HMG in relation to the Falkland Islands." [674]

In Argentina, the National Culture Commission sponsors Juan Carlos Moreno to travel to the Falkland Islands; to discover what is happening there and to find out about the Islanders. [675]

"Before traveling he consulted the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic (to discover) whether his trip would set a bad precedent for the country's position in the sovereignty dispute. In the absence of Minister Carlos Saavedra Lamas, who was in Europe, the undersecretary of that portfolio suggested that he "proceed with caution to avoid any friction with the English government" and allow his passport to be endorsed." [676]

November 20th, at Magallanes, in Chile, James Willison Miller, born in the Falkland Islands and the holder of a British passport, is refused a visa by the Argentine Consulate. They issue him with an Argentine passport.

"... stating that applicant was born in the Falkland Islands, Argentine Republic." [677]

December 24th, from Montevideo, Juan Carlos Moreno sails for the Falkland Islands in *Lafonia*. [678]

"The Lafonia left with the English, Uruguayn and Argentine flags (flying) but, according to Moreno, only the last one disappeared on the high seas." [679]

December 29th, at Port Stanley, *Lafonia* anchors and discharges its passengers, including Juan Carlos Moreno.

"Moreno did not speak English. "From the beginning I looked for the inhabitants who spoke Spanish", he says, "mainly the Argentines", who then numbered four." [680]

December 31st, HMS *Ajax* anchors in Stanley harbour. [681]

The Falkland Islands annual, end-of year report notes an estimated population as of December 31st, of 2,399 including 1,070 females. 45 births were registered during the year, and 21 deaths. [682]

> *"The education of children between the ages of five and fourteen years residing in Stanley is compulsory. In Stanley there are two elementary schools, one maintained by the Government and one under Roman Catholic management. Provision is also made at the Government school for attendance at a continuation class for a two-year course of more advanced study. Grants are made in approved cases to enable children from country districts to be taught in Stanley."*

674 Foreign Office submission to the Parliamentary Foreign Affairs Committee in 1983. See *The Falkland Islands, 5th Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 1983-1984 HC 268 25.10.1984.* See 1955.
675 Moreno was a nationalist writer, lawyer and teacher.
676 Carassai 2022
677 *FO 371/20597*
678 At a cost of £14, the voyage took five days.
679 Carassai 2022
680 *Ibid.*
681 Remaining until January 8, 1937.
682 *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Falkland Islands 1936.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1931 to 1938.pdf

1937 – January, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Henderson writes to Foreign Secretary Eden.

> *"The Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs informed the counsellor to the Embassy that the Ministry for Foreign Affairs had no desire whatever to make an issue of the Falkland Islands question, but that their position was awkward when politicians or the press brought it to the fore, and when Government departments or the judiciary referred to them matters connected with it, they could not avoid taking official notice. They desired, however, as far as possible, to keep the matter in the background, and as a proof of their goodwill they had erased from the forthcoming presidential message to Congress all reference to contentious questions connected with the Falkland Islands."* [683]

In the Falkland Islands, still gathering information, Moreno notes; *"... public life is orderly and hygienic and the administration is good and neat. He notices that rural workers earn twice as much as their counterparts in Patagonia despite the fact that the cost of living is similar, he notes with envy that "there is no class struggle in the Falklands. There is no misery. There is no unemployment", and is surprised that almost all the islanders have savings in Stanley's modest bank. ... Moreno notes that trade with Argentina was "null"."* [684]

January 30th, at Stanley, *Penguin* magazine reports on an interview with Juan Carlos Moreno:

> *"The peoples of the Argentine and of Uruguay have a mistaken conception of the Falkland Islands and of the conditions there. Many know the Islands are inhabited but suppose its port insignificant, the population living poorly and dejectedly without modern comforts, and under icy climatic conditions with tempestuous winds all the year round. Actually the Islands have been a revelation to me.*
>
> *The Falklands are neither joyless nor poor. True there is not much vegetation but its soil is covered with grass and small bushes, (serving as fodder for flocks of sheep and herds of cattle) and the undulating lands, with its many hills crowned with white rocks, gives the Islands an attractiveness all their own, Stanley, cheery and picturesque with its bright white and red painted houses inclining to the lake like harbour of blue tranquil waters, favourably calls attention to its cleanliness and modern conveniences, good buildings and drains, macadamised roads, electric lights and telephones. The modest home is comfortable, the hospital clean as a mirror and friendly as a home, yet as modern as any to be seen in largely populated urban centres. The public administration is excellent.*
>
> *There are no delinquents, no clashing of the classes and no crushing miseries such as plague large cities. Falkland Islanders are frank and kind. All greet each other familiarly in .the street. Those that do not know me greet me kindly. Again it is pleasant to take a walk on Ross Road following the curving beach as far as 'Little Italy' and on to where the young bicyclists ride ends and only to begin the horsemen's journey into the country An alluring touch to the scene — suggesting to the visitor to spend a month each, year on these far away Islands of the Astral Seas."* [685]

February 6th, at the South Orkney Islands, RRS *Discovery II* arrives to emphasise British sovereignty; visiting Signy Island and the Argentine meteorological station on Laurie Island.

In Stanley, a new whaling factory on Deception Island in the South Shetland Islands is proposed.

"Between 1935 and 1939 there were various proposals for establishing a new factory at Deception Island, but none have materialised. In correspondence about one of these applications in 1937, the Governor of the Falkland Islands stated that he was influenced not so much by revenue considerations as by a certain feeling

683 *FO 371/20508*
684 Carassai 2022
685 Republished in *The Falkland Islands Times* September 4, 1978 p.7. Also published in *Caras y Caretas* as *My Impressions of the Falklands* by Juan Carlos Moreno

on uneasiness regarding the tenuous hold by the Falklands Government over the South Shetlands area. He submitted that no opportunity should be lost to display control in some wider form than that of leasing a disused whaling station." [686]

February 10th, at Magallanes, in Chile, an Falkland Islander, W. G. Gleadell, presents his Falkland Islands passport to the Argentine Consul with a request for a visa to enter Argentina. He is supplied with an Argentine passport; *"Mr. Gleadell as an ex-soldier is particularly bitter in his resentment at Argentine nationality being ascribed to him."* [687]

March 10th, in London's House of Commons, a Parliamentary question concerning Laurie Island is answered.

> *"His Majesty's Government … do not regard the Argentine maintenance of the observatory as constituting any claim to sovereignty over either the South Orkneys or the Falkland Islands,…"* [688]

On his return to Argentina, after an eight week visit to the Falklands, Juan Carlos Moreno notes; [689]

> *"My two months stay in the Archipelago gave me an opportunity to visit its ports, farms and institutions, and talk to the inhabitants, both British and Falkland Islander. The British and natives form two different sectors, like Spaniards and Indians at the time of the conquest. Only about 15% of the Islands' residents are really British. 85% are native. .., native, that is "Falkland Islanders". ... The islander feels out on a limb and even scorned; he looks upon himself, with wry humour, as a 'kelper' (seaweed), at the mercy of the waves. That is his own expression, …*
>
> *The natives descend from Scots, Irish, Swedes, Norwegians, Dutch, Danes, Germans, Italians and Latin Americans. There are numerous families who descend from the Scandinavians who towards the middle and end of the last century spent their time whaling in Antarctic waters. And there are many, especially women, who have never left the Archipelago. Amongst those I have met I can remember the Pitaluga family, of Italian origin; the Benders of German descent; the Enestroms, of Norwegian origin; and Llamoza, the only survivor of the original Spaniards who inhabited the Islands under Argentine rule. Father Mario Luis Migone was an Uruguayan; the Maria Auxiliadora nuns were of various nationalities and none of them English, and the watchmaker Morales and the sailor Berrido were Chileans. …"* [690]

"The distinction between English and natives served to differentiate the reactions that his presence aroused on the islands. He describes the first ones as being upset by the visit of an Argentinian. ... To the latter, however, he attributes an implicit sympathy towards him and towards an eventual Argentine administration. "The English blindly defend the British occupation and expresses it bluntly", he writes, "the native, on the other hand, is more reserved in his opinion, because he is not English, because he is not interested in defending the English situation". Convinced that the islanders were unhappy with the Crown, he speculated that the sporadic presence of British ships on the coasts of the islands could be due to London's fear of a local uprising against colonial authority." [691]

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686 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

687 *Governor Henniker Heaton to Secretary of State Ormsby Gore March 19, 1937* in *FO 371/20597.* See May, 1937

688 *HC Deb 10 March 1937 vol.321 cc1150-51*

689 Included in an article written by Moreno for *La Nacion* in 1965. See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/juan-carlos-moreno-in-la-nacion-may-2-1965.pdf

690 There were no descendants of any Spaniards from the 1820s in the Islands after the 1870s. José Llamosa/Llamoza arrived as an itinerant employee/gaucho working for Lafone in June 1847; becoming a permanent resident in 1859. The Llamosa name appears to have died out in the Islands some 30 years before Moreno's visit.

691 Carassai 2022. Moreno had mostly limited his interactions to Spanish language speakers. Clearly something got lost in translation with anyone else.

March 12th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Embassy reports a re-issue of the 1 peso stamp.

> *"The former edition by its shading represented not only the Falkland islands but also territory belonging to Chile in Tierra del Fuego and elsewhere in the south. In the present edition the shading has been removed from the Chilean territory, whose Chilean sovereignty is thereby recognised; but it has been left just as it was in respect of the Falkland Islands, which thus continue to appear as Argentine... I do not know whether you will take the view that this new edition of the stamp constitutes in international law a fresh claim on the part of the Argentine to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands which it is important to impugn, whether by public or diplomatic statement. ... the reply of the Argentine Government would be a forgone conclusion..."* [692]

March 15th, in London, plans by the Falkland Islands Government to produce a new edition of stamps to commemorate the Coronation, provoke a discussion at the Foreign Office.

> *"If special Coronation stamps are to be issued to all our colonies, we cannot very well object to one being issued for the Falkland Islands, but it seems most desirable that it should be of as little provocative a nature as possible, and should not embody a map of the Islands."* [693]

April 5th, the Foreign Office debate continues.

> *"Unless... every fresh issue of stamps in respect of the Falkland Islands is to be considered as giving the Argentine Government ground for provocation, I do not see anything in the forthcoming issue which could give any special ground for offence. It is desirable that the Foreign Office should deprecate anything unduly provocative; but on the other hand we can hardly take the line that the Falkland Islands should be precluded from doing those things any normal government is entitled to do merely because it might remind the Argentine Government that they have a theoretical claim to the islands."*[694]

April 12th, in the Falklands, sinking, the *SS Great Britain* is beached in Sparrow Cove.[695]

May 24th, from London, Britain's *charge d'affairs* in Buenos Aires is instructed to take up the matter of visas, and the attitude of the Argentine Consul at Magallanes, with the Foreign Ministry. [696]

The International Conference for the Regulation of Whaling opens in London to discuss preservation of species and catch limits. In the information provided by each delegation, Argentina includes the catches for the 'Compañía Argentina de Pesca'.[697]

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692 *Henderson to Eden March 12, 1937* in *FO 371/20597*. On April 22, 1937, and with an Anglo-Argentine trade agreement awaiting ratification by Buenos Aires, London instructed the Embassy not to protest.

693 *Troutbeck to Fitzmaurice March 15, 1937* in *FO 371/20597*

694 *Troutbeck April 5, 1937* in *FO 371/20597.* This discussion appears to have been based upon either misinformation or misunderstanding as all the colonies were expected to use the same pattern of Coronation Stamps, none of which contained a map. There had been, however, a suggestion that the Falklands could issue its own series of stamps and one of those designs had included a map. That was not subsequently approved.

695 Declared unseaworthy at Stanley in May, 1886, Isambard Kingdom Brunel's ship had been sold off to the Falkland Islands Company for the storage of wool, grain and coal.

696 *FO 371/20597*

697 Not unreasonable, considering *Pesca* was an Argentine registered company and the whales had been caught on the high seas by vessels flying the Argentine flag. It was only processing that took place at Grytviken, on land leased from the British government.

During the opening speeches, Britain's Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries provides a brief history of whaling in the south Atlantic; *"In a short time a prosperous industry was established, based on land stations in the Falkland Islands and their dependencies…"* [698]

May 25th, during the 2nd plenary session of the whaling conference, Argentina's Ambassador to London, Dr. Manuel Malbran, makes a statement to the assembled representatives.

> *"… I should like to make a reservation, which is very important. The Minister of Agriculture, in his opening speech, mentioned in regard to the powers that have been given to the Government for the Falkland Islands, a jurisdiction in all adjacent islands. His Majesty's Government is well aware that my country has always firmly sustained its right of jurisdiction over those Islands. That is a question that has nothing to do with this Conference, but as I believe the speech of the Minister of Agriculture will be recorded in the Minutes of the Conference, I consider it right and I cannot see any objection to recording it in the Minutes, the statement that I made on behalf of my Government that any agreement reached, or any document signed, or any duty to be paid by the companies working in territorial water should not be considered. My Government will not consider in any way anything prejudicial to the rights firmly sustained by my country. That is the reservation that I should like to make, and I ask you Mr. Chairman, if the speech of the Minister of Agriculture is recorded, that the statement I have made should be recorded also."* [699]

"The Ambassador had felt that it behoved him at the next meeting to enter a reservation on behalf of his Government to the effect that no document to which the Argentine Government might subscribe as a result of the Conference would in any way prejudice the rights claimed by them to the Falklands and other islands…" [700]

"It was only in 1937 that Argentina first participated in an international whaling conference and contested the United Kingdom's right to represent the whaling interests of the Dependencies. … Notwithstanding the United Kingdom's open assumption, and long-standing and peaceful exercise of sovereignty over the territories concerned, and the clear and precise delimitation of the Falkland Islands Dependencies in the… Letters Patent, the Government of the Republic of Argentina formulated pretensions in … or about 1937 to all the territories of the Falkland Islands Dependencies…. the dispute crystallised when Argentina first asserted her claims…" [701]

At Montevideo, on the same day, G.E.J. Smith and W.J. Hutchinson, born Falkland Islanders, are refused visas to enter Argentina by its Consul-General. They are told to apply for Argentine passports. [702]

"Passport difficulties occurred in 1922, 1932, 1936 and 1937 as a result of the Argentine attitude towards the Falklands. Argentine Consuls, acting on instructions, refused to visa passports of persons born in the Falkland islands and thus holding British passports. Such persons, it was claimed, were Argentine subjects, to be issued with Argentine passports – after their Falkland islands passports had been impounded." [703]

May 28th, following representation by the British Legation in Montevideo, Smith and Hutchinson receive visas in their British Passports. [704]

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698 *MAF 41/356*
699 *Ibid*
700 *FO 371/20597*
701 *Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, May, 1955*
702 *FO 371/20597*
703 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/490*
704 *FO 371/20597*

"A further refusal of the Argentine consular authorities to grant visas on the passports of Falkland Islanders occurred in May 1937. The British Chargé d'Affaires and the Argentine Under-Secretary of State agreed, however, to avoid so far as was possible all publicity with regard to questions affecting passports." [705]

June 1st, in London, Argentine Ambassador Malbran threatens to withdraw from the International Whaling Conference unless Britain's Minister finds a form of words regarding the Falkland Islands and Dependencies which would allow him to remain.

"... from about 1925 onwards Argentina slowly began to suggest that it was raising a claim to all the Falkland Islands Dependencies, and on 1 June 1937 for the very first time mentioned a claim to them." [706]

June 2nd, at the opening of the Conference's 6th plenary session, Britain's representative addresses delegates.

> *"... there is one thing that I have to say, which is particularly for the benefit of His Excellency, the Argentine Ambassador, who raised certain points in our second session about the Falkland Islands. I am asked on behalf of His Majesty's Government to state that the reservation made by the Argentine Delegate concerning the Falkland Islands and recorded in the minutes of the second session, has been noted. His Majesty's Government consider that the character and the purpose of this Conference are such that it has nothing to do with any question of jurisdiction. Nevertheless His Majesty's Government must declare in their turn that the reservation made by the Argentine delegate cannot in any way affect the British right to the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies. Equally, I think it will make no difference to the friendship between this country and the Argentine."* [707]

June 23rd, in Buenos Aires, Britain's *charge d'affairs,* Charles Dodd, speaks to Dr. Ibarra Garcia, Under-Secretary of Foreign Affairs, regarding the problems with the issue of visas.

> *"Garcia explained to me that the instructions issued to Argentine Consular Officers abroad were to the effect that the applications for visas received from persons born in the Falkland Islands presenting British passports were to be referred in each case by telegraph to the Argentine Government. He added that the Consular Officers would be given immediate authority to grant the visa, which would, however, be accompanied by the reserve, written on the passport, regarding the claim of the Argentine Government to sovereignty..."* [708]

"Dodd stated that Dr. Garcia had remarked to him that the Argentine public had a bee in their bonnet about the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands to which it was unprofitable to supply food gratuitously. His Majesty's Charge d'Affairs and the Argentine Under-Secretary of State were in agreement that it was desirable so far as possible to avoid all publicity with regard to questions affecting passports." [709]

June 26th, Dodd writes to Foreign Secretary Anthony Eden.

> *"For Argentina the question involves her national pride ... in 200 years, when the Argentine nation had become the greatest nation in the world, the question of the Falkland Islands would find its solution."*[710]

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705 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/490* citing *Confidential memorandum 15978, para.3*
706 Pascoe 2020 p.272
707 This being the form of words suggested by Dr. Malbran
708 *FO 371/20597*
709 *CO 78/213/3*
710 *FO 371/20597* as quoted in Beck 1983. A theme that can still be heard today (2025), nearly a century later.

August 6th, in Argentina, *Figuritas* magazine's 'Professor Plin' call for submissions on the theme "*Las Malvinas son Argentinas*".

"Their responses were massive, with an unexpected passion that led Professor Plin to affirm the existence of "a national movement of vindication," ... Toward the end of the school year, he noted that the campaign had acquired "the surprising progression of a snowball ... Figuritas began to include in its pages "this poster as a proclamation and as an affirmation: The Malvinas are Argentine," and urged teachers and students to emulate it, placing the slogan "in a visible place in the classroom and, especially, in the reading places." The proposal to include this motto in schools was later extended to all readers, accompanied by the legend "Cooperate in the FIGURITAS moral crusade. Say, write, and spread everywhere and in every way: 'THE MALVINAS ARE ARGENTINE'," ... The initiative gained the approval of readers, who, through the correspondence sent to the magazine, left testimony of their actions in line with it. For example, the magazine reproduced photographs of graffiti with this legend ... Over the years, the magazine constantly insisted on that motto and variations of it, inserted in small boxes or in different locations on its pages: "THE MALVINAS ISLANDS ARE ARGENTINE!", "Remember and Repeat: THE MALVINAS ARE ARGENTINE!", "The Malvinas were, are, and will be Argentine!", "Only the reason of force can overrule this reason: THE MALVINAS WERE, ARE, AND WILL BE ARGENTINE!", "The chorus of the entire Nation will proclaim it to all the winds: THE MALVINAS ARE ARGENTINE"." [711]

September 18th, in Argentina, a decree is promulgated prohibiting the publication of any maps, official or otherwise, that do not show Argentina in its entirety; including all claims. Existing maps used by official departments, schools and similar institutions which do not meet this requirement must be replaced.

"By 1935 the Argentine Ministry for Justice and Public Education had already passed a resolution to address "the apparent dominant cartographic arbitrariness with regards to the geographical/political representation of the country." This measure was not thoroughly enforced..." [712]

October 15th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador forwards a complaint from *charge d'affairs* Charles Dodd, to the Foreign Office; regarding the need for constant protests to the Argentine Foreign Ministry concerning visas, passports and Argentine identity documents.

> *"We cannot expect the Argentine Government to act as if their claim to the islands were invalid. And the F.O. seem inclined to be unable to see the matter from the Argentine Government's point of view. The chief concern of H.M.G., is to maintain de facto and if possible de jure possession of the strategic base consisting in the Islands. I wonder whether it would not be a more practical method to overlook any individual cases, such as are brought to our notice, and on January 1st of each year, instead, to address a formal note to the Argentine Government, in spite of any individual acts during the year which may or may not have come to the notice of H.M.G., the Islands are under the sovereignty of H.M."* [713]

November 26th, *Figuritas* magazine receives increasing support for its *Las Malvinas Son Argentinas* campaign.

"Letters, essays, poems, and drawings poured in from the school environment, both from individual students and entire classes (grades 3-6), as well as messages from teachers and school principals in every province and national territory, from urban and rural schools, from provincial capitals, and from remote towns. The

711 Tato y Soprano 2022
712 Wainschenker 2023
713 *FO 371/20597*

Malvinas Islands were actually incorporated into the classroom content: "In the country's schools, legends multiply: THE MALVINAS ARE ARGENTINE. Children listen to special related classes, compose compositions, draw, paint, question, discuss, and learn for life" about Argentina's sovereign rights over the islands." [714]

December 2nd, the Foreign Office responds to Charles Dodd's complaint.

> *"The reason for doing so is simply that, in so far as the Argentine dealings in regard to these islanders are based on the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands, failure by us to protest against these dealings might amount to an implied admission of the validity of the Argentine claim... there can be no doubt that if the matter ever came before a court, and we can by no means exclude the possibility that it some day may, it would be of considerable assistance to the Argentine case if they could show that .... we had never protested against these acts or had only rarely done so, though well aware of them..."* [715]

December 4th, in Buenos Aires, a statue to George Canning is unveiled in the Plaza Britannia. [716] A radical political youth group - Fuerza de Orientación Radical de la Joven Argentina - promptly issue a statement. [717]

> *"Jorge Canning wrote in 1824: "Spanish America is free, and we Englishmen manage our businesses with skill, it will be English." Under his inspiration and instructions, English diplomacy segregated the Banda Oriental del Uruguay and Alto Perú. The English financiers Baring Brothers indebted us without risking capital. English merchants seized control of currency, land, and foreign trade. One hundred years later, the work of domination has been completed and perfected:*
>
> *ENGLISH is the means of communication and transportation.*
>
> *ENGLISH monopolizing companies of foreign trade.*
>
> *ENGLISH for the most part public service companies.*
>
> *ENGLISH the largest ranches in the Republic.*
>
> *ENGLISH the best lands in Patagonia.*
>
> *ENGLISH all the big stores.*
>
> *ENGLISH all the companies that make money and are protected by the Argentine Government.*
>
> *ENGLISH are the wills that manage the currency and credit from the Central Bank.*
>
> *ENGLISH are the directives to which our foreign and internal policy obeys.*
>
> *ENGLISH "are" the Falkland Islands and Orkney.*
>
> *Canning's designs have been fulfilled. English businesses have been conducted and are conducted with "skill". THAT'S WHY CANNING HAS A STATUE IN BUENOS AIRES! CITIZEN: Reflect that such enslavement of a people – typical of any imperialist policy, whatever its flag – operated artfully for a century by Great Britain, has only been possible due to the permanent and treacherous surrender of the country, carried out by our oligarchy.*

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714 Tato y Soprano 2022

715 *FO 371/20597*

716 Britain's Foreign Secretary, George Canning, being the first European politician to recognise Argentine independence with a treaty in 1825. *cf.* 1824, 1825 and April, 1984

717 Radical Orientation Force of Young Argentina. Formed on June 29, 1935 *"in a basement on Corrientes Street."* Dissolved, October, 1945. See – *Forja, la invasión inglesa y nuestras Islas Malvinas: denuncias para la soberanía nacional* Juan Gody in *Punzó* 2021

Consequently, our Argentine struggle must be twofold: against the foreign enemy that invades and against the enemy from within that surrenders. And while fascism tries to replace the British colony with that of other powers, and Marxism works to destroy the National Revolution, the leaders of the Radical Civic Union, stubborn in their electoral opportunism, oppose the line of intransigence and struggle Argentina. FORJA, authentic expression of the Radical Civic Union, from its invariable position of combat, calls on the people to reconquer and defend their sovereignty."



The Falkland Islands annual, end-of year report notes an estimated population as of December 31st, of 2,391; including 1,072 females. 37 births were registered during the year, and 20 deaths. [718]

"Eleven appendectomies were performed during 1937, the majority being in the quiescent stage. From time to time outbreaks of acute enteritis occur but so far the origin of these outbreaks has not been definitely determined. Coryza in epidemic form is very common. Two cases of tuberculosis were under treatment during the year. The incidence of bovine tuberculosis is being investigated, the double intradermal test being used.

During the year 1937, 219 persons were admitted to the hospital as compared with 149 in the previous year and 1,010 new cases were seen in the out-patients' department. Six deaths occurred in hospital; 184 operations were performed as compared with 241 in the previous year." [719]

718 *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Falkland Islands 1937.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1931 to 1938.pdf
719 *Ibid.*

1938 – Falkland Islander, Mr. J. F. Langdon is granted an Argentine passport. [720]

January 3rd, in Buenos Aires, FORJA commemorates the "*British occupation of the Islands in 1833*."

"The Malvinas Islands are the geographical expression of English domination over Argentina ... The Argentine conscience must be permanently agitated in reaffirmation of the national will to recover the Malvinas." [721]

February 20th, in Argentina, Roberto Maria Ortiz becomes President; *"... not merely a right-winger, like his predecessors ever since the military coup of 1930, but he strongly sympathized with the Nazi and Fascist movements in Europe."* [722]

April 10th, in Buenos Aires, a Nazi 'Day of Unity' rally is held at the Luna Park Stadium (right) to celebrate the Anschluss – the annexation of Austria. [723]

April 13th, Argentina's Foreign Ministry issues an apology to the German *charge d'affairs in Buenos Aires* for the behaviour of protesters outside the Luna Park Rally.

May 21st, in Buenos Aires, the Academia Nacional del la Historia (ANH) is created; dedicated to historical research. [724]

June 3rd, *Figuritas* magazine initiates a campaign to have June 10 established as Malvinas Day.

"... in commemoration of the creation of the Political and Military Command headed by Luis Vernet on that date in 1829, in order to "consolidate our position in the spirit of the Republic's universities, colleges, and schools" until the recovery of the islands was achieved. "Exercising the right to petition", Figuritas requested that the Minister of Education, Jorge Eduardo Coll, establish this anniversary and commemorate it through a class on it in educational establishments at all levels. At the same time, the magazine urged teachers to effectively adopt the commemoration of Malvinas Day ("until it is officially decreed, we invite you to institute it in all schools in the country, holding a class on the subject") and reiterated its offer to send them a free compilation of Groussac's work to support it. The magazine's proposal found an echo in "a considerable number of schools throughout the Republic" that held commemorative events on June 10 that year and the following year. Although the official commemoration of the date would not take place until 1973." [725]

June 13th, in Clorinda, Argentina, a public remembrance is held at the General Urquizza School; *"on the occasion of the 109th anniversary of the decree of the government regime for the Malvinas Islands..."* The

720 *PRO A 916/916/2* citing the *Evening Standard* newspaper. An F. G. Langdon had previously been refused an Argentine visa until representations were made by the British Embassy. I am unable to find any further information regarding a J. F. Langdon or the circumstances surrounding this event.

721 FORJA leaflet

722 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.386

723 Attended by 20,000 'Nazis'. Outside Luna Park, counter demonstrations were held by the Federacion Universitaria Argentina and socialist youth groups. German flags were burned and German businesses were stoned. Two uninvolved bystanders were trampled to death by police horse.

724 This Academy had its origins in the 'Junta de Historia y Numismática Americana' founded in 1838 by Ernesto Quesada and former president Bartolomé Mitre. A notable luminary would be Ricardo Caillet-Bois who considered the history of the Falkland Islands as "*unjustly neglected.*" See 1948, below.

725 Tato y Soprano 2022

service is followed by a lecture at the Clorinda Lawn Tennis club on the subject of – *Argentine Rights of Possession of the Malvinas Islands.* [726]

"We are still too young to understand the issues of state, by virtue of which England claims ownership of a small part of our territory, which rightfully belongs to us, but despite our youth, our hearts tell us—and children's hearts are never wrong—that the Malvinas Islands are Argentine." [727]

Héctor Ratto publishes *Hacia una doctrina argentina sobre Malvinas (Towards an Argentine Doctrine on the Malvinas).*

"The purpose of the work was to improve understanding of a "transcendent," "painful," "intricate," and "complex" issue, incorporating "convincing and valid" approaches that had not been considered until then, while others were dismissed as "unconsulted and inconsistent," contributing "nothing new" and "obscuring" the issue. Ratto reviewed the historical background, with abundant maps and documents, until reaching the "ungrateful year" of 1833, when British rule of the Malvinas Islands became, for Argentines, "a painful thorn embedded in the most sensitive part of their young organism"." [728]

June 14th, in London, a new ten day international whaling conference opens. Statistics are provided by the delegations with regard to their nation's whaling catches. Data from South Georgia's *Compañía Argentina de Pesca* is submitted by both Britain and Argentina. [729]

June 24th, at the end of the London Conference, Norway proposes a further Antarctic conference to discuss a range of issues including questions of sovereignty.

July 1st, *Figuritas* (no.102) magazine publishes a letter from a resident of Rio Negro; *"to say, very loudly, The Malvinas are Argentine and will always be Argentine".*

At Stanley, the Governor estimates that 2,704,654 acres of Falklands land, out of a total acreage of 2,962,243 are in the hands of absentee landlords. [730]

July 12th, Argentine Consulates around the world are instructed to cease issuing visas to people regarded as 'undesirable' in their own country – as the Jews are in Germany; to prevent Jews fleeing to Argentina.

August 10th, in Argentina, *Figuritas* magazine proclaims; "*The Argentine people must undertake a new and glorious reconquest. The third British invasion has already dragged on for too long."* [731]

> *"Let's talk now about the third English invasion. THE IMPROPER POSSESSION OF OUR MALVINAS! … The best values of England are making the greatest and most intelligent efforts to neutralize all imperialism and all intents of domination by force. The English kingdom cannot set itself up as the champion of law in one place and trample it in another. Furthermore, the Argentine people are ready to carry out this other Reconquista. It would be good politics for Great Britain to act as a force in fulfilling this national aspiration. … IN ANY CASE, THE FALKLANDS HAVE BEEN, ARE, AND WILL BE ARGENTINE!"* [732]

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726 Details provided to, and published by, the *Figuritas* magazine no.102

727 Letter quoted in *La Pagina del Profesor Plin* in *Figuritas* November 5, 1937 no.69

728 Desiderato 2022

729 The periods were for 1934/5 and 1937/8. During the course of the discussions, Argentina rejected any limitations on *"land stations"* but did not identify any belonging to Argentina. No issues of sovereignty were raised during the conference. Argentina signed the resulting agreements on June 24th.

730 Ellerby 1990 p.30 citing *Henniker-Heaton to MacDonald, August 10, 1938* in *CO78/210/8.*

731 Presumably 1806 and 1807 being the first two invasions.

732 *Figuritas* August 10, 1938

In **September**, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Minister speaks to Britain's *charge d'affaires* to draw attention to; *"... a statement that British troops for the Falkland Islands would touch at Buenos Aires en route."*[733]

"If this were true, then the Argentine Foreign Ministry deprecated it in the most friendly manner, for they feared a popular outcry over the Falkland Islands question. The report proved incorrect: the "troops" consisted of one British sergeant of marines, accompanied by his family, proceeding, as instructor, to the local militia." [734]

September 22nd, Argentina's President Roberto Ortiz, announces the ratification of postal conventions signed at Cairo in 1934; albeit with a reservation.

> *"... an express categorical reserve reasserting the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies, which were described as belonging to the Argentine nation by inalienable right. At the same time the President sent a message to Congress explaining that this reservation had been made, not as a modification of the law, but as a partial rectification of the convention which prejudiced, as a matter of principle, rights of sovereignty which had always been invoked and would ever be maintained. This rectification, it was pointed out by the Argentine press, related to the action of the British Delegation to the Cairo Postal Conference, who had included the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies as British possessions at the time of signature."* [735]

"... the possibility of some counter-declaration to the above-mentioned statement had been contemplated by the Foreign Office at the time, but that the conclusion had been reached that such action was unnecessary, since it was not the first time that a reservation of this kind had been made. The President's action ought accordingly to be treated as a matter of routine and ignored..." [736]

"The fact that it had taken four and a half years from Argentina's signing the postal convention to the formulation of that reservation, and that as late as 1937 some Argentine maps continued to omit the Falklands, shows that until the late 1930s Argentina's claim to the islands was still half-hearted..." [737]

During **October**, in Buenos Aires, a book by Juan Carlos Moreno, based upon his visit to the Falkland Islands in 1936/7, is published – *Nuestras Malvinas*. [738]

"The preface contained an account, written from the extreme Argentine nationalist standpoint of the Argentine-British claims on the islands... In the final chapter, the author suggested the employment of economic sanctions i.e., the confiscation of British property in the Argentine,.. The idea of arbitration was, however, rejected as the Argentine rights were described as being indisputable." [739]

"In the opinion of the Embassy, the publication of Senor Moreno's book was all part of an official campaign to keep the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the islands constantly before the public eye." [740]

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733 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/490* citing *A 7297/916/2* of 1938
734 *Ibid.*
735 *CO 78/213/3*
736 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
737 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.360
738 Publication had been sponsored by the *Commision Nacional de Cultura.* A copy was forwarded to the British Foreign Office by the Embassy in Buenos Aires in April 1939.
739 *CO 78/213/3*
740 *Ibid.*

"In a short time, book and visit turned Moreno into a recognised voice on the subject. Nuestras Malvinas was published in October 1938, with a subtitle that clarified content and financing: "trip of study and observation, with a scholarship awarded by the National Commission of Culture". Sold out in a few months." [741]

"This is, in fact, the first book specifically about the Malvinas Islands written by the fascist-sympathizing Catholic right. Before becoming an important figure in the country for the Malvinas cause, Moreno published articles on the subject in the aforementioned Crisol and other pro-fascist newspapers such as El Pampero and La Fronda. Despite this, there are many more similarities than contrasts with Palacios's text, which can be identified in a brief prologue that summarizes the history of the Islands. There he criticizes Darwin, for example, and laments that his "erroneous theories are still studied in our schools," exalts the role of Rosas and even attacks Groussac who "as a good mason, despised the papal bull" (Moreno, 1950: 14, 16).31 Otherwise, he does not stray too far from the publications of 1934." [742]

"Excerpts from the volume appeared in Figuritas, Caras y Caretas, and other periodicals, thus achieving wide circulation." [743]

October 17th, in the UK, Britain's General Post Office is informed by the government that the Argentine reservation of 22nd September was not considered to have any practical effect; *"His Majesty's Government took the view that no counter-statement was required."* [744]

November 11th, in Argentina, the *Figuritas* magazine reports the students from the Venado Tuerto teacher training school in Sante Fe have named their football team – *Las Malvinas son Argentinas*. The magazine's Profesor Plin dubs them "*Malvineros*".

"Shortly after, students from that same institution petitioned the municipality to name the city's children's park "Islas Malvinas"." [745]

Figuritas magazine also issues its own stamps (right).

> *" This proclamation of our cause will travel the world proclaiming Argentina's right to our, very much ours!, Malvinas Islands. Those who wish to cooperate in spreading our campaign can request these stamps; their size is adequate for adding them to correspondence, homework boxes, desks, blackboards, etc."* [746]

"... Figuritas issued stamps with a map of Argentina and the legend "The Malvinas are Argentine," which it distributed free of charge to its readers. This campaign benefited from the impetus for inter-school correspondence that the magazine encouraged, which brought its slogan to the far reaches of the country and some South American countries." [747]

Britain and the USA sign a trade agreement.

"The attitude of the United States Government has been consistently that of desiring to avoid becoming a party to the controversy between the Argentine Republic and Great Britain. During negotiations for the Anglo-United States Trade Agreement of 1938, for example, United States negotiators refused to accept a list of

741 Carassai 2022
742 Benciowicz 2025
743 María Inés Tato 2025 in Paula Seiguer Alina & Silveira (eds) 2025 p.75
744 Carassai 2022
745 Tato y Soprano 2022
746 *La Pagina del Profesor Plin* in *Figuritas* November 11, 1938
747 María Inés Tato 2025 in Paula Seiguer Alina & Silveira (eds) 2025 PP.73-74

British colonies in which the Falkland Islands appeared, on the ground that acceptance of this list might be interpreted as a United States acknowledgement of the British title; and this would create difficulties with the Argentine Government. Clearly, political considerations dictated this decision." [748]

The Falkland Islands annual, end-of year report notes an estimated population as of December 31st, of 2,378 including 1,070 females. 41 births were registered during the year, and 20 deaths. [749]

> *"The Agricultural Department established in 1937 continued its work during the year in connection with the investigation of the sheep farming industry. Work on the improvement of the pastures on Stanley Common was also carried out and included surface draining. Sowing of large areas of land with English grasses, planting of Tussac and Sand grasses and the erection of sub-divisional fences. The average production of wool during the past five years was four million pounds annually. The actual weight of wool exported in 1938 was 3,618,327 lb. valued at £163,109, or less by 984,632 lb. than the previous year. The average price realized was 10 • 81 pence per lb. Some 29,000 sheep were exported during the year to Chile for freezing and re-export for sale on the market in the United Kingdom. The estimated value of the sheep exported was £14,508. Hides and Skins exported during the year were valued at £19,436 as against £17,923 in 1937, an increase of £1,513. Livestock.*
>
> *A number of rams and ewes were imported from New Zealand and Patagonia in 1938 for the purpose of improving the flocks in the Colony, and two Freisian bulls were imported from New Zealand by the Government with a view to the improvement of the cattle herds in the islands. Seal Oil.*
>
> *The Falkland Islands and Dependencies Sealing Company, Limited, which has confined its activities hitherto to the production of oil from hair seal, was unable to continue operating in 1938 on account of the unfavourable market conditions."*

1939 – January 14th, Norway claims a section of Antarctica – Queen Maud Land (below right). [750]

> *"The King approves and signs a submitted draft Royal Order proclaiming that the portion of the mainland shoreline of Antarctica stretching from the border of the Falkland Islands Dependencies in the west (the border of Coats Land) to the border of the Australian Antarctic Dependency in the east (45° eastern longitude), including the land inland from this shore and the ocean abutting it, is to be brought under Norwegian national sovereignty."*



"Upon hearing of the Norwegian claim, the Government of Chile expressly reserved all and any right that the government of Chile might have upon the Antarctic territories in question." [751]

748 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/490*

749 *Annual Report on the Social and Economic Progress of the People of the Falkland Islands 1938.* See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1931 to 1938.pdf

750 The subject of a claim by Norway had been discussed on a number of occasions during the early 1930s, without the Norwegian government making a final decision. However, in December, 1938, Germany was believed to have despatched an expedition, in some secrecy, to the same area of Antarctica. Norway concluded that Berlin was intent on claiming that area, and so finally decided to act. Justified on the grounds of geographical exploration and whaling activities over the previous decades.

March 9th, in Britain, an *Emergency Powers Order in Council* is promulgated; *"Whereas it is expedient to make other provision than that now existing for the security in time of emergency of the colonies and protectorates..."* [752]

> "*6. (1) The Governor may make such Regulations as appear to him to be necessary or expedient for securing the public safety, the defence of the territory, the maintenance of public order and the suppression of mutiny, rebellion and riot, and for maintaining supplies and services essential to the life of the community."*

April 1st, in Buenos Aires, the 11th International Postal Conference opens.

"... in order to avoid the possibility of any unfortunate incident arising at the Postal Congress at Buenos Aires, when the British Delegation came to sign the convention negotiated thereat, a declaration concerning the colonies should not be appended as had been done at Cairo in 1934, but should be made at the time of ratification. In these circumstances, the Argentine Delegation would have no occasion to present any observations... it would appear that the above procedure was adhered to, and that there was no incident." [753]

"Apparently no incident occurred at the 1939 postal Congress, and when the matter of the Argentine reservation of 1938 was again raised in June 1939, His Majesty's Government determined once more to make no reservation, and the Colonial Office concurred in these views." [754]

April 14th, *Figuritas* magazine initiates a campaign to promote inter-school correspondence.

"Figuritas encouraged correspondence between primary school students throughout the country and the Americas with several objectives: to encourage written expression, to establish "bonds of solidarity and cooperation in their schoolwork," to "learn about the homeland," and to encourage "pacifist education." To this end, it opened a registry of schools willing to join this correspondence network. Within a year, 457 schools had joined the Figuritas Inter-School Correspondence Guide, 355 of them located in Argentina, serving around 20,000 students, and 102 in Central and South America. Two years later, the magazine reported that more than 600 schools were registered in the Guide. This campaign was interconnected with the campaign to promote the use of stamps alluding to the Malvinas Islands, as demonstrated, for example, by the support for the Argentine sovereignty claim received from countries such as Uruguay, Chile, Venezuela, Ecuador, and Brazil." [755]

June 10th, in Caras y Caretas: *"Why did the English take the Malvinas Islands from us? Because Rosas had forgotten them. Because for Rosas, the Argentine Republic ended at the Colorado River. Rosas's crime isn't having slit the throats of 200 enemies. If he doesn't slit their throats, they'll slit his own. Rosas's crime is having slit the throats of his homeland in the Falklands."* [756]

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751 *Frozen Empires: A history of the Antarctic sovereignty dispute between Britain, Argentina, and Chile, 1939 – 1959* Adrian John Howkins 2008

752 Introduced in recognition of the deteriorating situation in Europe and the Far East. Replaced 2017. See - https://faolex.fao.org/docs/pdf/sth106951.pdf

753 *CO 78/213/3*

754 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/490* citing *A 5018/3582/1 of 1939*

755 Tato y Soprano 2022

756 *Do they want to take Patagonia from us like they took the Malvinas Islands from us?* Juan José Soiza Reilly in *Caras y Caretas* June 10,1939.

June 20th, in Buenos Aires, the 'National Committee of Homage and Remembrance to the Heroes of the Reconquest in Defence of Buenos Aires' appeal to King George VI to "*return*" the Falkland Islands on the anniversary date of August 12th. [757]

July 17th, at Stanley, David Roberts is appointed Consul for Norway and Honorary Vice-Consul for Uruguay.

June 27th, in London, J. V. Perowne of the Foreign Office's *American Department*, notes regarding the Falkland Islands; *"... our consistent policy has been to avoid a clash with the Argentine government over this question and we have consistently shown great forbearance in dealing with various provocative actions..."* [758]

In **July**, from Buenos Aires, the Argentine Government announces that it will attend a proposed 'International Polar Conference and Polar Exhibition' in Bergen, Norway. [759]

"It was stressed in numerous press articles that this opportunity would be taken to assert Argentine claims to sovereignty in the Antarctic." [760]

In Argentina, Dagnino Pastore, a popular writer of geography texts for Argentine schools, refers to Britain's *'possession'* of more than 8 million square kilometres of the Antarctic. [761]

July 8th, in London, following concerns expressed by the Colonial Office with regard to Argentina's attitude over the Postal conventions, the Foreign Office responds.

> *"... the consistent policy of His Majesty's Government (has been) to avoid an open controversy with the Argentine Government over this matter. The greatest care had therefore always been shown in the face of the various provocations in which the Argentine Government had seen fit to indulge in the past in connexion with their claim. The Foreign Office saw no advantage in departing from the above mentioned policy. ... Representations would not lead to any withdrawal of the Argentine claim, but were more likely to afford the Argentine Government an opportunity they would otherwise lack to formulate in some definitive manner a claim which it would be embarrassing for His Majesty's Government to receive."* [762]

July 15th, in Buenos Aires, a temporary '*Commission*' is created by decree (no.*35,821*). [763]

> "*Article 1.- A committee is set up under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and composed of a representative appointed by that Department and one representative appointed by the Departments of Marine and Agriculture respectively, in order that within a period of 90 days from the - date of its constitution it may produce a. plan for Argentine participation in the International Polar Exhibition and Congress of Arctic explorers to be held at Bergen in 1940.*
>
> *Article 2.- The Committee shall make a comprehensive study of the present state of Antarctic problems, and of their eventual relation to Argentine interests, and shall further propose to the Executive Power a plan of action to include questions of Oceanography, Meteorology, Fisheries and any explorations which Argentina might undertake.*

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757 *CO 78/213/3.* A reference to the British attacks on the Spanish colony of Buenos Aires in 1806 and 1807. Poorly conceived, the attacks were unsuccessful. This organisation, formed in 1938, and associated with a small clique of army officers with fascist sympathies behind the pro-Nazi newspaper *Crisol*, commemorated these events. *cf.* 1806/07

758 *FO 371/22714*

759 The conference was cancelled due to the outbreak of war.

760 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

761 *Education, political culture, and foreign policy: the case of Argentina* Carlos Escude 1992 *cf.* May, 1940 & February, 1944, below.

762 *CO 78/213/3*

763 Made permanent by decree 61,852 of April 30, 1940

Article 3.- The Committee shall be empowered to obtain directly from the various Ministries, National Departments and Private Institutions, any documentary material and expert advice which it may consider necessary for the better accomplishment of its task."

"Senor Galmarini, a member of the newly-appointed commission... had stated, in a newspaper interview, that the Bergen Congress must settle the political questions of sovereignty before any other business could receive attention.... These claims to polar territory received prominence in the whole Argentine press." [764]

"Positive official acts in support of Argentina's (Antarctic) claims had been limited to continued maintenance of the Laurie Island station and to the protests and exchange of notes with the British Government in the 1920's ... but the Antarctic attracted little or no attention. The initial stimulus to interest appears to have been provided in the uneasy summer of 1939 by the announcement of the Byrd Expedition and Norway's move to call an International Polar Exposition and Congress of Arctic explorers at Bergen. By decree of July 15, 1939, the Argentine Government set up a commission in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to plan for participation in the Bergen Conference and to study "the possibility of carrying out, on behalf of the State; thorough exploration in that part of the Antarctic regions which are considered most closely connected with the Argentine Territory". The preamble to the decree cited Argentina's maintenance of a permanent observatory in the Antarctic, naval expeditions, and geographic and geological bases for Argentine "interest" in the region, but made no mention of "claims" or "rights" in the Antarctic such as had been made in the statements published in the 1920's. The Commission was specifically charged to "make a full study of the present state of the problems of the Antarctic and their eventual connection with Argentine interests, and it will also propose to the Executive Power a plan of action comprising matters of oceanographic and meteorologic nature, as well as fishing and exploration such as the country may take upon itself to make". ..." [765]

"Partly in an effort to appease nationalist sentiments, President Ortiz began to investigate and assert Argentina's territorial rights in the region. In 1939 he founded the Argentine Antarctic Commission. Its founding decree noted: 'That the geographic position of its territory, situated in the most southern part of South America, assigns to Argentina, for both scientific and political reasons, a natural right to participate in the questions surrounding the problems of the Antarctic continent.' Geographical proximity, the Argentines and other Southern Hemispheric nations believed, assigned to them special rights in relation to the Antarctic."[766]

July 24th, Argentine newspaper *La Prensa* reports:

"If Great Britain considers that by virtue of a geographical extension of the Falkland Islands she has juridical rights over the group of islands situated in the frozen Antarctic Ocean known under the name of South Georgia, South Orkneys, South Shetland and South Sandwich and the territory known under the name of Graham Land, it is obvious that Argentina, which has never recognised Great Britain's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, reserves its rights in that region by virtue of the same theory as is propounded by the British Government."

"On the following day the Buenos Aires Herald was more explicit, stating that Argentina claimed absolute sovereignty to the Antarctic Sector between longitudes 20°W and 68°W, and would strongly contest all British claims within this area ..." [767]

764 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
765 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.
766 Howkins 2008 (2). As for the relevance of geography with regard to sovereignty claims, see 1928.
767 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

"When first published on July 15, 1939, the decree attracted no attention, providing a measure of the absence of public interest in Argentina's position in the Antarctic. But, beginning on July 24, the entire Buenos Aires press simultaneously gave heavy coverage to the decree, to the forthcoming Bergen conference, to Argentine Antarctic claims, and to the possibility that the Byrd Expedition foreshadowed assertion of claims by the American Government. The Embassy in Buenos Aires reported that the points taken up and the phraseology used were so similar as to warrant the belief that, despite the expressed surprise of the Foreign Office at the aggressive and provocative one adopted by the press, the campaign was officially inspired. The critical reaction abroad to the Argentina press campaign brought a statement by the Argentine Embassy in Washington that the "Foreign Office ...', without any intention against any friendly country, is only considering the unquestionable interests of Argentina in those regions within a criterion of permanent collaboration with the other countries who are carrying out their action in the Antarctic". This statement appears to have closed the affair. With the outbreak of war the government's plans to advance Argentine "interests" at Bergen, (which was in any case to have been a strictly scientific conference) were forestalled by the cancellation of the conference." [768]

"Apart, then, from the spurious Argentinian claim to succession from Spain, what else might be adduced by Argentina as a basis of title in international law? Firstly, it seems that Argentina might have some tenuous grounds for alleging that its title to the Falkland Islands themselves (presupposing this is valid) could parasitically take in the Dependencies as well on the basis of the latter having been administratively included by the UK in its government of the Falklands, and that consequently the UK is estopped from denying that the Dependencies form part of a "greater Falklands" complex..." [769]

August 16th, from Buenos Aires, reports inform the Foreign Office of an anti-British poster by the Nationalist Youth Alliance, stating that the UK is attempting to; *"... seize the Antarctic regions which were under Argentine sovereignty..."* [770]

August 18th, in Argentina, a pamphlet published by the Nationalist Youth Alliance celebrates the 1807 *'reconquest'* of Buenos Aires. [771]

> "132 *years ago the native people of this country made the ENGLISH invaders bite the dust of defeat in the streets of Buenos Aires. Today the vanquished of 1806 and 1807 dominate our Islas Malvinas of which they deprived us by violence thus doing honour to their well established fame as PIRATES And now they are endeavouring to take possession of Antarctic Regions under Argentine sovereignty. At the same time they control the essential factors which govern our economic life, and while they wax rich as a result of our Railways, our Urban Transport Systems and our Frigoríficos, the native population of the country suffers hunger and misery.*
>
> *This is why we now proclaim the necessity for ANOTHER RECONQUEST."*

"Groups such as the Nationalist Youth Alliance (later renamed the Nationalist Liberation Alliance), led by Juan Queraltó, undertook numerous actions to demand the restitution of the archipelago, including public lectures and the distribution of wall posters, brochures, and flyers with relevant slogans. This group also collected

768 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.
769 Symmons 1984
770 *CO 78/213/3.* Following a complaint by the British Embassy, Argentina's Foreign Ministry reported that no such youth organisation existed and that no importance should be attached to the poster. Private inquiries by the Embassy however suggested that those behind the poster were associated with the anti-British/pro-Nazi newspaper *Crisol*.
771 *CO 78/211/9*. British diplomats at the time, suspected some German influence. *cf* 1806 & 1807

signatures for a petition addressed to the president demanding the recovery of the islands. The petition garnered numerous signatures in schools, where the group had an active student wing ("Nationalist Youth Alliance," 1939). Leaflets and newspaper propaganda pieces urged people to sign the petition, stating: "Every moment is opportune to repair the offenses to our honor. As long as we do not recover the Malvinas, we will be in debt to our ancestors and to the glorious past they left us" ("Todo momento es propicio," 1939).” [772]

September 3rd, the United Kingdom declares war on Germany. A volunteer defence force of 300 men is established on the Falkland Islands. Fearing an invasion by German sympathisers in Argentina, Falklands Governor Henniker Heaton requests that the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires send any trained men willing to volunteer.

> *“The Islands are claimed by a foreign government, which might, if unfriendly to Great Britain, be tempted to profit by our temporary embarrassment in other parts of the world to throw its lot in with the enemy in order to endeavour to assert its alleged rights.”* [773]

September 4th, at Stanley, David William Roberts is appointed Consul for Sweden.

September 7th, Chile founds its own Antarctic Commission to study Chilean rights in Antarctic areas.

September 13th, in Montevideo, thirty-three volunteers from Argentina and Uruguay board the Falkland Islands Company ship *Lafonia* for the journey to Stanley. [774]

September 21st, in Panama City, delegates from the American nations attend a conference. Twenty-one countries send their Ministers of Foreign Affairs. Discussions center on the situation in Europe, neutrality, economic cooperation and the maintenance of peace. A maritime security zone is considered, extending 300 nautical miles from the American continents, not including Canada or other European colonies or possessions.

> *“The Malvinas should be ours, although they produce nothing. Their value is strategic ... We shall always be dominated by the foreign country that controls them. Today that is Britain, the only country capable of bringing armies to South America and providing them with a powerful base of operations.”* [775]

“At the Panama meeting of Foreign Ministers of September 1939 and subsequently, the Argentine Government spoke in terms of Argentine "claims and rights in the Antarctic," "possession and sovereignty over certain Antarctic areas," "Antarctic regions claimed by the Argentine Republic," and so forth. But the language of its reservations end statements continued vague and general. In connection with Argentina's standard reservation of rights in the Falklands in the Panama Declaration establishing a hemisphere defense zone, Foreign Minister Leolzioldo Melo stated that the legitimate claims and rights of the Argentine Republic are reserved and maintained intact with respect to islands such as the Malvinas, as well as any other Argentine lands which might be situated within or beyond the line".” [776]

September 28th, at Stanley, James Woodgate is appointed commander of the Falkland Islands Defence Force.

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772 María Inés Tato 2025 in Paula Seiguer & Alina Silveira (eds) 2025 p.77

773 *Falkland Islands Defence Scheme 1939* p.6 CAB 120/516. *cf.* Howkins 2008

774 Mostly British born or Anglo-Argentines, with the addition of a few from Uruguay. On their arrival at Stanley, six were declared as medically unfit and returned to the Rio de la Plata. The remainder called themselves the Tabaris Highlanders after a night club in Buenos Aires. These men remained in the Falklands until 1939.

775 *La Maroma* October, 1939

776 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.

October 3rd, in Panama City, the final *Declaration of Panama*, provides for a provisional security zone.

> "*As a measure of continental self-protection, the American Republics, so long as they maintain their neutrality, are as of inherent right entitled to have those waters adjacent to the American continent, which they regard as of primary concern and direct utility in their relations, free from the commission of any hostile act by any non-American belligerent nation, whether such hostile act be attempted or made from land, sea or air.*" [777]

Argentina adds a statement in Section XV of the Declaration.

> "*The Argentine Delegation declares that in waters adjacent to the South American Continent, in that territorial extent of coasts which, in the zone defined as free from any hostile act, corresponds to the Argentine Republic, it does not recognise the existence of colonies or possessions of European countries, and adds that it specifically reserves and maintains intact the legitimate titles and rights of the Argentine Republic to islands such as the Malvinas, as well as to any other Argentine territory located within or beyond the said zone.*" [778]

DOCTRINA MONROE
"AMÉRICA PARA LOS AMERICANOS"
ISLAS MALVINAS
El Tío Sam: —Este velo debe proteger hasta aquí abajo.
Juan Pueblo:—¿Y por qué no protege también esa parte del costado?
CARAS Y CARETAS
Uncle Sam: This veil must protect down here. Juan Pueblo: And why doesn't it also protect that part of the coast?

At Argentina's insistence, the Falklands are included within the preliminary mapping of the zone. South Georgia lies outside it.

"... the Foreign Office considered that it would be politic to ignore the Argentine declaration,..." [779]

October 19th, in Buenos Aires, the *Junta de Recuperacion de las Malvinas* is established at a meeting attended by Senator Alfredo Palacios, Antonio Gomez Langenheim, Juan Carlos Moreno and a dozen more nationalists; *"Senor Palacios has said that the fact that the Democracies were fighting the battle for liberty and justice and, consequently, had the support of most Argentines was no reason for the latter to be silent about England's "theft" and that England cannot fight for international law without applying it to her relations with other Powers."* [780]

"At Palacio's request, proceedings at the inaugural meeting were opened by Juan Carlos Moreno, who proposed Palacios as president of the committee. Palacios was thereupon unanimously elected as president; Gomez Langenheim and Senor Ford de Halle were elected as vice-presidents, and Juan Carlos Moreno was elected general secretary. After the election the inaugural meeting accepted Palacios's brief programmatic statement of the society's purpose – to promote "propaganda in the national universities and colleges" – and also decided to hold monthly meeting. ... The timing of the new society's foundation was significant – they were taking advantage of Britain's preoccupation with the Second World War." [781]

"On the eve of the outbreak of the war, the Socialist legislator had spearheaded the founding of a "Board (Junta) for the Recovery of the Malvinas Islands," composed mostly of intellectuals from the authoritarian

777 *Declaration of Panama* p.36.
778 Also *Una Tierra Argentinas: Las Islas Malvinas* R. R. Caillet-Bois 1982 6th ed. p.406
779 *Ibid*
780 *CO 78/213/3*
781 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.367. *cf.* 1966

right, including Juan Carlos Moreno as secretary and Rodolfo Irazusta. Despite being widely cited in the literature, it is unknown what initiatives this "Junta" pursued in the period immediately following its formation, if any." [782]

October 21st, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Minister, writes to London.

"... German propaganda had been active since the outbreak of the Second World War in trying to exploit the sense of grievance latent in Argentina over the retention of the Falklands group by Britain. A campaign, led by the scurrilous Crisol and the National Youth Alliance, was possibly being aided and abetted by certain Germanophile sections of the Argentine army. But the British Minister concluded that the agitation would never be more than a nuisance value:.." [783]

October 23rd, in Buenos Aires, the *La Prensa* newspaper outlines Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands in a major article, but concludes; *"... that the existing world crisis was the worst possible moment for any State to solicit support in order to obtain the triumph of justice over force."* [784]

October 25th, Britain's Foreign Office considers the implications of war on Falklands sovereignty.

> *"In normal times the Argentine Government probably do not regard the satisfaction of their claims to the Falkland islands and their dependencies as a matter of practical politics, but .... Now we are at war their hopes of acquiring our possessions in the South Atlantic are probably a good deal higher."* [785]

In Argentina, *Noticias Graficas* publishes an interview with Foreign Minister Honorio Pueyrredón, in which he says that the Argentine claim to the Falklands is *"undeniable"*, but, in the circumstances, action now would be, *"inopportune and unchivalrous."* [786]

"The press of the other Latin American countries at the outbreak of the Second World War followed the line set by the Argentine press, namely that the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands was a just one, but that it was inopportune to press that claim at a time when Britain was engaged in a life-and-death struggle.." [787]

"At the end of 1939, following a request for permission for an event by a Bahía Blanca association that was operating at the headquarters of the Civic Legion (one of the main anti-liberal and anti-democratic nationalist groups of those years), a decree from the province of Buenos Aires prohibited the campaign for the recovery of the Islands. In the reasons for this measure, it argued that it "is not sincere and only tends to hinder the good relations that Argentina maintains with a friendly country"." [788]

November 25th, from Washington DC, US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, sends instructions to Admiral Richard Byrd regarding an expedition that is about to leave for Antarctica. Byrd, the expedition's leader, is instructed to establish bases in Antarctica, and prepare a case for a US claim. [789]

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782 Benciowicz 2025
783 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
784 *Ibid.*
785 Perowne in *FO 371/22714*
786 *PRO A/7425.* A circular (no. 125) from Argentina's Ministry of Justice and Public Education warned education authorities around the country that they should prevent students from gathering to express opinions for or against the combatants in Europe. Strict neutrality was to be observed. Restrictions on freedom of speech would see *Figuritas*'s Falklands campaign effectively silenced for the much of the war. However, see February, 1942, below.
787 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
788 Tato y Soprano 2022
789 Howkins 2008

"Anxiety concerning the objectives of the Byrd Expedition of 1940 was apparently allayed by official assurances from the US that it was "not intended to prejudice in any way the rights or interests which any American "Republic may have in the Antarctic regions" and would in fact serve to safeguard hemisphere rights in Antarctica and to prevent encroachments by non-hemisphere powers. Moreover special facilities were provided to Argentina and Chile to permit designated representatives to visit the Byrd headquarters in the Antarctic." [790]

December 2nd, at Stanley, HMS *Exeter* (Bell) and HMS *Ajax* (Woodhouse) are anchored in the harbour. Commodore Harwood, commanding the South American Division, orders both ships to the Rio de la Plata, it being one of two locations that he expects the German pocket battle ship *Admiral Graf Spee* (Hans Langsdorff) to make for. The British cruisers are to rendezvous with HMNZS *Archilles* (Parry). HMS *Cumberland* (Fallowfield) is to follow.

December 13th, near the Rio de la Plata, HMS *Exeter* is sighted by lookouts on *Graf Spee* at 0552am. Twenty-five minutes later, *Admiral Graff Spee* commences firing at *Exeter* which is hit amidships, severely damaging the wheelhouse. Capt. Bell returns fire, hitting *Graf Spee* near its turrets. *Exeter* is hit again. At 0631, *Exeter* fires three torpedoes, which miss. *Exeter* is hit again. Commodore Harwood orders *Exeter* to withdraw. *Archilles* and *Ajax* enter the fray. Capt. Hans Langsdorff, inspecting the damage caused by *Exeter*'s hit, orders his ship towards the Rio de la Plata and the neutral port of Montevideo. The battle becomes a pursuit.[791]

December 14th, *Graf Spee* anchors off Montevideo. *Ajax* and *Archilles* patrol the mouth of the river.



December 15th, badly damaged, with a 7° list, HMS *Exeter* is ordered to make her way back to the Falklands.

December 17th, at Montevideo, believing a large British force now awaits him outside the river mouth, Captain Hans Langsdorff orders *Graff Spee* to be scuttled in the Rio de la Plata. [792]

December 26th, at Port Stanley, HMS *Exeter* arrives for emergency repairs.

790 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.

791 A controversial decision. According to some reports, the German pocket battleship had sustained only light damage despite being hit some 17 times, as many of the British shells had simply bounced off. Other reports, suggest that *Exeter*'s hit had penetrated two decks and damaged the ship's raw fuel processing system, leaving her with just 16 hours of pre-cleaned fuel.

792 The Germans had been fed false intelligence to the effect that an aircraft carrier (*Ark Royal*) and battle cruiser (*Renown*) were assembling near the mouth of the Rio de la Plata. In reality, *Ajax* and *Archilles* had only been joined by *Cumberland*. Langsdorff shot himself at Buenos Aires on December 19, 1939

1940 – January 3rd, in Argentina, the 'Junta de Recuperación de las Malvinas', issues a manifesto.

> *"… the Junta's purpose is to arouse the collective conscience of the Argentine people, and especially of the youth of the country, to protest not only against this particular case of aggression but also against the domination of Argentina's economic life by foreign interests."* [793]

"Although German propaganda at this time had been allowed to die down in Buenos Aires, it was still active in outlying parts of the country, and was concentrating on inflaming the masses against British "commercial imperialism" …" [794]

January 8th, from England, a member of the British Union of Fascists, (Edward) Jeffrey Hamm, moves to the Falkland Islands under a three year contract to work as a travelling teacher. [795]

January 13th, at Stanley, HMS *Achilles* anchors in the harbour. [796]

January 21st, HMS *Exeter* sails from Stanley, escorted by HMS *Dorsetshire* and HMS *Shropshire*. [797]

January 22nd, three Argentine P2Y-3A seaplanes over-fly the Falklands archipelago.

"The flight was specifically ordered by President Ortiz, ostensibly as a patrol of the Pan-American Security Zone set up by the Declaration of Panama of October 1939. … they took off around 6.30 a.m. On 22 January 1940 and headed to wards the Falklands, assisted by four torpedo boats, La Rioja, Cervantes, Garay and Mendoza, which were specifically stationed in a line between Argentina and the islands, positioned some 30 miles apart … The aircraft flew over Mendoza at 8.42 a.m. And duly reached the Falklands; they overflew the Jason Islands, which were visible through heavy cloud, and part of the north coast of East Falkland, but deliberately avoided overflying Stanley, … then they turned for home,… That flight had no specific aims; it was intended as a test of Argentina's ability to mount such a patrol…" [798]

March 6th, in Britain's Parliament, a statement is made on Falklands defence.

> *"… the Colony is finding this year a sum of nearly £21,000 for defence purposes which is equivalent to about 30 per cent. of the pre-war revenue. Towards this expenditure fresh taxation which is estimated to provide some £14,000 additional revenue has been imposed… these figures reflect credit on this small Colony whose total population is less than 3,000 persons."*

April 30th, Argentina's *National Antarctic Commission* becomes permanent under decree *61,852*.

> *"Article 1. A National Commission of the Antarctic, which will centralize and take in charge the consideration of and giving of advice concerning all matters relative to the protection and development of Argentine interests in the Antarctic, shall be created with permanent character and shall be dependent upon the Ministry of Foreign Relations and Worship.*
>
> *Article 2. The Commission will continue the studies of overall character which it has undertaken concerning the present state of the problems of the Antarctic and their connection with Argentine interests, and will propose to the Executive Power a plan of action which will include all aspects of this matter, both of an internal and international order.*

793 Quoted in *CO 78/213/3*
794 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/490*
795 See June, 1940, below.
796 Departed again on the 14th.
797 Arrived Plymouth on February 15, 1940.
798 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.386 citing *La Nación* February 19, 1977.

Article 3. The Ministries and Dependencies and the competent Institutes will directly assist the National Commission of the Antarctic with the documentation and advice which it requests of them for the better fulfilment of its task…"

In **May**, Argentina's Antarctic Commission concludes that the government should claim a sector of Antarctica between 25° and 68° 34' West, south of 60° South. [799]

Argentine author, Dagnino Pastore changes the content of his school geography text of 1939; taking out the word *'possess'*. The text now says that Britain *"attributes to itself"* eight million square kilometres of Antarctic. [800]

"The thing to note is the use of the word "Falklands" to refer to the Malvinas in texts before 1940. Only after this decade and especially 1945 is the issue of (the) territorial claim over the Falkland Islands introduced into the (education) manuals and reading books, adding (the) disputes over the Antarctic sector." [801]

June 3rd, in the Falkland Islands, (Edward) Jeffrey Hamm is arrested by members of the Defence Force following an accusation that he is spreading his political opinions amongst his pupils. [802]

June 17th, from Washington DC, US Secretary of State Cordel Hull instructs US envoys to notify the governments of Germany and Italy that; *"the United States would not recognize any transfer, and would not acquiesce in any attempt to transfer, any geographic region of the Western Hemisphere from one non-American power to another non-American power."* [803]

June 18th, in Argentina, the Ministry of the Navy produce an assessment of the war in Europe and the possible outcomes should Germany win; including a transfer of the Falklands to Germany.

"… history will not tolerate, without severe criticism for those responsible, the transfer of dominion from Great Britain to any nation other than our own… If such a thing were to happen, a reaction would occur within the country that we have a duty to avoid, so that it does not dangerously influence the nation's internal politics. Nothing allows us to affirm today that such a change of dominion would take place between Great Britain and any nation other than our own; however, there are many indications to presume that it could happen if, with all due foresight, we do not take the appropriate measures to prevent it." [804]

"Not only was there fear that another power would occupy the Malvinas; there was also concern about what could happen to the United States. At that time, that country was neutral, but that status could easily change in the future. If it entered the war against Japan and Germany, and a disturbance temporarily affected the Panama Canal, the US government could observe with interest "the strategic importance" of the Falklands. And if it remained neutral, it could not "fail to see the importance of these islands for the policy of economic and commercial expansion and absorption that [characterized] the United States and all nations of Saxon origin". … To avoid this, it was recommended to "anticipate events" and mobilize a significant portion of the Fleet to the Islas de los Estados (Staten Island), to stand by and resort to the Malvinas at the first command."[805]

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799 See 1946, below.

800 Escude 1992. See July, 1939 & February, 1944

801 Garcia 2009

802 An accusation that Hamm denied. Despite not being charged with any offence, Hamm was deported to South Africa in October, 1940. For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/hamm_jeffrey

803 Quoted in *Pan American solidarity, 1932-1940* Morton M. Grodzins 1977. Notification was also presented to the British, Dutch and French governments.

804 *DEHN, Fondo Scasso, Caja 5, Legajo 4, "Ligera apreciación de la situación", Buenos Aires, 18/06/1940, foja 1* in Desiderato 2022

805 Desiderato 2022

June 21st, in Buenos Aires, notified of the agenda of an inter-American conference proposed for July, Argentina responds to the US Ambassador.

> *"... the Argentine Government, ... agrees in principle to the new meeting which is proposed and does not have any objection to the place suggested, the city of Habana. Nevertheless, in view of the special interests which the Republic must take into consideration, ... this Government desires to consider beforehand the program of the conference, the work of which it is desirable to see in advance in a definite and delimited form. As to questions of sovereignty expressly contemplated in the proposal in question, it may be pointed out that the Argentine Government, which maintains as inalienable the rights of this country over the Falkland Islands, cannot but continue in this definite position, without admitting that that part of the territory, of essential interest to the national defense, be the object of any deliberation within the plan contemplated by the proposal."* [806]

"The German victory in France, the taking of Denmark, Norway, and the Low Countries, and the threatened invasion of Great Britain had brought the war considerably closer to America; politically closer because Danish, Dutch, and French possessions in this hemisphere were no longer controlled by "friendly democracies"; economically closer, because the expansion of the war had created a crisis in Latin American exports." [807]

June 24th, in Argentina, Antonio Gomez Langheim takes over the *Junta de Recuperacion de las Malvinas* following the resignation of Senator Palacios. [808]

July 21st - 30th, in Cuba, at the Havana Conference, consideration is given to the possibility that European colonies may fall under Axis control.

"In his address before the Conference on July 22, Hull stated that the United States was in favor of "the establishment of a collective trusteeship, to be exercised in the name of all the American republics," for European territory in America threatened by a change of ownership. The Secretary of State denied that the trusteeship would carry with it any thought of the creation of a special interest by any American republic and suggested that "as soon as conditions permit, the region should be restored to its original sovereign or be declared independent when able to establish and maintain stable self-government"." [809]

Delegates agree that there should be collective trusteeship of any territory in danger; and that such territories should eventually have the right to determine their own futures – *Act of Havana: Convention on the Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas*.

> "*... when islands or regions in the Americas now under the possession of non-American nations are in danger of becoming the subject of barter of territory or change of sovereignty, the American nations, taking into account the imperative need of continental security and the* ***desires*** *of the inhabitants of the said islands or regions, may set up a regime of provisional administration."* [810]

"At the Havana Conference the U.S. and several South American nations agreed to work together to prevent Axis acquisition of British, French or Dutch colonies in the Americas. At the conference the United States

806 *Ambassador Armour to US Secretary of State June 21, 1940* in *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The American Republics, Volume V*
807 Grodzins 1977
808 Langheim was formally elected President on September 19, 1940
809 Grodzins 1977
810 Quoted in Grodzins 1977. My emphasis.

agreed to share with other countries in the Americas the responsibility of enforcing the Monroe Doctrine. The Havana Conference marked a change in the use of the that foreign policy." [811]

However, Argentina submits a reservation; [812]

> *"(Such territory)… does not include the Falkland islands as these do not constitute a Colony or possession of any European nation, being part of (Argentina's) territory and included within its domain and sovereignty…"* [813]

"Excluded from the operation of the Act of Habana (sic) are any "territories or possessions which are the subject of dispute or claims between European powers and one or more of the Republics of the Americas". Presumably this refers to the Argentine claim to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands and Chile's claim in Antarctica, which were specifically reserved by those two republics at the time of signature of the Act." [814]

"Dr. Milo, the Argentine delegate to the Havana Conference, subsequently claimed for Argentina "incontestable rights" to the Falkland Islands and their dependencies, rejecting all and any "stipulations or treaties between Europe or American Countries, because they (the Islands) constitute an integral part of the Argentine soil and only their sovereign, the Argentine people, has authority to make decisions regarding them." This was understood to be an indirect hint to the United States that Argentine nationalists were unwilling to allow, even to the United States, access to Britain's naval base in the South Atlantic (in the manner later arranged between the United States and British Governments)." [815]

"The Argentine delegations at the Panama and Havana meetings of Foreign Ministers reserved national rights in the Falklands according to the time-honored formula, but did not argue that the establishment of the defense zone as such affected the Falklands dispute." [816]

"As usual, Argentina supplied the main, and in this case, about the only opposition to the plan of the United States." [817]

August 8th, Chile's Antarctic Commission outlines a territorial claim based on proximity, and an assertion that the Antarctic Peninsula is a geological extension of the Andes mountain range. The rescue of Shackleton's crew in 1917 is also cited as an *'act of sovereignty.'* Based upon these, the Commission suggests that Chile has rights to Antarctic territory between 60° and 80° West.

"... both Argentina and Chile were at pains to point out that they were not making new claims, but rather defining longstanding sovereignty rights to the region. These rights, they claimed, dated back as far as the Treaty of Tordesillas in 1494, which had divided the world between Spanish and Portuguese spheres of influence stretching from Pole to Pole. According to international lawyers in Buenos Aires and Santiago, Spain's imperial rights had been inherited by Argentina and Chile upon independence through the legal idea of uti possidetis." [818]

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811 Diary of US President Franklin D. Roosevelt July, 1940. For the Monroe Doctrine, see 1823

812 Chile also, rather vaguely, reserved "*the rights of Chile in Antarctica*". See November, 1940 below.

813 Quoted in Caillet-Bois 1982

814 *The Provisional Administration of European Colonies and Possessions in the Americas* Herbert Wright 1940 in *World Affairs* December, 1940 vol.103 no.4

815 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908* citing *A 4514/2382/2 of 1940*

816 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp08c01297r000800090022-3

817 Grodzins 1977

818 Howkins 2008 (2)

September 4th, Argentine diplomats express concerns following reports that the US has obtained a naval base in the Falklands from Britain. The reports are denied. [819]

> *"The Argentine Ambassador came in today to exchange views on the state of affairs generally. He seemed to think that the British-American agreement regarding naval bases would be well received. In this connection he noted that one newspaper, the Washington Herald, had editorially wondered why we did not include a base in the Falkland Islands; and feared that that might lead to some repercussion in the Argentine press. I said at once that we had recognized throughout the peculiar relationship of the Argentine Government to the Falkland Islands, and that to me it seemed preposterous that under existing circumstances we should endeavor to acquire a base there except after full discussion with Argentina. However, the question was purely hypothetical; the Falkland Islands, so far as I was aware, had not entered into the discussion at any time."* [820]

"It will be observed from the note that Argentina bases its claim to the Antarctic areas in question on – 1) continuous occupation through maintenance of an observatory in the South Orkneys established 37 years ago; 2) certain expeditions made by its Navy, and 3) the geographic proximity of the area to the archipelago of the Falkland Islands, which it asserts, "is also a part of our national territory"." [821]

September 11th, in Buenos Aires, following receipt of an Australian map of Antarctica, Argentina's Foreign Ministry proposes a conference to consider the *'juridical-political'* status of Antarctica.

> *"... the Argentine Government understands that the situation created by the unilateral claims to zones of the Antarctic made by various States, to which Chilean claims are now added, can be satisfactorily settled from an international point of view only by means of a conference of the interested States and through an agreement among them on the basis of their just claims and rights."* [822]

"It was decided to ignore this suggestion, as it was not put forward in the form of an invitation." [823]

November 4th, in Buenos Aires, at a meeting of the Junta de Recuperacion de las Malvinas, the lyrics of a song written by poet Carlos Obligado are approved by the members. [824]

Behind its cloak of mist
We must not forget them
The Falklands, Argentina
The wind cries and the sea roars. ...

The Falklands, Argentina
In domain already immortal.
And before the sun of our emblem

819 These rumours followed the lease of a number of British bases by the USA. What was known as the *Destroyers-for-bases* deal signed on September 2, 1940. As a result, 50 destroyers were transferred from the American fleet, to the UK and the USA acquired ports in North America and the Caribbean.

820 *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, The American Republics, Volume V – Memorandum of Conversation, by the Assistant Secretary of State (Berle), Washington, September 4, 1940.*

821 *US Ambassador in Buenos Aires to Secretary of State No.1543 November 15, 1940*

822 *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, General and Europe vol.II – The Ambassador in Argentina (Armour) to the Secretary of State, Buenos Aires, November 15, 1940*

823 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

824 Asserting Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, these words were subsequently put to music by Jose Tieri. Now known as the - *'Marcha de las Malvinas'*.

Pure, clear and triumphant
Shine "Oh, Homeland" on your headband
The lost southern pearl.
In honor of our emblem,
for national pride
Shine "Oh, Homeland" on your headband
The lost southern pearl [825]

November 6th, in Santiago, President Juan Rios issues a decree setting out Chile's claims in Antarctica.

"CONSIDERING:
That it is the duty of the State to accurately set its territorial limits;
That the limits of the Chilean territory have not been specified so far in the part that extends to the polar region called American Antarctic;
That this ministry publicly recorded, in 1906, that the delimitation of the aforementioned territory was the subject of initiated studies, but not yet complete;
That the current state of such studies already allows a determination to be taken;
That the special commission appointed by the decree of this Ministry No. 1,541, of September 7, 1939, has established the limits of the Chilean Antarctic territory in accordance with the data provided by the geographical, historical, legal, legal and diplomatic backgrounds and that have been come accumulating to date
DECREE:
Chilean Antarctic or Antarctic Chilean territory forms

All lands, islands, islets, reefs of rocks, glaciers (pack-ice), already known, or to be discovered, and their respective territorial waters, in the sector between longitudes 53° and 90° West, constitute the Chilean Antarctic or Chilean Antarctic Territory." [826]

"The Chilean Government thus claimed a large area of British territory within the Falkland Islands Dependencies, including the whole of Graham Land and the South Shetland Islands, to which Argentina had also made a claim in July 1939. It is to be noted that no northern limit to the area is specified. In justification of this claim the Chilean Press argued that the Spanish conquerors of Chile gave to her undeniable rights rights to all land south of the continental territory..." [827]

"From 1940 onwards competing claims were put forward to the South Shetland Islands by other powers; Chile claimed the islands by a decree communicated to the Foreign Office on the 11th November 1940; Argentina also put forward claims, and from about that time the Shetland Islands became a disputed area. In our view, however, before these competing claims were put forward Great Britain did acquire a title which can be maintained to either a part, or the whole, of the South Shetland Islands. We think that Great Britain certainly acquired a title to Deception Island." [828]

"The record of Chilean interest in Antarctica ante-dates Argentine activity in this area, but is of an even more tenuous nature. Chilean claims are based largely on succession to Spanish rights in Antarctica, which are

825 Shortened, obviously. Now the official hymn of the Argentine Province of Tierra del Fuego having been decreed by the Teirra del Fuego Governor, Rosana Bertone, in May, 2017.
826 *Decree 1.747 of November 6, 1940*. However, Chile was not effectively present in the claimed territory until 1947
827 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
828 Opinion of the Law Officers 1947 in *LCO 2/4908. cf.* 1819, 1829

contestable; on acts of authority exercised in the region, which are unconvincing in comparison with those of other claimants; on geological continuity, which appears to lack scientific foundation; and on geographical proximity." [829]

"The limits set by the Decree were almost twice those proposed by Cordovez less than three months earlier. ... On the same day that the Chilean Decree was passed the Chilean Ministry of Foreign relations issued a verbal note to the Argentina Government inviting them to send a delegation... in order to discuss the question..." [830]

November 12th, Argentina protests to Chile.

> *"The Argentine Republic has for a long time recognized the importance which must be attached to the problem of the Antarctic and to the national interests bound up with it, which have materialized for the present in the well-known occupation which this Republic has exercised within the zone for the past thirty seven years, by the maintenance of the Observatory of the [South] Orkneys.*
>
> *Thus, upon the creation on 15 July 1939 of the Antarctic Commission, which was given a permanent character by the Decree of 30 April 1940 "in order to give attention to matters which require the fostering and expediting of national interests in the Antarctic zone and continent," this Government could announce that – without taking account of divers expeditions made by its navy – "Argentina is the only country in the world which maintains a permanent observatory in the antarctic regions, and the work of this observatory, which has augmented for more than thirty years, has come to be of inestimable value in the field of universal science."*
>
> *By reason of this effective and continuous occupation which has gone on since 1904, the inhabited place which is nearest to the South Pole is Argentine, and our country is the only one "which has lived there for 37 years and the only one, consequently, which maintains in real form the rule of its sovereignty in the lands of the Antarctic."*
>
> *Argentine rights, moreover, are not solely dependent upon the principal fact of this occupation. They are also justified under the subsidiary systems admitted for the attribution of those zones. By reason of the geographical propinquity of both the continental territory of Argentina and of the archipelago of the Malvinas [Falklands] which is also part of the national soil, it would be difficult for another nation to take the place of Argentina on the ground that it had better rights with respect to the attribution of the ownership of this zone. Argentina's title also could scarcely be disputed if the question is to be solved on the basis of the sector which is a prolongation of the American continent."* [831]

"However, (Argentina) welcomed Chile's suggestion that the two countries meet to agree on their rights in the Antarctic." [832]

November 13th, in Santiago, Britain's Minister to Chile informally hands to the Minister of Foreign Affairs an extract from the *Colonial Office List* showing the limits of the Falkland Islands Dependencies.

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829 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/docs/CIA-RDP08C01297R000800090022-3.pdf

830 Howkins 2008

831 *Julio A. Roca to His Excellency don Conrado Rios Gallardo, Ambassador of Chile November 12, 1940.* Contiguity (geography) had been considered in the *Islas de Palmas* arbitration of 1929, with the conclusion that it was not relevant in sovereignty disputes.

832 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See link above.

"Senor Bianchi, who seemed ignorant of British claims in the region in question, took these observations in very good part." [833]

December 11th, in Buenos Aires. Dr. Carlos Pueyrredon, during a conversation with Lord Willingdon, suggests that in exchange for British recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands, the archipelago would be '*leased-back*' to Britain for a pepper-corn rent of between one and five pesos per annum for 100 years. [834]

"In February 1941 'Transocean' reported that a member of the Argentine Chamber of Deputies had urged the Government to request the return of the Falkland Islands from England at the end of the War, by means of a Pact which would grant England naval and air bases at Port Stanley... He further proposed that Argentina should lease the Islands to England for 99 years, ... One Argentine newspaper described this suggestion as "monstrous," as it would result in the existing illegal holding of the Islands becoming a legal one." [835]

December 19th, from Santiago, Chile's Ambassador in London is instructed to search the British archives for evidence in support of Chile's Antarctic claim.

1941 – January 3rd, in Buenos Aires, a ceremony at the tomb of Luis Vernet is held by members of the Junta de Recuperación de las Malvinas. [836] The *Marcha de las Malvinas* is played publicly for the first time.

> *"On this day we think of January the 3rd 1833, when a British warship by an act of force took possession of a piece of Argentine soil."* [837]

"The activities of the Junta de Recuperacion de las Malvinas, beginning at a time when Britain faced an existential threat in the Second World War, were crucial in reviving the defunct Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands. ... they succeeded in getting the Falklands made a permanent part of the Argentine school syllabus, which it had not been before, and they induced Argentine governments to pay more attention to the issue and to introduce it into international discussions." [838]

"... in January 1941 the famous march was unveiled at an event attended by the new president of the Junta and the pro-fascist general Juan Bautista Molina; Molina had been driving the Malvinas-ization campaign through the Civic Legion and the Nationalist Youth Alliance, organizations he headed." [839]

January 22nd, at South Georgia, HMS *Queen of Bermuda*, an armed merchant cruiser, anchors. [840]

January 28th, at the Falkland Islands, Allan Wolsey Cardinall is promoted from Colonial Secretary to the position of Governor; replacing the retiring Sir Herbert Henniker Heaton. [841]

February 25th, at Santiago de Chile, in a diplomatic *Note*, the UK rejects Chile's Antarctic territorial claims.

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833 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

834 Beck 1983 (2). Lord Willingdon was head of the *British Economic Mission* in Buenos Aires; while Pueyrredon was the Mayor of Buenos Aires.

835 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908. Transocean* was a German news agency. Which member of the Chamber of Deputies was not revealed.

836 Reported by the German news agency, *Transocean*, the following day.

837 Quoted in *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

838 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.392. However, see 1937 above.

839 Benciowicz 2025

840 Too late to save most of the Norwegian whaling ships which had been operating out of South Georgia. They had been captured on the high seas the week before by the German raiding ship *Pinguin* (Krüder) and despatched with prize crews to Europe. See Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.392-394

841 Not gazetted. However, the award of a Knighthood in 1943 refers to him as Governor (*The London Gazette No.35841*). For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/cardinall_sir

"At the same time a copy of the full text of the Letters Patent of 28th March, 1917 was enclosed for the information of the Chilean Government. This note was acknowledged without comment." [842]

March 5th, at Deception Island in the South Shetlands, HMS *Queen of Bermuda* destroys the fuel supplies left by the 'Hektor Whaling Company'. To prevent them falling into German hands.

"This measure, which was taken to deny the use of the oil tanks and fuel stocks to Axis raiders, constituted a most significant display and exercise of British sovereignty over the South Shetlands." [843]

On the Island of South Georgia, Britain places gun batteries.

March 14th, diplomats from Argentina and Chile meet to discuss their respective Antarctic claims.

"The idea of a South American Antarctica... emerged out of the Escudero-Ruiz Moreno negotiations ... Implicit in the idea of a South American Antarctica was the sense that the Antarctic Peninsula region belonged to Argentina and Chile, not just legally and historically, but also environmentally and geographically. Geological continuity, shared weather systems, and Palaeontological evidence of similar flora and fauna provided 'proof' that the Antarctic Peninsula was part of South America." [844]

March 27th, Argentina newspapers publish accounts of the discussions between Argentina and Chile, suggesting an agreement between the two governments to pursue in common the; *"... indubitable sovereign rights of Chile and Argentina in the Antarctic zone..."* [845]

May 28th, in Buenos Aires, President Roberto María Ortiz, mentions Argentina's claim to the Falklands in his 'Message to Congress'. For the first time in the 92 years since 1849. [846] Referring to the Havana Conference of July, 1940, Ortiz tells Argentina's Congress:

> *''The signing of those instruments moreover gave the Argentine delegate, Dr. Leopoldo Melo, an opportunity to reaffirm by means of reservations in the case of our rights over the Malvinas Islands, whose status as a colony or European possession we naturally cannot recognise."* [847]

"The fact that the islands received no mention in the Messages for almost a century invalidates assertions that Argentina "has never ceased to protest" to Britain over the Falklands." [848]

June 20th, a Japanese steamship, *Nan-a-Maru*, arrives at Buenos Aires from Tokyo. On board are 83 diplomatic pouches declared by the German Embassy as containing personal effects.

"However, Argentine custom officials were suspicious because of the size of the shipment and alerted the Argentine foreign minister, fearing it could contain material which could endanger Argentina's neutral stance in World War Two at the time. Five of the pouches were opened at random and found to contain postcards, photographs and Nazi propaganda material. The German embassy in Buenos Aires requested that the pouches be sent back to its embassy in Tokyo - from where they had been sent in the first place - but an Argentine judge

842 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908.* No reply was received until January, 1946
843 *Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, May, 1955*
844 Howkins 2008. Nothing substantial emerged until 1947
845 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
846 Ortiz appears to be a common link joining the South Georgia claim in 1927 (Minister of Public Works), the South Sandwich Islands claim in 1938 and the resurrected Falklands' claim of 1941, when he was President. Messages to Congress were an annual event along the lines of the King's Speech in the UK and the Falkland Islands had featured regularly before 1850.
847 *Diario de Sesiones May 28, 1941* quoted in Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.394
848 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.394. Whether such a message to Congress would actually amount to an official protest, is moot. Official protests need to be made country to country, not via a third party such as the Postal Union, or the Argentine Congress.

ordered in September 1941 that all of the 83 pouches be seized. Argentina's Supreme Court was tasked with the decision as to what to do with them next but it appears no decision was made before 1944 - when Argentina broke relations with the Axis powers…" [849]

In **August**, the Argentine Government announces that naval wireless operators will, in future, man the station on Laurie Island because; *"… such an act would not normally be tolerated by another owner."* [850] Argentina also informs the International Postal Union that they are opening a permanent, accredited, post office in the South Orkneys once their navy takes over the meteorological from the civilian staff. [851]

August 14th, in Canada, Britain and the United States of America sign the Atlantic Charter.

"In August 1941, Prime Minister Winston Churchill sailed across the Atlantic on the British battleship HMS Prince of Wales for a secret rendezvous in Placentia Bay, Newfoundland, with American warships carrying President Roosevelt. The United States had yet to enter the Second World War and it would have stuck in the throat of any properly conscientious American to form an alliance to protect the British Empire:… Yet Churchill and Roosevelt managed to agree a statement, an Atlantic Charter, which laid out eight war aims. The very first of these stated that neither country was seeking any territorial gain from the conflict. The veteran of the battle of Omdurman may not have had his fingers crossed when he agreed to this. But he certainly had anxieties about the third principle to which the men signed up, which claimed that the two governments 'respect the right of all peoples to choose the form of Government under which they will live; and the wish to see sovereign rights and self-government restored to those who have been forcibly deprive of them.' … Churchill later blithely told the House of Commons that what he'd had in mind was merely self-determination for the peoples of Nazi occupied Europe." [852]

From Buenos Aires, amid rumours of a planned attack by Japanese forces, Britain's military attaché urges London's War Office to send troops to the Falklands to bolster defences. London argues that Japan is too far away to be a serious threat. [853]

In **September**, in both Stanley and London, issues regarding greater local representation are raised.

"During the early 1940s the British Government sought to change the appearance of colonialism to win the support of American public opinion for the British war effort. Article III of the August 1941 Atlantic Charter, signed by President Roosevelt and Winston Churchill, stated that all peoples had the right to chose their own form of government. Churchill's failure to restrict the principle to Europe led to a review within the Government of the Empire's future. In September 1941 a Colonial Office memorandum submitted to Churchill referred specifically to the Falklands as a territory which could not be granted self-government, although the growth of local institutions might be a healthy development.[854] *… the Reform League raised the question of electoral representation in a petition to the Governor. The Secretary of State's positive reply probably reflected the wider context of countering anti-colonial American sentiment. He stated that, "It should be in accord with general policy and principle that a measure of representation through election of say half of the unofficial members of the Legislature should be introduced, unless there are strong reasons to the contrary … This is a matter which should be considered now and … carried through even under war conditions."…"* [855]

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849 *Crates Full of Nazi documents found in Argentine court's basement* in *The Guardian* May 12, 2025
850 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
851 *Antarctica Cases: United Kingdom v. Argentine; United Kingdom v Chile* International Court of Justice 1956 p.30
852 *Empire* Jeremy Paxman 2012 p.251
853 See *PRO FO 371/25979*
854 Ellerby 1990 p.38 citing *Imperialism at Bay, 1941-1945: The United States & the Decolonization of the British Empire* William Roger Louis 1977
855 *Ibid.* citing *Memorandum FI.s Review of Constitutional Reform* in *CO 78/242/8*

September 26th, in Buenos Aires, Capt. Ernesto Villanueva of the Argentine Navy, presents a plan to invade the Falkland Islands while the UK is *"... occupied in other world theatres..."* [856]

"The possibility of recovering the Falklands from British occupation apparently first began to receive serious official attention in 1941. The .Argentine High Seas Fleet is reported to have sailed during this year under sealed orders -- countermanded at the last moment -- to occupy the Falklands." [857]

"The mission was to "restore the sovereignty of the archipelago to its rightful owner whose strategic location is of vital importance to the maritime defence of the nation..." (the) joint operation was criticized by an Army Officer, Lieutenant Colonel Benjamine Rattenbach who said in a report: "as regard the coup de main... my opinion is that it will not offer major difficulties... The hard part will be keeping it. Maintaining the islands against an attempt by the UK to recapture..." So the operation was shelved." [858]

"Due to the global context, the author thought that Great Britain was too busy in other parts of the world to attend to the fate of a few small colonial islands." [859]

"His plan envisaged a landing in two places on the shores of Berkeley Sound, aiming to establish a base at Port Louis before the Argentine force moved to capture Stanley. He did not envisage any role for the airforce; it was to be a purely amphibious operation by the army and navy, landing in a surprise action at dawn, involving a battalion of Marines distributed in "two heavily armed cruisers, a light cruiser, twelve torpedo boats, a tanker and nine intelligence vessels". After a successful landing, 750 soldiers would move against Stanley." [860]

"On September 26, 1941,..., Frigate Captain Ernesto Villanueva submitted a paper entitled "Occupation of the Falkland Islands" for the "Combined Operations" course taught by then-Lieutenant Colonel Benjamín Rattenbach at the Naval War College. Villanueva... proposed seizing them through a "coup de main," thus restoring a territory that belonged to the country and whose "strategic location" was of "vital importance" for maritime defense, economic life, and the nation's wealth. The seizure would be carried out through a combined operation, involving Navy and Army personnel. The element of surprise was essential, so one of the mission's first objectives was to cut the submarine cable and destroy the radiotelegraph stations at Puerto Stanley and Bahía Fox (Fox Bay). The landing would take place on the beach at Urania Bay, south of Annunciation Bay (Berkeley Sound), while the Fleet would take Cow Bay as its base of operations. The Army General Staff was interested in Villanueva's study and requested a copy from Rattenbach, who sent it along with some personal comments and assessments. In short, he believed that the plan would not present "major difficulties," although the complex aspect would be defending the islands "against an attempted reconquest by the English." Villanueva's work said nothing of this." [861]

In **October**, Argentina's Instituto Geografico Militar publishes maps indicating Argentine sovereignty over a sector of Antarctica between 25°W and 75°W.

856 *Army and Navy Co-operation: Occupation of the Malvinas Islands* E. Villanueva 1941
857 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link
858 *El plan para recuperar Malvinas de 1941* Omar Poxequi in *Taringa!* October 4, 2016
859 *A 80 años del plan secreto para recuperar las Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* September 26, 2021
860 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.394-395 citing *Argentina considero invadir las malvinas durante la Segunda Guerra Mundial* Bernardo Veksler in *Diario del Fin de Mundo* November 14, 2013.
861 Desiderato 2022 citing *DEHN, Fondo DEHN, Caja 200, "Ocupación de las Islas Malvinas" Buenos Aires, 26/09/1941* p. 2-3. See October, 1966, when a secret reconnaissance of Cow Bay was undertaken by Argentina's amphibious command.

November 14th, the British Government is informed that Argentina has established a permanent Post Office on Laurie Island.[862]

"The Argentine Government in November 1941 declared the opening of a permanent post office in the Orkneys; which placed on a formal basis the postal facilities maintained at Laurie Island since 1904,.." [863]

November 21st, at Port Stanley, HMS *Birmingham*, a light cruiser, anchors in the harbour. [864]

December 7th, at Pearl Harbour, Hawaii, Japanese forces attack the US naval base. Attacks also take place at Guam, Midway, Wake Island, Philippine Islands and Britain's colonies of Malaya, Singapore and Hong Kong.

December 8th, Britain and the Unites States of America declare war on Japan.

December 11th, the Unites States of America declares war on Germany.

"The U.S. entry into the war led to the South Atlantic becoming the defence responsibility of the American Atlantic Naval Command. The Chiefs of Staff invited the U. S. to garrison the Falklands, without consulting the Foreign and Colonial Offices or the War Cabinet on the political implications. The Foreign Office described the action as an "unthinking procedure" which could result in the loss of the Falklands. The British dilemma was to find, "... the best means of ensuring that the effect of additional defence of the Falkland Islands under the new conditions does not lead to any diminution of our actual or juridical control over the Islands". The Foreign Office proposed a compromise whereby Britain remained responsible for the Colony's land defences while America gave maritime support." [865]

December 16th, in Argentina, the newspaper *Pampero* claims that it is now *"inevitable"* that Britain will transfer the Falkland Islands to the USA.

"In 1941 an Argentine military service delegation to the U.S.A. stated that Argentina was willing to cooperate in a South Atlantic defence scheme on the condition that the Americans use their influence to persuade Britain to cede the Falklands." [866]

December 18th, Britain's Embassy in Washington advises London that a joint Argentine Army and Navy Mission is bringing to the United States; "*... a plan of defence which includes an area in South Atlantic bounded on the East by a line running straight South from boundary of Brazil and Uruguay to Antarctic. The Falkland Is., are included in this area. Minister insists success of Defence plan is contingent in Argentina securing Falkland Is., and indicates US good offices with British would probably be asked.*" [867]

In London, a Foreign Office *minute* notes:

> *"These blackmail tactics are what might have been expected of the Government of Acting President Castillo and Sr. Ruiz Guinazu. Either way they have something to gain. If they do not get the Falklands they have an admirable excuse for staying out of the war; if they do get them they at once become national heroes instead of being thoroughly disliked and despised by 90% of the Argentine public."* [868]

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862 The International Postal Union had been informed in August, 1941.
863 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above.
864 Remained until the 25th.
865 Ellerby 1990 p.55 citing *FO 371/25979*
866 *Ibid.* p.61 citing *Washington to Admiralty December 18, 1941* in *FO 371/25979*
867 *PRO FO 371/25979*
868 *Ibid*

"... in December 1941 the Argentine Government, for the first time since the exchange of notes in the 1880's, indicated a desire to secure the assistance of the American Government in regaining the Falklands. At this time the Argentine Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that the Argentine naval defense plan envisaged an area in the South Atlantic including the Falkland Islands and that his government might request the good offices of the American Government for the purpose of inducing the British to withdraw from the Falklands. Embassy Buenos Aires commented that "the reason for this change in tactics is open to conjecture but it may be that the Argentines feel that they can now invite the cooperation of the United States by contending that it is necessary for the defense of Argentina as well as for continental security to have the Falklands under Argentine control"." [869]

December 26th, Britain's Admiralty send a message to the Commander-in-Chief of forces in the Atlantic.

> *"The Japanese have given out that they will shortly be running a convoy to Argentina and that they will capture the Falkland Islands and present them to the Argentinians."* [870]

"Japan was worried Argentina, then neutral, would host U. S. troops and threatened the country with reprisals, the files show." [871]

"... the Japanese Ambassador to Buenos Aires promised the Argentine government that Japan "would see that the Falkland Islands are returned to Argentina", according to documents emanating from Esmond Ovey, the British Ambassador." [872]

1942 – January 7th, in the Falkland Islands, HMS *Birmingham* returns to Port Stanley. [873]

January 14th, from London, a request is sent to the Canadian Government, asking that it considers the provision of a force to garrison the Falkland Islands. [874]

> "*Request for Garrison of Falkland Islands originated by Chiefs of Staff Committee in London and desired U.S. to provide a garrison because of the possibility that Japanese might seize islands and either hold them or offer them to Argentina. British Chiefs of Staff Washington concurred in view that greater local defense was necessary but felt that U.S. could not be asked to provide in view of her Pan American commitments which would oblige her to offer to let Argentina provide the garrison.*
>
> *Chiefs of Staff accordingly advised Prime Minister to address request to Canada. In view of possibility that U.S. might endeavour to placate Argentina at the forthcoming Pan American Conference by offering her the Falkland Islands which Argentina has long desired. Chiefs of Staff feel it would be desirable to be able to assure the U.S. that adequate provision had been made for their defense should the question be raised in the near future."* [875]

January 15th - 28th, a third Pan-American Conference of Foreign Ministers is held in Rio de Janeiro (Rio Conference). The purpose to discuss the implications of the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbour and to consider

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869 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.
870 *PRO FO 371/25979.* Quoted in Britain's *The Telegraph* newspaper, December 10, 2014.
871 *Japan Times* December 10, 2014
872 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.396
873 Departed the following day.
874 *Proposed despatch of a Canadian Force to the Falkland Islands 1942* Report (Historical Section, Army Headquarters) No.80 J. A. Swettenham 1959. See - https://publications.gc.ca/collections/collection_2016/mdn-dnd/D63-5-80-1959-eng.pdf
875 *Tel X19 MA 66 15/1, Military Attache Washington to C.G.S. Jan 15 42*

the South American countries either declaring war on Germany, Italy and Japan, or breaking off diplomatic relations. [876] During discussions, Argentina demands responsibility for the protection of the Falkland Islands.

"... which the Japanese had promised them in the event of a successful invasion." [877]

"Japan's sweep southwards and the sudden threat to Australia and New Zealand meant that the Falklands again became the "key to the whole Pacifick Ocean", as the Earl of Egmont had written to the Duke of Grafton on 20 July 1765." [878]

January 16th, from Buenos Aires, a warship, *Primero de Mayo* (Capt. Alberto Oddera), sails with orders to raise the Argentine flag over Deception Island and Graham Land. Inscribed bronze plates are to be put in place asserting Argentina's claim to all lands lying between 25ºW and 68º 34'W, south of latitude 60ºS. [879]

January 18th, at the Falklands, HMS *Birmingham* commences a 10-day patrol of the archipelago.

January 23rd, in Rio de Janeiro, Ministers at the Pan-American Conference agree a final text, including;

> *"... (3) The American Republics consequently, following the procedure established by their own laws within the position and circumstances of each country in the actual continental conflict, recommend the rupture of their diplomatic relations with Japan, Germany, and Italy, since the first of these states has attacked and the other two have declared war upon an American country. ...."* [880]

"Two Argentine decrees were issued in Buenos Aires at this time. The first, by the Ministry of Finance, to the effect that Argentine income tax was to be paid by business men and other residents of the Falkland Islands "when it becomes possible for the Argentine Government to enforce its collection". The second, by the Minister of Agriculture, to the effect that exporters were no longer required to obtain export certificates for agricultural produce exported to the Falklands, the Islands being considered an integral part of the Republic." [881]

February 6th, at Deception Island, *Primero de Mayo* raises Argentina's flag over the old whaling station. Painted boards and copper cylinders containing official notices (the marks and signs of sovereignty) – are also set up around the island.

"In February 1942 the Argentine Antarctic expedition made Argentina's first specific claim to a sector of the Antarctic: The commander of the naval transport Primero de Mayo left a 'document at strategic Deception Island in the South Shetlands "reaffirming" Argentine rights over the sector ... At the same time the Argentine representative took formal possession of Deception Island, placing Argentine markers and painting' the National colors on British installations." [882]

The British Foreign Office comments on Argentina's new permanent Post Office in the South Orkney Islands.

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876 Prior to the conference being called, the Dominican Republic, Haiti, Cuba, Panama, Costa Rica, Nicaragua, Honduras, El Salvador and Guatemala had declared war on the Axis powers. While Mexico, Columbia and Venezuela had severed diplomatic relations. Following the conference, Brazil, Ecuador, Peru, Paraguay and Uruguay severed diplomatic relations. Germany and Argentina had already withdrawn their respective Ambassadors but without a formal breach in diplomatic relations. For an insight into Argentina's attitude, see - https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1942v05/d21

877 Howkins 2008 p.71 quoting *Ovey to Foreign Office December 12, 1941* in *ADM 116/5104*

878 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.396

879 Why the change from 25°W to 75°W is not clear.

880 *Foreign Relations of the United States: Diplomatic papers, 1942, The American Republics, volume v.*

881 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

882 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.

"...(the) Argentine Government are obviously seeking to build up a claim by occupation to sovereignty over the South Orkneys and... there is some danger that unless we take counter-measures they may establish a claim which it would be difficult to contest. It is desirable to take action..." [883]

February 8th, in the South Atlantic, aboard the *Primero de Mayo*, Captain Alberto Oddera lays claim on behalf of Argentina to territory south of 60°S, between longitudes 25°W and 68° 34'W extending to the South Pole.

"Until that time Argentina showed no urgency in fixing the borders of the area which it believed should be subject to its dominion." [884]

"These acts by Argentina were new; there had been nothing like them before, ... That in itself confirms the primacy of the British claims to all the Falkland Islands dependencies." [885]

February 11th, in Canada, Britain's High Commissioner informs Prime Minister Mackenzie King, that the US Government has no objections to a Canadian force being sent to the Falkland Islands. [886]

"*President Roosevelt stated to Lord Halifax that so far as he was concerned there was no objection at all and he thought it would be all right if the despatch of Canadian troops could be kept quiet until a few weeks after the movement had been completed. President Roosevelt suggested the matter could then be presented as a part of a general policy by which United Kingdom and Dominion troops garrisoned some island posts and the United States others."* [887]

February 26th, Canada's War Committee, in receipt of a report from its General Staff, [888] decides against garrisoning the Falklands. [889]

"Reference •••• Telegram•••• from the Prime Minister of Great Britain to the United Kingdom High Commissioner, While fully appreciating desirability of strengthening defences of Falkland Islands, after careful review of overseas commitments already agreed upon and military requirements in Canada under present conditions, Canadian Government considers that Canadian troops could only be made available for despatch to Falkland islands by withdrawing units and personnel from formations training for early despatch overseas to complete Canadian Army Programme. We feel that completion at earliest possible date of balanced Canadian Force in United Kingdom will contribute more to common war effort than diversion for this isolated commitment."

"*There is no available evidence to indicate that the matter was pursued further with the Canadian Government. In spite of the silence of the documents, it is worth noting that this request to garrison the Falkland Islands was received only three weeks after the fall of Hong Kong to the Japanese on Christmas Day 1941. Two Canadian battalions, which had landed in that colony on 16 Nov 41 to reinforce the garrison there at the request of the British, were lost either as battle casualties or prisoners-of-war. It is perhaps a fair assumption that the atmosphere created by the result of a similar request for help at Hong Kong may have affected tho Canadian decisions in the case of tho Falkland Islands."* [890]

883 *CAB 121/510*
884 *La Dispute con Gran Bretaña por las islas del Atlántico Sur* Ernesto Fitte 1968 p.247
885 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.403
886 Swettenham 1959
887 *Ibid*. p.17
888 *Ibid*. pp.20-22. Canada's General Staff had concluded that the minimum force necessary would have had to consist of a battalion of infantry, a field battery, anti-aircraft detachments with twelve anti-aircraft guns, a construction company of engineers together with a headquarters detachment and field hospital. Supplying such a force was considered as "*presenting great difficulty*."
889 The UK was notified on March 11, 1942.
890 Conclusion by Colonel C. P. Stacey (Director Historical Section) in Swettenham 1959

In Caracas, Venezuela, on the same day, a treaty is signed with the UK which sees Patos Island returned to the sovereignty of the South American nation. Venezuela agrees that it has no claim to another feature, Soldado Rock. [891]

In Argentina, Profesor Plin (Vincent Cacuri), absent from the pages of *Figuritas* since 1940, writes; "*Yesterday it was Venezuela, when is it Argentina's turn?*" [892]

"References to the Malvinas cause became increasingly scarce, and the crusade languished, along with Figuritas." [893]

February 22nd, from Stanley, the Governor proposes; *"... the construction of a £150,000 road across East Falkland, £3,000 per mile, with new townships either side of the Falkland Sound linked by a ferry."* [894]

> *"One cannot sub-divide, one cannot colonize, one cannot even improve the present very low standard of economy, unless one breaks down isolation, inaccessibility, the primitive pastoral use of land which ranching entails, and the general backwardness of the country."* [895]

March 3rd, Chile protests the publication of Argentina's *Instituto Geografico Militar* maps of October, 1941.

April 1st, in London, PM Churchill orders General Ismay to find troops to garrison the Falklands.

> *"It would be a very serious thing to lose the Falkland Islands to the Japanese and no comfort to say that it would hurt the United States more than ourselves... They would certainly have to be retaken."* [896]

In **May**, on the north-west coast of the Antarctic Peninsula, at Dallmann Bay, Argentina erects a lighthouse.

June 27th, Argentina's right-wing President Roberto Maria Ortiz is replaced by Ramón Castillo.[897]

In **August**, in the Falklands, 1,700 men from the 11th Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment, arrive together with a few Royal Engineers and some men from the army Ordinance Corps; to be known as the Falkland Islands Force 152. A military camp, using Nissan huts, is laid out to the west of Stanley.

September 2nd, in Buenos Aires, newly appointed British Ambassador David Kelly, is instructed to protest the *Primero de Mayo* expedition. He refuses.

> *"... this is one political question on which all Argentines are agreed and if (which of course may be untrue) the Minister for Foreign Affairs is really pro-German ... we might be sending him a heaven sent opportunity (to break off relations)."* [898]

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891 These features are located between Venezuela and Trinidad, which was then a British colony.

892 Effectively silenced by restrictions on freedom of speech, Cacuri had reluctantly brought a halt to his campaign. Even this mild contribution would seem to have caused some difficulty for *Figuritas*, which did not make any further comment until 1943.

893 Tato y Soprano 2022. *Figuritas* ceased publication in November, 1946

894 Ellerby 1990 p.33

895 *Cardinall to Cranborne February 22, 1942* cited in Ellerby 1990

896 Quoted in *The Telegraph* newspaper, December 10, 2014

897 Castillo was even more right-wing and favoured increased contact with both Nazi Germany and the Spanish dictator, General Franco. In November, 1942, Argentina's representative visited Berlin where he received assurances that Germany would recognise Argentina's claims to the Falkland Islands once the war was over. See Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.408-410.

898 *ADM 116/4670*

"He justified his insubordination by resorting to the specter of Nazism in Argentina ... and he clearly regarded the maintenance of good relations as being more important than legal wrangling..." [899]

"... he was authorised to defer presenting it for not more than two months. The Foreign Office legal advisers strongly emphasised their opinion that, if the present situation was allowed to continue, the British title to the South Orkneys would become progressively weaker... it was questionable whether the steps which his Majesty's Government had so far taken had done more than create an inchoate title to the Islands." [900]

September 28th, in the Falklands, the children evacuated at the beginning of the year are returned to Stanley.

"The total population is about 2,000. Of these, 1,200 live in Stanley. There are smaller settlements of which Darwin, with a population of about 100 persons, is the most important." [901]

October 10th, from Argentina, Foreign Minister Ruiz Guiñazú writes to the Argentine Ambassador in London, Dr. Cárcano proposing that he open a negotiation with the British Government.

"The foreign minister focused not so much on the illegal and illegitimate occupation of the Malvinas Islands by Great Britain, but on the possibility that another power could invade and occupy the archipelago, affecting Argentina's territorial, political, and strategic security, suggesting that it could be Japan. He also cited the study presented by the Ministry of the Navy, highlighting that control of the islands could encourage foreign advances on the continent, especially on the Comodoro Rivadavia oil fields. In this regard, he assigned Ambassador Miguel Ángel Cárcano the mission of contacting the British Foreign Office to propose urgent negotiations to reach a definitive agreement... a) The Argentine Government will assume responsibility for the defense of the Malvinas Islands and reject any act of non-British occupation; b) The Argentine Republic and Great Britain will formulate a definitive settlement of their dispute over the islands, on the basis that they would be returned to the former within a given period, with the exception of Port Stanley, which would remain in the hands of Great Britain for 75 or 99 years as an international leasehold zone; c) Special agreements would establish any possible British collaboration in the defense of the islands, as well as the compensation system that may arise for the surrender of British installations." [902]

November 8th, at Deception Island, Argentine Capt. Alberto Oddera (*Primero de Mayo*), places a cylinder containing a flag and a claim to sovereignty.

November 27th, from London, Argentina's Ambassador responds to the October instruction to speak to the British Foreign Office.

"Not without some perplexity at the text of the memorandum, Cárcano cautiously expressed his disagreement with the chancellor's intention. However, he proposed approaching Foreign Office officials to begin discussions on those premises, so as not to be interpreted as an "unfriendly" mission given the United Kingdom's commitment to the war. ... compounded by the improbability of Japan launching an offensive against the Falkland Islands, given its concentration in the Asian seas and archipelagos. With all this, he urged the Argentine Foreign Minister to set aside any negotiations with the Crown, as they would not be well received at

899 Howkins 2008 p.89

900 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

901 Swettenham 1959 citing *Colonial Reports – Annual: No.1932: Annual Report on the Social and Economic progress of the people of the Falkland Islands 1938* (H.M. Stationary Office, London, 1940) p.3

902 *Guerra de Malvinas - Los planes previos a 1982: ¿verdad o solo analogías?* Luis Esteban Dalla Fontana 2022 in *Malvinas y las Guerras del Siglo XX* María Inés Tato & Germán Soprano (directores) 2022 citing *AMREC. CM, caja 86AH0007-2, expediente 18, 1, "Nota del canciller Ruiz Guiñazú al embajador argentino en Londres, Dr. Cárcano", 6/10/1942* and *AMREC. CM, caja 86AH0007-2, expediente 18, 2, "Memorándum reservado del canciller Ruiz Guiñazú al embajador argentino en Londres, Dr. Cárcano", 6/10/1942.*

the time. He was convinced that Argentina should abandon the idea of taking charge of the defense of the Islands to avoid hindering the scant dialogue that existed between the two countries regarding the South Atlantic dispute and other underlying problems." [903]

During **December**, armed merchant cruiser, HMS *Carnarvon Castle* is sent to patrol the South Atlantic.

"... to examine the anchorages in those territories for any signs of use by enemy raiders, and to investigate Press reports of purported acts of sovereignty at Deception Island by the Argentine naval transport Primero de Mayo." [904]

December 29th, from London, Argentina's Ambassador Dr. Cárcano writes to Buenos Aires.

"A month later, he reaffirmed his position, warning the Foreign Minister that Argentina's intention—which had already been reported within the Houses of Parliament—was beginning to generate harsh reactions among Parliamentary officials. The ambassador had become convinced that this was not the strategic or political opportunity to stir things up, much less if they were in the South Atlantic." [905]

1943 – January 8th, at Deception Island, in the South Shetlands, men from the *Carnarvon Castle* are sent ashore to raise the British flag.

"... and there obliterated from the walls of the Hektor Whaling Company's factory the national colours of Argentina, which appeared to have been painted on them recently by the Primero de Mayo, and also removed the Argentine notice of claim. ... A writ was at the same time affixed to the building proclaiming that the company's lease had lapsed and that the building was the property of the British Government." [906]

HMS Carnarvon Castle
Emerging from Neptune's Bellows at Deception Island in the South Shetland Islands Jan 1943.
The remains of the old Whaling Station are on the left
Small watercolour 14 x 4 inches.
By Jim Rae

903 *Ibid*. citing *AMREC. CM, caja 86AH0007-2, expediente 18, 1/3, "Memorándum reservado del embajador argentino en Londres, Dr. Cárcano, al canciller argentino, Dr. Ruiz Guiñazú", 27/11/1942.*

904 *Antarctica Cases: United Kingdom v. Argentine; United Kingdom v Chile* International Court of Justice 1956 p.28

905 Fontana 2022 citing *AMREC. CM, caja 86AH0007-2, expediente 18, 1/4, "Memorándum reservado del embajador argentino en Londres, Dr. Cárcano, al canciller argentino, Dr. Ruiz Guiñazú", 29/12/1942.*

906 *Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, May, 1955* p.28. See - https://www.icj-cij.org/sites/default/files/case-related/26/026-19550504-APP-1-00-EN.pdf

"HMS Carnarvon Castle,... collected the bronze tubes deposited by the Argentine and put in place a wooden board with the British flag painted (on) and three (more) with the caption: 'Land of the British Crown.'..." [907]

January 27th, in Britain, the War Cabinet are informed of a; *"... situation created by Argentine encroachments against certain Antarctic Dependencies of the Falkland Islands Colony. As a result the War Cabinet decided that all possible steps should be taken to strengthen our title to these possessions..."* [908]

January 28th, a decision is made to reinforce British claims in Antarctica.

"... recognizing that permanent occupation and use are central to a territorial claim, the War Cabinet decided on 28 January 1943 that "all possible steps should be taken to strengthen our title to the Antarctic Dependencies against which the Argentines encroach". This did not sit well with Churchill, at the time on his way back to London from the Casablanca Conference of Allied leaders, who was concerned that the wartime relationship with the anti-colonial United States might be damaged." [909]

"... British officials ... spent the rest of 1943 making preparations for the expedition. These officials.... became so accustomed to working through the night that the expedition became known as Operation Tabarin, after a famous Parisian nightclub." [910]

February 4th, Argentine warship, *Primero de Mayo,* sails again with three Chilean naval officers aboard.

"... with the aim of affirming – without making new claims – the sovereign rights of both countries in South American Antarctica." [911]

February 8th, visiting the South Orkney Islands, men from *Carnarvon Castle* erect flagstaffs carrying the Union Jack at Signy Island. [912]

February 9th, *Carnarvon Castle* moves on to Laurie Island.

"The captain of the Carnarvon Castle had instructions not to make a demonstration of force if the Argentines showed any disposition to resist a landing, for His Majesty's Ambassador at Buenos Aires had expressed the opinion that any armed clash would do serious lasting damage to Anglo-Argentine relations. The reception at Laurie Island, however, was most cordial, and no references were made to the subject of sovereignty. The Argentine flag was flying over the station." [913]

"When the auxiliary cruiser HMS Carnarvon Castle visited Laurie Island, the Secretary of State for the Colonies cautioned the crew against sending letters while on shore, as doing so would undercut the British position that Argentina had no authority to establish a post office on Laurie Island in the first place." [914]

February 11th, in Buenos Aires, the bronze cylinder recovered from Deception Island is returned to the Argentine Government; which is also informed of the British action at Signy Island.

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907 *The Third Reich and the Antarctic dispute between Great Britain and Argentina during the Second World War and the postwar period* Pablo Fontana 2013 (p.6) presented to the 13th Meeting of Latin American Historians at the Antarctic Maritime Museum of Ushuaia, October 2013

908 *CAB 121/510*

909 *Maritime Support for Great Britain's Antarctic Sovereignty Claim: Operation Tabarin and the 1944-45 Voyage of the Newfoundland Sealing Ship Eagle* Anthony Dickinson 2016 in *The Northern Mariner/Le marin du nord,* XXVI, No. 1 (January 2016) pp.1-20

910 Howkins 2008 p.92. See December, 1943, below.

911 Fontana 2013 p.75

912 See 1947

913 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

914 *Argentine Encroachments Against Certain Antarctic Dependencies of the Falkland Islands PRO CAB 66/33/41*

"His Majesty's Ambassador informed the Argentine Foreign Minister of the visit of the Carnarvon Castle to Deception Island and assured him that His Majesty's Government had no intention of allowing their title to go by default or be challenged. To this the Argentine Foreign minister replies that the Argentine Government considered its claims, inherited from Spain, were absolutely justified..." [915]

"Subsequently the British Government notified the Argentine Foreign Office of its action, expressing "surprise-and-regret" at Argentina's attempt to assert possession of Deception Island." [916]

"On being so informed, the Argentine Foreign Minister replied that the Argentine Government considered its claims, "inherited from Spain"." [917]

February 15th, Argentina responds to the UK with a diplomatic *memorandum.*

"In its reply of February 1943 the Argentine Foreign Office reaffirmed the sector claimed in the documents deposited at Deception and thereby put the British 'Government formally on notice for the first time that it claimed a sector superimposed upon the greater part of the British sector (20W to 80W) as well as the islands south of the Falklands which had been the subject of previous declarations. Although the Argentine Government expressed its "most formal reservations to jurisdictional acts carried out by British officials" within the Argentine claim, both governments agreed to give the episode - no publicity." [918]

"(Argentina) defined her pretensions in the area south of latitude 60' South as covering all Antarctic lands and dependencies between longitudes 25° and 68° 34' West. It also purported to "protest" against jurisdictional acts carried out by British officials." [919]

February 18th, Argentina's post office, in a note sent to the Universal Postal Union, contests Britain's right to regulate the movement of mail through the Falkland Islands.

In Stanley, Governor Cardinall establishes a Naming Committee to assist in the preparation of accurate maps of the Falklands by the Royal Engineers. [920]

March 5th, at Deception Island, *Primero de Mayo,* accompanied by two transport vessels, *Pampa* and *Patagonia*, returns. Members of the crew re-erect the Argentine flag, replace the bronze cylinder and repaint Argentine colours onto the walls of the old whaling factory.

"... the Commander was unpleasantly surprised to discover that the Argentine flag which the crew of the transport had painted on her last visit had been obliterated and replaced by the British flag. The British emblems, therefore, were in turn removed and the Argentine flag was repainted. The ship left Deception Island on 11th March (1943): the Argentine Government have not yet (1947) seen fit to avow this act to His Majesty's Government. A full report of the activities of the Primero de Mayo was subsequently obtained confidentially from Captain Cordovez, the senior Chilean officer who accompanied the expedition. This report provides evidence of unsuccessful attempts on the part of the Argentines to enroll Chile's co-operation in presenting a

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915 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

916 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.

917 *Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, May, 1955* p.30. These islands had never formed any part of Spain's dominions; nor had they been claimed by Spain. The private agreement between Spain and Portugal known as the Treaty of Tordesillas, signed in 1494, placed South Georgia, the South Orkney Islands and the South Sandwich Islands within Portugal's sphere of influence. If Argentina claimed to have inherited territory in Antarctica from Spain, then Brazil could claim to have inherited from Portugal.

918 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948*

919 *Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, May, 1955* p.31

920 *The Toponymy of the Falkland Islands as Recorded on Maps and in Gazetteers* Permanent Committee on Geographical Names 2006

common front to Great Britain... On return of the expedition to Buenos Aires, the Argentine Government suppressed all public announcements regarding the removal of the Argentine emblems from Deception Island and their replacement by British emblems." [921]

"... when the Primero de Mayo, visited- Deception Island in March 1943 on a second survey expedition, apparently no further provocation was offered the British, although the Argentine press reported that the markers left in 1942 had been removed." [922]

April 12th, in Buenos Aires, responding to Argentina's *memorandum* of February, Britain's Ambassador presents a UK *memorandum* reasserting British titles. [923]

"... while discussing the Falkland Islands Dependencies with the Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Guiñazu, (Britain's Ambassador) reminded him that, as far as the Falkland Islands were concerned the question of title was not purely one of first discovery but also of prolonged occupation." [924]

May 27th, in London, a decision is made to organise effective occupation of the disputed Antarctic territories.

"After protracted discussions it was decided... to send parties of occupation to Deception Island, South Shetland, and to Signy Island, South Orkneys but not to Laurie Island. It was realised that the omission of the latter might result in its loss to the British Empire, but His Majesty's Government were not at that time prepared to remove the Argentines by force,.. The special position at South Georgia, which is permanently inhabited, necessitated separate instructions for the Officer Commanding the South Georgia Defence Force in the unlikely event of an Argentine party landing and attempting to perform acts of sovereignty there. At South Georgia it was considered that the local representatives of His Majesty's Government should use all the force at their disposal to uphold their authority over the island." [925]

"Organized from the Colonial Office, but operated under the auspices of the Admiralty for improved security and fiscal control, the expedition was to set up bases at Deception Island (Base B) in the South Shetland Islands group; and Hope Bay (Base D) on the northeast tip of the Antarctic Peninsula. A decision not to set one up on the South Orkney Islands because of the Argentine presence on Laurie Island from January 1904, when the Scottish National Antarctic expedition gave then their base, and the related assumption by Britain that their claim might thus be difficult to justify, was later reversed in favour of placing one (Base C) at Sandefjord Bay, Coronation Island." [926]



In Argentina, Alfredo Roberto Lucio Ryan takes a major shareholding in the 'Compañia Argentina de Pesca' which still leases a shore base at Grytviken, on South Georgia. [927]

921 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
922 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.
923 The British document was dated April 7, 1943. A footnote to para.112 in *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* January 12, 1947 (Foreign Office) in *LCO 2/4908* states; *"A considerably stronger British case could have been made than is presented in this document."*
924 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908* citing *A /4225/25/2 of 1943*
925 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
926 Dickinson 2016
927 At some date in 1944, Ryan took full control of *Pesca*. For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/ryan_alfredo

June 4th, in Argentina, a military coup ousts the government of Ramon Castillo.

June 7th, General Pedro Ramirez takes over as President of Argentina.

"The question of Argentine claims in the Antarctic appears to have been shelved during the period of the de facto government which assumed control in June 1943. The unstable character of the government and the grave problems that it faced meant that Argentina's claims in Antarctica, which had been advanced chiefly for their prestige value, had a low priority. Moreover, since the de facto government was anxious to assure continued recognition by the British Government, its chief rival in Antarctica, it was in no position to ruffle British feelings by pressing Argentine claims. During this period the British Government established token settlements in the Antarctic sector claimed by Argentina. ... Annual relief missions to the Orkneys continued, but Argentine activity in the Antarctic, as in the Falklands, was put on a standby basis." [928]

"... the second coup, which occurred in 1943 ... rested upon the decision of the armed forces not to declare war on Germany." [929]

"(Colonel Juan Domingo) Perón was the real leader, though he remained a mere colonel; he exerted power from behind the scenes, while "puppet generals" served a figureheads. ... The clearly pro-Nazi tendencies of the new government increased British suspicions of Argentina's intentions..." [930]

August 18th, in Buenos Aires, *de-facto* Argentine President Pedro Pablo Ramirez signs decree *5,626* into law, placing Tierra del Fuego and Staten Island under the control of the Argentine Navy. [931]

October 28th, at Stanley, a trade union – the Falkland Islands General Employees Union – is founded to represent the workforce. [932]

During **November**, in London, the Foreign Office, alarmed at events in the Antarctic territories, compiles a confidential dossier on the sovereignty issues entitled - *"Territorial Claims in the Antarctic."* [933]

December 14th, from the UK, members of shore parties for Britain's Antarctic territories leave for the Antarctic (*Operation Tabarin*)[934] on *Highland Monarch*, supported by HMS *William Scoresby*. [935]

"It was further decided that no communication should be made to the Governments of Argentina, Chile or the United States until the parties of occupation had reached the islands, and that the substance and timing of any communication which might then have to be made would depend upon developments." [936]

928 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.
929 Mira & Pedrosa 2021
930 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.410
931 A further decree (*No.8,667*) of April 5, 1944 established that Tierra del Fuego would be known as a 'National Territory and Gobernacion'.
932 Affiliated with the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions from 1949
933 Howkins 2008 p.99. Written up by one Brian Roberts, explorer and polar expert, this document remains unavailable at the UK's National Archives.
934 See January 28, 1943, above.
935 Dickinson 2016. On arrival in the Falklands, another vessel, SS *Fitzroy*, was chartered from the Falkland Islands Company.
936 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

1944 – January 28th, in the Falkland Islands, the *Operation Tabarin* shore parties for Britain's Antarctic territories arrive at Stanley. On the same day, the West Yorkshire Regiment troops garrisoning the Falkland Islands depart on *Highland Monarch*; replaced by men from the Royal Scots led by a Colonel of the Royal Artillery.

January 29th, from the Falklands, HMS *William Scoresby* and SS *Fitzroy* sail with the *Tabarin* forces.

February 3rd, in the South Shetland Islands, on Deception Island, a British base is constructed together with Post and Telegraph offices plus; *"... a fully equipped meteorological station."* [937]

February 7th, at Hope Bay on the Trinity Peninsula, an attempt to establish a British base is thwarted by sea ice.

"Operation Tabarin established its primary supply and logistics base (B) in the abandoned whaling station on Deception Island on 3 February 1944.9 However, it failed to set up the base at Hope Bay, although five of the party went ashore from the ice-reinforced William Scoresby on 7 February, because the master of the Fitzroy was unwilling to take his unstrengthened ship into the ice-filled bay with the hut and supplies, fearing that the Falkland's only maritime link with the outside world might be incapacitated." [938]

February 15th, at Port Lockroy on Goudier Island near the Antarctic Peninsula, a British base is completed with Capt. James Marr appointed Magistrate, Post Master and Harbour Master. An Argentine flag and bronze cylinder containing Argentina's claim, are removed.

Magistrates[939] are also sworn in for Graham Land, the South Orkneys and South Shetland Islands. [940] Exploration and mapping work commences together with scientific research in the areas of meteorology, biology, glaciology and geology.

"Although an alternative base (A) was set up on 15 February at the more accessible Port Lockroy, Wiencke Island, off the coast of Graham Land, this location did not address the government's requirement for a base on the continent per se." [941]

February 21st, *Operation Tabarin* visits Signy Island, where Britain's '*marks & signs*' have not been disturbed.

In Argentina, Dagnino Pastore amends the content of his school geography text for a third time; replacing the section on the Antarctic to claim *'unquestionable rights'* for Argentina over a vast Antarctic sector. [942]

February 24th, at South Georgia, members of *Operation Tabarin* arrive.

February 25th, in Argentina, General Edelmiro Farrell becomes President. His Vice President is Juan Peron.

"It had been agreed that, when the season was well advanced and the British bases firmly established, Sir D. Kelly should notify the Argentine Government of all these developments and protest against the activities of the Primero de Mayo in 1943. However, in view of the confused political situation in Argentina in March 1944, it seemed important that any publicity should be postponed until a decision should be reached regarding recognition or non-recognition of General Farrell's Administration."[943]

February 29th, at Port Stanley, members of *Operation Tabarin* returns.

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937 *Ibid.*
938 Dickinson 2016
939 Lieutenant-Commander J.W.S. Marr and Mr. W. R. Flett
940 *Antarctica Cases: United Kingdom v. Argentine; United Kingdom v Chile* International Court of Justice 1956 p.29
941 Dickinson 2016
942 Escude 1992. *cf.* July, 1939 & May, 1940
943 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

March 14th, HMS *William Scoresby* sails from Port Stanley; *".. to convey further stores to the two bases established the previous February at Deception Island and Port Lockroy."* [944]

April 17th, in Stanley, the Town Hall is lost to a fire (right) which also damages the Museum and Post Office which are housed within the building.

"For thirty years the Town Hall, built in 1914 had been the central venue for social events in Stanley: bazaars, concerts, amateur theatricals, wedding receptions and of course the ever-popular dances. Its sprung dance floor upstairs, which ran the full width and most of the length of the building, was reputed (by those qualified to judge) to be the best in the whole of the South Atlantic. The building housed the post office, the museum, the library and part of the islands' archives including police records." [945]

A special series of postage stamps (example below right) are issued by the Falkland Islands Government.



"... overprinted with the names South Georgia, South Shetland Islands, South Orkney Islands and Graham Land. The Bureau of the International Postal Union at Berne was informed of the issue of these stamps, and... In accordance with the practice which had been followed since the German occupation of southern France, specimens were sent directly from the General Post Office in London, to the postal administrations of non-enemy countries, including Argentina and Chile..." [946]

April 24th, in London, a press release announces that Britain has arranged for scientific and survey work to proceed in the Falkland Islands Dependencies and; *"... that the personnel, which included administrative officials, had already arrived; that fully equipped bases had been established; and that the personnel were expected to remain in the Antarctic for a considerable period."* [947]

"No information was received as to the reaction of the Argentine Government to this announcement. ..."[948]

On the same day, the first broadcast of '*London Bridge*' is beamed to the Islands from the UK. A music broadcast with messages. [949]

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944 *Ibid*
945 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.414. Rebuilt in 1950.
946 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
947 *Ibid.*
948 *Ibid.* Antarctic claims were the least of Argentina's political problems at this time. See June, 1943 above.
949 The name was subsequently changed to '*Calling the Falklands*' and operated for more than 40 years.

In **June**, the Argentine government offers to negotiate with Chile over disputed islands in the Beagle Channel.

"... in June 1944 the Argentine Government suggested to the Chilean Government that they should endeavour to reach a settlement of their long outstanding boundary dispute relating to the Beagle Channel "as between two friendly countries" and without having recourse to the arbitration which they had agreed upon in 1938. The Argentine Government added that they wished only to insist on recognition of their sovereignty over Isla Nueva (New Island) south of Tierra del Fuego." [950]

In **July**, Argentina's Ministerio de Marina publishes a chart of Deception Island bearing the title '*República Argentina Océano glacial Antártico Isla Decepción* (right).'

".. this official document may be regarded as a further provocative measure by the Argentine Government." [951]

At Stanley, David William Roberts is reappointed Honorary Vice-Consul for Uruguay.

August 21st, in Washington DC, a secret conference commences at Dumbarton Oaks.

Delegates from China, the UK, the USA and the USSR consider proposals for an international body to preserve peace and security.

Chile rejects Argentina's offer of negotiation over the Beagle Channel Islands, in favour of formal arbitration.

"In August 1944 the Chilean Government replied stating that they considered the arbitration should take place, since Chile could not, in any circumstances, agree to Argentina's proposal regarding Isla Nueva." [952]

September 29th, in London, Chile's Ambassador, Señor Bianchi, complains that the Falkland Island Dependencies stamps which had been issued for Graham Land and the South Shetland Islands cover areas within Chile's territorial limits; as defined by Chile's decree of November 6th, 1940. Bianchi adds that; *"... he had been instructed to place on record that Chile reserved full rights in connection with Graham Land and the South Shetland Islands."* [953]

Ambassador Bianchi is referred to the British note of February 25th, 1941, and is given a copy of the Letters Patent of 1917.

In **October**, Britain announce its intention to send a second expedition to the UK's Antarctic territories.

"Operation Tabarin did not boast a single high profile geographical objective such as the attainment of the South Pole or the crossing of Antarctica. Instead, .., it was an expedition designed to reassert British interests in the region in the face of expanding Argentine claims. In addition, in an attempt to mitigate the risks of a diplomatic incident and the resulting potential for an interruption in the substantial wartime imports of

950 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908.* See below
951 *Ibid.*
952 *Ibid.* An agreement was eventually signed in 1971 which led to arbitration proceedings commencing. The decision, in Chile's favour, was announced in 1977. Argentina rejected that, and subsequent arbitral decisions, before putting the last to a plebiscite of the Argentine people which agreed to recognise Chile's ownership. *cf.* 1971, 1977, 1978, 1979, 1981, 1982 & 1984
953 *Ibid.*

Argentine beef, the War Cabinet decided to disguise the expedition as a campaign to prevent German U-boats and surface raiders from using Antarctic and sub-Antarctic harbours for refuelling and re-provisioning." [954]

December 7th, at a convention in Chicago, agreement is reached between 54 nations on the regulation of international air travel and the establishment of an *International Civil Aviation Organisation* (ICAO).

> *"Article 1: Every State has complete and exclusive sovereignty over airspace above its territory.*
>
> *Article 5: The aircraft of States, other than scheduled international air services, have the right to make flights across a State's territories and to make stops without obtaining prior permission. However, the State may require the aircraft to make a landing.*
>
> *Article 6: (Scheduled air services) No scheduled international air service may be operated over or into the territory of a contracting State, except with the special permission or other authorization of that State. …"* [955]

1945 – during **January** and **February**, Britain's Antarctic base sites at Deception Island, Port Lockroy (Wiencke Island), Hope Bay (Trinity Peninsula) and Sandefjord Bay on Coronation Island (South Orkneys) are visited by *Operation Tabarin*. [956]

February 4th, in the Crimean Peninsula, part of the Soviet Union, a conference is held at Yalta to consider the future of Germany and Europe after the war. Attended by the leaders of the Allied nations – US President Franklin D. Roosevelt, the UK's Prime Minister Winston Churchill and the Premier of the Soviet Union, Joseph Stalin. [957]

February 11th, at the end of the Yalta Conference, Roosevelt, Churchill and Stalin declare their resolve to establish*, "… a general international organization to maintain peace and security."*

February 21st - March 8th, in Mexico City, twenty-one American states attend the Inter-American Conference on Problems of War and Peace. The objective is to consider, *inter alia*, the proposals for an international organisation and recognition of human rights. Also to be discussed is Argentina (yet to take a positive stand regarding Nazi Germany) which is not invited by the hosts. [958]

March 6th, twenty of the delegates resolve a reciprocal assistance pact to be known as the *Act of Chapultepec*. [959]

March 8th, at the end of the conference, Argentina agrees to abide by the *Final Act* in order to be eligible to attend the San Francisco discussions scheduled for April.

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954 *The 'Heroic' and 'Post-Heroic' Ages of British Antarctic Exploration: A Consideration of Differences and Continuity* Stephen Haddelsey 2014 (internet published PhD. thesis)

955 Came into force April 4, 1947. Argentina submitted its acceptance on June 4, 1946. Flights to and from the Falklands would become an issue in the years after 1966; continuing to be a political football to this day.

956 With varying degrees of success. See Dickinson 2016 - https://www.cnrs-scrn.org/northern_mariner/vol26/tnm_26_1-20.pdf

957 There is a story relating to this conference which is often asserted in Argentina. This claims that Prime Minister Winston Churchill, during the conference, asserted the Argentina should not be permitted to become a power as "… *she will drag behind her all of Latin America.*" The source appears to be an anonymous Argentine author of the 1950s. There is no evidence that Churchill ever said this. However, Argentina was isolated at this time due to its apparent Nazi sympathies and it is possible that the South American nation would have been the subject of discussion.

958 The US Government considered Argentina to have been an active collaborator with Nazi Germany. Argentine delegates were allowed to attend before the end of the conference, however.

959 This would become the *Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance* (the Rio Treaty aka TIAR) in 1947.

March 27th, Argentina declares war on Germany.

March 29th, from Stanley, Governor Cardinall writes to London.

> *"This Colony is so hopelessly unlike any other Crown Colony in that it is entirely peopled by British, most of whom look to retiring to the homeland, that I am even toying with the idea, now air traffic is so speedy and certain, to put forward a suggestion that the Island be incorporated in the U.K."* [960]

April 25th, in San Francisco, California, 850 delegates from 50 nations gather for a United Nations Conference on International Organization; attempting to expand on the ideas raised at Dumbarton Oaks and Yalta. [961]

April 30th, following protracted negotiation over the question of admission to the new United Nations Organization, Argentina's membership is finally approved. The Soviet Union, Czechoslovakia, Greece and Yugoslavia vote against.

"World War II thrust Argentina and the entire world into a sea of change. Argentina was forced to confront the existing socioeconomic conditions of 1945: national depression and humiliation due to misguided decision-making during World War II; working-class alienation due to changes from agrarian to industrial modes of production; and the growing lack of prestige and influence of traditional elites." [962]

May 7th, in Germany, Generaloberst Alfred Jodl signs the unconditional surrender of all German forces.

May 23rd, in San Francisco, the 25th meeting of the IV Committee of the United Nations Organisation considers questions of trusteeship. Article 77 of the proposed Charter established a trustee system for ● territories held under mandates established by the League of Nations after the First World War; ● territories detached from "enemy States" as a result of the Second World War; and ●territories voluntarily placed under the system by States responsible for their administration. The basic objectives of the International Trusteeship System included: the promotion of the political, economic, social and educational advancement of the inhabitants of the Trust Territories and their progressive development towards self-government and independence; and to encourage respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms for all.

During the debate, Argentina makes a general reservation. [963]

> *"The Argentine delegation makes the reservation that the Argentine Republic in no case accepts that this Trust system can be applied to/or on territories belonging to Argentina, whether they are subject to claim or controversy or are in possession of other States"*

Responding. the United Kingdom submits a similar reservation:

"In regard to the Falkland Islands the delegation of Argentina, at the twenty-fifth meeting of the Committee, made a reservation to the effect that the Argentine Government did not recognize British sovereignty in the

960 Ellerby 1990 citing *Cardinall to Secretary of State March 29, 1945* in *CO 78/221/2*

961 Advisers and staff raised the numbers attending to 3,500. As with most international conferences, the important decisions had already been made. See - https://www.un.org/en/about-us/history-of-the-un/san-francisco-conference

962 *Emotional Actor: Foreign Policy Decision making in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War* Nora Femenia 2000

963 *N*early all of the delegations made reservations relative to some dispute over sovereignty or territory.

Falkland Islands. The delegation of the United Kingdom made a parallel reservation, not recognizing Argentine sovereignty in these islands." [964]

"... the Argentine Delegation had raised the question of Argentine rights in the Falkland Islands." [965]

"The foundation of the United Nations (UN) in 1945 gave Argentina a new forum in which to present a claim to the Falklands, though that claim had been devoid of legal validity for a very long time." [966]

June 14th, in Port Stanley, a Victory Parade is held near Government House.

June 26th, the United Nations Charter, a multi-lateral treaty, is signed in San Francisco. [967]

> *"Art. 1: The Purposes of the United Nations are:*
>
> *1. To maintain international peace and security, and to that end: to take effective collective measures for the prevention and removal of threats to the peace, and for the suppression of acts of aggression or other breaches of the peace, and to bring about by peaceful means, and in conformity with the principles of justice and international law, adjustment or settlement of international disputes or situations which might lead to a breach of the peace;*
>
> *2. To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, and to take other appropriate measures to strengthen universal peace;*
>
> *3. To achieve international cooperation in solving international problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and*
>
> *4. To be a center for harmonizing the actions of nations ..."*

Art. 2 lays out the organisation's principles.

> *"Art. 2:3 All members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered."* [968]

"It is well established in international law that no State can, without its consent, be compelled to submit its disputes with other States either to mediation or to arbitration, or to any other kind of pacific settlement."[969]

"Does the U. N. Charter prescribe, as a matter of conventional international law, a general obligation to negotiate for the ... member states? A number of the stated purposes and principles of the U. N., as stipulated in Articles 1 and 2 of the Charter, support the proposition that member states should settle disputes by peaceful means and resolve common problems through cooperation. It is doubtful, however, that any of these provisions impose general obligations on member states to negotiate in the absence of more specific directives

964 Footnote 2 to UN Resolution 66 (1) of 1946. *"To the effect"*? The Falklands were not specifically mentioned.
965 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
966 Pascoe 2020 p.289
967 The Charter had to be ratified by all the signatory nations, however it was agreed that the United Nations Organisation would come into existence when the Government of China, France, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and the United States, and a majority of others, had ratified it.
968 Art.33 - *"1.The parties to any dispute, the continuance of which is likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security, shall, first of all, seek a solution by negotiation, inquiry, mediation, conciliation, arbitration, judicial settlement, resort to regional agencies or arrangements, or other peaceful means of their own choice. 2.The Security Council shall, when it deems necessary, call upon the parties to settle their dispute by such means.*
969 *Status of Easter Carelia, Advisory Opinion, 1923 PCIJ (ser.B) No.5 (July 23)* para.33

found in other Charter provisions. For instance, Article 2(3) provides that "[a]ll Members shall settle their international disputes by peaceful means in such a manner that international peace and security, and justice, are not endangered." While there is considerable uncertainty concerning the scope and, import of this very general proposition, it is probably safe to say that it does not create an obligation for member states to negotiate." [970]

"... once the existence of an international dispute has been established, the parties are obliged to seek a peaceful solution, in accordance with Articles 2(3) and 33(1) of the United Nations Charter. ... States have the obligation to resolve their disputes peacefully, in accordance with international law. ... The question of the Malvinas Islands is a legal and justiciable dispute..." [971]

In relation to issues of decolonization, the Charter states.

> *"Art. 73: Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:*
>
> *a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses; b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;*
>
> *c. to further international peace and security;*
>
> *d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to co-operate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply. ...*
>
> *Art.74: Members of the United Nations also agree that their policy in respect of the territories to which this Chapter applies, no less than in respect of their metropolitan areas, must be based on the general principle of good-neighborliness, due account being taken of the interests and well-being of the rest of the world, in social, economic, and commercial matters."*

970 *The Obligation to Negotiate in International Law: Rules and Realities* Martin A. Rogoff 1994 pp.154-155

971 Rodriguez 2025. There is a big difference between "*States have the obligation to resolve their disputes peacefully, in accordance with international law*" and "*States have the obligation to resolve their disputes.*" If disputes are to be resolved, they should be resolved peacefully, but there is no obligation to resolve disputes which may best be left in abeyance. The more-so if that suspension is entirely peaceful. Attempts at resolution can, after all, inflame a situation. Letting "sleeping dogs lie" may be the better approach. As regards the Falkland Islands, the UK regards the dispute as having been settled in 1989/90. See Vol.5

"The rapporteur of the relevant committee of the San Francisco Conference where the Charter was drafted in 1945 recorded that it was there made clear that an essential element of the principle of self-determination 'is a free and genuine expression of the will of the people'." [972]

"The Committee responsible for the drafting of the relevant provision agreed on four points. First, 'this principle corresponded closely to the will and desires of peoples everywhere and should be clearly enunciated in the Chapter [of the UN Charter].' Second, 'the principle conformed to the purposes of the Charter only insofar as it implied the right of self-government of peoples and not the right of secession.' Third, it was agreed that the principle of self-determination 'as one whole extends as a general basic conception to a possible amalgamation of nationalities if they so freely choose.' Fourth, it was agreed that 'an essential element of the principle [of self-determination] is free and genuine expression of the will of the people, ...'" [973]

The Charter of the United Nations also founds a new International Court of Justice (ICJ).[974]

This to be a replacement for the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) which had operated under the League of Nations at the Hague from 1922. [975]

Article 36 of the Statute of the International Court of Justice, states, *inter alia*:

> *"1. The jurisdiction of the Court comprises all cases which the parties refer to it and all matters specially provided for in the Charter of the United Nations or in treaties and conventions in force.*
>
> *2. The states parties to the present Statute may at any time declare that they recognize as compulsory ipso facto and without special agreement, in relation to any other state accepting the same obligation, the jurisdiction of the Court in all legal disputes concerning:*
> *a: the interpretation of a treaty*
> *b: any question of international law*
> *c: the existence of any fact which, if established, would constitute a breach of an international obligation*
> *d: the nature or extent of the reparation to be made for the breach of an international obligation"*

The United Kingdom makes a unilateral declaration that it recognises the automatic/compulsory jurisdiction of the court - subject to a condition. [976]

> *"The general acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Permanent Court of International Justice by His Majesty's Government's Declaration of 1946 excluded disputes arising out of facts or situations prior to 1930."* [977]

"1. The Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland accepts as compulsory ipso facto and without special convention, on condition of reciprocity, the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, in conformity with paragraph 2 of Article 36 of the Statute of the Court, until such time as notice may

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972 Dunnett 1983 p.417

973 *Self-Determination of Peoples: A Legal Reappraisal* Antonio Cassese 1998

974 This principle judicial organ of the UN has two roles; firstly the settlement of disputes submitted to it by Member States and, secondly, to provide advisory opinions on questions referred to it by duly authorised international organs and agencies – most specifically the UN itself. Only States may be a party to cases before the ICJ.

975 The Statute of the International Court is based upon that of the PCIJ so as to provide continuity. The PCIJ would meet for the last time in October, 1945. Its judges all resigned in January 1946, and new judges were elected in February, 1946. See April, 1946.

976 The UK recognised the Courts automatic or compulsory jurisdiction with a caveat. Neither Chile nor Argentina have made a similar declaration.

977 *TNA LCO 2/4908*

be given to terminate the acceptance, over all disputes arising after ..., with regard to situations or facts subsequent to the same date, other than: ..." [978]

July 9th, a proposal to send senior German military officers, in small groups, to live in remote British colonies such as the Falklands, is considered by senior staff officers of the Allied armies. [979]

July 17th, in London, *Operation Tabarin* is renamed the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS). Control of its four manned bases passes to the Colonial Office. [980]

At South Georgia, with the end of the European war, whale processing recommences with shore stations at Grytviken, Husvik and Leith.

August 15th, in Stanley, on the announcement that Japan has surrendered, two days of holiday are declared.

... the islands had made a contribution to the British war effort out of proportion to their small population: they had donated £71,656 to Britain, including £16,492 towards war charities such as the Red Cross, much of it raised through Bazaars... As in the First World War, the Falklands financed the construction of aircraft for the war effort: in 1940 the Legislative Council voted that £50,000 of the total was to be used to finance the building of Spitfires, and with this money ten were built, which flew into action bearing the name "Falkland Islands (I-X)". After the end of the War, ... a Roll of Honour was drawn up that listed 24 Falkland Islanders who "Died in the Service of the Country"..." [981]

September 11th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador presents a diplomatic *Note* to the Argentine Government regarding the reservation raised by their delegation at San Francisco in May and concerning; *"... the undisclosed activities of Argentina in the Dependencies in 1943 ... and concluded with a statement that His Majesty's Government would continue to take all necessary steps to conserve their sovereign rights over the Colony and the Dependencies."* [982]

October 12th, from London, orders are issued for the construction of new UK bases in the South Orkney Islands and at Marguerite Bay (Antarctic Peninsula/Graham Land).

The USA declines to sign a military assistance treaty with Argentina, saying that it does not trust the regime. [983]

In the UK, the *Colonial Development and Welfare Act 1945* makes available £120 million in funding for the colonies, to be spread over a ten year period.

"Colonial submitted ten-year development plans to the Colonial Economic Development Council (C.E.D.C) which was inaugurated in October 1946 to advise the Secretary of State. Its membership included doctors, academics, and individuals with experience of British commerce and industry. The C.E.D.C. was initially concerned with identifying the fundamental needs of each territory and how to meet them,..." [984]

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978 In 1945 the year was set at 1930. Any dispute arising after that year would see the UK accepting, automatically, the Court's jurisdiction over that dispute. Reviewed periodically. The last review was on February 22, 2017, which set the limitation date as January 1, 1987. In practice this gives any claimant a decade to submit a complaint to the Court. It must be noted that this is not the only route for a dispute to reach the Court. There can be an agreement between States to take a dispute to the Hague or, a State can lobby the UN's General Assembly to have a question put to the ICJ for its advisory opinion. *cf.* 1920. See – https://www.icj-cij.org/en/declarations/gb

979 *The New York Times* July 9 & July 22, 1940

980 See 1948

981 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.417. Pascoe notes that the list was inaccurate and should have contained 20 names.

982 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/490*

983 *Blue Book* 1946. See below.

984 Ellerby 1990 p.80. *cf.* 1948

October 24th, following ratification by 29 of the original 50 signatories, the UN Charter comes into force and with it the United Nations Organisation. [985]



CHARTER OF THE UNITED NATIONS

WE THE PEOPLES OF THE UNITED NATIONS
DETERMINED

to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and

to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and

to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and

to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,

AND FOR THESE ENDS

to practice tolerance and live together in peace with one another as good neighbors, and

to unite our strength to maintain international peace and security, and

to ensure, by the acceptance of principles and the institution of methods, that armed force shall not be used, save in the common interest, and

to employ international machinery for the promotion of the economic and social advancement of all peoples,

HAVE RESOLVED TO COMBINE OUR EFFORTS
TO ACCOMPLISH THESE AIMS.

Accordingly, our respective Governments, through representatives assembled in the city of San Francisco, who have exhibited their full powers found to be in good and due form, have agreed to the present Charter of the United Nations and do hereby establish an international organization to be known as the United Nations.

November 14th, the UK's Polar Committee establishes a sub-committee to consider Antarctic place names.

December 10th, the British Settlements Act 1945 is promulgated, amending the British Settlements Act 1887.[986]

"... the British Settlement Acts 1887 and 1945 provide the statutory legal basis for the constitutions of some territories such as the Falkland Islands and Pitcairn; while the majority of the territories in the Caribbean are overseen by the West Indies Act 1962." [987]

1946 – January 10th, in London, the first session of the United Nations General Assembly is convened in the Methodist Central Hall. [988] 51 member nations attend.

Argentina appoints José Arce as the first head of the Argentine delegation. [989] The Argentine Government replies to Britain's note of September 1945, but the response does not touch directly upon the question of the Dependencies, instead being; *"... devoted to the Falkland Islands themselves."* [990]

"From 1946 onwards Argentina also often mentioned its claim to the Falklands, but no moves were made which might have led to an open dispute,.." [991]

During the austral summer, 93 whale catchers operate in the waters of the South Atlantic and Antarctic; feeding 9 factory ships and 3 South Georgia shore stations (Grytviken, Husvik, and Leith). 13,387 whales are taken. [992]

January 23rd, after nearly five years, Chile's Ambassador finally replies to Britain's note of February 25th, 1941.

"... while the Chilean Government had refrained from reverting to this Note during the war, he had now been instructed to reserve their rights once more to "regions always held to be Chilean, on geographical, juridical, historical, diplomatic and administrative grounds". He added that the Chilean government had never been officially notified of the text of the Letters Patent of 28th March, 1917, defining the Falkland Islands Dependencies, and that the claims of his Government were in accord with Chile's geographical position, which gives her "indisputable sovereignty" over regions indicated in the 1940 Decree." [993]



February 1st, in Stanley, a set of Falkland Islands postage stamps are issued showing a map of the Dependencies (6d example right). [994]

985 See - https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/full-text
986 *1945 Chapter 7 9 & 10 Geo 6.*
987 *The United Kingdom and its Overseas Territories: No longer a 'benevolent patron'?* Peter Clegg in *Small States & Territories* vol. 1, no. 2 2018 pp. 149-168
988 The second session was in New York, the third in Paris. The UN did not have a permanent home until 1952.
989 Career politician. See 1948, below.
990 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
991 Pascoe 2020 p.272
992 Headland 1989
993 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
994 *Ibid.* In 1/2d, 1d, 2d, 2 1/2d, 3d, 4d, 6d, 9d, & 1/- *cf.* June, 1946

On the same day, a base on Stonington Island, Neny Fjord in south-west Graham Land is established by the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey.

"During the southern summer of 1945-46 British relief parties were sent out... Three ships were employed: HMS William Scoresby, Fitzroy and Trespassey. The organisation was now termed the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey, and its control was transferred from the admiralty to the Colonial Office. The existing bases were maintained, and new bases were set up ..." [995]

February 4th, at Laurie Island, *Trespassey* pays a visit to the meteorological station.

"The visit passed cordially and without mention of political matters. It was noticed that the station had been considerably enlarged and improved,... and that the staff had been increased from four to nine men." [996]

February 9th, in London, at the United Nations meeting, the General Assembly adopts resolution *9(1)* regarding *Non-Self Governing Peoples*; bringing into immediate effect *Articles 73* and *74* concerning the provision of information regarding such territories.

> *"By Chapter XI, all the members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount. They accept, as a sacred trust, the obligation to promote to the utmost the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories. To that end, they accept certain specific obligations, including the obligation to develop self-government and to assist the inhabitants in the progressive development of their free political institutions."* [997]

February 12th, from Washington DC, the State Department sends out a consultation document to the other American Republics. This questions Argentina's fitness to be a part of the proposed Rio meeting, which is to discuss a treaty of reciprocal assistance (left). [998]

ARGENTINA EXPOSED!
UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT
OFFICIAL INDICTMENT OF THE
FASCIST REGIME IN ARGENTINA
Blue Book on Argentina
sensational case history of the Nazi-Argentine plot against
the freedom and peace of the world.

> *"The question is whether the military regime, or any Argentine government controlled by the same elements, can merit the confidence and trust which is expressed in a treaty..."* [999]

February 13th, in Argentina, the newspaper, *La Prensa*, dedicates five pages to the '*Blue Book*'.

February 24th, Juan Domingo Perón is elected President of Argentina. [1000]

"As a popular issue, the Falklands dispute had a natural appeal to the Argentine Congress which took office following the elections of February 1946. One of the earliest acts of the new Chamber of Deputies was to pass unanimously a resolution presented by an Opposition Radical deputy that "it would view it with pleasure should the Executive Power, opportunely and with due urgency; address the Security Council of the United Nations affirming the sovereign rights of the Argentine

995 *Ibid.*
996 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
997 *UN Resolution 9 (1)* of 1946.
998 It is asserted, that the man behind this publication was an ex-US Ambassador to Argentina (1945), Spruille Braden. Perón used the Blue Book in his Presidential campaign with the slogan "*Either Braden or Perón*".
999 *Blue Book on Argentina: Consultation among the American Republics with respect to the Argentine Situation.* US *memo* February 1946. See https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2012/02/blue-book-on-argentina.pdf
1000 With 56% of the vote. See June, below

Nation over the Islas Malvinas [Falklands], claiming from England, the nation holding them, the restitution of this territory". The Peron Government did not act upon the resolution of the Chamber of Deputies." [1001]

"A career army officer, he had been involved in the military coups of 1930 and 1943, and had spent the years 1939-41 in Fascist Italy, where he became an admirer of Mussolini's "corporatist state" system. During his time in office he helped many Nazi and Fascist war criminals, including some high ranking ones, to obtain sanctuary in Argentina. ... Perón pursued a policy initially called "justicialism", soon called simply "Peronism" based on "social justice, political sovereignty, and national independence", ..." [1002]

March 23rd, the Argentine Government reactivates its National Antarctic Commission.

March 31st, on the Falkland Islands, a population census identifies 2,239 people present in the archipelago, including 1,012 females. [1003]

April 18th, at the Hague, the judges of the International Court of Justice meet for the first time in the Great Hall of Justice at the Peace Palace.

"*Future Prospects: It appears unlikely that the Falklands dispute will be decided on the merits of the case. Neither the Argentine nor the British Government appears willing to submit its claims to the International Court or to impartial arbitration."* [1004]

"... the PCIJ was formally dissolved, and the International Court of Justice, meeting for the first time, elected as its President Judge José Gustavo Guerrero (El Salvador), the last President of the PCIJ. The Court appointed the members of its Registry (largely from among former officials of the PCIJ) and held an inaugural public sitting on the 18th of that month." [1005]

June 3rd, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador, Sir Reginald Leeper, is summoned to the Foreign Ministry.

> *"This Ministry has just been informed by its Embassy in London that the Government of Great Britain has issued a new series of postage stamps of the Malvinas Islands [Falklands] and their geographical dependencies, which have been ordered to be on sale beginning 5 April of this year. The Argentine press has also recently published a reproduction of these stamps, in the part of whose design which corresponds to the Antarctic sector, between the 20° and 80° meridians, the [South] Georgias, [South] Orkneys, [South] Shetlands and other islands appear to be joined to the Malvinas.*
>
> *Your Excellency's Government well knows that the Argentine Republic has never at any time surrendered the just right which supports its claim to a portion of territory of its own dominions – the Falkland Islands – by virtue of geographical, historic, and juridical rights which it would be superfluous to set out in detail. To this is added its indisputable right to the lands situated south of the 60th parallel between the meridians of 25° and 68°34' west longitude. ... it is my duty to inform Your Excellency that the Argentine Government has taken steps to inform the Universal Postal Union, as it did in 1943 on the occasion of the issue of British stamps commemorating the centenary of the occupation of the Malvinas, that correspondence coming to the Republic which bears these stamps will be considered as lacking postage, and the appropriate sanctions will be applied to it."* [1006]

1001 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp08c01297r000800090022-3

1002 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.420

1003 See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2021/10/census-report-1946.pdf

1004 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.

1005 From the website of the ICJ, May, 2020.

1006 *International Law Documents 1948-49 Navpapers 15031 vol. XLVI Washington 1950* citing *Argentine Republic, Boletin del Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto, September 1946, pp. 16-18*

Argentina sends a similar message to the Universal Postal Union in Berne. [1007]

June 4th, in Buenos Aires, Juan Domingo Perón is sworn in as President of Argentina.[1008]

"With the election of Peron in February 1946 and the establishment of the government on a firm constitutional basis, Argentina's forward movement in the Antarctic was resumed. The new government was no longer so greatly in need of British support for its international position; it also was ambitious to reestablish Argentine prestige abroad. The Antarctic claims were well designed for this purpose. There was little danger that assertion of claims would lead to an international incident. Because of the peculiar nature of the region in dispute the government could, send notes, protests, and expeditions almost at will without suffering the usual consequences of such action, and was assured of the unanimous support of all political groups and of public opinion in general for an aggressive policy. Thus the government could anticipate a return from its efforts both in domestic and foreign affairs out of proportion to the risks involved and the expenditure required to fit out naval expeditions and make new installations in Antarctica." [1009]

"... the Malvinas only emerged as an Argentine cause célèbre in 1946, soon after the charismatic caudillo Juan Domingo Peron had placed the sky-blue sash of the presidency across his chest." [1010]

"The clearest example of a type of nationalism ... on which Perón drew ... was that of irredentism in relation to the Falkland Islands, or Malvinas. ... The 'Peronist March' (the party anthem) laid claim to the Malvinas ... But even though nacionalismo may have contributed to the escalation and militarisation of the Falklands problem, it was not a campaign issue of their making ... and Perón did less to escalate the conflict than is commonly believed." [1011]

"... from 1946 onwards, Perón began to use the Falklands issue to distract attention ... from Argentine domestic problems, and he also raised a new Argentine claim to part of Antarctica and escalated the hitherto halfhearted claim to the Falkland Islands Dependencies." [1012]

June 6th, after Britain's Ambassador to Argentina is formally introduced to the new President, he reports that Perón made no mention of the Falkland islands. [1013]

June 8th, in London, the Victory Parade celebrating the end of WWII, includes fourteen Falkland Islanders.

June 29th, the Secretary-General of the United Nations, Trygive Lie, writes to all Members asking for their interpretation of the term *'non-self governing territory,'* and whether or not they consider themselves as administering such a territory. Countries that do so are also asked to submit a list of those territories, and indicate what information they will provide under *Art.73* of the Charter, which states:

> "*Members of the United Nations which have or assume responsibilities for the administration of territories whose peoples have not yet attained a full measure of self-government recognize the principle that the interests of the inhabitants of these territories are paramount, and accept as a sacred trust the obligation to promote to the utmost, within the system of international peace and security established by the present Charter, the well-being of the inhabitants of these territories, and, to this end:*

1007 Chile registered a complaint regarding the new issue of postage stamps on July 2, 1946
1008 Having won the Presidential election on February 24, 1946.
1009 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.
1010 *Invasion 1982: the Falkland islanders' Story* Graham Bound 2007
1011 *Argentina's Partisan Past: Nationalism and the Politics of History* Michael Goebel 2014
1012 Pascoe 2020 p.289
1013 *Reginald Leeper to Ernest Bevan June 6, 1946* in *British Documents on Foreign Affairs: Reports & Papers from Foreign Office* Part IV, Series D, vol.1 pp.88-90

a. to ensure, with due respect for the culture of the peoples concerned, their political, economic, social, and educational advancement, their just treatment, and their protection against abuses;

b. to develop self-government, to take due account of the political aspirations of the peoples, and to assist them in the progressive development of their free political institutions, according to the particular circumstances of each territory and its peoples and their varying stages of advancement;

c. to further international peace and security;

d. to promote constructive measures of development, to encourage research, and to cooperate with one another and, when and where appropriate, with specialized international bodies with a view to the practical achievement of the social, economic, and scientific purposes set forth in this Article; and

e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply."

In **July**, in London, Britain's Foreign Office undertakes to review questions of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and its Dependencies.

"It was thought in July 1946 that Argentina might raise the question of the Falkland Islands before the General Assembly of UNO. Preparations were therefore made to undertake a more detailed investigation of the legal situation..." [1014]

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's Chamber of Deputies approves unanimously a motion that the Government submit the nation's Falkland Islands and Antarctica claims to the United Nations Security Council. [1015]

August 20th, Argentina decrees that goods produced in the Falklands are not to be subject of import duties.

"In August 1946 the Argentine Government reverted to its pin-pricking policy towards Great Britain on the question of the Falkland Islands. Falkland Island residents in Punta Arenas (Chilean territory in the Magellan Strait) who wished to travel to Argentina were compelled to provide themselves with Argentine passports. One of the passports so issued was endorsed with the following clause: "Valid only for travel to the Republic in order to regularize his military status."..." [1016]

August 26th, from the US, an expedition to keep Washington DC's sovereignty claims alive - Operation Highjump – is ordered. [1017]

"This expedition, part of the Cold War, was organized by Byrd and consisted of 4,700 men and 13 ships, including three aircraft carriers and a submarine." [1018]

September 2nd, in Argentina, Presidential decree *no.8,944*, prohibits the publication of maps that do not represent the entire national territory; it being *"necessary to arbitrate all means so that the cartography that is disseminated in our country and, even more so abroad, does not suffer from failures that, produced voluntarily or involuntarily, can harm national sovereignty, giving rise to erroneous knowledge of our*

1014 Dunnett 1983 p.426

1015 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.*

1016 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908* citing *AS 5141/311/2 of 1946*

1017 Officially known as the United States Navy Antarctic Developments Program. Also called *Task Force 68*. The expeditions' objectives were, at best, obscure but included the establishment of a research base on the Ross Ice Shelf and the aerial mapping of the Antarctic. See November, 1946, below.

1018 Fontana 2013 p.7

territorial heritage." [1019] The Instituto Geografico Millitar is made responsible for the supervision and publication of Argentina's charts and maps.

"Although the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies are not specifically mentioned, it is clear that the Decree is intended to refer to them." [1020]

"Under the leadership of Juan Domingo Peron, Argentine public education was increasingly committed to producing a new series of geography textbooks celebrating the fact the Argentine Republic now encompassed the Argentine Antarctic sector. School children were expected to memorize the size of the country and accurately draw Argentina including its South Atlantic and Antarctic Territories." [1021]

"President Perón slowly intensified Argentina's territorial disputes with Britain, and by a decree of 2 September 1946 he extended the western boundary of Argentina's Antarctic claim to longitude 74° West." [1022]

"Another important milestone in the school construction of the Malvinas as a "national cause" was Decree 8,944 of 1946, which stipulates that the international limits of this country included in school textbooks must be approved by the Military Geographic Institute. Art.2º indicates that the cartographic representation will clearly indicate the Argentine jurisdiction of a set of territories among which the Malvinas Islands are expressly indicated. In this way, the map of the territory constituted an important element in the representation of space, activating feelings of national identification in the collective imagination, from recognizing the territorial cartographic contour as a symbol of the figure of the nation." [1023]

September 17th, in London, a provisional Foreign Office *memorandum* is prepared regarding Britain's historical claims to the Falkland Islands; for internal use only. [1024]

> *"... Great Britain has been in formal possession and effective occupation of the Falkland Islands since 1833; on that date the Islands were not effectively (ineffectively) occupied by the Government of Buenos Aires; and it can be argued then that they were open to acquisition by the first effective occupying power. In this sense, the British occupation of 1833 was, at the time, an act of unjustifiable aggression that has now acquired the support of rights of prescription. The present population is entirely British."*

September 24th, Argentina's Congress ratifies its membership of the United Nations. [1025]

September 30th, Geoffrey Miles Clifford is gazetted as Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Falklands. [1026]

October 11th, in Buenos Aires, the Argentine government publishes decree *no.14,708* entitled – *Decree Concerning National Sovereignty Over the Epicontinental Sea and the Argentine Continental Shelf*. [1027]

1019 See November, 1946, below.
1020 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
1021 *Scott of the Antarctic (1948): Geopolitics, Film and Britain's Polar Empire* Klaus Dodds 2012
1022 Pascoe 2020 p.272
1023 *Malvinas. La construcción histórica de una causa nacional en el ámbito escolar (1945-1973)* Mariano Santos La Rosa 2022
1024 *Research Department, Foreign Office, Preliminary Memorandum on the Falkland Islands. Secret (17111), September 17, 1946 (FO AS 5728/311/2), p. 6.* A dire piece of research, seemingly done in haste and based, almost in *toto*, upon the 1927 book by the American, Julius Goebel. Stands as an indictment of Foreign Office thinking.
1025 Something that had not happened in 1920 with the League of Nations.
1026 *The London Gazette No.37747.* For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/clifford_sir
1027 Adopted October 9, 1946. An early attempt to base a sovereignty claim on a geological feature. It was not generally accepted in 1946, and is still not recognised as a determining factor regarding sovereignty in 2025. Despite Argentina's insistence that the Falklands sit on 'their' continental shelf. See 2016.

"Article 1. It is hereby declared that the Argentine Epicontinental Sea and Continental Shelf are subject to the sovereign power of the Nation: Article 2. For purposes of free navigation, the character of the waters situated in the Argentine Epicontinental Sea and above the Argentine Continental Shelf, remains unaffected by the present Declaration."

"The full text of this Decree is not yet available and its meaning is not clear. It is evident, however, that the continental shelf of the Falkland Islands Dependencies was included." [1028]

"By decree of October 9, 1946, it affirmed national sovereignty over the "Argentine continental plateau" and the "Argentine epi-continental Sea, citing a declaration of the American Government in 1945 establishing sovereignty over the continental shelf of the United States. This area, interpreted by both the American and Argentine Governments as extending to a point at which the sea is more than 100 fathoms deep, included the Falkland Islands. The insistence of the Argentine delegation that the hemisphere defense zone as finally established at the Conference of Rio de Janeiro in 1947 should include the Antarctic as well as the Falklands indicated that the Argentine Government viewed the regional defense measure as a potential source of support for its claims in both areas. In addition the Peron administration's aggressive development of Argentine claims in Antarctica, beginning in 1946, represented a new threat to the British position in the Falklands." [1029]

"... the Argentine,.., was the first state to claim a right of sovereignty over both shelf and superjacent seas." [1030]

"An underlying theme of Argentina's interest in the Falklands, and the sea, has long been national jurisdiction of the continental shelf. Although it is commonly accepted that continental shelf doctrine was born with the 1945 Truman Proclamation, the so-called "Argentinian School" first advocated a claim to the continental shelf in 1916. Argentina's continental shelf doctrine draws heavily on ocean research conducted early in this century by the Swedish geologist Otto Nordenskjöld and the Scottish meteorologist William Bruce. Their findings show the "Antillean Loop" to be an extension of the Andean Mountain system. The Falklands and the more southerly island groups of South Georgia, the South Sandwich, the South Orkney and the South Shetland Islands, are the landed areas above water of this submarine ridge which later emerges as the Antarctic Andes. Argentina considers that since these island territories are part of the Andes and because they are joined to South America by the continental shelf, this amounts to prior claim. By a



1028 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*

1029 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.

1030 *The Continental Shelf 1910 – 1945* Edwin J. Cosford in *McGill Law Journal* 1958 vol.4 p.245. Argentine interest in the continental shelf can be traced back to 1916/1918 when two jurists, Storni and Suarez, recommended that adjoining states protect their fisheries by asserting jurisdiction over the waters above the shelf. The USA had declared its own rights to the *"resources of the sub-soil and sea-bed of the continental shelf"* in September, 1945, but Argentina's decree went further, leading Washington to complain in a *Note* of July 2, 1948 that Argentina's position was at *"variance with the generally accepted principles of international law." cf.* 2016

Presidential Decree of 1946, Argentina laid claim to this area as an epicontinental sea (the sea above the continental shelf) which has since been called "the largest claim ever made, since the times when Grotius' mare liberum prevailed for a maritime zone." The Falklands situated some 400 miles off Argentina's coast fell within this zone, as did the more southerly island groups." [1031]

"In October 1946 the Argentine Government annexed the continental shelf which surrounded the Falklands without defining its limits. Argentina's additional claim to the fisheries above the continental shelf, although imitated by other Latin American states, was not widely accepted by the international community." [1032]

October 14th, in Stanley, the Victory Bar opens.

October 21st, Britain responds to the UN Secretary-General's June 29th request regarding Art.73 territories.

> *"I have the honour under instructions from His Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs to acknowledge Your Excellency's letter to him of 29th June, 1946, requesting information about the progress made by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom in giving effect to the Resolution on Non-Self-Governing Peoples adopted at the General Assembly of the United Nations in London on 9th February, 1946, and relating to the application of Article 73 (e) of the Charter.*[1033]
>
> *Your Excellency requested the views of His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regarding the factors to be taken into account in determining which territories are to be included within the scope of Chapter XI. In the view of H.M.G. it would be difficult to define in detail principles capable of general application, bearing in mind the great variety of conditions in the territories referred to in this Article and the number of different members of the United Nations who have responsibilities for such territories.*
>
> *The terms of Article 73 (e) appear to provide a sufficient and satisfactory guide in practice, and His Majesty's Government feel that the purposes of this Article can be adequately fulfilled without the necessity of any further interpretation. For their part, His Majesty's Government propose initially to supply information in accordance with Article 73 (e), in respect of the non-self-governing territories listed in Annex I. …"* [1034]

Britain's list of 40 territories includes the Falkland Islands. Not included are South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands, the sub-Antarctic islands (South Shetland Islands, South Orkney Islands), and British Antarctica; there being no "*inhabitants*" or "*people*" in these territories. [1035]

At the United Nations, an *ad hoc* sub-committee of the Fourth Committee is constituted by the General Assembly for the purpose of reviewing the information provided: the *Ad hoc Committee on Information from Non-Self Governing Territories*. Membership of the *ad hoc* sub-committee is made up of all those countries which have provided a list of territories, plus an equal number of others. [1036]

1031 *Motivations in the Falklands War and the Aftermath* Marshall Van Sant Hall 1983. See 1966

1032 Ellerby 1990 p.123 citing *Colonial Office Papers, Series 78, vol. 248/11, henceforth cited as C078/248/11: Carter to Clifford, 22 Nov. 1949 and Stevens to Leche, 6 Jan. 1948.*

1033 For *Art. 73 (e)*, see above.

1034 Quoted in *Hansard: Lords:5 November 1945 col.992*. See - https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1946-11-05/debates/485ddc2a-d3db-4f8a-90bc-93518f049ae5/UnitedNationsAndNon-Self-GoverningPeoples

1035 Only eight countries (Australia, Belgium, Denmark, France, Great Britain, the Netherlands, New Zealand and the USA) responded; identifying 72 non-self governing territories. Notably absent from the list were territories under the control of China and Russia, which did not view themselves as colonial powers, despite all evidence to the contrary. Also Argentina, which did not list Patagonia; colonized in the 1860s.

1036 Every member of the UN is represented on the Fourth Committee. The *ad hoc* Committee was only supposed to last for 12 months, but had its life extended in 1947 when it became the Special Decolonization Committee.

November 11th, Britain responds to Chile's note of January 23rd, 1946.

> *"His Majesty's Government could not share the view that Chilean claims to the Falkland Islands Dependencies were well founded, ... it is not the practice of His Majesty's Government to notify to friendly Governments the publication of Letters Patent which are, by their nature, open for all to see."*

"The Note rejected Chilean claims on "geographical, juridical, historical and administrative ground"." [1037]

Argentina's Instituto Geografico Militar publishes a map which includes the Falkland Islands and South Georgia as Argentine territory; claiming an Antarctic sector lying between the meridians 25° and 74° West; bounded in the north by the 60° parallel (next page). [1038]

" ... and new stamps showed Argentine claims. In connection with the drive to create a "national Antarctic mindedness" (and) "active journalistic propaganda by means of systematic publications" and celebration of Argentine anniversaries relating to the Antarctic were promoted by the National Antarctic Commission,..." [1039]



At Stanley, Miles Clifford arrives and is sworn in as Governor.

"His first acts were to bring two unofficial members on to the Legislative Council and to establish a Stanley Town Council... The Town Council comprised six elected members and three nominated by government." [1040]

November 12th, a US press release concerning Operation Highjump announces; *"... the purposes of the operation are primarily of a military nature, that is to train naval personnel and to test ships, planes and equipment under frigid zone conditions. ... A major purpose of the expedition is to learn how the Navy's standard, everyday equipment will perform under everyday conditions."*

December 2nd, the first ships of Operation Highjump, set sail from North America, for Antarctica.

December 14th, the United Nations General Assembly adopt resolution *66(I)*

> *"The General Assembly, on 9 February 1946, approved a resolution on Non-Self-Governing Peoples. By this resolution the Secretary-General was requested to include in his annual report on the work of the Organization a statement summarizing such information as may have been transmitted to him by Members of the United Nations under Article 73e of the Charter relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are responsible, other than those to which Chapters XII and XIII apply.*

1037 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
1038 The South Sandwich Islands did not fall within the area described.
1039 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.*
1040 Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.156. See November 1947 and January 1948, below.

The General Assembly notes that information has been transmitted by the Governments of ... the United Kingdom concerning conditions in Barbados, Bermuda, British Guiana, British Honduras, Fiji, Gambia, Gibraltar, Leeward Islands, Mauritius, St. Lucia, and Zanzibar Protectorate; ...

The General Assembly also notes that the following Governments have declared their intention of transmitting information: ... and the United Kingdom on Aden (Colony and Protectorate), Bahamas, Basutoland, Bechuanaland Protectorate, British Somaliland Protectorate, Brunei, Cyprus, Dominica, ***Falkland Islands****, Gold Coast (Colony and Protectorate), Grenada, Hong Kong, Jamaica, Kenya (Colony and Protectorate), Malayan Union, Malta, Nigeria, North Borneo, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland, St. Helena and Dependencies, St. Vincent, Sarawak, Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Swaziland, Trinidad and Tobago, Uganda Protectorate, and the High Commission Territories of the Western Pacific (Gilbert and Ellice Islands Colony, British Solomon Islands Protectorate, Pitcairn Islands). ...*[1041]

The General Assembly, therefore,

1. Invites the Members transmitting information to send to the Secretary-General by 30 June of each year the most recent information which is at their disposal; ...

4. Invites the Secretary-General to convene, some weeks before the opening of the second session of the General Assembly, an ad hoc Committee composed in equal numbers of representatives of the Members transmitting information under Article 73e of the Charter and of representatives of Members elected, by the General Assembly at this session, on the basis of an equitable geographical distribution; ...

6. Invites the ad hoc Committee to examine the Secretary-General's summary and analysis of the information transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter with a view to aiding the General Assembly in its consideration of this information, and with a view to making recommendation~ to the General Assembly regarding the procedures to be followed in the future and the means of ensuring that the advice, expert knowledge and experience of the specialized agencies are used to the best advantage."[1042]

December 27th, in Washington DC, Acting-Secretary of State Dean Acheson announces that the USA has not recognised any claims by other nations in the Antarctic, and has reserved all rights which it might have there.

December 30th, at Scott island in the Antarctic, vessels from Operation Highjump rendezvous.

December 31st, in London, an enquiry is addressed to the UK's Law Officers. [1043]

"*For 113 years His Majesty has held the Falkland islands as a Colony. During the whole of this period the Argentine has claimed that the islands belong to her as of right. It is probable that the Argentine Government may raise this question in some manner in the United Nations. ... Mr. Secretary Bevin and Mr. Secretary Creech-Jones consider that the Cabinet will desire to be informed of the strength in law of the British title to the Falkland Islands... the Cabinet would wish to know in the case of the Falkland Islands whether... if His Majesty's Government consented to let the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands go before the International Court, there would be any risk of the Court*

1041 My emphasis

1042 Of the 74 territories listed as non-self-governing in General Assembly resolution 66(1), 8 became independent during the 1946-1959 period, while the requirement for the transmission of information was discontinued in respect of 21 others. No new additions were made to the 1946 list before 1960. When Spain and Portugal joined the UN in 1955, both nations denied administering any territories that could be described as non-self-governing under Art.73 of the Charter.

1043 *LCO 2/4908.* Submitted on January 12, 1947, authorship was not indicated, but at the top of the document are the words '*Secret Copy No.7*' and at the bottom are the numbers *13742 [32858]*. Accompanying documents suggest that the *memo* was by Becket (Foreign Office) and Roberts-Wray (Legal Advisor). Britain's Attorney General in 1947 was Sir Hartley Shawcross; the Solicitor General was Frank Soskice.

declaring that His majesty had no valid title to the Islands. We are, therefore, directed to lay the enclosed papers before you and to request that you would be so good as to furnish your opinion upon this matter."

At the end of the year, a number of Antarctic expeditions are either being planned or are underway; by the USA, the Argentine Republic, the Republic of Chile and the Soviet Union. [1044]

"In view of these foreign expeditions, the Colonial Office, in consultation with the Foreign Office, decided in December 1946 to establish, and to occupy, for the southern summer only, a British base at Admiralty Bay, in King George Island, South Shetlands, since this and Deception Island... are the only known localities in the Dependencies where a large fleet of naval vessels could anchor in comparative safety." [1045]

"The (Argentine) government climaxed ... in December 1946 by preparing an expedition to establish new bases in the Antarctic. Unilateral action by the various interested countries to improve their several positions had already become the order of the day." [1046]

1947 – January 3rd, in Buenos Aires, following newspaper reports of a forthcoming expedition, Britain formally rejects all Argentine claims in a diplomatic *Note* to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. [1047]

"In a Note of 3rd January, 1947, His Majesty's Ambassador at Buenos Aires once more rejected Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, ..." [1048]

In London, the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS) is considered.

"In January 1947,.. there are British occupation parties at Port Lockroy (Base A), Hope Bay (Base D), Stonington Island, Neny Fjord (Base E), Argentine Islands (Base F), all in Graham Land; at Deception Island (Base B) and Admiralty Bay, King George Island (Base G), both in the South Shetlands; and at Cape Geddes, Laurie Island (Base C), in the South Orkneys." [1049]

January 4th, from the Rio de la Plata, Argentine transport ships, *Patagonia* and *Chaco,* sail with orders to visit the sub-Antarctic islands.

"During the 1947 season two expeditions from the US and one from Chile visited the polar regions, and British expeditions had already established token settlements in the sector claimed by the British and Argentine Governments. The Argentine expedition, as the Ministry of Marine somewhat extravagantly put it, would complement "the chain of installations based in the Orkneys ..." and would explore Antarctica as far west as 74°W. The (Argentine) Foreign Office rejected a British offer to assist the "Argentine visitors" who might call at the British stations as "not consistent with reality, because a visitor cannot be considered as such when he visits his own property". During its visit to Argentine "property", which received headline press treatment at home, the 1947 expedition provided the annual relief party for Argentina's base at Laurie'Island, recommissioned the lighthouse set up at Dallman Bay, Melchior Archipelago in 1942, .installed several new beacons, and left a group of men .., on Gamma Island. ... As Foreign Minister Bramuglia summed up the work of the expedition, it had constituted "one of the most important operations effected thus far in the Antarctic. Our country has the satisfaction of having contributed to the knowledge of that region and of "having actually

1044 During the dispersal of German assets after 1945, the Soviet Union took possession of a whaling factory ship and seven whale-catchers which were renamed - the Antarctic Whaling Fleet *Slava*. See March 1947 below.
1045 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908*
1046 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.
1047 *HC Deb 12 March 1947 vol.434 cc211-2W*
1048 *HC Deb 19 June 1950 vol.476 cc857-8*
1049 *Memorandum on the Falkland Islands Dependencies* 1947 in *LCO 2/4908.* It was noted that although a hut had been landed, there was, at the time this document was compiled, no occupation party at Base G.

been in its Antarctic zone with a fleet of seven ships, at the same time that other powerful nations were making similar efforts in other Parts of the southern continent". Renewed Argentine activity in the expedition of 1947 conflicted chiefly with British pretensions in the Antarctic area." [1050]

".. some three years after the renewal of the British programme of bases, the Argentine Government began a course of systematic encroachment on the British territories of the South Shetlands and Graham Land." [1051]

January 15th, in Antarctica, the men of the US's Operation Highjump commence the construction of a base – Little America IV – with facilities for aircraft, including an airstrip.

January 21st, two Chilean ice-breakers, *Angamos* and *Iquique*, sail for Antarctica.

"In reciprocation for an Argentine invitation to Chilean officers in 1943 the Chilean expedition of 1947 had invited the participation of Argentine representatives. In turn Chilean officers accompanied the Argentine expedition. ... The Argentine naval officers who accompanied the first Chilean expedition of 1947 were regarded by the Chilean Government as an embarrassment and secret instructions were issued to the commander of the expedition to prevent their presence at the formal ceremony of annexation in order to forestall reservations of Argentine rights." [1052]

In Santiago, Chile's Foreign Minister Raul Juliet, informs the Senate of Chile's historical, geographical, juridical, diplomatic and administrative antecedents to sovereignty rights in Antarctica. [1053]

"Citing historical works of the period, he affirmed that since 1555 all successive Governors of Chile considered their jurisdiction to extend southward from the Magellan Straits to the South Pole; quoted documents issued by the Emperor Charles V to the conquistadors to show that that monarch considered his sovereignty to extend over "all the lands on the other side of the Magellan Straits", and contended that Chile when she attained her independence of Spain, was the natural inheritor of the frontiers of the Mother Country and automatically came into possession of territory comprising the natural prolongation of her lands in the direction of the South Pole." [1054]

January 28th, in London, Britain's Law Officers report with regard to December's request for an opinion.

> *"That, in our view, whilst it is not easy to express views with confidence in the unsettled state of International Law in relation to acquisition and loss of territory, Great Britain has a reasonably strong claim to have acquired the Falkland Islands by* ***acquisitive prescription*** *in the nature of* ***usucaption*** *consisting in its de facto possession and occupation of the Falkland Islands since the year 1833. ...* [1055]

1050 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp08c01297r000800090022-3

1051 *Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom to the Registrar of the International Court of Justice, May, 1955.* At Ushuaia, these were joined by a tanker, *Minister Ezcurra*, and a whaling ship, *Don Ernesto*. This expedition appears to have visited Deception Island, Port Lockroy, Stonington, Winter Island and Melchior Island; and to have overflown and photographed British bases. *cf.* Fontana 2013

1052 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link

1053 The full speech can be found here - https://tribunainternacional.uchile.cl/index.php/RTI/article/view/46059/48063

1054 *Keesing's Record of World Events* vol.vi-vii, February, 1948

1055 My emphasis. Usucaption is "*The acquisition and possession, undisturbed and uninterrupted of a territory which was formerly under another State's sovereignty or occupation ie., which was not terra nullius"* (*FCO 76/1892 Annex 3 footnote to p.12.)* The Law Officers considered the archipelago to have been *terra nullius* after 1811 but, to support their argument regarding usucaption, that could not have been the position in 1833. Therefore they reluctantly concluded that Argentina had gained a title to East Falkland Island between 1829 and 1833.

Between 1841 and 1849 there were spasmodic protests by the Argentine Government to Britain; protests were renewed from 1884 to 1888. From 1908 onwards there have been a series of protests.

Since 1833, however, there has not been any manifestation at all of physical control by the Argentine over the Islands. The protests made by the Argentine can be described as paper protests in that they were never followed up by further positive action. Furthermore, they were punctuated by long periods of silence so far as Great Britain is concerned, during which the Argentine showed no animus either way. There was, for example, such a period of silence between 1849 and 1884 (35 years), and between 1884 and 1908 (24 years). ... no positive attempt was made by the Argentine to have the matter referred to any process on international arbitration (although it is true that Dr. Ortiz suggested arbitration in 1884), even after the establishment of the League of Nations the Argentine did not bring the matter before this body. ... Britain, on the other hand, from 1833, or at least from 1841, ... had had factual occupation of the Islands without physical disturbance of any sort and without adverse claim from any quarter, apart from the Argentine, until the present day. ... in our view by international law Britain has acquired a prescriptive title to the Falkland Islands, and we accordingly think that if the matter were adjudicated upon, Britain would be successful in establishing her case..." [1056]

"There can be no doubt that the establishment, first of the League of nations and the Permanent Court of International Justice, and later of the United nations and the International Court of Justice, has considerably modified the old practice whereby the somewhat crude and ineffective method of the diplomatic protest was the only method, short of war, of interrupting peaceful possession. ... The position now is that, if the matter is a proper one for the determination by the Security Council or the International Court of Justice, failure to bring the matter before the Council or to attempt to bring it before the Court must be presumed to amount to acquiescence, even if, for propaganda purposes or for other reasons, "paper protests" are still made from time to time." [1057]

"Acquisitive prescription ranks among the five modes of acquiring territory in international law. It has been defined as 'the result of the peaceable exercise of de facto sovereignty for a very long period over territory subject to the sovereignty of another'. It does not apply to terra nullius. Doctrine distinguishes three different types of acquisition through lapse of time. First, there is 'immemorial possession'. It involves a situation which has been in place for so long that there is no certainty about its origins. It may be legal or illegal, but it is presumed legal. 'Immemorial possession' is not derived from Roman law. It stems from medieval customary law ... Second, there is a type of acquisitive prescription, which international lawyers have recognized as being close to the Roman usucapio. The conditions for acquisition under usucapio in Roman law were, as Johnson enumerated them: "(a) A thing susceptible of ownership (res habilis); (b) An, albeit defective, title of some kind (justus titulus), such as sale, gift, or legacy; (c) Good faith (fides); (d) Possession (possessio), implying physical control (corpus) and the intention to possess as owner (animus); (e) The possession must be uninterrupted for a period of time defined by law (tempus)". ... Acquisitive prescription serves to affirm the rights of the holder of a defective title. It is supposed to attribute title to the state, which can prove a peaceable or undisturbed possession of the territory over a long period of time. It does not involve an assessment of the claims or titles of other states, which it is supposed to overrule. But in all cases brought before international tribunals or arbitrators, competing acts of sovereignty or possession of different states had to be weighed against one

1056 Opinion of the Law Officers in *LCO 2/4908.* See also *FCO 76/1892.* It seems that the Law Officers were not made aware of Lieut. Smith's arrival in the Islands as Residential Officer, in 1834.

1057 *Acquisitive Prescription in International Law* D.H.N. Johnson in *British Yearbook of International Law* 1950 vol.27. pp.332-337

another. In consequence, there is no example of an international adjudication to be cited where 'acquisitive prescription' in the sense of the Roman usucapio served as the sole title." [1058]

January 29th, at Deception Island, Capt. Luis Miguel Garcia, in command of a fleet of seven ships out of Ushuaia, and with orders to construct permanent bases, arrives to find two vessels from the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey already there. After protesting, his squadron retires. [1059]

"The grand matter of Antarctica has one directive: to defend the sovereignty of the Republic and prove to the world, the inalienable rights of the disputed area." [1060]

February 14th, from Stanley, Governor Clifford informs the Secretary of State for the Colonies of the situation with regard to the Grytviken weather station.

> *"... it appears that the house belongs to the company and that they supply fuel, &ct., but that the instruments are the property of the Argentine Government or Meteorological Department in Buenos Aires. The Company also provides the Observer, although it is understood that part of his salary is paid by the Argentine Government. The stamp of the Director of Meteorology of the Argentine has for many years appeared on the Meteorological Returns furnished by Pesca in accordance with the terms of the lease… It is understood that the Station has been inspected on one occasion at least by a representative of the Meteorological Department at Buenos Aires..."* [1061]

"... the keeping of meteorological records formed part of the terms of the lease. I originally raised this question in 1946 because the company had been extraordinary slack about carrying out the terms of their lease in this respect (When I was in South Georgia before the war the meteorological officer appointed by the Company was almost continuously drunk and made up most of his records without the use of his instruments!) It seemed by 1946 that we must either take over the meteorological station, or enforce the terms of the lease, or expect the Argentine Government to use it as the thin end of their South Georgia wedge." [1062]

February 15th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Juan Atilio Bramuglia, rejects an offer of logistical help from the British Embassy for an Argentine scientific expedition to Antarctica; *"... considering it unacceptable that its members were classified as "visitors"."* [1063]

Bramuglia also sends a note to the Embassy; *"Argentina rights over the (Falkland) Islands are incontrovertible, and the only thing missing, for a proper legal order to be established, is the the de jure sovereignty exercise over them to be complemented by the constantly claimed possession."* [1064]

In Antarctica, on the same day, Operation Highjump sends out an aircraft on a photographic mission. [1065]

1058 *Argument from Roman Law in Current International Law: Occupation and Acquisitive Prescription* Randall Lesaffer in *The European Journal of International Law* 2005 vol.16 no.1

1059 Christie 1951 p.272

1060 Juan Perón in *Soberanía Argentina en la Antártida* Argentina (Ministry of Foreign Relations & Worship) 1947

1061 *FO 371/97376*

1062 Note signed *B.B. Roberts, August 27, 1952* in *FO 371/103153/15212/104.* This note referred to an internal FO publication entitled '*Territorial Claims in the Antarctic*'. Undoubtedly *FO 371/44744/1*, which remains closed/retained until January, 2026. *cf.* 1905, 1906 & 1950.

1063 Carassai 2022

1064 Quoted in *El desarrollo de la cuestión Malvinas en el gobierno de Juan Domingo Perón (1945-1955): afianzamiento de la problemática en la sociedad argentina y el orden internacional* G. R. Garcia 2022

1065 This appears to have continued only for a week, before weather conditions closed the flights down. It is very difficult to see what was being achieved other than the US showing a presence in Antarctica.

February 26th, in London, asked in the House of Commons regarding the progress towards a; *"... constitution which will give elective representation to the people of the Falkland Islands," a* Government spokesman responds; *"I await the report of the new Governor, who has recently arrived in the Colony. Meanwhile two Unofficial Members have recently been added to the Executive Council."* [1066]

February 28th, in the *Nottingham Evening Post:*

> *"Argentina's claims to the Falkland Islands and an Antarctic area are reaffirmed in a Note from Dr. Bramuglia, Argentine Foreign Minister, to Sir Reginald Leeper, British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, in reply to a note from the Ambassador pointing out that the islands have been administered under Britain for 100 years. Sir Reginald offered British aid for Argentine expeditions to the Antarctic. Dr. Bramuglia declined the proposed aid for Antarctic expeditions as "the terms employed do not correspond with the clear position of Argentina on the questions mentioned". Rejecting the British case as one-sided, he claims that the Argentine was "the first effective occupant of the Antarctic zone."..."*

The Soviet Union's Antarctic Whaling Fleet, *Slava* operates some 1200 miles from South Georgia.

"At that time it became necessary to send one of the catchers [Slava I] to South Georgia." [1067]

March 2nd, the Foreign Ministers of Chile and Argentina meet to discuss the future of their Antarctic claims.

"In March 1947, Foreign Minister Bramuglia said: The problems of the Antarctic and the Malvinas Islands are different; they have different origins and they require different solutions."Despite these differences, the Foreign Minister commented, the two problems have a certain regional and political similarity". This regional and political similarity, which inheres in the fact that both Argentine and British claims in Antarctica are to some extent based on the Falklands, means that British weakness in face of Argentine advances in Antarctica may be construed as an invitation to Argentina to move to force." [1068]

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's Ministry of Finance appoints an Inspector to verify the presence of distillation equipment at Grytviken, and to affix the appropriate customs tags asserting that South Georgia is a; *"... territory over which the Argentine Republic has legal jurisdiction."* [1069]

Governor Clifford tours the Dependencies, handing out formal protests to those he finds in charge of Argentine posts on Laurie Island (South Orkney Islands) and Gamma Island (Palmer Peninsula, Graham Land); and to the Chilean commander of a base on Greenwich Island (South Shetland Islands).

March 12th, Britain's Law Officers provide advice regarding the Dependencies, for the attention of Cabinet.[1070]

> *"That the Argentine and Chilean claims are based on the ground (1) of their successors to Spain, and (ii) on geographical contiguity and the circumstance that, as they allege, the areas in dispute are extensions of the South American Continent. These claims, we think, can at the outset be discarded as not maintainable. The partition by the Pope in 1493 and the subsequent treaty of Tordesillas in 1494*

1066 *HC Deb 26 February 1947 vol.433 cc288-9W*

1067 Fleet Captain-Director Vladimir Voronin quoted in *The first practical Soviet steps towards getting a foothold in the Antarctic: the Soviet Antarctic whaling flotilla Slava* Irina Gan 2009 in *Polar Record* January, 2009 45. Voronin did not give the reason for this, but subsequent news reports reminded their readers of Bellinghausen's visit to South Georgia in December, 1819. *cf.* 1819, 1950 & January, 1957.

1068 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp08c01297r000800090022-3

1069 Bologna 1988 p.48. There is no evidence of an Argentine inspection of any equipment at Grytviken.

1070 *FO 371/61290/1*

allotted to Spain only some of the territories, and in respect of these Spain never acquired any title independently of this partition. Even if Spain had acquired any title by the partition, we think that the areas subsequently undoubtedly became terra nullius, and that accordingly the requirements of the uti possidetis principle are not fulfilled.

With regard to the claim founded on the geographical situation of the areas in question, there is, we think, no authority which can be said to establish such a claim in international law. ... South Georgia can be treated as falling into a separate category. Virtually South Georgia consists of one compact island. It was annexed by Letters Patent in 1908; since 1909 there has been a resident magistrate; and since 1912 there were small Government buildings and a Post Office. Leases and Licences for whaling were granted from time to time. There has been a small settled population since 1905. These circumstances in our opinion are quite sufficient to establish a clear title in Great Britain to South Georgia.

With regard to all the other territories, the question is a great deal more difficult and, to put the matter generally, we do not feel in a position to advise that Great Britain has a clear title to these territories. We feel, however, at the same time that with regard to the South Shetland Islands, part of the South Orkneys, and, possibly, to a somewhat lesser extent, to the South Sandwich Islands, Great Britain has an arguable case which can be said to come just within the requirements laid down in the Clipperton Island award and the Status of East Greenland award, ...

In conclusion, therefore, we can advise with confidence only that Great Britain has acquired a title to South Georgia and to Deception Island in the South Shetlands. We feel fairly confident as to the British title to Signy Island. With considerably less confidence, we feel that Britain can establish a title to the rest of the (South) Shetland Islands and the South Sandwich Islands. As to Graham Land, we feel the British title is confined to the actual areas of the British settlements."[1071]

May 16th, in Santiago, the Chilean Government rejects the protests made against it by Britain, regarding Chile's Antarctic claims.

May 24th, Argentina creates a sub-committee of its National Antarctic Committee. The sub-committee being charged with studying all the nation's records; *"... regarding Argentina's irrevocable rights over the Falkland and South Georgia ... to protect and recover the territorial estate which legally belongs to the Republic..."* [1072]

"In this Decree, South Georgia was for the first time separated by the Argentine Government from the other Dependencies and grouped with the Falkland Islands. The implication appears to be that South Georgia, like the Falklands, is regarded as Argentine territory under de facto British occupation; and as such differs from the other territories in the Dependencies which they regard as Argentine both de jure and de facto. We made no protest about this at the time." [1073]

In **June**, in London, the Foreign Office proposes an aerial survey of the Dependencies to determine their extent.

June 24th, in Washington, a State Department research paper summarises US policy towards the Falklands.

"(a) The United States accepts and works with the de facto situation; (b) It accepts tacitly but by unmistakable implication the de jure sovereignty of the United Kingdom over the Islands, although

1071 Opinion of the Law Officers 1947 in *LCO 2/490. cf.* 1775, 1906, 1959 (*Antarctic Treaty*) & 1966
1072 Quoted in *Note by B.B. Roberts August 27, 1952 American Department A/15212 (FO 371/103153/15212/104)*
1073 *Ibid.*

there has been a tendency even in intra-departmental statements to avoid clear cut, categorical recognition of British sovereignty; (c) It seeks to avoid exacerbating Argentine sensibilities by refraining so far as possible from public explicit commitment on the dispute." [1074]

"The study confirmed that neither British nor Argentine claims were admitted as being valid or determinative of the sovereignty issue and stressed that such a policy was consistent with the United States policy on non-intervention in foreign controversies. After a detailed historical analysis, the study summarized the current (1947) United states policy regarding conflicting British-Argentine claims ... The latter statement regarding "exacerbating Argentine sensibilities", would seem to imply that if the United States were to have made a public commitment on the issue in 1947, it would not have been favourable to the Argentinians. In fact, a world map prepared for the Department of State by the American Geographical Society in 1947 portrayed the Islands as "(UK) (Claimed by Argentina)". An internal Department of State memorandum at the time commented on this indication as follows: "This makes it clear that we regard the Islands as British, but wish to indicate the Argentine claims". This memorandum was cleared and apparently was regarded "as an official, although not public, expression of policy"." [1075]

July 12th, in Buenos Aires, Chilean President Gabriel González Videla arrives for an official visit.

"Argentine-Chilean relations in Antarctica was further signalized by a joint declaration of July 12, 1947 during President Gonzalez Videla's stay in Buenos Aires, that the two governments were "desirous of putting into effect a friendly policy for determining frontiers" and "that they desire to conclude as soon as possible an Argentine-Chilean treaty of demarcation of limits of South American Antarctica"." [1076]

July 27th, Chile and Argentina announce a Joint Declaration on Antarctica.

"(Desiring) to arrive as soon as possible at the conclusion of a Treaty between Argentina and Chile, regarding the demarcation of boundaries in the South American Antarctic."

However, despite extensive negotiations, no decision as to the territory to be claimed by each is reached; although both remain convinced; *"... of the indisputable rights of sovereignty of the Argentine Republic and of Chile over the South American Antarctic,..."*

"Department's impression is that Argentina and Chile, regarding Antarctic problem as matter of prestige, are prepared to go to great lengths to defend their claims and probably would not accept reference of their claims to an international court for settlement. Department's impression coincides with British view that the Argentine-Chilean accord on the subject is more apparent than real. However, it seems probable that the accord would be firm against Britain." [1077]

1074 *The United States Position Respecting Argentine-British Claims to the Falkland Islands Research Project* No.55 p.8 (24.6.47) quoted in Perl 1983 p.19. This research paper did not have any official standing as a formal Department of State viewpoint, but is probably as far as the US will ever be prepared to go in recognition of British sovereignty over the Falklands archipelago. Its own dispute with Argentina, dating back to the raid by the USS *Lexington* in December, 1831, was left in abeyance until such time as the Anglo-Argentine dispute was resolved. Should such a resolution go in Argentina's favour, the US would find itself facing a claim for compensation plus more than a century of interest. The US undoubtedly prefers the status quo.

1075 Perl 1983 pp.19-20

1076 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link

1077 *Memorandum by the Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Hulley)* December 16, 1947 in *Foreign Relations of the United States. Vol.1 General: The United Nations (Document 536)*

August 8th, in London, during a meeting of the British Cabinet, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin recommends that Argentina and Chile be informed of the UK's intention to maintain its sovereignty claims throughout the Dependencies. Also of Britain's willingness to take the issues to the International Court of Justice.

> *"(Foreign) Governments were encroaching on certain territories to which we had long laid claim. If we did nothing to check this tendency our claim to the territories in question could go by default. ..."*[1078]

August 15th, near Rio de Janeiro, an Inter-American Conference brings together the Foreign Ministers of American states to discuss issues of security amid concerns regarding communism. [1079]

August 26th, at the Rio conference, a decision is made to define a *'security zone'* around the Americas, identifying the geographical areas to which any agreements will apply. At the insistence of Argentina's delegation, led by Dr. Pascual La Rosa, the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and the Antarctic areas claimed by his country, are included within the southern section of the zone. [1080]

"The Rio Conference of August-September 1947 afforded the Peron Administration a new chance to lend color to its Antarctic claims in connection with the demarcation of the hemisphere defense zone. The limits of this zone were laid down by a subcommittee of Committee II to cover the area originally demarcated at the Panama Meeting of 1939, which did not overlap British claims in Antarctica. At the instance of the Argentine and Chilean delegations the zone was enlarged to cover the entire area claimed by these two countries and to blanket in all but a small sector of the British "juridico-political status" of Antarctica." [1081]

"The treaty created a defense zone encircling the continents of North and South American and including Greenland and Antarctica. It asserted that an attack on any American state by either an American or a foreign nation would be considered an attack on all of those bound by the treaty and that collective measures would be taken to repel the aggression. Several countries indicated reservations in debate before the signing of the treaty. In one such action, Argentina raised the issue of sovereignty, reasserting its claim to the Falkland Islands over the British. But a United States delegate countered that the treaty had "no effect upon the sovereignty, national or international status of any of the territories" included within the security zone." [1082]

"Theoretically this would make any British military action in the Falkland Islands Dependencies an act of aggression against the American continent, and would consequently require a combined response from all the countries in the Western Hemisphere, including the United States." [1083]

In Buenos Aires, on the same day, the Argentine government makes an announcement.

"Simultaneously the Argentine Ministry of Marine announced the dispatch of an Argentine task force of cruisers, destroyers, auxiliary ships, and airplanes for maneuvers in the Antarctic and a visit to Deception Island." [1084]

1078 Quoted in Howkins 2008 p.151

1079 Originally called for October 20, 1945, the conference was postponed at the request of the USA until March, 1946, and then postponed again on a request from Uruguay.

1080 *Act of Chalpultepec (Rio Treaty) 1947.* At the time, Argentina considered this something of a diplomatic *coup* despite the Falkland islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands not being specifically mentioned.

1081 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See link above

1082 *The Rio Pact at a Glance* in *The New York Times* April 21, 1982

1083 Howkins 2008 p.147. See 1982

1084 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See link above

September 2nd, in Brazil, the *Rio Pact* is signed. [1085]

> *"Art. 3: 1. The High Contracting Parties agree that an armed attack by any State against an American State shall be considered as an attack against all the American States and, consequently, each one of the said Contracting Parties undertakes to assist in meeting the attack in the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defense recognized by Article 51 of the Charter of the United Nations. ... 3. The provisions of this Article shall be applied in case of any armed attack which takes place within the region described in Article 4 or within the territory of an American State. ...*
>
> *Art. 4: The region to which this Treaty refers is bounded as follows: beginning at the **North Pole**; thence due south to a point 74 degrees north latitude, 10 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 47 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 50 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 35 degrees north latitude, 60 degrees west longitude; thence due south to a point in 20 degrees north latitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 5 degrees north latitude, 24 degrees west longitude; thence due south to the **South Pole**; thence due north to a point 30 degrees south latitude, 90 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point on the Equator at 97 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 15 degrees north latitude, 120 degrees west longitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 50 degrees north latitude, 170 degrees east longitude; thence due north to a point in 54 degrees north latitude; thence by a rhumb line to a point 65 degrees 30 minutes north latitude, 168 degrees 58 minutes 5 seconds west longitude: thence due north to the North Pole."* [1086]

At the signing of the Final Act, several delegates make "Statements" including Argentina and Chile.

> *"Argentina: The Argentine Delegation declares that within the waters adjacent to the South American Continent, along the coasts belonging to the Argentine Republic in the Security Zone, it does not recognize the existence of colonies or possessions of European countries and it adds that it especially reserves and maintains intact the legitimate titles and rights of the Argentine Republic to the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the South Georgia Islands, the South Sandwich Islands, and the lands included in the Argentine Antarctic sector, over which the Republic exercises the corresponding sovereignty.*
>
> *Chile: The Delegation of Chile declares that, within the waters adjacent to the South American Continent, in the extension of coast belonging to the Republic of Chile, comprised within the Security Zone, it does not recognize the existence of colonies or possessions of European countries and it adds that it especially reserves and maintains intact the legitimate title and rights of the Republic of Chile to the lands included in the Chilean Antarctic zone, over which the Republic exercises the corresponding sovereignty.*
>
> *United States of America: With reference to the reservations made by other Delegations concerning territories located within the region defined in the Treaty, their boundaries, and questions of sovereignty over them, the Delegation of the United States of America wishes to record its position that **the Treaty of Rio de Janeiro has no effect upon the sovereignty, national or international status of any of the territories included in the region defined in Article 4 of the Treaty.**"* [1087]

1085 Otherwise known as the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (TIAR). The relevance of the security zone would become an issue during the 1982 Falklands War. For the full treaty, see - https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume 21/volume-21-I-324-English.pdf

1086 My emphasis. In 1948, the USA would deny that the Treaty included Antarctica. I can find no on-line map of the zone.

1087 My emphasis. For the full Final Act, see - https://treaties.un.org/doc/Treaties/1948/12/19481220 07-23 PM/volume-21-I-324-Final Act-English.pdf

"The "region" set up by Article 4 as a security zone runs in the word of Senator Vandenberg, "from pole to pole. It is a gigantic ellipse – a great oval – encompassing North, Central, and South America and their surrounding seas". It includes not only the continental territories of all the twenty-one American Republics, but also parts of the Arctic Ocean and on Antarctica, and territories outside of the Inter-American System: European colonies, Canada, Greenland, but not Iceland. ... With regard to this "region" several "Statements" were made: by Guatemala, concerning Belice (sic); by Argentina, concerning the Falkland Islands; by Argentina and Chile, renewing the claims of sovereignty over the respective "Antarctic Zones". But it is clear, as the United States expressly stated, that the Rio Treaty "has no effect upon sovereignty or national or international status of any of the territories included in the region defined in Article 4 of the Treaty". [1088]

"... at the signing of the final act of the 1947 Rio treaty, the U.S. delegation, headed by Secretary of State George C. Marshall, made clear our view that the Rio treaty is without effect upon outstanding territorial disputes between American and European states – and explicitly refused to endorse Argentina's claims." [1089]

Argentina's delegate, Dr. Atilio Bramuglia, tells a press conference that; *"... the Treaty does not imply recognition of sovereignty to anyone, but it is understood that (a claim) exists, otherwise (the Falklands) would not be included. ..."* [1090]

"US Secretary of State George C. Marshall urged both parties to settle the dispute peacefully and stated that the United States would not favor the outcome to the advantage of either party. This signified a departure from a tacitly pro-UK stance to one of neutrality." [1091]

On the same day, Uruguay and Britain sign an agreement for flights between the Falkland Islands and Montevideo. [1092]

October 26th, at Deception Island, an Argentine minesweeper, *Bouchard*, anchors. [1093]

From the UK, HMS *Snipe* is posted to the Falklands to facilitate the Governor's visits to the Dependencies.[1094]

November 3rd, at the United Nations, Argentina complains about the use of the name 'Falkland Islands', rather than 'Malvinas'.

> *"The Argentine Delegation also states for the record that the correct name of the islands mentioned under the name Falkland in the reports from the United Kingdom is Malvinas, which is amply justified by numerous widely known historical precedents, and that it is not possible to misrepresent or destroy."*[1095]

1088 *The Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance* Joseph L. Kunz in *The American Journal of International Law* vol. 42, no. 1 (January 1948) pp.111-120

1089 *The South Atlantic Crisis: Background, Consequences, Documentation* US Dept of State, Bureau of Public Affairs August 5, 1982 (evidence of Assistant Secretary Enders)

1090 Caillet-Bois (6th ed.) 1982 p. 407

1091 *The United States role in the Origins and Development of the Malvinas Dispute: Implications for the 1982 Conflict* David Lewis Feldman in *Peace Research* vol.19 No.1 (January 1987) pp.37-48. 1947's Rio Conference marked a change in attitude by the USA which had, before that, been generally cognizant of British sovereignty over the Falklands archipelago. Switching to a nuetral position suited Washington's perception of itself as leader of the America's. Afeared of Russian influence in its '*back-yard*', the USA was prepared to abandon a longstanding position, even if that meant offending an ally. However, tested in 1982, the USA supported the British.

1092 *The New York Times* October 29, 1952

1093 Fontana 2013 p.8

1094 Christie 1951 p.258

1095 *Consejo Argentino para las Relaciones Internacionales* (CARI). Historically, the name Falkland Isles can be found on charts as early as 1702, some 20 years before the French Malouines started to appear. It would be more than 60 years before Spanish tongues managed to mangle Malouines to Malvinas (Malouines-Maluines-Maluinas- Malvinas).

November 29th, in the Falkland Islands, an Ordinance to constitute a Town Council in Stanley, is assented to on behalf of His Majesty, King George VI. [1096]

> *"You will recall that my first step, and one which I have found most useful, was the appointment of two non-officials to my Executive Council; the second, which appeared to find favour with an informal Committee and with others whom I discussed it with, is an equally obvious one - and that is provision of local government for our capital, Stanley, through the establishment of a Town Council, advantages of this proposal, long overdue, are so manifest, so real that one would suppose they needed no further emphasis but since I am informed that there is some apprehension and misunderstanding in certain quarters, I will elaborate: It is safe to say that Stanley is the only capital in the Empire which has not its own Council and which is not, in greater or lesser degree, responsible for its own affairs.*
>
> *It is essential to the well-being and self-respect of any community - especially an all British one such as this - that it should exercise these powers which are its right; size does not diminish that right and Stanley is certainly large enough. It is for the people and not for the Government to determine such domestic matters as rating; where, when and in what order urban roads should be improved; street lighting; water supply and bathing establishments; use and management of the Town Hall; sanitary regulations and by-laws; licencing; poor relief; maintenance of the cemetery and a score of such considerations which are not the proper business of Government. It will provide a much-needed outlet for civic leadership and is the only sure means of acquiring political wisdom and administrative experience. It will furnish an authoritative link between the people of Stanley and the Administration where, at present, none exists;...*
>
> *Stanley will thus be able to send to the Legislature representatives chosen by itself, in whom the majority have confidence, who will be able to speak authoritatively and acceptably because, being responsible for the day-to-day affairs and problems of the Town, they will know what they are talking about; who will be able to participate effectively in debate through experience gained in Town Council proceedings and who will, for the be able to pull their weight in Committee."* [1097]

December 7th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador, Reginald Leeper, presents a diplomatic *Note* expressing "*anxiety*" at Argentina's activities in Antarctica. The UK requests that Argentine nationals evacuate bases on Deception and Gamma Islands. [1098]

December 8th, the US Government sends instructions to its Embassies in the UK, Chile and Argentina.

> *"... it is not impossible that during the coming Antarctic season, Argentine and Chilean expeditions might establish temporary bases in UK territory and if called upon to depart or recognize UK sovereignty their governments might claim this was British intervention in the Western Hemisphere. The position of the United States is clearly that the sovereignty or the national or international status of any territory is not affected by its inclusion in the hemisphere defense area, and thus that the status of the British, Argentine and Chilean claims in Antarctica are not affected by the inclusion of portions of Antarctica in that area. ... It is the Department's view that, until such time as a course calculated to bring about a full settlement of the Antarctic problem is determined, more decisive action might serve only to inflame the issue without affording any compensating advantage...*

1096 *Ordinance No.1 1947*
1097 Governor Clifford's speech to the Legislative Council on November 26, 1947. See January, 1948 below.
1098 *Keesing's Record of World Events* vols.6-7, February, 1948 p.9133

The Department has no information that would indicate directly the possible Chilean reaction to a British proposal to submit their conflicting Antarctic claims to an international court. However, in view of the general situation it is not illogical to suppose that Chile would be very reluctant to do so. As previously indicated (Department's A–865, September 8, 1947), the Department believes that Argentina would go to great lengths to avoid such a proposal. The American Government has not altered its position with regard to Antarctica, but in view of increasing British, Argentine and Chilean interest and tension, has come to the conclusion that a change in policy may be necessary and has initiated a study of the situation which may lead to an altered position within the course of the next few months, possibly along the lines suggested in the Department's cable No. 4090 of September 22, 1947 to the Embassy.

The Falkland Islands may be made the subject of a separate instruction, should any useful information become available. However, at this time the Department sees no advantage to be gained by including the Falkland Islands in the Antarctic problem. On the contrary, such inclusion would appear calculated to complicate greatly and unnecessarily both problems." [1099]

December 13th, at Deception Island and the Melchior Islands group, a C-54 airplane of the Argentine air force overflies British bases. Papers are dropped, claiming those islands as Argentine territory. [1100]

"On December 13, 1947 a 2500-mile non-stop flight was made by an Argentine naval plane which passed over Deception Island and Melchior Archipelago.... This flight was described by the Chief of Naval Aviation, Rear Admiral Portillo, as "a demonstration that the Antarctic is ours, not only by ocean navigation, but, by air, since we are able to arrive there at any time to resolve our problems"." [1101]

December 17th, in Buenos Aires, the UK invites the Argentine government to take its sovereignty claims regarding the Falkland Islands Dependencies, to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) for arbitration. [1102]

"If .. the Argentine Government are unwilling to admit the validity of His Majesty's Government's title to Gamma Island or any other region included in the Falkland Islands Dependencies and consider that their own title is a good one, it is suggested that their correct course is not to maintain without the consent of His Majesty's Government an occupied post in a territory to which His Majesty's Government's claim of title is universally known and which His Majesty's Government have for long actively administered; but, to invoke the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice at The Hague. ..."

In Santiago, Britain's Ambassador extends a similar invitation to Chile. [1103]

"H. M. Ambassador in Santiago, Sir John Leche, had similarly protested to the Chilean Government on Dec. 17, 1947, against acts of trespass in the Falkland Dependencies during the summer of 1947; and in particular against the action of the Chilean Navy in setting up permanent post on Greenwich Island (South Shetlands), proposing, as in the Note to Argentina, that the matter be referred to the International Court." [1104]

1099 *The Acting Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom* December 8, 1947 in *Foreign Relations of the United States. Vol.1 General: The United Nations (Document 534)*. This would indicate that the USA had prior knowledge that the UK was about to send invitations to the Argentine and Chilean governments regarding an approach to the International Court of Justice.

1100 Fontana 2013 p.8

1101 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See above for link.

1102 *HC Deb 02 July 1951 vol.489 cc1899-901*

1103 *Ibid.*

1104 *Keesing's Record of World Events* vols.6-7, February, 1948 p.9133

"Britain sent official Notes to both Argentina and Chile on 17 December 1947, inviting them to challenge Britain's sovereignty by invoking the International Court of Justice (ICJ), and stating that Britain would accept the decision of the Court." [1105]

In Washington DC, , on the same day, Counsellor Hadow from the British Embassy calls on Benjamin Hulley, Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs, to discuss the British invitations to the Argentine and Chilean Governments relative to Antarctica. Hulley mentions something under consideration within the US Government.

> *"I mentioned that one idea we were studying is the possibility of establishing a special United Nations trusteeship. He (Hadow) took strong exception to this thought, asking how it would be possible to keep the Soviet Union from being one of the trustees since the Soviets have a claim based on the voyage of a Russian ship to the area over a hundred years ago. He expressed his personal opinion as being absolutely opposed to a trusteeship. Among other objections, he mentioned the strategic value to us of control of passage around Cape Horn in the event that the Panama Canal proved vulnerable..."* [1106]

December 23rd, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador Leeper presents a further protest to Dr. Bramuglia; expressing surprise at continued violations of British territory and territorial waters by Argentine vessels. [1107]

"The British Government formally protested Argentine and Chilean activity in its Antarctic zone by notes of December 17 and 23, 1947. It suggested that the South American claimants should operate under British concessions, or, alternatively, either withdraw or submit their claims to the International Court of Justice." [1108]

A Falkland Islands end-of-year review notes: [1109]

> "*The population is white and has been derived to a large extent from the United Kingdom. On 31st December, 1947, it numbered 2,273 – 1,236 males and 1,037 females. The density of population is about one person to every two square miles. Approximately half the inhabitants live in Stanley, the capital, and the remainder are divided more or less equally between the outlying districts of the East and West Falklands. The number of births registered in 1947 was 33 and of deaths 31, ...*
>
> *Twenty-two marriages were celebrated during the year. ... One hundred and ninety-nine persons arrived in the Colony and 164 left during 1947. ...*
>
> *Education is compulsory (in Stanley only) between the ages of 5 and 14 and voluntary continuation classes enable study to be continued to the age of 16. In Stanley there are two schools, an infant school and a combined junior and senior school, both maintained by Government. Boarding allowances are granted to assist children from country districts to attend school in Stanley. Country children who are unable to come to Stanley are taught either in small one-teacher schools (some full-time, some part-time) or by travelling teachers."*

1105 Pascoe 2020 p.272

1106 *Memorandum of Conversation, by the Acting Chief of the Division of Northern European Affairs (Hulley)* December 17, 1947 in *Foreign Relations of the United States. Vol.1 General: The United Nations Document 538.* The notion of a trusteeship arrangement for the white continent was the forerunner of what would eventually become the Antarctic Treaty of 1959. See below.

1107 *HC Deb 02 July 1951 vol.489 cc1899-901*

1108 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See link above.

1109 *Colonial office Annual Report on the Falkland Islands 1947.* Also known as the Blue Book, these reports had been suspended in 1940 due to the war and only resumed in 1946 (an on-line copy of which is not currently available). See - https://www.nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1947 to 1955.pdf

1948 – during **January**, a Stanley Town Council is elected.

"A first step towards extending representative institutions has already been taken by the establishment at the beginning of this year of a new Town Council for Port Stanley consisting of six members elected by popular vote and three members (two of whom are officials and one a non-official) appointed by the Governor." [1110]

In the South Shetland Islands, Argentine sailors build a base on King George Island – *Refugio Ensenada Martel*.

In London, the film *Scott of the Antarctic* has its premiere.

" ... it was believed that it did not have commercial purposes, but rather sought to uphold the "territorial rights" of the Crown. The (ministry of Foreign Affairs) report highlighted the "tendency to use cinema as a modern means of argumentation", while suggesting the need to "update the material" available to implement a similar strategy in Argentina. The reports even included a list of politicians who had attended the premiere, various newspaper clippings, and the impact it had had on British society." [1111]

January 25th, on Deception Island, an Argentine expedition establishes a new base. [1112]

"In January 1948 Argentina held naval manoeuvres close to the Falklands after Britain had announced that five battleships would be scrapped. The Admiralty despatched H.M.S. 'Sheffield' to "show the flag."." [1113]

January 28th, Argentina's Government responds to Britain's December, 1947 invitation to the ICJ.

> *"Were Argentina, which exercises sovereignty de jure and de facto over its Antarctic sector, to petition the International Court, she could appear in the position of a state requesting something which belonged to her but over which she did not exercise effective possession. And the situation is otherwise, as is shown by the permanent installations which consolidate our rights."* [1114]

"... the Argentine Government had replied to the effect that both the Falkland Islands and the Falkland Dependencies were considered Argentine national territory by right, no formal declaration of annexation being considered necessary; had rejected the British request for the evacuation of Deception and Gamma Islands; and had likewise rejected the proposal to refer the matter to the International Court, suggesting instead that the political status of the territories concerned should be discussed at an international conference in Buenos Aires by Argentine, Chilean, and British representatives." [1115]

"No Argentine will ever recognize any sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands other than that of the country itself. With these words, which appear in the note addressed on January 28, 1948 by the chancellor of our country to the British ambassador, the thought of the Nation on this matter is conclusively expressed, in which all men of good will have to admit that Argentina defends the cause of truth and justice." [1116]

"... Argentine Foreign Minister Atilio Bramuglia sent to the British embassy an extensive note in which (he) considered British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Argentine Antarctic sector illegitimate. ... (he) proposed an international conference to identify the legal and political status of the region." [1117]

1110 Mr. Rees-Williams *HC Deb 12 February 1948 vol.447 c132W*
1111 Garcia 2022
1112 Headland 1989
1113 Ellerby 1990 p.122 citing *The Falklands Crisis* P. Calvert 1982 p. 23
1114 Copy in Christie 1951 Appendix C. Also *Antarctica Cases: United Kingdom v. Argentine; United Kingdom v Chile* International Court of Justice 1956 p.35
1115 *Keesing's Record of World Events* vols.6-7, February, 1948 p.9133
1116 *Historia universal y argentina: para los grados superiores de la escuela primaria* Arturo Vinardell 1950 quoted in Santos La Rosa 2022
1117 Fontana 2013 p.9

"In its reply of 28 January 1948 the Argentine government stated that it was convinced of the unquestionable rights of Argentina and Chile (!) over the disputed areas, adding that it would not be right for Argentina to appear before the ICJ as a country requesting what already belonged to it." [1118]

January 31st, from Santiago, Chile's government also declines to submit to arbitration at the International Court of Justice.

> *"While we have always maintained the principle that controversies of a juridical nature which may arise between states should be subject to international jurisdiction ... I cannot in this case share the point of view of Your Excellency's Government since, in the first place, there would be no logical justification in Chile having to approach the International Court of Justice, before effecting acts of sovereignty, within a territory over which she holds irrefutable juridical, political, historical, geographic, diplomatic and administrative titles;..."* [1119]

"... no matter how "irrefutable" Argentina's and Chile's titles may have been, they conflicted with each other as well as with Britain's, and neither country had a title anything like as good as Britain had." [1120]

February 4th, at Deception Island, HMS *Snipe* arrives with the Falklands Governor on board. A protest regarding *"provocative behaviour"* is lodged with the Argentine base commander. [1121]

February 11th, in the UK, the *Overseas Resources Development Act* establishes the Colonial Development Corporation (CDC).

"The CDC's purpose was to bridge the gap between the development activities of governments and the commercial operations of private enterprise for the benefit of colonial peoples... The Falkland Government had four sources of capital for development – the (Colonial Development & Welfare Act 1945) allocation of £150,000, the Colony's reserves, taxation and assistance from the CDC (Colonial Development Corporation) for suitable projects. Clifford appealed for the £150,000 allocation to be raised in line with Saint Helena, which was granted £200,000, The Colonial Office replied that Saint Helena had twice the population, a revenue of £14 per head and an allocation of £40 per head compared to the more prosperous Falklands which had £40 per head revenue and an allocation of £60 per head... Clifford was forced to trim his objectives by abandoning four plans. These included a road across East Falkland from Stanley to a suitable site for a ferry to West Falkland, a weaving project to produce woollens and high quality tweed, a fishing scheme and an Agricultural Institute to improve farming techniques." [1122]

February 14th, from Cape Town in South Africa, HMS *Nigeria* is deployed to the Falklands, with orders to patrol the Dependencies and investigate reports of Argentine landings. Informed, the USA expresses its reservations.

February 16th, Chilean President, Gabriel Videla, visits his country's base on Greenwich Island; one of the South Shetland Islands. There, he announces a decree renaming Graham Land (Antarctic Peninsula) as, Tierra de O'Higgins; *"We would deny our glorious history, we would deny our past, if we were to renounce a single piece of our territory, only because there are those who believe that acts of imperialism today constitute a title of sovereignty."*

1118 Pascoe 2020 p.272
1119 *Don German Vergara to John Hurleston Leche 31st January 1948*
1120 Pascoe 2020 p.272
1121 Fontana 2013 p.9
1122 Ellerby 1990 pp.79-81. *cf.* 1949

President Videla tells the press that the; *"... British Empire's active assertion of sovereignty ... was in direct contravention of the terms of the recently signed Pan-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, the boundaries of which stretched all the way to the South Pole. He called upon the other Republics of America to assist against this external aggression, conveniently forgetting that Chilean claims also conflicted directly with those of neighbouring Argentina."* [1123]

In London, on the same day, Foreign Secretary McNeil is asked a parliamentary question as to whether Argentina has now ceased acts of trespass in the Falkland Islands Dependencies. [1124]

> "*No, Sir. Argentine and Chilean naval forces are at present operating in British waters in the Falkland Island Dependencies, with the declared object of enforcing claims to sovereignty in this area. They have also landed parties, and purport to have set up military commands in British Territory. His Majesty's Government consider the British title to the Falkland Islands Dependencies to be well founded, and have been willing that it should stand the test of international arbitration. In the protests which we made to the Argentine and Chilean Governments in December last, we made it plain that we would accept the decision of the International Court. This offer has been rejected by both Governments, and we can only regard this as evidence that they have no confidence in their ability to dispute our legal title..."*

February 18th, in Washington DC, British Ambassador, Lord Inverchapel,[1125] speaks to Secretary of State, George C. Marshall to express concerns regarding Chilean and Argentine activity in the area of Antarctica. Lord Inverchapel informs the US Secretary of HMS *Nigeria*'s deployment.

> *"I told Lord Inverchapel that speaking off the record, I had been somewhat puzzled at the action of the British Government in sending a cruiser to the area and that I had been wondering just what the cruiser would do when it got there. In view of spectacular action, of Chilean President and dramatic departure of so-called Argentine fleet, I wondered if the British cruiser decision did not put them in an undignified position. I stressed the fact that in saying this I was speaking entirely as an individual and not as Secretary of State."* [1126]

In Canberra, on the same day, Australia's Prime Minister, Ben Chifley, states during an interview that, if asked, he would consider sending a cruiser in support of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

"As things are, His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom do not, however, see any necessity to ask the Australian Government to send a cruiser to the Falkland Islands. H.M.S. "Nigeria" is now due to arrive at the Falkland Islands very shortly and will then visit the Dependencies in company with H.M.S. "Snipe."..." [1127]

From Ushuaia, on the same day, an Argentine naval squadron consisting of *Almirante Brown, Veinticinco de Mayo* and the destroyers *Entre Rios*, *San Luis*, *Misiones*, *Santa Cruz*, *Mendoza*, and *Cervantes*, sails for manoeuvres in Antarctic waters. Under the command of Vice-Admiral Juan M. Carranza

"Operated around the South Shetland Islands in February; conducted some hydrographic survey, made an aerial photographic survey of Deception Island, and visited some Argentine Antarctic stations." [1128]

1123 Howkins 2008 p.158

1124 *Hansard: Commons Chamber: Oral Answers to Questions: Falkland islands Dependences (British Title) February 16 1948* col: 823

1125 Archibald Clark Kerr

1126 *George C. Marshall to the British Ambassador* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. general; The United Nations, Vol.1, part 2 – Memorandum of Conversation, by the Secretary of State, Washington, February 18, 1948*

1127 *HC Deb 23 February 1948 vol.447 cc1600-1*

1128 Headland 1989 p.324

February 19th, near Cape Legoupil, Trinity Peninsula, Chile's President Gabriel Videla opens a new base.

In Washington DC, the Chilean Ambassador is told that the USA does not consider that the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance of 1947 covers Antarctica. [1129]

February 20th, in Glasgow, Scotland, Lord Tedder, Marshall of the Royal Air Force, refers to jackals which, if the British lion appeared to be weakening, would come; "*... yapping and snapping round his flanks."* Chilean President Videla takes the remarks personally. [1130]

February 21st, in the South Atlantic, HMS *Nigeria* arrives ready to confront Argentina's squadron; reported to be on '*manoeuvres*' near Deception Island. [1131]

> *"The Argentine fleet carrying five Admirals is now, I understand, off Deception Island. His Majesty's representative in Buenos Aires has been assured by the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs that these vessels have been sent with no intention of asserting any rights or taking possession of any territory but merely to carry out routine exercises in that area..."* [1132]

"Argentine territorial claims in the Falkland Islands and Antarctica challenge British possession of the Falklands and conflict with actual or potential claims in Antarctica by the governments of Great Britain, Chile, and the US. Tension between Argentina and Britain over their conflicting claims, which gained world attention following the dispatch of British, Argentine, and Chilean naval units to Antarctica in February 19489 is the outgrowth of a century-old dispute over the Falklands and of recent changes in world power relationships. The dispute regarding the Falklands is an issue which remained quiet for over a century, during which British ascendancy was unquestioned. It now arises because Argentina can foresee the time when it might recover the islands by direct pressure or indirectly with the support of the US and the inter-American system." [1133]

February 23rd, in the US, the *Washington Post* newspaper criticises the Chilean misinterpretation of the *Rio Treaty* regarding the South Atlantic and Antarctica; noting that Argentina has yet to ratify the treaty. [1134]

"Mr. Attlee, questioned in the House on Feb. 23 by Mr. Eden, gave an assurance that the British Government would not be "checked or chivied out of British territory anywhere in the world," and added that the Nigeria, after her arrival at Port Stanley, would visit the Falkland Dependencies." [1135]

February 24th, published in the *Edmonton* Journal:

> *"Reports from Argentina indicate that public opinion is aroused to something approaching hysteria, and it seems that the same is true of Chile. Newspapers demand that the inter-American treaty be enforced to protect the southern part of the hemisphere against British intruders. Secretary of State George C. Marshall, however, has declared at a press conference that the United States is "interested in the controversy" but did not believe that the treaty could be applied..."*

From Santiago, Chile's government accuses Britain of "*aggression*" in sending HMS *Nigeria* to Antarctica; describing the act as a; *"... threat against all the nations of the Americans."*

1129 Despite the South Pole being specifically identified in Art. 4.
1130 Christie 1951 p.260
1131 Fontana 2013 p.9
1132 *HC Deb 25 February 1948 vol.447 cc1931-3*
1133 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp08c01297r000800090022-3
1134 Finally ratified by Argentina August 21, 1950. Ratified by the USA in December, 1947 and Chile on February 9, 1949.
1135 *Keesing's Record of World Events vols.6-7, February, 1948*

"As regards Antarctica, the Argentine Government will undoubtedly continue its operations and may expand them. Both the Argentine and Chilean Governments have developed a stake in Antarctica as an inexpensive means of gaining prestige at home and abroad. This barren area offers an unrivaled ground for aggressive activity and it has thereby secured an importance to the South American governments out of proportion to its real value to them." [1136]

February 25th, in London, Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin makes a statement in Parliament. [1137]

> *"The policy of His Majesty's Government is that the question of rival claims in the Falkland Islands Dependencies should, in the first instance, be brought before the International Court of Justice. This is based on our belief that international discussions could scarcely be profitable until the question of title has been subjected to international legal examination. This, of course, in no way precludes the possibility of discussions at a later stage.*
>
> *It has been suggested from the Chilean side that our offer to accept the opinion of the Court was not a fair one because we were asking the other parties to appear as plaintiffs. I wish to point out that the sole reason for presenting the matter in this form was that neither Argentina nor Chile had accepted the Optional Clause of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and that consequently it is impossible at present for His Majesty's Government to bring this dispute before the Court by themselves proceeding as plaintiffs.*
>
> *His Majesty's Government desire, however, to reaffirm that if the Argentine and Chilean Governments are willing to make an agreement with us under which the Court shall pronounce upon the title to these territories, we shall be glad to collaborate in the negotiation of such an agreement. …"*

March 4th, despite being unable to reach an agreement on demarcation, Chile and Argentina announce a further Joint Declaration regarding Antarctica.

> *"Until a friendly agreement is concluded concerning the common boundary line of the Antarctic territories of Chile and the Argentine Republic, in the names of their respective Governments – Senores Vergara Donoso and La Rosa declare:*
>
> *First: That both Governments will act in common accord in the juridical protection and defense of their rights in the South American Antarctic, which is included between the 25th and 90th meridians of longitude west of Greenwich, and in these territories Chile and the Argentine Republic mutually recognize indisputable rights of sovereignty.*
>
> *Second: That they are in agreement to continue their action of administration, exploitation, supervision, and development in the undefined frontier region of their respective Antarctic zones, in a spirit of reciprocal cooperation.*
>
> *Third: That as soon as possible and in any event in the course of the present year they will carry on negotiations until they arrive at agreement on a Chilean- Argentine treaty of demarcation of boundaries in the South American Antarctic."*

"The declaration of March 1948, which apparently was also made on an Argentine initiative, stated that the two governments would establish their boundaries within the year and that they would "act by common agreement in the protection and juridical - defense of rights in South American Antarctica in

1136 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See link above.
1137 *HC Deb 25 February 1948 vol.447 cc1931-3*

which territories both recognize unquestionable sovereign rights „.. and will continue administrative action, exploration, vigilance and development in the undefined boundary region in their respective Antarctic zones in a spirit of reciprocal cooperation". ... Chilean officials have indicated to representatives of the US that the Argentine-Chilean accord has been more apparent than real." [1138]

At Deception Island, on the same day, at Deception Island, an Argentine mine-sweeper, *Parker*, warns *Brategg,* a Norwegian fishing vessel, that she requires Argentine permission to anchor there; a warning written into the ship's log. [1139]

March 7th, at Greenwich Island in the South Shetlands, HMS *Snipe* arrives at the Chilean base and issues a warning to the commander there. [1140]

March 9th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Minister speaks to US Ambassador James Bruce.

"In a conversation of March 9, 1948 the Argentine Foreign Minister told the American Ambassador that Argentina was 'prepared to argue,' its Antarctic claims, but that it regarded the Falklands dispute as a matter of real importance which the Peron administration was determined to settle. The Argentine claims in the Falklands and Antarctica are interrelated in various ways although the Argentine Government has treated them as separate and distinct problems. ... Various press accounts have confused the Falklands with the Falkland Islands Dependencies. For example, both the editors of the New York Times and Sumner Welles have discussed the dispute between the British and South American Governments over Antarctic claims as though it were a dispute over the Falkland Islands. Argentine and British claims to the two areas mean that activity in one region is reflected to some degree in the other. Both Argentine and British claims in Antarctica depend in part on their respective claims to the Falklands. ... As to the Falklands, the Argentine Foreign Minister on March 9, 1948 approached the American Ambassador with the suggestion that the American Government support Argentina in forcing withdrawal of the British from possession of the islands. " [1141]

March 10th, US Ambassador James Bruce telegrams the US State Department in Washington DC concerning the 9th International Conference of American States which is due to meet in Bogatá, Colombia, on March 30th.

> *"Foreign Minister Bramuglia told us yesterday Argentina would have to bring up at Bogotá questions of European colonies in America with specific reference to Falkland Islands. We explained Department's position and Bramuglia said it was what he expected.*
>
> *Bramuglia said Argentine claim (to) Falkland Islands perfectly valid; British have no reason other than pride for wanting islands; costing British money and British unable defend them. Bramuglia said he and Perón convinced war with Russia probably near future inevitable and Argentine possession Falkland Islands indispensable since Argentina would join with the United States on first day of war and Falklands would be only base on which Russia could direct operations against Argentina, one of (the) food supplying centers (of the) world. He said Argentina considers Falkland question entirely separate (to the) Antarctic region; Argentina is prepared argue Antarctic question but matter (of) real importance is Falkland Islands.*
>
> *He assumed relations England-Argentina would not reach state (of) violence but emphasized Argentine determination. Bramuglia dwelt considerable length on his hope United States would give Argentina*

1138 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.*
1139 The warning was subsequently struck out by the Harbour Master at Whalers Bay as "*illegal*."
1140 Fontana 2013 p.9
1141 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland Islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp08c01297r000800090022-3

some support. Remarked England is in such sad state today, run by Socialist Government, contrary to all our principles, dependent for existence on generosity of United States Government, and (a) word from United States would determine final British position. It seems to us that Argentine arguments make considerable sense and we urge Department give them every possible consideration." [1142]

"The Bogata Conference offers the possibility of obtaining moral support and perhaps of warning the US that it should back Argentina against the UK. As such it is an interesting opportunity for the Peron administration, but by no mans one to be forced at the expense of other Argentine interests. ... The Bogota Conference will probably be used as a forum by the Argentine Government, either alone or in collaboration with the Chilean Government, as an opportunity to mobilize the support of the other American republics for Antarctic claims. In this case the claims will be linked with the general question of territorial disputes between Britain and the other American republics, notably the Falklands and Belize issues, and with the entire problem of non-continental claims and "aggressions" within the hemisphere defense zone. As a dramatic current issue involving "aggression" in the defense zone by the British Government, the Antarctic controversy will undoubtedly supply ammunition for irredentist claims against European possessions in the hemisphere, and in turn the South American claimants stand to secure backing in Antarctica from countries opposing European colonial claims." [1143]

March 15th, from Buenos Aires, the US Embassy report to Washington DC.

"British, Argentine, and Chilean maneuvers during the 1948 season in the Palmer Peninsula area of Antarctica, which are only the latest in a series of moves made by these governments to support claims between 200W and 900W, have brought into focus the general problem of over-lapping territorial claims in Antarctica. Argentina claims a sector lying between 25°17 and 74°W, and south of 60°S, including Palmer Peninsula, the South Shetlands, South Orkneys, and other island groups. In connection with its claims in the Antarctic and the Falklands, it also asserts sovereignty over the South Georgia and Sandwich Islands which lie north of its Antarctic claim. The Argentine claim over-laps both the British claim between 200W and 80N and the Chilean claim between 53°'and 90°W, and is potentially in conflict with US reserved rights in Antarctica. The American Government has so far abstained from a formal claim to Antarctic territory, but has reserved its rights in the area and has refused to recognize claims of other countries. The bases for claims already made in Antarctica comprise discovery, assertion of sovereignty, exploration, exercise of authority, occupation, historical rights, contiguity and geological affinity. Because of the peculiar nature of Antarctic territory, legal requirements for the establishment of valid title to Antarctic claims cannot readily be deduced from rules of international law and standards applicable to the Conditions of this area have yet to become the subject of a special international agreement." [1144]

March 17th, in Washington DC, an *aide-mémoire* from the British Embassy to the Department of State suggests that the USA host a four-power, round-table discussion on the conflicting claims to sovereignty in Antarctica.

"As result talks with Brit. Emb. this week, we decided, pending further consideration of subject, to postpone inquiry to other interested Govts as to their willingness to enter diplomatic discussion on possibility of Antarctic solution. Brit. Emb. on its side agreed Brit would not now issue invitation to UK US Chile Argentine round table on area of Brit Antarctic claims. We feel we could not assume responsibility in such round table to participate in discussing division of sovereignties.

1142 *Document 228* in *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948 vol. 1 pt.2 General: The United Nations*
1143 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland Islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See link above.
1144 *Ibid.*

If it dealt with Antarctic Continent as distinct from islands north of Palmer Peninsula all eight interested countries should be included and whole area considered. We would not be averse to Brit Arg Chilean settlement of overlapping claims in islands on mutually satisfactory basis which would safeguard essential points of Brit interest. We informed Brit we do not object their proposal tell Arg Chile informally Brit will confer with them on Antarctic Islands after Bogotá if they do not press matter at Bogotá." [1145]

March 23rd, in London, Foreign Secretary Bevan informs Parliament as to the situation in the Dependencies.

"Occupied posts have been established, in defiance of our protests, by the Argentines on Laurie Island in the South Orkneys group, on Gamma Island in the Palmer Archipelago, and on Deception Island in the South Shetlands group; and by the Chileans on Greenwich Island in the South Shetlands group and on South Graham Land. ..." [1146]

March 30th, in Bogatá, Colombia, the 9th International Conference of American States opens. [1147]

"... the Government of Guatamala requested that the topic of European colonies in America be included in the program of the Conference, and a draft declaration was prepared reciting that the historical process of the emancipation of America would not be concluded "so long as there remain in the Continent regions subject to the status of colonies" and declaring: "That it is a just aspiration of the Republics of America that the status of colonies that subsists in the Continent be terminated"." [1148]

Argentina's delegation complains that the local British Embassy has distributed a four page document, outlining Britain's title to the Falkland Islands.

"The Argentine Government must also consider the value of pressure in the Antarctic in weakening the British position in the Falklands. Recourse to the International Court to settle conflicting claims in the Falklands and Antarctica appears to be out of the question. Although Argentine rights in the Falklands are supported by many legal arguments, the Peron administration has indicated that it has no intention of submitting Argentine claims to the judicial process and anticipates settlement of the dispute on a power basis." [1149]

April 7th, in Buenos Aires, decree *No.9,905* places the administration of the Argentine Antarctic Sector under the Governor of Tierra del Fuego. [1150]

April 21st, at the Bogatá conference, the head of Chile's delegation proclaims that his nation's sovereignty rights over Antarctica go back to the Spanish colonial period. [1151]

1145 *Foreign Relations of the United States Diplomatic Papers, 1940, General; The United Nations, vol.1 part 2 – The Secretary of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom March 25, 1948*

1146 *HC Deb 23 March 1949 vol.463 cc342-3*

1147 March 30 to May 2, 1948. The conference was attended by delegates from 21 American States. Ten Foreign Ministers were there, plus the US Secretary of State.

1148 *The Ninth International Conference of American States* Charles G. Fenwick in *The American Journal of International Law* vol. 42, No. 3 (July 1948), pp.553-567.

1149 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See link above.

1150 At that time under the control of Argentina's Navy Command.

1151 Based upon the Spanish/Portuguese Treaty of Tordesillas of 1493 which divided the New World from pole to pole between the two nations. See Vol.1

April 26th, attending the conference, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Atilio Bramuglia, calls on the other American nations for support in ending colonialism or *"de facto occupation"* by non-American countries over territory in the Americas.

> *"With regard to the Malvinas Islands, there is no need for me to outline all the historical facts. It is sufficient to say that the Malvinas Islands were discovered by the Spanish in 1520; that they were held first by the French, then by the British, and lastly by the Spanish. And it is from the Spanish, Mr. President, that we inherited them, only to be violently divested of them by Great Britain in 1833; that is to say, force prevailing over law. … this is not a problem of colonies. It is a problem that is related to de facto possession, to illegal possession exacted violently. And we hold that Great Britain must return our Malvinas Islands. … In consequence, Mr. President, we came to this Conference to call for American solidarity. …"* [1152]

"… he was confident the dispute over the Falkland Islands could be settled. "The British are gentlemen. I think it will be settled in that spirit." He hoped that a "mutually satisfactory agreement" would emerge ***from the talks now taking place with Britain in Buenos Aires****, but insisted that Argentina's right to the territories would not be submitted to an international court or conference. "The Falkland islands are no possible use to Britain, but they are of the very greatest strategic and moral importance to us". He repeated that Argentina supported the Guatemala resolution now before the Pan-American conference, calling for an end to all European colonial possessions in the Western hemisphere. Dr. Bramuglia said Argentina's policy favoured a process of self-determination for* ***other*** *colonies, such as British Honduras and the Guianas, by means of plebiscites."* [1153]

"When the Argentine Foreign Minister asked the US to support the Argentine claim at the Bogota conference of 1948, we informed him that the US did not support either the British or the Argentine claims and that in the opinion of the US the dispute should be settled by peaceful means under the recognized procedures of international law. While Argentina did bring up the Falklands at Bogota in connection with its support of a general resolution regarding colonies and occupied territories, it is believed that Argentina made less of an issue of the question at Bogota as a result of our pre-conference talks with the Foreign Minister." [1154]

April 27th, in Buenos Aires, President Perón speaks to the US Ambassador.

"He blamed the British for provoking the recent disagreements over the Falkland Islands and the Antarctic regions. He said that the naval maneuvers which had drawn British ire were nothing new but were maneuvers which Argentina had engaged in before for many years. He said the British, were to blame for making too much out of these routine maneuvers … He described the Falkland Islands question as being a matter of "life and death" for Argentina and said that British possession of the Falkland Islands might be described as a fish-bone in the throat of every Argentine and the irritation would not be removed until the fish-bone was disgorged;…" [1155]

1152 Quoted in *Argentine Sovereignty over Malvinas: 50 Years after the Ruda Statement* Argentine Foreign Ministry, September 2014. Historically inaccurate as Spain did not visit the Falkland Islands before 1767. See - https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/1480-1762-discovery/

1153 *Reuter's* correspondent William Hardcastle. My emphasis. Quite what talks were taking place is unclear.

1154 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations, The Western Hemisphere:* vol.2 – *Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State October 26, 1951*

1155 *Ambassador Bruce in Buenos Aires to Secretary of State Washington April 28th No. 331* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948. The Western Hemisphere, vol.IX*

May 2nd, in Bogatá, Colombia, at the conclusion of the conference, resolution XXXIII declares that it is the aspiration of the American Republics that colonialism and the occupation of American territories by *"extra-continental countries"* should be ended. These territories are listed as Belize, the Falkland Islands, the South Sandwich Islands, South Georgia and what is described as the *"American zone of Antarctica."* [1156]

"... the resolution... goes no further than to create an American Committee on Dependent Territories "to centralize the study of the problem of the existence of dependent and occupied territories in order to find an adequate solution to that question". [1157]

Brazil and the US decline to sign the resolution.

May 5th, in London, Vice-Admiral Sir William Tennant writes to the First Sea Lord, Sir John Cunningham.

> *"... I would hold onto the Falkland Islands and South Georgia at all costs, even to the extent of going to war. But for the rest, would it not be a good idea to form an Antarctic club of those countries interested ... and discuss the question of nationalising the whole of the Antarctic. ..."* [1158]

May 6th, in the Falklands, a meeting is held in Stanley to protest Governor Clifford's approach to government.

"... there were too many highly paid officials, inefficiency, discrimination against Islanders, squandering of public funds on ill advised schemes and vacations for civil servants. It also said the administration has failed to provide any works of public benefit and asserted that increased taxation, to which the Governor is immune, chiefly affected the lower wage groups. The petition appealed for an increase in wages to cover the rising cost of living..." [1159]

"Sir Geoffrey Miles Clifford, Governor from 1946 to 1954, was responsible for guiding post-war development in the Falklands. Clifford had no experience of settler colonies having served for sixteen years between 1921 and 1937 in Nigeria followed by several short appointments in Gibraltar and Cyprus. Clifford's development proposals were prepared within a framework of limited funds, the need to introduce modern social services (because the Colony had changed little since the nineteenth century), and the requirement to balance benefits between the scattered economically productive half of the population and Stanley's residents." [1160]

"As the new governor he was faced with a multitude of problems upon his arrival following the end of World War II which had necessarily resulted in the Colony being run down and neglected through lack of resources. Faced with budget deficits Clifford scorned past policies of playing for time and introduced measures to increase revenue which antagonised the population and led to his unpopularity. He increased taxes and introduced ad valorem duties, which, while common elsewhere, were new to the Islands. Not all the much-needed funds could be raised in this way and the governor proved adept at securing grants from Britain, mainly from the Colonial Development and Welfare Fund, which were used on public works." [1161]

May 27th, the 'Compañía Argentina de Pesca', based at Grytviken on South Georgia, renews a 21 year lease over 500 acres of the island at £250 *per annum*.

1156 The conference had also settled upon a new name – the Organization of American States (OAS).
1157 Fenwick 1948.
1158 *ADM 1/21126.* Quoted in Dodds 2002
1159 *The Chicago Daily Tribune* July 7, 1949. Clifford had raised the maximum rate of income tax from 2/6d in the £ in 1947, to 3/6d in 1948. Taxation on wine, spirits and tobacco had also risen sharply.
1160 Ellerby 1990 p.81
1161 Frank Mitchell in Tatham (ed) 2008

"... (c) Will equip and maintain a meteorological station and a trained observer who shall take and record such meteorological observations and submit to the Governor such meteorological reports and returns as the latter may from time to time require and shall not, without the Governor's consent first obtained, submit such or any similar meteorological reports or returns to any third party whatsoever and the lessees shall at any time on demand surrender the said meteorological station together with its records and such equipment as may be the property of HMG to the Governor for operation and maintenance by his own agents." [1162]

June 4th, from Stanley, a petition with 1,200 signatures is sent to London.

"... a petition was sent to the Secretary of State signed, "... by more than 1,200 Falkland Islanders (pop.2,300)". The petition demanded Clifford's removal from office and the appointment of a Royal Commission to investigate seven complaints. First, the administration was too expensive for the size of the population. Secondly, the development proposals were a, "... squandering of public funds on ill-advised schemes". Thirdly, native born civil servants were discriminated against. Fourthly, inflation had increased since 1939 by approximately 100 percent while wages had risen by only 15 percent. Fifthly, Clifford's higher tax rates were too severe. Sixthly, health care was inadequate. Finally, the Government was too dictatorial. The petitioners demanded the introduction of democracy, "It is significant that after 115 years the Colony is still without representative Government and it is evident that under the present Administration elected representation on the Executive Council is a necessary preliminary to self administration". ..." [1163]

June 9th, Argentine decree *17,040* establishes the División Antártida y Malvinas, within the Foreign Ministry, to deal with matters pertinent to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the British Antarctic territories.

"The great issue of Antarctica, with strategic projections and economics that it offers, it must be treated with the due responsibility. All the Argentine contribution, to the very important solution of the matter, with the purpose of resolving it in the broadest possible way and in accordance with the international trajectory, has only one directive: defend the sovereignty of the Republic and accredit before the world, the imprescriptible rights to the area (...).

The fundamental fact that the areas in question constitute the natural geological extension of our territory, located in the southernmost part and in the extreme south of America is saying that, to the reasons of law, there are also added the geographical and historical reasons of the continent." [1164]

"Peron's chief propaganda drive is directed against Great Britain .. It centers on the Antarctic ... and also includes the Falklands and their dependent islands ... Recently, the Peronist press has been full of demands that the Malvinas and a part of Antarctica shall be recognised as Argentinean territory. In this demand, Argentina has allied itself with Chile, which is also to get its slice. At present, however, it seems very doubtful that Peron really wants the Malvinas, much less the Antarctic. He is simply whipping up nationalist sentiment and making an inexpensive bid for Chilean friendship." [1165]

1162 *FO 371/97376 (A15212/1).* Also Bologna 1988 p.48

1163 Ellerby 1990 p.89. Also, *The Inhabitants of the Falkland Islands* Juan Carlos Moreno in *La Nacion*, May 2, 1965. Translation in *CO 1024/434*. Blair (2023) gives the number of signatories as 740.

1164 President Juan Peron quoted in *Territorio, conciencia nacional y educación. Las Islas Malvinas y la Antártida argentina en las políticas de Estado peronistas (1946-1955)* Martín H. Bertone, Pablo Melara y Tamara Culleton 2022 in *Revista Defensa* no.8 2023

1165 *The Condor and the Cows* C. Isherwood 1949

"In 1948, Congress approved a declaration that reaffirmed national sovereignty in the Malvinas Islands and Antarctica and, by presidential decree, created the Antarctica and Malvinas Division, which functioned under the Political Undersecretariat of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship." [1166]

In Argentina, Ricardo Rodolfo Caillet-Bois publishes a book - *Una tierra argentina: las islas Malvinas*. [1167]

"The bibliography upon which this work is founded is the most complete of any used until now, ... Of particular interest is the list of documentary depositories, both Argentine and foreign. ... It describes with abundant documentation from the archive of Luis Vernet the origin and organization of the colonizing enterprise directed by Vernet ... and his efforts to establish the sovereignty of the United provinces in southern lands and waters. Vernet is shown to have been the driving force in the colonization and economic exploitation of these distant lands and a tenacious supporter of the territorial integrity of Argentina. ... This does not mean, however, that it is the final and definitive work on the subject. The author himself recognises that it has weaknesses and lacunae caused by his inability to obtain documents from certain foreign archives." [1168]

"... within the full Peronist context, he provides a broad historical account that extends from the 16th century to 1854, locating discoveries, sightings, and monarchical disputes as the initial axes of the dispute over the Malvinas Islands. He then engages in significant documentary research to demonstrate the islands' connection to Argentine territory. Historically, Caillet-Bois places May 25th as the founding axis of Argentine sovereignty, in that the legal recourse of Uti Possidetis Iuris validates and legitimizes the succession of territorial rights from the former territories of the Viceroyalty of the Río de la Plata to the emerging political regimes. It traces the founding exercises of sovereignty in the policies of the 1820s, and even incorporates the question that the English had knowledge of the activities of the Buenos Aires government in the Malvinas through the participation of agents such as Schoffield, Green, Hogdson, among others, who collaborated in the financing of Malvinas campaigns without questioning Argentine sovereignty. Along these lines, he places Luis Vernet as a key agent in the Falkland settlement. His communications with Fortunata Gómez de Vernet and María Luisa Vernet de Castro Almeyra to obtain archives and documents, highlighting that they provided him with numerous contributions, which he characterizes as the "most important find" (1948, p. 10)." [1169]

June 11th, in Washington DC, a Department of State Policy Statement is circulated within the department.

> *"With regard to the Falkland Islands, the US, while **not** questioning British possession, has in recent years avoided such public references to the subject as might be offensive to Argentine sensibilities. The British Antarctic claim is related to the general problem of an Antarctic settlement. The British have suggested to Chile and Argentina that their conflicting claims be submitted to the International Court of Justice, which proposal has been refused. We are now formulating a proposal for a trusteeship arrangement for the continent, which we plan to discuss with the British."* [1170]

1166 Carassai 2022

1167 Historian, teacher and author. This book was revised in 1952 and republished in 1953. See also, 1964

1168 Review by Antonio Salvadores in *The Americas* 1950 vol.7 no.1 (July) pp.113-117. Caillet-Bois, notably, had had access to the Luis Vernet family archive papers. Both those donated to the Argentine State in 1932 and those documents that had remained with the family. Despite the words of the reviewer, Caillet-Bois was privately critical of Luis Vernet's actions both during his time in the Islands, and particularly after 1834; but tempered his remarks out of respect for the access he had been granted.

1169 Lo Coco 2024. In 1932, Caillet-Bois had contacted the Vernet family to propose that the family archive be passed to the Archivo General de la Nación.

1170 *Foreign Relations of the United States 1948 Western Europe: vol.3 – Dept. of State Policy Statement, June 11, 1948.* My emphasis.

June 16th, in London, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Ernest Bevin, informs the House of Commons of the situation in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.

> *"... my information is that there is an Argentine base on Gamma Island, consisting of one officer, one doctor, one meteorologist, and seven naval ratings. There is a precisely similar base at Deception Island, but I have reason to believe that a smaller detachment at Admiralty Bay was evacuated before the ice closed. There is a Chilean base at Greenwich Island, consisting of one officer and five men, but Trinity Peninsula is now believed to be unoccupied."* [1171]

In Argentina, a book by José Arce, head of the Argentina's delegation to the UN, is published. *Las Malvinas, nuestras pequenas islas arrebatadas* (Our Malvinas, our small snatched Islands). [1172]

"... for United Nations diplomats ... The objective of Arce's book was to present the "facts and the law" that supported (Argentina) in its claim..." [1173]

June 19th, in London, at the Colonial Office, a *minute* notes the Islanders' complaints regarding the Governor.

> *"The people are virtually of UK stock, and it is easy to understand their desire for that measure of control over their own affairs which they would enjoy in the UK itself through urban district councils or county councils."* [1174]

June 25th, in Washington DC, a diplomatic *aide-memoire* is handed to British Minister, Sir John Balfour.

> *"The following considerations, in briefest outline, have led us to the conclusion that the establishment of an international status for the Antarctic area is the most practicable and preferable method of solving the problem of conflicting and potentially conflicting claims in that area. In view of the engagement in the area of the prestige of various nations; in view of the very difficult problems which would be posed, should a division among the various national sovereignties be sought through the International Court; in view of the fact that the foreseeable values of Antarctica are scientific rather than strategic or economic; and because an international regime would be well calculated to promote the exploitation of these scientific values: internationalization appears to present the best possibility of removing the area from the field of present or potential future contention, at the same, time preserving to the most interested nations control over the strategic use and possible economic value of the area.*
>
> *Strategic Significance: Strategic interest in the area centers on the Drake Passage between Tierra del Fuego on the north and the South Shetland Islands on the south. In the event of the closing of the Panama Canal, this Passage would become an important sea route and hostile naval or air units based on either side of it could interfere with passage of naval or commercial shipping. Chile and Argentina are the recognized sovereigns over Tierra del Fuego and islands adjacent thereto. Whatever the attitude of Argentina and Chile under war conditions, it is hardly likely that they would voluntarily give up control of their territories to the north of the Drake Passage. Exclusive control of the Drake Passage by Argentina and/or Chile would be prevented if Great Britain, Argentina and Chile share control of the South Shetland Islands or, preferably, if those islands were made part of an international area administered jointly by the several interested powers, including the United States and Great Britain. It will be noted that under the proposal, no additional nations could be included without the consent of all the original signatories.*

1171 *HC Deb 16 June 1948 vol.452 cc403-4*
1172 An Spanish edition was printed in Madrid in 1950, followed by an English edition in 1951.
1173 Garcia 2022
1174 *PRO CO 78 24/1*

Need for a Settlement: The conflict of interests, the friction and disagreement generated by the conflict of claims, and the unsettled status of Antarctica perturbs otherwise amicable relations and is susceptible of exploitation by the USSR to the disadvantage of the interested nations.

Values of a Settlement: An international administration for the Antarctic continent and sub-Antarctic islands would promote the further systematic scientific exploration and investigation of Antarctic phenomena. It would facilitate the correlation of meteorological observations of practical significance in long range weather forecast, particularly for countries of the Southern Hemisphere." [1175]

July 3rd, from Stanley, Governor Clifford telegrams London regarding the petition.

"The root of the present discontent ... is the absence of popular representation and, as such, I must say at once that it has my entire sympathy."

From London, Britain's Colonial Office acknowledges Islander concerns and requests that the Governor address the issue of democratic reform with the local population.

"The Colonial Office remained loyal to Clifford and sympathized that he had, "... a thankless job to do governing this lonely, bad-weathered and bad-tempered Colony."..." [1176]

On the same day, Britain responds to the US *aide-memoire* of June, 25th. Britain accepts the initiative in principle, but prefers an eight-power condominium rather than UN trusteeship. The US agrees to reconsider.

July 21st, in Buenos Aires, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs is handed a copy of the Washington DC's June 25th proposals; after which Embassy staff report back.

"Larosa emphatic and voluble in personal conviction that internationalization totally unacceptable as basis discussion: question is one of national sovereignty on which Argentina, Chile and US could easily agree. However, it is utterly inadmissible that countries outside western hemisphere should be given voice within American quadrant. If US would cease backing illegal British retention of Falklands (about which Argentine feelings profound), Antarctic problem would be easy. US should not make mistake of considering Argentina too lightly in the general picture..." [1177]

Argentine maps are published showing South Georgia as Argentine territory.

"Until 1948, official Argentine maps usually made lat. 60°S the northern limit of their claims. None showed a claim to South Georgia. From that year all official Argentine maps started to show South Georgia (in lat. 54°S) as Argentine. We have ignored this." [1178]

August 18th, in the UK, Governor Miles Clifford registers the purchase of two light aircraft – an Auster Mk.4 and an Auster Mk.5 at a cost of £700 each.

August 28th, in Washington DC, the Department of State issues a press statement on the subject of Antarctica.

1175 *The Department of State to the British Embassy, June 25, 1948* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General, The United Nations, vol.1, Part 2. Document 240*

1176 Ellerby 1990 p.90

1177 *The Chargé in Argentina (Ray) to the Secretary of State, July 21, 1948* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General, The United Nations, vol.1, Part 2. Document 248.* Pascual La Rosa was an Argentine diplomat actively involved in negotiations with Chile regarding Antarctica.

1178 *Note by B. B. Roberts August 27, 1952 American Department A/15212 cf. FO 371/97376*

"It is the viewpoint of the Department of State that the solution should be such as to promote scientific investigation and research on the area. The Department of State has suggested that this can perhaps be done most effectively and the problems of conflicting claims at the same time solved through agreement upon some form of internationalisation." [1179]

During **September**, the US government circulates the idea of an 8-member condominium to consider questions relating to Antarctica. [1180]

September 29th, a new flag is adopted for the Falkland Islands. [1181]



"His Majesty the King was graciously pleased, by Warrant dated 29th September, 1948, addressed to the Earl Marshal, to assign to the Colony new Armorial Ensigns, viz. Per Jesse wavy Azure and Argent in chief a hornless Ram statant upon Tussac grass issuant proper and in base two Bars wavy of the first surmounted by a representation of the ship Desire. On the flag and pennons charged with a Cross and the Mainsail with five Estoiles Gules, with the motto "Desire the Right"." [1182]

Control over the *Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey* (FIDS) passes to the Falkland Islands' Governor.

In **October**, in Stanley, following consultations by Governor Clifford; it is proposed to reform the constitution of the Legislative Council. To provide for a fairer mix of appointed and elected members.

"It is distressing for loyal subjects to hear spoken openly, what was once whispered by the few, in public places 'Would we not be better off under the Argentines.'" [1183]

"The Executive Council, which meets approximately monthly, consists at present (besides the Governor) of two ex-officio members, namely, the Colonial Secretary and the Senior Medical Officer, an official member and two non-officials appointed by the Governor. The Legislative Council, which meets once or twice a year, has the same composition with the exception that it has three non-officials instead of two. Proposals are now under consideration to increase unofficial representation in a reformed Legislative Assembly." [1184]

October 6th, in Paris, Argentina's Ambassador, Juan Carlos R. M. Varela speaks to the United Nations Trusteeship Committee with regard to the UN's listing of non-self governing territories; *"Argentina cannot agree that the Falkland Islands can be anything but Argentine. We cannot take into consideration this report, which includes the islands among the non-self-governing territories."* [1185]

October 7th, addressing the Trusteeship Committee, Argentina affirms its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands; *" ... for the first time within the United Nations."* [1186]

Chile responds to US proposals on a condominium for Antarctica, in a diplomatic *Note Verbale*; arguing that the proposal constitutes a *"lack of harmony"* with the Rio Treaty of 1947. [1187]

1179 *Dept. State Bulletin,* vol.19, no.479, September 5, 1948 p.301
1180 Howkins 2008 p.172
1181 See 1999.
1182 *Colonial Office Annual Report on the Falkland Islands 1948*
1183 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.90 citing *Petitioners to Creech Jones 30 Sept. 1948* in *CO 78/241*
1184 David Rees-Williams *HC Deb 12 February 1948 vol.447 c132W*
1185 *The New York Times* October 7, 1948
1186 Carassai 2022
1187 *The Antarctic Treaty 1959* John Hanessian 1960 in *The International and Comparative Law Quarterly* vol.9, no.3 (July 1960) pp.436-480

"... note rejects US Antarctic proposal as unacceptable on basis Chilean supreme decree November 6, 1940 and Article 4 inter-American Treaty Reciprocal Assistance, signed Rio September 3, 1947. Cites Spitsbergen as example failure condominium' pointing out its relationship to Norway (to which Spitsbergen finally ceded) same as that of South American Antarctic to Chile.

Chile suggests agreement whereby interested nations will exchange scientific data and believes first step in avoiding international friction would be issuance declaration that establishment bases expeditions, etc., in area south of parallel 6th, would not constitute basis strengthen future claims. Agreement to last five or more years would provide opportunity give careful study to final solution and embody advantages of US proposal without its disadvantages.

In handing me (the) Chilean note, Riesco said Chileans are positive as to their claims which no Chilean government can abandon without serious collision with public opinion. At same time said Chile not eager push matter as is Argentina, and believes Chile's plan leaving settlement until after world crises is over is, in best interest all concerned. He again said Chile not at all interested in Argentina's claim to Falkland." [1188]

October 13th, in Buenos Aires, decree *No.31.813* declares a *"flame of the Argentine spirit"* which is to be lit in Ushuaia for transport to the Falklands archipelago when the time is right, and; *"... defines a new extension of Argentine 'security zones' to include (among other Antarctic territories) South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands."* [1189]

October 20th, Britain's *naval attaché*, Tony Lincoln in Buenos Aires, writes to the Foreign Office concerning Argentine attitudes towards the Falkland Islands; *"... a belief in the justice of their claims is one conviction common to all Argentines; irrespective of class and party; it is perhaps the only reliable key to national unity."*

Reporting rumours of a, *"general mobilization in the middle of December to coincide with the occupation of the Falkland Islands,"* Lincoln adds that he does not believe a *'coup de main'* is likely unless the UK is otherwise occupied in a distant war. A symbolic act is more likely. Lincoln advises that HMS *Sparrow* should be warned.[1190]

November 1st, Argentina rejects US proposals regarding Antarctica.

"(The) Government rejects proposals advanced even as basis (for) discussion. Reason given is national territory such as Argentine Antarctic could in no case be incorporated into international regime. Adds that Government desirous collaborating solution general problem and will omit no effort (to) assist (a) definitive friendly settlement." [1191]

November 4th, Britain's Postmaster-General, Onesimus (Ness) Edwards, lodges a complaint with the Director of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union in Switzerland, with regard to the surcharging by the Argentine Government of correspondence bearing stamps of the Falkland Islands. [1192]

1188 *The Ambassador in Chile (Bowers) to Secretary of State October 8, 1948* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General, The United Nations, vol.1, Part 2. Document 259*

1189 *Note by B. B. Roberts August 27, 1952 American Department A/15212. cf. FO 371/97376.* Roberts added – *"We also ignored this."*

1190 *CO 537/4023*

1191 *The Ambassador in Argentina (Bruce) to the Secretary of State November 1, 1948* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General, The United Nations, vol.1, Part 2. Document 261*

1192 *HC Deb 05 July 1950 vol.477 cc447-8*

November 7th, in London, Argentina's Foreign Minister Bramuglia arrives for talks on economic relations. Minister Ernest Bevan proposes that both countries should avoid *"naval displays"* in waters south of 60° south latitude. [1193] Bramuglia reaffirms his country's claim to the Falkland Islands.

"Our leaders have sent letters of protest to Britain to assert our rights. The last presented in 1948 and 1949, are bright summaries of solid grounds on which our claims are based. We hope that the traditional friendship Argentina with the British (will) allow one day soon (for us to) again raise our flag in the Falkland Islands."[1194]

November 11th, the Universal Postal Union acknowledges Britain's protest against Argentina of November 4th.

November 19th, in the Falkland Islands, the *Weekly News* report:

> *"The Falkland Islands and the Dependencies have been in the news of late, owing to the action of Argentina in advancing yet another claim for their possession. This 'claim' is of true comic opera pattern. The 'argument' is that, because Spain was once in possession of all South American territories, therefore Argentina, having assisted in expelling the Spaniards from the continent, the Falkland Islands are now the property of Argentina!"*

November 26th, in London, at a meeting of the Privy Council, King George VI approves the *Legislative Council (Elections) Ordinance No.16 1948*.

"An enabling Bill was passed in the Legislative Council at the end of the year conferring upon it a wide range of powers such as are associated with local government elsewhere. Moreover, the-reform of the Legislative Council was taken a stage further by the announcement that it is to consist of three exofficio members, namely the Colonial Secretary, the Senior Medical Officer and the Agricultural Officer, four elected members, one each for East and West Falklands and two for Stanley, three nominated official members and two nominated unofficial members. The Governor, as President, has a casting vote." [1195]

"Although this change to the Constitution allowed for an equal balance of official and unofficial members (six of each) on LegCo, elected members were still in a minority for four to eight. The Governor had no normal vote in Legislative Council, but if the other members were evenly divided, he could exercise a casting vote." [1196]

In the Falkland Islands, on the same day, Joseph Lynch, a member of HMS *Nigeria*'s crew, rescues leading seaman Hughes who had fallen overboard in Stanley harbour.[1197]

In the Falkland Islands, the two Auster light aircraft purchased in London in August, arrive.

"Two Auster aeroplanes were bought through Royal Air Force disposals, one as an ambulance, the other for the carriage of mails. They arrived in the Colony at the end of 1948, being brought out on the John Biscoe, and quickly

1193 *The Ambassador in the United Kingdom (Douglas) to the Secretary of State, November 24, 1948* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General, The United Nations, vol.1, Part 2. Document 263*

1194 Grade IV Argentine school book of 1953 quoted in Garcia 2009

1195 *Colonial Office Annual Report on the Falkland Islands 1948*

1196 *Development of the Falkland Islands Constitution 1843-2006* Jane Cameron 2006. See - https://nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Legislative Council Minutes/Development of the FI Constitution by Jane Cameron.pdf

1197 Lynch was invested with the Albert Medal in 1951, and re-invested with the George Cross in 1973. See - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/lynch_joseph

proved their value for hardly had they been assembled and tested before an emergency call was received from North Arm. The call was promptly answered, and a little girl was flown into Stanley, where she was successfully operated upon; she would otherwise have died." [1198]

November 30th, in London, Foreign Secretary Bevin warns Minister Bramuglia that any attempt by Argentina against the Falklands would result in *"hostilities."* Agreement is reached between Bevin and Bramuglia with regard to the avoidance of naval encounters during the forthcoming austral summer, by reducing the number of warships, from both nations, sailing south of 60°. [1199] Chile also signs up to this agreement. [1200]

On the same day, the UK informs Washington DC that it is prepared to accept, in principle, US proposals for an 8-member condominium to consider the future of Antarctica. [1201]

"Claims in Antarctica by Britain and potential claims by the US are based chiefly on discovery, exploration, and some type of occupation. In addition the British Government formally asserted its claims in 1908 and has exercised a degree of supervision over the sector claimed from its base in the Falklands. ... Argentine claims on the basis of expeditions, exercise of authority, and assertions of sovereignty do not compare favorably with British claims. The Chilean position in Antarctica rests on shadowy historical rights, early assertions of sovereignty, and recent occupation of a base in Antarctic as well as the principles of proximity and geological continuity, is in turn less well-founded that Argentina's. Argentina has advanced the thesis that the Andes extension through the Falkland, South Sandwich, South Georgia, South Orkney, and South Shetland Islands to the Palmer Peninsula is a valid basis for its claims in Antarctica. Chile likewise asserts the Andes extension to Antarctica as a basis for its claim." [1202]

December 1st, in a speech to the House of Lords, the Earl of Perth refers to the claims of Chile and Argentina.

> *"Clearly, cases of this kind ought to be referred to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, as His Majesty's Government have expressed their willingness to refer them, for a decision on legal ownership. The claimants, however, are showing themselves reluctant to adopt this procedure, and I cannot but deduce from their hesitation that in fact the claims are not legally sound."* [1203]

December 13th, in Stanley, a new Legislative Council is constituted, consisting of the Governor, two *ex-officio* officers (the Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary) and elected members. [1204]

A *Legislative Council (Elections) Ordinance* provides for **all** persons above the age of 21 years, to vote. [1205]

Royal Instructions provide for the constitution of an Executive Council consisting of two *ex-officio* members (the Chief Secretary and the Financial Secretary), two unofficial members appointed by the Governor and two elected members of the Legislative Council. The Governor is required to consult the Executive Council before making decisions. Although not obliged to take their advice, if he does not do so then the Governor must report the

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1198 *Colonial Office Annual Report on the Falkland Islands 1948*. An emergency flight to North Arm in Lafonia (southern part of East Falkland Island) to retrieve a 9-year old girl, Sandra Short, suffering with life-threatening peritonitis. See Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.424-425

1199 *CO 537/4940 Bennet to Dodds June 28, 1949*

1200 See January, 1949, below.

1201 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1948, General, The United Nations, vol.1, Part 2. Document 264*

1202 *Argentine Claims in the Falkland islands and Antarctica: CIA Report March 15, 1948.* See - https://www.cia.gov/readingroom/document/cia-rdp08c01297r000800090022-3

1203 *HL Deb 1.12.48 vol.159 c707* Hansard

1204 *Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) Order 1948*

1205 Both men and women.

reasons to the Foreign Secretary in London. The Governor retains the power – (a) to make laws for the peace, order and good government of the Dependencies, (b) to appoint judges and other officers, (c) to dismiss any person holding public office, (d) to make grants and dispositions of land within the Colony. [1206]

The Dependencies remain legally distinct from the Falkland Islands, albeit administered from Stanley.

December 24th, the Falkland Islands Government Air Service (FIGAS) commences operations from Stanley.[1207]

The Falkland Islands end-of-year review notes:

> *"On 31st December, 1948, it numbered 2,268 - 1,239 males and 1,029 females. .... The number of births registered in 1948 was 31, and of deaths 25. Nineteen marriages were celebrated during the year. ... The principal industry, sheep-farming, employs between 400 and 450 men. Labour in Stanley is almost solely at the disposal of the Government and of the Falkland Islands Company Limited ...*
>
> *Basic rates of wages and hours of work were unchanged throughout 1948. In Stanley unskilled labourers were paid at the rate of 1s. 2d. per hour, plus 3d. per hour cost of living bonus, and skilled labourers and artisans received 1s. 3d. and 1s. 1d. respectively, plus 3d. cost of living bonus.' A Cost of Living Committee was, however, considering the problem during the year and as from 1st November an interim award of 2d. per hour was granted in respect of increased cost of living. The working week is 45 hours. On the sheep farms in the country districts wages are calculated on a monthly basis as follows: general labourers, termed "navvies", £6, and shepherds £7; at the end of the year both were receiving cost of living bonus at the rate of £4 1s. 3d. per month. In addition they receive free quarters, fuel, meat, milk and garden. ...*
>
> *With the exception of some 40,000 acres remaining to the Crown, all land is now freehold and the whole of it is divided into sheep farms or ranches varying in area from 3,600 to 400,000 acres and carrying from 1,700 to 80,000 sheep, approximately one sheep for every three acres. ..."* [1208]

1949 – January 7th, in the Falkland Islands, Governor Clifford, in a radio broadcast, speaks to the Islanders.

> *"There has been,.., a certain measure of idle but quite natural speculation locally as to the possibility of an attack upon us by a certain neighbour... For myself I will say only that it is a possibility which need not cause us the loss of five minutes sleep at present. I repeat, at present."*

January 18th, the agreement not to send warships below 60° S is confirmed in the *Tripartite Naval Declarations* between Chile, Argentina and the UK. [1209]

"Being anxious to avoid any misunderstanding in Antarctica which might upset the friendly relations between the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile, the governments of these three countries have informed each other that in present circumstances they foresee no need to send warships south of latitude 60° during the 1948-49 Antarctic season..." [1210]

The USA welcomes the statement. Adding, that it is also *"not contemplating sending any vessels to Antarctica."*

1206 *Falkland Islands Letters Patent 1948.* Came into force on March 4, 1949
1207 See Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.424-425
1208 *Colonial Office Annual Report on the Falkland Islands 1948*
1209 This agreement between the three nations would be renewed every year until 1959.
1210 *Hansard – 1 February 1949 – House of Lords 418*

Britain's Foreign Office responds to the US initiative on Antarctica in a press statement; *"In August last, the United States Government made proposals to the seven governments claiming Antarctic territory which were designed to settle conflicting claims to sovereignty by the establishment of a limited form of international regime. These proposals have been accepted in principle by His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom but most of the other governments to which they were addressed have not felt able to return equally favourable replies to the United States Department of State..."* [1211]

On the same day, South Georgia's weather station is given an international index number; *".., the International Meteorological Organisation (whose President was then an Argentine) allotted an Argentine index number to this South Georgia station, thus implying international recognition that it was an integral part of Argentina. It was agreed inter-departmentally in London that this constituted an infringement of British sovereignty and that a formal protest should be made, but for various reasons it appears that nothing was done ..."* [1212]

February 10th, in Leningrad, Russia's Geographical Society hears a report from its President entitled, '*Russian Discoveries in the Antarctic and Present-Day Interest in that Area*'.

"Russia looks like joining the band of nations claiming a voice, if not a share, in the partition of the last continent. According to the Tass report the Russian geographers, led by their president, academician Leo Berg, and supported by a number of distinguished polar scientists, notably Professor V. V. Vise of the Arctic Institute, have made an "insistent appeal" to the Soviet Government to see to it that no decisions about the future of Antarctica are made without the participation of the Soviet Union. ... Russia, the geographers insisted, had never renounced her Antarctic rights or agreed to the disposal of Antarctic lands discovered by Russian navigators." [1213]

"A resolution in February 1949 by the All-Soviet Geographical Society stressed that in the light of the early explorations by the Russian Fabian G. Von Bellingshausen, the USSR should have had a say in future partition or joint administration of the continent." [1214]

March 4th, in the Falkland Islands, for the first time, four of the six members of the Legislative Council are elected by popular vote. [1215]

"On 4th March, 1949, the Colony's new Constitution was inaugurated. For the first time four out of six of the unofficial members have been elected by popular vote. The new Legislative Council comprises the three senior officials in the Administration, namely the Colonial Secretary, the Senior Medical Officer and the Agricultural Officer who hold their seats by virtue of office; four elected members representing Stanley and East and West Falkland, two nominated unofficial members selected by the Governor and three nominated official members. The Council has thus an evenly balanced Chamber with the Governor as President exercising a casting vote only." [1216]

1211 Foreign Office Press Statement quoted in Hanessian 1960 pp.436-480

1212 *Note by B. B. Roberts 27 August, 1952 American Department A/15212 cf. FO 371/97376*

1213 *Russia and Antarctica* L. P. Kirwan in *The Spectator* February 18, 1949 p.8

1214 *On thick ice: scientific internationalism and Antarctic affairs, 1957-1980* Simone Turchetti, Simon Naylor, Katrina Dean & Martin Siegert 2008 in *History and Technology* 24:4 pp.351 – 376

1215 It is really quite remarkable that it took until the mid-point of the 20th century before the people of a British territory were allowed a soupçon of representation; albeit with the balance still against the electorate. This attitude of the British Government, or more accurately its Foreign Office, would allow Argentina to depict the people of the Islands as third-class citizens - with some justification.

1216 *Colonial Office Annual Report on the Falkland Islands 1949*

"The Legislative Council formerly consisted of the Governor, three official and five nominated members who were appointed for five years. It was henceforward composed of the Governor, three ex-officio, three nominated official, two nominated unofficial and four elected members. This constitutional reform was preceded by other changes and an extensive debate." [1217]

March 11th, Argentina adopts a new Constitution; *"Perón did not enshrine the Falklands as Argentine territory in the 1949 constitution, and although he was clearly behind the new policy of raising the profile of the Falklands issue, he left others to carry that policy out, generally avoiding overt personal commitment."* [1218]

In Washington DC, America's State Department reviews the responses from foreign governments with regard to its proposals for Antarctica, circulated in September, 1948. [1219]

"By late March all the replies had been received. Argentina categorically rejected the proposal on the grounds of her "uncontestable (sic) sovereignty" over Antarctic territory, Chile,... asserted strong objections to any attempt at internationalisation on similar grounds of national sovereignty. France and Australia, although welcoming the US proposal for scientific co-operation, saw no need to include the question of sovereignty. New Zealand alone stated that it was not adverse to the US plans, though Norway indicated that it might be persuaded to agree. Thus, the US reluctantly concluded that their plan was not likely to be accepted." [1220]

March 23rd, Britain's Embassy to the US is informed.

> *"Mr. Meade (Counsellor) came in at his (Hulley) request. He asked about the status of our proposal for a settlement in Antarctica. If it looks like dying, the British Government will contemplate reverting to its proposal to open discussions direct with Argentina and Chile for settlement of their respective conflicting claims. I said that now that all the replies from the interested governments are in, we are re-examining the question in the light of their preponderantly negative reaction. It seems pretty clear that the plan is not likely to be accepted unless we exert strong pressure which to my mind would hardly be justified.*
>
> *I said we were considering a modified plan which would be confined largely to cooperation in the scientific sphere as a step toward our objective of a settlement of sovereignty claims. We had used the Chilean proposal as a basis and are making certain modifications. I did not know whether or not we would want to follow the Chilean idea of a moratorium on claims. It might be a month or two before I could be more definite.*
>
> *He said he would report this in a letter to the Chief of the Latin American section of the Foreign Office and would also report my request that we be informed in advance of any definite British plan to proceed with direct negotiations with Chile and Argentina. He asked again about our plans to announce our claims and I told him that we still had this in mind and that it could happen this year. However, the timing had not been decided."* [1221]

In London, on the same day, in Britain's House of Commons, Mr. Mayhew, Secretary of State for Foreign Afairs, is asked; *"... how many aliens have established posts on British territory in the Falkland Islands or their dependencies."* Mayhew responds:

1217 Ellerby 1990 p.91
1218 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.423
1219 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Vol.1 Doc 313*
1220 Hanessian 1960 pp.436-480
1221 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Vol.1 Doc 313*

"Occupied posts have been established, in defiance of our protests, by the Argentines on Laurie Island in the South Orkneys group, on Gamma Island in the Palmer Archipelago, and on Deception Island in the South Shetlands group; and by the Chileans on Greenwich Island in the South Shetlands group and on South Graham Land. The House will be aware that His Majesty's Government have, on more than one occasion, offered to refer this question to the International Court of Justice at The Hague, but the Argentine and Chilean Governments have not seen fit to avail themselves of this offer." [1222]

March 31st, in Argentina, Judge Robert Palmieri rules that children born in the Falkland Islands can be listed in Argentina's public records as if they are Argentine. Following this ruling, Argentina refuses to recognise the validity of birth certificates issued in the Falkland Islands. [1223]

"The refusal of the Argentine authorities to recognise the validity of documents issued in the Falkland Islands is believed to be based on the Argentine Government's claim to sovereignty over these islands. The Falkland Islands are, and have been for over 100 years, governed by the United Kingdom and the Argentine claim has no foundation. Our position has been made clear to the Argentine Government in numerous diplomatic notes.

The action of the Argentine authorities can affect neither the British title to the islands nor the position of the persons concerned as citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies, and it is therefore not proposed to take further diplomatic action." [1224]

In **April**, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) is founded. [1225]

"The North Atlantic Alliance was founded in the aftermath of the Second World War. Its purpose was to secure peace in Europe, to promote cooperation among its members and to guard their freedom – all of this in the context of countering the threat posed at the time by the Soviet Union. The Alliance's founding treaty was signed in Washington in 1949 by a dozen European and North American countries. It commits the Allies to democracy, individual liberty and the rule of law, as well as to peaceful resolution of disputes. Importantly, the treaty sets out the idea of collective defence, meaning that an attack against one Ally is considered as an attack against all Allies. The North Atlantic Treaty Organization – or NATO – ensures that the security of its European member countries is inseparably linked to that of its North American member countries. The Organization also provides a unique forum for dialogue and cooperation across the Atlantic." [1226]

June 29th, in London, concerned about continuing rumours of an Argentine invasion of the Falklands, the Foreign Office urges the Ministry of Defence to send troops to bolster the Falkland Islands Defence Force. [1227]

In Buenos Aires, Britain's Embassy issues a bulletin outlining the history of the Falklands.

"There have been Argentine protests, it is true,.. but it should be noted that there were long periods – 35 years between 1849 and 1884, and 20 years between 1888 and 1908 – when no protests were made. Their early protests were all based on an alleged succession to the supposed title which Spain claimed, a claim which Britain has consistently rejected. In any case the Buenos Aires government was far from

1222 *HC Deb 23 March 1949 vol.463 cc342-3*
1223 *HC Deb 11 April 1949 vol.463 cc2453-4*
1224 *Ibid.*
1225 Founding members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxenbourg, the Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom and the United States.
1226 From the NATO website. Action is limited to Europe and North America, and does not include a signatory's overseas territories
1227 *CO 537/4940*

representing either territorially or politically the whole of the vice-royalty of La Plata within whose jurisdiction, even if the Spanish titles were admitted, the Falkland islands were claimed to come. It was not until 1884 that their protests put forward a doctrine of contiguity as a basis for their claims."[1228]

"Although states have in certain circumstances maintained that islands relatively close to their shores belonged to them in virtue of their geographical situation, it is impossible to show the existence of a rule of positive international law to the effect that islands situated outside territorial waters should belong to a state from the mere fact that its territory forms the terra firma (nearest continent or island of considerable size)." [1229]

July 8th, from Argentina a *Chicago Tribune* reporter notes; *"The United States is still blamed here for Argentina's loss of the Falklands more than a century ago. Pending in the foreign office is a claim for nearly 300,000 pesos for damages caused in 1831 when Comdr. Silas Duncan of the sloop Lexington wiped out the Argentine colony on the islands. ..."* [1230]

August 8th, in Washington DC, further proposals for Antarctica are considered at the US State Department.

"A year ago the US proposed to the Antarctic claimant countries that a solution for the Antarctic territorial problem be discussed on the basis of internationalization. This proposal was unacceptable to the majority of the claimant countries. It is, therefore, now recommended that we accept the substance of the Chilean proposal for a modus vivendi, amending it so far as possible to bring it into harmony with our views on the desirable eventual solution. As we would seek to amend it, the modus vivendi would be a declaration or agreement by the eight claimants to freeze the status quo with respect to territorial rights as between the signatories for a period of 5, 10 or more years; to promote scientific investigation; and to cooperate for the advancement of their common interests. (It is far from certain that this proposal will be accepted by Argentina, which has taken an extreme nationalistic position.)"[1231]

September 13th, the latest proposals are passed to the British Embassy. [1232]

In **October**, in London, a confidential 'Committee of Enquiry into the Constitutional Development in the Smaller Colonial Territories' is tasked to look at the prospects of 21 dependencies, including the Falkland Islands.[1233]

"Any hint which might reach the Colonies that such an enquiry was proceeding could only raise speculation and lead to political agitation." [1234]

1228 Quoted in *The Chicago Tribune* July 8, 1949. Contiguity is geographical connection (adjacency). In fact, there was no government to government (Argentina to UK) protest in 1908. Only an Argentine protest to Italy (see 1908, above) Argentina made no direct protest to the UK between 1888 and 1947 – 59 years.

1229 *US v. Netherlands 2R. Int'l Arb. Awards 829 (1928).* See 1928.

1230 Historically inaccurate. Commander Duncan, in December 1831, did not "wipe out" the Buenos Aires settlement at Port Louis on East Falkland (Soledad) Island. Duncan arrested eight suspected 'pirates', spiked the settlement's guns and burned its gunpowder (so they couldn't be used against him) before persuading a majority of the few settlers to leave. *cf.* 1831, 1832, 1884, 1885 & 1887

1231 *Memorandum by the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affairs (Perkins) to the Under Secretary of State (Webb) August 22, 1949* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Policy, Vol.1 Document 317*

1232 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Policy, Vol.1 Document 319*

1233 See August 1951, below.

1234 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.113 citing *P.R.O., Cabinet Office Papers, 1949, Memorandum 62, henceforth cited as CP(49)62: 'Constitutional Development in Smaller Colonial Territories', 10 Mar. 1949.*

"Sir Frederick Rees, the Principal of University College, Cardiff, was appointed Chairman. The Colonial Office was represented by a Deputy Under-Secretary of State and a legal adviser. Other members included the Deputy Chairman of the Local Government Boundary Commission, Miss Margery Perham, Professor Vincent Harlow and Conservative and Labour M.P.s with colonial experience." [1235]

In Stanley, the Chilean Consulship falls vacant. Foreign Office advice is that the Colonial Office should find a suitable candidate among the Islanders.

"... by accepting an exequatur ... (Chile) to some extent officially recognises our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands." [1236]

November 18th, Britain's agreement with Argentina and Chile, not to send warships south of 60° S, is renewed.

> *"... UK would be pleased if US would, "do the same as last year", and issue statement welcoming Chilean-UK-Argentine understanding re naval demonstration in Antarctica..."* [1237]

November 19th, in London, the effects of compromise in Antarctica and the South Atlantic are considered.

"The possibility of territorial compromise raised the question of which areas should be retained. (Governor) Clifford saw the issue from a Falkland perspective. He recommended the incorporation of, "South Georgia and the excepted units, whichever they may be, as an integral part of the Falkland Islands administration; I want the whaling revenues for the latter for it would solve most of the Colony's material problems". In 1949 the revenue of the Falkland Islands Dependencies Government was £218,917. The revenue of the Falkland Government was £6,169,811." [1238]

December 2nd, at the United Nations, the General Assembly adopts resolution 334 (IV).

> "*The General Assembly, ...*
>
> *Having noted the information supplied by certain Members concerning the constitutional changes which have led to the cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73e in respect of certain territories which were enumerated in resolution 66 (1),*
>
> *1. Considers that it is within the responsibility of the General Assembly to express its opinion on the principles which have guided or which may in future guide the members concerned in enumerating the territories for which the obligation exists to transmit information under Article 73e of the Charter;*
>
> *2. Invites any special committee which the General Assembly may appoint on information transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter to examine the factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether any territory is or is not a territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government."*

In the Falkland Islands, work starts on a new freezer plant at Ajax bay.

"The final objective of Clifford's development plan was to diversify the economy. This was an unmitigated disaster due to mismanagement. ... The aim was to utilize the annual surplus of 40,000 sheep carcasses which could not be consumed locally. The C.D.C. (Colonial Development Corporation) agreed to fund the estimated

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1235 Ellerby 1990 p.113. *cf.* 1951

1236 *Fordham to Bennett, November 25, 1949* in *F0371/74758.*

1237 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1949, National Security Affairs, Foreign Policy, Vol.1 Document 320.* Chile had shown some reluctance and it was hoped the US statement would prod them into signing the agreement. It did.

1238 Ellerby 1990 p.136 citing *Clifford to Bennett, 19 Nov. 1949, F0371/74757; Colonial Office Annual Reports, Falkland Islands and Dependencies. 1950/1951 (H. M. S. O., London), pp. 9-32.*

cost of £242,000 because the project would diversify the economy, encourage pasture improvement and stock breeding, and increase meat supplies to Britain. Work began ... despite opposition from Islanders who were not consulted. The antagonism probably reflected a belief that the undertaking was too ambitious and had not taken local problems into account." [1239]

December 6th, at the United Nations, the General Assembly adopts resolution 375 (IV) – ***Draft*** *Declaration on Rights and Duties of States.* [1240]

> *"Article 9: Every State has the duty to refrain from resorting to war as an instrument of national policy, and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of another State, or in any other manner inconsistent with international law and order.*
>
> *Article 10: Every State has the duty to refrain from giving assistance to any State which is acting in violation of article 9, or against which the United Nations is taking preventive or enforcement action.*
>
> *Article 11: Every State has the duty to refrain from recognizing any territorial acquisition by another State acting in violation of article 9.*
>
> *Article 12: Every State has the right of individual or collective self-defence against armed attack."* [1241]

The Falkland Islands end-of-year review notes that the population numbers 2,267 with 40 births registered during the year, and 33 deaths. There have been 17 marriages. [1242]

1950 – January 1st, at Stanley, a Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS) 'Meteorological Service' is established; encompassing the observatory on South Georgia. Equipment belonging to Argentina is repatriated.

> *"The C.O. have confirmed that the Governor of the Falkland Islands invoked his rights under the terms of the renewed lease of 1948 to demand the surrender of the station by the Pesca Whaling Company. The Governor has been operating the station with FIDS personnel since January 1950."* [1243]

"... on 1 January 1950 England took a (further) step to claim the islands by seizing the Argentina weather station. The old instruments (were taken) to Montevideo aboard the steamship Ernesto Tornquist ..." [1244]

"Falkland Islands and Dependencies Meteorological Service established as an integral part of the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey, with headquarters at Stanley, Falkland Islands, to provide forecasting services for the whaling fleets, local forecasts in the Falkland islands, and collective broadcasts (FICOLS) for interception in other parts of the Southern Hemisphere. The meteorological station at King Edward Point, South Georgia, was transferred to the Service, 1 January, from the Compania Argentina de Pesca; Daniel Borland became senior meteorologist." [1245]

1239 *Ibid.* pp.84-85. The facility was not completed until 1953 and at a cost of £500,000. Poorly designed and fitted out, it closed in 1956

1240 My emphasis. A draft, it remains to this day (2025).

1241 Advisory, rather than mandatory, the annex to resolution 375 (IV) was prepared by the International Law Commission. Arguably the final nail in the coffin of conquest as a recognised and legal means of territory acquisition. However, it remains a 'Draft' and while influential within international law, it has been ignored on a number of occasions; e.g. Indonesia in 1975 when it annexed East Timor and Russia when it annexed Crimea in 2014. The relevance here is that annexation/conquest was not illegal under any form of internationally recognised rules or norms before the 20th century. Therefore Britain's action at Soledad in 1833, could be argued to be an annexation resulting in full title to the UK. *cf.* 1919

1242 *Colonial Office Annual Report on the Falkland Islands 1949.* See - https://www.nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1947 to 1955.pdf

1243 *FO 371/97376*

1244 Bologna 1988 p.48. It would be two years before Argentina protested. *cf.* 1952

1245 Headland 1989 p.332. The requirement to maintain the station had been deleted from the company's lease in 1948

January 10th, in Washington DC, still pursuing its aim of reaching some settlement over Antarctica, the US State Department forwards a proposal to the Chilean Embassy. This envisages the formation of an international scientific committee, with representation from all the claimants; sovereignty issues being set aside. [1246]

In Santiago, Chile's Foreign Ministry approves a private visit by the Falkland's Governor to Punta Arenas. Commenting, Minister German Riesco tells Britain's Ambassador, Bertrand Jerram, that Argentina is going through; *"... a phase of pathological sensitiveness."* [1247]

In **March**, the Soviet Union's Antarctic Whaling Fleet *Slava* completes its fourth whaling voyage. The flotilla consists of fifteen vessels, including scientific and auxiliary vessels.

May 24th, in Stanley, the new Town Hall opens.

Governor Sir Miles Clifford tours the Falklands Dependencies in HMS *Veryan Bay*.

June 8th, from Moscow, in a *memorandum* addressed to the Antarctic Consultative Parties,[1248] the Soviet Union demands that it be included in any talks on the future of the Antarctic. [1249]

> *"The Government of the USSR cannot agree that such a question as that of the regime of the Antarctic be decided without its participation. In this connection the Soviet Government considers it necessary to call to memory the outstanding contributions of Russian seamen in the discovery of Antarctica.*
>
> *It is a generally recognized fact that the Russian seamen Bellingshausen and Lazarev at the beginning of the 19th century, first reached the coasts of Antarctica, circumnavigated this continent and thus showed the falsity of the widely held view of that time that there was no land at the south polar circle.*

1246 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Vol.1 Document328*
1247 *Jerram to Foreign Office February 28, 1950* in *F0371/81326.*
1248 Those nations consulted by the USA in 1948.
1249 Copies were also sent to the governments of the United Kingdom, France, Norway, Australia, New Zealand and Argentina. Published on the 10th in the Russian newspapers *Pravda* and *Izvestiya*.

… the Soviet Government cannot recognize as legal any decision regarding the regime of the Antarctic taken without its participation." [1250]

June 9th, Argentina's Postmaster General publishes a further notice that any mail arriving in the country bearing a Falkland Islands, or Dependencies, stamp, will be treated as unfranked.

At the United Nations, Argentina argues that the name '*Malvinas*' should be used on all documents referring to the Falkland Islands.

"… a 1950 attempt by the New York Mission to insert the name 'Islas Malvinas' in all UN documents referring to the archipelago obtained no support." [1251]

In Argentina, the Naval Information Service publishes a Spanish language version of the 1927 book by Julius Goebel jnr. - *The Struggle for the Falkland Islands*. [1252]

At Stanley, E. G. Rowe is appointed Vice-Consul for Uruguay.

June 19th, in London, in the House of Commons, Sir John Mellor asks the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs if he will protest the Argentine Government's refusal to accept stamps bearing the words 'Falkland Islands'. Also the Argentine Government's issue of postage stamps emphasising Argentina's pretensions to the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. [1253] For the British government, Mr. Ernest Davies replies:

"*In a Note of 3rd January, 1947, His Majesty's Ambassador at Buenos Aires once more rejected Argentina's claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, on which is based their action in surcharging correspondence bearing stamps of the Falkland Islands. In the same Note it was also stated that they regarded such action as a breach of the Universal Postal Convention. Subsequently, the Postmaster-General registered a protest with the Director of the International Bureau of the Universal Postal Union.*

As regards the second part of the Question, there is no international convention which forbids the issue of stamps designed to promote territorial claims and, while His Majesty's Government deplore this practice, we do not wish to exaggerate its importance by making a diplomatic protest." [1254]

In **July**, it is suggested that the Falkland Islanders should swear an oath of allegiance to the Crown in an attempt to inform Argentines of the Islands' true status.

"Britain considered asking Falkland Islanders to swear loyalty to the king in 1950 in a bid to defuse the territorial dispute with Argentina, writes The Daily Express. According to the article, former First World War airman Harold Taylor, living in Buenos Aires, wrote to George Labouchere, the charge d'affaires at the British Embassy, in July 1950. "I am convinced that it is a fact that very few Argentines know that the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands are of British descent and have no desire to be anything but British". He said the Government should urge the Islanders to formally declare allegiance to the British Empire saying he felt the declaration would, "...come as a shock to the average Argentine and might shake the faith of many in the justice of their cause". The proposal was eventually rejected however when, in September 1950, the governor of the Islands advised a policy of "dignified silence"." [1255]

1250 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, Nat. Sec. Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Vol.1 Document 328.* For the full *memo*, see - https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1950v01/d331

1251 *The Genesis of the Falklands (Malvinas) Conflict M. A.* Gonzalez 2014 p.31. See also 1944.

1252 Carassai 2022

1253 *HC Deb 19 June 1950 vol.476 cc857-8*

1254 *Ibid*. Davies went on to refer to Argentina's actions as a "*petty gesture*".

1255 *Penguin News* January 19, 2001 p.5

July 12th, in Buenos Aires, a motion is tabled in the Chamber of Deputies:

"The Honorable Chamber of Deputies of the Nation

DECLARES

That in view of the request in the House of Commons for a protest to be sent to Argentina over the refusal by its government to accept British stamps bearing the inscription 'Falkland Islands', it reaffirms the sovereignty of the Argentine Republic over those territories, which, by history, tradition and geographical configuration, belonged, belong and will belong to our country.

Likewise, the Chamber of Deputies applauds the firm and decided policy of the President of the Republic, General Juan Perón, who at all times has unceasingly maintained the right of the Nation of Argentina over the Malvinas Islands, and as a consequence the rejection of the British stamps which purport not to recognise the inalienable rights of the Argentine people.

Finally, the Chamber of Deputies categorically rejects the proposal of the British Parliament, considering it an unfriendly act damaging to Argentine sovereignty, and requests the Argentine government to give no countenance to the intended British protest." [1256]

"Deputy Jose Visca presented the motion on July 12, saying it concerned a matter of national interest, and it was duly discussed in a major debate over parts of four days: 12, 14, 19 and 20 July 1950. ... " [1257]

July 19th, in Argentina's Chamber of Deputies, continuing the debate commenced on the 12th, Deputy Absalón Rojas accuses the long deceased General Rosas of losing sovereignty over the Falklands by failing to make any reference to the Islands in the 1850 treaty with Britain; *"... a concession to Britain or a culpable oversight?"* [1258]

"Apart from being culpable by commission, as the causer of chaos, Rosas bears another responsibility, much more serious, more direct, by omission, ... On 27 August (sic) 1849 Rosas signed his famous treaty of friendship with Great Britain,[1259] *with the aim of putting an end to the differences existing between the two countries. It was a sort of general settlement of accounts with Britain, since all problems are about to be settled. ... However, in that treaty nothing is said about the Malvinas islands, which is odd, since Rosas especially remembered the island of Martin Garcia, which might have reminded him of those other unredeemed islands, at least by association of ideas. It is obvious that in treaties it is not always possible to obtain everything desired but what is serious is that in the treaty Rosas accepts our "perfect friendship" with Britain is restored, and does not formulate at least a reservation in respect of the Malvinas islands...*

What was the reason behind Rosas's omission of all references to the Malvinas islands? There are two hypothesis: the first that he was leaving them for a later negotiation; the second that Rosas was so devoted to Britain that he could not even allude to the issue, not in the treaty nor even in the preliminary discussions of it.

1256 Translation in Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.427

1257 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.427-428

1258 *Diario de Sesiones de la Cámara de Diputados, Año del Libertador General San Martín, 1950, Tomo II, Período Ordinario, 6 de julio-10 y 11 de agosto*, Buenos Aires 1951 pp. 1095-1096. Quoted in *Cuando Rosas quiso ser inglés* A. R. Burnet-Merlín 1974.

1259 Actually signed November 24, 1849.

In the discussions he had with Mr. Hood there is sufficient documentation to confirm that Rosas did not remember to claim the Malvinas in the preliminary negotiations either. … The first hypothesis, relating to a possible later negotiation, might be acceptable, but in that case it should at least state a reserve of rights.

For that reason I reject that first hypothesis … the question relating to the negotiations on the islands, is not of great importance in my view... By contrast, the lack of reference to the Malvinas islands in the treaty of 1849 is of great importance. That treaty, at any rate its silence on that point, was a concession to Britain or a culpable oversight...'' [1260]

Deputy Rojas also calls for an approach to the International Court of Justice.

''My opinion is that the Government should study the possibility and the opportunity of bringing a case before the International Court of Justice at The Hague to demand that England hand over the Malvinas Islands to the Argentine Republic … free of all occupation … thus repairing the outrage and restoring things to the state they were in before the dispossession... That would not prevent England from discussing afterwards, if it wants to, the titles and rights of each side to sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands. But it should begin by handing them over.'' [1261]

"Rosas is, for me – and I will prove it – the culprit of the situation of the Malvinas Islands; guilty by his actions and guilty by default." [1262]

"On the third day of debate, ... the first speaker was Deputy Absalón Rojas, member for Santiago del Estero, who began by saying he was going to treat the question of the Malvinas as if he were a lawyer defending a case in court, and pointed out that one of the most important things for a lawyer defending a case, or for a general defending a military position, is to know the weak points of one's own position. That weak point, he said, was the actions of General Manuel Rosas, whom he accused of being responsible in two ways for the loss of the Malvinas by Argentina to Britain: first, Rosas's machinations in 1833 had caused the chaos in Argentina that made the British takeover possible (which was entirely untrue), and secondly Rosas had failed to reserve Argentina's sovereignty in the Convention of Peace." [1263]

August 28th, at Stanley, Ernesto Rowe is confirmed as Consul for Uruguay; *"... which he remained until at least 1966, and presumably until his death in 1975."* [1264]

August 30th, Argentina publishes a rejection of Russia's *memorandum* of June.

"The Argentine note asserted that the "Argentine Antarctic" and neighboring archipelagos were Argentine national territory not subject to any general regime which might be set up for the Antarctic continent, that the "Argentine Antarctic" forms part of the "South American Antarctic" which belongs exclusively to the jurisdiction of Argentina and Chile, and that the claim of the USSR was unacceptable." [1265]

"... (Chile and Argentina) categorically rejected any "right" of the USSR to claim territory or to participate in a discussion of Antarctic problems, and reaffirmed the validity of their own territorial claims." [1266]

1260 Translation in Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.428-429. Deputy Rojas appears to have been shouted down.
1261 Rojas quoted by Pascoe 2022 vol.2 pp.627-628 citing *Diario de Sessiones de la Camara de Diputados, Ano del Liberatador General San Martin, 1950, Tomo II, Periodo Ordinario, 6 de julio-19 y11 de agosto* 1951.
1262 *Rosas y las Malvinas* Absalón Rojas 1950 p.7
1263 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.427-428
1264 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.331
1265 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Vol.1 Doc.335*
1266 Hanessian 1960 pp.436-480. None of the other claimant states responded to the USSR. Nor did the USA.

October 15th, at South Georgia, the *Ernesto Tornquist* runs aground. Declared a total wreck. [1267]

November 6th, in Britain's House of Commons, Ernest Davies, in answer to a number of Parliamentary questions regarding the Falkland Islands Dependencies, addresses the House.

> *"The position as regards Argentine and Chilean posts on British territory in the Falkland Islands Dependencies has not changed since the statement made in the House on 23rd March, 1949, by the then Under-Secretary, of which I am sending the hon. Member a copy.*
>
> *The Argentine base at Laurie Island was founded in 1904, that on Gamma Island was founded on 31st March, 1947, and that on Deception Island on 27th January, 1948; the Chilean base on Greenwich Island was established on 22nd February, 1947, and that on Cape Legoupil in Grahamland on 18th February, 1948. It is known that Service personnel are employed at some of these posts, but I have no information to show whether all foreign parties are armed.*
>
> *His Majesty's Government have on various occasions protested through the diplomatic channel against the establishment of these posts and have rejected Argentine and Chilean claims to sovereignty over any part of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. The last Note on this subject was communicated to the Argentine Government on 23rd December, 1947, and to the Chilean Government on 1st March, 1948. In addition, local protests have been delivered by the leaders of British parties to intruders in British Antarctic territory. The most recent protests of this nature were made during the 1949–50 Antarctic season. Furthermore, His Majesty's Government have signified their willingness to accept the decision of the International Court, but Argentina and Chile have not availed themselves of this offer. None the less, His Majesty's Government are convinced that the problem can be solved by peaceful settlement and will let slip no opportunity which may lead to that end."* [1268]

November 20th, Britain, Chile and Argentina renew their agreement not to send warships south of 60° S.

December 15th, at Port Stanley, a change to the Constitution reduces the number of nominated official members from three to two; "*... giving, for the first time, a majority to the unofficial members of the Council.*"[1269]

December 21st, a British *Order in Council* extends the boundaries of the Falkland Islands' colony to include the adjacent continental shelf. [1270]

> "*2. The boundaries of the Colony of the Falkland Islands are hereby extended to include the area of the continental shelf being the sea-bed and its subsoil contiguous to the coasts of the Falkland Islands. The boundary of such area shall be from position on the 100 fathom line 110 nautical miles 023 degrees true from Jason West Cay (the Westernmost of the Jason Islands, latitude 50 degrees 58 minutes South, longitude 61 degrees 27 minutes West approximately), following the 100 fathom line as shown on Admiralty Chart No. 2202B round the northern, eastern, southern and western sides of the Falkland Islands to position 20 nautical miles 278 degrees true from Jason West Cay, thence by straight line crossing in its narrowest part the area where the depths are less than 100 fathoms, in 032 degree true direction for 115 nautical miles to the starting point."* [1271]

1267 260 passengers and crew managed to get ashore without loss of life.
1268 *HC Deb 06 November 1950 vol.80 cc598-600*
1269 *Colonial Office Annual Report on the Falkland Islands and Dependencies for the years 1950 & 1951*
1270 Headland 1989 p.333. *cf.* 1958 & 2016
1271 *The Falkland Islands (Continental Shelf) Order in Council 1950 no.2100.* Also *International Law Quarterly* vol.4, no.2 (April, 1951) pp.245-252. For the Order in Council, see - https://www.legislation.gov.uk/uksi/1950/2100/pdfs/uksi_19502100_en.pdf

"... under the terms of the Continental Shelf Convention of 1958 and the applicable rules of international law, the United Kingdom has exclusive jurisdiction over the exploration and exploitation of the continental shelf areas adjacent to the Falkland Islands. Certain powers to licence exploration and exploitation are conferred on the Governor of the Falkland Islands under the Falkland Islands (Continental Shelf) Order in Council 1950 and the Falkland Islands Mining (Mineral Oil) Regulations of 1964." [1272]

"... it stated that an area of 85,000 square kilometers covered by the islands and the continental shelf were declared British and taken away from our sovereignty." [1273]

"The Islands lie on the southern end of the South American tectonic plate, separated from the main part of the plate by the Falklands Fracture Zone and from the much smaller Scotia Plate by the Falkland Thrust ... The Falkland Islands lie on a part of the Falklands Plateau known as the Falklands Microplate ..." [1274]

"The Falkland Islands and Argentina are situated on the same continental shelf. Argentina claimed all of this. A 1950 Order of Council extended the 'boundaries' of the Falkland Islands to include an area of continental shelf bounded by the 100 fathom line. This did not cover the Dependencies where the UK had not claimed continental shelf rights. At that time the Islands' territorial sea was only three miles, sufficient for inshore fishing and the development of an alginate industry from seaweed." [1275]

1951 – February 12th, Argentina's 'First Scientific' expedition sails to Antarctica in *Santa Micaela*.

> *"Time offers the best form of justice. We must, therefore, confidently wait because, if at this point what justly belongs to us is not acknowledged as ours, the progressively greater power of Argentina and time will form the undisputable basis of our rights. Some day, probably, if justice does not prevail, we shall make Argentine rights prevail, if necessary by the use of force. ... Argentine scientific expeditions, which will successively and progressively occupy the Antarctic, will be the only force we will use, for the time being,.."* [1276]

"The difference between this expedition and such disinterested scientific expeditions as have visited the poles for the purpose of meteorological and other research ... was thus clearly established." [1277]

At South Georgia, a British registered ship, *Polar Maid*, drops a cargo off before sailing to Argentina, where the owners' agents are charged an import duty on the goods delivered to South Georgia. An Inland revenue charge is also claimed by the Argentine authorities. [1278]

"The 'Polar Maid' incident of 1951 is the worst example of slow Argentine infiltration. Having discharged a cargo in South Georgia, this British-owned vessel went direct to an Argentine port. The Argentine Government claimed payment of import duty and Inland Revenue tax on the cargo discharged in South Georgia." [1279]

1272 *HL Deb 17 June 1981 vol.421 cc630-1*

1273 Destefani 1982 p.106

1274 *The Geology of the Falkland Islands – British Geological Survey Technical Report* D. T. Aldiss & E. J. Edwards 1999. See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2021/03/geology-of-the-falkland-islands-1999.pdf

1275 *Official History of the Falklands Campaign* L. Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.68

1276 Argentina's President Perón quoted in *La Nacion,* February 13, 1951

1277 US Embassy *memorandum* dated February 14, 1951

1278 The vessel's owners, Messrs Salvesen, were only notified in May, 1951, by their Argentine agents, Messrs Wilson, that the charges were being demanded. Those agents eventually settled the first claim of 17,155.78 pesos "*under protest*". See July 30, 1951, below.

1279 *PRO FO 371/90453 1951 File 15225*

March 15th, for South Georgia, Kenelm Somerset Pierce-Butler is appointed to be the magistrate at King Edward Point. [1280]

April 3rd, Britain protests Argentine and Chilean establishments at Paradise Harbour in Graham Land.

"There are an Argentine and a Chilean post on two islands in this harbour. Protests at these actions of trespass on British territory have been delivered locally to the leaders of both parties. ... The protests were delivered by the "John Briscoe," when it was relieving British posts in the Dependencies. The Chileans have been there rather longer than the Argentinians. The Chileans set up their post during the Antarctic season, which is just ending." [1281]

April 17th, in Buenos Aires, a Presidential decree (*No.7338/51*) creates an Instituto Antárctico Argentino.

"The IAA was founded on April 17, 1951 by decree 7338/51 of President Juan Domingo Perón, with the purpose of "continuing to ensure in an inalienable way for the Argentine Nation the historical, geographical and territorial rights that assist it over the Argentine Antarctic Sector", under the inspiration of General Hernán Pujato, who was its founder and first Director." [1282]

April 24th, in the Falklands, the Falkland Islands Company celebrates the centenary of its founding as the Royal Falkland Land, Cattle, Seal and Whale Fishery Company in 1851. [1283]

"During 1951 the Falkland Islands Company, Limited, celebrated its Centenary. It announced its intention of providing sports and social clubs in Stanley and the Camp (the countryside other than Stanley), made numerous gifts to employees and pensioners, and a generous offer, which has been accepted, to build a boarding school at Darwin to help the Government in its efforts to improve Camp education." [1284]

April 27th, in Argentina, the National Court of La Plata orders the seizure of all copies of the Italian Touring Club's International Atlas, as it implies that Argentina does not exercise sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.[1285]

April 30th, the UK again offers to take the Antarctic disputes to the ICJ in diplomatic *Notes* presented to both Argentina and Chile. [1286]

"... I would recall that I had occasion on 30th April to deliver a Note protesting against the continued acts of trespass in British territory in the Falkland islands Dependencies by unauthorised Argentine parties; rejecting your Government's claims to sovereignty over any part of this territory; and rehearsing once more the irrefutable legal basis of His Majesty's Government's title." [1287]

May 1st, in Buenos Aires, Juan Perón presents the annual Presidential Mensaje (Message) to Congress.

> *"The Argentine Republic wants to maintain solidarity with all the nations of America, but demands that America show solidarity too, at least with respect to our true, inalienable right."* [1288]

"Perón went on to add that Argentina does not favor fighting in far away lands, but will defend her own frontiers to the death. Her policy is oriented on the basis of collaboration with the American States in a spirit of solidarity. But solidarity is a two-way street, and the Americas should begin by remembering that

1280 For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/pierce-butler_kenelm
1281 *HC Deb 18 April 1951 vol.486 cc1810-1*
1282 From the website of Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Trade and Worship.
1283 Shortened to the Falkland Islands Company in January 1852. *cf.* April, 1851
1284 *Colonial Office Annual Report on the Falkland Islands and Dependencies for 1950 &1951*
1285 Caillet-Bois 1982 p.406
1286 Bologna 1988 p.49. Also *HC Deb 11 June 1951 vol.488 cc161-2W*
1287 *Sir H. Mack to Señor Don Jerónimo Remorino Buenos Aires July 30, 1951*
1288 *The New York Times* May 2, 1951

Argentina has some unredeemed territory (Falkland Islands) still in the hands of a non-American power, and they should show some solidarity with her by helping her get it back." [1289]

President Perón makes a further announcement.

> *"... for the first time the truth about the Falklands and "Argentine sovereignty over the Antarctic" was being taught in the schools."* [1290]

"All the Peronist textbooks contained maps of Argentina with all its provinces and "national territories", accompanied by another little map of the Malvinas (Falkland) Islands and Antarctica, which according to the text, "were, are, and will be Argentine". [1291]

May 7th, in London, answering a question in the House of Commons, the Government spokesman informs the House that; *"There are five Argentine and three Chilean posts in the Falkland Island Dependencies. I do not know whether all these are manned by armed forces..."* [1292]

May 25th, from Santiago, Chile rejects both the British protest of April 3rd and the diplomatic *Note* of April 30th.

"The fundamental Chilean thesis is that installation of the new base is nothing more than an act of the Chilean Government in the exercise of its sovereignty within the jurisdictional limits of the Republic of Chile. The note declares specifically that the site of the base – Isla Pingüino, Puerto Paraíso, en la Costa de Danco, en la Tierra de O'Higgins – lies in what it calls the "Chilean Antarctic". With regard to the British suggestion that the problem be referred to the International Court of Justice, the Chileans state that they could not participate in such action because it would signify a surrender of sovereignty on Chile's part, since the disputed act (i.e., establishment of the base) occurred within the borders of the Republic. Furthermore, the Chileans continue, such a procedure could not lead to a satisfactory resolution of the Antarctic "pretensions" of other countries, however much merit they might contain." [1293]

June 1st, from Buenos Aires, Argentina also rejects the British diplomatic *Note* of April 30th. [1294]

> *"The islands of South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and the Argentine sector of Antarctica are subject to our authority ... My government regard as acts violating their sovereignty the unauthorised British administration, establishments, scientific and exploratory expeditions in the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and the Argentine sector of Antarctica."* [1295]

1289 *The First Secretary of Embassy in Argentina (Pool) to the Secretary of States, May 3, 1951* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, National Security; Foreign Economic Policy, Vol.1 Document 762*

1290 *Ibid.*

1291 *Politics and Education in Argentina, 1946 – 1962* Monica Rein 1998. In relation to the Falkland Islands, the mantra *Las Islas Malvinas fueron, son y serán Argentinas* has become, without doubt, the most oft repeated sentence in Argentina.

1292 *HC Deb 07 May 1951 vol.487 c179W*

1293 *US Ambassador to Chile (Bowers) to the Secretary of State May 25, 1951* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1950, National Security Affairs, Foreign Economic Policy, Vol.1 Doc. 763*

1294 Despite nigh on 50 years of complaining to other organisations, this was the first time that Argentina made a specific claim to South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands directly to the British Government.

1295 Quoted in *Note by B. B. Roberts August 27, 1952 American Department A/15212 cf. FO 371/97376.* Despite nigh on 50 years of complaining to other organisations, this was the first time that Argentina made a specific claim to South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands directly to the British Government. Complaints to third parties have no legal merit, although the exchange in 1927, following Argentina's assertions to the International Postal Union, had alerted the UK to Buenos Airean pretensions.

"In a Note dated 1st June, your predecessor refused to acknowledge the validity of the arguments set out in support of His Majesty's Government's claim in my note of 30th April and once more alleged Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland islands Dependencies. His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom can in no way recognise these pretensions, which are without legal foundation." [1296]

"This is the earliest specific official communication to HMG of the Argentine claim to South Georgia. ... This also constituted the first official intimation that Argentina lays claim to the South Sandwich Islands. No rejoinder was sent to this." [1297]

June 13th, in London, asked for information about the strength of the Argentine and Chilean bases inside British territory, the Government publishes a report.

> *"Chilean parties: Greenwich Island (South Shetland Group)—six men. Cape Legoupil (north-west tip of Grahamland)—six. Paradise Harbour (west coast of Grahamland)—personnel not yet installed at time of visit; likely estimate ten to twelve. Argentine parties: Laurie Island (South Orkney group)—eleven. Deception Island (South Shetland group)—ten. Paradise Harbour (west coast of Grahamland)—four. Melchior Islands (Palmer Archipelago, off west coast of Grahamland)—uncertain. Marguerite Bay (west coast of Grahamland)—the establishment of this party was announced by the Argentine Government late last Antarctic summer; independent confirmation is not yet available."* [1298]

June 19th, from Stanley, Governor Clifford notifies London that Argentina has established a base at Marguerite Bay on the west side of the Antarctic Peninsula.

June 20th, in London, announced in the House of Commons; *"There are at present four permanently manned British posts in the Dependencies, in addition to South Georgia, which is permanently inhabited and administered territory. Plans for the coming season will involve an increased scale of activity in these territories,.."* [1299]

July 30th, in Buenos Aires, Britain protests regarding the *Polar Maid* charges.

"... His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom consider that the Argentine Customs and Inland revenue authorities had no right to levy any form of duties or taxes on cargoes discharged at South Georgia, a territory occupied and administered solely by His majesty's Government in the United Kingdom. I have accordingly been instructed to protest strongly against the unjustifiable action of these authorities, which has resulted in considerable financial loss to a British firm, and to request that the competent Argentine authorities be at once instructed to refund the sum that has been paid (17,153.78 pesos) and to withdraw their claim for the payment of "Inland revenue duties at South Georgia" amounting to 132,980.73 pesos." [1300]

An Argentine court rules that British income tax cannot be deducted from employees on South Georgia. [1301]

During **August**, on Deception Island, the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS) begin ionospheric observations. [1302]

1296 *Sir H. Mack to Señor Don Jerónimo Remorino Buenos Aires July 30, 1951*
1297 *Note by B. B. Roberts August 27, 1952 American Department A/15212 cf. FO 371/97376.*
1298 *HC Deb 13 June 1951 vol.488 cc2270-1*
1299 *HC Deb 20 June 1951 vol.489 cc489-90*
1300 *Henry B. Mack to Mr. Morrison August 8, 1951*
1301 *PRO FO 371/90457 1951 File 15232*
1302 Headland 1989

In London, the report of the *Committee of Enquiry into the Constitutional Development in the Smaller Colonial Territories* is submitted to the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

"Its chief recommendation was to transform the Falklands and other small colonies into a new category of 'Island States' and 'City States' which would be granted internal autonomy. Municipal government would replace the trend towards the Westminster model, and representation in London would be through a central consultative 'Council of Island and City States' associated with the Privy Council. The State Council in each territory would be elected and carry out executive functions similar to a local authority. The Commonwealth Relations Office and the Colonial Office would be divided into three departments under a Minister for Commonwealth Affairs. The stress on 'Commonwealth' emphasized the end of colonial status. The Rees Report failed to offer a viable solution for the future of the Falklands because opinion in the Colonial and Commonwealth Relations Offices was unfavourable. The Report was not circulated in Cabinet. The most pertinent criticism was that a single solution was unsuitable for colonies composed of diverse cultures, races and economies." [1303]

August 29th, from Santiago, Chile's government protests the presence of two new Argentina Antarctic bases in territory claimed by Chile. [1304]

October 25th, in London, Winston Churchill returns to Downing Street as Prime Minister; confirming his predecessor's commitment to expand activities in the Falkland Islands Dependencies. Alan Lenox Boyd is appointed Colonial Secretary and immediately raises the question of more forceful measures to oppose Argentine and Chilean encroachments. [1305]

October 26th, from Washington DC, the US Department of State issues a Policy Statement;

> *"Argentina claims sovereignty over the Falkland Islands which have been held and administered by the British since 1833. The question of determining to whom the islands legally belong is at best a difficult one. The US is in no way a party to this dispute. However, we have used our influence to prevent the problem from being made an issue which would create friction on the question of European possessions in the western hemisphere at a time when solidarity among the world's anti-communist forces is sorely needed. When the Argentine Foreign Minister asked the US to support the Argentine claim at the Bogota conference of 1948, we informed him that the US did not support either the British or the Argentine claims and that in the opinion of the US the dispute should be settled by peaceful means under the recognized procedures of international law."* [1306]

November 1st, on South Georgia, a survey party lands. Led by Verner Duncan Carse, and sponsored jointly by The Royal Geographical Society and the Scott Polar Research Institute. [1307]

November 11th, *Don Samuel* is wrecked outside Queen Maude Bay, South Georgia. The crew of 16 get to shore.

November 19th, Britain's agreement with Chile and Argentina not to send warships south of 60° S is renewed.

> *"Being anxious to avoid any misunderstanding in Antarctica which may affect the friendly relations between the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile, the Governments of these three countries have*

1303 Ellerby 1990 pp.113-114 citing *The Official History of Colonial Development* D. J. Morgan 1980.

1304 See - https://heritage.utas.edu.au/index.php/chilean-note-to-argentina-reserving-chilean-rights-in-respect-of-the-establishment-of-two-more-argentine-bases-within-chilean-antarctic-territory

1305 Howkins 2008 p.197

1306 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1951, The United Nations, The Western Hemisphere: vol. II – Policy Statement Prepared in the Department of State October 26, 1951*

1307 This was the first of four survey expeditions between 1951 and 1957. Carse was better known as the voice of *Special Agent Dick Barton* for BBC Radio from 1949. See also, Ellerby 1990 pp.113-114.

informed each other that, in present circumstances, they foresee no need to send warships south of latitude 60 degrees during the 1951 to 1952 Antarctic season, apart, of course, from movements such as have been customary for a number of years." [1308]

In London, following discussions involving the Colonial Office, the Admiralty and the Cabinet, it is decided that the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS) should rebuild the Hope Bay base at Trinity Peninsula, which had been destroyed in a fire on November 8, 1948.

In **December**, from Buenos Aires Britain's Embassy confirms to London that the FIDS intention to rebuild its Hope Bay base is; *"common knowledge."*

December 15th, the *Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order* reduces the number of nominated official members from three to two, giving the unofficial members a majority for the first time.

December 17th, from Punta Arenas, the British Consul writes to inform the Embassy in Santiago of problems being experienced with Argentina.

"A letter from Chancery, British Embassy Santaigo, dated 31 December 1952, enclosed a letter (17 December 1952) from the British Consul in Punta Arenas in southern Chile, referring to the day-to-day problems experienced. There was an appreciable Falkland Islander community in the Punta Arenas area, and "for some time" those wishing to go to Argentina had been required to hold Argentine passports and documents: "Generally speaking this is taken in good part, causing amusement more than anything else. There are no more patriotic people in the British Empire the Falkland Island people."..." [1309]

"Regretfully HM Government have no weapon ready to their hand with which they might enforce better treatment of the Falkland Islanders within Argentinian jurisdiction. Protests alone will do nothing. We shall merely elicit the flat assertion that the Falkland Islands are manifestly Argentinian territory, albeit under foreign occupation and that the inhabitants are Argentinian citizens. Retaliation offers no prospect of advantage." [1310]



December 31st, at Hope Bay, in a clear breach of the warships agreement, six armed Argentine Navy vessels arrive and commence construction of a base.

During the austral summer, five British weather stations established in the Dependencies, submit weather reports to Stanley. These are analysed and the resulting forecasts' broadcast to whaling ship in the area.

A Falkland Islands review covering 1950 and 1951, notes that the population of the Falkland Islands is 2,280. Forty-five births have been registered, along with 27 deaths. [1311]

1308 *HC Deb 03 December 1951 vol.494 cc2022-4*
1309 Armstrong & Forbes 1997
1310 A *minute* to Anthony Nutting, Parliamentary Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office dated March 14, 1953 quoted in Armstrong & Forbes 1997
1311 *Colonial Office Report on the Falkland Islands and Dependencies for 1950 & 1951.* See - https://www.nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1947 to 1955.pdf

1952 – in **January**, from the Falklands, a group of FIDS scientists and workers, with building supplies, sail for Hope Bay in the *John Biscoe*.

January 18th, at the UN, resolution *567 (VI)* is adopted by the General Assembly.

> *"The General Assembly,*
>
> *Recalling that, in resolution 334 (IV) adopted on 2 December 1949, the General Assembly invited any special committee which might be appointed on information transmitted under Article 73e of the Charter to examine the factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether any territory is or is not a territory whose **people** have not yet attained a full measure of self-government,...*
>
> *1. Decides to take as a basis the list of factors drawn up at the sixth session of the General Assembly, which list is annexed to the present resolution;...*
>
> *Annex*
>
> *1. The territories which are covered by Chapter XI of the Charter are those territories whose **people** have not yet attained a full measure of self-government...*
>
> *3. The condition under which the provisions of Chapter XI of the Charter cease to apply will be that the **inhabitants** of the territory have attained, through political advancement, a full measure of self-government. The fulfilment of this condition may be achieved by various means, involving in all cases the expression of the free will of the **people**. The two principal means are*
>
> *(a) the attainment of independence and*
>
> *(b) the union of the territory on a footing of equal status with other component parts of the metropolitan or other country or its association on the same conditions..."* [1312]

Researcher's Comment: In this resolution there is a clear association between a non-self-governing territory (NSGT) and a people. If there are no people, a territory cannot be included under Chapter XI of the Charter.

As the UN lists the Falkland Islands as a NSGT under Chapter XI, the Falkland Islanders must constitute a people. If, as some Argentines claim, the Falklanders do not constitute a people, then the territory cannot be listed under Chapter XI. So, let there be no doubt – the United Nations recognises that the Falkland Islands have a people, and has done so since 1952.

"The points on which the main administering powers were generally agreed (as conveniently summarized for example in the report on the Third Committee discussions in the United Nations Yearbook for 1952) were: 1. The right of self-determination must be subordinate to the maintenance of world peace. 2. There was discrimination against certain states, i.e. the administering powers, in the text proposed. 3. Obligations were imposed which were not laid down in the Charter. 4. The Charter, while imposing a 'sacred trust' on administering powers, recognized the need to take into account a people's capacity for full government, i.e. for gradual advance. 5. The administration of non-self-governing territory fell within the domestic jurisdiction of the state responsible. 6. No definition had been established of such terms as 'peoples', 'nations' and 'the right of self determination'." [1313]

1312 My emphasis. In 1952 the United Nations recognised 5 official and 3 working languages; the latter being English, Spanish and French. The draft of resolution *567* was submitted to the General Assembly by a sub-Committee comprising Australia, Cuba, Denmark, France, Guatemala, Iraq, the United States and Venezuela, with the term *people* used in English; *pueblo* in Spanish and *population* in French. It was voted through without opposition.

1313 Dunnett 1983 pp.419 & 420

January 29th, in London, Argentina's Embassy submits a *memorandum* to the Foreign Office regarding the FIDS take-over of the Grytviken meteorological station in January, 1950. [1314]

> *"The Embassy of the Argentine Republic has the pleasure to address itself to the Foreign Office in connection with the measure adopted by the British Government, by virtue of which it was disposed that the meteorological observatory installed at Port Grytviken, Cumberland Bay, Islands of South Georgia, should cease to operate.*
>
> *In this connection, the Argentine Embassy points out that the said observatory, maintained by the Directorate General of the National Meteorological Service through a company established in Argentina, kept up a connection of a scientific and informative character with the Argentine official technical organizations.*
>
> *As the said activity constitutes an expression of the sovereignty which the Argentine Nation exercises over the Islands of South Georgia, the measure adopted in this respect signifies, beside the interruption of a technico-scientific (sic) task of general interest, a disregard for the legitimate titles of the Republic over the Archipelago referred to, facts which move the Argentine Government to present through the medium of this Embassy, the most formal reserve of their rights over the said Islands, which are an integral part of Argentina's territorial patrimony."* [1315]

"The meteorological station was erected and maintained by an Argentine Company, Compania Argentina de Pesca, and not the Argentine Government, solely because they were required to do so by the terms of their lease, and similar requirements were imposed on other whaling companies." [1316]

"As regards our title to South Georgia in general, Argentine policy has been to "infiltrate" so gradually that we should not react violently or make any specific protest; but we have repeatedly protested in general terms about Argentine encroachments in the "Falkland Islands Dependencies"..." [1317]

January 31st, in Stanley, Governor Clifford receives a radio message to the effect that the Hope Bay party have arrived to find Argentine sailors some 400 yards from the site of the British base. The Governor orders the civilian FIDS staff to continue with the task, but also to make a formal protest to the Argentine commander.

> *"It looks very much as if the Argentines knowing our intention to re-establish the base at Hope Bay made sure to be there before the British party."* [1318]

In notifying the British Embassy in Buenos Aires of the Argentine *memorandum* of January 29th, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Anthony Eden, notes.

> *"Senor Hogan emphasised that his approach by no means implied a protest, but merely recorded Argentine reservations within the framework of international discussions which had continued over many years. His Excellency agreed that I might assume that it was his Government's wish that these international discussions should continue rather than be cut short."* [1319]

1314 *FO 371/103149/15212/3. cf.* 1906, 1907, 1946, 1950 & November, 1952
1315 See - https://heritage.utas.edu.au/index.php/argentine-memorandum-to-the-united-kingdom-protesting-at-the-british-closure-of-the-argentine-meteorological-station-on-south-georgia-island
1316 *Telegram MED 52/53/02 Governor of the Falklands to Sec. of State for the Colonies 14 June, 1952*
1317 *FO 371/103149/15212/3*
1318 *FO 371/97375*
1319 *Mr. Eden to Sir H. Mack (Buenos Aires) January 31, 1952* in *A 15212/1*

February 1st, at Hope bay, while unloading stores for the erection of the new building, shots pass over the heads of unarmed FIDS staff. Fired by Argentine sailors from the *Buen Suceso*. Notified by radio, the Governor seeks instructions from London. [1320]

"At noon a few bursts of machine gun fire were fired over our shore party's heads and Argentines, armed with rifles, commenced surrounding base party. At 1400, armed Argentines closed our party and ordered us into their launch, which came to our landing beach. Our party obeyed Argentine officer's cocked pistol and are now all on board. Have now received official protest that any further attempt at landing stores will be fired on. Request instructions ... this presumably constitutes an act of war." [1321]

"On 1st February the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey vessel "John Biscoe" landed a civilian party with stores at Hope Bay in order to re-establish the British base there. An Argentine party already on shore forced them to re-embark. The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately informed Her Majesty's Embassy at Buenos Aires of the incident and explained that the Argentine commander had acted in error and that his instructions had been rectified." [1322]

"Captain Diaz recalls ... it was clear that a base of some sort was about to be built, given the material being unloaded. Diaz ordered that the captain of the John Biscoe should be informed that he was on Argentine territory and that the new installation would not be tolerated. For two days work came to a halt; Diaz speculates that this was probably while instructions were being sought. Then work resumed and consequently Diaz resolved to inform the British, through an officer, that unless building was stopped, force would be used. Captain Diaz, who, having been on five Antarctic expeditions, one with Admiral Byrd, was no newcomer to the area, ordered some of his men on shore, and, once again, had an officer request the termination of building activities. Only then, remembers Diaz, were shots fired, and these were well above the heads of the British men; the latter then withdrew, leaving the Union Jack flying. Diaz says he had it brought down and returned to the British ship." [1323]

February 2nd, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry informs the British Embassy that the action; *"... was taken in error and due to an over-literal interpretation by the Commander of his instructions.."* Also that they; *"... had not anticipated the landing of civilian personal from a British vessel."* The Ministry adds that their explanation; *"... should not be regarded as modifying in any way their attitude with respect to to sovereignty over these territories."* [1324]

February 4th, from Stanley, Governor Clifford sets out for Hope Bay to investigate the incident.

"... the Governor of the Falklands, Sir Miles Clifford, at once left Stanley for Hope Bay in the frigate HMS Burghead Bay with six British Royal Marines aboard, and landed scientists without further incident." [1325]

1320 The first, and only, military action recorded in the Antarctic – todate (2025).
1321 *Clifford to Sec. Of State for Colonies Feb 1, 1952*
1322 *HC Deb 20 February 1952 vol.496 c21W*
1323 *Argentine Approaches to the Falklands/Malvinas* Guillermo A. Makin 1983
1324 *FO 371/97375*
1325 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.441

In London, Winston Churchill calls for a review of defence plans for the Falkland Islands. [1326]

February 5th, at the United Nations, General Assembly resolution *545 (VI)*, resolves that an article shall be included within the International Covenant on Human Rights - in the following terms; *"All peoples shall have the right of self-determination."*

February 6th, in the UK, King George VI dies unexpectedly at the age of 56. [1327]

February 8th, in Buenos Aires, the British Embassy responds to the Argentine government's information of the 2nd with a formal protest.[1328]

> *"... I have received instructions from His Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to address to the Argentine Government a communication in the following terms, respecting the incident which occurred in Hope Bay, Graham Land, on 1 February ...*
>
> *Hope Bay is a British base which has been occupied for five years continuously and there are British properties and British graves on the shore. ...*
>
> *His Majesty's Government are glad to learn that the instructions of the Argentine commander have just been rectified, since this will enable the John Biscoe to continue normal operations without the risk of an even more serious incident ...*
>
> *His Majesty's Government are entitled to expect that the commander will be suitably reprimanded and steps taken to see that such an incident does not occur again. ..."* [1329]

February 20th, in Britain's House of Commons, the Government make a statement.

> "*On 1st February the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey vessel "John Biscoe" landed a civilian party with stores at Hope Bay in order to re-establish the British base there. An Argentine party already on shore forced them to re-embark. The Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs immediately informed Her Majesty's Embassy at Buenos Aires of the incident and explained that the Argentine commander had acted in error and that his instructions had been rectified. On 4th February Her Majesty's Embassy at Buenos Aires, acting under instructions from my right hon. Friend, handed a Note of protest to the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs. The Governor of the Falkland Islands has since visited Hope Bay in Her Majesty's frigate "Burghead Bay" and the base has been re-established without further incident."* [1330]

February 27th, Argentina responds to Britain's protest regarding the Hope Bay incident.

> *"... The Ministry has taken due note of the contents of the embassy's Note ... In this connexion I must state, in the first place, that Hope Bay is situated in Argentine antarctic territory. ... my government have repeated their instructions to the commander of the Argentine antarctic group to avoid, as far as possible, any action which might prejudice the framework of peace and friendship in which Anglo-Argentine relations have always been conducted. ..."* [1331]

1326 Freedman 2005

1327 Succeeded by his daughter, Elizabeth, whose coronation would not take place until June 2, 1953. However, from shortly after this date in 1952, official papers would start to refer to "Her Majesty's Government".

1328 *HC Deb 20 February 1952 vol.496 c21W*

1329 *Richard Allen to the Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship February 8, 1952.*

1330 *HC Deb 20 February 1952 vol 496 c21W*

1331 *Minister Jeronimo Remorino to British Ambassador, Buenos Aires February 28, 1952*

"Her Majesty's Embassy at Buenos Aires received a reply on 27th February. I have not yet received the full text but I understand that the Argentine Note, while re-asserting Argentine claims to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies, confirms that fresh instructions have been given to the Argentine commander. The Argentine Government say that they are making inquiries in order to decide whether further measures are required. But they have expressed their conviction that there will be no recurrence of the incident." [1332]

During **April**, an experimental return flight, Southampton to Stanley via Lisbon, Cape Verde Islands, Rio de Janeiro and Montevideo, is made by 'Aquila Airways Ltd.' (right). [1333]

April 19th, Argentina responds to the British protest of July 30th, 1951, regarding *Polar Maid*; rejecting the assertion that South Georgia is British territory, and reiterating its own claim to sovereignty.

April 25th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Minister of Marine announces that the Argentine Antarctic Task Force had, in the preceding season, established a new base and wireless station at Hope Bay and had installed naval stations naval air stations and shelter huts at other places lying within the Falkland Islands Dependencies.

April 26th, President Perón tells the Argentine press; *"... sovereignty will have to be re-stated every year..."* [1334]

In **May**, on their return to Buenos Aires, the men from the *Buen Suceso* are fêted by President Peron.

> "*Soldiers and sailors when they are carrying out so sacred a duty as that of serving their country are permitted to err through displaying too much energy, but they are never permitted to err by displaying too much weakness. For this reason the attitude of these sailors of Hope Bay can be an example for every Argentine... Thanks to such efforts our sovereignty is now firmly established over the Antarctic sector."* [1335]
>
> *"No one has rights over those lands, in good faith, except the Chileans and the Argentines."* [1336]

May 22nd, Perón is reported in *La Nacion* as saying; *"We defend our rights and time will confirm them. We must therefore wait with confidence and launch generations of Argentines towards the Antarctic..."*

May 23rd, at Stanley, the Churchill wing of the Hospital is formally opened; *"... this extension, which the Prime Minister has honoured with his name, comprises general wards, private wards, maternity wing, X-ray department, out-patients department, laboratory, dispensary, boardroom, staff dining room, duty room, kitchen and laundry."* [1337]

June 25th, in Buenos Aires, a Presidential decree (*1,253*) classifies the Argentine base at Hope Bay, Trinity Peninsula, Graham Land as a naval base with the name – 'Esperanza'. [1338]

July 5th, Britain's Embassy in Argentina, registers another diplomatic protest regarding Argentine bases at Hope Bay and elsewhere within the Falkland Islands Dependencies.

1332 *HC Deb 03 March 1952 vol.497 cc3-4W*
1333 Headland 1989. return flight May 2, 1952Nothing came of this experiment.
1334 *La Nacion April 16, 1952*
1335 President Perón quoted in an Argentine Grade 5 School text book of 1953, in Garcia 2009
1336 President Perón quoted in Bertone, Melara & Culleton 2022
1337 *Colonial Office Annual Report on the Falkland Islands and Dependencies for the years 1952 & 1953*
1338 Established in December, 1951, some 800 yards north-west of the FIDS huts.

"I have received instructions from Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom to record a further protest against these persistent infringements of British sovereignty, which are more deplorable in that, as pointed out in my Note of 30 April 1951, recognised juridical means exist whereby inter-governmental territorial disputes can be settled. The failure of the Argentine Government to accept the jurisdiction of the International Court not only casts doubt upon the confidence of the Argentine Government in the validity of their claim but also opens the way to incidents such as that which occurred at Hope Bay. ... Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom regret that the Argentine Government show no disposition to co-operate in using the means available for the avoidance of such incidents in the future, .." [1339]

September 27th, in London, an internal Foreign Office *memo* notes.

"The question whether we should reply to the Argentine protest of last January has been considered carefully in light of the Government's recommendation. It is the view of our legal team that a reply should be made for the record. Except incidentally in our note of protest over the Polar Maid incident in July 1951, HMG have never made their position clear about the status of South Georgia as part of the Falkland Island Dependencies in a communication to the Argentines. Conversely several administrative actions of the Argentine Govt. in the last four years implying a separate status for South Georgia from that of the rest of the FID have been allowed to pass without comment. The present occasion therefore gives us an opportunity for a general refutation of Argentine claims…" [1340]

October 10th, in New York City, at Turtle Bay, the United Nations official headquarters is formally dedicated (right).

October 14th, at the UN building, the first General Assembly session at that place, commences. [1341]

October 21st, in Buenos Aires, Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr. Jerónimo Remorino summons Uruguay's Ambassador, Dr. Mateo Marques Castro. During a two hour meeting, Remorino protests Uruguay's 1947 agreement to form an air-link with the Falklands. Also, the 1924 appointment of a consular agent at Stanley. [1342]

"I present the most formal protest to the Government of Uruguay against the disregard for Argentine sovereignty in the Malvinas Islands implied by the agreement on aviation signed with the government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, and against the violation of that sovereignty involved in the appointment of a consular official to act within those territories..." [1343]

"In using the Falkland Islands as the basis for their protest they appear to have decided to brave the risk of ridicule inherent in raking up the terms of an agreement five years old; and in complaining about a consular appointment far older still." [1344]

1339 *British Ambassador in Buenos Aires to Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship July 5, 1952*

1340 *G.H.S. Jackson to C.M.H. Harrison (Colonial Office)* in *FO 371/97376.* The Colonial Office responded on October 13, 1952, to say that they had no objection to a response to Argentina. See below.

1341 Before the building had been completed, some Secretariat staff had moved in during August, 1950, followed by 3000 other employees in January, 1951. The site covers some 17 acres on the Manhattan shore-line overlooking the East River. Considered international territory, not under the ownership of the USA.

1342 See January, 1953, below.

1343 *Formulo la Argentina una protesta Ante el Uruguay* in *Noticias Graficas* October 23, 1982.

1344 *Allen to Eden, November 15, 1952* in *F0371/97383.*

"In 1952 the Argentine government protested sharply against the presence of a Uruguayan consulate in Stanley, making it clear that Argentina did regard the existence of a consulate as relevant to the question of sovereignty." [1345]

"Significantly, the official Uruguayan reply did not state in so many words that Uruguay recognised Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands; the Uruguayan consulate in Stanley remained open for many more years and its coat of arms may now be admired in the Historic Dockyard Museum." [1346]

October 28th, Argentina prohibits her own shipping from calling at Uruguay's ports.

November 12th, in London, to a question in the House of Commons, the Government responds:

> *"(a) Argentine parties are established at the following localities: (i) Laurie Island (South Orkney Group); (ii) Deception Island (South Shetland group); (iii) Hope Bay (Trinity Peninsula); (iv) Paradise Harbour (West coast of Graham Land); (v) Gamma Island (Palmer Archipelago); (vi) Marguerite Bay (West coast of Graham Land).*
>
> *(b) Chilean parties are established at the following localities: (i) Greenwich Island (South Shetland group); (ii) Cape Legoupil (Trinity Peninsula); (iii) Paradise Harbour (West coast of Graham Land)."* [1347]

November 20th, from Argentina, secret orders are issued to a Task Force 8, led by the commander of the *Bahia Buen Suceso*, Silvio Casinelli; the purposes of the force to; *"To relieve and provision detachments, to install detachments and services, to give support to other Forces, and to carry out hydrographic and scientific work ..."* [1348] More specifically, the Task Force is to; *"... transport relief personnel and supplies for the detachments; it will occupy (Bahia Luna and Dundee Island), will construct two new detachments at (Bahia Luna and Mikkelsen Island), and a new dwelling-house at Esperanza; it will set up a forecast station at Melchior, will occupy temporary positions and will make scientific observations..."*

A certificate is provided for issue to foreign vessels.

> *"To the highest ranking person on .....*
>
> *It is my duty to inform that you, together with all the personnel under your command, are in waters which belong to the territorial domain of the Argentine Republic. The nation recognises no rights except those of her own dominion in this territory. No foreign country can issue permits or authorisations of any nature whatsoever...*
>
> *The presence of foreign personnel who state that they have official representation in this territory, the erection of installations of any type and the carrying out of any activities whatsoever, amount to an illicit act not permitted by the principles and fundamental regulations of International Law.*
>
> *I accordingly reject and consider as not having been received any verbal or written statements which you may make as regards your ignorance of the unquestionable rights of dominion held by the Republic in these territories and territorial waters and in which the operations carried out by the Argentine Navy constitute jurisdiction acts which admit of no discretion. ..."* [1349]

1345 Pascoe 2020 p.228
1346 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.438
1347 *HC Deb 12 November 1952 vol.507 cc59-60W*
1348 *ADM 1/27598.* A copy of these orders were seized in February, 1953 from the Argentine base on Deception Island.
1349 *Ibid*

November 28th, Britain responds to Argentina's January protest, regarding the Grytviken weather station.

> *"The observatory referred to was maintained until January 1950 by the Compania Argentina de Pesca, in its capacity as a private company, because it was required to do so under the terms of the lease from the Government of the Falkland Islands... Mr. Eden therefore wishes to place on record Her Majesty's Government's formal refutation of the pretensions of the Argentine Government..."* [1350]

December 10th, in Britain's House of Commons, asked why £47,000 is being spent on "*additional bases in the Falkland Islands Dependencies*", Colonial Secretary Oliver Lyttleton responds:

> *"Her Majesty's Government consider it essential to maintain British sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies."* [1351]

On the same day at the United Nations, resolution 648 (VII) is adopted by the General Assembly, giving provisional approval to a further list of factors which should be taken into account in deciding whether a territory has attained a full measure of self-government.

December 16th, at the UN, resolution *637 (VII)*, entitled – *The right of peoples and nations to self-determination* – is adopted by the General Assembly. The resolution places a duty on member states to uphold the principle of self-determination. As regards the Non-Self Governing Territories listed by the UN, the resolution requires that:

> *"... States Members of the United Nations shall recognize and promote the realization of this right of self-determination of the peoples of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories who are under their administration and shall facilitate the exercise of this right by the peoples of such Territories according to the principles and spirit of the Charter of the United Nations in regard to each Territory and to the freely expressed wishes of the peoples concerned, the wishes of the people being ascertained through plebiscites or other recognised democratic means,* ***preferably*** *under the auspices of the United Nations;..."*

"Since the war we have become more and more dependent on Argentina as a source of meat and the growth of nationalism all over the world and anti-colonial feeling has made it more desirable than ever that we should refrain from bringing disputes over colonial territories to a head with the likely consequence of suffering some setback or rebuff at the UN. There are therefore stronger reasons than ever for refusing to make an issue of the dispute." [1352]

In the South Shetland Islands, Argentina and Chile erect new base stations on Deception Island. Both nations site their buildings next to the British runway, which had been constructed in 1928. [1353]

> *"... we have started to do what should have been done fifty years ago."* [1354]

"Argentinian and Chilean landings in Deception Island appear to be deliberately provocative, and ones we should not tolerate." [1355]

An Falkland Islands end of year review notes a Falklands population of 2,230, with 55 births and 33 deaths.

1350 *No. A 15212/3* in *FO 371/97376.* This was addressed to the Argentine Embassy in London.
1351 *HC Deb 10 December1952 vol.509 cc450-1*. Also
1352 Foreign Office *Minute* quoted in Armstrong & Forbes 1997
1353 Howkins 2008 p.210
1354 Argentina's President Perón quoted in Garcia 2009
1355 Colonial Office Telegram of January 30, 1953 quoted in Armstrong & Forbes 1997

1953 – January 7th, the *New York Times* reports;

> *"Under the pretext that Uruguay has impinged upon the sovereignty of Argentina by maintaining for more than twenty years a consul in the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands, the Argentine Government brought tourist traffic with this country to a halt last year. Uruguay has for many years enjoyed the title of "America's Switzerland". In normal years 100,000 of the 150,000 tourists who visited this country were Argentines. Last year only fifty Argentines had permits to come here. … Uruguay is now concentrating on attracting United States tourists."*

"In view of Argentina's sharp protest against the existence of an Uruguayan consulate in the Falklands, and the punitive measures adopted by Argentina as a reaction to it, it would seem hard for Argentina to deny the diplomatic and political relevance of the consulates maintained in the Falklands by a number of countries for many years." [1356]

January 19th, at Deception Island, Acting-Governor Colin Campbell delivers a protest note to the Argentine party there.

"Campbell also played a key role in countering Argentine expansion in the Falkland Islands Dependencies. Between December 1952 and January 1953 an Argentine party landed at the British base at Port Foster, on Deception Island, erected two buildings and raised the Argentine flag. Campbell, as the acting governor, visited Deception Island on 19 January 1953 to deliver a protest note. On his return to Stanley, Campbell sent a paper on the situation to the Secretary of State for the Colonies in London, and this was discussed at a meeting of the British Cabinet on 31 January 1953. The decision was made to eject the Argentines and to dismantle their illegal base." [1357]

February 11th, at Port Stanley, HMS *Superb*, flagship of Vice-Admiral Sir William Andrewes, arrives with instructions to assist in the removal of Argentines from Deception Island. The flag-ship's marine contingent transfer to HMS *Snipe*.

February 15th, on Deception Island, a magistrate and constables from the Falkland Islands Police detain two Argentine soldiers. Buildings erected by Argentina and Chile are demolished.

> *"At the beginning of this month Her Majesty's Government were informed that Argentina and Chile had established naval parties on the airstrip adjoining the British base at Port Foster, Deception Island, which is British territory, and that permanent buildings had been erected. These encroachments represented not merely an infringement of our sovereignty on the Island, but a nuisance and an obstruction to those who were maintaining our base.*
>
> *Instructions were accordingly given to the Acting Governor of the Falkland Islands to dismantle the buildings which had been erected and to arrest and deport under the Falkland Islands Aliens Ordinance any occupants found in them. These instructions were carried out on February 15, by the British magistrate, assisted by constables of the Falkland Islands police. … Two occupants of the Argentine hut were arrested, without resistance, and the Argentine and Chilean huts were dismantled. The Chilean hut was unoccupied…"* [1358]

February 16th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador registers a further protest regarding Deception Island.

1356 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.438
1357 Stephen Palmer in Tatham (ed) 2008. See - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/campbell_colin
1358 *HL Deb 23 February 1953 vol.180 cc609-11*.

"I have the honour, under instructions from Her Majesty's Principal Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, to convey to your excellency an emphatic protest at the erection in January by the commander and naval crew of the Argentine tug Chiriguano of a hut, tent, flag and other equipment at Deception Island in the South Shetland Islands. These islands, as your excellency's government well knows, and as has been made clear in previous notes from this embassy, are (both as a group and as respects Deception Island individually) British territory, over which Her majesty's Government alone are entitled to exercise sovereignty. ...

This latest encroachment by the Argentine Government not merely constituted an infringement of the sovereignty of Her Majesty's Government, but was further calculated to cause serious nuisance and obstruction to Her majesty's subjects and interests at Deception Island. I am therefore to inform your excellency that the Acting Governor has been instructed to effect the removal of the occupants of the new buildings ... the occupants were to be arrested and detained by the British Magistrate, assisted by the Falkland Islands Police, and deported from Her majesty's Government's territory. Instructions have also been given that the buildings erected on crown land are to be dismantled and removed ... and to be disposed of as the Acting Governor sees fit. These instructions will now have been put into effect.

Her Majesty's Government must point out that not only was this a deliberate act of trespass, amounting to a flagrant contravention of the laws in force in the Dependencies, but also, since the vessel and party used formed part of the Argentine armed forces, it was an armed incursion into British territory and waters ...

If the Argentine Government consider that they have a good claim to sovereignty over any part of this area, their correct course, in view of the undoubted prior United Kingdom title, is to accept the offer which has been made to refer the matter to the International Court..." [1359]

"*... the Government have been concerned to dispel any doubt about their attitude to encroachments of this type on British territory. At the same time they have repeated the offer made to both countries by the late Government to refer the conflicting claims to territory in the Antarctic to the International Court of Justice..."*[1360]

"Personal congratulations were sent to those involved in the arrest by Sir Anthony Eden, then the British Prime Minister. An attempt was made to hush the whole event up (with the connivance of the Argentinians and Chileans), but the matter leaked out. There was a very real fear at the time that there might be reprisals against other British bases in Antarctica or the Falkland Islands themselves." [1361]

On the same day, a second protest is lodged by the British Ambassador following an Argentine announcement that mails had been delivered to one of its bases on Half-Moon Island, off Livingston Island in the South Shetlands group. The British Government concluding that the Argentines had established yet another base on British territory.

February 18th, at South Georgia, the two Argentines detained at Deception Island are; *"... handed over ... to the master of an Argentine vessel bound for Buenos Aires."* [1362]

1359 *British Ambassador in Buenos Aires to Argentine Minister for Foreign Affairs and Worship February 16, 1953.*
1360 *HL Deb 23 February 1953 vol.180 cc609-11*
1361 Armstrong & Forbes 1997. Winston Churchill was British Prime Minister during 1953. Anthony Eden was Deputy Prime Minister.
1362 *HL Deb 23 February 1953 vol.180 cc609-11*

February 20th, both Chile and Argentina reassert their conflicting claims to Deception Island. Chile mobilizes its navy, and threatens to take its case to the Organisation of American States (OAS). Argentina demands that Britain rebuild the huts on Deception Island and issue a formal apology. Both nations also threaten to invoke the Rio Treaty and to demand reciprocal assistance from other American States. [1363] With regards to the British offer to take the question to the ICJ, both countries decline.

February 21st, Britain deploys a Royal Marines detachment to Deception Island for three months.

February 23rd, in Britain's House of Lords, the Marquess of Reading makes a statement regarding the action taken at Deception Island.

> *"In taking the steps I have described, the Government have been concerned to dispel any doubt about their attitude to encroachments of this type on British territory. At the same time they have repeated the offer made to both countries by the late Government to refer the conflicting claims to territory in the Antarctic to the International Court of Justice. I am sorry to say that both countries, in their Notes, have seen fit once more to reject this offer."* [1364]

Asked whether Argentina has given any reasons for the rejection of ICJ adjudication, the Marquess replies; *"No, my Lords, no reason has been given. So far as I recollect the terms of the replies, they are a bare refusal to contemplate that particular form of procedure."* [1365]

Off Stromness Bay, South Georgia, *Southern Wave*, a whale-catcher owned by *Christian Salvesen*, is scuttled.

March 23rd, in Santiago, considering what action to take against the British, Chile's Government concludes that it cannot cooperate with Buenos Aires, as the Argentines have; *"no rights to sovereignty in Deception Island."*[1366]

March 24th, Chile demands that the UK restore their hut on Deception Island, destroyed in February.

"It is the natural wish of Her Majesty's Government that the Chilean Government's action at Deception Island in January should not impair the generally friendly relations between the two countries. They cannot, however, regard the Chilean memorandum as holding out a prospect of a mutually satisfactory solution, and the Chilean Government are being so informed." [1367]

March 28th, a population census is held in the Falkland Islands.

March 31st, in Santiago, Chile's Foreign Minister threatens to boycott the forthcoming coronation of Elizabeth II in London. He erroneously claims that Chile is sending a *"fully munitioned"* fleet to Deception Island, to rebuild its base there.

April 1st, in Chile, Britain's Embassy sends a letter to the Foreign Ministry described as "*stiff*." Chile's Government promptly dismiss their Foreign Minister.

"The threat that Chile might "declare war" on Great Britain lingered for a couple of weeks after the dismissal of Olivarria, but the Chilean government was gradually able to let its public threat to raise the matter at the OAS drop quietly without losing face." [1368]

1363 Howkins 2008
1364 *HL Deb 23 February 1953 vol.180 cc609-11609*. Also *HC Deb 23 February 1953 vol.511 cc1729-31*
1365 *Ibid*
1366 *US Embassy to State Department March 23, 1953 USNA 702.022/3-2353*
1367 Selwyn Lloyd in the Commons – *HC Deb 01 April 1953 vol.513 cc1195-6*
1368 Howkins 2008 p.217

June 2nd, in England for the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, Argentina's representative, Admiral Alberto Teisaire, asks for a *"private and unofficial"* meeting with Foreign Office representatives concerning *"certain matters affecting Anglo-Argentine relations."* [1369]

June 5th, in London, at the Park Lane Hotel, Admiral Teisair greets Gerald Isaacs, Lord Reading, Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs who is accompanied by Roderick Barclay, Under-Secretary of State at the Foreign Office. Also present is a Counsellor from the Argentine Embassy, Señor Bengolea.

> *"After a few preliminaries the Admiral said that he wished to bring up the question of the Falkland Islands. His Government had received hints from a number of different quarters that H. M. Government might be glad to discuss this matter, which had long affected Anglo-Argentine relations. The Argentine Government wished to see Anglo-Argentine economic relations put on a firm long-term basis, and their proposal was that, as part of some long-term arrangement, H. M. Government should surrender all their rights and claims to the Falkland Islands.*
>
> *He did not see that there should be any great difficulty about this, since we had sold a number of islands to the U.S. Government (We pointed out that if he was thinking of the U.S. Bases in some of the West Indian Islands this was an entirely different matter.).* [1370]
>
> *Lord Reading replied that as far as the Falkland islands themselves were concerned our position was quite clear. The inhabitants of the Islands were British, and if a plebiscite was held would vote practically unanimously to remain under the British Flag (The Admiral agreed that this was probably true). Lord Reading said that in the circumstances it was inconceivable that any British Government should consider the sale of the Islands. If they were to do so there would at once be a tremendous outcry from the public, and the Government would certainly be overthrown. He could only advise the Admiral that this was a matter on which it was impossible to change our attitude, and the Argentine Government had better resign themselves to accept things as they were.*
>
> *Lord Reading then went on to refer to the Falkland Islands Dependencies. He said that here we were faced with an entirely different situation, since there were conflicting Argentine, Chilean and British claims, and in our view the only way to make progress was to get an authoritative judicial ruling. For this reason we had favoured a reference of the dispute to the Hague Court, and we still considered that this would be the best way of reaching a settlement. He hoped that the Argentine Government would come round to the same point of view.*
>
> *Admiral Teisaire was non-committal, but did not appear to reject this idea. …*
>
> *Admiral Teisaire's attitude throughout was most friendly, and he appeared to take in good part the firm rejection of his proposal about the Falkland Islands. He mentioned more than once the desire of President Peron to have good relations with the United Kingdom, and referred also to Argentine dislike of the United States."* [1371]

"Argentine President Juan Domingo Perón tried to buy the Falkland Islands from the Government of London in 1953, as revealed yesterday by official documents from that time made public in the British capital. Perón

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1369 *PRO FO A/1051/9*

1370 An attempt to purchase would indicate recognition of the right of the possessor to sell. However, quite what offer was being made is not clear from the British archive, despite most newspapers reporting an offer to buy. Interesting that the Argentine Admiral referred to British rights, but perhaps not as intriguing as Lord Reading's acknowledgement that the Falkland Islanders had a say in the future of the Islands, some seven years before the United Nations would reach a similar conclusion with UN Resolution 1514.

1371 *F/O Minute Mr. Barclay A 1051/9 June 8, 1953.* See also August, 1993 & May/June 1995

made his firm offer of purchase through a special envoy, who attended the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II of England as Argentine representative on June 2, 1953. The British Government rejected the offer – which did not materialize in a price – for fear that the government of Sir Winston Churchill would fall. ... The 1953 document details the conversations that the then president of the Argentine Senate had in a central London hotel. Perón's offer was answered with the same arguments that the London authorities use today, 30 years later: Her Majesty's Government considers the sale of the Falkland Islands (British name for the islands) inconceivable because its inhabitants are British. Lord Reading also commented to the Argentine representative that if a referendum was held in the Falklands at that time, its inhabitants would decide to continue under the British flag, to which Teisaire agreed saying that yes, that would probably be true. ... Lord Reading ... made it clear that "the Government, with all certainty, would be overthrown" if such a sale operation was allowed." [1372]

"In 1953, on the occasion of the coronation of Queen Elizabeth II, the Peronist government sent a mission headed by the senate president (who later became the nation's vice-president), Alberto Tesaire, in order to offer to buy the Falkland Islands from the United Kingdom as the state had done with the railroads. After conversations at the highest level, the Argentine proposal was rejected by Winston Churchill's government. The decision took into account the negative repercussions that it would bring to the then prime minister. The British argument was based on the fact that the inhabitants of the Islands were British, which shows that from that moment this issue was already a central axis of British policy towards the Islands." [1373]

"Teisaire took advantage of the days of his stay in London to carry out "a secret and extremely delicate process": he had a proposal that his interlocutors at the Foreign Office received with surprise: a purchase of the Malvinas Islands. He conveyed the idea during the conversations he held in a central London hotel with the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Lord Reading, who had responsibility for Latin American affairs." [1374]

"According to official British documents declassified in January 1984, the Mendoza man stated that the Government "wanted Anglo-Argentine economic relations to be established on a firm basis, and that his proposal was that, as part of some arrangement (and) in the long run, Great Britain should renounce all rights and claims to the Falkland Islands". Although no specific figure was offered, the UK official rejected such a proposal, ..." [1375]

In Argentina, schools promote a Falklands claim and the cult of Perón.

"... the recovery of the Malvinas Islands, as the dream of the whole country, inculcated especially in formal education, especially in early childhood. Take for example the text Obreritos, a second grade reading book used in the year 1953: "The Malvinas are Argentines, they always were. They are part of our territory. Below the sea they continue naturally with our soil. In 1833, however, English troops were installed by force in that part of our territory. Today and always, the children of the New Argentina must say: The Falklands are ours! And it will be a day of joy for all when the blue and white flag flutters over them! "..." [1376]

August 20th, Sir Oswald Raynor Arthur, Clifford's replacement, is gazetted Governor of the Falklands. [1377]

1372 *Perón quiso comprar las Malvinas al Reino Unido en 1953* in *El Pais* January 3, 1984
1373 Mira & Pedrosa 2021
1374 *La 'misión Teisaire' a la coronación de Isabel II y la negociación por Malvinas* Mariano Caucino in *Infobae* September 8, 2022 citing *Detrás de Perón. Historia y leyenda del almirante Teisaire* Fabian Bosoer 2013
1375 *Cuando Perón le quiso comprar las Malvinas a Isabel II* in *Nuevos Papeles* September 8, 2022
1376 *Malvinas, los muertos que (no) tenemos* Alejandra Diaz Biglia 2015
1377 *The London Gazette No.40090*.

"The most outstanding achievement of Clifford's governorship was perhaps the improvement of social services. The public works were concentrated in Stanley. They included a new Town Hall, electric power station, hospital extension, a broadcasting transmitter and studio. New services included local teacher training courses, Queen's Nurses being posted on East and West Falkland and a travelling cinema for the Camp. Clifford justified this concentration on social amenities by claiming that they were a prerequisite for economic growth. ... Clifford is possibly unique as a Governor who was accused by a colonial population of being a spendthrift. Islanders considered the Falklands' economy could not finance further expenditure on development." [1378]

In **October**, on South Georgia, a British survey expedition lands, led by Verner Duncan Carse.

"In four southern summers, between 1951 and 1957, he organised and led the South Georgia Survey. This was a formidable enterprise requiring dogged determination and the ability to traverse mountainous, crevassed and mostly untrodden terrain in weather which was frequently atrocious. Not himself a qualified topographic surveyor, Carse recruited well-qualified men for all the work. The survey produced the first proper map of the whole of South Georgia..." [1379]

October 25th, Chile's Antarctic Commission meet to decide what future action they should take regarding Deception Island. Their decision is to quietly rebuild their base, in a less provocative location.

November 17th, at the Hague, the International Court of Justice considers the *Minquiers and Ecrehos* case.

"Judge Alvarez, ... made a declaration expressing regret that the Parties had attributed excessive importance to medieval evidence and had not sufficiently taken into account the state of international law or its present tendencies in regard to territorial sovereignty." [1380]

November 20th, in London, a gift of two horses for Queen Elizabeth II arrives from Argentina's President.

November 26th, Chile, Britain and Argentina renew their agreement regarding warships in Antarctic waters.

November 27th, the UN adopts resolution *742 (VIII)* which identifies factors to be taken into account in deciding whether a territory is, or is not, a territory whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government. At the top of the annexed list entitled *Second Part: Factors indicative of the attainment of other separate systems of self-government* (ie. not independence) is Art.1 which states: - *1. Opinion of the population. The opinion of the population of the Territory, freely expressed by informed and democratic processes, as to the change in status which they desire. ..."* [1381]

In **December**, before his departure for the UK, Governor Clifford inspects the dependencies on HMS *Nereide*.[1382]

The Falkland Islands statistical review for the years 1952 and 1953 notes a population in the Falkland Islands of 2,220. There have been 46 births in 1953 and 27 deaths. Nineteen marriages have been celebrated. [1383]

1378 Ellerby 1990 pp.82 & 89

1379 Geoffrey Hattersley-Smith in Tatham (ed) 2008

1380 See - https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/17/2025.pdf

1381 In 2013 the Falkland Islanders held a referendum. Turnout was in excess of 90% and almost all of those opted to retain their links to the UK. If the United Nations was committed to its own resolutions, the Falkland Islands should have been delisted in 2014. That the UN chose to do nothing, suggests that the only option that the UN will accept is independence. Three British territories have now held referendums and each has chosen the status quo. None have been delisted. In claiming to be acting on behalf of the peoples of the Non-Self Governing Territories the UN says one thing, but does another. On that basis alone, the decolonization process, as viewed by the United Nations, will never be complete.

1382 Headland 1989

1383 *Colonial Office Report on the Falkland Islands and Dependencies for the years 1952 & 1953*

1954 – January 20th, in London, a report that Argentina intends to set up an air base on Dundee Island, to the east of the Antarctic Peninsula, is mentioned in Britain's House of Commons.

> *"On inquiry by H.M. Ambassador, the Argentine Government categorically denied that they had any intention of establishing such a base at Dundee Island. H.M. frigate "Nereide" paid a routine visit to the Dependencies at that time, and the Royal Research Ship "John Biscoe" landed a party on Dundee Island. The only intruders found were three Argentine personnel, to whom a protest was handed at their unauthorised presence there."* [1384]

February 5th, in London, the US Embassy considers Britain's ICJ invitations to Chile and Argentina.

> *"A decision by the International Court … would be saleable to Commons and the press. The Foreign Office believe that this would be true regardless of whether a defeat might be suffered at the hands of the Court on a number of British claims, and the Foreign Office in fact recognise the possibility of adverse decisions on some points."* [1385]

In **March**, in the South Atlantic, HMS *St. Austell Bay* shadows Argentina's *Les Eclaireurs*, throughout the Minister of Marine's voyage to visit Argentine Antarctic stations. [1386]

April 8th, Argentina's President Perón announces that he intends to increase Argentine activities in Antarctica until his country's 'sector' is "*saturated*" with Argentines. [1387]

April 20th, for South Georgia, Robert Spivey is appointed magistrate at King Edward point to oversee, *inter alia*, sealing activities.

"...the 1954 and subsequent licences specified that "the licensee shall ensure the seals are killed in the most humane way that is practicable, i.e. they shall not be clubbed or lanced to death, but shall only be shot". The sealing inspectors exercised vigilance." [1388]

April 28th, in London, Secretary of State for the Colonies, Henry Hopkinson, is asked to make a statement to the House of Commons regarding the "*present position in the Falkland Islands Dependencies.*"

> *"At the settlement and whaling station in South Georgia, a number of improvements have been made to buildings and communications. In other parts of the Dependencies, work has continued at the six established scientific bases on an extensive programme of scientific and meteorological work planned by the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey. The Royal Research ship "John Biscoe" is just completing her annual relief of these bases. The number of unauthorised foreign settlements is eleven."* [1389]

At South Georgia, off Stromness Bay, *Southern Shore*, a whale catcher owned by 'Christian Salvesen', is scuttled.

The South Sandwich Islands are visited by the Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS). [1390]

July 15th, in Washington DC, at a meeting attended by President Dwight D. Eisenhower, the Vice-President and Secretary of State, the USA's interest in a claim of Antarctic territory is considered.

1384 *HC Deb 20 January 1954 vol.522 cc166-7W*
1385 *Zimmerman to State Dept. Feb 5, 1954 USNA 702.022/2-554*
1386 Headland 1989 p.347
1387 *Ibid.*
1388 Dickinson 2007 p.146
1389 *HC Deb 28 April 1954 vol.526 cc1600-1*
1390 Headland 1989

"Mr. Allen Dulles said... We ought, he believed, in the first instance to talk to the Governments of Chile and Argentina at the time we asserted our claims, to see if it were not possible to reach an amicable agreement with these two Latin American states. Secretary Smith said that he was strongly opposed to this course of action because of the fact that a British claim conflicted with the claims of Chile and Argentina in this area. He much preferred the President's suggestion that we simply reassert our rights in Antarctica. The President said that he would rather offend the British than our Latin American friends regarding issues in Antarctica." [1391]

It is decided that, at an "*appropriate time,"* the USA will assert its rights; *"... which have been ours as the inherent results of discovery and exploration, and unofficial claims made on behalf of the U.S."* [1392]

August 25th, Argentina promulgates a new law to identify the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies as a part of one of its national territories - Tierra del Fuego. [1393]

In **September**, following proposals and invitations sent out in 1952/53, the International Council of Scientific Unions announce plans for an International Geophysical Year in 1957, to commemorate the 25 years since the last Polar Year of research in 1932/33.

"Toward the end of 1952, in consideration of the scientific aspects outlined above, ICSU deemed it of value that the International Geophysical Year program be pursued in order that advantage be taken of the period of maximum solar activity in 1957-58 and of the concurrent eclipses. ICSU accordingly established a Special Committee for planning on an international scientific level, and adhering bodies of the various nations were called upon to establish National Committees for the planning and undertaking of the program of specific nations. ... The cognizance of ICSU in scientific matters on an international level go back in time to the Inter-Allied Conference on International Scientific Organizations, London, October, 1918." [1394]

"In contrast to the United States and Great Britain, Argentina and Chile were less enthusiastic about IGY research in Antarctica. The proposals for open scientific access to all parts of the continent appeared to undermine their sovereignty claims." [1395]

November 18th, an Argentine squadron consisting of ARA *Bahia Buen Suceso*, ARA *Bahia Aquirre*, ARA *Punta Loyola*, ARA *Chiriguano*, ARA *Sanaviron*, ARA *Yamana* and an ice-breaker ARA *General San Martin*, sail for the Antarctic to establish a new base. [1396]

November 22nd, the United Nations adopts resolution *850(IX)*. [1397]

"2. Considers that, in order to evaluate as fully as possible the opinion of the population as to the status or change in status which they desire, a mission, if the General Assembly deems it desirable, should, in agreement with the Administering Member, visit the Non-Self-Governing Territory before or during the time when the population is called upon to decide on its future status or change in status."

1391 *Memorandum of Discussion at the 206th Meeting of the National Security Council on Thursday, July 15, 1954 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952–1954, General: Economic and Political matters, vol.1, part 2 Doc.304*

1392 *Ibid*

1393 Based upon comments in the British House of Commons on December 20, 1954. However, I am unable to identify the legislation referred to. See November & December, 1954, and June, 1955 below.

1394 *Memorandum* attached to *Bronk (President National Academy of Sciences) to Adams (Assistant to the President of the United States) April 21, 1954* in the Dwight D. Eisenhower Presidential Library. By June, 1954, some 29 nations had agreed to take part in the IGY, including the UK and Argentina. Chile, expressed an interest.

1395 Howkins 2008 p.253

1396 Led by Capt. Alicio E. Ogara.

1397 Titled – *Consideration of communications relating to the cessation of the transmission of information under Article 73e of the Charter.* This resolution is often misquoted by Argentina as prohibiting visits to NSGTs subject of a dispute.

November 24th, in Buenos Aires, the British Embassy registers an official protest with regard to the Argentine proposals promulgated in August. [1398]

"Last August the Argentine Government promulgated a law which implied that the Falkland Islands and Falkland Islands Dependencies are under Argentine jurisdiction. On the 24th November Her Majesty's Government protested to the Argentine Government about this law,..." [1399]

During **December**, Britain reoccupies six of its bases on the Antarctic Peninsula.

December 15th, from Buenos Aires, responding to Britain's protest of November, the Argentine Foreign Ministry states; *".. neither directly nor indirectly can British occupation of the Malvinas be considered lawful because it derived from an act of force."* [1400]

" ... on 15th December the Argentine Government replied with a Note in which they repeated their pretensions to our territory." [1401]

December 21st, the UK again invites Argentina and Chile to refer the Dependencies disputes for adjudication.

> *"Her Majesty's Government believe that the most satisfactory way of settling the dispute concerning the sovereignty over the Falkland Islands Dependencies would be for Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Argentina together with the Government of Chile to refer the question to judicial settlement and they have many times invited the Argentine Government to submit their claims to the adjudication of the International Court of Justice.*
>
> *Her Majesty's Government regret that the Argentine Government have taken up this position and they wish to enquire whether as an alternative to adjudication by the International Court of Justice, the Argentine Government would be prepared, jointly with the Government of the United Kingdom, to submit to an independent ad hoc arbitral tribunal the adjudication of their respective rights under International Law in the territory designated the Falkland Islands Dependencies by Letters Patent of 1908 and 1917.*
>
> *Her Majesty's Government trust that the above proposal will meet with an early and favourable response from the Argentine Government. If, however, this is not the case, Her Majesty's Government will consider themselves free to avail themselves of any means that may be open to them to seek a determination of their legal rights by the International Court of Justice."* [1402]

"On 21st December last Her Majesty's Government repeated this offer in identical Notes addressed to the Argentine and Chilean Governments..." [1403]

"One of the steps open to the United Kingdom is to bring the dispute before the Court by a Unilateral Application under Article 40 (1) of the Statute and Article 32 (2) of the Rules,.." [1404]

1398 See June, 1955, below

1399 *HC Deb 20 December 1954 vol.535 c58W.*

1400 *The New York Times* December 16, 1954.

1401 *HC Deb 20 December 1954 vol.535 c58W.*

1402 Attached to *Foreign Service Despatch Am Embassy Buenos Aires to Department of State May 17, 1955* in *CIA-RDP08CO1297R000800090016-0 Declassified and Approved for Release 2012/10/03*

1403 *HC Deb 06 May 1955 vol.540 cc178-80W.* Also Bologna 1988 p.49

1404 *Antarctica Cases: United Kingdom v. Argentine; United Kingdom v Chile* International Court of Justice 1956 p.36. *Art. 40(1)* states: *"Cases are brought before the Court, as the case may be, either by the notification of the special agreement or by a written application addressed to the Registrar. In either case the subject of the dispute and the parties shall be indicated."*

"... neither Argentina nor Chile had accepted the Optional Clause of the Statute of the International Court of Justice and that consequently it is impossible at present for His Majesty's Government to bring this dispute before the Court by themselves proceeding as plaintiffs." [1405]

"... the International Court of Justice seemed to offer a way to end, one way or the other, the unwanted dispute in the Falkland Islands Dependencies. An unfavorable decision could not be portrayed as an imperial "cave in," but rather a demonstration that Great Britain upheld the principle of international law, while a favorable decision would settle the question of sovereignty once and for all in the eyes of the international community. The prospect ... appealed much less to the two South American countries than it did to Great Britain." [1406]

"On 21 December 1954 Britain invited Argentina and Chile to join Britain in referring the dispute to an independent ad hoc tribunal for a ruling, but both countries rejected the offer." [1407]

As of the end of the year, the population of the Falkland Islands is estimated at 2,212. There have been 49 births and 20 deaths. There have been 26 marriages. [1408]

1955 – January 2nd, in the South Atlantic, the Argentina squadron led by Capt. Ogara sails to the southernmost point of the Weddell Sea.

January 3rd, on the Filchner Ice Shelf, after identifying a suitable site for a base, stores are unloaded and five buildings and a hanger constructed. Enough fuel for three years is offloaded from the ships. [1409]

"The commander of naval operations, Mr. Ramón Brunet, announced in a press conference, that the base called "General San Martín" is the southernmost of those that exist to date. Brunet said the new base is located in the dangerous region of the Weddell Sea, within the triangle claimed by Argentina, in Antarctica, at 78º South latitude and 39º West longitude. It will consist of several buildings and elements for the members of the commission to live and work .... It is reported that they will be carrying out observations of cosmic radiation with equipment provided by the Atomic Energy commission. Forces from the Navy, Army and Aeronautics will work (there), and men of civil sciences." [1410]

January 25th, at Thule (aka Morrell) Island, in the South Sandwich Islands, Capt. Ogara establishes a summer station. The base (right) is staffed by a midshipman and two radio operators.

"... and in 1954-55 the Argentine ice-breaker General San Martin (Capt. A. Ogara and A. C. Lopez de Bertodano) landed a party which built the refuge hut "Tentiente Esquivel" at Hewson Point, Thule Island." [1411]

In the South Shetlands, at Deception Island, Chile sets up base, *Aguirre Cerda,* at Pendulum Cove.[1412]

1405 Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin speaking to the House of Commons, February 25, 1948 in *HC Deb 25 February 1948 vol.447 cc1931-3.* Britain had signed the '*optional clause*' recognising automatic ICJ jurisdiction in 1946; albeit only for cases arising after 1930. See 1920 & 1946

1406 Howkins 2008 p.230

1407 Pascoe 2020 p.273

1408 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1954 & 1955.*

1409 Within the sector claimed by the United Kingdom, the base was situated in Piedrabuena Bay at 77° 43'00"S 38° 04'00"W. Closed in 1980 due to deteriorating conditions on the ice shelf, it was replaced by a new base nearby.

1410 *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006

1411 *British Antarctic Survey Scientific reports No.91 The South Sandwich Islands: 1. General Description* W.M. Holdgate & P.E. Baker 1979. Evacuated on January 14, 1956 following a nearby volcanic eruption. *cf.* 1976

1412 Destroyed by volcanic eruptions in 1967 and 1969.

"The new settlement, which consists of a hut occupied by a small party of Chilean naval personnel, is being kept under close observation by the British authorities at Deception Island. Her Majesty's Charge d'Affaires in Santiago has protested to the Chilean Government at this infringement of British sovereignty." [1413]

From the Falklands, Governor Sir Oswald Raynor Arthur, tours the Dependencies in HMS *Veryan Bay*.

The South Shetland Islands and the South Orkneys are visited by HMS *Burghead Bay*.

March 29th, in Washington DC, the State Department once again considers Antarctic claims.

> *"... 4. The U. S. is the only country of the eight primarily interested in the Antarctic which does not have an official claim dating back one or more decades. In any controversy over the significance of an early statement of claims, the seven friendly claimants would tend to be arrayed against the U. S. (and the USSR, if it should make a claim).*
>
> *5. It has thus far been considered impossible, from a foreign relations and psychological viewpoint, to announce a U. S. claim extensive enough to include all existing U. S. rights. Such rights virtually circle the continent and undoubtedly will be extended by future U. S. expeditions; it may, however, be doubted whether we will ever find it desirable to announce a claim to all.*
>
> *6. Irrespective of prospects for an official U. S. claim, the relative strength of all existing U. S. rights can be maintained only by matching the Antarctic activities of each of the seven countries with which we presently compete for Antarctic rights. ...*
>
> *12. The Department of State proposes to enter into bilateral negotiations with the seven Antarctic claimant countries (Argentina, Chile, the U. K., Australia, New Zealand, Norway and France) to obtain their recognition of superior U. S. rights in certain areas (indicated on the map attached to this report) in return for U. S. agreement not to contest their individual claims in the remaining areas..."* [1414]

April 16th, from Buenos Aires, the US Embassy reports upon attitudes within Argentina.

> *"The idea of Argentine sovereignty in the special piece of pie Argentines have claimed for themselves in the Antarctic is upheld by all political parties. Moreover, the people have been so indoctrinated with the idea that they believe it as a matter of natural right ..."* [1415]

April 25th, in Washington DC, deliberations as to a US claim over Antarctic territory continue. There are two proposals. The first a negotiation with Australia, New Zealand, the UK, France and Norway. The second, a general reservation of rights, deferred for one year, or; *"... until such time as an intelligent analysis can be made to determine the areas of potential value."* [1416]

April 28th, Soviet army newspaper *Krasnaya Zvezda* (*Red Star*) reports that the United States is attempting to use the Antarctic as a training ground for new weapons, and for experiments with the hydrogen bomb. [1417]

April 30th, in London, the British Government determines to try a unilateral approach to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding Chilean and Argentine pretensions to the Falkland Islands Dependencies.

1413 *HC Deb 02 March 1955 vol.537 cc2033-4*

1414 *Staff Study prepared by the Operations Coordinating Board, March 29, 1955* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations and General International Matters, vol.11, Doc.299*

1415 Quoted in Howkins 2017 p.126

1416 *Memorandum from the Acting Executive Officer of the Operations Coordinating Board (Satterthwaite) to the Members of the Board April 25, 1955.* Record held at the University of Wisconsin-Madison.

1417 *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 p.22

"If the two governments do not see fit to accompany us to the Court we shall at least have acquainted the Court of the facts of the case and have placed on record before the Court and world opinion generally the grounds on which we consider our title to the United Kingdom sector of the Antarctic to be firmly rooted in international law." [1418]

"Her Majesty's Government therefore decided to make a direct application to the International Court and lay their case before it. They prepared two documents relating to encroachments by Argentina and Chile, respectively,..." [1419]

May 4th, at the Hague, in the Netherlands, Britain submits its cases against Chile and Argentina to the ICJ. [1420]

"1. Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Argentine Republic. [1421]

Differences have existed between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Republic of Argentina for a number of years, concerning pretensions advanced by the Republic in 1925, and at various dates thereafter, to the sovereignty of certain Antarctic and sub-Antarctic territories which belong to the United Kingdom under prior, long-standing, and well-established legal titles, dating from, at latest, the period 1775-1843. The territories in dispute between the two countries form part of the Falkland Islands Dependencies,.. The Government of the United Kingdom, in submitting this application to the Court, accordingly contends:- ...

The Government of the United Kingdom therefore, asks the Court to declare -

(1) that the United Kingdom, as against the Republic of Argentina, possesses, and at all material dates has possessed, valid and subsisting legal titles to the sovereignty over all the territories comprised in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, and in particular South Sandwich Islands, South Georgia, the South Orkneys, South Shetlands, Graham Land and Coats Land;

(2) that the pretensions of the Republic of Argentina to the territories comprised in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, and in particular South Sandwich Islands, South Georgia, the South Orkneys, South Shetlands, Graham Land and Coats Land, and her encroachments and pretended acts of sovereignty in or relative to any of those territories are, under international law, illegal and invalid;

(3) that the Republic of Argentina is bound to respect the United Kingdom's sovereignty over the territories comprised in the Falkland Islands Dependencies, and in particular South Sandwich Islands, South Georgia, the South Orkneys, South Shetlands, Graham Land and Coats Land, to cease her pretensions to exercise sovereignty in or relative to those territories ..." [1422]

2. Application Instituting Proceedings Against the Republic of Chile... [1423]

Differences have arisen between the Governments of the United Kingdom and of the Republic of Chile since November 6, 1940, concerning pretensions advanced by the Republic in a Presidential Decree of that date, to the sovereignty of certain Antarctic and sub-Antarctic territores which belong to the United Kingdom under prior, long standing, and well established legal titles dating from, at latest, the period 1775-1843. The particular territories in dispute between the two countries, namely the South

1418 Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan to the House of Commons quoted in *HC Deb 06 May 1955 vol.540 cc178-80W*
1419 *HC Deb 06 May 1955 vol.540 cc178-80W.* The case had been prepared by Sir Humphrey Waldock
1420 *Antarctica Cases: United Kingdom v. Argentine; United Kingdom v Chile* International Court of Justice 1956. Worthy of note, that an Argentine Judge, Lucio Manuel Moreno Quintana, was a member of the panel at this time.
1421 See - https://www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/26/026-19550504-APP-1-00-EN.pdf
1422 *Antarctica Cases: United Kingdom v. Argentine; United Kingdom v Chile* International Court of Justice 1956
1423 See - https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/27/027-19550504-APP-1-00-EN.pdf

Shetland Islands and Graham Land, form part of Falkland Islands Dependencies. ... The Government of the United Kingdom, in submitting this application to the Court, accordingly contends:- ...

The Government of the United Kingdom therefore, asks the Court to declare -

(1) that the United Kingdom, as against the Republic of Argentina, possesses, and at all material dates has possessed, valid and subsisting legal titles to the sovereignty of the South Shetlands and Graham Land; (2) that the pretensions of the Republic of Chile to the South Shetlands and Graham Land and her encroachments and pretended acts of sovereignty in or relative to those territories are, under international law, illegal and invalid; (3) that the Republic of Chile is bound to respect the United Kingdom's sovereignty over the South Shetlands and Graham Land, to cease her pretensions to exercise sovereignty in or relative to those territories ..."

"It is not clear what the British Government hopes to accomplish by its application to the International Court of Justice. It can have no illusions about the acceptance of the jurisdiction of the Court by either Argentina or Chile. ... The British would seem to have no prospect of achieving anything more than a tactical and propaganda result,.." [1424]

On the same day, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Minister sends a note to the British Embassy responding to the UK's letter of December 21st, 1954.

"... 2. The Letters Patent of 1908 and 1917, on which the British Government rely so much to support the rights which they invoke are, from the point of view of international law, acts or measures totally ineffective as a basis of sovereignty because they were exclusively unilateral and did not in any way have the concurrence of the Argentine Government.

3. Furthermore the foundation of the said documents is absolutely false because the territories which they mention and declare to be British are under the sovereignty of the Republic. The Falkland Islands are Argentine as are the lands which fall within out Antarctic Sector, as well as the South Georgia and Sandwich Islands. This, as Her Majesty's Government will know, rests upon unquestionable legal bases. Known historical reasons and geographical factors also support and give evidence to this. These apart from forming the incontrovertible basis for its material and permanent condition, are beyond all possibility of being invoked by Great Britain. Nevertheless, Her Majesty's Government avoid the fundamental question and, as though everything were reduced to one factor alone, mention as the only problem requiring solution, that which refers to the Antarctic territories to which they presume and which they class as dependencies of the Falkland Islands. On the other hand, nothing is said about the fundamental problem of sovereignty regarding the latter. ...

6. In consequence, while the question referred to above is not settled in the sense indicated, it is not suitable to propose, as has Great Britain, the submission of the matter to the International Court of Justice at The Hague or to any ad hoc arbitral tribunal. ...

7. No judicial or moral principle forces States to submit to the decision of external powers or entities their territorial rights based on legitimate titles such as are those which underlie the unquestionable sovereignty of the Republic over the Antarctic sector and adjacent islands..." [1425]

1424 *Foreign Service Despatch AmEmbassy Buenos Aires to Department of State May 17, 1955* in *CIA-RDP08CO1297R000800090016-0 Declassified and Approved for Release 2012/10/03*

1425 *Ibid.* Attached.

Argentina's rejection goes on to claim that acceptance of the British invitation to the court is also excluded by the, *"Treaty of Mutual Assistance of Rio de Janeiro"*, being; *"... incompatible with the aspirations of the peoples and Governments of this Continent who have confirmed in the Tenth Inter-American Conference at Caracas their desire finally to eliminate colonialism and who have confirmed their solidarity with the just claims to territories occupied by extra-continental countries."* [1426]

"It was a foregone conclusion that the Argentine Government would reject any proposal which in any way involved an admission of British sovereignty over the Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands). Such a recognition was implicit in the British proposition to arbitrate the conflicting Antarctic claims in the form of an adjudication of rights to the "Falkland Islands Dependencies."..." [1427]

"South Georgia has its own history, and the basis for the Argentine claim to it appears to be merely succession to British administrative powers exercised from the Falkland/ Malvinas." [1428]

"In Argentina, the southern continent mattered more to President Peron as an anti-imperialist "irrendenta" ... Peron believed that Argentina was winning the contest for Antarctic sovereignty, and saw no reason why the glory should be taken away at the stroke of a judge's pen. ... In Chile there was a genuine fear that their country would lose a case at the International Court of Justice. While most officials believed that Chile had excellent historical and geographical claims to the Antarctic Peninsula region, they realized that their efforts to "effectively occupy" the region had been less successful than those of Great Britain and Argentina." [1429]

"Without giving any evidence, the Argentine rejection of the proposal for a tribunal stated baldly that: "The Malvinas islands, together with the lands situated in our Antarctic sector, are Argentinian, as are the South Georgias and the South Sandwich Islands". It went on to say that since the Malvinas islands were Argentinian, the islands which were associated with them, by repeated British declarations, were Argentine territory too."[1430]

May 6th, in London, Foreign Secretary Harold Macmillan makes a statement to the House of Commons regarding Britain's submission to the ICJ. [1431]

> *"Our Ambassadors at Buenos Aires and Santiago have since been informed by the Argentine and Chilean Governments that they reject the offer of arbitration which we made last December. The Ambassadors have been instructed to express to the two Governments our disappointment at their replies and our hope that, in the light of the action which we have taken before the International Court, they will reconsider their attitude and accept the jurisdiction of the Court. If they do this the Court will be enabled to hear the case and give judgement. ...*
>
> *I hope that Argentina and Chile will accept the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice and that this issue, which has impaired our relations with two countries with whom we desire to be on terms of friendship, may be resolved by a judgement of that Court."*

1426 *Ibid.* Chile would repeat the same arguments to the ICJ, almost to the letter. See *US Embassy, Santiago to State Dept. May 16, 1955 USNA 702.022/5-1655*

1427 *Ibid.*

1428 *Historical and Legal Background of the Falkland/Malvinas Dispute* Alfred Rubin in *The Falklands War: Lessons for Strategy, Diplomacy and International Law*, Alberto R. Coll & Anthony C. Arend (eds.) 1985 p.20 footnote.

1429 Howkins 2008 p.232

1430 Pascoe 2020 p.273

1431 *HC Deb 06 May 1955 vol.540 cc178-80W*

May 13th, in Buenos Aires, a British Foreign Office spokesman is reported by the Argentine press as saying that the ICJ, under its rules, now has no option but to formally ask if Argentina and Chile are willing to accept its jurisdiction.

May 27th, Chile agrees to participate in the International Geophysical Year planned for 1957.

June 3rd, in Washington DC, it is noted that a decision has been made to defer an American claim to parts of Antarctica; *"We had recently decided to postpone the action for a year during which time US expeditions in the area might obtain additional information upon which we might better select the area of greatest value to the United States."* [1432]

June 12th, at the Falklands, a new infants school opens in Stanley; as does a new boarding school at Darwin.

"The new boarding school at Darwin was completed in 1955. The Falkland Islands Company Limited, to mark their centenary, made a generous gift of £20,000 towards the cost of the school. The Government contributed the next £10,000 and the Company and Government will, between them, meet all costs in excess of £30,000. The school, which is to be staffed and equipped at Government expense, will mark a new era in education in the Camp (the country outside the capital)." [1433]

June 15th, in Argentina, the proposal promulgated in August, 1954, to designate the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies as a part of one of its national territories (Tierra del Fuego), is approved by the Senate.

June 17th, in Chile, the country's claimed Antarctic Territories are placed under the Province of Magellanes. [1434]

June 28th, Argentine law *No. 14,408* states that national territories, including Tierra del Fuego, are to become Provinces; *"Art. 1º ... c) Another province will be constituted, limited to the north by the parallel 46°S; to the East, by the Atlantic Ocean; to the West, by the dividing line with the Republic of Chile, and to the South, with the Pole, including Tierra del Fuego, South Atlantic islands and the Argentine Antarctic sector."* [1435]

"My Lords, an Argentine Law was promulgated on August 25, 1954, which gave to certain parts of the Argentine Republic together with what were described as "the Antarctic sector and the Islands of the South Atlantic" the status of "National Territories". Her Majesty's Government protested against that Law at the time. The Bill to which the noble Lord refers raises such "National Territories" to the status of provinces. It has now become law. The Falkland Islands and the Falkland Islands Dependencies are not specifically designated in the new Law, but are implicitly included in one of these provinces under the heading of "the islands of the South Atlantic and the Argentine Antarctic Sector."..." [1436]

July 1st, at the United Nations, the General Assembly notes that it; *"... had already recognized the right of peoples and nations to self-determination; the next step was to formulate an appropriate article by which States would undertake a solemn obligation to promote and respect that right."* [1437]

1432 *Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, June 3, 1955. Department of State,central Files, 702.022/6-355 Secret.*

1433 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1954 & 1955.* See - https://www.nationalarchives.gov.fk/jdownloads/Colonial Annual Reports/1947 to 1955.pdf

1434 Both Chile and Argentina passing almost identical laws within days of each other could not be a coincidence.

1435 This does not appear to have been implemented. A further decree (*No.11,429*) of July 20, 1955 renamed the national territory of Tierra del Fuego as the Province of Patagonia but that was followed in 1956 by yet another decree (*No. 21,178*) which limited the Province of Patagonia to Santa Cruz. The reasons behind these changes are not clear. *cf.* 1990

1436 *HL Deb 20 July 1955 vol.193 cc.909-10.*

1437 United Nations General Assembly, Tenth Session: *Annotation on Draft International Covenants on Human Rights, UN doc. A/2929*, 1 July 1955, Chap. IV, p. 40, para.4.

In Paris, France, representatives of twelve nations meet to discuss the proposed International Geophysical Year.

"Throughout the meeting ..., the Chilean delegation, along with that of Argentina, sought to establish a clear distinction between IGY scientific research and politics in Antarctica. ... The meeting therefore established a "Gentleman's Agreement" by which none of the research and activity of the IGY would have any bearing on the question of Antarctic sovereignty." [1438]

July 12th, Britain protests against Argentina's law of June 15th.

July 15th, at the Hague, Chile formally indicates to the International Court of Justice that it refuses to recognise the Court's jurisdiction in relation to the British case.

In Argentina, President Perón declares; "*The Perónist Revolution has ended; now begins a new constitutional stage without revolution ... I have ceased to be the leader of the National Revolution in order to become President of all the Argentines."* [1439]

July 19th, in Buenos Aires, the US Embassy delivers a diplomatic aide memoir to Argentina's Foreign Ministry; *"The Government of the United States of America notes that legislation recently enacted by the Argentine Congress purports to incorporate into Argentine provincial administration those areas claimed by the Argentine in the Antarctic. The Government of the United States wishes to reiterate that it recognizes no claims advanced in the Antarctic and reserves all rights of the United States in the area."* [1440]

August 1st, in Holland, Argentina's Ambassador formally declines to accept the jurisdiction of the Hague court.

> *"... the Argentine Government has several times had occasion to indicate in notes addressed to Her Britannic Majesty's Embassy in Buenos Aries that it cannot consent to the question of sovereignty over the Antarctic Territories of Argentina which it is sought to raise being referred for decision to any International Court of Justice or Arbitration Tribunal. By this present note, my Government reaffirms its refusal in the most express way with regard to the jurisdiction of this Court and with regard to any possibility that it should be seised as such to deal with this case."* [1441]

"... the Agent for the Government of the United Kingdom stated that it regarded the letter of August 1st, 1955, from the Argentine Ambassador to the Netherlands as amounting to a rejection of the jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice for the purposes of the present case;.." [1442]

"... Argentina rejected the British suggestion to bring the dispute to the International Court of Justice in accordance with (the) fundamental principle that territorial sovereignty could not be subject to discussion or put into question." [1443]

"... there was nothing to stop Argentina from taking the Falklands dispute to the ICJ, with or without the Dependencies – the lack of any such move suggests that Argentina was not optimistic that the Court would uphold the Argentine claim." [1444]

1438 Howkins 2008 p.257
1439 See September, 1955 below.
1440 See - https://heritage.utas.edu.au/index.php/united-states-aide-memoire-to-argentina-reserving-the-united-states-rights-in-the-antarctic-areas-incorporated-by-argentina-into-its-provisional-administration
1441 *Antarctica Case (United Kingdom v. Argentina) Order of March 16, 1956*
1442 *Ibid.*
1443 Bologna 1988 p.50
1444 Pascoe 2020 p.274

In **September**, in Argentina, a military coup forces Juan Perón from power.

September 14th, in Washington DC, at a meeting between the Australian Minister for Foreign Affairs, Richard Casey, and US Deputy Under Secretary of State Murphy, the latter confirms US policy regarding Antarctica.

"Mr Murphy said that we did not recognize the validity of any of the claims so far advanced and noted that many of them involved areas in which we also had an interest based on a long history of exploration. He referred to the friction resulting from the conflicting claims of the United Kingdom, Chile and Argentina. He referred also to the 1948 proposal for some kind of common sovereignty ... He said that at some suitable time we favored negotiation among the seven claiming countries, excluding the USSR, so that conflicting claims could be reconciled." [1445]

September 25th, from Argentina, Juan Perón sails into exile. [1446]

"After the overthrow of Perón as a consequence of the 1955 coup d'état, the policy of peronization of the educational sphere was put to an end, Peronist school books were prohibited and references to the "National Doctrine" were eliminated, but the policy deployed by the deposed government around the Malvinas issue not only remained but also strengthened, while academic production on the subject continued. At the primary level, the school discourse on the islands established in the previous decade remained without great variations,..." [1447]

October 6th, at the meeting of the UN's Trusteeship Committee, Argentina's representative protests Britain's transmission of information regarding the Falklands, as required under Article 73 of the *Charter*. [1448]

December 31st, the population of the Falkland Islands is estimated to be 2,249 (1,260 males & 989 females). There have been 48 births and 22 deaths. Eighteen marriages have been celebrated. [1449]

> *"The principal industry, sheep farming, employs approximately 500 men. Labour in Stanley is mainly at the disposal of the Government and the Falkland Islands Company Limited. The former employed an average of 60 men on hourly wages during 1955 and the latter employed 72; 23 workmen from Germany were employed on the new Stanley roads and water filtration projects.*
>
> *The Public Works Department employed a few artisans engaged under contract from the United Kingdom. Several farm managers also found it necessary to import labour from the United Kingdom to work as shepherds and navvies in the Camp. Four Chilean navvies were engaged in 1955 to work on one farm. There was a general shortage of labour in the Colony and, consequently, no unemployment…*
>
> *Three small dairies in Stanley supply milk to the town. Farms in the Camp have their own cows. Methods of keeping livestock are uniform throughout the Colony. Sheep and cattle are distributed among farms in the East and West Falklands.*
>
> *At the 31st December 1955 the Colony had 597,781 sheep, 12,256 cattle, 2,858 horses and 67 swine."* [1450]

1445 *Memorandum of a Conversation, Department of State, Washington, September 14, 1955* in *Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/9-1455*
1446 At first to Paraguay, then eventually to Spain where he spent the next 18 years.
1447 Santos La Rosa 2022
1448 A Charter obligation placed upon the Administering Power, which was the UK.
1449 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1954 & 1955.*
1450 *Ibid.*

1956 – January 12th, in Washington DC, the National Security Council considers US Antarctic policy. [1451]

"The USA did not pursue its geopolitical interests in the region by claiming specific sectors as this would have meant leaving other strategic areas under the exclusive control of other countries. Instead, its activities were part of a broader effort to ensure a panoptical control over the whole continent." [1452]

January 26th, Argentina's Antarctic Institute is established by Presidential Decree. [1453]

On Thule (Morrell) Island in the South Sandwich group, Argentina's summer Antarctic station - *Teniente Esquivel* - is abandoned due to volcanic activity. [1454]

February 17th, at the United Nations, India's envoy asks that the issue of Antarctica be raised as a provisional item at the next session of the General Assembly. So that some form of trusteeship may be discussed.

"This is quite a good selection since it will cause the maximum amount of irritation to the largest possible number of countries." [1455]

"The explanatory memorandum has not yet been presented by the Indians to the UN secretariat and we have no details on the Indians proposal. Rumor has it that it involves a UN trusteeship over the Antarctic. Until we have seen the Indian proposal we are not in a position to say whether or not we would favor it. Should we favor a trusteeship we would be going contrary to the views of a number of friends." [1456]

February 22nd, in London, the British Foreign Office considers India's UN proposal.

> *"HMG has steadfastly refused for several years to accept the idea that territories over which they have sovereign rights should be submitted to UN control..."*

In Santiago, Chile, the newspaper *La Union* reports; "*Chile would not accept the Indian proposition*."

February 27th, Chile formally protests to the Indian Government. France and Norway also raise objections.

March 16th, at the Hague, the International Court removes the Antarctic cases from its list.

> *"... the Court finds that it has not before it any acceptance by the Government of Argentina of the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the dispute which is the subject of the Application submitted to it by the United Kingdom Government and that therefore it can take no further steps upon this Application;.."* [1457]

1451 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations & General International Matters, vol.11, Doc. 313.* The President was very concerned as to costs; *"... before he bought a horse he wanted to know what he was going to do with him besides feed him."*

1452 Turchetti, Naylor, Dean & Siegert 2008

1453 Headland 1989

1454 See 1976 & 1982

1455 Foreign Office note in *FO 371/119835*

1456 *Memorandum from the Assistant Secretary of State for European Affiars (Merchant) to the Under Secretary of State (Hoover) February 24, 1956* in *Department of State, central Files, 702.22/2-2456*

1457 See http://www.worldcourts.com/icj/eng/decisions/1956.03.16_antarctica1.htm and http://www.worldcourts.com/icj/eng/decisions/1956.03.16_antarctica2.htm

In Argentina, a children's author of fiction, Martiniano Leguizamón Pondal, in his book *'Toponimía Criolla en las Islas Malvinas'*, creates the legend of Antonio Rivero as a *'revolutionary hero'* who resisted British rule in the Falklands in 1833. [1458]

> *"… Buenos Aires did not hear Rivero's appeal, the gallop of his colts [sic], the crackle of his camp fire, the shudder of the anticolonialist idea, and the Buenos Aires squadron did not go to the unhappy islands… On the verge of trance, Antonio Rivero, in a superb expression of life and spontaneity, without hesitating, ordered the uprising… The English flag on the flagpole in front of the Irishman's store… was visible some five hundred metres to the south; towards it, with a sort of gigantic, epic energy, the rebels made their way. Dickson… emerged from the store shooting, and received a shot that stopped him. The gauchos, carried almost to frenzy, with patriotic fury, pulled down the English flag and, delirious, raised that of Belgrano, and, certainly rejoicing, pulled more than one cork…"*[1459]

"Leguizamón Pondal is not a historian and the merit in his work is multiplied by having interpreted the documentation with an Argentine sense." [1460]

"Attempts have been made to create a legend about courageous gauchos who attacked and defeated the British, but this is just imagination." [1461]

"Sprung from the imagination of a jingoistic writer, a cowardly thief and murderer who went by the name of Rivero and who was endowed with the undeserved virtues of a gaucho, rose to the Hall of Heroes." [1462]

"… Leguizamón Pondal's book led to the foundation of a new organisation, the "Comisión pro Monumento a Antonio Rivero", on 11 November 1965, which agitated for a monument to be raised to Rivero as a patriotic Argentine hero." [1463]

"(Leguizamón Pondal) admits the lack of historical sources to support his view, but in writing he appeals to national sentiment and to the sentiment of the author himself: "We confess that we have not found the same wealth of materials for all the chapters, but it goes without saying that all have been worked with the same eagerness, love and enthusiasm"... In his opinion, national historians had followed the British interpretation."[1464]

March 22nd, Chile protests the existence of British bases within its claimed Antarctic Territories. Immediately rejected by Britain. [1465]

1458 *False Falklands History at the United Nations: How Argentina misled the UN in 1964 – and still does* G. Pascoe & P. Pepper 2012 p.6. A book for children. The problem, of course, is that children grow up with the memory. Back in 1833, Rivero was recognised as a murderer by Buenos Aires and, in particular, by Luis Vernet, whose managers Rivero killed. He was no revolutionary hero, but lies told to children can last forever. *cf.* 1833 in Vol.2

1459 *Toponimía Criolla en las Islas Malvinas* Martiniano Leguizamon Pondal 1956. Fiction, indeed. *cf.* August, 1833, November, 1965, January, 1966, April, 1966, August, 1972, April 1982, August 2012 and March 2015

1460 *El gaucho Antonio Rivero. La mentira en la historiografía académica* Mario Tesler 1971

1461 Destefani 1982.

1462 *Falklands or Malvinas: Myths & Facts* M. P. Peña & J. A. Peña 2018

1463 Pascoe 2020 p.165

1464 *Las Malvinas, el Gaucho Rivero y la construcción de un mito nacional (1956 – 2012)* 2022 F. G. Lorenz 2022. Britain does not have an 'interpretation'. Britain has the witness statements. See August 26, 1833

1465 *Antarctica in International Law* Ben Saul & Tim Stephens (eds) 2015

June 1st, in Buenos Aires, distribution of the United Nations magazine *'World Communications'* is banned due to it listing the Falkland Islands as a British possession.

June 25th, in Washington DC, an Anglo-US agreement is signed - *Concerning the Extension of the Bahamas Long Range Proving Ground by the Establishment of Additional Sites in Ascension Island.* [1466]

"... in 1956 an agreement was signed by Britain and the US permitting the use of Ascension as a tracking station for the USAF Eastern Missile Test Range. The airfield was improved and its runway extended to 10,000 feet. A new base was built together with radar and telemetry facilities. ..." [1467]

August 3rd, from Paris in France, the Chilean Ambassador cables his Ministry in Santiago; *"Antarctic Conference concluded its active work today without adopting any agreement that could harm us."* [1468]

October 16th, at the UN, India submits its '*Explanatory Memorandum*' for the agenda of the 11th meeting of the UN's General Assembly; *"... the Indian Government suggests that the "General Assembly should call upon all States to agree to and affirm the peaceful utilization of Antarctica for the general welfare and in particular agree that the area shall not be used in any manner that would create or accentuate world tensions".* [1469]

October 17th, at the United Nations, India's representative calls for a General Assembly discussion. [1470]

Chile and Argentina, supported by 18 other Latin American nations, oppose the motion.

"Chile's titles on the polar cap formed by the meridians 53° west longitude of Greenwich and 90° west longitude of Greenwich are so clear and irrefutable that it is not possible to admit that other nations, individually or collectively, can call into question our sovereignty. Few countries, in fact, can adduce more solid and ancient antecedents, of a historical, geographical and legal order, to prove the belonging of a territory. Already at the time of Spanish domination, "the famous Antarctic region" of which Don Alonso de Ercilla gallantly speaks, extended to the last and most remote limits of the southern hemisphere, that is, to the South Pole. The peninsular domain titles represent, therefore, a very ancient basis of our current Antarctic sovereignty. Geographically, these regions have a configuration and characteristics that also reveal their affinity with our continental and island territory. The identity of flora, fauna and glaciers clearly demonstrates that Chile and the polar cap form an indissoluble natural unity. In addition to all these antecedents and many others, our Homeland has long exercised the indisputable acts of sovereignty over these territories." [1471]

November 5th, India's call for a General Assembly discussion regarding Antarctica is opposed by the USA.

> *"While we have not undertaken formulate detailed comments on the Indian memo we would like to make certain general observations at this time. We can see no need to raise Antarctica in UN at this juncture and believe it politically unwise to do so. While GOI apparently wished avoid raising*

1466 According to the xAI - *"The US was granted permission to develop and operate facilities on Ascension Island, including the reactivation and expansion of Wideawake Airfield, which had been originally built during World War II. The agreement facilitated the establishment of a US Air Force tracking station, officially activated on June 25, 1956, as a satellite of Patrick Air Force Base (now Patrick Space Force Base) in Florida. This station supported the Eastern Test Range for missile and space launches from Cape Canaveral. The agreement included provisions for US military personnel and contractors to operate on the island, ..."*

1467 *Ascension Island – Gateway to the Falklands* Jeremy Price in *Royal Air Force Historical Society: Journal 30* 2003. *cf.* 1982

1468 *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 p.179

1469 *Memorandum from the Director of the Office of United Nations Political and Security Affairs (Adams) to the Assistant Secetary of State for International Organization Affairs (Wilcox) in Department of State, Central Files, 702.022/11-656*

1470 *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 p.87

1471 *Ibid*. pp.86-87

question territorial claims we doubt if this can be avoided entirely. This could lead to exacerbation existing rivalries among countries having claimed Antarctic territory making even more difficult an eventual solution problem. Moreover, we doubt whether any constructive result likely be obtained. There is freedom of exploration and scientific investigation in Antarctica as evidenced by extent of voluntary cooperation by countries currently participating IGY activities there. We fail see legitimate basis for what we understand to be Indian concern over possible use Antarctic region for nuclear testing." [1472]

At South Georgia, *Busen 8*, a whale-catcher owned by 'Tonsbergs Hvalfangeri', is scuttled off Stromness Bay.

November 14th, at the UN, India abandons its proposals regarding trusteeship for Antarctica.

"The issue initiated by India was, for months, a cause of friction in the relations between the Government of New Delhi and Latin Americans, particularly those of Argentina and Chile. Recently the governments of Australia and Canada indicated that they shared the Latin American opinion opposed to the incorporation of the Antarctic issue in the Assembly. Australia, which like Chile and Argentina exercises sovereignty in Antarctica,..." [1473]

"In withdrawing the item Mr. Krishna Menon explained that his Government was doing so in order to have time to prepare the item better and to persuade other governments of its importance. It may be assumed, therefore, that the Indians may well re-introduce the subject at a subsequent meeting of the General Assembly." [1474]

"The fact that the "Antarctic Question" was not raised at the United Nations General Assembly in 1956 had other important implications for the future of Antarctica. It is difficult to imagine that the members of the United Nations would have allowed twelve countries to sign the Antarctic Treaty of 1959 and form an "exclusive club", if they had already had experience of debating Antarctica." [1475]

November 21st, Argentine, Chile and the UK renew the agreement not to send warships into Antarctic waters.

December 31st, the population of the Falkland Islands is estimated as 2,294. There have been 48 births, 22 marriages and 18 deaths.

"*With the exception of meat and a limited quantity of vegetables and berry fruits, practically the whole of the Colony's requirements in foodstuffs are imported. ... No crops are grown in the Colony, with the exception of a limited supply of oaten hay. ... In 1956 the Colony had 608,882 sheep, 12,168 cattle, 3,040 horses and 60 swine. ... No dairy produce was exported. An occasional shipment of mutton was made to the whaling establishments in South Georgia and some sheep were sold to meat freezing plants in Southern Chile. The Colony is self-supporting in mutton and beef, supplies for Stanley being obtained from various settlements. Three small dairies in Stanley supply milk to the town. Farms in the Camp have their own cows."* [1476]

1472 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations & General International Matters, vol.11, Doc. 315*
1473 *El Diario Ilustrado* Noviembre 15, 1956 quoted in *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 p.90
1474 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, United Nations & General International Matters, vol.11, Doc. 317*
1475 Howkins 2008 p.275
1476 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Years 1956 & 1957*

1957 – January 1st, in the South Atlantic, HRH Prince Phillip tours in HMY *Brittania,* visiting FIDS bases.

January 7th, in the Falklands, Prince Philip, Duke of Edinburgh, arrives at Stanley for an official visit. [1477]

"The Royal Yacht Britannia, accompanied by H.M.S. Protector, anchored in Stanley Harbour and His Royal Highness came ashore to receive a hearty welcome from the residents of Stanley and the inhabitants of outlying settlements who had travelled to the capital by air, ship and horseback for the eagerly awaited day. After reviewing a guard of honour, His Royal Highness received an Address of Welcome delivered in the Council Chamber by the Senior Elected Member of the Legislative Council, to which he replied. Prince Philip then attended a special race-meeting organised for the occasion and was cheered to the echo when he won the Sailors' Race. Visits to the Hospital and new Infants' School followed, after which His Royal Highness saw an exhibition of peat cutting and then spent some time on the Rifle Range where the Falkland Islands Rifle Association were engaged in a contest against a combined Royal Navy and Royal Marines team. Next followed an exhibition arranged by the Sheep Owners' Association and the Guild of Spinners, Weavers and Dyers. A treeplanting ceremony and a short visit to Christ Church Cathedral completed the daytime programme. That same evening His Royal Highness attended a Colony Ball and presented some of the major prizes won at the race-meeting." [1478]

January 9th, at Fox Bay, West Falklands, the Duke of Edinburgh arrives in the Royal Yacht.

"The visit to the Falkland Islands was highly successful in every way and enabled the inhabitants of this loyal Colony to welcome a member of the Royal Family for the first time since 1871."[1479]

January 12th, HRH Prince Phillip visits South Georgia.

January 20th, at Montagu Island, South Sandwich group, a Soviet whale-catcher, *Slava 15*, lands a party. [1480]

In **February**, in London, Anthony Hurd, a Conservative MP and a Director of the Falkland Islands Company (FIC), meets with Britain's Foreign Secretary to discuss an expansion of the Company's activities.

"Hurd reminded the Foreign Secretary of the restrictions on Falklanders visiting Argentina. He then said that, "If relations with Argentina were normal the Falkland Islands Company would probably re-route their monthly steamship service to Argentina. In addition, they would welcome an extension of the (Argentine) Patagonian air service to the Falkland Islands (it was not an economic proposition for the Company to run an air service to Montevideo). ... He asked for consideration of an "outright solution" whereby,"... the Argentine claim to sovereignty could be recognized by us in return for an Argentine undertaking to accept the permanence and legality of our administration of the Islands."..." [1481]

1477 For details of the visit see – https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/165
1478 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Years 1956 & 1957*
1479 *Ibid.*
1480 Holdgate & Baker 1979 p.6. See December, 1957 below.
1481 Ellerby 1990 pp.102-103 citing *FO 371/126165*

"By the mid-twentieth century, the FIC owned and enclosed up to nearly half (46 percent) of the land in the islands. The company established a monopoly of wool trade, shipping, retail, chandlery, banking, accommodations and entertainment. Through this hold on production, distribution and consumption, the FIC had overpowered the local British colonial governors in local influence." [1482]

February 28th, in Argentina, decree *No.2191* re-establishes the 'National Territory of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands'. [1483]

> *"Art. 2. The National Territory of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and South Atlantic Islands includes: The eastern part of the Isla Grande and other Islands of the archipelago of Tierra del Fuego and Islas de la Estados and Año Nuevo,, according to the limits set by the Treaty of July 23, 1881, the Islands Malvinas, South Georgia Islands, the South Sandwich Islands and the Argentine Antarctic sector between the meridians 25° West and 74° West and the parallel 60° South"*

"... it is worth noting the decree of Decree 2,191 of 1957 by which the national territory of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and the South Atlantic Islands is reestablished, referring to the 1881 treaty. Indeed, in its article 2, said decree established the jurisdiction of the new territory comprising the eastern part of the Big Island, other islands of the archipelago of Tierra del Fuego and islands of the States and New Year, the Falkland Islands, the Georgias Islands, the South Sandwich Islands and the Argentine Antarctic Sector." [1484]

March 3rd, during the inauguration of its fifth permanent base in Antarctica, Chile's Minister of Foreign Affairs, Osvaldo Sainte Marie, reaffirms his country's '*rights*' to the Antarctic Peninsula.

> *"Gentlemen, it is not unknown to you that these polar territories that have belonged to us since ancient times, by virtue of irrefutable historical and legal titles, are also linked to the continental territory of the republic for an identity that the geophysical sciences only confirm. It is your turn as patriots and hard-working researchers to increase scientific knowledge about this connection that highlights and highlights our position as sovereigns in the Antarctic zone and consecrates us as legitimate owners of these promising lands"* [1485]

April 4th, at Stanley, John Matthew is appointed magistrate at King Edward Point, South Georgia.

April 28th, Edwin Porter Arrowsmith arrives as the new Governor of the Falkland Islands. [1486]

In **May**, in London, the Foreign Office produces an internal report on the future of Britain's colonies. This suggests that the Falkland Islands can be given an independent government with no loss to British prestige, however, the danger from Argentina is recognised.

> *"Provided withdrawal of UK jurisdiction did not also involve withdrawal of UK protection, there would be no vacuum to be filled by an outsider. If however, protection were also withdrawn, the Falkland Islands would be in danger of occupation by Argentina, and the abandonment of a racially British population to such a fate would be discreditable and severely damaging to prestige."* [1487]

1482 *Salvaging Empire: Sovereignty, Natural Resources, and Environmental Science in the South Atlantic* J.J.J. Blair 2023

1483 Symmons 1984. Tierra del Fuego had first been designated as a national territory in 1862, but this had been followed by a number of reorganisations involving the territory. Tierra de Fuego would finally become a Province in 1990.

1484 Argentine Congress August 3, 2006 *Document 4302-D-06*

1485 *La Unión de Valparaíso* quoted in *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 pp.98-99

1486 Not gazetted, but Arrowsmith was referred to as Governor when Knighted. *cf. The London Gazette No.41727*. For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/arrowsmith_sir

1487 *Future Constitutional Development in the Colonies CAB 134/1551*

May 22nd, in Washington DC, the Director of the National Security Council submits a *memorandum* to the National Security Council Planning Board.

> *"The existing U.S. policy on Antarctica, adopted in July, 1954 and amended in January, 1956, provided that the United States would not make a formal claim to any Antarctic territory, but would reserve and at an appropriate later time reassert all its rights therein. At that time, and in subsequent reconsideration of the policy by the National Security Council in 1956, the major emphasis of U.S. programs in Antarctica was placed upon scientific activities in support of the International Geophysical Year. …*
>
> *In 1948, the United States explored unsuccessfully with the claimant powers the possibility of placing the Antarctic under some form of international administration. The United States has neither reaffirmed nor rejected, publicly or to the present claimant powers, the position it took publicly in 1948 favoring the establishment of an international regime in Antarctica. Conversations with the other friendly governments who have advanced claims to portions of Antarctica have produced no agreement.*
>
> *Argentina and Chile take a pronounced nationalistic and emotional attitude toward their prospective and sometimes conflicting claims, which cover the Drake Straits and the Palmer Peninsula, and from a purely strategic point of view constitute most important areas in Antarctica. Argentina and Chile contest the claims of the United Kingdom to the same area, and their quarrel with Great Britain is exacerbated by Argentine sensitivity over the Falkland Islands dispute. … it would seem desirable, on balance, that the United States, .., make a formal claim to portions of Antarctica and be prepared to recognize claims by friendly Free World claimants. …*
>
> *It is recommended that, keeping in mind the need for action before or on the tentative target date of January 1, 1959 for putting forth a U.S. claim to Antarctica, and having due regard for the possibilities analyzed in the preceding paragraph, the United States commence forthwith diplomatic conversations among the seven Free World claimant powers."* [1488]

June 14th, in Paris, the Fourth Antarctic Conference opens at the French Geographic Institute. The US delegate proposes an extension to the Geophysical Year into 1959. Argentina announces that, regardless of the final decision, it intends to maintain its bases in Antarctica. [1489]

July 1st, Antarctica sees the commencement of the International Geophysical Year involving scientific projects from 67 countries. Antarctic projects are initiated by twelve countries. [1490] British scientists are specifically tasked to consider the economic worth of the UK's claims in the Antarctic Peninsula so that the advantages, or otherwise, of holding onto sovereignty can be assessed.

"The Admiralty arranged for a 3,600-ton net-laying vessel, HMS Protector, to be strengthened for service in ice-infested waters and to be equipped with helicopters. She was commissioned for service in the Dependencies and was able to render valuable assistance to field parties and to help with the relief of bases." [1491]

1488 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, UN & General International Matters, volume 11, Doc.330*. The proposal was rejected on June 26, 1957 (*Doc. 332*)

1489 *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006

1490 Britain, USA, Australia, France, Norway, New Zealand, Russia, Chile, Argentina, Belgium, Japan and South Africa.

1491 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Years 1956 & 1957*

"Rather than embracing the IGY whole-heartedly, Argentina and Chile were somewhat reluctant collaborators in a global scientific project that they viewed as potentially damaging to their political claims in the southern continent. They feared that an unfettered movement of scientists would undermine their sovereignty claims, ..." [1492]

August 17th, at Marguerite Bay, on the western side of the Antarctic Peninsula, Argentina establishes a new base within the area claimed by Chile. [1493]

At Stanley, RMS *Darwin* arrives in the port on her maiden voyage. [1494]

August 23rd, from Washington DC, responding to a telegram from the British Government, the Department of State (Dulles) informs the US Embassy in London that:

> *"US in principle willing to participate in proposed quadripartite working level talks which could be held in Washington in October. Dept's first reaction to British suggestion is that creation of condominium including USSR would not best serve interests ... and would be inconsistent with present US policy. US itself was about to propose talks leading to merging of claims among present claimants and US and gradual development of condominium starting however with only the sector embracing Australian and New Zealand claims, and unclaimed Marie Byrd Land. Later, countries presently claiming other parts Antarctic would be urged to accede to condominium.*
>
> *Immediate inclusion of British was not contemplated solely because of political situation Argentina and conflicting British-Argentine-Chilean claims. Our plan calls for keeping arrangements secret until after IGY. This condominium could of course offer to make arrangements with USSR as to any continued Soviet activities."* [1495]

September 27th, in Buenos Aires, decree *11,818* re-organises Argentina's maritime divisions to include South Georgia Island, the South Sandwich Islands and Argentina's claimed Antarctic sector within the prefecture of the *"Southern Atlantic Zone"*. [1496]

October 4th, from the Soviet Socialist Republic of Kazakhstan, Russia launches *Sputnik 1* into space. Officially listed as part of it's contribution to the IGY, this forces the USA to bring forward its own plans; starting the *"space-race."*

"Just four days before the meeting, the launch of the first artificial satellite, Sputnik, demonstrated emphatically Soviet technological prowess and prompted concerns among the meeting's participants about the role Russia was going to play in the southern hemisphere." [1497]

"The two superpowers had a very similar approach to Antarctic sovereignty: both refused to recognise any existing claims and reserved their own rights over the entire continent. But throughout the IGY, there was constant speculation that one or both of the superpowers would make formal sovereignty claims." [1498]

1492 Howkins 2008 (2)
1493 *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 p.117
1494 Purchased by the Falkland Islands Company as a replacement for RMS *Fitzroy.*
1495 *Telegram from the Department of State to the Embassy in the United Kingdom August 13 1957* held at University of Wiscosin-Madison. The original London telegram remains elusive.
1496 *Boletín Oficial* October 15, 1957. See - https://heritage.utas.edu.au/index.php/decree-no-11-818-re-organising-maritime-divisions-to-include-south-georgia-island-south-sandwich-islands-and-the-argentine-antarctic-sector-within-the-prefecture-of-the-southern-atlantic-zone
1497 Turchetti, Naylor, Dean & Siegert 2008
1498 Howkins 2008 (1) p.298

October 7th, in Washington DC, a meeting of representatives from the UK, Australia and New Zealand, is convened. Britain's Viscount Samuel Hood proposes the internationalization of the Antarctic continent as a basis for discussion. The USA repeats its suggestion of an 8-power condominium.

> *"A condominium could be established whereby claims over all or part of the Antarctic would be merged, provided the United States and all or certain of the other friendly claimant powers were to agree on the advisability and desirability of taking such action. To the extent disputed area is involved, such an international administration would obviate the necessity of negotiating out rival claims as between the claimant powers. The United States, as one of the joint sovereigns over areas in which the Soviets are located, would have a better basis for opposing objectionable Soviet activities or claims in those areas. It is expected, however, that both Argentina and Chile would strenuously resist the concept of a condominium."* [1499]

"On 7–8 October 1957, when the IGY was in full swing, a secret meeting was organized at the US State Department in Washington DC, including high-ranking officials from the Foreign Offices of Britain, Australia and New Zealand. One of the points on the meeting's agenda was Australia's growing concern over the establishment of Soviet bases in Australian Antarctic Territory. It was not just sovereignty at stake – the Australians believed that the bases could be used as launch sites for nuclear weaponry. … The convenor of the Antarctic meeting was the US Department of State's adviser on Antarctic affairs, Paul C. Daniels,… However, years later, John Heap, a leading British diplomat and Antarctic scientist, claimed that it was the British Foreign Office that had been responsible for organizing the meeting. The fact that the British delegation, in contrast to the other parties, presented a document setting out a proposal for an international regime in Antarctica seems to confirm this claim." [1500]

October 8th, on the second day of the Washington DC meeting, Britain's delegation present a paper.

> *"The present current of opinion in many countries, fomented partly by public interest in the IGY, is favourable to international co-operation in the Antarctic. The cold war has not yet been extended to the Antarctic. This favourable climate of opinion and absence of conflict may not last for long after the end of the IGY and therefore the present moment offers an opportunity which may not recur for considering a change in the status quo."* [1501]

"The UK document went on to suggest the possibility for claimant states to retain territorial sovereignty in name, but in practice to hand the continent's governance over to an international governing body. … The meeting was concluded by indicating as common objectives of Antarctic policy the demilitarization of the continent; the encouragement of scientific research; and the possibility of exploiting its resources. … it was agreed that US diplomats would exert some pressure on Chile and Argentina in order to make them accept the invitation for a meeting on Antarctic affairs." [1502]

December 11th, at the United Nations, resolution *1188 (XII)* reaffirms that; *"Member States shall, in their relations with one another, give due respect to the right of self-determination."*

".., between 1950 and 1957, the General Assembly adopted eight resolutions on the right of peoples and nations to self-determination and independence. Each resolution was adopted by a majority of the membership of the United Nations … The General Assembly was unrelenting in the attention that it paid to the development of the

1499 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955–1957, UN & General International Matters, volume 11, Doc.333*
1500 Turchetti, Naylor, Dean & Siegert 2008
1501 *Summary report of informal talks held among officials of Australia, Great Britain, New Zealand and the United States, Annex I – UK Document, Secret, 2–3. Copy in FCO 7/3248, NA* quoted in Turchetti, Naylor, Dean & Siegert 2008
1502 Turchetti, Naylor, Dean & Siegert 2008

right to self-determination. The resolutions adopted in the seven-year period instilled confidence in peoples under colonial domination. Between 1957 and 1960, and prior to the adoption of 1514 on 20 December 1960, 18 countries under colonial domination became independent. It is arguable that the analysis of the flurry of General Assembly resolutions over the seven-year period 1950 to 1957 shows that State practice and opinio juris combined to establish the right to self-determination as a rule of international law by 1957 …" [1503]

December 16th, in the South Sandwich Islands, the Soviet whale-catcher, *Slava 15* (Ivanov) arrives at Zavodovski Island. [1504]

"… a party landed by boat and walked some way inland, erecting a cairn as a mark of their visit." [1505]

December 31st, at Neptune's Bellows on Deception Island, whale-catcher *Southern Hunter* is wrecked whilst attempting to avoid an Argentine naval vessel entering the harbour. [1506]

In Buenos Aires, on the same day, decree *17,413* re-organises Argentina's National Antarctic Commission.

> *"The general policy of the Antarctic will be established by the National Executive Power with the advice of the ministers and secretaries of state that it deems necessary, or by the National Defence Council when necessary. The National Antarctic Commission … will have the general function of "advising" the Executive Branch and the Ministers Secretaries of State on the general policy to be developed in the Antarctic..."*

The population of the Falklands is estimated as 2,253 with 41 registered births, 22 marriages and 22 deaths.

> *"Children in the Camp not attending a boarding school are encouraged to attend school in Stanley and a boarding allowance of £2 per month for each child is granted. This scheme now also applies to children whose parents live in South Georgia. Under an agreement with the Dorset County Council one boy was sent on a scholarship to a County Grammar School in Dorset in 1956 and one girl in 1957. An Overseas Education Allowances Scheme was initiated in 1957 under which Government makes a tax-free grant of £150 for the first year and £100 a year for the next four years to the parents of children between the ages of 11 and 18 years who are receiving full-time education overseas at a school approved by the Superintendent of Education. There was one child of school age in South Georgia in 1957. There were no educational facilities but books and materials are obtainable from the Education Department in Stanley. …*
>
> *The authorised strength of the Falkland Islands Police Force is seven, consisting of the Chief Constable, one sergeant, one senior constable and four constables, all of whom are stationed in Stanley. Two constables are stationed at South Georgia. With the exception of the Chief Constable, members of the Force are recruited locally. Training is carried out under the supervision of the Chief Constable. The number of indictable offences has increased slightly. The most serious cases of juvenile delinquency during the period under review were sacrilege and larceny. The incidence of juvenile delinquency has increased during the last two years."*[1507]

1503 Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson in *Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965 February 25, 2019*

1504 First discovered by the Russian expedition led by Thaddeus von Bellingshausen in December, 1819

1505 Holdgate & Baker 1979 p.6 citing Ivanov 1959b. Rather than just a commemorative cairn, it has been suggested to me that the crew raised the Soviet flag and erected a four meter wide sign indicating Russian sovereignty. To-date, I have found no evidence to support this, although, in the context of the period, such an action would not have been surprising. *cf.* 1947, 1950 & January, 1957 above; January, 1958, below.

1506 Headland 1989

1507 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Years 1956 & 1957*

1958 – January 3rd, in London, Government spokesman Ian Harvey, addresses the House of Commons on the situation in the South Atlantic.

> *"Argentina now occupies eight and Chile five posts in the Falkland Island Dependencies. Only one of these, the Chilean station on Trinity Peninsula, has been established since 1956. Both Governments have also erected navigational beacons and refuge huts in the area. Her Majesty's Government have made formal protests when each installation was set up, the last being in March, 1957, at the end of the 1956–57 Antarctic season. The International Geophysical Year opened on 1st July, 1957. Her Majesty's Government welcome scientific exploration in the Falkland Island Dependencies during this period and do not regard this as affecting sovereignty in any way.*
>
> *All the above-mentioned Argentine and Chilean posts are participating in the scientific programme of the International Geophysical Year. In the case of activities which are not connected with the International Geophysical Year such as the Argentine tourist cruise to Deception Island in January, Her Majesty's Government have made their attitude on the question of sovereignty clear to the Governments concerned."* [1508]

January 8th, Chilean newspaper *La Unión de Valparaíso* reports; *"The authorities refused to comment on press reports in London and attributed to Moscow radio that Russia has planted its flag on Zavodovsky Island, South Sandwich Islands. In such press reports it was conjectured that Russia could be planning some territorial claim on that island. The authorities here say that they do not have any official information concerning this fact and that the issue has not been the subject of international discussions."* [1509]

On the same day, in Washington DC, a State Department spokesman, speaks to the press.

> *"The United Press then asked for some general indication of the current political views of the American government with respect to Antarctica, and the official replied that in 1948, the United States proposed to the governments of Argentina, Chile, Australia, New Zealand, Great Britain, France and Norway to internationalize that vast southern territory."*
>
> *This proposal was not accepted by the other countries", the official said, "and the US has continued to observe its policy of not making territorial claims in Antarctica or recognizing any claims by another power, but reserving, in the meantime, the right to assert their rights throughout the continent.*
>
> *US rights include the right to make a claim based on many past American actions or the right to make claims when the US is satisfied that such action will lead to a comprehensive agreement on Antarctic problems and to the peaceful administration of the continent.*
>
> *Our 1948 proposal has never been withdrawn and if other countries want to consider it, the United States will be interested in knowing their points of view. Any administrative provisions that are taken into account must contemplate the continuation of the fruitful cooperation in the scientific field that is being carried out with such success in the present in the International Geophysical Year".* [1510]

From the Falklands, Governor Sir Oswald Arthur visits the Dependencies aboard RRS *Shackleton*.

From Argentina, tourists aboard *Les Eclaireurs*, sail for the South Shetland Islands. [1511]

1508 *HC Deb 03 February 1958 vol.581 cc137-8W*

1509 *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 p.126

1510 *La Unión de Valparaíso* quoted in *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 pp.125-126

1511 Organised by the Argentine Navy, Chile expressed reservations on March 26, 1958 which were rejected by Argentina on April 24, 1958.

January 17th, in Moscow, the Soviet Union's Antarctic exploration chief, Mikhail Mikhailovich Somov, declares that it has not yet been proven that Antarctica is a continent, but if it turns out to be one then Russia will claim its right to participate; *"Somov indicated that Russia does not claim sovereignty over a specific part of Antarctica, but that "it would be unfair to solve the future without Russian participation"."* [1512]

At South Georgia, an Argentine customs officer arrives aboard a 'Compañia Argentina de Pesca' transport ship from Buenos Aires.

"He rather naively said he had come to assume duty ashore in South Georgia. However he was required to remain on board ship while he was there, except once when he was escorted ashore by the policeman/handyman in uniform to the dentist's surgery at Grytviken for treatment and back on board again." [1513]

February 16th, in Santiago, an editorial in Chile's *El Murcurio* journal asserts that the government cannot consent to any discussion of the internationalisation of Antarctica.

> *"The British Foreign Office has announced that it is preparing, in consultation with Australia and New Zealand, a plan for the internationalization and demilitarization of Antarctica, which would include a joint administration of the countries that have interests there under the supervision of the United Nations. The United Nations would have control of Antarctica and its mineral wealth and would prohibit the establishment of military bases, which would be expected to put an end to the claims of several powers, including Chile, Argentina, the United States, the Soviet Union and the United Kingdom. Her British Majesty's own ambassador to La Moneda, Sir Charles Empson, has informed our Foreign Ministry about the surveys carried out by his Government in this regard with the aim of developing a project "that contemplates joint collaboration for the future, once the AGI ends on December 31, 1958".*
>
> *The United Kingdom ambassadors recently carried out the same action before the Casa Rosada and the White House, according to cable news, and in both countries there have already been unofficial statements that show that the British plans have not found any favorable response. ...*
>
> *The issue of the internationalization of Antarctica is not new, as it had already been raised in 1948 by the United States, which proposed the establishment of a condominium of Argentina, Chile, the United States, Great Britain, Australia, New Zealand, Norway and France, a proposal that the three members of the British community of nations were willing to consider, but which did not prosper as it was flatly rejected by Chile and Argentina."* [1514]

February 18th, Chile's Foreign Minister, Alfredo Sepulveda Contreras, makes a statement to the press. [1515]

> *"1) There is an American Antarctic that is an integral part of the Western Hemisphere. In accordance with the provisions of the Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance, signed in Rio de Janeiro in 1947, and in force today in all the republics of America, the Antarctic region between the 42nd and 90th meridians of Greenwich longitude, is part of the zone of security of America. The American Antarctic is included in the Inter-American Defensive System and its security is the direct responsibility of the States that*

1512 *Ibid.* p.127
1513 John Matthew in Tatham (ed) 2008
1514 *La Unión de Valparaíso* quoted in *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 pp.131-132
1515 Hanessian 1960 pp.436

have traditional control of their territories and, in the event of an extra-continental attack or aggression, of all the nations that are part of this system.

2) Included in this American Security Zone is the Antarctic Territory of Chile limited, as is known, by the 53rd and 90th meridians of longitude west of Greenwich; territory over which our country has the oldest titles of dominion constituted, first, by repeated provisions and mandates of Spain, and later, throughout our republican life, by successive acts of Government and an uninterrupted exercise of sovereignty.

3) For the reasons indicated, the Government of Chile cannot but reject any proposal that implies the internationalization or condominium of any part of its national territory, whether located in Antarctica, in America or in its island possessions in the South Pacific." [1516]

"The Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mr. Alberto Sepúlveda, in a written statement delivered to the press yesterday afternoon, reaffirms the decision of the Chilean Government to "reject any proposal that implies the internationalization or condominium of any part of the national territory". This declaration is a consequence of the conversations held with Great Britain for the conclusion of an international agreement on the future of Antarctica. He then adds the Chancellor's statement: "With any proposal of this kind ruled out, the Government of Chile is willing to consider with interest a closer understanding to ensure the continuity of scientific collaboration"." [1517]

March 10th, in Washington DC, a further "*conversation*" takes place at New Zealand's Embassy.

"Representatives of the United Kingdom, Australia, New Zealand, and the United States, as indicated above, met informally at the New Zealand Embassy to discuss the present status of developments in regard to Antarctica. Ambassador Daniels stated that the United States had had talks with the Governments of Chile and Argentina and their reaction to proposals for an international solution to the Antarctic problem was as anticipated. Both countries, he stated, though opposed to any solution involving sacrifice of claims, seemed to be interested in the concepts of scientific cooperation and peaceful uses of Antarctica.

Ambassador Daniels also stated that the United States is planning to make an approach soon to all claimant powers in order to determine whether or not there is a generally agreed basis for going ahead with plans for Antarctica. Lord Hood … stated that the United Kingdom favored bringing in the widest range of countries in the general agreement, at the same time was interested in limiting the number of countries involved in the actual administration. He felt that the whole arrangement would be open to less criticism in the UN if we went ahead "full steam" taking into consideration all the factors which might cause question or opposition in the UN. An effective, well-rounded program would impress members of the UN and the UN would then be more likely to leave "hands off."…" [1518]

"... there was a gradual realisation that Antarctica would not prove to be the frozen El Dorado of popular imagination... (which) contributed to Britain's growing desire to resolve the question of sovereignty in Antarctica. ... The advantages of maintaining exclusive sovereignty in the Falkland Islands Dependencies increasingly seemed to justify neither the diplomatic headaches it caused, nor the expense it incurred." [1519]

1516 Quoted in *La Unión de Valparaíso* February 19, 1958
1517 *La Unión de Valparaíso* quoted in *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 pp.134-136
1518 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, United Nations and General International Matters, vol.2 Doc.270*
1519 Howkins 2008 p.307

March 24th, the USA seeks the views of the IGY countries in respect of the political future of Antarctica. [1520]

April 29th, in New York, following two months of general debate, the United Nations opens a number of accords for signature by members.

Convention on the High Seas (CHS) [1521]

Convention on Fishing and Conservation of the Living Resources of the High Seas (CFCLR) [1522]

Optional Protocol of Signature concerning the Compulsory Settlement of Disputes (OPSD). [1523]

Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone (CTS) [1524]

> *"Article 10 1. An island is a naturally formed area of land, surrounded by water, which is above water at high tide. 2.* ***The territorial sea of an island is measured in accordance with the provisions of these articles.****"* [1525]

Convention on the Continental Shelf (CCS) [1526]

> *"Article 1: For the purpose of these articles, the term "continental shelf " is used as referring (a) to the seabed and subsoil of the submarine areas adjacent to the coast but outside the area of the territorial sea, to a depth of 204 metres or, beyond that limit, to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of the natural resources of the said areas; (b) to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands.* [1527]
>
> *Article 2: 1. The coastal State exercises over the continental shelf sovereign rights for the purpose of exploring it and exploiting its natural resources. ...*
>
> *Article 6: 1. Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them.* ***In the absence of agreement****, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances,* ***the boundary is the median line****, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured."* [1528]

"Islands generate their own territorial sea and continental shelf. Furthermore, the principle that islands should be treated as any other land territory for the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, contiguous zone and continental shelf was expressly recognised in Article 10(1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. In so far as the continental

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1520 In the form of an *aide-memoire* handed to representatives from the Embassies of Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, Norway, New Zealand, the Union of South Africa, the Soviet Union, and the United Kingdom. The inclusion of the USSR was a controversial decision within the US Government; also raising some objections from other western powers. Copy of the *aide-mémoire* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, United Nations and General International Matters, vol.2 Doc.271*

1521 Came into force September 30, 1962

1522 Came into force March 20, 1966

1523 Came into force September 30, 1962

1524 Came into force September 10, 1964

1525 My emphasis.

1526 Came into force June 10, 1964

1527 Effectively giving islands their own continental shelf for the purposes of international law. Argentina declined to sign.

1528 My emphasis. Britain only ratified this convention in May, 1964; a month before it was due to come into force.

shelf is concerned, the Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, at Article 1(b) provided that the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring inter alia 'to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands'. Any insular formation, which is above water at high tide, therefore possesses a territorial sea and a continental shelf." [1529]

"In 1950 Britain approved the Falkland Islands (Continental Shelf) Order in Council, which established full sovereignty over the seabed and subsoil contiguous to the colony's coasts. Even more worrying from Buenos Aires' perspective was the ominous turn taken by the Geneva negotiations. When the Philippines' proposal to grant an explicit continental shelf status to islands was accepted and included in the 1958 Convention, the Falklands Order in Council suddenly acquired a firmer standing in international law and a more dangerous meaning for Argentine pretensions. Now Britain... could claim that, as the sole UN-recognised administering power of the South Atlantic Islands, it had a legitimate title to the rights prescribed by the conventions. Moreover, in its Article 6 the convention outlined the process whereby a continental shelf adjacent to two or more states could be divided between them and provided that, in the absence of an agreement, the boundary would be the median. This last proviso suggested that the convention applied even to those states, like Argentina, which had refrained from signing it." [1530]

May 2nd, the US government invites a select group of countries to a conference regarding Antarctica.

"On 2 May 1958 the US Ambassadors of 11 countries (seven claimant states plus Japan, Belgium, Germany and Russia) delivered to their foreign ministers a letter inviting them to participate in a conference on Antarctica. The letter referred to the 'splendid example of international cooperation' set by the IGY and its importance for mankind. The US letter then indicated the need to find a political solution for Antarctica that would allow 'a continuation of the international scientific cooperation which is being carried out so successfully during the IGY.'..." [1531]

May 3rd, in Washington DC, US President Eisenhower announces:

> *"The United States for many years has had, and at the present time continues to have, direct and substantial rights and interest in Antarctica... my Government reserves all of the rights of the United States with respect to the Antarctic region, including the right to assert a territorial claim or claims... the interests of mankind would be best served, in consonance with the high ideals of the Charter of the United Nations if the countries which have a direct interest in Antarctica were to join together in the conclusion of a treaty which would have the following peaceful purposes:*
>
> *A. Freedom of scientific investigation throughout Antarctica...*
>
> *B. International agreement to ensure that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only.*
>
> *C. Any other peaceful purposes not consistent with the Charter of the United Nations."* [1532]

"It is added that the North American plan is still in its exploratory stage and presumably the project would end with the conclusion of a treaty that guarantees that Antarctica will only be used for peaceful purposes." [1533]

May 4th, in Chile, *El Mercurio de Santiago* quotes from the invitation sent by the US government.

1529 *Islands* Andrew J. Jacovides in *Peaceful Order in the World's Oceans: Essays in Honor of Satya N. Nandan* Michael Lodge & Myron Nordquist (eds) 2014

1530 González 2014 p.109. See above.

1531 Turchetti, Naylor, Dean & Siegert 2008

1532 *Department of State Bulletin*, vol.38, no.988, pp.910-912

1533 *El Mercurio de Santiago* May 3, 1958 quoted in *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 p.140

"*... The International Geophysical Year concludes at the end of 1958. The need for coordinated scientific research in Antarctica will undoubtedly continue for many years into the future. Consequently, it would seem desirable for those countries participating in the Antarctic program of the International Geophysical Year to reach agreement among themselves on a program that ensures the continuation of the fruitful scientific cooperation referred to above.*

An agreement of this nature would have the additional advantage of avoiding unnecessary and undesirable political rivalries on that Continent, the uneconomical disbursement of funds intended to defend the national interests of each State and the possibility of repeated international misunderstandings. If an adequate agreement were reached between the countries directly interested in friendly collaboration in Antarctica, it would be advantageous not only for those countries, but also for all the others.

The current situation in Antarctica is characterized by various legal, political and administrative regulations that are making friendly collaboration difficult in the absence of such understanding.

Among the countries concerned, seven of them have proclaimed claims of sovereignty over regions of Antarctica, some of which overlap and give rise to occasional friction. Other countries have a direct interest in that continent, based on discoveries and explorations carried out in the past, on its geographical proximity, on air and sea transport routes, and on other considerations. ... the interests of humanity would be better served, in accordance with the high ideals contained in the Charter of the United Nations, if the countries that have a direct interest in Antarctica united in celebrating of a Treaty that brought together the following peaceful purposes: a. Freedom of scientific research throughout Antarctica, by citizens, organizations and governments of all countries and the continuation of international scientific cooperation that is being carried out with such success during the current International Geophysical Year; b. Celebration of an International Convention that ensures that Antarctica will be used only for peaceful purposes; c. Any other peaceful objective is not contrary to the Charter of the United Nations.

The Government of the United States of America is willing to discuss, jointly with the governments of all other countries that have a direct interest in Antarctica, the possibility of entering into an agreement, in the form of a treaty, with the objective of giving legal status to these high principles. It is estimated that a treaty of this type could be signed without the requirement that any of the participating nations renounce the basic historical rights they may have in Antarctica or any sovereignty claims they may have proclaimed.

It could be specifically stated that such basic rights and claims would not be affected while the Treaty is in force and that no new rights could be acquired or any new claims made by any country during the duration of the Treaty. In other words, the legal "status quo" in Antarctica would be frozen during the validity of the treaty, thus allowing collaboration on scientific and administrative matters to be carried out constructively without being hindered or affected in any way by political considerations.

Similarly, provisions could be made in relation to joint administrative arrangements that are necessary and desirable to ensure the successful achievement of agreed objectives." [1534]

1534 From the invitation to Chile, quoted in full in *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 p.

"In other words, it would seem that through the traditional diplomatic language in which the US Government note is written, one could see the intention of reaching an Antarctic condominium agreement under the administration of the United Nations. If this were the case, Chile would be renouncing inalienable rights, a situation that, we are certain, neither the Government nor the people would accept. As Foreign Minister Sepúlveda has said on the occasion, our country is willing to continue cooperating in scientific studies such as those carried out on the occasion of the International Geophysical Year in Antarctica, but it is not willing to give up its clear, clean and very ancient position. legal, historical, geographical and geological that gives sovereignty over the Antarctic territory that runs between the 53rd and 90th meridians longitude west of Greenwich." [1535]

"By emphasizing that current claims will not be affected during the life of the treaty, Eisenhower has sought to circumvent the obstacles that arose to an agreement ten years ago. Great Britain, Argentina and Chile have so far been at odds over their claims to the Palmer Peninsula, which extends from Antarctica towards the tip of South America." [1536]

May 13th, Chile formally accepts the invitation to the proposed Antarctic Conference; with reservations including that it does not accept the "*internationalization*" of Antarctica.

"By agreeing to attend this Conference, our Foreign Ministry has stated with frankness and precision the conditions under which Chile would agree to sign the proposed treaty. Firstly, the different situation of Chile with respect to the other Antarctic powers that have colonial possessions there is revealed, while our country extends the southern end of its metropolitan territory towards Antarctica. This circumstance means that Chile has to be cautious regarding the commitments it makes and the limitations it agrees to impose on the exercise of its jurisdiction in those territories. Secondly, the Government of Chile rejects, in the most categorical manner, any idea of internationalization of its Antarctic territory, whether direct or indirect. In this sense, Chile will excuse itself from accepting any interference from the United Nations by virtue of the principle inscribed in the Charter of this international organization that prohibits it from intervening in the internal affairs of its members. Chile accepts, however, the continuation of its current scientific collaboration established on the occasion of the celebration of the International Geophysical Year that will end at the end of this year." [1537]

May 20th, the British Government accepts the invitation to the proposed Antarctic conference.

May 21st, Argentina accepts the invitation to the proposed Antarctic conference, arguing that it should be held in Buenos Aires. [1538]

"For its part, Argentina's position was summarized in this way by circles close to the Government: "Argentina agrees with the proposed conference, but it must be preceded by an agreement on the agenda that will govern the deliberations"." [1539]

June 2nd, the USSR informs the USA of its general agreement with the Antarctic proposals.

"Russia has reaffirmed to the United States, in a note, that it reserves all rights in Antarctica "based on the discoveries and explorations of Russian sailors and scientists at the beginning of the 19th century," as it said last night. Moscow radio. The note delivered to Washington was the response to the North American note of

1535 Editorial in *La Unión de Valparaíso* May 5, 1958
1536 Editorial in *El Mercurio de Santiago* May 7, 1958
1537 Editorial in *El Mercurio de Santiago* May 18, 1958
1538 *El Mercurio de Santiago* May 21, 1958 in *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 p.151
1539 *La Tercera* June 8, 1958

May 3, addressed to Russia and ten other countries, proposing a conference to discuss an international agreement to ensure that Antarctica is reserved only for peaceful purposes, the radio said. The Russian note says that the Soviet Government would not have and could not recognize any separate arrangement leading to state ownership of Antarctica. He says, however, that Russia agrees with the American proposal for a conference for an international agreement regarding Antarctica and believes that governments, organizations and citizens of all countries should enjoy freedom of scientific research throughout Antarctica. under equal conditions." [1540]

June 5th, from Washington DC, the US State Department announces that all those countries invited to the proposed Antarctic conference have accepted - Argentina, Australia, Belgium, Chile, France, Japan, New Zealand, Norway, Russia, Southern Africa, and the United Kingdom.

June 13th, in Washington DC, informal discussions regarding the proposed Antarctic conference are held; *"... informal meetings have been held once or twice a week, for the most part in the Board Room of the National Academy of Sciences building, among representatives of the Embassies in Washington of the eleven countries and the U.S. to reach mutual agreement on time and place of the conference and on other procedural matters. It was the hope of most of the representatives, except the Soviet, that in these meetings preliminary agreement could be reached on some of the substantive questions pertaining to the treaty. The Soviet representative has consistently refused to discuss substantive matters except in the conference itself. He has also insisted at every occasion that all other countries which desire to do so be invited to participate in the conference. This position is opposed by all the other countries invited by the U.S. The group has tentatively agreed upon Washington as the site of the Conference. Efforts to agree upon a date, however, have been unsuccessful mainly because of Australian insistence that more preparatory work must first be accomplished before a conference date can be set. Both the U.K. and Australia also insist that an understanding must first be reached with the USSR that participation be limited to the 12 invited by the U.S. Both fear that if the Conference convenes during the U.N. General Assembly the USSR will walk out of the Conference and immediately bring up the question of participation before that assembly (India has already placed the subject of Antarctica on the provisional agenda of the General Assembly but later indicated it would not press for inclusion of the item in the agenda). The Chilean and Argentine representatives have insisted that if the informal working group now meeting does not agree on an early date for the Conference (October 23 has been proposed) this failure will surely cause the General Assembly to take up the question. Chile and Argentina, which would both consider U.N. discussion of Antarctica as interference in their domestic affairs, would likely refuse to participate in any U.N. discussion of Antarctica."* [1541]

August 30th, Chile and Argentina voice their opposition to any internationalization of the Antarctic; *"..., the Chilean and Argentine delegations set out their positions with long diatribes on their right to the southern continent. ... Enrique Gajardo, the Chilean representative, made it clear that Chile considered Antarctica part of its metropolitan territory... adding once again that the Antarctic Peninsula was a geological extension of Chilean territory..."* [1542]

In Cambridge, England, Britain's Scientific Committee on Antarctic Research (SCAR) is founded. Established at the Scott Polar Research Institute, it is to operate within the IGY.

In Buenos Aires, proposals to transfer the assets of the 'Compañia Argentina de Pesca', following its sale to the British based company, 'Albion Star', are vehemently opposed by the Argentine government. [1543]

1540 *El Mercurio de Santiago* June 5, 1958
1541 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, United Nations and General International Matters, vol.2*
1542 Howkins 2008 p.322
1543 *FO371/131892; Colonial Office Records; Public Record Office,* October 17, 1958

September 17th, in New York, at the UN, India once again postpones its proposed General Assembly consideration of the "*Antarctic Question*". [1544]

September 18th, in Santiago, the *La Tecera* newspaper reports:

> *"Authorized diplomatic sources said today that President Eisenhower's proposal to convene an International Conference on Antarctica is mired in a fantastic tangle of conflicting interests and positions. After three months of preparatory meetings, the twelve nations included in the project have still not managed to set the date, place or agenda of the conference. "This is a mess", declared a source."* [1545]

September 27th, at the United Nations:

"The Trust Commission of the General Assembly of the United Nations, heard today, as every year, statements on rival claims regarding dependent areas, and which are made known when the Commission studies the report of the administrative powers. There were references to the sovereignty of the Malvinas (Falklands), Gibraltar, areas of Antarctica, Mauritania, Eden, British Honduras (Belize), Cyprus, Western New Guinea (Western Iran) and certain African territories. Miss Teresa Hortensia Flouret, from Argentina, was the first to speak. Regarding the British report on the Malvinas Islands, she said that the islands are occupied by the United Kingdom "for an act of violence never accepted by Argentina". She stated that the islands are "an integral part of Argentina". Sir Anthony Cohen of the United Kingdom gave the response that his country has reiterated many times during similar debates: that his Government has no doubts about the sovereignty of the islands and that he wished to make formal reservations about the United Kingdom's position on the question. Cohen gave the same response when objecting to British administration over areas such as Gibraltar, Cyprus, British Honduras and Eden. Chilean Antarctica. The Chilean delegate said in reference to the British report on the Malvinas, that Chile reserved rights over sectors of Antarctica. Spain's Manuel Aznar called for an end to British control over Gibraltar, Europe's "last and definitive example of colonialism"." [1546]

In Washington DC, the US government produces a series of informal working papers on Antarctica; *"Despite the differences emerging during the preliminary conversations, considerable optimism prevailed among the participants, ..."* [1547]

Falkland Islands Governor, Sir Oswald Arthur, inspects the Dependencies aboard HMS *Protector*. [1548]

December 11th, in Chile, *El Mercurio de Santiago* reports; *"Great Britain has decided to increase polar scientific research from its bases in Antarctica and invest larger sums in the project, according to official sources. The Colonial Office has established a draft estimate that contemplates an expenditure of approximately £500,000 during 1959-1960 on such research and on the maintenance of twelve bases in the Falkland Islands and the Dependencies of the same name. The calculation is twice the amount approved for this year's operations. Research in the Falkland Islands Dependencies is a scientific and official organization under the direct administrative control of the Governor of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. Its permanent bases on the mainland and on the islands neighboring Graham Land, directed by experts and technicians, are located in the sector that Great Britain claims for itself, and that, in turn, Chile and Argentina consider as part of their territories. Respective."* [1549]

1544 *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 p.162
1545 Quoted in *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 p.162
1546 *El Diario Ilustrado* November 11, 1958.
1547 Hanessian 1960 pp.436-480
1548 Headland 1989
1549 *La Antártica y el año Geofísico Internacional 1954-1958: Percepciones desde fuentes chilenas* 2006 p.170

In New York, the United Nation's 'Economic and Social Council' propose a resolution concerning the attainment of self-government by Trust Territories.

"In 1958 the United States had managed to secure approval in the Economic and Social Council for a proposal to establish an ad hoc commission to conduct a thorough survey of the concept of self-determination. But this proposal was rejected when it came before the Third Committee. Various grounds were given by the anti-colonialists for rejecting this proposed study, for instance that it would serve only to delay still further the active exercise of the right to self-determination. A more subtle objection was voiced by the Pakistani representative and constitutes a continuing strand in anti-colonialist thought -

> *"The international community has reached a sufficient degree of maturity to be able to distinguish between genuine self-determination and self-determination used as a cloak for secession. In the last analysis could it not be said that the expressions 'people' and 'nations' are purely legal concepts independent of political, social and economic factors? Could it be said that any attempt at definition might prove dangerous to subject peoples by providing those who govern them with pretexts for denying them self-determination?"*

Thus the anti-colonialists wished to reserve it for the 'mature' judgement of the international community, whether in any particular case a group is to be recognized as a people entitled to self-determination." [1550]

December 31st, at years end, the population of the Falkland Islands is estimated as 2,238 with 46 births, 17 marriages and 21 deaths during 1958. There are also 611,421 sheep, 12,059 cattle, 3,099 horses and 56 pigs.[1551]

1959 – January 20th, in Washington DC, an internal US Department of State *memo* records progress regarding the proposed Antarctic conference.

> *"... thirty-one meetings of preparatory talks on Antarctica have been held, attended by representatives of the United States and of the Embassies in Washington of the eleven countries to whom our note of May 2, 1958, was addressed. It has been agreed that the conference should be held in Washington but no announcement of this will be made until there is a decision on the date of the conference... Except for differences as to formulation there is general agreement for the provisions that Antarctica be used for peaceful purposes only and that there be freedom of, and continued international cooperation in, scientific research in Antarctica. The differences as to formulation are related in most cases to other points which have either not yet been discussed as fully or on which agreement will be difficult.*
>
> *The problems on which there may be difficulty in reaching agreement include:*
>
> *(1) The inclusion of a provision setting aside the question of rights and claims ("freezing the legal status quo"). The USSR has expressed opposition to the inclusion of this provision and France, for other reasons, has also expressed a difference of view regarding its formulation.*
>
> *(2) There is a difference of opinion as to whether high seas should be included in the area of application of the treaty.*
>
> *(3) The USSR and Australia have opposed a provision which would expressly reserve the right to use military personnel and equipment for peaceful scientific uses.*
>
> *(4) Provisions for an adequate inspection or observation system in order to assure compliance with the principle of peaceful use remain to be discussed among all twelve.*

1550 Dunnett 1983 pp.423 & 424
1551 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Years 1958 & 1959*

(5) For some time now the Soviet representative has not repeated his suggestion that participation in the conference be broadened, which all of the other eleven oppose. Beyond this, the question of the relationship of the treaty to states other than signatories has not been threshed out as yet among the twelve." [1552]

At South Georgia, *Busen 10,* a whale catcher owned by 'Tonsbergs Hvalfangeri', is scuttled off Stromness Bay.

April 6th, in Buenos Aires, decree *4,022* sets out harbour regulations for Port Foster at Deception Island.

May 28th, details of the long proposed conference are finally announced by the US government; *"... on May 28, 1959, the Department of State announced that the Antarctic Treaty Conference would be held in Washington commencing on October 15."* [1553]

June 24th, at South Georgia, Dennis Joseph Coleman arrives as magistrate.

October 15th, the Washington DC, the Antarctic Treaty Conference convenes in formal session with the US representative elected as conference chairman. Delegates form two committees to consider the various substantive proposals that have arisen from the preparatory informal "*conversations*." Argentina, Chile and France remain particularly sensitive to any suggestion of a dilution of their territorial claims in Antarctica.

"... (Argentina & Chile) made themselves thoroughly unpopular by obstructive practices and long speeches." [1554]

"Argentine Ambassador Adolfo Scilingo emphasised that the Conference had been called primarily to provide for the "exclusive peaceful use of Antarctica" and for the development of "scientific co-operation" in the region, and did not neglect to refer to Argentina's strong feelings regarding the maintenance of the status quo.... The Chilean Delegate reaffirmed that "Chilean Antarctic Territory does not have the character of a colonial possession, but is part of its metropolitan territory and forms part of its southernmost province,"..." [1555]

Britain's representative, Sir Esler Dening, addresses the delegates.

"... recognising the need to ensure that knowledge of the Antarctic and freedom of access to it should not be limited by political considerations, and while fully maintaining the indisputable rights to sovereignty to which the United Kingdom is entitled, we are nevertheless prepared to subscribe to a clause in the Treaty which will maintain the legal status quo throughout the are of the Antarctic." [1556]

October 20th, Argentina's delegation demand a closed session of the Antarctic conference.

"... any obligation stronger than an agreement to cooperate would not be acceptable to Argentina and, if insisted upon, would force Argentina to withdraw. Various language formulations were suggested in an attempt to meet the Argentine position but were not acceptable." [1557]

"South American officials never believed that 'scientific goodwill' was ever more than a facade for the political interests of the great powers, and Britain in this context was conceptualized as a 'great power.' ... Argentine and Chilean participation in the negotiation of the Antarctic Treaty can be explained as a direct continuation of their reluctant collaboration with the IGY." [1558]

1552 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, United Nations and General International Matters, vol.2 Doc.281*
1553 Hanessian 1960 pp.436-480
1554 Britain's Brian Roberts quoted in Howkins 2008 p.329
1555 Hanessian 1960 pp.436-480
1556 Quoted in Hanessian1960 pp.436-480
1557 *Memorandum From the Head of the U.S. Delegation to the Conference on Antarctica (Phleger) to the Secretary of State, October 20, 1959* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, United Nations and General International Matters, vol.2 Doc.296*
1558 Howkins 2008 (2)

November 20th, at the Antarctic Conference, some issues that delegates had thought resolved, return.

"... there had been a misunderstanding when Article IV was approved. The French, Belgian and Argentine delegates believed that the French version had been approved, whereas the U.S., Soviet, UK, Australian and other delegations had believed that the English text was what was approved. All agreed that the fundamental purpose of the Article was to preserve everybody's positions regarding the recognition or non-recognition of claims and that the treaty under no circumstances would be interpreted as prejudicing any party's position on this question. ..." [1559]

November 30th, in Washington DC, a final conference session agrees on the issue of nuclear testing in Antarctica. The way is now open for a treaty, despite Argentine and Chilean expressing doubts.

> *"I am a skeptic, in each of these accords we are losing rights. In Antarctica the weapon is science. There is a war for dominion and the weapon is science."* [1560]

"Right until the end of November, it remained uncertain whether any agreement could be reached. ... In the nature of all compromises not everybody was happy ..." [1561]

December 1st, in Washington DC, the *Antarctic Treaty* is signed, covering the globe south of latitude 60°S. [1562]

Article 1 deals with the limitation on the presence of armed forces within the Antarctic region.

> *"1. Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. There shall be prohibited, inter alia, any measure of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military manoeuvres, as well as the testing of any type of weapon.*
>
> *2. The present Treaty shall not prevent the use of military personnel or equipment for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose."*

Article IV (2) deals with sovereignty claims.

> *"No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force."* [1563]

"The Treaty revives the principle of unanimity in that it requires unanimous ratification and cannot be amended unless all parties consent... As no termination date is given, the Treaty remains in force indefinitely"[1564]

1559 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960, United Nations and General International Matters vol.2 Doc.319*
1560 General Cañas, head of Chile's IGY committee on his resignation. Quoted in Howkins 2008 (2)
1561 Howkins 2008 (1) p.337
1562 The treaty came into force on June 23, 1961. Argentina ratified it, reluctantly, on April 25, 1961. Chile on June 23, 1961. Other nations have acceded and ratified since December, 1959. Full list here - https://treaties.un.org/pages/showDetails.aspx?objid=0800000280136dbc
1563 The Antarctic Treaty suspended all claims, although to this day (2025) both Argentina and Chile still publish statements regarding their "*rights*". The Treaty has no end date. In 1991, a *Protocol on Environmental Protection to the Antarctic Treaty* was adopted (effective from 1998), which included a clause (Art.25) allowing for review (of the Protocol) after 50 years, commencing in 2048. This appears to have confused some commentators into believing that the Antarctic Treaty will end in 2048. That is not the case.
1564 Hanessian 1960 pp.436-480

"The Antarctic Treaty did not, as is frequently asserted, solve the Antarctic territorial question. It provided only for a modus vivendi as between the players." [1565]

"By signing the Treaty, Argentina and Chile effectively suspended their rights to the exercise of normal sovereignty over their claims to the Antarctic Peninsula region. For the duration of the Treaty, they could not, for example, prevent any country from establishing a scientific base in their claimed territories, and had no legal jurisdiction over nationals from other signatory nations." [1566]

"Its convoluted wording indicated that the signatory states agreed chiefly on their disagreements." [1567]

December 12th, the UN General Assembly adopts resolution *1467 (XIV)* calling for a committee to determine the principles which should guide members as to the transmission of information required by Art.73e of the UN Charter. [1568]

Art.73e states: *"e. to transmit regularly to the Secretary-General for information purposes, subject to such limitation as security and constitutional considerations may require, statistical and other information of a technical nature relating to economic, social, and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible other than those territories to which Chapters XII and XIII apply."*

December 31st, at the end of the year, the population of the Falkland Islands is estimated as 2,173 with 41 registered births, 18 marriages and 28 deaths. [1569]

1960 – a documentary by Walt Disney, *'Islands of the Sea'*, is filmed in the Falklands, the Galapagos, Guadeloupe and Midway. [1570]

March 2nd, in London, Britain's House of Commons is informed of the situation in the South Atlantic.

> *"Argentina at present occupies nine and Chile four bases in the Falkland Islands Dependencies. Both Governments have also erected navigational beacons and refuge huts in the area. Her Majesty's Government made formal protests when each installation was set up. The Antarctic Treaty signed in Washington on 1st December, 1959, on behalf of twelve nations, including the United Kingdom, Argentina and Chile, provides for the maintenance of the legal status quo as regards territory. The Treaty, when ratified, will ensure that United Kingdom sovereignty in the Antarctic is fully safeguarded."* [1571]

May 31st, the United Kingdom ratifies the Antarctic Treaty. As regards sovereignty claims, Article.4 states:

> *"1. Nothing contained in the present Treaty shall be interpreted as:*
>
> *(a) a renunciation by any Contracting Party of previously asserted rights of or claims to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica; (b) a renunciation or diminution by any Contracting Party of any basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica which it may have whether as a result of its activities or those of its nationals in Antarctica, or otherwise; (c) prejudicing the position of any Contracting Party as regards its recognition or non-recognition of any other State's right of or claim or basis of claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica.*

1565 John Heap quoted in *The Polar Regions and the Development of International Law* Donald Rothwell 1996
1566 Howkins 2008 (2)
1567 Turchetti, Naylor, Dean & Siegert 2008
1568 This Special Committee comprised three Administering Powers (Netherlands, UK and USA) and three non-administering (India, Mexico and Morocco).
1569 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Years 1958 & 1959*
1570 An Academy Award Nominee. Available here - https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=TPsaZycEv-o
1571 *HC Deb 02 March 1960 vol.618 c1220*

2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force."

"The treaty provides that Antarctica shall be used for peaceful purposes only. It specifically prohibits "any measures of a military nature, such as the establishment of military bases and fortifications, the carrying out of military maneuvers, as well as the testing of any type of weapons." (The Treaty does not prohibit the use of military personnel or equipment, however, for scientific research or for any other peaceful purpose.) Nuclear explosions and the disposal of radioactive waste material in Antarctica are prohibited." [1572]

In Argentina, the 10th edition of a book first published in 1949, is prepared for use in the education system – *Curso de Historia Argentina* by José Carlos Astolfi.

"... in the second half of the 20th century, the publishing market began to be dominated by textbooks that were no longer produced by authors from the academic field. The way in which the new books approached the Malvinas question is similar to that developed in the first generation of Argentine history manuals, although they give it a more prominent treatment. This is observed, for example, in the work of Astolfi. In the first edition of his manual, published in 1949, a very small space is given to this topic, just three paragraphs that do not exceed half a page. On the other hand, in the 10th edition published in 1960, three pages are already allocated to develop the history of the Malvinas, ending the topic with the development of eight points that show that the islands are Argentine due to a series of arguments that would be taken up later in other editorial proposals: 1. It is the heir to all Spanish possessions "in this part of the continent" and said succession is implicitly contained in the recognition of our independence by the Motherland. 2. The pilot Esteban Gómez of the Magellan expedition was the first to sight the islands, in 1520. 3. It was not an English sailor but the Dutchman Sebaldo (sic) de Wert who first explored them. 4. Both France and England, which had occupied parts of the archipelago in 1764 and 1766 respectively, withdrew shortly after, recognizing Hispanic sovereignty. 5. From 1774 to 1833, for 59 years, the Malvinas depended without any protest, first on Spain and then on the government of Buenos Aires. 6. As it was effectively occupied by Argentine residents and officials, it could not be considered an abandoned or ownerless place (res nullius). 7. No cause or conflict justifies the war action of January 3, 1833. 8. The Malvinas Islands are on the continental submarine platform and therefore are a geographical extension of Patagonia and are within what modern International Law considers jurisdictional waters." [1573]

August 18th, in Washington DC, the USA formally ratifies the Antarctic Treaty.

September 20th, in New York, at the United Nations, newly independent States are admitted as members.

"... 17 new independent states (16 in Africa plus Cyprus) were admitted as members of the UN on a single day (20 September 1960). That began a transformation of the UN, and the new members were keen to extend the benefits of independence to the remaining colonial territories." [1574]

September 23rd, before the UN's General Assembly, the USSR's Nikita Khrushchev proposes a declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples. [1575]

1572 US Secretary of State Archive website. A copy of the full treaty can also be found there. See - https://2009-2017.state.gov/t/avc/trty/193967.htm
1573 Santos La Rosa 2022
1574 Pascoe 2020 p.289
1575 Noteworthy that the USSR had not identified any colonies in its possession in 1946.

"The States that set up the United Nations founded its Charter upon the lofty and humane ideals of equality of rights and the self-determination of nations end peoples. Born in the period of victorious conclusion of the Second World War, the United Nations embodied hopes that the inequality and. enslavement of some nations and peoples by others would disappear along with the barbarity and criminal acts of fascism and militarism. But not all the hopes of the peoples came true. Still unsolved is a vital problem of our time: the complete liberation of mankind from the shameful colonial regimes inherited from the past." [1576]

September 28th, the UN's General Assembly vote in favour of allocating the USSR's proposal to the First (Security & Political) Committee for consideration.

November 28th, seventy delegations consider the Soviet Union's proposals.

"The Assembly discussed the item in plenary between 28 November and 14 December. The discussion centred mainly on two draft declarations: one introduced by the USSR which would have proclaimed inter alia that "all colonial countries and Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories must be granted forthwith complete independence", and that "all strongholds of colonialism in the form of possessions or leased areas in the territory of others must be eliminated" which was not put to a vote as a whole after its first three substantive paragraphs were rejected; the other sponsored by forty-three Afro-Asian states which was eventually adopted..." [1577]

"The USSR representative, opening discussion of the item on 28 November, said that, although the process of liberation of peoples under colonial rule had already achieved striking results in Asia and Africa, colonialism was not yet dead. As recent events in the Congo had shown, some countries had not been completely freed from colonial domination in spite of their nominal independence. Then, too, there were still many countries in Asia, Africa, Latin America and Oceania "languishing under the yoke of foreign domination". He recalled that Mr. Khrushchev had warned the General Assembly on 12 October 1960 that, unless the most urgent measures were taken, colonialism was capable of causing still more suffering and much loss, destroying many millions of lives, giving rise to military conflicts, and endangering peace and security not only in certain areas but the world over. ... The United Kingdom representative said ... Since 1939, .., some 500 million people formerly under British rule had achieved freedom and independence and their representatives sat in the General Assembly. ... The United Kingdom representative said he found it hard to improve on the terms of Article 73 of the Charter, by which administering powers undertook, among other things, to develop self-government in the territories under their control. However, the problems of the development of political independence varied according to the circumstances of the different territories. For example, there were no fewer than 29 Non-Self-Governing Territories under United Kingdom administration with a population of under one million each; 14 of these had a population of less than 100,000. [1578] *The people of those small territories, he stressed, had to think carefully about their future. The United Kingdom considered that it had a solemn obligation to work out with the people concerned the form of independence which would best satisfy their aspirations."* [1579]

1576 *Declaration on the Grant of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples submitted by Mr. N. S. Khrushchev, Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the USSR September 23, 1960 – UN Document A/4502.* See – https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2021/04/declaration-on-the-grant-of-independence-to-colonial-countries-and-peoples-submitted-by-mr.-n.-s.-khrushchev.-un-document-a4502.pdf

1577 *Decolonization: A publication of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization* 1975 December vol.II No.6

1578 In November, 1960, the UK was the Administering Power for 36 colonies around the world, including the Falkland Islands. The seven territories with populations exceeding one million would seem to have been Hong Kong, Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Northern Rhodesia, Nyasaland and Singapore.

1579 UN Year Book 1960. See - https://cdn.un.org/unyearbook/yun/chapter_pdf/1960YUN/1960_P1_SEC1_CH5.pdf

Indonesia's Representative speaks before the meeting.

> *"... it is a matter of great importance to us that this declaration is designed to prevent any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity or territorial integrity of a country. It emphatically declares in paragraphs 4, 6 and 7 that the integrity of the national territories of peoples which have attained independence shall be respected."* [1580]

The Soviet delegate states, with regard to a proposed paragraph on *'territorial integrity'* that; *".. no attempt should be made to raise private claims and reservations to the level of a general principle* ***restricting*** *the inalienable right of every people to self-determination."* [1581]

On the same day, a draft-resolution is introduced by Cambodia on behalf of 26 African and Asian nations. [1582] Guatemala attempts to amend the Africa-Asian draft by the addition of a new paragraph.

> *"The principle of the self-determination of peoples may in no case impair the right of territorial integrity of any State or its right to the recovery of territory."*

This amendment is rejected. [1583]

"... when Guatemala tabled an amendment to include a categorical affirmation to the effect that "the principle of self-determination of peoples may in no case impair the right of territorial integrity of any state or its right to the recovery of territory", the 43 Afro-Asian sponsors of the draft Declaration ***refused*** *to endorse it..."* [1584]

"Guatemala was concerned that paragraph 6, as drafted, placed insufficient restrictions on the exercise of self-determination in territories that were the subject of dispute or litigation. ... In any event, the Guatemalan amendment received little support in the General Assembly." [1585]

December 14th, in New York, Resolution 1514 – entitled the *Declaration of the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* – is presented to the General Assembly of the United Nations. [1586]

> *"Conscious of the need for the creation of conditions of stability and well-being and peaceful and friendly relations based on respect for the principles of equal rights and self-determination of all peoples,... Convinced that all peoples have an inalienable right to complete freedom, the exercise of their sovereignty and the integrity of their national territory,*
>
> *Declares that:*
>
> *1. The subjection of peoples to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation constitutes a denial of fundamental human rights, is contrary to the Charter of the United Nations and is an impediment to the promotion of world peace and co-operation.*
>
> *2. All peoples have the right to self-determination; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.*
>
> *3. Inadequacy of political, economic, social or educational preparedness should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence.*

1580 *UN Document A/PV.936 para.55*
1581 *CO 936/879 Sankey to Jerome 21.1.64* My emphasis.
1582 *UN Document A/L.323* The number of sponsors eventually rose to 43.
1583 The USSR also sought to amend this draft resolution, but was voted down.
1584 Gonzalez 2014 p.34. My emphasis
1585 *Self-determination in Disputed Colonial Territories* Jamie Trinidad 2018
1586 See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1514(XV) See *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* E. McWhinney 1960

4. All armed action or repressive measures of all kinds directed against dependent peoples shall cease in order to enable them to exercise peacefully and freely their right to complete independence, and the integrity of their national territory shall be respected.

5. Immediate steps shall be taken, in Trust and Non-Self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom.

6. Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.[1587]

7. All States shall observe faithfully and strictly the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and the present Declaration on the basis of equality, non-interference in the internal affairs of all States, and respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity."

Eight-nine nations vote in favour. Nine abstain. There are no votes against. [1588]

"We regard paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514 as referring only to the territorial integrity of colonial territories. The paragraph ... is in our view irrelevant to territorial claims by long-established sovereign states, which themselves fall clearly outside the general purview of Resolution 1514, addressed to "colonial countries and peoples."..." [1589]

"The term 'territorial integrity,' as used in paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514 (XV), referred to the wholeness and indivisibility of territories which had been administered as a single unit ... to be distinguished from the principle of geographic integrity, which applied to adjacent areas, or areas apparently forming part of a single geographical unit. The latter meaning had clearly never been intended in Resolution 1514 (XV), since that would have meant that almost any colonial Territory could have become subject to a claim by an immediate neighbour." [1590]

1587 Clarified as being only applicable to the Non-Self Governing Territories by the International Court of Justice in 2019.

1588 Article 73 of Chapter XI of the UN Charter (Declaration on Non-Self Governing Territories) states that UN Members administering territories that have not yet obtained a full measure of self-government have an obligation for the well-being of those inhabitants. The article then sets out five principles to ensure that this obligation is met; *due respect for the culture of those peoples; the development of self-government; the furtherance of peace and security; the promotion of their development and a requirement to transmit information to the UN regarding those peoples and territories*. As an article of the Charter of the UN, an international treaty, these are mandatory obligations in international law. As is Art.1 which enshrines the principle of the self-determination of peoples. UN General Assembly resolutions, on the other hand, are merely advisory. Initially, at least. Nowhere in Art.73 is there mention of decolonization or independence. Any form of decolonization that excludes self-determination would not therefore appear to carry legal weight. Resolution 1514 was an attempt to get around that inconvenience by declaring colonialism to be contrary to the Charter (para.1); despite the Charter not saying so. Also that a disruption of national unity/territorial integrity was contrary to the Charter; despite the Charter not saying that either. From the beginning, interpretation was going to be controversial and disputed.

1589 *UK Mission to the United Nations (Shaw) to FCO (Diggins) January 22, 1969* in *FCO 7/1080* at *186.* Following the *Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965* in February 25, 2019, this appears to have been the correct interpretation.

1590 *The Right of Self-Determination in Very Small Places* Thomas M Franck & Paul Hoffman 1976

"The wording forbids present and future actions to break up colonies and does not refer to the past. It certainly does not cover "recovery of territory," based on claims about nineteenth century history." [1591]

"... paragraph (6) was not considered by most speakers to be a key paragraph; most emphasised 2 (right to self-determination), 3 (inadequacy of preparation should never serve as a pretext for delaying independence) and 5 (immediate steps should be taken to transfer all powers to the peoples of the territory)'. The allusion to territorial integrity had only appeared in the final draft partly as a result of the Congo civil war and the attempted secession of Katanga (which independent African states opposed) and partly due to Indonesia's hostility to the Dutch presence in West Irian." [1592]

"The wording used in resolution 1514 (XV) has a normative character, in so far as it affirms that "[a]ll peoples have the right to self-determination". ... In order to prevent any dismemberment of ***non-self-governing territories****, paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) provides that: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." ... The Court recalls that the right to self-determination of the people concerned is defined by reference to the entirety of a non-self-governing territory, as stated in the aforementioned paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) (see paragraph 153 above). Both State practice and opinio juris at the relevant time confirm the customary law character of the right to territorial integrity of a non-self-governing territory as a corollary of the right to self-determination. ... The Court considers that the peoples of non-self-governing territories are entitled to exercise their right to self-determination in relation to their territory as a whole, the integrity of which must be respected by the administering Power. It follows that any detachment by the administering Power of part of a non-self-governing territory, unless based on the freely expressed and genuine will of the people of the territory concerned, is contrary to the right to self-determination"* [1593]

"(Paragraph 6) deals with the important question of the integrity of the national territory of dependent peoples. Territorial integrity is addressed four times in 1514. The last preambular paragraph speaks of the inalienable right that all peoples have to the integrity of their national territory. The fourth paragraph requires that colonial States respect the integrity of the national territory of dependent peoples. Paragraph 6 goes a step further by declaring that an attempt by an administering Power to dismember partially or totally the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter. This paragraph incorporates a very serious and solemn declaration. The fourth reference to territorial integrity is in paragraph 7, which calls for respect for the sovereign rights of all peoples and their territorial integrity. The relevance of this paragraph to this case is that it clarifies that the unit for self-determination for colonial peoples is their territory in its entirety.." [1594]

1591 *The United Nations, Self-Determination and the Falkland Islands* Peter Willetts 2013 See - https://www.staff.city.ac.uk/p.willetts/SAC/COMMENTS/PW080313.HTM. See also *A/L325* in *General Assembly Fifteenth Session Official Records,... Agenda Item 87*

1592 Gonzalez 2014 p.34.

1593 *Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice regarding the Legal Consequences of the Separation of the Chagos Archipelago from Mauritius in 1965* February 25, 2019 paras.153 and 160. My emphasis. See https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/169/169-20190225-01-00-EN.pdf

1594 *Ibid. Separate Opinion of Judge Robinson*

"In its (Chagos) Advisory Opinion, … the ICJ was convinced that, both in terms of its content and the circumstances of its adoption, resolution 1514 had 'a declaratory character with regard to self-determination as a customary norm', which was reflected in its key provisions. The Court also arrived at the conclusion that the subject of the right to self-determination – the 'people' concerned – was to be defined by reference to a NSGT as a whole and the customary right to territorial integrity was the corollary of the wider entitlement to self-determination, by virtue of paragraph 6 of the Colonial Declaration." [1595]

"It is a general legal principle that laws cannot apply retroactively (i.e. they cannot apply to events that happened before the laws were enacted), … It is therefore abundantly clear that paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514 cannot apply to any events that took place before 1960, so it does not apply to Britain's actions in 1833."[1596]

December 15th, also adopted by the General Assembly is resolution *1541 (XV).* [1597]

Principles which should guide Members in Determining whether or not an obligation exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e of the Charter. [1598]

> *"Principle I: The authors of the Charter of the United Nations had in mind that Chapter XI should be applicable to territories which were then known to be of the colonial type. An obligation exists to transmit information under Article 73e of the Charter in respect of such territories whose people have not yet attained a full measure of self-government.*
>
> *Principle II: Chapter XI of the Charter embodies the concept of Non-Self-Governing Territories in a dynamic state of evolution and progress towards "a full measure of self-government". …*
>
> *Principle III: The obligation to transmit information … constitutes an international obligation and should be carried out with due regard to the fulfilment of international law.*
>
> *Principle IV: Prima facie there is an obligation to transmit information in respect of a territory which is geographically separate and is distinct ethnically and/or culturally from the country administering it.*
>
> *Principle V: … If (additional elements) affect the relationship between the metropolitan State and the territory concerned in a manner which arbitrarily places the latter in a position or status of subordination, they support the presumption that there is an obligation to transmit information under article 73e of the Charter.*
>
> *Principle VI: A Non-Self Governing Territory can be said to have reached a full measure of self-government by - (a) Emergence as a sovereign independent State; (b) Free association with an independent State; or (c) Integration with an independent State.* [1599]
>
> *Principle VII: Free association should be the result of a free and voluntary choice by the peoples of the territory concerned …* [1600]

1595 *Self-determination, the Chagos Advisory Opinion and the Chagossians* Stephen Allen 2020 in *International & Comparative Law Quarterly* 2020

1596 Pascoe 2020 p.292

1597 For 1541 (XV) complete see - https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/153/15/pdf/nr015315.pdf

1598 For 73e see - https://www.un.org/en/about-us/un-charter/chapter-11

1599 A further attempt to extend Chapter XI of the UN Charter into an area that had not been considered in 1945. Any resolution that begins "*The authors of the Charter of the United Nations had in mind that …*" has to be treated with suspicion.

1600 Free association with the UK was only available up until the Anguilla crisis of 1967 (see below); after which the UK government concluded that the option was too fraught with difficulties.

Principle VIII: Integration with an independent State should be on the basis of complete equality …

Principle IX: (a) The integrating territory should have attained an advanced stage of self-government with free political institutions so that its people would have the capacity to make a responsible choice… (b) The integration should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples …"

"In this resolution the Assembly established that an international legal obligation exists to transmit information under Article 73(e)…" [1601]

"Resolution 1541 is just as important to the Falklands as is the Decolonisation Declaration. It specifies that the Falklands must remain on the agenda of the Decolonisation Committee until one of the three options has been chosen and implemented. It also specified that no option will be valid, unless it is freely chosen by the people of the Falklands. This means that even if some future British government were to agree to hand the Falklands over to Argentina the Falkland Islanders would still have the right to say yes or no to the integration option. The very fact of being on the agenda of the Decolonisation Committee each year is the strongest possible evidence that the Falkland Islanders do have the right to self-determination." [1602]

"Is the population of the Falklands/Malvinas distinct ethnically or culturally from the UK? … As stated on the website of the Falkland Islands Government, the heart of the community is predominantly of British descent. The UK's government itself reconfirms this fact. In the light of this data, the population of the Islands is certainly not distinct ethnically or culturally from the administering power and, therefore, it would not qualify as a NSGT entitled to self-determination, on the basis of resolution 1541." [1603]

"… the General Assembly passed Resolution 1541 (XV), which like 1514 has central relevance to the Falklands: Resolutions 1514 and 1541 state definitively that the peoples of all non-self-governing territories have the right to self-determination, and the UN includes the Falklands on its list of non-self-governing territories, the "Chapter XI territories" (i.e. those covered by Chapter XI of the UN Charter), thus expressly confirming that they are covered by resolutions 1514 and 1541. Those Resolutions, together with 2625, rule out Argentina's aim of taking over the Falklands, but Argentina misuses the first Resolution and disregards the others. … The constant suppression of any mention of UN Resolution 1541 in Argentine works … is a blatant distortion of history and of the legal situation. The reason for that omission is clear: 1541 enshrines the "wishes" of the Falkland Islanders as paramount in discussions of the future of the Falklands, and hence destroys Argentina's case." [1604]

December 31st, the population of the Falkland islands is estimated as 2,127, with 54 births registered during the year. There have been 21 marriages and 32 deaths. [1605]

1601 *Decolonization: A publication of the United nations Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization* vol. II No.6 December 1975. All General Assembly resolution start life, as merely advisory.

1602 Willetts 2013. Original emphasis. UN resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970, added a fourth option, albeit now ignored.

1603 *Does the Population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) really have the right to Self-Determination."* Fabian Raimondo 2014. Contrary to this conclusion, UN resolution 2625 (XXV) of 1970 stated that an NSGT has a status *"separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it."* See 1970, below.

1604 Pascoe 2020 pp.290/297. In an 11 volume work covering all Argentine activity at the United Nations - *Malvinas, Georgias, y Sandwich del Sur: Diplomacia Argentina en Naciones Unidas* – there is not a single mention of resolution 1541 in any of its near 5000 pages.

1605 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Years 1960 & 1961*

1961 – March 8th, Argentina's President makes a highly publicized visit to Deception Island. [1606]

"President Arturo Frondizi flew by helicopter to Antarctica. From the Argentine Base on Deception Island he once again proclaimed to the world Argentina's inalienable rights to Antarctic sovereignty." [1607]

"In the message that he addresses to the country from there, the relevance of his presence is evident as an act of reaffirmation of Argentine sovereignty in the region, while expressing recognition of the uninterrupted efforts of the country and its armed forces. But, it is also interesting to highlight in the development of his speech the emphasis placed on the defense of the Antarctic Treaty, to which he assigns: "a deep historical and moral significance", considering it "the first successful attempt to integrate the interests of a group of nations and put them at the service of peace and good, of humanity...", "with which the new concepts of international cooperation that are making their way in the world find concrete expression...", and enhancing the fact that it "constitutes the first successful attempt to ban explosions longing for a similar prohibition to be extended to the entire world..."." [1608]

March 13th, in Argentina's *La Prensa* newspaper, diplomat Dr. Alberto Candiotti, argues against ratification of the Antarctic Treaty. [1609]

> *"If our governments do not sign documents that mean a decrease in the strength of our Antarctic rights, the problems of limits in our vast territory of the southern continent will be resolved in our favour in the next century, before the Argentine Republic arrives at one hundred million inhabitants. By then we will also have recovered, with full sovereignty, all our South Atlantic Islands."* [1610]

Candiotti also seeks a legal opinion from a recognised constitutional expert, Professor Carlos Sánchez Viamonte.

> *"If there is a 'principle of public law that is axiomatic in the Argentine Constitution is the one related to the integrity of its territory and the validity of the Constitution over the entire territory. Of that, any assignment, however small, temporary or permanent, of the exercise of territorial sovereignty, entails the flagrant violation of the most important, transcendental and urgent of the principles of law Argentine public and this principle does not tolerate interference or intermittence of any nature. That is why I consider that the Antarctic Treaty is contrary to the principles of Argentine public law and cannot be validly approved by the National Congress. It could even be argued that it was unconstitutional if necessary."* [1611]

At South Georgia, redundant whalers, *Southern Spray* and *Southern Chief*, are scuttled off Stromness Bay.

March 31st, at Grytviken, the last official Norwegian service is held in the South Georgia church.

In Argentina, a book is published for use in schools by José Cosmelli Ibañez – *Historia Argentina*.

"*Another of the iconic texts of this second generation of Argentine History manuals is Historia Argentina by José Cosmelli Ibañez, which had numerous reissues between the 1960s and 1980s, despite the fact that he was not a professor of History but of Letters. Since its first publication in 1961, the author allocates an important*

1606 Part of the South Shetland Islands. Claimed for Britain in January, 1820, Chile in 1940 and Argentina in 1942. Subject of the *Antarctic Treaty* system, under which no claims are recognised.

1607 Howkins 2008 (2)

1608 *Cambios y continuidades en la política antártica argentina, 1959-1983* Miryam Colacrai de Trevisan 1997 citing *La Prensa* March 9, 1961

1609 See also *Nuestra Antártida no es tierra conquistada ni anexada. El Tratado Antártico no debe ratificarse* Alberto M. Candiotti 1960

1610 Trevisan 1997

1611 Candiotti quoted in Trevisan 1997

space to the history of Malvinas. Spanish rights over the islands are presented as a fact that does not need to be explained and is reiterated on various occasions. The text ends with the usual allegation about the Argentine sovereign rights that are qualified as "permanent", and that would be justified because they integrate an extension of the Patagonian continental platform and our country has inherited from Spain the just titles of possession that it defends and on which the author affirms that "there is not and cannot be any doubt" (Ibañez 1967:378).” [1612]

April 14th, in Argentina's Chamber of Deputies, ratification of the Antarctic Treaty meets with stiff opposition; opposed by both the Unión Cívica Radical del Pueblo (Radical Civil Union of the People) and the Radical Nacional (National Radical) parties.

April 25th, after fierce debate, Argentina's Congress approves the proposed ratification of the Antarctic Treaty (law no. *15,802*).

June 13th, departing from Argentina, a Lockheed *Neptune* aircraft overflies the Falkland Islands; intruding into British airspace without permission.

“... at a height of 2,500 metres, this time also including Stanley, and took a series of photographs.” [1613]

June 23rd, on the day that the Antarctic Treaty comes into force, it is finally ratified by Argentina and Australia.

“... the legitimate claim of our province (Tierra del Fuego) on the Argentine Antarctic Sector is based on the effective and uninterrupted occupation exercised by the national State since 1904, consolidating itself with exploration, scientific and technological activities, highlighting the First Testimony of Sovereignty signed on December 5, 1954. As previously noted, in 1957 the creation of the national territory of Tierra del Fuego, Antarctica and the South Atlantic Islands took place. At the international level, midway through the second decade of the 1950s, the international scientific community proposed the celebration of the Third Polar Year, which in fact became the International Geophysical Year (1957–1958). Within it, all states claiming rights on the Antarctic continent allowed free access for scientists of any nationality, as well as the unrestricted exchange of research results. In a favorable climate of cooperation, the Antarctic Treaty was signed in Washington on December 1, 1959, Argentina being a signatory State. The treaty entered into force on June 23, 1961. It is significant that the Treaty arises from the need to reach a compromise on the territorial differences raised, as well as seeking adequate protection from the fragile Antarctic environment. ... Article 4 of said treaty establishes that "no provision of the same would be understood" ... as a waiver, by any of the contracting parties, to their rights of territorial sovereignty or to the territorial claims in Antarctica, which it would have previously asserted... ".” [1614]

“The Australians had also dragged their feet over ratification due to fears, similar to those in South America, that the Treaty represented a surrender of national interests...” [1615]

“At the heart of the Antarctic Treaty, which entered into force in June 1961, were three core principles: the region should be a zone of peace; international scientific collaboration was to be encouraged; and the existing sovereignty disputes should be put on hold in favour of general cooperation and confidence building through the free exchange of information and a right to inspect each other’s scientific stations. The resource potential of the Antarctic was not discussed in the treaty, and this omission unquestionably helped to secure overall consensus, given the disputes over ownership of territory and resources. Scientific diplomacy loomed large,

1612 Santos La Rosa 2022
1613 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.460
1614 Argentine Congress August 3, 2006 *Document 4302-D-06. cf.* 1991
1615 Howkins 2008 (1)

and it was hoped that signatories (and those who joined later) would embrace the spirit and purpose of the treaty, with its underlying commitment to peaceful coexistence." [1616]

In Washington DC, on the same day, Chile deposits its ratification of the Antarctic Treaty with the US Department of State. [1617]

In **July**, the First Consultative Meeting of the Antarctic Treaty (ATCM1) takes place in Canberra, Australia.[1618]

September 1st – 6th, a summit is held in Belgrade, Yugoslavia. Hosted by Josip Broz Tito, 25 nations gather to form a collective of States independent of the Cold war superpower blocs – the Non-Aligned Movement. [1619] The movement rejects colonialism and imperialism and promotes peaceful coexistence between nations and non-interference. [1620]

September 15th, three *Neptune* aircraft of the Argentine Naval Air Squadron, fly over the Falkland Islands.

November 27th, in New York, United Nations resolution *1654 (XVI)* establishes a Special Committee of 17 members with a mandate to consider implementation of resolution *1514*. To be known as the – '*Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*.' [1621] Initial membership consists of Australia, Cambodia, Ceylon (now Sri Lanka) Ethiopia, India, Italy, Madagascar, Mali, Poland, Syria, Tanganyika, the USSR, the UK, the USA, Uruguay, Venezuela and Yugoslavia. [1622]

"... an international lobby for absolute independence regardless of the consequences..." [1623]

"The Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples did not specify the means by which the United Nations was to ensure its implementation. ... the resolution proceeded to establish a Special Committee of 17 Members, to be nominated by the President of the General Assembly. The Committee ... began work in 1962." [1624]

December 31st, the population of the Falkland Islands is estimated as 2,099. [1625]

1616 *Britain and the British Antarctic Territory in the wider geopolitics of the Antarctic and the Southern Ocean* Klaus Dodds & Alan D. Hemmings 2013 in *International Affairs* 89: 6 (2013) 1429–1444

1617 However, Chilean Foreign Relations Decree *361*, which approved the text of the Antarctic Treaty, was only published on July 14, 1961, to then reappear, with changes, in the Official Gazette of December 2, 1961. Subsequently, Foreign Relations Decree *174*, published on May 29, 1962, established that the version published on December 2, 1961 should be considered as the official text of the ratification rather than that of June, 1961.

1618 See - https://www.ats.aq/devAS/Meetings/Past/2

1619 Building on the principles of the 1955 Bandung Conference, those nations attending were Afghanistan, Algeria, Burma (Myanmar), Cambodia, Ceylon (Sri Lanka), Congo, Cuba, Cyprus, Ethiopia, Ghana, Guinea, India, Indonesia, Iraq, Lebanon, Mali, Morocco, Nepal, Saudi Arabia, Somalia, Sudan, Tunisia, United Arab Republic (Egypt-Syria), Yemen, and Yugoslavia. For the declarations see - http://cns.miis.edu/nam/documents/Official_Document/1st_Summit_FD_Belgrade_Declaration_1961.pdf

1620 By 2025, membership had grown to 120 nations. Of the 29 nations on the UN Decolonization Committee in 2025, 26 are members of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The remaining three are Chile, China and Russia. See 1964, below and 1973.

1621 A UN sub-committee of 16 members in 1961. Alternatively known as the Special Committee on Decolonization or, more informally, the C24 following its enlargement in December, 1962 to 24 members [res.*1810(XVII)*]. Currently (2025) there are 29 members.

1622 Australia, Italy, the UK and the USA were administering Powers. See - https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1654(XVI)

1623 *The Participation of Micro-States in International Affairs* Professor Roger Fisher 1968

1624 *Decolonization: A publication of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization* 1975 December vol.II No.6

1625 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Years 1960 & 1961*

1962 – February 20th, in New York, at the United Nations, the first meeting of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, takes place.

"The representative of the United Kingdom recalled the conditions under which his Government had accepted the invitation from the President of the General Assemhly to participate in the work of the Committee. The United Kingdom Government had given full co-operation to the Committee on Information from Non-Self-Governing Territories and saw no need for any other committee: nevertheless, it was willing to co-operate with the Special Committee. subject to the understanding that it could not accept any form of intervention in the administration of the territories for which it was responsible and that, if there were any attempts so to intervene. the United Kingdom Government would he bound to withdraw its co-operation. He reserved the position of his Government with regard to the consideration of territories individually, which he believed should be by category or area. He also expressed his Government's reservations on the hearing of petitioners and the dispatch of visiting missions. which he believed should not be done without the consent of the administering Power. He wished the Committee to give sympathetic understanding to four propositions in which his Government helieved. The first of these was that the United Kingdom exercised sole responsibility for carrying out the advance towards self-government and independence in the territories which it administered. The second was that there was no question in his Government's mind ahout the general policy to be followed in accordance with the Charter. That was not simply to confer independence without other considerations, but to confer independence on free and stable governments which were ahle to exercise that independence to the best advantage of the people concerned. The third principle was that this policy was being carried out hy his Government with as much speed as circumstances permitted. The fourth principle was that his Government regarded preparation for self-government as all-important. It had taught the principles of good order, equal justiceand representative government. He considered that if the Committee failed to pay attention to the question of practical steps in preparation for self-government, it would be doing a grave disservice to the peoples concerned. Independence should be attained rapidly. hut administering Powers also had the responsibility of giving the best possible start in independence to the peoples concerned." [1626]

March 3rd, in an administrative re-organisation, the British territorial area subject to the Antarctic Treaty is separated from the other Falklands Dependencies and renamed the '*British Antarctic Territory*'. To be administered by a High Commissioner and the British Antarctic Survey.



> *"We are not in any way seeking to extend our territory but to rename and divide a particular part of it, the reason being that our Antarctic territory bore previously a name derived from the disputed area outside the Treaty area. We thought it better to change it in the interests of general agreement and working together in the area."* [1627]

1626 *Report of The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* October 8, 1962.

1627 Reginald Maudling to the House of Commons in *HC Deb 13 March 1962 vol.655 cc1108-9.* The British Antarctic Territory consists of that segment of the Antarctic continent lying south of latitude 60°S and between longitudes 20° and 80°W. It comprises the Antarctic Peninsula with all adjacent islands, the South Orkney and South Shetland Islands and the Weddell Sea, as well as the landmass extending to the South Pole.

"Britain's Antarctic Treaty Order of 3 March 1962 laid out the country's entrance into the AT (Antarctic Treaty) regime and at the same time reaffirmed the validity of its territorial claims on the British Antarctic sector, but this was mainly an attempt to divide the sector's administration from that of the Falkland Islands, which further embittered relations with Argentina. Thus the formerly titled Falkland Islands Dependency (FID) became the BAT and its administration was assigned to the BAS (formerly known as the FID Survey)."[1628]

"The entry into force of the Antarctic Treaty had implications for the UK's administration of its most southerly colonial territories. The FID (Falkland Islands Dependencies) were, in effect, broken up, and the territories below the Antarctic Treaty's zone of application (south of 60°S) were separated from the SGSSI (South Georgia South Sandwich Islands). Created in March 1962 in the aftermath of the dissolution of the FID, the BAT remains by far the UK's largest overseas territory in terms of geographical area (over 660,000 square miles). It comprises the region south of 60°S, encompassing the territory between longitudes 20°W and 80°W." [1629]

March 22nd, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Prince Phillip, Duke of Edinburgh, arrives for a short visit. Part of an 11 nation, 54 day tour, the Prince is greeted by Argentina's President, Arturo Frondizi.

From New York, Argentina's Permanent Representative to the UN, Enrique Ros, returns to Buenos Aires to take over the Foreign Ministry's *Antarctica & Malvinas Division*. He is replaced at the UN by Lucio Garcia del Solar.

March 29th, in Argentina, the government of Arturo Frondizi is overthrown in a military coup.

September 20th, at the United Nations, the Special Committee on Decolonization submits its first report to the Secretary-General. [1630]

"Since 20 February 1962. when the Special Committee began its work, it has held 117 meetings and examined the implementation in twelve territories of the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples, including eleven territories in Africa to which it had decided to give priority consideration. In deciding to give priority consideration to the African territories, the Special Committee has had in mind that it is in Africa that the largest number of people are still living under colonialism, that it is in Africa that the largest colonial territories still exist and that it is in Africa where some of the most difficult problems are encountered." [1631]

December 14th, UN Resolution 1803 (XVII) declares that:

> *"1. The right of peoples and nations to permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources must be exercised in the interest of their national development and of the well-being of the people of the State concerned.*
>
> *2. The exploration, development and disposition of such resources, as well as the import of the foreign capital required for these purposes, should be in conformity with the rules and conditions which the peoples and nations freely consider to be necessary or desirable with regard to the authorization, restriction or prohibition of such activities. ...*
>
> *7. Violation of the rights of peoples and nations to sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources is contrary to the spirit and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and hinders the development of international co-operation and the maintenance of peace.*"

1628 Turchetti, Naylor, Dean & Siegert 2008
1629 Dodds K. & Hemmings A. D. 2013
1630 Covering the period February 20, 1962 to September 19, 1962.
1631 Report of *The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* October 8, 1962 para.149.

December 17th, UN Resolution *1810 (XVIII)* enlarges its Special Decolonization Committee to 24 members. [1632]

"The Special Committee was asked inter alia to continue to seek the most suitable ways for the speedy and total application of the Declaration to all territories not yet independent, to propose specific measures for the complete application of the Declaration, to submit to the General Assembly a report with recommendations on all territories to which the Declaration applied ... and to apprise the Security Council of any development in those territories which might threaten international peace and security." [1633]

"In terms of membership, the balance was now clearly tipped against the colonial powers, with the Afro-Asian bloc controlling half of the seats and four others reserved for Eastern European countries. Furthermore, the new committee's competence included the examination of the political situation in each non-self governing territory and the making of recommendations for the early attainment of independence." [1634]

December 31st, the Falkland Islands end of year review notes:

> *"Evening classes are held each year from May to October. The following subjects are offered: English, arithmetic, advanced mathematics, Spanish, dress-making, art, book-keeping, shorthand, basketry and electronics. Royal Society of Arts examinations are taken in shorthand and book-keeping. Evening classes are compulsory for all junior officers in Government and for all apprentices. The response well merits the expenditure. ...*
>
> *The majority of the houses in the Colony are built of timber with metal outer covering; the roofs are usually of corrugated iron. Concrete block building, particularly for Government premises, is now becoming popular. ... An increasing interest is being taken in angling. Brown trout {salmo far io) were introduced into the Colony's rivers between 1947 and 1952. These trout have over the years formed a sea-going habit, and return to the rivers to spawn. Specimens weighing 7 lb. to 10 lb. are not uncommon. The trout fishing season opens on the 1st September and closes on the 30th April. Salmon and sea trout ova were imported during the period under review and efforts are being made to introduce these fish into the Colony as well. ...*
>
> *The authorised establishment of the Falkland Islands Police Force is seven, consisting of the Superintendent of Police, one sergeant, one senior constable, and four constables, all of whom are stationed in Stanley. Two constables on special appointment are also stationed at South Georgia. With the exception of the Superintendent of Police, members of the Force are recruited locally. Training is carried out under the supervision of the Superintendent of Police. ... There is one small prison in Stanley. The Superintendent of Police acts as Gaoler and other members of the Police Force as warders. A gaol matron is employed for the supervision of female prisoners; she also arranges the catering of meals supplied to all prisoners. Two prisoners (males) were received during 1962 and served sentences of 21 days and six months respectively."* [1635]

1632 Although numbers have changed more than once, the Committee is still widely known as the Committee of 24 (C24). See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1810(XVII)

1633 *Decolonization: A publication of the United Nations Department of Political Affairs, Trusteeship and Decolonization* 1975 December vol.II No.6

1634 Gonzalez 2014 p.34

1635 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Years 1962 & 1963*

1963 – in **January**, redundant whale catchers *Stora* and *Southern Star* are scuttled off South Georgia.

February 1st, the British Antarctic Territory issues its first stamps; an engraved set of 15 values ranging from 1/2d to £1.

October 12th, in Argentina, following constitutional elections permitted by the armed forces, Arturo Illia becomes President. That same day, Illia addresses Congress, mentioning the Falkland Islands.

> *"We do not covet anything that is not ours, but nor can we cede anything we own. We have updated our claim to the Malvinas. We are convinced of the legitimacy of our rights. Meanwhile we have taken the necessary precautions to ensure that the recovery of this Argentine territory is not frustrated by an artificial independence that we would never recognise."*

"Once regarded as a natural leader of South America, Argentina found herself, following the collapse of the Peronist experiment, a prey to political instability and economic stagnation. "Las Malvinas" appealed to her politicians as a tempting battle-cry calculated both to rally nationalist sentiment and to win "anti-colonialist" sympathy throughout Latin America and the Third World. In 1963, the government of President Illia decided to press its claim through the United Nations and ... the Falkland Islands was made a major target for Argentine diplomacy and internal propaganda." [1636]

October 25th, in New York, at the UN, the Special Committee on Decolonization submits its second annual report; *"... the Committee was able to consider only twenty-six of the sixty-four territories included in the preliminary list, ...With regard to the territories which still remain to be considered by the Special Committee, it is the Committee's intention to consider them as a matter of priority in 1964."* [1637]

November 29th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Embassy raises its fears of an Argentine attack against the Falklands archipelago in a letter to London; *"The islands are less than a day's steaming from the nearest Argentine naval base at Ushuaia. It is a remote spot and they could quickly and unobtrusively prepare an offensive by a small body of men capable of overcoming resistance from the Islands' population or Voluntary Defence Force;..."* [1638]

December 11th, from Washington DC, the US Secretary of State telegrams the Governor in the Falkland Islands, requesting overflight permission for the Falklands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands for a period January 18, to February 7, 1964; *"...for U.S. Navy Superconstellation NC-121K No.145925 engaged on project Magnet an Air Force geomagnetic survey. Grateful to learn whether clearance granted. No landings anticipated."* [1639]

December 16th, in New York, adopting United Nations resolution *1970 (XVIII)* the General Assembly expresses its decision to dissolve the *'Committee on Information from Non-Self Governing Territories*'; requiring instead that the '*Special Committee on Decolonization*' study issues with regard to information transmitted under Art. 73e of the Charter by Administering Powers. [1640]

1636 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

1637 *Report of The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* October 25, 1963. The Falklands were not considered.

1638 *CO 1024/433*

1639 *TRN/AVI/4#4.* Permission was granted the next day.

1640 A sub-committee of the UN's Fourth Committee. No committee resolution qualifies as a UN resolution unless adopted by the General Assembly. See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/1970(XVIII)

"Considering that all United Nations activities concerning Non-Self-Governing Territories should now be co-ordinated and consolidated, with a view to the immediate ending of colonialism."

December 31st, the population of the Falkland islands is estimated as 2,132 with 44 births registered during the year. There have been 21 marriages and 24 deaths. [1641]

1964 – February 25th, in New York, the Special Committee on Decolonization meets at the United Nations building, chaired by Sori Coulibaly (Mali). Vice-Chair is Carlos María Velázquez (Uruguay). A decision is reached to form three sub-committees to consider the list of non-self-governing territories (NSGTs). The Falkland Islands falls to Sub-committee III, chaired by Carlos María Velázquez – a strong supporter of Argentine claims. [1642]

Representatives of the Administrating Powers are restricted to full membership of only one sub-committee.

*"In the case of the Falklands, ..., this **apparently** inconsequential bureaucratic reorganisation has a series of significant political effects, contributing to a structuring of the discussions in Argentina's favour. To begin with, the reform led to Britain's loss of full membership in the subcommittees... the Afro-Asian majority decided that administering powers could only be members of one subcommittee, while they would be invited to participate **without a vote** in the rest. ... The lack of full membership did have two important negative effects on Britain's position on Subcommittee III, where the Falklands came to be discussed: on a symbolic level, it put the Argentine delegate on an equal footing with that of the administering power; procedurally, it deprived the British delegate of the right to participate in the private caucuses that would be held to consider the conclusions and recommendations drafted by the subcommittee's rapporteur... The committee's subdivision also magnified the value of (Argentina's) allies... The regional character of each subcommittee attracted the Latin American members to participate in Subcommittee III... Subcommittee III was thus composed of delegations whose profile made them less menacing for the Argentine position."* [1643]

February 26th, Britain's Foreign Office recognises that Sub-committee III deliberations are likely to be adverse.

"If, in the face of our denial of the Argentine claim and our maintenance of the principle of self-determination for the Falklands, the Committee passes an unacceptable resolution favouring the Argentine, we shall simply ignore it, as we have done with other unacceptable resolutions, as an emanation from a non-competent body." [1644]

March 6th, in the South Sandwich Islands group, HMS *Protector* lands a survey party (geologist, zoologist and botanist), supported by Royal Marines, on Candlemas Island. [1645]

March 16th, in the Falkland Islands, two days of elections are held. For the first time, elected councillors hold a majority position in the Legislative Council. Also for the first time, a woman, Marjorie Vinson, is voted onto the Legislative Council.

April 2nd, in Argentina, President Arturo Illia's Government circulates an instruction to schools. This requires that the subject of the Falklands is taught in an *'anti-imperialistic'* way.

"I have the pleasure ... to remind you that next September 8, at the Meeting of the 24, the future of our Malvinas Islands shall be considered. The Representatives of the foreign powers, at that act, shall consider the problems inherent to colonialism and peoples' self-determination and, in that agenda, the

1641 *Colonial Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Years 1962 & 1963*
1642 Pascoe 2020 p.299
1643 González 2014. My emphasis
1644 *FO 371/173663 Marnham to Arrowsmith.* All resolutions of the United Nations, with the exception of the Security Council, are only advisory in effect.
1645 *British Antarctic Survey Scientific Reports No.91*. The group remained for 16 days.

Malvinas Islands shall be included in the British colonies. The Argentine Republic can not and must not accept this decision because Malvinas Islands are a piece of its territory that was seized by force… it is very important – due to the psychological force of this action – to explain to the students of the educational institutions of the country the vicissitudes that the nation is experiencing, under the threat of the definite loss of a piece of its soil." [1646]

At South Georgia, three whale catchers and four service boats sink at their moorings due to the weight of snow that has fallen overnight. No attempt is made to raise them.[1647] *Southern Foster* is wrecked on Jason Island.

April 20th, in New York, Argentina's Deputy Permanent Representative, Lucio Garcia del Solar, requests to be allowed to participate in the proceedings of the United Nations' Decolonization Committee (C24), where those proceedings involve the Falkland Islands. [1648]

In Argentina, historian Ricardo Caillet-Bois founds the *Comisión Pro Recuperación de Malvinas* (Commission for the Recovery of the Malvinas Islands). [1649]

"... although Caillet Bois' historiographical interest in this subject was not new, the geopolitical circumstances of the 1960s presented peculiar characteristics that led to looking to the past for the legitimation of the present policy. Thus, Caillet Bois intervened actively from his position as historian, linking the documentary evidence that supported the Argentine claim to the Malvinas territory and, at the same time, supporting the political-diplomatic efforts that the government of Alberto U. Illia was settling in the UN. Combining politics with history and the present with the past, in 1964 Caillet Bois promoted and chaired the Commission for the Recovery of Malvinas, with the aim of keeping alive the protest and the demand for the return of the archipelago conquered by England. One of the main actions of this Commission was to organize a collection of signatures and a popular event at the Luna Park Stadium, defined as a "political, historical and artistic" event in which students from various schools participated and where, at the end, a telegram addressed to the Secretary General of the United Nations was read." [1650]

May 1st, in Buenos Aires, President Illia speaks to the Argentine Congress.

"We place a jealous preoccupation in the defense of territorial sovereignty. We do not aim for anything that is not ours, but we can not yield anything that is owned."

June 1st, at Port Stanley, Governor Arrowsmith's speech to the Legislative Council is reported in *The Falkland Islands Monthly Review*: *".. what, may you ask, is the future of the colony? It seems that, almost every day, a former colony becomes independent. What will be the situation when we are one of the few remaining colonies? We are a unique colony, in the old sense of the word; that means we are a settlement of people from the mother country in a distant part of the world. For the past one hundred and thirty yeas, the Falkland Islands have been settled and developed by people from the United Kingdom and by a few from other parts of Europe. There is no more loyal colony that this one and, far from wishing to sever its link with the United Kingdom, I believe that the desire of its people is to strengthen it, maintaining the law, to exercise ots own system of government. How best to achieve this is, of course, a matter that requires much thought and deliberation, but I have no doubt we can look to the future with confidence."* [1651]

1646 Quoted in *Malvinas as an educational policy* Alberto Sileoni 2010
1647 Headland 1984
1648 *Lo que no sabemos de Malvinas: Las islas, su gente y nosotros antes de la guerra* S. Carassia 2022
1649 See 1948
1650 *Las Islas Malvinas en el fondo documental del Instituto Ravignani (1930-1983)* Sandra Sauro, Eugenia Bedini y Marina Mattina 2023
1651 Quoted in Carassia 2022

June 10th, the United Nations '*Convention on the Continental Shelf*' of 1958 comes into force.

> *"Art.6. (1) Where the same continental shelf is adjacent to the territories of two or more States whose coasts are opposite each other, the boundary of the continental shelf appertaining to such States shall be determined by agreement between them. In the absence of agreement, and unless another boundary line is justified by special circumstances, the boundary is the median line, every point of which is equidistant from the nearest points of the baselines from which the breadth of the territorial sea of each State is measured."* [1652]

"... when the Geneva Convention entered into force in June 1964, the Illia government needed to act quickly before the treaty (until then only signed by 22 states) gained recognition as definitive in international law. Boycotting the emerging regime was impractical and irresponsible for a nation that championed the consolidation of world order. An alternative was to strengthen Argentine legislation with the aim of reasserting the sovereignty claim over the whole of the adjacent continental shelf: in August Illia submitted to Congress a draft law that updated and improved Perón's 1946 decree and specifically mentioned Argentina's rights over the Malvinas. Yet it would take more than a piece of domestic legislation to attain an international acceptance of Buenos Aires' maritime jurisdiction.... What was imperative for Argentina was to gain a clear UN recognition of the islands' disputed character..." [1653]

June 11th, in New York, Britain's Mission to the United Nations receives instructions from the Colonial Office to; *"... persuade the Sub-Committee and the Committee to recognise that it is for the people of the Falkland Islands to determine their constitutional future."* [1654]

In **July**, at the UN, after intense Argentine lobbying, the question of the Falkland Islands is placed at the top of those items to be considered by Sub-committee III.

> *"During this year's sessions, the United Nations commission in charge of studying the situation of the Non-Self-Governing Territories is preparing to consider the problem of the Malvinas Islands. The case, however, is totally outside the competence of that commission.*
>
> *The Malvinas are not a Non-Self-Governing Territory of the British Empire. They are Argentine territory occupied by Great Britain since 1834. ... if there is a commission in the United Nations competent to deal with the situation of a territory never owned by a member state, but seized by force from another member state, that commission, and not that of non-autonomous territories, is the one who must make out the matter."* [1655]

"The territory on which our position in the Committee is weakest is the Falklands. There are only 2,000 people involved and we can hardly offer independence as the alternative to the Argentine claim. The Falklands have no petitioners who could appear effectively before the Committee of 24. No doubt because of this Uruguay and Venezuela brought it forward as the first territory to be discussed." [1656]

"... ensuring that it was discussed before the second round of debates on Gibraltar at the main Committee. This immunised the Argentine case from any collateral damage arising from the re-examination of the controversial Spanish claim." [1657]

1652 See - https://legal.un.org/ilc/texts/instruments/english/conventions/8_1_1958_continental_shelf.pdf *cf.* 2016
1653 González 2014 p.109
1654 *CO 936/816.* Considering the make-up of the Committee, this was an impossible task. The Committee had already been hijacked.
1655 *Las Islas Malvinas en la Historia* Bonifacio del Carril in *Diario La Nacion* July 26, 1964
1656 Donald Derx quoted in *CO 936/879 14.9.64*
1657 Gonzalez 2014 p.66

In Cairo, the Organization for African Unity holds its first Assembly. Delegates agree that the borders between their nations should be those that existed at the date of independence.

"This was in effect a decision not to allow self-determination to apply in Africa." [1658]

July 10th, in Vienna, Austria, members of the Universal Postal Union adopt a Constitution, subject to ratification; *"With a view to developing communications between peoples by the efficient operation of the postal services, and to contributing to the attainment of the noble aims of international collaboration in the cultural, social and economic fields*." [1659] Argentina reserves its position on Article 23 concerning the application of the constitution to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and the "*Argentine Antarctic*".

July 24th, in Buenos Aires, at the Salón Peuser, an exhibition is held with the title - *Exposicion Historica de las Islas Malvinas, Georgias del Sur y Sandwich del Sur*. Carried out under the auspices of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship. [1660]

In the Falkland Islands, on the same day, the National Progressive Party is founded.[1661]

"The party says its aim is to further the cause of progress in all things appertaining to the people and the country, in the manner most suited to the speediest and most fruitful attainment of their aims. being at all times mindful of the best interests and wishes of the people. The party will support ideas from any source that would be in the best interests and for the benefit of the people. Letters were sent to the four elected Members of Legislative Council advising them of the existence of the party and offering any assistance that they might be able to render. A similar letter was sent to the Labour Federation. As with all political associations the aim of the Falkland Islands National Progressive Party is the preservation of the natural and inalienable rights of man among which is the right of the people to govern themselves in the manner in which they choose. The National Progressive Party considers that in the past there has been no open organisation to which everyone could put their ideas. The National Progressive Party considers that these Islands belong to the people and what they do with them, in them, and the manner in which they do it is their own concern. They repudiate the claim to the Falklands made by the Argentine. They state they are 100% Falkland Islanders and give their allegiance and loyalty to the Falklands. It is with these sentiments that the National Progressive Party was formed and it is in this spirit that they intend to go forward." [1662]

"The first stirring of political activity by Islanders was the creation of the National Progressive Party (NPP) in August 1964 (sic). Despite the respectability of the members, many of whom went on to become councillors, they were subjected to police surveillance and the party was swiftly strangled by the colonial government which was preparing a quiet transfer of sovereignty." [1663]

August 1st, in Buenos Aires, the government submits a draft law to Congress asserting sovereign rights over the continental shelf off its Atlantic coastline. Included within this domestic legislation, is the shelf around the Falklands' archipelago.

1658 Dunnett 1983 p.417
1659 Ratified by Argentina on June 23, 1967. Ratified by the UK on August 2, 1966.
1660 Published as a book by Humberto F. Burzio later in 1964.
1661 Notable as one of only two political parties in Falklands history. *cf.* 1987
1662 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* October 5, 1964
1663 *Dirty Wars and Devious Politics: The Foreign Office, the Falklands, Argentina and the USA 1964-1999* Robert Elgood 2025 citing *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* November, 1964.

"Art.1: Sovereignty of the Nation Argentina extends its territory adjacent to sea to a distance of two hundred nautical miles measured from the line of the lowest tides, except in cases of the gulfs San Matías, Nuevo and San Jorge in which they shall be measured from the line connecting the ends that form their mouth." [1664]

"It is... absurd to claim that because islands stand on the continental shelf adjacent to a continental coastal state that state has thereby a claim to sovereignty over the islands. Then France could claim the UK." [1665]



"The Falkland Islands lie within the 'Falklands Microplate', part of an assemblage of crustal blocks at the southern end of the South American continent. In Early Jurassic times, these blocks lay between what are now South Africa and East Antarctica." [1666]

August 3rd, from Stanley, the Falkland Islands Legislative Council send a message to the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization.

"We, ... understand that the Special Committee proposes to discuss the Falkland Islands in September. We accordingly wish to make known to members of the Special Committee the wishes of the people of this colony. We are proud to be citizens of this British Colony which was settled and developed by people from the United Kingdom. We wish to retain and strengthen our link with the United Kingdom and to state in the strongest possible terms that any constitutional association with a foreign power would be completely repugnant to us. ... respectfully request you to arrange for this telegram to be circulated to all members of the Special Committee." [1667]

On the same day, Stanley Town Council also sends a letter to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

"We the Chairman and Members of the Stanley Town Council wish to declare to the Special Committee on colonialism that as free agents and representatives of the people of the capital of the Falkland Islands we have no wish to be ruled by any person or in any manner not of our own choosing. In this tiny but democratic country we realise through our councils the wishes of the people as to the manner in which they live and are governed. Though small in number of population we have created an entity with its own way of life, sound economy, and freedom for all. No solution by imposition without reference to us would be fair or in accordance with the United Nations Declaration that all peoples have the right to self determination." [1668]

1664 This would eventually become Argentine Law 17.094 on December 29, 1966
1665 *CO 936/910*
1666 Aldiss and Edwards 1999
1667 *UN Document A/AC.109/102 p.44*
1668 *CO 1024/434 Annex D*

August 11th, in Argentina, following a request by the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Dr. Miguel Angel Zavala Ortiz, the '*Academia Nacional de la Historia de la República Argentina*' produces a review of the country's history in relation to the Falklands. Published as - *Los derechos argentinos sobre las islas Malvinas* – the work contains papers by Enrique Ruis Guiñazú (Discovery and Occupation), Enrique de Gandia (Secret Clause of 1771),[1669] Ricardo R. Caillet-Bois (Usurpation) and Ricardo Zorraquin Becú (Legal and Moral Aspects). The final paper provides the National Academy's overall opinion.

"... we refer to the opinion drafted by Dr. Ricardo Zorraquin Becu, and approved by the national academy of History in session of 11 August, 1964, ratified in May 1982. Summarizing the findings, the Argentine claim is based historically on the following reasons: a) Spanish sovereignty of the islands, derived from the papal concession and occupation of territories in the South Atlantic. England recognized that sovereignty by committing to not navigate or trade in the South Seas (treaties 1670, 1713 and after). [1670] *b) The legal continuity of Argentina with respect to all rights and obligations inherited from Spain, who resigned by the treaty of September 21, 1863 to the sovereignty, rights and corresponding shares.* [1671] *c) The peaceful and exclusive occupation of the archipelago by Argentina from 1820 until January 2, 1833, (and) that its authorities were forcibly evicted."* [1672]

August 14th, an Argentine aircraft, from the air force base near Rio Gallegos, flies over Stanley. [1673]

August 19th, Cosmo Dugal Patrick Thomas Haskard is gazetted Governor of the Falkland Islands. [1674]

August 24th, in Argentina, the British Embassy and three vice-consulates are attacked by extremists.

In London, at the beginning of **September**, the merits of Britain opening negotiations with Argentina are considered within the Foreign Office.

> *"Offers to enter into talks where there is no real hope of agreement seem to us more likely to end in exacerbating the position rather than calming it."* [1675]

"The (UN) Mission ... feared that a persistent rejection of talks risked alienating the Western allies, most importantly the United States." [1676]

September 8th, early in the day, a Buenos Aires radio station, *Radio el Mundo*, broadcasts a message to the Islanders telling them to; *"... keep calm during an imminent occupation by the Argentine Navy."* [1677]

In the Falklands, during the afternoon and coinciding with the opening session of UN Sub-committee III in New York, an Argentine national – Miguel Fitzgerald – lands a *Cessna* light aircraft at Port Stanley, hangs an Argentine flag on a nearby fence, hands a proclamation to a confused bystander, and takes off again. [1678]

1669 Based heavily on Goebel's 1927 work.
1670 See Vol 1. Contrary to Argentina's opinion, Popes were not the source of international law.
1671 Spain did not possess the Falklands in 1863. In fact, Spain saluted the British flag at Stanley that same year.
1672 *Malvinas: las causas inmediatas de la Guerra* Mario Meneghini in *La Razon Historica. Revista hispanoamericana de Historia de las Ideas* No.29 2015 p.67. Buenos Aires did not claim the Islands until 1829 and were first ejected by the USA in 1831.
1673 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.460
1674 *The London Gazette No.43424.* For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/haskard_cosmo
1675 *Donald Derx to Falle September 4, 1964* in *CO 936/879*
1676 González 2014 referring to a UKMIS telegram of September 1, 1964
1677 *UN Doc A/5800/Rev.1*
1678 The bystander was one Jim Shirtcliffe.

"To the Representatives of the occupying English Government, Islas Malvinas:

I, Miguel L. Fitzgerald, Argentine citizen – the only necessary and sufficient title I hold in the completion of a mission which is by the will and decision of 22 million Argentinians, arrive in the Falklands territory in order to communicate the irrevocable determination of those who, as I, are determined to put an end to the third English invasion of the Argentinian territory.

Almost 132 years have expired since the piracy and enslavement of Argentine territory that today I symbolically occupy. The plunder perpetrated by the privateers[1679] *of the frigate Clio, impressed in those days the nation, young though it was, and throughout the generations a usurpation had been maintained which was never accepted by the Argentinians, by the Latin Americans, and by all those in the world whose task it is to adjust the inalienable rights of each nation today. Today my country, awakened from a long sleep, conscious of her moral and material grandeur, has decided to recuperate (recover) her island territory. It is for this reason that I constitute the advance of this patriotic and just ideal that will grow, we do not doubt, like a great avalanche.*

We, the Argentinians, are resolved not to permit England to continue occupying an archipelago that for geographical, historical, political and just reasons belongs to the Republic of Argentina. I think, as do my countrymen, that in the end, in the sight of the world, England will be considered responsible for this moral injury and unjust situation which has continued for so many years.

Islas Malvinas have, for the Argentinians, a value that cannot be measured only by material standards – notwithstanding the systematic pillage to which they have been and are subjected, nor do we accept that they be a matter for negotiation. They have, on the other hand, a value in human dignity because they are an unquestionable part of the country that I, as an Argentine citizen, represent in this voluntary and complete action. Argentina does not make the exercise of liberty and right an empty manifestation, as if it were a consignment or a commercial theme. Argentina supports equal rights and liberty for all the people of the earth, and therefore she demands the same treatment.

The twenty-one gun salute which in a past century signalized the hour in which Argentina established her flag in Port Soledad, an act in which she exercised complete sovereignty, resounds anew to announce to the world that in this hour another conquest will begin, as in 1807.[1680]

In consequence, as an Argentine citizen, I have been able by myself and before the world to descend into our national territory to ratify Argentinian sovereignty in this archipelago, and to reiterate to the representatives of the usurping English government that 'we have not been and never will be a conquering nation, but neither do we accept that others may conquer us,' as the chancellor (foreign minister) of my country affirmed so well last August. With the same purpose I have just raised, in this island of Soledad, a part of the archipelago, my blue and white flag.

This personal attitude, which expresses the sentiments and the dedication of the people of Argentina, coincides with the decision of the organization of the United Nations to consider, in the highest international tribunal, the legitimate revindication (vindication) of my country's claim to the Malvinas territory.

In this first minute of the reconquest of Malvinas." [1681]

1679 *Clio* was part of the British Navy, and not a privateer. See 1832 & 1833

1680 During a war with Spain, British forces attacked both Montevideo and Buenos Aires; unsuccessfully as it turned out. See 1806/07. As for Soledad Island (East Falkland), it was the one island that Spain still claimed in 1811.

1681 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* October 5, 1964 pp.1-3

"I took off for Río Gallegos, the capital of the province of Santa Cruz, following straight ahead to the Malvinas archipelago, which is five hundred and fifty kilometres away. Navigating through clouds, I noticed some clearings that allowed me to determine the location of the islands, orienting myself between the island of Gran Malvina and Soledad Island when I saw the San Carlos channel. The British flag was flying over the governor's residence, showing me the direction of the winds, which I took advantage of to land, after describing several circles about the population. ... I landed in a horse racing field ... Immediately I put the Argentine flag on a pole. Five people arrived who asked me in English if I wanted or needed something. I told them that it only remained to hand over a sheet of paper that was intended for the representative of the British government in the archipelago. I did it like that. Ten minutes later I got up again to go to Río Gallegos ..." [1682]

"If a country falls into a "long sleep" on a territorial claim, it is likely to find when it awakes that its claim has become defunct... it was simply not true that Britain's possession of the Falklands "was never accepted" by Argentina. [1683]

"When Mr. Hector Ricardo Garcia, the director of Crónica, arrived in Rio Gallegos. He began to play his role. Crónica had the scoop. The title in characteristic type was "Malvinas: Today they were occupied"." [1684]

On being made aware of Fitzgerald's stunt, the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires immediately presents the Argentine government with a formal note protesting Fitzgerald's actions; *"Although the Argentine Government disassociated itself from this incident, after a strong protest from Britain, the aviator returned home a hero."*[1685]

"In 1964, the Argentine pilot was applauded upon his return to Buenos Aires and accompanied by a motorcade on his tour of the city." [1686]

In New York, at the United Nations, Britain's delegate to Sub-committee III makes an opening statement.

> *"... the United Kingdom Government cannot agree to participate in discussions of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands either in this Sub-Committee and Committee or indeed in bilateral talks with the Argentine Government..."* [1687]

Argentina then successfully applies to be represented during the deliberations of Sub-committee III. Britain's representative comments:

> *"It is for the Islanders to determine what their ultimate constitutional status should be and the British Government are always ready to consider any proposals for constitutional change that the Islanders may advance. For the present the Islanders have made it clear that they do not want independence. ... In the opinion of my delegation, the request by the distinguished representative of Argentina to participate in the work of this Sub-Committee constitutes, especially in view of the wording employed in the request, an intervention in the affairs of this territory in which Argentina is not properly concerned. The claim advanced by the Government of Argentina to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands is in effect a bid to annex those Islands in defiance of the clearly expressed wishes and interests of the people of the territory, wishes and interests which according to the United Nations*

1682 Fitzgerald quoted in *El Problema de las Malvinas* A. D. Alejo 1982.
1683 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.463
1684 *Ahora El Herado* September 1, 2024
1685 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281.* While the Government disassociated itself from the act, Argentina's Senate endorsed; *"... all initiatives aimed at bringing about the return of the Malvinas to the national territory."*
1686 Tato 2025
1687 *CO 1024/434/182*

Charter and the Declaration on the granting of independence to non-self-governing territories and peoples should be paramount. In the view of my Government, the Special Committee and this Sub-Committee are not competent to attempt to consider or discuss territorial claims;...

It may be suggested, as it has been suggested in the past, that operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) constitutes a mandate to the Committee to consider questions of sovereignty; but in my delegation's view this reading of paragraph 6 is not borne out either by the wording of the paragraph itself, which clearly refers to possible attempts at disruption in the future and not to issues of sovereignty dating back to distant history, or by the remainder of the Declaration which indeed is very specific in stating that "all peoples" - and I repeat the crucial words, "all peoples" - "have the right to self-determination". It seems to my delegation, and I think it will be agreed by any fair-minded person who reads the terms of the Declaration without preconceived ideas, that paragraph 6 cannot possibly be construed as imposing a limitation of such importance on the universal application of the principle of self-determination, which is indeed guaranteed under the Charter itself." [1688]

September 9th, Argentina's representative, Dr. José María Ruda, makes a statement to Sub-committee III in which he lists the bases of Argentina's alleged rights to the archipelago. [1689]

1. that Spain discovered the archipelago
2. that England had admitted that it had no right in 1748
3. that it was clear from the 1771 document that England had accepted the sovereignty of Spain
4. that when the British left in 1774, the lead plate only claimed one Island
5. that Port Egmont was destroyed in 1777, with the full knowledge of Britain
6. that the Nootka Sound agreement limited British rights in the South Seas
7. that the rights held by Spain had been succeeded to by the Argentine Republic in 1810
8. that David Jewett applied Argentine fishing regulations in the Islands
9. that Buenos Aires appointed Don Pablo Areguati Governor in 1823
10. that the 1825 treaty had contained no reservation by Britain concerning the islands
11. that Vernet's first expedition was *'partially successful'*
12. that the Lexington attacked Puerto Louis under a French flag
13. that Britain and America conspired together
14. that Britain expelled *'almost all'* the Argentine settlers in 1833
15. that Argentina had protested continually since 1833
16. that Britain had taken South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands by force
17. that the Islanders' are only a temporary population
18. that Britain's possession violates Argentina's '*territorial integrity*'

1688 Quoted in *UN Document A/AC.109/102 p.45*
1689 *19 UN GAOR Annex 8 (Agenda item 21, addendum item part 1), UN Doc. A/5800/Rev.1*. Also *A/Ac.109/106*

In addition, Dr. Ruda asserts that Britain, having *'abandoned'* the Islands in 1774, thereafter acknowledged both Spain's and then, via inheritance, Argentina's, sovereignty. Ruda also gives his opinion on self-determination.

> *"We consider that the principle of self-determination should not be implemented in situations in which part of the territory of an independent state has been separated against its inhabitants' will, by force, by a third state, as was the case of Malvinas. No subsequent international agreement ratified this de facto situation; on the contrary, the offended state has constantly complained about this circumstance. These considerations are specially aggravated when the original population has been forcefully evacuated and replaced by floating groups of citizens from the occupying power. Besides, the indiscriminate implementation of the principle of self-determination to territories so scarcely populated by citizens of the colonialist power would leave the fate of such territory in the hands of a power which has settled there by force, violating the most basic rules of law and the international morals. The fundamental principle of self-determination must not be used to transform an illegitimate possession into a full sovereignty, under the protection of the United Nations."* [1690]

Cecil King, Britain's representative, exercises a right to reply.

> *"The Argentine representative had suggested that the status of the Falkland Islands as a British colony was an anachronism; the Sub-Committee might consider whether it was the United Kingdom Government's clearly stated policy of allowing the Falkland Islanders to choose their constitutional future or the Argentine Government's desire to annex a small Territory against the wishes of its inhabitants that was more in keeping with modern thought. ... his delegation found nothing in the Charter or in the Declaration on the granting of independence to colonial countries or peoples to suggest that the principle of self determination should not be applied to communities of British descent..."* [1691]

Researcher's Comment: As regards the historical references:-

1. Discovery cannot be attributed with any certainty until the Englishman, Davis, in 1592. There may have been an earlier sighting but the odds are equally divided between Spanish and Portuguese navigators. Anything before 1592, is merely conjecture.

2. England admitted no such thing in 1748, or even 1749 when it had an exchange with Spain over a proposed expedition. That expedition was postponed, not cancelled, as a result of Spanish concerns. An English chart published in 1753 clearly identified the island(s) as British. [1692]

3. It was Spain that had been forced to recognise British rights in 1771 when Port Egmont was restored. Spain had, of its own volition, removed its marks and signs of sovereignty from Port Egmont and the western islands.

4. This may be true, depending upon interpretation. However, Britain had long referred to Falklands Island as a single unit, rather than Falkland Islands.

5. Port Egmont was not destroyed in 1777. The buildings at Jasons Town and Fort George were burnt down in 1780 during an Anglo-Spanish war. No Spanish flag was raised over any of the islands surrounding the harbour

1690 Quoted in *Malvinas and the Self-Determination of the Nations* Luciano Oscar Fino & Luciano Pezzana 2013

1691 *UN Doc A/5800/Rev.1* p.442. Ruda's speech took Argetina's distortion and reinterpretation of historical events to a new low, but there is little doubt that it was instrumental in persuading the General Assembly to adopt resolution 2065 the following year. Britain's Ambassador to the United Nations clearly knew too little of Falklands history to effectively rebut Ruda's lies; further hamstrung by being seen to represent an Imperial power. At the United Nations, the adage that a lie can travel around the world before the truth can get its boots on, is certainly true.

1692 See – https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/1753-john-green-map-detail.png

of Port Egmont (a body of water) and, following the destruction, Spanish forces withdrew. At no point after 1770 had Spain attempted to raise its flag over the western islands.

6. The Falklands are not in the South Seas, which was the name given to the South Pacific. Nootka was a success for Britain. A failure for Spain, which was forced, in circumstances similar to 1771, to recognise limitations on its claims to the Americas. Spain could only claim territory it occupied. Spain at no time occupied West Falkland Island or the isles that were adjacent to it. In any case, the archipelago was not deemed to be 'adjacent' to the coasts of South America and therefore, the Nootka Convention did not apply.

7. Argentina did not exist in 1810. As the United Provinces, independence was declared in 1816. When independence was actually attained, however, is at best, moot. The separate provinces did not combine to become a nation State before 1860. No inheritance was recognised by any international convention at that time.

8. David Jewett, an American privateer in the employ of Buenos Aires did not attempt to enforce any fishing controls during his limited stay on East Falkland in 1820/21. Buenos Aires did not recognise Jewett's actions in the islands until 1832.

9. No governor was appointed by Buenos Aires in 1823. No 'Governor' was appointed until 1829. That appointment led to a formal protest by Britain.

10. The commercial Anglo-Argentine treaty of 1825 was based upon information supplied by Buenos Aires to the British envoy, Woodbine Parish, in 1824. That information was published in 1825 and included a full list of the territory claimed by Buenos Aires. There was no mention of the Falklands archipelago.[1693] Buenos Aires did not publicly claim the Falklands until 1829.

11. Vernet's first expedition (1824) had been sub-contracted to an Englishman (Schofield). The last remnants of it had to be rescued by English sealers.

12. It is a tradition for a visiting ship to display the flag of the port on its arrival. USS *Lexington*'s commander would seem to have viewed Berkeley Sound (Accaron Bay) as French. Little had been made public regarding Spain's garrison there from 1767 to 1811.

13. Quite the contrary. It was fears of American interest that pressured the UK, in 1832, to decide upon a physical assertion of its own rights to the islands.

14. No settlers were expelled in 1833. A trespassing garrison was requested to leave. All but 4 of those settlers that had been present at Port Louis before the arrival of the armed force from Buenos Aires, were still there after it had departed.

15. The Argentine Confederation made a protests in 1833, 1834, 1841 and 1849. There were none after 1850 for 34 years until an informal protest in 1884.

16. The first time that Britain had to use force, or the threat of force, to eject an invader would be in 1982.

17. Ruda used a whole new definition of '*temporary*'. Many of the Islanders in 1964 had been there for five generations. Far more than most Argentinians could claim to have been Argentine.

18. A clear reference to operative paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 of 1960. Confirmed in 2019 (ICJ Chagos Opinion) that Res. 1514 only applied to the NSGTs. It offered no protection to Argentina. [1694]

1693 See – https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/an_account_historical_political_and_stat.pdf
1694 See Vol.5

"It is arbitrary to say, as was stated by Representative King, that Argentina wants to "annex this small territory against the wishes of the inhabitants". Naturally, the Britisher defends the occupation because he is a patriot and because he believes that the history set before him is sincere. The Falkland Islander, on the other hand, abstains from supporting the British position and harbours very serious doubts as to the legitimacy of the present occupation... Many Islanders are hoping that the Argentines will take some basic measure in their favour... Many would prefer to form part of Argentina because of the proximity of its ports and the greater facility to acquire food and medicines. They listen with pleasure to the radio transmissions from Comodoro Rivadavia and Puerto Gallegos." [1695]

"From 1945 Argentina made a very brief mention of its claim at the United Nations every year for 20 years but did little else. The new stridency dates from 9 September 1964, when Argentina's UN representative, José María Ruda, made an 8,000-word speech to UN Sub-Committee III, which was part of the UN Decolonisation Committee ..., His speech ... was riddled with errors and gave a profoundly false account of history. Nevertheless Ruda's speech ultimately resulted in the passing of Resolution 2065 ..." [1696]

September 10th, in New York, a further session of Sub-committee III opens with comments from the Committee's Chair, Carlos Velázquez (Uruguay).

> *"... the strict application of the principle of self-determination... would place the fate of the territories in question in the hands of a small group of settlers brought in by the conquering Power... Those considerations were particularly true in the case of the Malvinas, which had been originally uninhabited and where the present population came almost entirely from the mother country and fluctuated with the seasons."* [1697]

"In his opening speech on 10 September, Velazquez himself admitted that the Decolonization Committee was not entitled to judge on the merits of a territorial claim or to decide on a sovereignty dispute. However, the committee's lack of authority to settle a territorial conflict was one thing; its right to examine each and every aspect of a colonial situation, ... was quite another." [1698]

"In his speech Velázquez sought to bolster Argentina's claim with some historico-legal background but his history was seriously at fault." [1699]

September 12th, in Buenos Aires, demonstrators stone the British Embassy Residency.

September 14th, in New York, at Sub-committee III, Iran emphasises the small size of the Falklands' population, while Bulgaria speaks of 133 years of *"imperialistic control"*. Venezuela openly supports Argentina.

September 16th, at a further meeting of Sub-committee III, Dr. Ruda speaks again.

> *"The Argentine Republic is a peace-loving country which is pacifist by tradition and which has been accustomed in its short history to settle its disputes, some of which were very serious, by peaceful means. ... Argentina is prepared to negotiate a full settlement of the problem with the United Kingdom in accordance with the wish expressed by all the members of this Sub-Committee."* [1700]

1695 *The Inhabitants of the Falkland Islands* Juan Carlos Moreno in *La Nacion, May 2, 1965.* Translation in *CO 1024/434.*
1696 Pascoe and Pepper 2012. See https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2019/04/false-falklands-history-at-the-un-2012-2nd-ed..pdf
1697 Quoted in Pascoe 2020 p.304
1698 González 2014 p.60
1699 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.472
1700 Quoted in *CO 1024/434/*

Responding for Great Britain, Cecil King expands upon the UK's interpretation of resolution 1514.

> *"Whatever the history and background of the evolution of legal principles on the American continent, the meaning and interpretation of paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) must stand on its own; in my delegation's opinion, it cannot be a requirement for understanding a General Assembly resolution that one should be an expert in inter-American legal history. Words must be assumed to mean what they say, in General Assembly resolutions if not in documents of a more legal character.*
>
> *Mr. Chairman, if I understood your learned exposition correctly, your contention was that paragraph 6 of this resolution gave international validation to an established principle of American law under which no country should accord recognition of sovereignty over territory acquired illegally or by the use of force. Leaving aside for a moment the question whether British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands was in fact so acquired, it seems plain to my delegation that paragraph 6 in fact says nothing of the kind.*
>
> *Let me read the text of the paragraph to the Sub-Committee: "Any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations." Mr. Chairman, if words mean what they say, this paragraph is an injunction addressed to all countries to take no actions in the future – I stress "in the future" because the word used in the resolution is "attempt" – whose consequences would be to split existing territories or States or which would infringe their sovereignty in a manner inconsistent with the United Nations Charter, and in particular with Article 2 of the Charter. There is no justification for regarding this paragraph of resolution 1514 as constituting a limitation on the principle of self-determination assured by paragraph 2 of the same resolution and by Article 1, paragraph 2 of the Charter..."* [1701]

King also deals with the question of Anglo-Argentine negotiations raised during the previous speeches.

> *"It has been suggested by several speakers that the Sub-committee should appeal to Britain and Argentina to hold discussions of the problem and thus find a peaceful solution... The reservation which I must express on the question of possible discussions between my Government and the Government of Argentina is made necessary not by any intransigence or unwillingness on the part of my Government to settle problems by peaceful means, but by the inescapable facts of the situation. My Government has in its care the security and interests of a community of people who cannot be negotiated or compromised out of existence. These people have rights, and they look to my Government for the protection of those rights. ...*
>
> *When therefore it is suggested that a solution to the problem lies in negotiations between the parties directly concerned, I hope the Sub-committee will remember that the party most directly concerned of all is the people of the islands themselves, and that the British Government's first and paramount obligation is to them. The question of their own future and of sovereignty over the islands is not therefore a matter on which my Government can or will negotiate with Argentina, or on which, in justice to the islanders, there can be any compromise....*
>
> *Once again, I reaffirm that my Government, which has no doubts as to its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, stands by the principle of self-determination for these Islands, and I hope that the Sub-Committee will do nothing that could be construed as limiting or weakening that principle.*

1701 *UN Document A/AC.109/102 p.54.* See also November, 1965. See 2019

As I have said, it is for the Falkland Islanders themselves to determine what their ultimate status should be,... In this conflict between, on the one hand, an attempt to annex a peaceful and prosperous community against its wishes, and on the other hand, the principle of self-determination as enshrined in the Charter, there should in my delegation's view be no question about the proper choice for this Sub-Committee." [1702]

September 17th, the Chair of Sub-committee III, Uruguay's Carlos Velazquez, calls for a committee only discussion. Neither King, nor Ruda, are invited.

"... the Chairman's intention was to ensure, through this procedure, the drafting of recommendations as favourable as possible to Argentine objectives, and to obtain unanimous agreement on a text prior to its presentation in the following day's official session. The strategy worked. In the reduced conclave Velazquez was able to impose his authority and make some adjustments to the rapporteur's draft that benefited Argentina. However, the chairman did not achieve everything he and his Argentine allies had aimed for. Rather, the negotiation took the form of a delicate compromise between the Uruguayan-Venezuelan emboldened defence of the Argentine case and the mitigated but not completely dispelled Afro-Asian concerns about the principle of self-determination, ... The text proposed by Iran and eventually adopted by the subcommittee consisted of three conclusions and two recommendations. The first conclusion merely stated that the subcommittee had examined the situation in the territory. When it came to name the latter, the Latin Americans managed to add the phrase 'otherwise known as Malvinas islands' to the original draft's use of the traditional 'Falkland Islands' denomination, thereby buttressing the petition that Argentina was separately making to the General Secretariat to obtain the recognition of the Spanish nomenclature. In its second conclusion, the subcommittee confirmed the applicability of Resolution 1514, thus asserting its competence vis-a-vis this colony. Velazquez attempted at this point to include a specific reference to paragraph 6 of the resolution so as to highlight the prominence of the principle of territorial integrity in this particular colonial situation, but he withdrew the suggestion when most of the other members made it clear that is paragraph 6 was mentioned, the text would also need to cite paragraph 2 on self-determination. In its third conclusion the subcommittee 'took note of the existence of a dispute between the Government of the United Kingdom and Argentina on the sovereignty of the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands'. Here Uruguay and Venezuela, this time backed by Italy, were more successful in overriding the concerns of the Afro-Asian delegations, which preferred to dilute the text's wording by substituting 'question' or 'situation' for 'sovereignty.'..." [1703]

"The outstanding work of Ambassador Ruda and Ambassador Lucio García del Solar, at that time Chargé d'affaires ad interim at the United Nations, deserves to be underlined once again. When it comes to recognizing the impeccable efforts of both, an inevitable reference must be added to a distinguished Uruguayan jurist and diplomat, Ambassador Carlos Velázquez, Permanent Representative to the United Nations, who provided valuable and decisive support to our representatives in the better traditions of River Plate diplomacy,..." [1704]

September 18th, at the United Nations, Sub-committee III ends its consideration of the Falkland Islands.

"... (b) The Sub-Committee confirms that the provisions of the Declaration of the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples apply to the Territory of the Falkland Islands (otherwise known as the Malvinas Islands);

1702 *CO 1024/434*

1703 González 2014 p.68

1704 *Malvinas: Un Nuevo Enfoque en la Relacion con el Reino Unido* Vicente Berasategui in *Malvinas y la construcción de un reclamo soberano: pasado, presente y futuro* Bologna (et al.) 2017

(c) The Sub-Committee notes the existence of a dispute between the Government of the United Kingdom and that of Argentina concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (otherwise known as the Malvinas Islands);

(d) The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should invite the Governments of the United Kingdom and Argentina to enter into negotiations with a view to finding a peaceful solution to this problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the United Nations Charter and of resolution 1514 (XV), the interests of the population of the Islands, and the opinions expressed during the course of the general debate;

(e) The Sub-Committee recommends that the Special Committee should invite the two above-mentioned Governments to inform the Special Committee or the General Assembly of the results of their negotiations." [1705]

Cecil King, on behalf of the UK, exercises a right of reply.

"... I should like to refer once more to the reservation which I expressed in my delegation's statement… when I made it clear that my Government cannot contemplate discussions with the Government of Argentina on the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands...

The essential point is that the right of the Falkland Islands people to self-determination is not negotiable." [1706]

"Commenting on these recommendations the United Kingdom Representative regretted that there was no reference in the draft to the ***principle*** *of self-determination, or at least to the wishes and aspirations of the people of the Falkland Islands."* [1707]

" ... there was a delay: the 19th session of the United nations (1964-5) was anomalous since the UN was suffering a financial crisis due to the refusal of a number of countries to pay their contributions. Some countries were two years in arrears, which meant that under Article 19 of the UN Charter they lost their right to vote in the General Assembly. To avoid a confrontation, and while discussions were held on resolving the crisis, it was agreed no contentious vote would be taken during the session. That is reflected in the number of "Resolutions and Decisions adopted" by the UN in the 19th session, which was less than a tenth of the average number at that time, and the reports of the C24 jump a year and three quarters from 13 December 1963 to 22 September 1965. That also explains the hiatus between the presentation of a draft resolution on the Falklands on 18 September 1964 and the actual vote on what became Resolution 2065 (XX) on 16 December 1965)." [1708]

On the same day, the UK's mission submits written comments to the United Nations.

"In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government the two elements in the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples are complementary to one another, and in so far as self-determination is a legal, and not merely a political concept, it is properly expressed as a principle and not as a right.

The concept of self-determination has been invoked, or prayed in aid, in a number of different circumstances) its relevance, it is submitted, can only be determined in relation to the circumstances of each particular case, and in the light of other principles which are affirmed in the United Nations Charter. Indeed, the principle of self-determination has been of fundamental importance in British

1705*CO 1024/434 Annex A. cf.* resolution 2065 of 1965.
1706 Quoted in *CO 1024/434*
1707 *CO 1024/434.* My emphasis. At this time, the UK considered self-determination to be a principle, rather than a right.
1708 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.466

policy towards the non-self-governing territories and has played a cardinal part in their evolution to self-government and independence. It is, however, in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government to place an unwarrantable gloss 0n the Charter to derive from the wording of either Article 1 (2) or of Articles 73 (b) and 76 (b) a "right" of self-determination…

In the opinion of Her Majesty's Government, although the principle of self-determination is a formative principle of great potency, it is not capable of sufficiently exact definition in relation to particular circumstances to amount to a legal right, and it is not recognized as such either by the Charter of the United Nations or by customary international law."[1709]

"… it was not before the 1970s, at the earliest, that the United Kingdom accepted that it could be said that the principle of self-determination had become a right under general international law." [1710]

September 21st, the Argentine Government invites Britain to enter into negotiations regarding the Falklands.

"The United Kingdom Government … replied to that note, declaring its willingness to enter into discussions with the Argentine Government through diplomatic channels, and asking that topics for such discussions should be suggested, bearing in mind the United Kingdom's reservations concerning its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and the need to take into account the wishes and interests of the people of the islands." [1711]

In the Falkland Islands, a new Constitution comes into force.

"This new Constitution provides for a reduction in the number of officials both on Executive and Legislative Councils and means that the Senior Medical Officer and the Nominated Officials J. Bound and H. Bennett are no longer members of the Legislative Council. The elected members remain the same but the nominated unofficial members, Messrs. G.C.R. Bonner and L.G. Blake, are now styled Nominated Independent Members which more correctly describes their title. There are now only two Officials (the Colonial Secretary and Colonial Treasurer) and six Unofficials. The Senior Medical Officer and Mr. N.K. Cameron are no longer on Executive Council." [1712]

From New York, Ambassador King attempts to explain to the Foreign Office why the Islanders' wish to remain British is treated with suspicion at the UN.

"… a situation of this kind, which challenges the basic assumption of Resolution 1514 that all colonial peoples are struggling to get rid of the yoke, is bound to be irritating to anti-colonialists; and the irritation can only be increased when the Administering power invokes the principle of self-determination, thus assuming the unpopular role of the Devil quoting scripture to further its ends." [1713]

September 29th, in London, the Joint Intelligence Committee reviews Falklands' defences in light of Fitzgerald's illegal landing, and Colonial Office concerns regarding incursions from Argentina. [1714]

October 1st, at the United Nations building in New York, Sub-committee III's report is published. Foreign Office legal adviser, Arthur Watts, prepares a counter-argument to the points presented by Dr. Ruda. [1715]

1709 *UN Document A/5725/Add.4* of September 22, 1964. After 1976, the UK would argue the opposite.
1710 *Counter-Memorial of the United Kingdom* in *Chagos Marine protected Area Arbitration (Mauritius v United Kingdom) 2015* at the Permanent Court of Arbitration. See UN resolution *2625* below.
1711 Fourth Committee, 1552nd Meeting Tuesday November 9, 1965
1712 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* October 5, 1964
1713 *King to Falle September 21, 1964* in *FO 371/173657*
1714 *JIC/786/64*
1715 *FO 371/179725*

"The Colonial Office, however, repeatedly vetoed its publication, fearing that the paper's arguments were not cast-iron, … Only after heavy pressure did the Colonial Office belatedly agree to the use of Watt's memo, but only as a defensive recourse rather than as the proactive response to Ruda's 1964 allegations…" [1716]

October 5th, in Cairo, the second conference of the Non-Aligned Movement is convened.

> *"The Heads of State or Government of the Non-Aligned Countries declare that lasting world peace cannot be realised so long as unjust conditions prevail and peoples under foreign domination continue to be deprived of their fundamental right to freedom, independence and self-determination, Imperialism, colonialism and neo-colonialism constitute a basic source of international tension and conflict because they endanger world peace cand security, The participants in the Conference deplore that the Declaration of the United Nations on the granting of independence to colonial countries and peoples has not been implemented everywhere and call for the unconditiona, complete and final abolition of colonialism now, …"* [1717]

October 9th, at Stanley, Cosmo Haskard, new Governor to the Falkland Islands, arrives aboard RMS *Darwin*.

"The "Darwin" berthed at the East Jetty at 2.20 p.m. and a salute of 17 guns was fired in His Excellency's honour. A Guard of Honour of Members of the F.I.D.F. was drawn up at the end of the jetty under the command of Capt. R.V. Goss. After inspecting the Guard of Honour, the Governor designate proceeded to the Town Hall where introductions were made of Council Members and wives, Ministers of Religion, Heads of Departments and other prominent people. The swearing in ceremony was held in the Council Chamber with the Commissions for the Falkland Islands and Dependencies, and British Antarctic Territory read by the Clerk of Councils." [1718]

October 15th, in the UK, the Labour party takes over the government, with Harold Wilson as Prime Minister.

"… a modernising government intent on redefining Britain's role in the world, which included a withdrawal from areas east of Suez and a new attitude towards overseas territories." [1719]

October 17th, Buenos Aires cancels a joint naval exercise due to take place with the Royal Navy. HMS *Protector,* however, continues to sail towards the Falklands.

October 30th, in New York, Britain's mission to the UN assesses the situation.

> *"The Argentines are in a stronger position than Spain. They are not a Colonial power and the Communists will not be rocked by fears of favouring a Fascist State; they have had some success in getting across the idea that the Falkland islanders are temporary white settlers, a fiction which appeals to the Afro-Asians; and the Chileans will try to avoid coming out against their fellow Latin Americans."* [1720]

November 5th, at Stanley, HMS *Protector* arrives, carrying the *Combined Services Expedition*.

1716 González 2014 p.84

1717 *Programme for Peace and International Co-operation adopted by the Second Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned Countries, held in Cairo from 5 to 10 October 1964.* See - https://www.ris.org.in/sites/default/files/NAM Summit-2-Cairo-Oct 5-10-1964-FinalDocumentCairo_Declaration-min.pdf

1718 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* November 2, 1964

1719 Pascoe 2020 p.310

1720 *Derx to Derrick* quoted in Gonzalez 2014 p.75. Also *CO 936/818*

November 6th, in Santiago, Chile, the Ambassadors of Chile and Argentina meet. They agree that the territorial dispute between them regarding the rivers Palena and Encuentro should be settled by arbitration. Chile suggests that the arbitrator should be Britain. [1721]

"One of the most bizarre aspects of the developing Falklands dispute in the 1960s was that precisely during the years when Argentina was escalating its activities at the United Nations, with Ruda's speech and the passing of Resolution 2065,.., Argentina was yet again accepting Britain as a judge entitled to rule on how far Argentine territory extended." [1722]

November 9th, in New York, Argentina's Minister del Carril addresses the UN's Fourth Committee. He gives Argentina's view as to Britain's interpretation of UN resolution *1514;* as set out by Cecil King on September 16, 1964.

> *"Resolution 1514 (XV) solemnly affirmed the inalienable right of all peoples to the integrity of their national territory and stated, in paragraph 6, that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the territorial integrity of a country was incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.... The United Kingdom representative had insisted that paragraph 6 of resolution 1514 (XV) was applicable only for the future. He had thought thus to obtain a bill of indemnity against the territorial dismemberment carried out before the United Nations Charter had been signed. He had been mistaken, however, for although the United Kingdom had seized the Malvinas before the Charter had been signed, it was a question of preventing the legalization of a de facto situation that had never been accepted: it was therefore a question which had to be resolved at the present time, and not before the signing of the United Nations Charter."* [1723]

Britain's representative exercises a right of reply.

> *"The United Kingdom Government had no doubts concerning its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and must formally reserve its position on the question."* [1724]

November 13th, at the UN, the Special Committee on Decolonization, sitting as a whole rather than in sub-committees, hears from the UK's representative.

> *"... my delegation made it clear in both its statements to the Sub-committee that the United Kingdom cannot agree to participate in discussions of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, even in the Special Committee and its sub-committees, or with the Government of Argentina,..."* [1725]

"His Government considered that the Special Committee was not empowered by its terms of reference to consider territorial claims or disputes over sovereignty, and it would therefore not consider itself as bound by any recommendations of the Committee on those subjects. The United Kingdom had no doubts about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. Where the future of the islands was concerned, his Government would be guided by what it regarded as the interests of the Falkland Islanders themselves, as required by Article 73 of the Charter. ... He wished to make a formal reservation concerning the use of the phrase 'otherwise known as

1721 Argentina accepted the suggestion on November 25, 1964.

1722 Pascoe 2020 p.318. Three British judges were appointed to the arbitration panel and they reached a decision on November 24, 1966. Both Chile and Argentina accepted the result which largely favoured Argentina.

1723 *Fourth Committee, 1552nd Meeting Tuesday November 9, 1965*. A confused argument, at best. Resolution 1514 was not retroactive and contained no past tenses. See 2019 (Vol.5) for the ICJ's opinions regarding resolution 1514.

1724 *Ibid.*

1725 *CO 1024/434*. See also *Document A/5800/Rev.1** Report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.* (1964)

the Malvinas Islands' ..., which his Government interpreted as indicating purely the Spanish translation of the name of a Territory, and thus as having no implications with regard to the question of sovereignty over the Territory..." [1726]

Dr. Ruda responds on behalf of Argentina.

> *"This sophistical interpretation of the intentions of bilateral negotiations keeps the problem at a standstill, because it is set up in such a way as to keep out of the negotiations the one point which throws a shadow on the excellent relations which my country has maintained and wishes to preserve with the United Kingdom. What meaning could be attached to bilateral negotiations between the United Kingdom and Argentina if the substance of the problem, namely re-establishment of our territorial integrity by the restoration of the Malvinas Islands, is not touched upon?"* [1727]

Lucio Garcia del Solar, deputy-head of the Argentine delegation, also speaks. [1728]

> *"... The problem had arisen from an act of military force by the United Kingdom in 1833 against a part of the Territory of Argentina... following which the Argentina authorities and inhabitants had been expelled from the islands and later replaced by settlers from the United Kingdom. The... United Kingdom could invoke no international instrument giving it any rights over the Malvinas Islands... Argentina had never ceased to press its claim for reparation of the injury done to it, which no lapse of time could validate. ... since the Islanders were not the original inhabitants, but had simply replaced those expelled by force, paragraph 5 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) could not be blindly applied, and the terms of paragraph 6 must be taken into account."*

"Where political interests were concerned, the truth of history, the factual state of the territory and the wording of UN resolutions did not matter. The Sub-Committee, and after it the whole C24, was "hijacked" by Argentina, with the connivance of Uruguay, into following Argentina's line, that it was time for Britain and Argentina to start negotiating on the islands' future." [1729]

November 24th, in New York, Sub-committee III's report is adopted by consensus (without a vote), by the full Special Committee on Decolonization.[1730]

Chile's delegation, having previously challenged the committee's competence to discuss sovereignty disputes, now openly supports Argentina. Chile endorses *'hemispheric solidarity'* and complains that the *'occupation'* of American territories is frustrating regional integration. [1731]

November 26th, in Argentina, at Luna Park, an event organised by the Comisión Popular Pro Recuperación de las islas Malvinas is held.

"Young people, academics, and specialists on the subject were present. After hearing the National Anthem, the Malvinas March, and a lecture on the topic at hand, they heard the words of Caillet-Bois, president of that commission. There, the historian spoke about current events and the debate within the United Nations (UN), rejecting the principle of Kelper self-determination, emphasizing that "we trust in the spirit of high justice of the United Nations, but, whatever the outcome, we warn the world once again that Argentina will never

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1726 *CO 1024/434*
1727 Quoted in *CO 1024/434*
1728 UN Document *A/5800/Rev.1 Annex 8 pp..436-437*
1729 Pascoe 2020 p.307
1730 Adoption by consensus is a method to get around the rule, that only members who are fully paid up can vote.
1731 At the time, it was asserted that, in order to gain Chile's support, Argentina had made promises with regard to a Beagle Channel arbitration.

renounce possession of a land that rightfully belongs to it." The event concluded with the reading of a telegram to the UN demanding justice for the case, and the performance of the march "Malvinas Argentinas" by the Municipal Symphonic Band." [1732]

In **December**, on South Georgia, Grytviken whaling station finally closes. [1733]

"There is no doubt that sealing from Grytviken made an important contribution to the revenues of the whaling companies and to the economies of South Georgia and the Falklands. ... During 1909-1964, some 9,628171 barrels of marine mammal oil were produced in South Georgia, 5.2 percent of which (498,870 barrels) was seal oil. ... Revenue also accrued to the Falkland Islands government from royalties and licence fees." [1734]

December 7th, the reports of the Special Committee, incomplete, are not placed before the General Assembly.

"(The) reports were not considered at the 1964 Session of the General Assembly." [1735]

However, during a general GA debate, Argentina's representative addresses the question of the Islands.

> *"We are prepared to negotiate with the United Kingdom for the return of the Malvinas Islands, covering the interests of the small group of settlers who inhabit the archipelago. The conclusions of the Committee of 24 recommend these bilateral conversations..."* [1736]

December 21st, in London, in a Colonial Office *minute*, Edward Jerrom suggests making Argentina an offer of negotiation; although it is recognised that this may create a precedent for Spain over Gibraltar. [1737]

> *"... I entirely fail to see any need to make the first move in the present situation... If Argentina thinks she has a valid claim let her put it to the International Court..."* [1738]

December 22nd, at the United Nations, the third report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, is submitted to the Secretary-General. [1739] As regards the Falkland Islands: [1740]

> *"The representative of the United Kingdom said that his Government's position on the question of the Falkland Islands had been set out at length in his delegation s statements to Sub-Committee III, which appeared in full in document A/AC.l09/102. His Government considered that the Special Committee was not empowered by its terms of reference to consider territorial claims or disputes over sovereignty, and it would therefore not regard itself as bound by any recommendations of the Committee on those subjects. The United Kingdom had no doubts about its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.*

1732 Novas Lo Coco 2024

1733 Ragnor Thorsen remained as caretaker until 1971.

1734 Dickinson 2007 p.152. The last licence to hunt sea lions was issued by the Falkland Islands government in 1967.

1735 *CO 1024/434*

1736 *Ibid.*

1737 *CO 936/880*. Spain had been increasing aggressive over Gibraltar; using border restrictions to virtually cut off the colony. *cf.* Gonzalez 2014

1738 Note added to minute in *CO 1024/438,* dated December 23, 1964 and signed Miss E. M. Ware

1739 *Report of The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* December 22, 1964. *UN Document A/5800/Rev.1.*

1740 Written petitions placed before the Committee had been received from Richard Goss and three other elected member of the Legislative Council of the Falkland Islands; the Falkland Islands Sheep farmers Association; the Falkland Islands Labour Federation and the Civil Servants Association.

Where the future of the islands was concerned his Government would be guided by what it regarded as the interests of the Falkland Islanders themselves as required by Article 73 of the Charter. It was always ready to consider any proposals for constitutional change which the Islanders might advance but it was clear from the petitions submitted to the Committee that they wished to retain and strengthen their link with the United Kingdom and that any constitutional association with a foreign Power would be repugnant to them. His delegation had made it clear in Sub-Committee III that, while the United Kingdom could not agree to participate in discussions of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, it was always willing to discuss with the Argentine Government ways in which the two Governments and the Islanders could avoid damage to the good relations between them as a result of the unfortunate dispute." [1741]

December 31st, the Falklands end of year review notes that there have been 42 births, 20 marriages and 13 deaths.

"Mutton is the staple diet; it is delivered to homes in Stanley twice weekly and is supplied regularly to farm employees, although on many farms beef is more commonly used during the winter months. The Stanley diet is also supplemented by deliveries of fresh beef during the winter. The wild upland goose offers a welcome change of diet and can be eaten at all seasons. Supplies of fresh fish, poultry and pork are irregular but most of these items are obtainable from frozen food dealers. Potatoes, turnips, carrots, parsnips, radish, lettuce, cabbage, cauliflower, cress, parsley, peas and beans are easily grown and the majority of householders grow their own as there is little opportunity to buy fresh locally-grown vegetables. Tomatoes and cucumber are cultivated under glass, and gooseberries, raspberries, red currants and strawberries are grown out of doors. When available, fresh locally-grown vegetables are obtainable from 6d. to 9d. per lb., and fresh vegetables imported from Montevideo are offered at prices ranging from 9d. to 1$. 6d. per lb. Fresh fruit is also obtainable from Montevideo with prices fluctuating according to the rate of exchange for the Uruguayan peso. …

An important item in the domestic economy is peat, the only fuel produced locally. A lorry-load (approximately 12 cubic yards), costs 65s. and a year's supply averages from 12 to 20 loads according to the size of the house and the number of rooms heated. Many people cut and rickle their own peat and only have the expense of transport from the peat-banks. As the peat deposits near Stanley become exhausted it is necessary to open new banks farther away and the cost of transport has increased to about 255. to 305. per load. … The colony has one hospital, situated in Stanley. It is modern and well-equipped, and has 32 beds for the treatment of medical, surgical, obstetric and tuberculosis cases. There were 123 admissions in 1964" [1742]

1741 Falkland Islands from p.434 to 449. Available here - https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/732454?ln=en&v=pdf
1742 *Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Years 1964 & 1965*

1965 – January 1st, at Stanley, in response to fears of another Argentine stunt, a Royal Marine detachment consisting of 30 men remain when HMS *Protector* takes the Governor to visit the Dependencies. Before leaving, Governor Haskard asks the British Embassy in Buenos Aires to publicise the presence of troops. [1743]

January 6th, Argentina's *Commission for the Recovery of the Falkland Islands* demands that the; *"Argentine flag should fly everywhere in Puerto Soledad, the island's capital."* [1744] Foreign Minister Zavala Ortiz tours South and Central America.

"... the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands figured high on the agenda." [1745]

January 28th, in Buenos Aires, responding to Haskard's request, the British Embassy argues that; *"The thought that the defences of the Falkland Islands are so tenuous that the presence or otherwise of 30 Royal Marines might have significance can have occurred to very few people in this country. So it may be better to ... leave them under the illusion that our position is stronger than it really is."*

March 4th, entry to the Falkland Islands by any person, other than a permanent resident, without a permit, is prohibited by the *Immigration Ordinance 1965.* [1746]

"In practice control is exercised by the Civil Commissioner on the advice of a local Immigration Committee, which gives local people a veto on immigration. As a result, would-be immigrants from the South American mainland would find it difficult if not impossible to be allowed to settle in the Falklands, unless they are married to Falkland Islanders or British nationals." [1747]

In **April**, from London, the British Government informs the UN Secretary-General of the extension of the *Narcotics Convention* to various British territories, including the Falkland Islands. Argentina promptly protests.

"... in a Note to the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires about the inclusion... and claimed that the territory was an Argentine archipelago. The Note went on to remind the Embassy of the conclusions and recommendations of the Committee of 24 as regards the Falkland Islands in which the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom had been invited to negotiate on a peaceful solution to the problem." [1748]

From New York, Britain's UN Mission suggests to London; *"... we should have a much better chance of securing UN endorsement if we had first attempted a negotiated settlement with the claimants."*

May 2nd, in Argentina, *La Nacion* reports: [1749]

> *"The Special Decolonization Committee of the United Nations gave a favourable recommendation on the Argentine case on the Falkland Islands, and submitted it to the General Assembly for final consideration. The Committee recommended that Argentina and Great Britain should be invited to find a solution to the problem of sovereignty, taking into account the United Nations' objectives and the interests of the Islands inhabitants. ...*

1743 Freedman 2005 vol.1. Also HMS *Protector 1964-1965,* a private publication, undated. Foreword by Captain M. S. Ollivant. The detachment would become a permanent deployment shortly thereafter.

1744 *British Broadcasting Service Monitoring Report V/1751/I*

1745 *FO 371/179725*

1746 A *'permanent resident'* was defined as a person born in the Islands, or a person who had been ordinarily resident there for at least 7 years; dependents of any such persons, or a person naturalised locally.

1747 *The Falkland Islands, 5th Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 1983-1984 HC 268 25.10.1984* para.152

1748 *CO 1024/434.* Conclusions not adopted by the General Assembly in 1964.

1749 *The Inhabitants of the Falkland Islands* Juan Carlos Moreno in *La Nacion* May 2, 1965. See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/03/juan-carlos-moreno-in-la-nacion-may-2-1965.pdf

For the first time, since the Archipelago's arbitrary occupation, the task of recuperating our southern Islands was decisively confronted. Argentina's thesis was adhered to by the majority of the countries members of the Decolonization Committee." [1750]

An economic survey carried out in the Islands, estimates that the average income per head of the population is £503 per annum. [1751]

July 6th, in London, the Foreign Office mulls Britain's options.

"... there may in certain circumstances be both material and moral advantage in coercing the few in order to gratify the many. We may have other reasons for opposing the Argentine claim to the Falkland Islands in addition to the reluctance of the Falkland Islanders to be governed from Buenos Aires. But if it is our only motive, we should perhaps calculate how much it would cost us to bribe all 3,000 Falkland Islanders to emigrate to New Zealand (or to accept Argentine sovereignty on the basis of special local guarantees and privileges) as against what it would cost in military expenditure and the loss of economic interests if we were to have a really serious quarrel with the Argentine." [1752]

July 16th, in Berne, Switzerland, the International Telecommunications Union publish a note provided by the British Embassy identifying the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands as overseas territories of the UK. [1753]

August 2nd, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador is instructed to respond to Argentina's note of April by making it plain; *"... (that) HMG had no doubts as to its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and reserved its position,.."* He is to make no reference to negotiations. [1754]

September 20th, a further *Note* from the Argentine Government, invites Britain to enter into negotiations on the question of the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. [1755]

"In virtue of the fact that the ... Committee of 24 requests that the Committee should be informed of the result of the negotiations, and in order to ascertain the British Government's wishes in regard to the opening of ... negotiations, the Argentine Government extends its invitation to hold these negotiations..." [1756]

September 27th, in New York, at the United Nations, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Miguel Zavaia Ortiz, addresses the General Assembly.

"We are dealing here with an illegal administration that the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland exercises over an integral part of our national territory, a portion of our national soil that was occupied by violence after the Argentine authorities that had peacefully exercised the right of sovereignty there, were evicted, even though they exercised that sovereignty as the unchallenged heirs of the territorial rights of the Spanish mother-country.

It must be stated that the Malvinas Islands never formed part of the territory of the United Kingdom. Neither could they have constituted a colony, in the classic sense of the term, since none could create

1750 Much of the information in the article appears to come from Moreno's visit in 1937.Translation in *CO 1024/434*
1751 *UN Working Paper 1969 A/AC.109/L.584*
1752 Quoted in *CO 1032/406*
1753 See February, 1966
1754 *CO 1024/434*
1755 *UN Yearbook 1965* and *CO 1024/434 Annex B*
1756 Quoted in *CO 1024/434*

a legal status that in itself would alter the absence of any right to occupation or the right of Argentina to claim its territorial unity. This being the case, there is also no legal basis for speaking of self-determination. Argentina has always recognized that all the peoples of the earth have this right. But self-determination requires that as its first condition that it be achieved in a territory properly one's own, not in one torn from the possession of others.

To leave the fate of the Malvinas archipelago to the self-determination of those presently occupying it would be tantamount to leaving it to those whom the United Kingdom itself has placed there. It would be tantamount to permitting the United Kingdom all by itself to resolve the question. It would be tantamount to allowing the despoiler, in order to save himself, to create his own entitlement. For obviously, the settlers all represent the British Empire. And how is this? Simply because England scattered the original population, replaced it and cut the Islands off from the rest of the world, turning them into an isolated land behind a padlock of British exclusivity."

"... since 1964 Argentina has been allowed to present false versions of the history of the Falklands as justification for taking over the islands against the wishes of their inhabitants, thus depriving them of self-determination. ... Ortiz of Argentina, who of course mentioned Argentina's Falklands claim. He repeated some of the central untruths in Argentina's version." [1757]

Ortiz quotes the recommendations in paragraphs (c) and (d) of the Decolonization Committee's 1964 report.

"Argentina expects to be able to present to the assembly all elements necessary to determine the justice of the recommendation and of our claim, and will do so in due course before the appropriate Committee. ... we have invited the United Kingdom to meet with us and discuss the settlement of this dispute. We trust that the United Kingdom will agree to this." [1758]

Britain's UN representative, Ambassador Caradon, immediately writes to the UN Secretary-General.

"... to inform you upon the instructions of my Government, that the United Kingdom Government cannot accept the statement of the distinguished Argentine Foreign Minister insofar as it disputes the United Kingdom's sovereignty over the Falkland Islands." [1759]

October 7th, in London, the Colonial Office's John Bennett considers a response to Argentina's invitation to negotiate.

"It will be seen that the draft recommends accepting the principle of discussions while making it clear that we are not prepared to negotiate about sovereignty. This safe-guard is, at least formally, watertight and not inconsistent with the position taken publicly hitherto. The Argentine Government may not take up this limited offer, since they are only interested in sovereignty, and there is in fact not much else to discuss. But if discussions did start one can never be sure where they might eventually lead to, especially since the results would be reportable to the United Nations; and our own Foreign Office themselves have been dropping hints in recent months that they would like to regard the Falkland Islands as an expendable irritant in Anglo-Argentine relations...

The Argentine claim to the Falklands is an impertinence, and to sacrifice the Islanders to Anglo-Argentine relations might be widely regarded as an unworthy act. One's first reaction therefore would be to dismiss the Argentine Note with a firm "No", ...

1757 Pascoe 2020 p.307
1758 *CO 1024/423. cf.* September 18, 1964
1759 *CO 1024/434 Annex C*

The Argentine Government would perhaps not be reviving their ancient claim to the Falklands if they did not sense that the international climate and British preoccupations might make the moment propitious... if the Colonial Office money and Admiralty hardware which have for years been devoted to the peaceful Antarctic were applied to strengthening our position in the Falkland Islands, we might now be in a position, if we wished, to snap our fingers at this Argentine Note. As things stand, I have felt obliged to recommend a somewhat risky form of playing safe." [1760]

October 12th, Bennett informs the Foreign Office of his Department's view.

"We see no room for compromise on the question of sovereignty. Other considerations apart, in view of the public position taken as recently as last year it would seem impossible to open up this question without at least a fresh Cabinet decision and consultation with the Falkland Islanders themselves.... In present circumstances it could also be very damaging in the Gibraltar context..." [1761]

October 26th, in Antarctica, in a military operation prohibited under the terms of the Antarctic Treaty, ten soldiers of the Argentine Army, led by Colonel Jorge Leal, commence a crossing to reach the South Pole.

November 1st, from London, Britain formally responds to Argentina's invitation to negotiate.

"Her Majesty's Government are in no doubt as to their sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and they cannot regard this as a matter for negotiation. At the same time they are anxious to minimise any damage which the controversy may cause to the otherwise cordial relations between the United Kingdom and Argentina. Subject to the reservation about sovereignty above, and bearing in mind the position which Her Majesty's Government have consistently maintained in regard to the wishes and interests of the Islanders themselves, Her Majesty's Government would accordingly be glad to enter into discussions with the Argentine Government…. and would welcome any suggestions which the Argentine Government would care to make regarding the topics for discussion. For their part Her Majesty's Government would think it useful to discuss, inter alia, the practical obstacles which presently impede free movement between the Falkland Islands and Argentina..." [1762]

Buenos Aires is reminded that the Dependencies are not part of the Falklands; and not within the UN's remit. [1763]

In New York, Argentina's representative addresses the United Nations Fourth Committee, which is reviewing the work of the Special Committee.

"The Malvinas should be decolonized, in accordance with the Assembly's resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960... The only course of action, he stated, was to return them to Argentina, in compliance with the provisions of that resolution which affirmed the right of all peoples to the integrity of their national territory. ... If the United Kingdom agreed to discuss the problem with a sincere desire to find a solution, there could be no difficulty in finding a formula which would guarantee the rights and aspirations of the inhabitants of the territory."

Britain's representative exercises a right of reply.

"...(The UK) did not accept the arguments of the representative of Argentina, and ... The question of disrupting Argentina's territorial integrity therefore did not arise. The important issue was the

1760 *CO 1024/438*
1761 *Ibid*
1762 *CO 1024/438* at *113*
1763 *PREM 19-0625 6 May 1982*

interests and wishes of the inhabitants, who were genuine, permanent inhabitants having no other home but the islands, and who did not wish to sever their connections with the United Kingdom. No provision of the Assembly's resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 could be interpreted as denying the principle of self-determination to the inhabitants of territories which were the subject of a territorial claim by another country."

"(In Argentina) The most nationalist sectors didn't want us to admit that it was a colony ... "It's our territory, it's not a colony, so we can't ask for it to be decolonized". Our position was criticized internally, but the only way to universalize the claim was precisely at the United Nations." [1764]

November 2nd, from Buenos Aires, Garcia del Solar asks Latin American Ambassadors to sponsor a draft-resolution at the UN. Ten express a willingness to do so without conditions, but others seek changes to the wording proposed by Argentina. Brazil and Mexico decline outright. Eventually fifteen Ambassadors agree to sponsor a draft.

"What Argentina needed was a General Assembly resolution that would in itself constitute a response to the British note by demonstrating both that the Argentine claim was universally recognised and that Argentina's rights rather than the islanders' were the paramount factor in decolonizing the archipelago. In the struggle for that resolution, Buenos Aires' most important asset was the 'hate Britain year'. As Caradon had feared, the 20th General Assembly marked the zenith of anti-British sentiment ..." [1765]

November 5th, Britain's Foreign Office orders its mission at the UN to inform the Fourth Committee that the UK had responded positively to Argentina's invitation to negotiate.

November 8th, in London, the British Indian Ocean Territory is created by an Order in Council under the Royal Prerogative. The BIOT consists of the Chagos archipelago (administered from Mauritius from 1814) and the islands of Aldabra, Desroches and Farquhar (administered from the Seychelles). A Commissioner is appointed with power to make all laws and ordinances for the operation of the new British Territory. [1766]

November 9th, in New York, the United Nation's Fourth Committee continues its consideration of reports from the Special Committee. After listening to other representations, Argentina's Ambassador, Dr. Bonifacio del Carril, speaks.

"On 10 June 1829, my great-grandfather, Don Salvador Maria del Carril, as a Minister of the Buenos Aires Government, drafted and signed together with the provisional Governor, General Martin Rodriguez, the decree setting up the Political and Military Command of the Malvinas Islands. Three and a half years later, on 2 January 1833, a British naval detachment forcibly ejected the small Argentine garrison which was guarding the place. As a result of that act of force Great Britain took possession of the Islands and is continuing to have dominion over them. ... It falls to my lot to come and claim before this Assembly, in which 117 countries of the world are represented, the reparation of the spoliation unjustly suffered by the Argentine Republic..." [1767]

"While there was a core group of Malvinas enthusiasts who, in some cases, went as far as arguing in favour of Argentine sovereignty over the islands, most delegations simply endorsed the call for negotiations, without passing judgement on the parties merits or the specific outcome to be expected from the talks. In fact, a number of them felt the need to make their neutral stance clear by explaining their vote. Moreover, there was a third

1764 Lucio Garcia del Solar quoted in *Las Malvinas y la Resolucion 2065* Mario Rapoport in *Pagina 12* January 29, 2012
1765 González 2014 p.119
1766 First Commissioner was also Governor of the Seychelles. See December, 1965, and December, 1966, below.
1767 *UN Document A/C.4/SR.1552*. Translation by Dr. Graham Pascoe. *cf.* October, 1975

group – the Western bloc – that remained overwhelmingly sceptical towards the Argentine initiative. Even Italy, under strong British pressure, came close to defecting, triggering a major Argentine operation that succeeded in prolonging Rome's support." [1768]

November 10th, from London, the Foreign Office write to the UK's Mission at the United Nations in New York.

> *"Indian Ocean Islands: We recognise that we are in a difficult position as regards references to people at present on the detached Islands since we want to avoid the territory being classed as non-self-governing within the terms of Chapter XI and also* ***do not wish to give an argument to the Argentine over the Falkland Islands*** *and also to some extent to Spain over Gibraltar. …*
>
> *They can all be classified as Mauritians or Seychellois but we know that a few were born on Diego Garcia and perhaps some of the other Islands and so were their parents before them. We cannot therefore assert that there are no permanent inhabitants however much this would have been to our advantage. In these circumstances we think it would be best to avoid all references to "permanent inhabitants".."* [1769]

November 11th, in Argentina, a new organisation is founded to agitate for a statue of Antonio Rivero – *Comisión pro Monumento a Antonio Rivero.* [1770]

"This committee requested financial support from the Argentine foreign ministry in order to set up a monument to commemorate the "hero" Rivero, such as a statue. The foreign ministry thereupon requested the Academia Nacional de la Historia, the official advisor to the Argentine government on historical matters, to give an opinion on the appropriateness of the planned commemoration. It duly did so, five months later in April 1966,…" [1771]

November 15th, in New York, at the UN building, the Special Committee on Decolonization presents its report for 1965 to the Secretary-General. [1772]

Venezuela formally presents to the UN's Fourth Committee the draft of a resolution, sponsored by 15 Latin American countries.

"Diaz Gonzales (Venezuela) spoke this morning on the Falkland Islands. He gave a brief historical account from 1810. The Falkland islands was a Colony, but on occupied territory – it must be reintegrated with Argentina in accordance with paragraph 6 of Resolution 1514. Self-determination must not be misused to legitimise a 'de facto' situation… He then introduced a draft resolution…" [1773]

"During my time at the UN, negotiations within the Decolonization Committee began. My task was to try and obtain a draft resolution there inviting the parties to negotiate, and the preliminary draft was drafted in collaboration with the Chairman of Subcommittee III, the Uruguayan Ambassador.[1774] *One day, in a New York*

1768 Pascoe 2020 p.124

1769 *FO 371/184529 DG Oct/Nov 1965* My emphasis

1770 For the events that Rivero was involved in, see August, 1833 in *Falklands Wars* vol.2. See also – March, 1956, January, 1966, April, 1966, August, 1972, April 1982, August 2012 and March 2015

1771 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.488-489

1772 *UN Document A/6000/Rev.1 - Report of The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* November 15, 1965 p.429-430. Notably two pages long, including a revised (inaccurate) history from Argentina. Compared to 15 pages in 1964. Available here - https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/732453?ln=en&v=pdf

1773 *CO 1024/438*

1774 Carlos Maria Velázquez

restaurant, we drafted the germ of 2065. This is the cornerstone of the entire negotiation process. Subsequent resolutions repeat all the same terminology, using the expression "the interests of the inhabitants" instead of "the wishes". It all originated there. ... In summary, ... The issue would not be decided by the wishes of the inhabitants, but by their interests, a much more ambiguous concept, which could easily imply their inclusion in Argentina." [1775]

"When discussion of the Falklands continued at the C24 on 15 November 1965, the Venezuelan delegate, Leonardo Díaz González, spoke first, in support of Argentina, followed by the Argentine representative Lucio García del Solar. Díaz González gave the standard, untrue account of the islands' history, and then added a few new but equally untrue statements, such as: "The United Kingdom had recognized the new Argentine State in March 1822, without making any territorial claim to the Malvinas, and in 1825 had concluded with Argentina the Treaty of Amity, Commerce and Navigation, in which reference was made to the territories of the United Provinces, presumably including the Malvinas. [...]... the islands had the special feature of being an occupied Territory inhabited by a transient population, composed almost exclusively of United Kingdom nationals who had come to work for the Falkland Islands Company..." And the Argentine delegate (Solar) repeated two of the standard untruths: ... "he had clearly explained to the Special Committee that the Argentine population of the Malvinas Islands had been dispersed after the occupation of the islands by the British in 1833 and had since been replaced by a population of British origin, most of whom lived there for part of the year only"." [1776]

Liberia's representative denounces the resolution for failing to mention the people of the Falkland Islands.

"(The resolution) displayed the masterly drafting skills of its originator, the Uruguayan vice-chairman of the C24 and chairman of Sub-Committee III, Carlos María Velázquez. He was well aware that no resolution that unequivocally supported Argentina's claim to the Falklands would be passed (or at least not without amendments that would negate its purpose), so he drew up a fairly anodyne text that sounds eminently reasonable..." [1777]

November 18th, the UN's Fourth Committee accepts the draft-resolution.

"Various delegations spoke supporting it, most either explicitly endorsing Argentina's claim or at least recommending the draft as a good way forward. Only an occasional voice was raised in defence of the islanders..." [1778]

The Fourth Committee also agrees that the name to be used in UN documentation is - '*Falkland Islands (Malvinas),'* in all languages except Spanish, when the name is to be - *'Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands).'* [1779]

> *"In addition, where a reference to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) may raise or bear upon the question of sovereignty over the Territory, it should be accompanied, as the case requires, either by the standard disclaimer ... or by a note or footnote as follows: "A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)."..."* [1780]

1775 Lucio Garcia del Solar quoted in Rapoport 2012
1776 Pascoe 2020 p.309
1777 *Ibid.* p.311
1778 *Ibid.* p.310
1779 This issue had been discussed within *Sub-Committee III* in 1964 following a proposal by Syria and adopted by 19 votes to 1 (UK) with 2 abstentions (Australia & USA). However, the 1964 conclusions had not been considered by the General Assembly during that session. See also 1944 and 1950.
1780 Quoted in *UN Doc ST/ADM/Ser.A/1084*

"Thanks to a diplomatic initiative of mine, we had the terminology changed at the UN, where "Falklands" always appeared in English, even in the Spanish texts. Some delegates, whom I had already convinced, began to raise their hands and say that the Falklands in their country were called Malvinas. And a fierce debate broke out, because the English delegate had no instructions on the matter and did not understand what was happening. He became extremely angry because when the British are caught off guard, which is very difficult, they lose their cool. It was a very heated debate that was initially won." [1781]

"Velazquez (Uruguay) emphasised that the usage proposed had no legal implication." [1782]

Britain's representative makes a statement.

> *"... with regard to the decision of the Fourth Committee,.. regarding terminology to be used in describing the Falkland Islands in United States documents, my delegation wishes to reaffirm that this decision cannot affect either British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands or the correct name of the territory."* [1783]

December 1st, in Antarctica, Argentina's troops involved in *Operation 90* arrive at the South Pole.

December 12th, in Buenos Aires, a memorial to Luis Vernet is unveiled at the Museo Histórico Nacional. Director of the museum, Humberto Berzio tells the audience; "*This memorial, which today remains open to the public's expectation, is a symbol of Argentina's tenacity in claiming an indisputable right to complete the legacy." homeland with the lands of the Malvinas archipelago and surrounding areas. Governments and citizens have never renounced this sovereign right; to do so would legitimize injustice, a sentiment that is not part of the national soul due to its pristine history and the heritage of its ancestors."* [1784]

December 16th, in New York, at the United Nations building, the General Assembly adopts a resolution. [1785]

General Assembly Resolution 2065

"The General Assembly,

> ***Having** examined the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),*
>
> ***Taking** the chapters of the reports of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), and in particular the conclusions and recommendations adopted by the Committee with reference to that Territory,*
>
> ***Considering** that its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 was prompted by the cherished aim of bringing to an end everywhere colonialism in all its forms, one of which covers the case of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),*

1781 Lucio Garcia del Solar quoted in Rapoport 2012

1782 *UK Mission New York telegram No.2536 to Foreign Office CO 1024/483*. Carlos Velazquez was Uruguay's Ambassador to the UN, and had been the Chairman of *Sub-Committee III* in 1964.

1783 *CO 1024/438.* During the debates in 1964, Argentina argued that 'Malvinas' was not the Spanish language translation of the Falkland Islands (Islas Falkland) but the original name for the archipelago for Latin American countries. No evidence was offered. Falkland Isles first appeared on a chart in 1702. The French Malouines was in general use from circa 1720. It took a few more decades for Spanish tongues to mangle Malouines-Maluines-Maluinas-Malvinas. Not in general use until the early 1800s.

1784 Novas Lo Coco 2024

1785 Adopted with a vote of 94 for, none against and 14 abstentions including the UK. See - https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/218/29/pdf/nr021829.pdf

Noting *the existence of a dispute between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the said Islands,*

1. ***Invites*** *the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem, bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the* ***population*** *of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);* [1786]

2. ***Requests*** *the two Governments to report to the Special Committee and to the General Assembly at its twenty-first session on the results of the negotiations.*

"Resolution 2065 (XX) says nothing about returning the Falklands to the Argentine Republic, and, as far as the UN is concerned, principle VI of the Annex to resolution 1541 (XV) sets out three alternative courses of decolonization, of which integration with a sovereign independent state is only one. In any case, according to Principle IX of the same resolution, such integration "should be the result of the freely expressed wishes of the territory's peoples, acting with full knowledge of the change of their status, their wishes having been expressed through informed and democratic processes impartially conducted and based on universal adult suffrage"... del Carril says that "the terms of the Resolution [no. 2065] are unequivocal. In it, all references to the wishes and so-called rights of the inhabitants of the Malvinas islands was omitted". This is an extremely selective interpretation, since the resolution, ... refers not only to the interests of the Falklands' population, but also to Resolution 1514 (which states that "all peoples have the right to self-determination") and above all to the provisions and objectives of the Charter, with the quite unequivocal obligations placed on us by Article 73." [1787]

"With this resolution Argentina achieved a real victory. By saying that there was a dispute between Great Britain and Argentina, it was implicitly accepting the Argentine position of Resolution 1514 and not the principle of self-determination upheld by England." [1788]

"The Committee of 24, which is the Decolonization Committee, has existed since 1961. We have to remember that in those years—the late 1960s, early 1970s—the great decolonization movement began, and among the cases were some very small territories, including the Malvinas Islands, which were and are formally a British colony. It was in that committee that we fought our battles in 1964 and 1965, on the instructions of President Illia. I was then in charge of the Argentine delegation to the United Nations, and the objective was to obtain a resolution calling on the parties to enter into negotiations to resolve the dispute. It can be said that since the approval of this resolution and other subsequent ones, the possibility of independence for the Falklands has been practically frozen because the right of its originally transplanted islanders to be considered in the same category as the aboriginal inhabitants of the colonies, with the right to independence and self-government, was challenged. Furthermore, the existence of a sovereignty dispute is an obstacle to the success of a movement toward independence. The United Nations has no mandate to declare it without general consent." [1789]

1786 The term '*population*' has caused some to suggest that this is recognition that the Islanders were not considered a '*people*' by the UN, despite being identified as such in 1952. See above.

1787 *UK Mission to FCO January 22, 1969* in *FCO 7/1080* at *186*

1788 *Conflicto Reino Unido De Gran Bretana Y República Argentina Por Las Islas Malvinas* Alfredo Bruno Bologna 1981

1789 *Diálogo con el Embajador Lucio García del Solar in Revista de Relaciones Internacionales* 1996 no.11, June – November

"Contrary to what is believed by sources that are not well informed, the process that began in Subcommittee III until the approval of resolution 2065 was not like walking on a bed of roses. It was a path characterized by difficult negotiations, not without moments of tension. Although the existing minutes and documents do not tell the whole story, it is possible to get closer to the truth by simply reading the resolution, starting with the title: "Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)", which is already a controversial situation. When the text of the document is reached, the last preambular paragraph says: "Taking note of a dispute between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom ... about sovereignty over these Islands." Anyone familiar with the meaning of "taking note" in multilateral diplomacy knows that it is a formula to get out of trouble when it is not possible to reach an agreement that commits the voting delegations. Furthermore, although it does not appear in the minutes, an effort by our representatives and their allies to "recognize" the dispute, did not materialize to preserve the large majority that should be obtained in the vote. The first operative paragraph invites both Governments to continue without delay the negotiations recommended by the Decolonization Committee "in order to find a peaceful solution to the problem ..." What is the problem, which does not appear in the operative part of the resolution? Our representatives would have promoted a more direct formula, but they wisely preferred not to risk the loss of votes,... Nor does the resolution make explicit the principle of territorial integrity, to avoid a complicated debate on the scope of self-determination,..." [1790]

Having abstained in the voting, Britain's representative exercises a right of reply. [1791]

> *"... my Government has welcomed the suggestion by the Argentine Government that our two Governments should hold talks on the question of the Falkland Islands... bearing in mind our well-known reservations regarding sovereignty and the need to respect the wishes and the interests of the people of the Falkland Islands. It is because of those reservations and the phraseology used in parts of the resolution which has just been adopted that my delegation abstained from the vote..."* [1792]

"... the terms of the resolution (No. 2065) are unequivocal. In it, all reference to the wishes and so-called rights of the inhabitants of the Malvinas Islands was omitted." [1793]

"... the resolution... refers not only to the interests of the Falklands' population, but also to resolution 1514 (which states that "all peoples have the right to self-determination") and above all to the provisions and objectives of the Charter, with the quite unequivocal obligations placed on us by article 73." [1794]

"... several factors lead the British to show solidarity with the islanders: the British conception of the exercise of power, and the human side of the problem, based on the principle of self-determination for the Falkland Islanders and their loyalty to the Crown. This is very Anglo-Saxon. We Latin Americans place more importance on the land than on humanity, and the presence of the islanders has been irrelevant to us. ... On the subject of the islanders' wishes, London has been very consistent from 1965 onward in maintaining that any solution cannot be agreed upon behind their backs. This position... ignores the fact that the United Nations, when referring to them, speaks of their interests and not their wishes ..." [1795]

1790 Berasategui 2017

1791 The abstention, rather than a vote against, was the result of a direct instruction from the Labour Government in London.

1792 *CO 1024/438*

1793 Ambassador Bonifacio de Carril quoted in *Shaw to Diggines (1969)* in *FO 7/1080*

1794 *Shaw to Diggines (1969)* in *FO 7/1080*

1795 *Diálogo con el Embajador Lucio García del Solar in Revista de Relaciones Internacionales* 1996 no.11, June – November

"Of course, the General Assembly is not a legislature. Mostly its resolutions are only recommendations, and it has no capacity to impose new legal obligations on States." [1796]

"Although for the first time Argentina obtained international recognition of the existence of the dispute and succeeded in tying the Falkland's decolonization to that dispute's resolution, there was no UN acknowledgement of Argentine sovereignty or open acceptance of the superiority of territorial integrity over self-determination as guiding principles for the settlement of this conflict. ..." [1797]

"Ambassadors Ruda and García del Solar ... preferred to avoid what I call a "diplomatic battle" - which could have ended in failure – and obtain a compromise text that brought the United Kingdom to the negotiating table, as agreed in the joint statement Zavala Ortiz-Stewart in January 1966, by which the United Kingdom accepted an express reference to resolution 2065 and the texts included in it. ... The resolution ... was undoubtedly a resounding political success that declared Argentina a party to the controversy and opened the way to these bilateral negotiations, but to give it the character of a document that favors our position on the issue of Sovereignty is an impossible difference... What is more, I can add knowingly that Ambassadors Ruda and García del Solar were of the opinion that what really mattered were negotiations and not returning to the General Assembly to reopen a process that could lead us to regress on what has already been obtained." [1798]

"The resolution establishes jurisprudence for occupied territories that are not subject to "self-determination" but are part of another State from which a portion of the territory was taken away by the colonizing power."[1799]

"... it merely calls for negotiations to begin, and lays down that their result should be a peaceful solution to the problem. Expressed like that, it sounded like a mild, positive call for peaceful progress, so it is not surprising that no country voted against it (including Britain, whose heart was not in the job of defending the Falkland Islanders)." [1800]

"(2065)*... was read by the Argentine governments (and is still considered today) as a diplomatic victory although, in short, it summoned both parties to enter into rapid negotiations."* [1801]

On the same day, the UN General Assembly adopts resolution 2070 relative to the British territory of Gibraltar. The resolution call for Anglo-Spanish negotiations regarding the status of the territory.

Also on the same day, at the UN, the General Assembly adopts resolution 2066 concerning Britain's colony of Mauritius. [1802]

> *"4. Invites the administering Power to take no action which would dismember the Territory of Mauritius and violate its territorial integrity."* [1803]

1796 *The Creation of States in International Law J.* Crawford 2007 (2nd ed.) p.113

1797 González 2014 p.21

1798 Berasategui 2017

1799 *Las declarationes de Madrid O la diplomacia como la continuacion de la guerra por otros medios* Guillermo Martin Caviasca 2018

1800 Pascoe 2020 p.311

1801 Mira & Pedrosa 2021. Resolution *2065* represented the highpoint of Argentine diplomacy (scheming?) at the United Nations, although all that had actually been achieved was a call for talks. Argentina wanted dialogue, so dialogue was what Argentina would get. Britain was an old hand at talking.

1802 See - https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/218/29/pdf/nr021829.pdf

1803 The Falkland Islands NSGT also had dependent territories in 1965, and this raises the question whether a newly independent Falkland Islands would have a legal claim to South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands. Possibly also Britain's Antarctic claims. In turn, this begs the question, just how much thought went into the selection of territories for listing in 1946 and what descriptions, if any, were provided. See 2019

"We have of course our obligations under Article 73 of the Charter, but we have never regarded Resolution 1514 as binding on us." [1804]

December 20th, at the United Nations, resolution *2105 (XX)* is adopted by the General Assembly. [1805]

> *"… Noting with deep regret that five years after the adoption of the Declaration many Territories are still under colonial domination, ….*
>
> *8. Requests the Special Committee to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate ways, as well as the steps to be taken, to enable the populations of those Territories to exercise fully their right to self-determination and independence;*
>
> *9. Requests the Special Committee, whenever it considers it appropriate, to recommend a deadline for the accession to independence of each Territory in accordance with the wishes of the people;*
>
> *10. Recognises the legitimacy of the struggle by the peoples under colonial rule to exercise their right to self-determination and independence …"*

"… a resolution was passed inviting both countries to discuss the islands' sovereignty issues, bearing in mind the inhabitants' interests. Interpretation of the resolution by both countries' diplomats was not identical: the Argentinean government understood in this case that the principle of self-determination by the people was not applicable." [1806]

"… what is the scope of a General Assembly resolution? … it would suffice to mention in this regard what the Charter of the United Nations and the Rules of Procedure of the General Assembly say. They are ultimately "recommendations"…" [1807]

December 30th, in London, before a visit by Secretary of State Michael Stewart to Buenos Aires, under-secretary John Rennie advises that, in the course of any discussion, talks regarding the sovereignty of the Falklands should be avoided.

> *"… apart from weakening our position in the Falkland islands Dependencies and the British Antarctic Territory, it would inevitably lead to an increase of pressure against British Honduras and British Guiana, and to the stiffening of the Spanish attitude towards Gibraltar. It could also be embarrassing to us further afield, e.g. in Aden. Indeed, it is impossible to say where the chain reaction would stop."* [1808]

December 31st, the population of the Falkland Islands is estimated as 2,079 with 52 births registered during the year. There have been 19 marriages and 18 deaths. [1809]

1804 *UK Mission to the United Nations to FCO (Diggins) January 22, 1969* in *FCO 7/1080* at *186*. See *Falklands Wars* vol.5

1805 See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2105(XX)

1806 *The impact of the resurging Malvinas (Falklands) issue on South American and European Union relations* Miriam Gomes Saraiva 2012

1807 Berasategui 2017

1808 *CO 1024/433*

1809 *Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Years 1964 & 1965*

1966 – January 3rd, in Buenos Aires, a new Argentine department - *Instituto y Museo Nacional de las Malvinas y Adyacencias de las Islas Malvinas* - is created by presidential decree to; *"... a) campaign for the return of the Falkland Islands to the Argentine, b) Collect relevant historical documents, c) Promote conference, and d) Establish a library."* To be chaired by historian Ernesto Fitte. [1810]

"This will, to all intends and purposes, be a Government propaganda organization under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs." [1811]

"Although long expected, the fact that the Decree was "No.1 of 1966", that it was published on the anniversary of the expulsion of the Argentine settlement from the Islands in 1833 and that this was only a few days before the Secretary of State's visit gave it some emphasis. But it needs more than one raindrop to make a shower and we have no evidence to say whether this presages a renewed wave of interest." [1812]

"Shortly afterwards the Government created the Instituto y Museo Nacional de las Malvinas y Adyacencias (Falkland Islands and dependencies Institute and National Museum) to be housed in a building under the control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. The aim of the institute was to "stimulate the national conscience", to demand the return of the Islands to Argentina, and to collect and disseminate information about the question. In addition, a specialist library was established and arrangements were put in hand for propaganda talks and films throughout the country." [1813]

"The Institute's objectives were to raise national awareness around the claim to the islands; gather documentation; disseminate aspects related to the archipelago for educational purposes, bringing them to public knowledge; and organize a specialized library." [1814]

In Buenos Aires, the *Comisión pro Monumento a Antonio Rivero* holds a ceremony; *"... at which Leguizamón Pondal assserted that Antonio Rivero had been a captain in the army of Manuel Dorrego fighting against Lavalle in the uprising in December 1828 before "fleeing" in 1829 to the Malvinas, where he headed the "rebellion of 26 August 1833", and that he died fighting in the battle of the Vuelta de Obligado in 1845. There is in fact no evidence for any of that; Leguizamon Pondal presented none, and Rivero cannot have been a captain since he was illiterate."* [1815]

"On that occasion, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs—during the Illia administration—requested an assessment of Rivero's activities in the islands from the ANH (Academia Nacional de la Historia)." [1816]

January 13th, in Buenos Aires, British Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart arrives on an official visit.

January 14th, at their meeting, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Dr. Zavala Ortiz, raises his country's claim to the Falkland Islands. Stewart emphasises the importance of the Islanders' views.

> *"In our experience, no good is served by keeping unwilling subjects under one's flag, but when the inhabitants' wishes are clear, as in this case they are clear, then the wishes of the Falkland islanders are more important than those of either the Government of the United Kingdom or that of Argentina..."* [1817]

1810 In March, 1967, it was noted (916/67) that this decree had been "*without effect*". See April, 1966 below
1811 *British Embassy, Buenos Aires to American Department, Foreign Office January 4, 1966*
1812 *Ibid. January 7, 1966*
1813 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281.* Also *Falklands or Malvinas? The Background to the Dispute* J. Metford 1968.
1814 Novas Lo Coco 2024
1815 Pascoe 2020 p.165. *cf.* 1833, 1956, 1965, 1966, 1972, 1982, 2012 and 2015
1816 Novas Lo Coco 2024. See April 19, 1966, below.
1817 Quoted in *The Times* January 14, 1966

Minister Ortiz responds.

> *"… one had to consider whether it was possible to apply the principle of self-determination in this case. He did not think it could be applied when its application might be detrimental to other principles generally accepted by the international community, such as those of territorial integrity and national sovereignty."* [1818]

"The Argentines… suggested that discussions should be continued without delay through diplomatic channels,…" [1819]

"When I visited Buenos Aires in January, 1966 I discussed this matter (sovereignty) with the then Argentine Foreign Minister. I stressed the importance we attached to the wishes of the inhabitants and suggested the removal of the existing Argentine obstacles to free movement. The Argentines did not respond to this." [1820]

"In January 1966 the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs of the United Kingdom, Michael Stewart, arrived in Buenos Aires as part of a tour of the region. His interview with Argentine Foreign Minister Miguel Ángel Zavala Ortiz had the issue of the Malvinas Islands as an almost exclusive topic. Zavala Ortiz invoked the good will of the British government so that the issue could be resolved. In turn, Stewart stated that he did not want the issue to constitute a source of ill will between the two countries. However, it was not possible for the UK government to act against the wishes of the population. The Argentine foreign minister pointed out that applying the principle of self-determination in this case would be detrimental to other principles generally accepted by the international community, such as territorial integrity and national sovereignty. He recognized the social and human aspects of the problem, but Argentine law guaranteed human rights. The islanders could integrate with neighboring Argentina and put an end to isolationism and insecurity. Faced with a community whose wishes were clear and indubitable, very powerful arguments were needed to invalidate them, Stewart argued. The Argentines had not presented any. It was the Argentine foreign minister who had to convince the islanders of the advantages they would obtain from integrating into Argentina. The inhabitants of the islands were not free to enter and leave Argentina. The islanders would be in a better position to understand the meaning of Argentine citizenship if the obstacles to communication were removed. He proposed to start talking about the possibility of improving communications rather than discuss possible changes in citizenship, which were not possible at the time. Zavala Ortiz warned that the wishes of the islanders could be encouraged by the British government. Stewart flatly denied this; there had never been the slightest sign that any of the islanders wanted to sever ties with the UK. The Argentine foreign minister pointed out that it was not fair that the wishes of 2,000 people prevail over the wishes of a majority of 22 million. If this idea of self-determination were accepted, few countries would preserve their unity. Argentina's desire to reincorporate the islands into its national territory was deeply felt. Ambassador Ezequiel Pereyra, an official from the Argentine Foreign Ministry present at the meeting, recalled that when reference had been made in the UN Assembly to the wishes of the inhabitants of Mauritius and the Seychelles, the representative of the United Kingdom commented that they only had 1500 inhabitants. The wishes of the 2,000 inhabitants of the Malvinas Islands were not a sufficient reason to destroy the territorial integrity of Argentina. Stewart arranged to discuss the matter with his ministerial colleagues in London. The British secretary warned that when the issue had been raised at the UN, the UK had made it clear that it did not consider the resolution to have any relevance to the issue of sovereignty, although it had been willing to discuss many aspects. For the third time he repeated his proposal

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1818 *FO 371/185135*

1819 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

1820 *Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 15, 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *154*

to facilitate communications between the islands and the mainland. Zavala Ortiz added that the United Kingdom had not opposed the UN resolution, therefore he understood that both the United Kingdom and Argentina wanted to put it into force..” [1821]

A *Joint Communiqué* is issued to the press.

> *“In keeping with the conciliatory spirit of the Resolution adopted by the 20th General Assembly of the United Nations, passed on 16 December 1965, both Ministers held a valuable and frank exchange of views during which they both reiterated the positions of their respective Governments. Finally, as a result of these conversations, the two Ministers have agreed on continuing without delay with the negotiations recommended in the above mentioned Resolution, through diplomatic channels or any other means they may agree upon in order to reach a peaceful solution to the problem and prevent the matter from affecting the excellent relations between Argentina and the United Kingdom. Both Ministers agreed to communicate this decision to the Secretary-General.”* [1822]
>
> *“The Ministers discussed the differences between the Government of the United Kingdom and that of the Argentine Republic on the Malvinas. In accord with the spirit of conciliation which inspired the resolution of the twentieth General Assembly of the United Nations approved on 16 December 1965, they have carried out a valuable and frank exchange of views, in the course of which both Ministers restated the positions of their respective governments.*
>
> *Finally, as a result of this exchange, both Ministers have agreed that discussions recommended by this resolution should be pursued without delay through diplomatic channels, or such other means as may be decided with the purpose of finding a peaceful solution to the problem and to prevent this question affecting the excellent relations existing between Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Ministers decided to transmit this decision to the Secretary-General of the United nations.”* [1823]

“Anglo/Argentine exchanges on the Falkland Islands date from 1966, following the December 1965 United Nations Resolution inviting both parties to hold discussions…” [1824]

“This, in itself, represented an important change for a power that since 1833 had denied that there was anything to discuss at all. … Britain wished that the dispute should not damage Anglo-Argentine relations and accepted the talks with this in mind, but it had no doubt about its sovereignty.” [1825]

“… diplomatic negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom were initiated after the adoption by the United Nations General Assembly of the aforementioned resolution 2065 (XX) and the Joint Communiqué, known as the Zavala Ortiz-Stewart Communiqué, which followed on January 14, 1966.” [1826]

“The communiqué published at the end of the meeting stated that the ministers had considered the difference between the two governments on the Malvinas/Falkland Islands. In keeping with the spirit of conciliation that had inspired the UN resolution, they had carried out a valuable exchange of views, both reiterating the

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1821 *Negociaciones para la firma de un memorándum de entendimiento argentino-británico relativo a las Islas Malvinas (1966-1968) según la documentación del foreign office* Leonor Machinandiarena de Devoto 2020 citing *DO 210/23*

1822 *FO 371/185135*

1823 *UN Doc A/AC.109/145* of February 16, 1966. See - https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N66/036/86/pdf/N6603686.pdf?OpenElement

1824 *FCO 76/1892 Annex 3*

1825 *Missed Opportunity? The Anglo-Argentine Negotiations over the Sovereignty of the Falkland Islands, 1966 – 1968* Martin Abel González 2009

1826 Berasategui 2017

positions of their respective governments. They had also agreed "to continue without delay the negotiations recommended in the aforementioned resolution through diplomatic channels or by those means that can be agreed upon in order to find a peaceful solution to the problem..." " [1827]

January 19th, an editorial in Argentine newspaper, *La Nacion,* comments on Stewart's visit.

> *"... the British and Argentine Foreign Ministers joint communique – and above all perhaps, the frankness with which Mr. Stewart approached the subject in the talks held during his visit – show the significance of the stage and interpret the new spirit in which Britain is beginning to deal with a subject which she had earlier evaded. ... (it was) agreed that discussions recommended by this Resolution (2065) should be pursued without delay through diplomatic channels, or such other means as may be decided, with the purpose of finding a peaceful solution to the problem and to prevent this question affecting the excellent relations existing between Argentina and the United Kingdom. ... the occupation of the Falkland Islands and their illegal retention by Britain have continued to act on Argentine opinion as a thorn in the flesh, the effects of which cannot be erased by anything less than a return to the situation ended by violence 133 years ago.*
>
> *From this point of view Argentina cannot negotiate with that which it is not in her power to trade: her sovereign rights over the lost Archipelago. ... Thus is renewed a dialogue which was interrupted in 1834..."* [1828]

January 24th, Minister Ortiz, in a televised address, tells the Argentine people that relations with the UK had entered a "*historic new phase*" and that with regard to the Falkland Islands, "*justice has become inevitable.*"

"..., far from Zavala Ortiz's subsequent pompous claim that a deal had been within reach at the summit, the record shows both sides restating their respective titles and positions." [1829]

In London, Ministry of Defence chiefs recommend that the Royal Marine detachment at the Falkland Islands be removed; defence of the Islands to be handed over to the Voluntary Defence Force, which consists of less than two dozen men.

January 31st, back in London, Foreign Secretary Stewart reports on his trip to the House of Commons.

> *"I did not discuss British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands with the Argentine Government; Her Majesty's Government does not consider that this is negotiable. I did, however, suggest that the Argentine Government should consider the removal of obstacles to free movement between Argentina and the Falkland Islands. We hope to discuss that subject again during further talks with Argentine officials."*[1830]

February 7th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship informs the British Embassy that it does not consider the information provided to the International Telecommunications Union in Bern, Switzerland, by the UK as affecting; *"... Argentine sovereignty over 'Las Malvinas', the Islas Georgias del Sur e Islas Sandwich del Sur' of which the United Kingdom holds possession by virtue of an act of force never recognised by the Argentine Government..."* [1831]

1827 Devoto 2020
1828 Translation in *British Embassy, Buenos Aires to American Department, Foreign Office January 24, 1966* in *FCO 371/185135*
1829 *Ibid.* p.114
1830 *Hansard January 31, 1966 col.161W*
1831 *FCO 371/185135.* See July 1965

In London, Prime Minister Harold Wilson informs Parliament that, following a request from Spain, his government had decided to start talks concerning the status of Gibraltar.

"The Gibraltar Council was given assurances that the Rock would remain British and that the interests of the Gibraltarians would be safeguarded. The Gibraltar Council told the UK Government that in their eyes, negotiating with Spain was unjustifiable for as long as the abnormal restrictions continued at the frontier." [1832]

February 22nd, in London, the Labour Government introduces its 1966 Defence White Paper to Parliament.

> *"... in view of our aim to provide for the protection of the Falkland Islands by building up the local defence force, there are insufficient military grounds to justify the provision of a landing strip from United Kingdom Defence funds."* [1833]

February 25th, at Stanley, six Royal Marines, the only regular troops on the Islands, start training the local Defence Force.

Average *per capita* annual income in the Falklands is £503; *"... high by colonial standards."* [1834]

March 18th, at the United Nations, the Executive Office of the Secretary-General circulates information.

> *"In accordance with a decision of the Fourth Committee of the General Assembly at its 1560 meeting on 18 November 1965, of which note was taken by the General Assembly at the 1398th plenary meeting on 16 December 1965, the name to be applied to the Territory of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in all United Nations documents is, (a) in all 1anguages other than Spanish: "Falkland Islands (Malvinas)" (b) in Spanish: "Islas Malvinas (Falkland Islands)". This nomenclature should be used in all documents and conference room and working papers. The only exceptions to be permitted may be in the verbatim reproduction of a speech or text in which the speaker or author has used a different terminology. ... In addition, where a reference to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) may raise or bear upon the question of sovereignty over the Territory, it should be accompanied, as the case requires, <u>either</u> by the standard disclaimer set forth in Terminology Bulletin No. 167 (ST/CS/SER.F/177/Rev.3, para 12) <u>or</u> (and especially in the case of an isolated reference to the Territory) by a note or footnote, as follows: "A dispute exists between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands (Malvinas)".* [1835]

In London, Argentina's Ambassador requests that negotiations move forward; *"... a preliminary meeting was arranged in London for July 19th and 20th."* [1836]

April 19th, at the United Nations, a Working Paper is prepared by the Secretariat on the question of the Falkland Islands. It notes the deliberations leading to Resolution 2065 of 1965 and the information from both Argentina and Britain that talks were about to commence. The paper adds that no new information regarding the territory is available. [1837]

1832 *Gibraltar: Closure of the Border 1969-2019.* See - https://www.gibraltar.gov.gi/uploads/Closure Booklet1.pdf
1833 *Annex A to DP 23/66 (Final)*
1834 *Guillebaud Report 1967* quoted in *FCO 42/429*
1835 *UN Doc ST/ADM/SER/A.1084.*
1836 *Guillebaud Report 1967* quoted in *FCO 42/429.*
1837 *UN Document A/AC.109/L.274* of April 19, 1966

In Buenos Aires, on the same day, academics Ricardo Caillet-Bois and Humberto Berzio, respond to calls for a monument to commemorate the gaucho Antonio Rivero as a revolutionary hero. In an open letter (right), these experts criticise demands for a statue. [1838]



actuación de antonio rivero en las malvinas

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Dictamen

Los documentos conocidos sobre la sublevación de Antonio Rivero y sus siete compañeros el 26 de agosto de 1833, son de origen británico. Su lectura permite conocer con cierto detalle cómo ocurrieron los hechos, con la base de las declaraciones de cinco testigos. No se desprende que un móvil patriótico impulsara a esos hombres a dar muerte al delegado y gente enviada por Luis Vernet, luego de consolida la usurpación de las islas Malvinas por la corbeta *Clio*. No eran las víctimas, por lo tanto, soldados o marinos británicos, sino empleados del ex comandante político y militar del gobierno de Buenos Aires, enviados para vigilar sus intereses y defender sus derechos ante el nuevo ocupante intruso. Esos hombres no fueron muertos con las armas en la mano, apostados para una lucha franca, sino cuando estaban ocupados en tareas pacíficas o en el sueño del descanso; el capataz Simón, salando cueros; el delegado Brisbane, entregado a la lectura en su casa; Dickson muerto fríamente con disparo de pistola y a sablazos; Ventura Paso al intentar huir, también alevosamente.

El móvil, según se desprende de la prevención sumaria abierta, elevada desde el buque *Sparkler* de estación en Río de Janeiro, al Almirantazgo, el 23 de marzo de 1835, fue que Rivero y los suyos recibían como paga, no dinero británico, sino billetes papel para uso en el establecimiento de las Malvinas, en vez de moneda plata.

La documentación conocida es indudablemente auténtica y no obstante su origen, nada hace presumir que los hechos relatados no se ajustaron a la verdad.

No fue la sublevación encabezada por Rivero la primera producida en las Malvinas. Se cuenta con el precedente de la del 30 de noviembre de 1832, con el asesinato alevoso del comandante Mestivier. Habría que conocer la participación que le cupo en este episodio a Rivero y sus hombres para poder juzgar la acción violenta, en casos como el de Mestivier, (abuso de autoridad) o el de Brisbane (pago en moneda papel en vez de la metálica de plata).

Antecedentes inmediatos al 26 de agosto de 1833 —fecha en que se produjo el alzamiento y los muertes ya mencionadas— y de origen no siempre británico, nos muestran a Antonio Rivero bajo una faz en la que el patriotismo y el coraje nada tienen que ver.

En unas declaraciones de Rivero, Antonio Wagner, Santiago López y otros hechas a pedido de Simón, consta casi sin variaciones, que al llegar la *Lexington* "de miedo de ella dispararon al campo mas de dia venían a pasear a las casas mas de noche se retiraban al campo por temor de haberlos corrido una vez que el único hombre que quedó en las casas fue el capataz (Simón), dos peones y un enfermo".

Que cuando arribó una goleta americana y empezó a matar caballos, "estando el capataz en el campo con cinco hombres al servicio de la hacienda pues si hubiese estado en las casas hubiese muerto el capataz y todos los peones para defender los caballos".

Aún hay más: Antonio Rivero es categórico cuando dice: "cuando el motivo si no hubiese sido el capataz Simón se hubiese perdido todo".

Es decir que los declaraciones dejan constancia del coraje de Simón y de la huida de los restantes que "de miedo", "dispararon al campo". Conviene puntualizar, asimismo, que Roberto Fitz Roy, el 20 de marzo de 1833, dirigiéndose a M. Brisbane le recomendó que retuviese a Juan Simón "en su actual empleo"; que deploraba mucho la remoción de este "cuya conducta ha sido evidentemente torgiversada y cuyos servicios son aquí, hasta el presente, esencialmente necesarios". Y reforzando su pedido añadió:

"Parece que los Gauchos se le han unido, y confían en él; si él permanece, ellos también desearían permanecer; pero si él deja la isla, ellos no permanecerán de buen grado; y si él y ellos se van, es evidente cuánto quedarán comprometidos los intereses del señor Vernet y todo lo que les concierne, pues casi todos los trabajos productivos cesarán con su partida."

A lo ya dicho hay algo más que añadir: de los integrantes de la partida que acompañó a Antonio Rivero, cinco o seis eran indios charrúas "que habían sido, algunos años antes, *confinados en la isla por el Gobierno de Montevideo* —nos informa Luis Vernet— y habían poco después entrado voluntariamente a mi servicio, como gauchos". Fueron ellos y tres gauchos descontentos los que asesinaron a los diversos colonos el 26 de agosto. El resto de los gauchos rehusó asociarse a Rivero y se refugiaron con mujeres y niños en una isla próxima. Al parecer, más tarde, colaboraron para perseguir y apresar a Rivero y los suyos.

Los antecedentes documentales hasta ahora conocidos, no son nada favorables para otorgar a Rivero títulos que justifiquen el homenaje que se proyecta, con más buena fe y entusiasmo patriótico que verdad histórica. Es deber y responsabilidad de la Academia Nacional de la Historia, como institución asesora del Poder Ejecutivo, comprobar fehacientemente el hecho y si el mismo revista carácter de verdad histórica indubitable de la defensa de la heredad patria.

Si no se aportan pruebas de que el levantamiento obedeció al noble propósito patriótico de expulsar a los usurpadores de la soberanía nacional, no corresponde el homenaje proyectado.

Ricardo R. Caillet-Bois
Humberto F. Burzio
Académicos de número
Buenos Aires, 1966

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However, this opinion immediately comes under attack from nationalists and revisionist historians.

> *"… To comprehend the quality of the impulse that inspired the struggle of Antonio Rivero, the boldness of his bravery, the driving force of his patriotism, it is necessary to begin by being Argentinian… With his qualities and his defects, his roughness and his tenderness, his triumphs and his defeats, Argentina is in Rivero and Argentina is Rivero, as a supreme protagonist of the drama of our lives, struggling against powers and empires, a vibrant will for justice which extols the native community of Argentinians, on the stages of that same human and political journey on which we travel and on which travelled Antonio Rivero…"* [1840]

"We can affirm - without being unfair - that he (Caillet Bois) is responsible, since he handled English information without giving it a logical interpretation.... Caillet Bois, based on British documents, historically reproves a group of gauchos and illiterate Indians whose resistance – to British domination – was the first Argentine cry of protest from the islands." [1841]

"The Rivero Myth was discredited in a "dictamen" (official opinion) written by the Argentine historians Ricardo Caillet-Bois and Capitán Humberto Burzio, adopted unanimously by the Academía Nacional de la Historia and published on 19 April 1966, pointing out that Rivero and his group did not rebel against Britain and that they killed representatives of Argentina.... The publication of the Academy's opinion at once unleashed a storm of protest in Argentina.... the Rivero Myth has been repeated many times by successive Argentine governments and Argentine authors." [1842]

1838 In 1967, Ricardo Caillet-Bois and Humberto Burzio published a book – *El Episodio Ocurrido en Puerto de la Soledad de Malvinas el 26 de Agosto de 1833: Testimonios Documentales* – in an attempt to set the record straight. However, the myth of the Gaucho Rivero persists to this day (2025).

1839 Quoted in Lorenz 2022 citing *El gaucho Antonio Rivero. La mentira en la historiografía académica* Mario Tesler 1971

1840 *Dictamen que agravia la soberanía* Enrique Corominas & Oscar Uriondo in *Propósitos* May 5, 1966

1841 Tesler 1971

1842 Pascoe 2020 pp.165-166

"A dissonant point that arose in the historiographical debate was anchored around the figure of the gaucho Rivero. For Caillet-Bois, as for the ANH, Rivero was a murderer and a harmful agent for the future of the establishment that Vernet had founded. ... The intensity of the discussion led to an event organized by the Pro-Rivero Commission the day before the ANH session, at the House of the Province of Buenos Aires. The verses of the Anthem and the Cantata to the gaucho of the Malvinas Islands, Antonio Rivero, were sung. The main speaker was Colonel Máximo Garro who highlighted that Rivero had lowered the English flag, reconquered the islands, and that in April 1834 he had been captured by the crew of the Beagle to be tried in London. The dispute grew so intense that both Juan Carlos Moreno and Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen expressed their approval of Rivero. This is interesting given that Yrigoyen and Moreno were members of the Malvinas Institute, which included Caillet-Bois, Burzio, Fitte, and other members of the ANH." [1843]

As a result of the controversy, Dr. Ernesto Fitte resigns as Chairman of the *Instituto y Museo Nacional de las Malvinas y Adyacencias de las Islas Malvinas.* [1844]

"One of the first provisions taken by the government of Dr. Illia at the beginning of 1966 was to create the Institute and National Museum of the Malvinas and Adjacency Islands, chaired by Dr. Ernesto J. Fitte. That institution, in its first steps, approved the Malvinas March (...) and the shield of the islands. A dissidence that arose within the institution spoiled its beginnings. The reason was the qualification of the events carried out by Rivero and his protagonists in August 1833, an episode on which the National Academy of History, at the request of the national government, ruled that year (...) The controversy led to the resignation of Dr. Fitte , in dissidence with the "riveristas", and on February 14, 1967 the Institute was dissolved by the government of the "Argentine Revolution"." [1845]

"This led to the resignation of Ernesto Fitte as president of the Institute, and the subsequent dissolution of the organization under a presidential decree signed by the then Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs, Jorge Mazzinghi. The most severe criticism levelled at Caillet-Bois and the ANH was that their position was based solely on English documents, and that this had a fundamental bias:..." [1846]

May 18th, in London, Spain's Government proposes that the terms of the *Treaty of Utrecht 1713* be cancelled, and Gibraltar handed over to Spain. [1847] The UK's Naval base to be retained subject to a separate agreement and the culture of the Gibraltarians to be guaranteed by the UN. Gibraltarians to retain their British passports and nationality.

June 2nd, in London, following a sharp drop in the price of wool likely to affect the Falklands economy, Foreign Office under-secretary Henry Hohler, notes; *"... (there) is now a much better prospect of reaching agreement over the Falklands since the islands are losing population and ceasing to be self-supporting. ... the islanders may themselves come to desire union with the Argentine."* [1848]

The British Government presents a counter-proposal to Spanish negotiators; an end to frontier restrictions; the appointment of a Spanish Commissioner in Gibraltar in a restricted capacity; modification of Gibraltar's political institutions and joint use of the airport, port and territorial waters. These proposals are rejected outright.

1843 Novas Lo Coco 2024 citing *La Nación* April 26, 1966

1844 A children's story written in the 1950s changed the character of Rivero to that of a revolutionary hero. In 1833, Luis Vernet damned Rivero as a murderer. In 1966, Argentina proclaimed him a hero.

1845 Lorenz 2022 citing *Crónica documental de las Malvinas* Hugo Gambini 1982 vol.1

1846 Novas Lo Coco 2024

1847 In 1713, Gibraltar had been handed to the British by the then Spanish monarch in a deal where, in exchange, Spain gained some recognition of its claims in the Americas. Gibraltar was ceded in 'perpetuity'. *cf*. González 2014

1848 Further confirmation, if any were needed of Foreign Office attitudes.

June 17th, in Argentina, *Telenoche*, a prominent news program, broadcasts a documentary – *Nuestras Islas Malvinas* – a 30-minute black and white film recorded in the Falkland Islands by a young journalist, Raymundo Gleyzer. [1849]

June 23rd, in New York, at the UN, Britain's Secretary of State for Economic Affairs, George Brown, meets Argentina's Foreign Minister, Nicanor Costa Méndez over breakfast. [1850]

June 24th, in Stanley, Governor Haskard is informed of negotiations with Buenos Aires, and provided with a legal opinion from the Law Officers. [1851]

> *"Thank you for your secret and personal letter FST.462/47/09 of 24th June regarding the Anglo-Argentine talks on the subject of the Falkland Islands. I note that the memorandum summarising the opinions of the Law Officers is for my personal information only."* [1852]

June 28th, in Argentina, President Illia is overthrown in a *coup* led by General Juan Carlos Ongania.

"The British government recognized the new government a week later by means of a brief statement, despite the fact that the United States had requested to postpone the recognition to allow time for the verdict of a meeting with the other American countries. The British government clarified that recognition did not necessarily imply approval." [1853]

July 11th, following a suggestion from the President of the Bank of London and South America, George Bolton, that Argentina and the UK set up a joint administration of the Falkland Islands.

"This proposal was rejected by the Malvinas Recovery Board, whose president was ambassador Alberto M. Candioti. In a note dated July 11, 1966, it said that this was an absurd demand and that if Great Britain did not comply with the United Nations recommendation, "our people will have the right to resort to other means"." [1854]

July 19th, in London, a preliminary meeting opens with teams led by Henry Hohler and Argentine Ambassador Dr. Alejandro Lastra. [1855] Argentine diplomat, Juan Carlos Beltramino, submits a formal note asserting that restitution of the Falkland Islands to Argentina would be the; *"... only solution within the aims pursued by Resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly."*

> *"In accordance with the rights and guarantees established in the Argentine Constitution my Government will assure the small number of inhabitants of the Islas Malvinas full enjoyment of their civil rights and religious freedom. Likewise, it will authorize the use of the English language both in schools and other activities, in order to avoid any harm to their interests. Moved by the same spirit it*

1849 Raymundo Gleyzer had, seemingly, the permission of the British government although the exact dates of his visit to the Islands are not recorded, nor how he got there. Gleyzer became one of the 'disappeared'. Kidnapped on May 27, 1976, outside the Argentine Cinematic Union it is believed he was taken to the detention centre El Vesubio, where he was tortured and murdered. His body has never been recovered. I can find no on-line source for the film.

1850 Reportedly a champagne breakfast hosted by the Argentine Minister. The purpose of the meeting was to review the progress, or lack of it, in the talks regarding the Falkland Islands.

1851 The limited available evidence suggest that informal talks were taking place between Harold Hohler, Assistant Under-Secretary at the Foreign Office, and Juan Carlos Beltramino of the Argentine Embassy in London.

1852 *Haskard to Bennet July 31, 1966* in *CO 1024/585.* This seems likely to have been the Law Officers' opinion of 1947. See September, 1966, below.

1853 Devoto 2020

1854 Bologna 1981 citing *La Recuperacion de las Malvinas* Juan Carlos Moreno 1973

1855 Leading Argentina's delegation, Lastra had been viewed as a person who the Foreign Office could "*work with,*" as he had previously expressed his desire to assist in a "*revival*" of the traditionally good relations between the two countries. After this initial round of talks, however, he resigned his position. Out of favour with the new regime in Argentina.

is prepared to consider exemption from military service for the inhabitants for a period to be determined."[1856]

"The first round of formal talks was held in London in July 1966 when the Argentines handed over a Note claiming the "return" of the islands and making certain offers about ways in which the Argentine Government would be ready to respect the Islanders' interests by offering safe-guards and guarantees to protect their position under a change of sovereignty." [1857]

July 20th, at a second meeting in London, Henry Hohler rejects both the demand and the implication; *"... that Britain had practised illegal occupation of the Islands..."*

"In addition, the British delegation asked the Argentines to consider the problem in human and not simply legal terms: it was argued that serious consideration had to be given to the Islanders' interests and that they had to be persuaded of the benefits of Argentine citizenship." [1858]

"... what the Foreign Office had in mind for the July round was not what Buenos Aires interpreted. .. Henry Hohler,.. strove to convince his guests that the Falklanders' needed to be in a position to fully appreciate the benefits of Argentine citizenship in order to change their mind. For this to occur, Buenos Aires had to remove the restrictions of movement..." [1859]

July 21st, Hohler writes to Ambassador Creswell in Buenos Aires.

*"Our aim should be to **get shot** of the Falkland Islands in an honourable manner, with a transition period long enough to enable the younger Islanders either to settle down under Argentine rule or to emigrate, and the older Islanders to live out their lives under British rule where they now are."* [1860]

The Colonial Office inform Governor Haskard. [1861]

July 23rd, Argentina is defeated, controversially, in the quarter-finals of the 1966 World Cup competition.

"First they stole the Falklands from us, and now the World Cup."

On the same day, David Hewlett of the Bank of London and South America, is interviewed on the BBC South American Service. [1862]

"The talks on the Falkland islands that have recently been held in London between the Argentine and British Governments were by no means the first. The ownership of these remote and inhospitable islands in the South Atlantic has been in dispute since the British first landed there in the 17th century. In the 18th century they were sighted and settled on by sailors from St. Malo and name Isles Malouines.

1856 Quoted in *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973) Annex 3* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

1857 *Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 18(?), 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *154*

1858 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973) in FO 7/3201 attached to 281.* Also *The Falkland Islands, 5th Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 1983-1984 HC 268 25.10.1984* para.29

1859 *FO 371/1851/39*

1860 Quoted in *FO 371/1851/37.* My emphasis.

1861 *Telegram 96* cited in *Haskard to Bennet July 31, 1966* in *CO 1024/585*

1862 The Bank of London and South America, operated in South America between 1923 and 1971 as a result of a merger between the London, Buenos Ayres and River Plate Bank and the separately owned London and Brazilian Bank overseen by Lloyds Bank in the UK, with which it merged in 1986.

France later ceded her claim to Spain and as Islas Malvinas they were considered to be part of Spain's Empire in the New World. Britain however continued to regard the islands as her own.

Islas Malvinas are some 300 miles east of the southern tip of Argentina and geographically they would appear to be part of the South American continent. When Argentina declared her independence from Spain a century and a half ago, the islands were regarded as being included in the Spanish vice-royalty of the River Plate and thus part of the Republic of Argentina. Britain's claim of ownership of the islands was not recognised, nor considered relevant.

Britain has never acknowledged this point of view. In the days of sailing ships and early steam navigation, the Falkland Islands were a useful provisioning and fuelling station for ships around Cape Horn. The opening of the Panama Canal reduced their usefulness considerably, though they were still regarded as having some value as a naval base. This view has subsisted to the present day, though it must be admitted that Britain's naval operations in the South Atlantic can hardly be regarded as being of major significance these days.

As a reason for retaining possession of the islands, their usefulness to Britain is relatively unimportant. Rather more weight should perhaps be attached to the wishes of the population, such as it is, which consists of some 2000 sheep farmers of mainly British origin. It is said or assumed that they have no desire to become part of the Argentine nation. It is hard to believe that a change would make any material difference to their lives on this remote group of small islands, but tradition and emotional ties are strong and the British Government very properly holds that their views must be respected.

It is not known what possible solutions were discussed at the recent talks, nor what prospects there may be for a satisfactory settlement when they are resumed in October, but several arrangements have been suggested from time to time that might satisfy the chief interests involved though there are complex legal problems to overcome.

Argentina bases her claim on geographical and historical grounds and the question of sovereignty over the islands is a matter of great emotional importance in Argentina.

One suggestion is that if Britain were to relinquish her claim in favour of Argentina, the 2000 inhabitants and their descendants could have dual nationality, like many thousands of people of British parentage born in mainland Argentina.

If the islands really had any value as a naval base, it should not be too difficult for Argentina to allow Britain to retain a base there as is commonly done in other parts of the world.

There is also the argument that Britain could benefit without affecting the interests of the islanders by a gesture towards Argentina by Britain which would show a proper recognition of Argentina's very real aspirations and would meet meet with two important results. In the first place, improved Anglo Argentine diplomatic relations might be reflected in better trading between the two countries and in the second place the gesture would greatly enhance the popular standing of the new government of General Juan Carlos Ongania. If, as now seems very likely, General Ongania has in his hands the keys to the solution of Argentina's economic and social problems it is in Britain's power to give him valuable assistance and so contribute indirectly to Argentina's future prosperity. This itself would be to Britain's material advantage since Argentina is one of our most important trading partners." [1863]

1863 Transcription in *CO 1024-585*

This interview is widely heard in the Falkland Islands, where there is a very negative reaction.

> *"The commentary on the Falkland Islands … was most disturbing. The impression given that the Islands could easily be given over to Argentine sovereignty by arranging that the Falkland Islands inhabitants were given dual nationality concessions was particularly upsetting…"* [1864]

"The reaction to this broadcast was immediate and in general, antagonistic. The BBC is regarded here as being the mouthpiece of the British Government and almost everyone who has commented to me on the broadcast has tended to assume that it was officially inspired. There is in fact a strong feeling that the British Government is prepared to sacrifice the interests of the Colony and its inhabitants for reasons of expediency."[1865]

"That such a broadcast should come from London rather than Buenos Aires was the first public indication that the British Government were inclined to appease Argentina." [1866]

July 24th, From Stanley, following a meeting of the Falkland Islands Executive Council, Governor Haskard telegrams the Foreign Office.

> *"Council wishes to emphasise that Falkland Islanders have no desire whatsoever to be handed over to Argentina. On the contrary population wishes to retain closest possible ties with Britain and rejects any suggestion that Colony of Anglo-Saxon stock should be used as pawn for any transitory political or material advantage."* [1867]

July 31st, Governor Haskard writes to the Colonial Office.

> *"As you say, reference to the International Court might present a mid-way course between complete stone-walling and some more radical solution and I am* ***interested to note from the final sentence of the memorandum summarising the views of the Law Officers that, assuming a case has to be argued internationally, it would be less difficult to do so before a legal body than in a political forum at the United Nations****. The determining factors, as you say are likely to be the political and practical ones and I appreciate the implications of the Gibraltar dispute for this Colony. … for most Falkland Islanders our right to be here is regarded as beyond any question of doubt."* [1868]

August 1st, in Britain, the Colonial Office and Commonwealth Relations Office merge, to form the Commonwealth Office. Herbert Bowden MP is appointed Secretary for Commonwealth Affairs.

August 4th, in London, responding to Governor Haskard's comment regarding a legal body, Britain's Foreign Office writes to the new Commonwealth Office.

> *"Many thanks for your letters FST 462/47/09 of 1 and 28 July about the possibility of referring the Falkland Islands dispute to the International Court. … We have consulted the Foreign Office Legal Advisor about this. Sir Francis Vallat intends to write to the Legal Secretary to the Law Officers, mentioning the 1947 opinions of this subject and asking how he thinks the present Law Officers would like to deal with the matter."* [1869]

August 11th, in London, George Brown is appointed Britain's Foreign Secretary.

1864 *MLA Vinson to Gov. Haskard July 24, 1966* quoted in *CO 1024/585*
1865 *Haskard to Bennet July 31, 1966* in *CO 1024/585*
1866 Governor Cosmo Haskard quoted in Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.275
1867 *FCO 42/67*
1868 *Haskard to Bennet July 31, 1966* in *CO 1024/585. M*y emphasis.
1869 *Atkinson to Sugg August 4, 1966* in *CO 1024/585. cf.* 1947

On the same day, a meeting at the new Commonwealth Office considers the possibility of Argentina taking a case to the ICJ.

> *"There seemed no doubt that, if the Argentines propose that we take their claim to the Court, we should have to agree to do so because this would accord with our general policy towards the United Nations and the International Court. Whether we should ourselves propose to go to the Court was a rather different matter. It did, however, appear fairly certain that an offer to go to the Court would be made by us to the Spaniards over Gibraltar and, if this happened, it would seem that we would have to make the same offer to the Argentines. If we did not do so it would be assumed that we considered we had not got as good a title to the Islands as we had to Gibraltar. ... The first step would be to get an opinion from the Law Officers..."* [1870]

August 17th, John Bennet, of the Commonwealth Office, writes to Robert Edmonds at the American Department of the Foreign Office.

> *"We here... have come to believe that if the Argentines ask us to go to the Court we would have to agree to go and if we do, as seems probable, propose to the Spaniards that we take the Gibraltar dispute to the Court, we would have no alternative but to do the same thing with the Argentines over the Falklands."* [1871]

Britain's Law Officers (the Attorney General and the Solicitor General) are asked to provide an opinion with regard to an approach to the International Court of Justice. [1872]

"In 1966 the question arose as to whether in the course of negotiations with the Argentines, the UK should offer to refer the dispute over the Falkland Islands to the ICJ. The Law Officers were asked to advise whether the strength in law of the British case for sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies was sufficient to justify such a reference. [REDACTED]..." [1873]

"Our original intention had been, ... to produce a classified paper and an accompanying sanitised version for use with suitable contacts. However, the nature of the paper and its conclusions have led us to decide to have the whole classified secret and not to produce any companion unclassified paper. The facts would seem to be that ***our case rests almost entirely on 148 years of continuous settlement****, and that while the Law Officers have previously been relatively certain that this would be sufficient in International Law to uphold our claim, there is certainly some risk in putting the contention to the test, particularly given the probable in-built anti-colonial bias of most of the international institutions which might be involved if the case went to arbitration."* [1874]

August 29th, George Thompson is appointed Secretary for Commonwealth Affairs.

September 7th, as regards an approach to the ICJ, the newly formed Dependent Territories Division at the Foreign Office adds its opinion.

> *"(British) policy since 1945 has been not to accept any specific and binding international commitment which could limit the freedom of the British government to decide on the most suitable constitutional*

1870 *CO 1024/585*. This meeting was attended by Galsworthy (Foreign Office) Bennett, Gordon-Smith and Sugg (all Commonwealth Office).

1871 *Bennett to Edmonds August 17, 1966* in *CO 1024/585. cf.* January, 1947 & December, 1966

1872 This needs to be understood. The advice sought was NOT about Britain's historic claim to the Falklands. It was only about the ICJ, and their likely opinion.

1873 FCO review October 14, 1981 in *ALW 040/325/1 Part B 26. cf.* 1947, 1955 & October, 1981

1874 *Fearn to Williams November 26, 1981* in *AW 040/325/1.* My emphasis.

goal for any territory when the time had come to do so. This policy has taken account of two major aims: to do the best we can for the people of any territory in their 'particular circumstances,' and to ensure that the government of the day remains free to decide how best to safeguard essential or important British or Allied interests." [1875]

September 8th, at the Commonwealth Office, John Bennet notes; *"... it has now been established informally from the Law Officers Department that they are **likely to confirm the previous Opinion of 1947** and will not expect another full-dress submission starting from scratch..."* [1876]

"[1947] .., in our view, whilst it is not easy to express views with confidence in the unsettled state of International Law in relation to acquisition and loss of territory, Great Britain has a reasonably strong claim to have acquired the Falkland Islands by acquisitive prescription in the nature of usucaption consisting in its de facto possession and occupation of the Falkland Islands since the year 1833. ... [1877] *Between 1841 and 1849 there were spasmodic protests by the Argentine Government to Britain; protests were renewed from 1884 to 1888. From 1908 onwards there have been a series of protests. Since 1833, however, there has not been any manifestation at all of physical control by the Argentine over the Islands. The protests made by the Argentine can be described as paper protests in that they were never followed up by further positive action. Furthermore, they were punctuated by long periods of silence so far as Great Britain is concerned, during which the Argentine showed no animus either way. There was, for example, such a period of silence between 1849 and 1884 (35 years), and between 1884 and 1908 (24 years). ... no positive attempt was made by the Argentine to have the matter referred to any process on international arbitration (although it is true that Dr. Ortiz suggested arbitration in 1884), even after the establishment of the League of Nations the Argentine did not bring the matter before this body. ... Britain, on the other hand, from 1833, or at least from 1841,*[1878] *... had had factual occupation of the Islands without physical disturbance of any sort and without adverse claim from any quarter, apart from the Argentine, until the present day. ... in our view by international law Britain has acquired a prescriptive title to the Falkland Islands, and we accordingly think that if the matter were adjudicated upon, Britain would be successful in establishing her case..."* [1879]

September 9th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Creswell writes to Henry Hohler. He argues that Britain should accept Argentina's proposals, perhaps via some lease-back arrangement.

> *"... the chances that Argentina will be prepared to make some advance towards the removal of obstacles to freedom of movement between the islands and the mainland are slight, unless we are willing to talk seriously about sovereignty."*

"While Creswell was convinced that Britain should pick up and exploit Argentina's own proposal, agreeing to concede sovereignty immediately in exchange for an extended list of guarantees for the islanders, there were voices, such as that of John Bennett – head of the Gibraltar and South Atlantic Department – which raised the opposite alternative of putting a brake on Buenos Aires' diplomatic offensive at the UN by submitting the dispute to the International Court of Justice." [1880]

1875 Quoted in *CO 936/977*

1876 *CO 1024/585.See December 2, 1966, below.*

1877 Usucaption is "*The acquisition and possession, undisturbed and uninterrupted of a territory which was formerly under another State's sovereignty or occupation ie., which was not terra nullius"* (*FCO 76/1892 Annex 3 footnote to p.12.)*

1878 It seems that the Law Officers were not made aware of Lieut. Smith's 1834 appointment as Residential Officer.

1879 1947 Law Officers opinion in *LCO 2/490.* See also *FCO 76/1892*

1880 González 2009

September 20th, Governor Haskard arrives in London to join the discussions.

"... he was convinced that more than 90% of the Islanders disliked Argentina and wished to continue in close association with the UK." [1881]

"The Governor firmly expressed his view that Creswell's proposal would generate a political storm in the islands, and that at a minimum what was needed was a long period of time for the older generation to pass away under British rule and for the younger islanders to plan ahead their future in a changed situation. Bennett added that disregarding the islanders' wishes would weaken Britain's Gibraltar policy vis-à-vis Franco's Spain; hence his preference was for the submission of the controversy to the International Court as a time and face-saving move." [1882]

Robert Edmonds, head of the American Department, gives his view on Britain taking a case to the ICJ.

> *"Argentina would refuse to accept the referee's decision and we would still have the dispute on our hands."* [1883]

September 26th, Britain's Prince Phillip, the Duke of Edinburgh, flies out to Argentina for an unofficial visit.

September 27th, at a meeting in the Commonwealth Office, rather than wait for Argentina to suggest an approach to the ICJ, it is suggested that Britain take the initiative and make an offer in line with that being made to Spain. Although likely to be rejected by Argentina, the offer would; *"... gain us some support in the UN, ... give us an advantage in our negotiations, and buy some time."* [1884] Others are less enthusiastic about a British win at the ICJ; *"... we should be saddled with an indefensible group of islands with a declining population that is of no possible use to us."*

"The question was not, however, pursued further. This was partly because reference to the Court would have had no attraction for Argentina, but more because the composition of the courts had by then become less favourable for the UK on what is seen by many other members of the UN as a colonial problem." [1885]

September 28th, an armed group of eighteen Argentines, from the militant *Condor Group*, hijack an *Aerolíneas DC4*, on an internal Argentine flight to Rio Gallegos, and force it to fly to the Falklands. [1886]

The plane has 26 passengers on-board, including Admiral Jose Guzmán, Governor of Tierra del Fuego and the Islands of the South Atlantic.[1887] Also a journalist, Héctor Ricardo Garcia, manager at the news journal *Crónica*.[1888]

Reaching the archipelago with little fuel remaining, but finding no runway, the aircraft is forced to land on the race-course at Stanley.[1889]

"The airliner, by far the largest aircraft ever seen over the Falklands, was carrying about forty passengers, fresh produce and crates of newly hatched chicks. It had taken off several hours earlier from the northern Patagonian town of Bahia Blanca for a flight to Rio Gallegos in the far south. Soon after take-off a number of

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1881 *FCO 42/67*
1882 *Minute by R. Edmonds, September 22, 1966* in *FO 371/185140*
1883 *Ibid.*
1884 *CO 1024/585*
1885 *Brief No. A6 ALW 0420/325/1 (FCO 07-3801) 1980.* However, see 1969, below.
1886 For a detailed account of the hijacking and its aftermath, see Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.496-518
1887 An Argentine Federal Territory, in 1966.
1888 Pascoe (2023 vol.3 p.498) suggests that Garcia may actually have been the initiator behind the stunt; financed, seemingly, by an Argentine businessman, César Cao Savaria.
1889 Between 0940 and 0950hrs, local time.

the passengers emerged from their seats, reached into their hand luggage and produced guns. The hijackers, ..., were the extreme right-wing Condor Group. They ordered the captain to change course for the Falklands, where they intended to reclaim the Islands for the motherland. The crew must have had concerns, but the Argentine guerrillas appeared blissfully unaware that Stanley had no airport. ... the DC4 needed to put down somewhere and Islanders felt a mixture of alarm and relief when it began to descend in the direction of the racecourse. Landing such a large aircraft on a soft stretch of grass with fences and grandstands on each side was desperately dangerous better, though, than running out of fuel in mid-air. Showing remarkable skill, the pilots touched down lightly and managed to reduce the DC4's speed before the undercarriage began ploughing into the soft turf. Eventually it came to a jarring stop, still upright but with its wheels well and truly stuck." [1890]

"They had, however, neglected to take the elementary precaution of finding out whether there was an airport in the islands – and at that time there was no airport at all. They were crackpots of course – who in their right mind hijacks an aircraft to a place with no airport to land at? They became distinctly edgy on realising there was no airport, and the lives of all on board were saved by the weather (it was clear and there was no typical Falklands storm or low cloud or fog) and by the skill of the pilot, who successfully brought the plane down on Stanley racecourse. If there had been a storm, or fog, or there had been vehicles parked on the racecourse, all on board would have died." [1891]

"Far from improvisation, "Operation Condor" had been prepared for three years. The day was carefully chosen, coinciding with the arrival of the Prince of Edinburgh—consort of Queen Elizabeth II—to meet with the de facto president Juan Carlos Onganía, play polo and watch the World Equestrian Championship. Among the passengers was Héctor Ricardo García, owner of the newspaper Crónica, who had been given a scoop about what would happen. If his presence was not enough to guarantee a high media impact, the de facto governor of Tierra del Fuego, Rear Admiral José María Guzmán, was also travelling - according to some versions, by pure chance. When his aide-de-camp noticed what was happening, he tried to open fire, but was effectively subdued by Carlos Rodríguez and Pedro Tursi, after which Guzmán resigned himself and remained silent." [1892]

The hijackers emerge from the aircraft to be met by Sgt. Robert Lawrence and two Marines, all unarmed. With the hijackers pointing machine guns at them, they surrender; being told that the *Condor Group* has come to liberate the Islands from their "*colonial masters*". Arriving members of other emergency services, Fire Brigade (2) and a Police Sergeant, are seized as hostages. Another innocent arrival, Marine Captain Ian Martin, is also taken. Despite being a hostages, Police Sergeant Terry Peck tells the terrorists that they are "*under arrest*."

A leader of the *Group*, Dardo Cabo, sends a radio message back to Argentina;

> *"Operation Condor accomplished. Passenger, crew and team all well. Position Puerto Rivero, Malvinas Islands. British Authorities consider us arrested. Chief of police and infantry taken hostage by us until British Governor annuls our arrest and recognises that we are on Argentine territory."*

1890 Bound 2007
1891 Pascoe 2020 p.314
1892 *Repercussions and representations of "Operative Condor" in the extreme right (1966-1986)* Boris Matías Grinchpun 2022

The hijackers then plant Argentine flags and sing their national anthem before a prepared text is read out.

> *"Today we set foot on the Argentine Malvinas Islands to reaffirm national sovereignty with our presence and remain as zealous custodians of the blue and white (National flag?). Either we fulfil our future, or we will die with the past."* [1893]

"Nicolás Karasiewicz stated years later that the intention was to hand over command to Guzmán right there, but Guzmán literally turned his back on them." [1894]

"In addition to raising Argentine flags and announcing the renaming of the islands' capital as "Puerto Rivero," the armed militants demanded that the governor recognize Argentine rights to the archipelago. In their proclamation, they did not refer to the 1833 incident, but rather emphasized the call to action ("we have preferred deeds to words") and the goal of "reaffirming national sovereignty with our presence" ... ." [1895]

Pamphlets, in poorly written English, are handed out to the hostages.

> *"We don't come as aggressors, but as Argentine citizens to meet again with our country and with men of this country which are our brothers, we are sons of a National (sic) readty to defend our proud (sic) we believe that the Malvinas has not to be more a territory condemned to the ambiguity (a)nd that their inhabitants has to realize themselves in (?) sure climate of progress.*
>
> *That in han(d)s of the Malvinas people the islands will get back their destine (sic) their tradition and their name.*
>
> *Their (sic) cease to be land inhabited by forgotten people to becam (sic) a land inherited by capable, worthy and free men and women they shall be owners of the place they live and work.*
>
> *For that reason we come and from here we say: Argentine present*
>
> *For that reason the Leader propose*
>
> *I) To consider Argentine all the people borned (sic) in this island and put them under the protection of the Argentine Nation and its laws and give them all the rights and benefits they got under this protection.*
>
> *II) That the name Falkland will be in the future changed by "Malvinas Islands' and Soledad (a)nd Ezperanza to Big East Islands. To the name called Port Stanley will be chanced (sic) by 'Port Riviero' to memory (sic) Argentine man.*[1896]
>
> *III) To declare private property to all the Malvine homes and to adjudge to all the natives theyr (sic) farms and houses."* [1897]

"... a persistent rain did not prevent the capital from being renamed "Puerto Rivero" in allusion to the gaucho who led an uprising in 1833." [1898]

Arms are issued to the Defence Force and police officers, who surround the aircraft.

1893 Quoted in Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.503 citing *www.pagina12.com.ar*
1894 Grinchpun 2022. Guzmán played no part in proceedings and was considered by the hijackers to be a coward.
1895 María Inés Tato 2025 in Paula Seiguer & Alina Silveira (eds) 2025 p.79
1896 The Gaucho murderer from 1833, who they believed to be some kind of revolutionary hero.
1897 Copy in the Jane Cameron National Archive in the Falkland Islands.
1898 Grinchpun 2022

Inside the *DC4*, Marine Captain Ian Martin suggests to Dardo Cabo that he and two other members of the *Condor Group*, go and negotiate with the man currently in charge of the archipelago, Acting Governor Leslie Gleadell. [1899]

"Les Gleadell was "his usual blunt uncompromising self" – he was surprised to receive visitors from Argentina, and burst out laughing when he heard what it was all about. He made it abundantly clear to Cabo that the islanders were not in need of liberation and that his whole group were on a fools errand." [1900]

The negotiating party return to the hostages, minus one Marine Captain; who slips away to join the Defence Force that is forming a cordon around the racecourse. Police Sergeant Terry Peck, one of the hostages, calms the Argentine passengers; with no assistance from Admiral Jose Guzmán. [1901]

Peck persuades the hijackers to let the passengers leave the aircraft.[1902] During the confusion of transporting the Argentine passengers out of the area, Terry Peck takes an opportunity to slip away.

"By about midday the last of the passengers and all of the crew except the pilot had been taken away, ..." [1903]

This leaves the hijackers and five hostages – three Royal Marines and two plumbers from the Public Works Department. Meanwhile, the Acting Governor informs the Commonwealth Office in London of events.

"The news of the hi jacking and the landing in the Falklands immediately became headline news all over the world, especially of course in Argentina, where crowds converged on the Plaza San Martin in Buenos Aires shouting nationalist Peronist slogans in opposition to the military government." [1904]

In Buenos Aires, Ambassador Creswell is summoned to the Foreign Ministry where Under-Secretary Mazzinghi disassociates his Government from the hijackers' actions. Referred to as, "*piracy*."

At Port Stanley racecourse, at about 8pm, and following the intervention of a Catholic priest, Rudolph Roel, the hostages are released. [1905]

September 29th, in Buenos Aires, shots are reported as having been fired towards the British Embassy, where Britain's Prince Philip is staying. Demonstrations are held and the British Consulate in Rosario, ransacked.

> *"In Buenos Aires, police cars constantly patrol out side the residence of the British Ambassador, Sir Michael Creswell, where the Duke of Edinburgh is staying. The Duke who is here on an unofficial visit, received a verbal apology yesterday from the government for the shooting up of the Embassy residence by unknown nationalists on Thursday as he was dressing for a dinner with Commonwealth diplomats.*
>
> *In London the Defence Ministry said that the 2.300-ton British frigate Puma, which sailed from Simonstown naval base, South Africa, for the Falklands on Friday morning, would continue her 4,000-mile voyage as a precautionary measure."* [1906]

1899 The Governor and Colonial Secretary were both in London.
1900 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.504
1901 Subsequently described by Peck as "*aggressive and arrogant*".
1902 On being taken past the Governor's residence, Admiral Jose Guzmán is reported to have called out - *"Mi casa"* ("*My house*").
1903 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.506
1904 *Ibid*. p.508
1905 The temperature had plummeted, and it was about 1°C at that time.
1906 *Canberra Times* Monday October 3, 1966

"... reactions to Operation Condor took on violent overtones in the main inland cities, including the burning of the British flag and effigies of the Queen, attacks on the British ambassador's residence and some consulates, the renaming of stations and streets, and anti-British slogans and leaflets." [1907]

In the Falklands, following a cold night and a mass with Father Rudolph Roel, the hijackers surrender. [1908]

"Stanley's meagre military force was mobilised to support the handful of unarmed policemen. It was a moment of glory for the Defence Force. Only six Royal Marines were then based in Stanley, training the local men and advising the Governor on issues of security and defence. They suggested the Defence Force stake out the DC4, denying the 'pirates' water, warmth and sleep. This may have been the only terrorist incident that ended thanks to Jimmy Shand, Russ Conway and the Beatles. The Force set up loudspeakers around the plane and a DJ maintained a constant flow of furious Scottish jigs and rinky-tink piano tunes. This was a low trick and the Argentines could not hold out for long. ... As light faded, the temperature dropped, the plane's toilets backed up, water became short and the DJ introduced his pièce de résistance – his collection of Beatles' singles. The next morning the guerillas asked the priest to convey their surrender to the authorities." [1909]

"... the Catholic priest of the Malvinas, the Dutchman Rudolf Roel, ... managed to get the "Cóndores" to agree to give their weapons to the pilot Fernández García and then be housed by the Catholic Church. In this way, the young men would have avoided - at least symbolically - surrendering to the British." [1910]

Under arrest, the Argentine hijackers are detained in an annex to the Catholic Church.

"In the same self-serving and appeasing fashion that characterised policy in the months before the 1982 invasion, London decided that Argentina was not to be provoked with a stiff response. There would be no local trial and the hijackers were held in an annexe to the Catholic church rather than in prison." [1911]

Following negotiations between London and Buenos Aires, an Argentine naval freighter, *Bahia Buen Suceso*, sails for the Falkland Islands.

September 30th, controversially, the *Condor* hijackers are repatriated to Ushuaia. [1912]

> *"The hi-jackers left Port Stanley, the Falklands capital, on Friday night for Argentina and a probable trial for piracy. The British motor vessel Philomel sailed from the port to take the band to the Argentine ship Bahia Buen Suesco, which was waiting offshore. The 20 nationalists, who include blonde playwright Maria Verrier, have been threatened with the full force of the law by President Ongania."*[1913]

1907 María Inés Tato 2025 in Paula Seiguer & Alina Silveira (eds) 2025

1908 With no hostages, it seems likely that the hijackers had been presented with an ultimatum – surrender or be attacked. Probably delivered by Father Roel. A draft of such, written out by Les Gleadell and Nap Bound, was found by Graham Bound among his fathers papers some years later.

1909 Bound 2007. Acting Governor Gleadell's handling of the situation was praised in London, and he was eventually awarded an OBE. The Governor of Tierra del Fuego, however, ordered his arrest on a charge of '*deprivation of freedom, public intimidation, rebellion and theft*'. The Argentine Press called for his extradition. See - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/gleadell_leslie

1910 Grinchpun 2022

1911 *Ibid.* The presence of the Queen's Consort in Buenos Aires may also have played on a few minds.

1912 The hijacked *DC4* returned to Argentina on October 8, 1966. With it went most of the hijackers' weapons. Cabo's Luger pistol; was somehow overlooked. The original cargo of eggs had, however, hatched with the resultant chicks '*usurped*' by the Islanders.

1913 *Canberra Times* Monday October 3, 1966. Prince Phillip was due to play polo with Argentina's President Ongania, who expressed himself personally embarrassed by the hijacking.

"President Onganía condemned the incident and skilfully avoided further trouble by having the extremists removed from the Falklands not to Buenos Aires, where they would have been fêted as heroes, but to Ushiaia on the grounds that their offence had been committed within the jurisdiction of the Governor of Tierra del Fuego. Much of the President's displeasure over the episode was due to the fact that the talks already initiated with the British Government seemed to him to offer the distinct possibility that Argentina's ambitions in the Falklands might as last be fulfilled. On the other hand, the hijacking and symbolic seizure of the Islands made the British public generally aware of the existence of the dispute and left an unfavourable mark on public opinion." [1914]

"There's no future if you don't know your history. That is why today I also want to honor, .., that group of young people who back in the sixties went to place, not arms, not arms, went to place our flag, the flag of all Argentinians, on our Malvinas Islands. I want to thank them and María Cristina Verrier, who is surely listening to me, and who was the keeper of those flags." [1915]

October 4th, in Ushuaia, Dardo Cabo and his *Condor Group* of hijackers, appear before a Federal Judge, Miguel Angel Lima, charged with air piracy, illegal possession of firearms and other offences "*compromising the peace and dignity of the Nation.*" [1916]

October 5th, in Spain, the Franco regime temporarily closes the border with Gibraltar.

"... the mounting domestic and international tension over Gibraltar was tying Britain more and more to the principle of respecting the wishes of the populations of its remaining colonies." [1917]

Responding, the UK offers to take the question of Gibraltar to the International Court of Justice. [1918]

"... an offer that Argentina did not want to see re-enacted in the Malvinas case." [1919]

October 23rd, in London, an executive of Baring Brothers Bank suggests that Britain lets Argentina "*infiltrate*" the Falklands, by selling them the Falkland Islands Company. [1920]

In Argentina, Lt. Oscar Hector Garcia Rabini of the Amphibious Command Section is summoned;

> *"The Commander of the Submarine Division, Captain Agustín César Ledesma, called me into his office. - "Corvette Lieutenant García Rabini, you must report immediately to the Commander of the Santiago del Estero Submarine, Captain Horacio González Llanos, to carry out the activities that he will indicate". ... I soon arrived on the deck of the submarine, ... in a few minutes the meeting began, which also included Lieutenant Omar Lodigiani and his Tactical Divers;... - "The (Commander) has arranged that you and three of your best men must embark on this Submarine in order to comply with the training that will consist of launching and recovering your patrol from the Submarine, in kayaks.*

1914 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281.* The Governor of Tierra del Fuego had been a hostage on the aeroplane.

1915 President Cristina Kirchner in a speech of April 2, 2014 quoted in *Malvinas between dictatorship and national Independence: Argentinian history in CFK's speeches* Paula Salerno 2019

1916 Tried and sentenced to periods of imprisonment between nine months and three years. The longer sentences for the group's leaders Dardo Cabo, Juan Carlos Rodriguez and Alejandro Giovenco. Released in 1969, Cabo was again sentenced to imprisonment for political offences in March, 1976. Shot dead while, ostensibly "*trying to escape*" in January 1977. At least five others appear to have died at the hand of the military authorities in the years that followed. However, in July, 2009, the provincial government of Buenos Aires awarded survivors of the Condor Group an annual pension.

1917 González 2009

1918 A *compromis* proposal was duly drawn up and dated October 11, 1966. Spain declined.

1919 González 2014 p.158

1920 *FCO 7/132 Meeting Gore-Phillimore 23.10.67*

They must be equipped to operate at night in the waters of the South of Argentina, with weapons endowed with one day of ammunition and with two two-seater kayaks, with two days of water and combat rations.

We will set sail in three days. The (operation) will last about fifteen days. You and your staff must use discretion and keep this order and its derivatives secret".

Then, the members of the patrol were selected and three non-commissioned officers were appointed. Two of my subordinates, both Chiefs of Patrol of my Amphibious Command Section, First Corporals Raúl Acevedo and Ricardo Guiñazú and Principal Corporal Polonio Martínez who had been one of my instructors in 1965. All men I trusted, proven professionals and excellent people. On the other hand, the landing group would be made up of a group of tactical divers under the command of Navy Lieutenant Omar Lodigiani." [1921]

After three days of training, the *Santiago del Estero* heads for East Falkland Island – *Operation Playa Vaca*. [1922]



"We took the greatest precautions not to be detected. The assigned task was to disembark both groups on an existing beach on the peninsula north of Port Stanley, today Puerto Argentino. The objective was to obtain as much information as possible about that area: beach gradient, submerged obstacles that prevented the approach of vessels, avenues of approach from land, obstacles to movement once on land. In a word, the essential elements of information for planning a landing. After several days of navigation, immersing during the day, since we did not have a snorkel, and on the surface at night, charging batteries, we reached the target area." [1923]

October 28th, off the Falkland Islands, *Santiago del Estero,* under Captain Horacio González Llanos, approaches the coast north of Stanley. [1924]

"We did a reconnaissance, by periscope, of the coast and we evaluated the depth to get as close as possible to facilitate the launching of the groups. At dusk we went out to the outcrop. The kayaks were assembled on the precarious deck of the submarine that had barely emerged and thus the action began". ... it was a special order which instructed" that in case of having contact with residents, police and military of the islands, as well as respect for private property and not to leave traces of our incursion and also what should we say (that we were in Argentine territory, and that we were Argentine citizens in our territory) if possible not to use weapons, except in extreme cases and in self-defence, for that we would go armed. " [1925]

1921 Audio interview with Oscar Hector Garcia Rabibi on March 20, 2017. See (hear) - https://www.mixcloud.com/fmcontainer/entrevista-cap-oscar-hector-garcia-rabini-playa-vaca-66/ (1 hour 55 minutes with some adverts at the beginning). A transcript was published in *Patagonia 24* on April 19, 2021. See https://patagonia24.com.ar/contenido/14715/historias-de-patagonia-el-secreto-mejor-guardado-de-malvinas-playa-vaca

1922 Playa Vaca = Cow Beach. This story has never been verified and a number of versions exist; none of which give an exact date. See *Land that Lost its Heroes: How Argentina Lost the Falklands War* Jimmy Burns 2012. Also, *Historias de Patagonia: El secreto mejor guardado de Malvinas* by Mario Novack in *El Diario Nuevo Dia* October 17, 2020.

1923 *Patagonia 24* April 19, 2021

1924 The date of the first landing is generally accepted to be October 28th, 1966, although some sources dispute this.

1925 *Patagonia 24* April 19, 2021

The landing is successful, but delayed by unexpected tidal currents, while the presence of an Islander near the beach prevents a proper survey. The two kayaks return to the submarine.

> *"The following night the Commander decided to repeat the operation. Now we knew about the treacherous tidal currents. The work was done and both groups returned with the required information. We had successfully completed the orders of the General Staff of the Navy."* [1926]

"... the Santiago del Estro had slipped quietly and undetected into Falklands waters some forty kilometres north of Port Stanley. Just after sunset Captain Llanos ordered the operation to get underway. About fifteen marines (sic) climbed into two rubber craft and began paddling with silent speed towards a beach a few hundred yards away. Their mission was to use the available twelve hours of darkness at that time of the year to survey the beach and its surroundings as a site of a possible future landing... A strong current took both craft off course and they spent most of the night trying to regroup on shore... Captain Llanos decided to give it a second try. After spending a further day submerged, the Santiago surfaced again the next night and the two craft were sent back... For over fours hours they inspected the beach, measured distances and probed the nearby countryside for tracks before returning to their submarine." [1927]

"The landing involved four men led by Lieutenant Oscar hector Garcia Rabini, in two two-seater German kayaks, ... The operation was so secret that although details were published some twenty years later, its exact dates are apparently not recorded anywhere. After sunset on the appointed day the Santiago del Estero made landfall off Cow Bay, south of Cape Carysfort....Garcia Rabini ... recalled to Mario Novack that he had seen the actual mission order signed by president Ongania, foreign minister Nicanor Costa Méndez and Rear Admiral Eugenio Fuenterrosa, commander of naval operations." [1928]

In **November**, in the UK, Britain's Treasury gives its opinion on the future of the archipelago.

> *"There is no British strategic or commercial interest in the Falkland Islands. ... Therefore the sooner we can reach a settlement with the Argentinians, preferably with a complete transfer of responsibility for the Islands, the better."*

November 22nd, in London, the Cabinet's Defence & Overseas Policy Committee review the question of the Falkland Islands.[1929] Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, George Brown, gives a presentation.

> *"British commercial interests in the Falklands are modest and we have no strategic interest in maintaining our position there. Our only major concern is with the welfare of the population, which now numbers just over 2,000. The population is slowly declining through emigration and labour has to be imported from other countries, including Chile. The islanders unanimously wish to maintain, and if possible strengthen, their links with the United Kingdom. Access to Argentina having been discouraged for some twenty years, the younger generation has little idea of what Argentina is like or*

1926 *Ibid.*
1927 Burns 2012 p.38.
1928 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.519
1929 Formed in October, 1963 to replace both the Defence Committee and the Overseas Policy Committee. Chaired by the Prime Minister, core membership included the First Secretary of State/Deputy Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary, the Chancellor of the Exchequer or Chief Secretary to the Treasury, the Home Secretary, the Commonwealth and Colonial Secretary and the Minister of Defence.

of the benefits which association with Argentina might bring. If the present barriers were lifted, this generation (which is showing signs of dissatisfaction with the confined life of the Islands) might, over an extended period of time, come to prefer association with Argentina to the present position. The Islands have a very small volunteer defence force which is not capable of defending the Colony without external help. They cannot quickly be reinforced because there is no airfield and in present circumstances the Ministry of Defence are not normally able to station one of HM ships in the area except during a few months of the southern summer. The Argentine pirate escapade of September 1966 was fortunately surmounted but the margin was very narrow. If the Argentines were to occupy the Islands by force, as they easily could, we should be obliged to go to war with Argentina to recover them. In short, possession of the Falkland islands is a political liability. This liability is likely to grow in future. We should do all we can to solve this problem now, for the following reasons:- (a) if the problem remains unsolved, it must continue to strain Anglo-Argentine relation; (b) Argentina can count on overwhelming support in the United Nations, as has already been proved by discussions there in 1964 and 1965; (c) is the dispute is not solved, Anglo-Argentine co-operation in the economic field may be prejudiced." [1930]

"The arguments in favour of seeking an early settlement of this problem were put to Ministers on 22 November 1966 by my predecessor Mr. George Brown..." [1931]

November 25th, in London, the Law Officers deliver their opinion with regard to an approach to the International Court of Justice relevant to the Falkland Islands. [1932]

"Legal Advisers do not dissent from the views expressed by the Law Officers in 1966, nor do they consider the composition of the ICJ as any more favourable to the UK position than in 1966." [1933]

November 28th, in Buenos Aires, information regarding a proposed extension to Argentina's territorial waters, reaches the US Embassy.

".., the (US) Buenos Aires Embassy warned that Argentina plans to substantially increase its territorial waters in the coming weeks, encompassing the Malvinas in its new configuration. "The press reports and various sources from the embassy confirm that the new Argentine legislation, which unilaterally changes the maritime jurisdiction, is in an advanced state of review," says the document, which attributes the urgency of the decision to the alarm raised in the country's armed forces for the appearance in Argentine waters of Cuban and Soviet ships. The embassy explains that it has tried to stop the decision by informing Argentine officials that such a change will not solve the problem and could create "new sources of misunderstandings and conflicts." ..." [1934]

1930 *Memorandum by the Sec of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 18(?), 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *154*

1931 Secretary of State for Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs, Michael Stewart, in *Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 18(?), 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *154*

1932 This opinion remains unavailable. Quite why a 59 year old (2025) opinion concerning an approach to the ICJ is still restricted is not clear. Particularly as it is known, from other sources, that the Law Officers' opinion was that Britain's claims were strong enough to justify a referral to the court despite the composition of the court not guaranteed to be favourable to the UK. In 1966, the fifteen Judges serving on the ICJ were from - United States, United Kingdom, Soviet Union, China, France, Japan, Australia, Pakistan, Senegal, Peru, Mexico, Italy, Poland, Lebanon and Greece. See December 2, 1966, below

1933 *Brief No. A4 – A6 ALW 0420/325/1 (FCO 07-3801) 1980. cf.* 1947

1934 *Urgent 24* November 28, 2010. A draft-law had been submitted to Congress in August, 1964 in response to the provisions of the United Nations *Convention on the Continental Shelf*.

"A WikiLeaks cable found that the dictator Juan Carlos Onganía considered retaking them (the Falkland Islands) in 1966." [1935]

November 29th, formal negotiations commence between the delegations of Argentina and the UK. The British propose a 40-year legal moratorium coupled with unfreezing communications between the Falkland Islands and the Argentine. At the end of which period the inhabitants of the Islands would be allowed to choose between British and Argentine sovereignty.

"At the first session, the British delegation put forward in broad terms the proposal, … that normal freedom of movement should be established between the Islands and the mainland of Argentina. It was also suggested that a transitional period of a minimum of 30 years should be allowed for the normalisation of relations between the Islands and Argentina and that the possibility of economic and other co-operation should be studied. At the end of the agreed period the Islanders would be free to choose between Argentina and British sovereignty… Administration of the Islands would remain in British hands and independent Argentine activities would not be tolerated…" [1936]

"However, the question of offering to refer the dispute to the International Court was not pursued further. The Foreign Office came to the conclusion that such a course would be inadvisable because: a) the composition of the Court might be less favourable to HMG (especially on colonial questions) after February, 1967, b) reference to the Court would have no attraction for Argentina, c) any tactical advantage in the UN would be temporary, and d) it would not solve the problem." [1937]

"The Hohler-Beltramino talks were conducted in secret and were clearly predicated on an eventual transfer of sovereignty. The chief concern was to find a means of protecting the rights and way of life of the islanders and to secure the continued development of the islands' economy." [1938]

"The Argentine negotiators were enthusiastic because, according to Carlos Ortiz de Rozas, a privileged participant of these meetings, there were conversations with the British where they pointed out that: With the development of new arms with intercontinental missiles, the islands had lost the strategic importance they had during the two world wars, and that the geographical proximity with Argentina, sooner or later, condemned them to an integration with our country." [1939]

November 30th, in New York, at the UN, the Secretary-General receives the annual report from the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples. [1940]

"In letters dated 22 August 1966, the Permanent Representatives of Argentina and the United Kingdom transmitted to the Secretary-General the text of a further communique, issued on 20 July 1966. In the communique, it was stated that meetings on the problem had been held on 19 and 20 July 1966. The talks had been condicted in a cordial atmosphere and it was agreed that they should be continued." [1941]

1935 *Chronicle of a referendum foretold: what next for the Malvinas–Falklands?* Cara Levey & Daniel Ozarow 2021. Not actually what the cable said.

1936 *The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

1937 *FCO 76/1892 Annex 3* of 1979

1938 *The Battle for the Falklands* Max Hastings & Simon Jenkins 1997 (reissue of 1983 original). Juan Carlos Beltramino was a career diplomat.

1939 *Las estrategias argentinas hacia Malvinas (1945-2012): negociaciones y guerra* Alejandro Simonoff 2015

1940 *UN Document A/6300/Rev/1 Report of The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples* November 30, 1966

1941 *Ibid.* p.752

December 2nd, in London, John Bennet of the Commonwealth Office, notes the Law Officers opinion.

> *"As forecast, the Law Officers confirm the Opinion given by their predecessors in 1947… and say in effect that the* ***British legal title to the Falkland Islands is strong enough to justify referring the issue of sovereignty to the International Court*** *if it seemed politically desirable to so and if the Argentine Government would agree. We could throw in the Dependencies too if necessary. There is no doubt about our title to South Georgia, the only inhabited dependence and although our title to the South Sandwich Islands is apparently a little shaky, nobody is likely to worry much over those windswept uninhabitable rocks near the Antarctic Circle. …*
>
> *The effect of this Law Officers' opinion is to arm us with a second shot to our bow if the current Anglo-Argentine discussions about the Falklands fail to reveal any other basis of agreement.*
>
> *The present position is that the Argentine delegation are considering the British proposal, made at the meeting on 29th November, for a 40-year legal moratorium coupled with unfreezing communications between the Falkland Islands and the Argentine, at the end of which period the inhabitants of the Islands would be allowed to choose between British and Argentine sovereignty. It is uncertain whether the Argentine Government will see enough in this proposition to interest them, but we may hope that discussion of it will at least keep the talks going for a while.*
>
> *The immediate tactical objective is to prevent the talks grinding to a halt before the close of the current Session of the United Nations General Assembly just before Christmas. If the Argentine Government do turn our proposal down out of hand and there is a risk of the dispute going back to the UN, we are now in a position, if we wish, to counter with an offer to refer the dispute to the International Court,…"* [1942]

"In 1966 the question arose as to whether in the course of negotiations with the Argentines the UK should offer to refer the dispute over the Falkland Islands to the International Court of Justice. The Law Officers were asked to advise whether the strength in law of the British case for sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and dependencies was sufficient to justify a reference to the International Court of Justice. The law officers in an opinion dated 25 November 1966 expressed the view that the strength in law of the British case is sufficient to justify such a reference, although they could not exclude the possibility that the International Court might find against the UK in relation to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, and particularly, over the South Sandwich Islands. With regard to the South Sandwich Islands, they were of the opinion that the case was not very strong, but considered a reference to the International Court would be justified if it was thought advisable to add the Dependencies in the reference to the Court." [1943]

December 9th, Argentina's delegation rejects Britain's November 29th proposals.

"… both questions – the return of the Islands to Argentina and the freeing of communications – were bound up with one another. … it was agreed that discussions should be continued on an informal basis in 1967…" [1944]

December 15th, Britain and Argentina inform the UN's Secretary-General of the progress made so far.

1942 *CO 1024/585.* My emphasis. See 1969, below.

1943 Noted in *FCO 76/1892 Annex 3* of 1979 – a draft *OD* (*Overseas Policy & Defence Committee*) paper.

1944 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

December 16th, in New York, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* is adopted by the United Nations' General Assembly in resolution *2200A (XXI)* -

> *"Article 1 –*
>
> *1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.*
>
> *2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.*
>
> *3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter...."*[1945]

"The United Kingdom strongly opposed the inclusion of [article 1], holding that self-determination was a principle not a right. The essential objection from the United Kingdom point of view was that because of the vagueness of the article, it could be interpreted as imposing on a colonial power greater obligations in respect of dependent territories than the Charter itself." [1946]

"Self-determination was thereby confirmed as a right of all peoples including those of non-self governing territories, and it became an obligation on states responsible for such territories to promote "the realization of the right of self-determination" for the peoples living in them. That self-evidently means external as well as internal self-determination – without external self-determination (the right to decide their relations with other countries) those peoples would not be able to "freely determine their political status", as paragraph 1 of the ICCPR puts it. Thus Britain is obliged to promote external self-determination for the Falkland Islanders. To hand the islands to Argentina would be a breach of that obligation..." [1947]

December 17th, at the UN, the Fourth Committee commences a review of the decolonization process.

"During the discussions on the question which took place at the twenty-first session of the General Assembly in the Assembly's Fourth Committee, many Members, .., welcomed the information that talks between Argentina and the United Kingdom were continuing. Uruguay and Venezuela emphasized that the solution arrived at ... should be compatible with the paragraph (paragraph 6) in the Assembly Declaration of 14 December 1960 ... which stated that any attempt aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and the territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the United Nations Charter. Iran considered it essential that the views not only of the people of the territory but of the people of Argentina should be taken into consideration, while India expressed concern at the leisurely rate at which the talks were proceeding..." [1948]

1945 Destined to take effect on March 23rd, 1976. The UK signed September 16, 1968 and ratified it on May 20, 1976. Argentina signed February 19, 1968 and ratified August 8, 1986. See - https://www.ohchr.org/en/instruments-mechanisms/instruments/international-covenant-economic-social-and-cultural-rights

1946 *Report of a Working Group of Officials on the Question of Ratification of the International Covenants on Human Rights*, August 1, 1974, Annex D, para. 5

1947 Pascoe 2020 p.312

1948 *UN Yearbook 1966*

December 20th, in New York, the UN's Fourth Committee reports to the General Assembly.

> *"With reference to General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 concerning the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the Fourth Committee took note of the communications dated 15 December 1966 of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland. In this regard there was a consensus in favour of urging both parties to continue with the negotiations so as to find a peaceful solution to the problem as soon as possible, keeping the Special Committee … duly informed about the development of negotiations on this colonial situation, the elimination of which is of interest to the United Nations within the context of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960."* [1949]

The General Assembly approves, without objection or comment.

December 28th, from Buenos Aires the US Embassy warns the State Department in Washington DC, that Argentina intends to increase its claimed territorial waters. [1950]

"On December 28, 1966, six months after General Juan Carlos Onganía's coup d'état and 15 years before the war between England and Argentina over the Falkland Islands, the Embassy in Buenos Aires warned that Argentina planned to substantially increase its territorial waters in the coming weeks, including the Falklands in its new configuration. "The press reports and various embassy sources confirm that the new Argentine legislation, which unilaterally changes maritime jurisdiction, is in an advanced state of revision," says the document, which attributes the urgency of the decision to the alarm aroused in the country's armed forces by the appearance of Cuban and Soviet ships in Argentine waters. The embassy explains that it has tried to stop the decision by informing Argentine officials that such a change would not solve the problem and could create "new sources of misunderstandings and conflicts." Argentina approved the new law the following day." [1951]

"A WikiLeaks cable found that the dictator Juan Carlos Onganía (1966–70) considered retaking them in 1966."[1952]

December 29th, in Argentina, following reports of Russian fishing vessels operating near the coast, law *17.094 – Soberania en el Mar Argentino* – is promulgated; extending Argentina's territorial waters to 200 miles. [1953]

> *"The President of the Argentine Nation sanctions and promulgates with force of law:*
>
> *Article 1.- The sovereignty of the Argentine Nation extends to the sea adjacent to its territory up to a distance of two hundred nautical miles, measured from the line of the lowest tides, except in the cases of the San Matías, Nuevo and San Jorge gulfs., in which they will be measured from the line that joins the ends that form its mouth.*
>
> *Article 2.- The sovereignty of the Argentine Nation also extends to the sea bed and to the subsoil of the underwater zones adjacent to its territory up to a depth of two hundred meters or beyond this limit, to the extent that the depth of the superjacent waters allows the exploitation of the natural resources of these areas.*
>
> *Article 3.- The freedom of navigation and air navigation is not affected by the provisions of this law.*

1949 *UN Document A/6700/Rev.1 (Part III)* p.127
1950 Part of a Wikileaks release of 250,000 US State Department documents.
1951 *Urgente 24* November 28, 2010.
1952 Levey and Ozarow 2021. Something of a leap, as there was no suggestion of an invasion.
1953 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281. cf.* 1958 & 1964

Article 4- The National Executive Branch will issue, within ninety days from the date of promulgation of this law, a regulation that will determine the forms and conditions in which the activities of exploration and exploitation of natural resources of the sea may be carried out by of foreign vessels, within the zone of two hundred nautical miles referred to in this law.

Article 5- Communicate, Publish, give to the National Directorate of Official Registry and archive."

"Although the epicontinental sea claim was abandoned in 1966 in favor of a 200 nautical mile territorial sea jurisdiction, Argentina continued to put forward its claim to the Falklands and the other islands on the basis of geographical and uti possidetis juris arguments, and on an illegal occupation by the British. The epicontinental sea right was abandoned because it was more a resource claim than a territorial claim. Nothing in the 1946 Presidential Decree indicated that the 1943 claim of a 12-mile territorial sea had been derogated or abandoned. The impetus to abandon the epicontinental sea in favor of a 200 nautical mile territorial sea came in the wake of the First and Second United Nations Conferences on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS I and II) held in Geneva in 1958 and 1960. The international community was unable to agree on the breadth of the territorial sea. The consequence of the failure to agree on this issue has been called a "gap in the law," which led to a pattern of unilateral assertions by various nations for their sea claims. ... The Latin American version of maritime law is not about freedom of the seas and the historical antecedents that go before it. It is about the natural right that accrues to a coastal state to exercise jurisdiction over its patrimonial sea." [1954]

December 30th, with an Exchange of Notes, the UK and USA conclude an agreement for an air base on the largest of the Chagos Islands (British Indian Ocean Territory) – Diego Garcia. [1955]

December 31st, the biannual Falklands review notes that there have been 41 births, 22 marriages and 23 deaths in the territory during 1966. [1956]

1967 – January 12th, in London, an internal Foreign Office *memo* considers the prospects for a deal.

"There was a point of fundamental disagreement. The British Government could not give a fixed date, however remote, on which the islands would be ***ceded*** *to Argentina. The Argentine Government could not, for juridical as well as political reasons, abandon the restrictions on communications (which they would regard as a great concession) simply in return for an undertaking that, at some given date, the islanders should be given the option of joining Argentina."* [1957]

"I have explained to the Foreign Office that the Commonwealth Office and the Governor were reluctant to contemplate a period of less than 30 years before the Islands could be handed over, since it would be unlikely that a shorter period would be politically acceptable to the Islanders." [1958]

February 14th, in Mexico City, a *Treaty for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean* (the *Treaty of Tlatelolco*) is signed. [1959]

1954 Hall 1983. See 1946

1955 The BIOT Administration compulsory purchased the commercial interests on the archipelago, primarily copra plantations, which had operated at a loss. They were run down from 1968 with the contract employees returning to the Seychelles and Mauritius. See 1971, below.

1956 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1966 & 1967*

1957 *FCO 7/140*. My emphasis. Cession, not 'return'.

1958 *Minute by Trafford Smith (Commonwealth Office) January 13, 1967* in *FCO 42/67*

1959 Under this treaty, the signatories agreed to prohibit the testing, use, manufacture, production and acquisition of nuclear weapons, as well as the storage and deployment of such weapons within the Caribbean and South America. The treaty has two additional protocols. The first binding non-Latin nations with territory within the area to the treaty's terms and the second requiring that nuclear States refrain from undermining the treaty. The UK ratified Protocol 1 in 1969. One of the original signatories, Argentina did not ratify the treaty until 1994. *cf.* April, 1982, 1994 & December, 2003

In London, under instructions from Foreign Secretary George Brown, the Foreign Office's American Department prepare a paper with fresh proposals; including a transitional period of 30 years followed by a referendum for the Islanders to decide on which country they wished to be a part of.

"The American Department took advantage of both the perceived Argentine openings and its firmer hold on Falklands policy to recommend, for the first time, that Britain should make a statement manifesting its readiness in principle to ***cede*** *sovereignty over the islands,* ***though only if cession could be shown to be in accordance with the wishes of the inhabitants****. These would be determined by means of a referendum to be held before 1991, because the Antarctic Treaty would come up for review from that year onwards and if the Falklands question was still alive, the continuity of international cooperation in the white continent – of far greater importance for British interests – could be threatened."* [1960]

"Foreign Secretary is not satisfied ... In his view there is no chance whatever that the Argentines would accept now an agreement providing for a referendum on sovereignty to be held "towards the end of the century."... Mr Brown thinks we have reached the point where we must be prepared to negotiate in realistic terms." [1961]

"It would be a two-edged weapon to shorten the proposed transitional period for the referendum below the minimum of 30 years which (as you know) the Governor advised was necessary to facilitate a change of heart." [1962]

In **March**, in Washington DC, the US Department of State protests Argentina's extension of its maritime limits to 200 miles, under Argentine law 17.094 of December, 1966. [1963]

March 13th, in London, a meeting of the Cabinet's Defence & Overseas Policy Committee approves revised proposals for the Anglo-Argentine talks. These are that the British Government is prepared to cede sovereignty of the Falklands, providing that the Islanders' agree.

> *"We should make it clear that we cannot abandon our position of principle regarding the consultation of the Islanders own wishes. It would be up to the Argentine Government to persuade the Islanders of the advantage of becoming part of Argentina."* [1964]

"Dick Crossman wanted to know how did we get started on this ridiculous thing at all when, it was quite clear, we could not reach agreement with the Argentine on conditions acceptable to ourselves? Once again the Foreign Office officials have been going beyond their remit... It was (George Brown) who had started the overtures without even consulting the Prime Minister." [1965]

March 17th, in London, Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, George Brown, speaks to Argentina's Ambassador, Eduardo McLoughlin. Brown suggests that Argentina reopens free communications between the Falkland Islands and the mainland, and that, after a suitable period, the islanders could be asked to decide on whose sovereignty they would prefer.

"After the problem had again been submitted to Ministers in March 1967 (OPD [67] 20) we proposed to the Argentines that an agreement should be made to reopen communications between the islands and Argentina, and that this agreement should include a clause freezing the legal position of both countries for the duration of

1960 González 2009. My emphasis.
1961 *Hohler to Trafford Smith March 2, 1967* in *FCO 42/67*
1962 *Trafford Smith to Hohler March 9, 1967* in *FCO 42/67*
1963 Levey & Ozarow 2021
1964 Quoted in *FCO 42/67*
1965 *The Castle Diaries 1964-1970* Barbara Castle 1984 p.566. Castle was Minister for Transport in 1967, and a member of Harold Wilson's Cabinet. Richard Crossman was Leader of the House of Commons.

the agreement which might be for 40 years. It was proposed that on its expiry the islanders would be free to choose between British and Argentine sovereignty. This proposal was rejected by the Argentines, but it was agreed that the talks would be continued." [1966]

"Revised proposals, approved by ministers and put to the Argentine Ambassador on 17 March, suggested a reduction in the length of the transitional period and stated that Britain would be prepared to cede sovereignty over the islands under certain conditions, one of which was that the wishes of the Islanders had to be respected. The Argentine Ambassador replied that the proposals contained "constructive bases for further negotiation" but rejected the proviso that the proposed cession must be acceptable to the Islanders." [1967]

From Argentina, Ambassador Creswell warns London that Méndez may be prepared to concede an extended period of transition if such was wished, but that the involvement of the Islanders could still pose problems.

March 22nd, a British journalist, Christopher Circle, reporting on the BBC's Radio Newsreel program, announces that the United Kingdom has agreed to recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.

"... the Foreign Office sent a message to the colonial government stating that London did not consider that its titles of sovereignty had changed. "It is not true that the British government has decided to recognise Argentine sovereignty over the islands", the official message concluded." [1968]

In the Falkland Islands, a satellite tracking station, one of four located around the globe, is built for the European Space Research Organisation.

An economic survey takes place in the Falkland Islands; *"Early in 1967 Mr C. W. Guillebaud, Emeritus University Reader in Economics at Cambridge University, was appointed to conduct an economic survey of the Falkland Islands. He spent five weeks in the Colony in March and April 1967, staying at ten different farms and visiting others."* [1969]

April 13th, Madrid, Spain announces a ban on aircraft overflying its airspace to get to Gibraltar. *The Guardian* newspaper reports:

> "*The Spanish Government has announced its intention of declaring the "Algeciras zone" prohibited to all types of foreign aircraft. It is notifying the International Civil Aviation Organisation of this decision, which it intends to put into effect from May 12. ... a total prohibition would affect civil air services to and from Gibraltar. Civil aircraft using the Gibraltar air strip fly over the Algeciras zone and it would be extremely awkward to land or take off without doing so."*

The Falkland Islands Dependencies Survey (FIDS), responsible for research in Antarctica, changes its name to the British Antarctic Survey (BAS).

April 17th, the Foreign Office receives a message from the Argentine Embassy rejecting the proviso that the Islanders' wishes should be taken into account. [1970]

April 24th, Spain steps back, clarifying that not all of the Bay of Algeciras is closed to British aircraft. [1971]

1966 *Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 18(?), 1968* in *FCO 7/1079*
1967 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281.* Original emphasis.
1968 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Monthly Review* April 3, 1967 no.100
1969 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1966 & 1967*
1970 *Ibid.*
1971 The UK decided to ignore the ban. Spain does not appear to have attempted to enforce it.

April 26th, in London, at a further meeting, George Brown tells Ambassador McLoughlin; *"If the Argentine Government were seriously to state that the wishes of the people should be ignored, it would be impossible to make progress."* Argentina's Ambassador complains that the potential veto by the Islanders; *"... "could be interpreted as the equivalent of a referendum."* Brown responds that; *"... great countries could not hand over other peoples as though they had no part to play in their own destiny."*

May 27th, at Stanley, Argentine evangelical pastor Arnoldo Canclini, visits.

"... the Argentine pastor recorded his admiration for "how much and good the English have done" in the islands. ... For Canclini, the islanders were not part of a backward world, ... "They really live in a world apart", he wrote, in a soil for which they have "a great local zeal". ...he states that "it is false that the population is artificial, totally transplanted". He writes 'malvineros', but notes that they call themselves Falklanders." [1972]

May 30th, on Anguilla, there is revolt against rule from St. Kitts. [1973]

"Associate statehood ceased to be attainable for the Falklands as a result of the Anguillan crisis which revealed its weaknesses. The 6,000 Anguillans, who feared domination by Saint Kitts, rebelled in 1967. The Government in Basseterre responded by declaring a state of emergency and cut all communications with Anguilla. In July the Anguillans formed an interim government and announced their intention to secede from Saint Kitts. The transfer of internal affairs restricted the British Government's manoeuvrability. It was unable to intervene militarily because the rebellion was an internal matter. The 1967 West Indies Act prevented Britain from passing legislation to change the status of Anguilla without the consent of the Legislature of the associated state in Basseterre. The UN interpreted the issue as a colonial problem. ... The Conservative and Labour parties concluded that associate statehood had failed and would not be offered to other colonies." [1974]

"In 1967, when Britain was shedding the vestiges of its empire, Ronald Webster emerged as the George Washington of the tiny Caribbean island of Anguilla — in reverse. He plotted a revolution to embrace the mother country rather than to break with it. London nation-builders had envisioned an independent federation that would formally join Anguilla in association with two other former island colonies, neighboring St. Kitts and Nevis. But Anguilla wanted to go it alone. After demanding to be severed from the federation, Mr. Webster, as the island's leading political figure, did the unthinkable: He all but insisted that Parliament declare Anguilla a British dependency again...." [1975]

May 31st, in London, at a Foreign Office discussion on the Falklands, it is stated that; *"... because of Gibraltar, we could not budge from our condition about the transfer of sovereignty being acceptable to the people."* [1976]

June 13th, a proposal is sent to the Argentine Embassy.

> *"Art.1: Her Britannic Majesty will be prepared to* ***transfer sovereignty*** *over the Falkland Islands to Argentina provided that the change is acceptable to the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands."* [1977]

1972 Carassai 2022. In 2000, Cancini published a book *Malvinas:Su historia en historias.*

1973 On February 27, 1967 the (joined-up) British territory of Saint Christopher-Nevis-Anguilla had been granted 'free association' status with the UK. An acceptable decolonization arrangement recognised by the United Nations in resolution 1541 of 1960. However, in a move unforeseen by the United Nations, the Anguillans were unhappy with the arrangement and voted to return to being a British dependency. *cf.* July, 1967 & March, 1969 below

1974 Ellerby 1990 pp.120-121 citing *'Report of the Commission of Inquiry... the Anguilla Problem', Cmnd. 3021 (H.M.S.O., London), Nov. 1970, pp.7-50.* Free Association is no longer an option for UK overseas territories.

1975 *The New York Times* January 22, 2017

1976 *FCO 42/44*

1977 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.25. My emphasis.

"... in an attempt to define the differences todate between Argentina and Britain a working document setting out a draft outline for a Treaty on the Falkland Islands issue was delivered to the Argentine Ambassador..." [1978]

"... the Argentinians promptly shot themselves in the foot by turning the proposal down, indignantly rejecting the idea that the islanders should be permitted a veto or even that they should be consulted at all." [1979]

June 14th, the British Government announces the holding of a September referendum in Gibraltar.

"(Whatever) the justification for the British decision, its consequences, as seen from Buenos Aires, were overtly negative. Argentina would have to fight fiercely – perhaps ... more fiercely than Spain itself – to prevent the UN from granting any measure of legitimacy to the referendum, since this would seriously weaken the case against using this instrument in the Falklands. As a result, Argentine diplomats would be even more reluctant to reach any settlement with Britain that sanctioned or appeared to legitimate the islanders' veto powers." [1980]

June 20th, in London, Anglo-Argentine talks, *in camera*, continue; *"Dr. José Ruda, Argentine Representative at UN, leads Argentine delegation, including Dr. Quìjano, a senior official in the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs, and Brigadier McLoughlin, the new Argentine Ambassador in London. First formula for Article 1 of proposed Agreement put to Argentines and rejected by them."* [1981]

June 23rd, in New York, at the United Nations, George Brown meets Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez and José Ruda. Méndez emphasises that making any transfer of sovereignty subject to the will of the islanders would not be acceptable to Argentine public opinion. Brown stresses that he could not carry either parliamentary or public opinion if he attempted to act against the wishes of the Islanders. Méndez reminds Brown that resolution *2065* had referred to '*interests*' and not '*wishes*.' Brown responds that *2065* merely called for talks, not a transfer of sovereignty.

"We had... good talks with George Brown about the possibility of reaching an agreement that could be on the basis of recognition of sovereignty by the British, and, in turn, acceptance of British authorities, for a certain amount of time, by Argentina. That was the basis of the whole thing. The Labour trend was towards decolonization." [1982]

"In 1967 the British Foreign Minister, George Brown, began conversations with his Argentine counterpart in New York, stating that his country was ready to concede sovereignty in return for the guarantee that the rights and the style of life of the inhabitants of the islands would be preserved." [1983]

In Buenos Aires, Argentine objections are confirmed to Britain's Ambassador.

"In a subsequent discussion with HM Ambassador in Buenos Aires the Argentine Foreign Minister declared that, furthermore, it would be unacceptable for the Argentine Government to make a transfer dependent on "consultation" with the Islanders." [1984]

1978 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

1979 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.525

1980 González 2014 p.187

1981 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973) Annex 1* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

1982 Dr. Nicanor Costa Mendez interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.100

1983 *Democratisation in Argentina and the End of the Cold War: The Impact on Anglo-Argentina Relations* Jose Octavio Bordon 1996 in *Argentina: Foreign Relations and the New Foreign Policy Agenda* C. M. Lewis & C. Szusterman 1996.

1984 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

July 11th, following a locally organised referendum, Anguilla declares itself independent of St. Kitts. [1985]

July 19th, in London, the question of the Falkland Islands is considered within the Cabinet's Defence & Overseas Policy Committee; *"... various draft formulae designed satisfactorily to define the conditions under which Her Majesty's Government would be prepared to consider a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina were approved by OPD on 19 July when they considered recommendations made by my predecessor in his Memorandum OPD(67)54."* [1986]

July 20th, Hohler holds further talks with Ambassador Ruda.

> *"... for Argentina, the problem (is) not really of economic, territorial or strategic importance; it was essentially an emotional problem, in which Argentine feeling was in some respects similar to the British feeling about Gibraltar."*

Ruda rules out any possible acceptance of a Gibraltar-style referendum, so Britain's representative presents a watered down first article from June. Also unacceptable.

> *"Her Majesty's Government will recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Islands provided that the guarantees and safeguards for the Islanders offered by the Argentine Government are acceptable to the Islanders."* [1987]

"The British side attempted without success to persuade the Argentines to make some concession to HMG's need to take account of the express wishes of the Islanders, and to emphasise the common need to improve the atmosphere in the Falklands by making a start on removing obstacles to communications in return for the concessions already made by Britain to the Argentines. The Argentines rejected the wording of Article 1, of the draft outline for a Treaty ("Her Britannic Majesty will be prepared to transfer sovereignty over the Falkland Islands to Argentina, provided that the change is acceptable to the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands") on the grounds that, without explicitly envisaging a referendum, the Article implicitly subordinated the transfer of sovereignty or, as the Argentines preferred to regard it, the acknowledgement of their sovereignty, to the wishes of the local inhabitants." [1988]

July 28th, within the Foreign Office, it is suggested that negotiations may be better served by consideration of a "*lease idea*." [1989]

August 10th, back in Buenos Aires, Dr. Ruda announces that the Argentine Government cannot accept London's proposals for a treaty; formally rejecting Britain's statement that - "*Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to transfer sovereignty to Argentina provided that the guarantees and safeguards for the Islanders' interests offered by the Argentine Government are acceptable to the Islanders*." [1990]

1985 1,813 for, 5 opposed. The desire was to be independent of St. Kitts, rather than an independent republic. In December, 1967 a deal was worked out whereby a British administrator would take charge for 12 months while an agreement was reached on Anguilla's long term future. However, a replacement administrator who arrived on March 11, 1969 was expelled at gunpoint leading to a British invasion on March 19, 1969 (Operation Sheepskin). See below.

1986 *Memorandum by the Sec of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 18(?), 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *154*

1987 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.25. See June 13, 1967 above.

1988 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

1989 *Trafford Smith to Hohler July 28, 1967* in *FCO 42/67*

1990 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

August 22nd, in New York, at the UN, Britain's representative announces that a referendum will be held in Gibraltar on September 10, 1967. He invites the United Nations to send observers.

August 26th, Ruda proposes that *Art.1* of the proposed agreement be amended to – *"Her Majesty's Government will recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Islands provided that the guarantees and safeguards offered by the Argentine Government give satisfactory assurance of respect for the interests of the Islanders in conformity with Resolution 2065 (XX) of the United Nations General Assembly."*

"... which Her Majesty's Government in turn found unacceptable." [1991]

September 1st, invited to the proposed referendum in Gibraltar, the UN's Special Committee on Decolonization declines to send observers to oversee proceedings. [1992]

"... the Special Committee... has completely disregarded this right of self-determination and has been seeking to award territory... against the wishes of the people who reside on that territory." [1993]

"The Committee of 24 declared that the referendum violated UN Resolutions on Gibraltar, refused to send observers and called for talks between Britain and Spain to resume. The vast majority of countries in the Committee once again came out in Spain's favour." [1994]

September 4th, from London, Britain's Government suggest an alternative draft of *Art.1* of the proposed agreement with Buenos Aires, to read - *"Her Majesty's Government will be prepared to transfer sovereignty to Argentina provided that she is satisfied that the guarantees and safeguards for the Islanders offered by the Argentine Government are acceptable to the Islanders."* [1995]

"We have this resolution and Argentina begins to negotiate in 1966 and then it (is) really my turn to begin the negotiations and develop them. I believe that this historical genesis is worth telling, because it is my personal experience. It finds me thus with a closed refusal of Great Britain, until one day at a United Nations Assembly in September 1967, I was introduced to the British chancellor of the time, Mr George Brown, an eccentric Labor member, eccentric in a country of eccentrics, extravagant, but very intelligent and very convinced of his Labor ideas. We had a long breakfast at the Carlyle Hotel (on 76th Street, in New York), we had long conversations and somehow he came away quite convinced that there was an argument, that there was substance in Argentine rights. ... And then we start working, we push for meetings, the meetings are held and a first draft is reached. Simultaneously, the British Parliament is also beginning to become aware of the matter. ... Brown tells me: "You know that we have done our campaign and we have triumphed with Labor ideas and one of the fundamental Labor ideas is the idea of decolonization, that is, the idea of freedom of the peoples and the idea of the restitution of usurped territories to whom it belongs. I am not telling you, Mr. Minister, that I accept for a minute that the Falklands constitute a usurped territory, but if you manage to prove it, we are going to have to arrive, if we are consistent with ourselves, to an agreement." [1996]

1991 *Ibid*

1992 The Committee had come to the conclusion that the planned plebiscite was being held contrary to previous UN resolutions. A view supported belatedly by the General Assembly, which adopted resolution *2353 (XXII)* in January, 1968. It is worthy of note that the UN went to great lengths to denounce the 1967 Gibraltar referendum. Not the case with that in the Falkland Islands in 2013, which passed without comment. *cf.* resolution *637 (VII)* December 16, 1952

1993 *The Status of Gibraltar* Howard S. Levie 1983

1994 *Gibraltar: Closure of the Border 1969-2019* HM Government of Gibraltar 2019

1995 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

1996 Nicanor Costa Méndez, Argentina's Foreign Minister 1966-1969, quoted in *1982: Los documentos secretos de la guerra Malvinas/Falklands y el derrumbe del pro* J. B. Yofre 2011 citing an interview Méndez supposedly gave to a select group of journalists in 1992, shortly before his death. Not otherwise reported.

September 10th, in Gibraltar, a referendum is held. Two possibilities are presented:

> *"A) To pass under Spanish sovereignty in accordance with the terms proposed by the Spanish Government to the Government of the United Kingdom on 18th May, 1966.*
>
> *B) Voluntarily to retain their link with the United Kingdom with democratic local institutions and with the United Kingdom retaining its present responsibilities."*

"Of the 12,762 Gibraltarians qualified to vote, no fewer than 12,138 voted to remain with Britain. Only 44 opted for the transfer of the Rock to Spanish sovereignty. … The voting slips were made out in Spanish and English, and voters had the choice of voting "to pass under Spanish, sovereignty in accordance with the terms proposed by the Spanish Government on May 18, 1966", or "voluntarily to retain their link with the United Kingdom, with democratic local institutions and with the United Kingdom retaining its present responsibilities"." [1997]

"Overnight, the Gibraltarians were in the public view transformed from a loose and eclectic society with diverse backgrounds into a coherent and demonstrable nation of people who knew how they wanted their political future to look like. Hassan now had a strong democratic backing for his version of decolonisation through self-determination. His challenge now was to convince the United Nations, which refused to recognise the legitimacy of the referendum or its results, to change their own line. Spain took umbrage at the referendum result and this further aggravated the tension. A week later, Britain sent military reinforcements to Gibraltar."[1998]

September 13th, in London, internal discussions take place attended by the Foreign Office, the Commonwealth Office, Ambassador Creswell and Governor Haskard.

"Trafford Smith commented that he thought ideally there should be a period of 25 years after an agreement and before the islands were handed over. He stressed the immediate problems involved and he again put forward the suggestion of a long lease, suggesting that if the Argentines had no further proposals to make, both sides should break off to consider their position." [1999]

September 15th, in the Falkland Islands, a Royal Navy Hovercraft arrives in the Falklands for testing by the Royal Marine Detachment (NP8901).[2000]

September 18th, Argentina responds to the alternative offered on September 4th, with an *aide-memoire* rejecting the suggested change. Their own offer rewords the article yet again – *"Her Majesty's Government is prepared to recognise the sovereignty of the Argentina Republic over the Islands provided that the guarantees and safeguards offered by the Argentine Government are sufficient to satisfy the interests of the Islanders."* [2001]

At Port Stanley, Governor Haskard returns; *"After his return to the Falklands in September 1967 he disclosed the general trend to the islands' Executive Council (Exco), as he had been permitted to do by the British government. The members of Exco were alarmed at once, not merely by the way things were going but by the fact that negotiations had been going on for so long behind their backs."* [2002]

1997 *The Guardian* September 11, 1967
1998 *Gibraltar: Closure of the Border 1969-2019* HM Government of Gibraltar 2019
1999 *FCO 42/67*
2000 Returned to the UK in 1972.
2001 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*
2002 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.526

September 21st, in New York, Brown and Méndez meet again at the United Nations building.

"In discussions with the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York on September 21st, the Foreign Secretary re-emphasised Britain's basic position that any transfer of sovereignty must be acceptable to the people of the Islands and went on to discuss the practical problems that would arise in restoring free communications when a satisfactory agreement on the question of sovereignty had been reached. The Argentine Foreign Minister agreed that a need existed for an air service to link the Islands with the mainland and a relaxation of formalities for both Argentines wishing to visit the Islands and for Falklanders wishing to visit the mainland..."[2003]

"In order to break the stalemate, and under pressure from Ruda to seize the historical opportunity to recover the islands, Costa Méndez made ... concessions. ..., he agreed that the two delegations should informally explore the modalities to open communications, so that British Ministers could be reassured that all the related procedures would be in place once an agreement on sovereignty had been finalised." [2004]

"Brown's Private Secretary Bill Rodgers wrote a minute in 1968: "George Brown made it crystal clear to Senor Costa Méndez [during sovereignty negotiations] that Britain did not give a damn about the Falkland Islands". Richard Luce MP found the minute in 1982; Ian Gow sent it to prime Minister Thatcher with a note: "Apparently the rule about access to the papers of previous administrations extends officially even to documents of such importance as this one"." [2005]

September 27th, at the UN, Minister Costa Méndez tells Lord Caradon that; *"... that his Government would now be prepared to give leaseholders in the Falklands capital to buy their land and would consider offering Islanders free land and passages to the mainland if they indicated a wish to settle there."* [2006]

October 2nd, Costa Méndez makes a further concession.

".. he told Caradon that Argentina was ready to accept the British government's obligation to consult the islanders, although he emphasised that such a consultation could only be limited to the Argentine guarantees (not to the transfer itself) and that it should be conducted in an informal manner so as not to imply that the Falklanders' had been granted a veto..." [2007]

Caradon writes to London; *"We may have hit on the right answer ... we shall not get anything better from the Argentinians. ... the best opportunity we are likely to have to deal with..."*

"The issue of Islands opinion, previously emphasised by Lord Caradon at the UN, was acknowledged. The British intended to win the islanders round by demonstrating the benefits which a link with the mainland would bring. The Argentines were happy to provide guarantees of continuity of customs and lifestyle. It was sovereignty, not a colony, which they craved." [2008]

October 12th, from London, the Commonwealth Office informs Governor Haskard of the position reached.

2003 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281.*

2004 González 2009

2005 Elgood 2025. I cannot find a record of a meeting between Méndez and Brown in 1968. This was their last recorded direct conversation. Méndez was, once again, Foreign Minister during the conflict in 1982.

2006 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

2007 González 2009

2008 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

"During the talks in New York the Argentine Foreign Minister said that his Government now accepted that Her Majesty's Government was entitled to consult the Islanders before accepting the safeguards and guarantees offered by the Argentine Government, although in any formula the transfer of sovereignty should not be subordinated to the Islanders' veto." [2009]

October 17th, in the Falklands, the FIG publish an economic survey conducted by Claude W. Guillebaude.

"In conclusion, I wish to express my personal belief and faith in the viability of the Falkland Islands1 economy But resolute action will be needed if a situation, which today is merely somewhat precarious, is to be prevented from reaching a stage when it becomes irreparable. It is not too much to say that it is the whole future of the Colony that is now at stake." [2010]

October 21st, from Stanley, Governor Haskard complains to the Commonwealth Office; *"Our links, sentimental and economic, bind us firmly to England. Argentina, seen through Falkland eyes is unknown, foreign, aloof, disdainful, corrupt, feared,..."* [2011]

October 24th, in London, the question of the Falkland Islands is again considered by the Cabinet's Defence & Overseas Policy Committee.

"... the question was resubmitted to Ministers in Mr. Brown's paper OPD(67)77 of 24 October, 1967. This laid down the framework within which the negotiations have proceeded over the past years, i.e. that Her Majesty's Government's conditional offer to transfer sovereignty should be written into a Memorandum of Understanding which would include an expression of the Argentine Government's willingness to reopen communications with the Islands, and it should be accompanied on publication by a unilateral statement by Her Majesty's Government in which they would state that the British Government would not "feel able to regard the Argentine safeguards and guarantees as satisfactory unless they were satisfied that the population of the Islands was ready to accept these guarantees and safeguards. Therefore the practical effect of this would be that sovereignty would not be transferred unless the change were acceptable to the population of the islands."..." [2012]

October 25th, the Argentine government promulgates law 17.500, declaring; *"... that "the resources of the Argentinian territorial sea are properties of the National State which will make concessions for their exploitation in accordance with the provisions of this Law and its regulations" (Article 1). Further, Article 2 provides that the resources within twelve marine miles from the coast "may be exploited by national vessels only." In addition, "the Executive Branch will annually establish a zone of the Argentinian territorial sea whose exploitation will also be reserved for national vessels"."* [2013]

October 26th, in London, the Foreign Office comment on the Cabinet discussion; *"... any process of consultation with the islanders will have to be a genuine one... we will be asked in Parliament to do the same as we have just done in Gibraltar."* [2014]

October 27th, the Defence & Overseas Policy Committee discuss the situation once again.

2009 *FCO 42/67*
2010 *Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands* C. W, Guillebaud 1967
2011 Quoted in *FO 7/154*
2012 *Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 18(?), 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *154*
2013 *Latin American Countries Facing the Problem of Territorial Waters* J. J. Santa-Pinter in *San Diego Law Review* 2019. See 1970 & 2016
2014 *Minute by A. Galsworthy, October 26, 1967* in *FCO 42/47*

"Prime Minister Harold Wilson... observed that Britain could not compromise its stand on the principle formulated in the Rhodesian context that "the British Government would need to be satisfied that any basis proposed for independence was acceptable to the people of Rhodesia as a whole"; a Falklands policy even at small variance with this principle could have "awkward implications". Lord Shepherd, ... backed this view and added that "we had also to bear in mind our policy in the case of Gibraltar and British Honduras."..." [2015]

November 10th, the draft of a new British proposal for a *Memorandum of Understanding* is handed to Argentina's Embassy.

> *"Desirous of responding in a positive spirit to the views expressed by Dr. Costa Mendez in New York, Her Majesty's Government, after careful consideration, now wish to offer the following proposals for the solution of the outstanding points of disagreement. Her Majesty's Government propose that the position so far reached in the talks should be recorded in a Memorandum of Understanding… In this connection, the Argentine Government will note that, according to the terms of paragraph 4… Her Majesty's Government would not feel able to regard the "safeguards and guarantees" as satisfactory unless they were satisfied that the population of the Islands was ready to accept them. Her Majesty's Government would be obliged to explain this publicly at the time of the announcement of the Memorandum of Understanding."* [2016]

"It was clearly explained that the revised proposals took the form of a draft Memorandum of Understanding rather than a Treaty or Agreement... because it appeared at this stage in the negotiations the purposes of both sides would be more readily served by a less elaborate document. It was also agreed that the proposed text should serve as the basis for a public announcement." [2017]

November 13th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Creswell sends an opinion.

> *"... we cannot expect the Argentine Government to agree publicly to the re-opening of communications with the Islands before that are in a position to make a statement that they have reached some agreement which touches on the question of sovereignty..."* [2018]

November 18th, the US Embassy in Argentina notifies the State Department of progress in the talks.

> *"... the most difficult problem in transferring the Islands to Argentina still remains gaining the acquiescence of the Islanders themselves. ... even though the British are willing to accept Argentine sovereignty over the Islands, they cannot transfer Island administration to the Argentines against the will of the Falkland Islanders ..."* [2019]

November 22nd, Governor Haskard telegrams London; *"Surely it is public opinion here, not in Argentina, that has to be influenced..."* [2020]

November 30th, in London, Argentina's Ambassador McLoughlin, passes a message to the Foreign Office.

> *"... his Government had given very careful study to the British proposals handed to him on 10 November. They accepted that an agreement should be drawn up in the form of a Memorandum of Understanding, and that its publication should be deferred... (he) said that the Argentine Government*

2015 González 2009
2016 Quoted in *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973) Annex 5* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281.*
2017 *Ibid.*
2018 Quoted in *FCO 42/67*
2019 Quoted in *Pink Ice: Britain and the South Atlantic Empire* K. Dodds 2002 p.129
2020 *FCO 42/67*

wished to review the wording of paragraphs 2, 3 and 4… As expected, the most important point of difficulty for the Argentines was the phrase "are acceptable to the population of the Islands."…" [2021]

December 4th, from Stanley, Haskard seeks guidance as to what he should tell the Islands' Executive Council.

"We fully realise the difficulties of getting Islanders to accept formula but Ministers involved have some responsibility towards Argentine public opinion (because of British interests there) as well as towards Parliament and the Falkland Islands, and something along the lines of the present formula appears to be the best way to bring about conditions to make possible HMG's desire for a satisfactory solution… You should now have received FO telegram No.936 giving Argentine reactions to the memorandum but Members should not repeat not, be told of these." [2022]

December 5th, at the UN, the annual report of the Special Committee on Decolonization is submitted.

"*Considering that bilateral negotiations are the best way of solving the problem of the decolonization of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), but having no information on the progress made in this direction since the approval of the consensus of 20 December 1966, the Special Committee recommends that the attention of the parties should again be drawn to General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) and the consensus of 20 December 1966, with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem as soon as possible, due regard being paid to the recommendation at the end of the consensus that the Special Committee and the General Assembly should be kept informed about the development of the negotiations on this colonial situation, the elimination of which is of interest to the United Nations within the context of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960."* [2023]

December 14th, after meeting with the Executive Council, Governor Haskard telegrams the Commonwealth Office. He complains that the Islanders are being kept in the dark, and that the longer they were in that state, the more they would feel deceived.

In New York, on the same day, Britain's Mission to the United Nations informs the Secretary-General that; *"… Her Majesty's Government has continued negotiations with the Government of the Argentine Republic in accordance with resolution 2065 (XX) and the consensus approved on the 20th December, 1966… progress has been made towards narrowing the area of divergence between the two governments…"* [2024]

December 16th, at the UN, the Fourth Committee consider the question of the Falkland Islands.

December 19th, proposed by Uruguay, and agreed by the Fourth Committee, a consensus is adopted.

"The General Assembly, having regard to its resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 … approves a consensus in favour of urging both parties to continue with the negotiations so as to find a peaceful solution to the problem as soon as possible."

On the same day, with regard to the Gibraltar referendum of September, 1967, the United Nations General Assembly adopts resolution 2353 (XXII).

"2. Declares the holding of the referendum of 10 September 1967 by the administering Power to be a contravention of the provisions of General Assembly resolution 2231 (XXI) and of those of the resolution adopted on 1 September 1967 by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the

2021 *Ibid*
2022 Quoted in *FCO 42/67*
2023 *UN Document A/6700/Rev.1* p.218
2024 *FCO 42/67*

Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples ;…" [2025]

The fifth preambular paragraph notes; *"… any colonial situation which partially or completely destroys the national unity and territorial integrity of a country is incompatible with the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and specifically with paragraph 6 of General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV),…"*[2026]

"It was a huge let-down for the Gibraltarians, as the UN had ignored their democratically expressed wishes. One extremely important consequence of the referendum, however, was the Constitutional reforms that Britain had promised to Hassan if the vote went in Britain's favour. " [2027]

Britain's Lord Caradon addresses the General Assembly.

"There are two basic principles which we cannot betray. First, the principle that the interest of the people must be paramount, and, second, that the people have the right freely to express their own wishes as to their future." [2028]

December 21st, representatives from Britain and Argentina meet to thrash out the text of a *Memorandum.*

"The common objective is to make early progress with practical measures for promoting free movement between the Falkland Islands and Argentina, the purpose being to create conditions under which the dispute over sovereignty can be finally and amicably settled, taking full account of the interests of the population of the Islands. The Argentine Government, in a desire to contribute towards such a settlement, will promote free movement between the mainland and the islands. Discussions on the practical measures to be taken to implement this policy will now take place in Buenos Aires. The Government of the United Kingdom have indicated that as part of such a final settlement they will be prepared to recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Islands with effect from a date to be agreed provided that the Government of the United Kingdom are satisfied that the safeguards offered by the Argentine Government are acceptable to the population …" [2029]

December 30th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's President Ongania gives an end-of-year speech.

"We have well founded confidence that the talks we are holding with the U.K. … will reach a satisfactory conclusion during the course of 1968, while we reiterate the undertaking of the Argentine Revolution to re-establish the effective exercise of our rights."

2025 Arrogant and hypocritical. Arrogant because UN resolutions are merely advisory; the UN General Assembly having no power, or right, to determine issues of sovereignty. In 1960, the UK's interpretation of art.6 (territorial integrity) was that it only applied to the Non-Self Governing Territories, an interpretation finally supported in 2019, by the International Court of Justice in the Court's Chagos Advisory Opinion. Art.6 offered no protection to established nations. Hypocritical, because this resolution flew in the face of the right of a people to decide their future. A right enshrined in the UN Charter. All parties had been notified of the referendum before it took place and appropriate institutions requested to observe. The referendum had put two simple options, the proposals of Spain, or the status quo. It can only be assumed that this reaction by the UN was simply because Spain had lost. Petulant. Spiteful but, at the end of the day, irrelevant.

2026 Supported by 73 nations (Latin America, Middle East, Africa and Eastern Europe). Opposed by 19 nations (UK and the Commonwealth) with 27 abstentions (US and Western Europe).

2027 *Gibraltar: Closure of the Border 1969-2019* HM Government of Gibraltar 2019

2028 Quoted in *HL Deb 15 February 1968 vol 289 cc275-310.* Caradon was talking about Gibraltar, but his comments were noted at the Foreign Office for their effect on the Anglo-Argentine discussions over the Falklands.

2029 Annex 6a of *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281. cf.* August, 1968

"By the end of the year the fundamental difficulty remained: that of reconciling the opposing views of the British and Argentine Governments on the "wishes" and "interests" of the Falklanders themselves... (Argentina's) continuing refusal to contemplate a change of sovereignty which would be conditional on the wishes of the Islanders made any substantial progress in the talks impossible..." [2030]

December 31st, in the biannual Falklands review, the population of the Falklands archipelago is estimated at 2,122 with 37 births, 18 marriages and 21 deaths. [2031]

1968 – January 16th, at Stanley, an Argentine author of British descent, Ronald K. Crosby, arrives at with his family, to gather information for a book – *El reto de las Malvinas* (The Challenge of the Falklands). [2032]

January 19th, in the Falklands, following the arrival of David Summerhayes, a Councillor from the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, Governor Haskard telegrams London.

> *"I have recently become increasingly concerned that (the) cardinal factor in Falkland Islands, namely the human problem, is in great danger of being overlooked. The island population has been sheltered from outside influences for years and has purposely been kept in ignorance of the talks. ... I appreciate that a gesture is necessary to satisfy Argentine aspirations and convince the Argentine of our good faith. I therefore put forward for discussion the suggestion that consideration be given to handing over South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands to the Argentine, pointing out that manifest human problems of the Falkland Islands are in a different category. Because of intense feelings of the population it is necessary for the Argentine first to woo the inhabitants before any declaration of intent to transfer sovereignty and meanwhile existing administration must continue."* [2033]

"... two years into the negotiations and not a word had been said about them either to Parliament (apart from a brief 'written answer') or in Port Stanley. The Foreign Office policy had been to prepare a satisfactory package of safeguards as well as economic benefits, to be presented to the islanders in such a way that the good news outweighed the bad. Aware of the sensitivity involved on both sides, officials wanted to avoid publicity 'until ministers were ready.' This could not last." [2034]

January 30th, Governor Cosmo Haskard flies into the UK to seek reassurances. [2035]

> *"... I decided to visit London to do my best to ensure that the views of Falkland Islanders are fully appreciated at the present time."*

February 10th, Spain's government demands that Britain negotiate the status of Gibraltar and restore Spain's territorial integrity.

"Britain responded that it was willing to talk, but not under the terms and conditions set out by the UN. The interests of the Gibraltarians had to be the primary concern." [2036]

February 14th, in London, Governor Haskard goes to see the Foreign Secretary. Present are John Beith, and a representative from the Commonwealth Office.

2030 *Ibid* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281.* Also *FCO 7-137 Telno 777*

2031 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1966 & 1967*

2032 A veterinarian and livestock farmer, Crosby concentrated on the state of agriculture, the breeds of domestic animals and the potential to improve production. Overall, he was not optimistic.

2033 Quoted in *FCO 7/156*

2034 *The Battle for the Falkland Islands* Max Hastings & Simon Jenkins 2010 (reissue)

2035 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973) Annex 1* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

2036 *Gibraltar: Closure of the Border 1969-2019* HM Government of Gibraltar 2019

"... when Sir Cosmo met Foreign Secretary George Brown, the depth of the islanders' hostility to change apparently took Mr Brown by surprise. "Mr Brown said he was exceedingly angry at the situation which had developed over the handling of the Falkland Islands' dispute with the Argentines," the minute of the meeting noted. "He could not understand why he had not been told before by the Commonwealth Office, that, in the Governor's opinion, we were going too far."..." [2037]

Pressed by Haskard for some form of statement for the people of the Falklands, John Beith notes; *"We shall probably have a battle over this because the sort of statement the Commonwealth Office have in mind would not suit us, if we are to take account of the delicate present juncture of Anglo-Argentine relations and the present negotiations... I expect to have an argument with the Commonwealth Office about it tomorrow morning."* [2038]

February 15th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Embassy refer to a proposal to delay talks with Argentina until the situation in the Islands is reconsidered; *"For tactical reasons it is no doubt better to try and work on the basis of the Argentine re-draft... the Argentines will no doubt accuse us of backsliding. ..."* [2039]

The Embassy suggest that the consent of the islanders to any deal should not be sought. [2040]

In London, on the same day, there is a debate in the House of Lords on the situation with Gibraltar. Baroness Emmet refers to Lord Caradon's speech before the General Assembly of December 19, 1967. [2041]

> *"If I may quote from Lord Caradon's speech at the United Nations on December 19 of this year, he recalled the fact that there is not another case in the history of the United Nations in which a territory has been decolonised in defiance of the freely expressed will of the people."*

Lord Shepherd also speaks.

> *"My Lords, my noble friend Lord Caradon at the United Nations left no one in any doubt as to the attitude of the United Kingdom Government — and, I believe, of Parliament — to this resolution, which he described as disgraceful because, among other things, it flouted the Charter of the United Nations. My noble friend stated our position in the following words: "There are two basic principles which we cannot betray: first, the principle that the interests of the people must be paramount; and second, that the people have the right freely to express their own wishes as to their future. These principles have guided us and will continue to guide us in our task of carrying out our responsibilities to the peoples of the dependent territories for which we are responsible."*
>
> *May I break off for a moment to say that we are not thinking in terms just of Gibraltar but of how it is going to affect all the other people who are now living under colonial rule. My noble friend Lord Caradon continued: "In the whole process of decolonisation we have adopted the methods of consultation and consent. We shall not abandon those principles in the few Dependent Territories for which we are still responsible. We have consequently maintained and constantly stated that to hand over this small, proud, united community of free men against their will, bound for ever to a régime which has done so much in an endeavour to harm them, would be an intolerable injustice." My Lords, those are the views of Her Majesty's Government expressed by my noble friend Lord Caradon."*

2037 *Birmingham Post & Mail* December 19, 2017
2038 *John Beith February 14, 1968* in *FCO 7/137*
2039 *FCO 7/137.* I am unable to find any details of the "*re-draft*" which would seem to have affected paragraph 4 of the December 21, 1967 MoU (not available). Not all the documents are present in the file.
2040 *Foreign Office to Buenos Aires February 15, 1968* in *FCO 7/137*
2041 *HL Deb 15 February 1968 vol 289 cc275-310*

Elsewhere in London, John Beith at the Foreign Office responds to that day's telegram from Buenos Aires.

> *"...2. Proposal in your paragrahs 6 and 7 has been carefully considered, but cannot be accepted because it would conflict with HMG's recent statements at the United Nations (e.g. Lord Caradon on Gibraltar) that they cannot hand a population over to another country against their will. Essence of your proposal is that consent of the people would not be sought or required.*
>
> *3. We have therefore concluded ... that best course would be to continue negotiations on the memorandum of understanding on existing lines. But we should tell the Argentines that we had concluded, after careful consideration that if we were to accept the phraseology in paragraph 4 of the memorandum which they have now suggested this might damage Anglo-Argentine relations by leading the Argentine authorities and public opinion to suppose that HMG could effect the transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the Islanders, or that it might be possible to persuade the latter to accept within a short time, say a couple of years, the safeguards and guarantees offered. We cannot expect the Islanders to abandon their present attitudes so quickly, nor can we expect all arrangements for rendering palatable a change of status to be negotiated between the two Governments in less than 5 to 10 years. We would therefore propose to introduce into the Memorandum some reference to procedures taking place over a period of time before cession of sovereignty can be decided upon,.."* [2042]

February 20th, Governor Haskard flies back into Stanley; *"... and called a meeting of Exco, at which he recounted his visit to London. Exco met on the two following days as well; Haskard had been given permission by London to tell members in confidence of the latest proposed version of the memorandum of Understanding, but he was not supposed to refer to matters still undecided in London, ... at one meeting he pointedly left the room while confidential documents were lying on the table, thus allowing members of Exco to find out things he was not supposed to tell them."* [2043]

"On his return the Governor told councillors the British government was "fully informed" of their feelings. John Beith, a senior official, wrote too Brown's office: "It is hardly consistent with our policy of trying to persuade the Falkland Islanders to see the advantages of an early transfer to make so abundantly clear that we would not and cannot move without them." [2044]

February 22nd, via the Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service, Haskard informs Islanders of his progress.

> *"You all know from press statements which have been issued from time to time that confidential talks have taken place between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Argentina. I have referred to these talks in periodic statements in the Legislative Council ... I decided to visit London to do my best to ensure that the views of the Falkland Islanders are fully appreciated at the present time; ... Letters and telegrams have their uses but I felt very strongly that what was needed was personal contact.... I think I can confidently say that I was able to make certain that those in positions of authority are fully informed on Falkland Islands affairs and in particular the feelings of the people of these Islands. A very full programme of conversations had been arranged for me. I was twice seen by the Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Mr George Brown. I had two meetings with the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. George Thompson. I met the Minister of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Lord Shepherd, on several occasions.*

2042 Quoted in *FCO 7/137.* Unlikely that the Foreign Office was aware of the House of Lords debate when this was drafted.

2043 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.526

2044 Elgood 2025 citing *The Independent* January 1, 1999

In addition I had meetings almost every day of my stay in London with senior officials in the Commonwealth Office and the Foreign Office who are directly concerned with the Falkland Islands. In these discussions I met with a sympathetic response to my attempt to convey what I conceive to be the general viewpoint of Falkland Islanders. ...

But, to be realistic, ... it would be wrong to pretend that our situation is a straightforward one. I could only wish that it were. The future of these Islands has to be looked at against the background of the resolution which was passed in the United Nations and this leads us to realise that, sooner or later, some solution will have to be found. That solution must respect the ***interests*** *of the people of the Falkland Islands. ...*

The negotiations have not come to an end and the talks are still confidential, but in these negotiations I am assured that the British Government are being guided by a strong regard for the ***interests*** *of the people of the Falkland Islands ...''* [2045]

"Haskard stressed several times that he had put the viewpoint of the islanders to the British government, but to islanders listening to his broadcast it was profoundly disturbing that the talks had been "confidential", i.e. secret, without involving them at all. And they noted that he had referred to their "interests", not their "wishes".'' [2046]

February 24th, in Stanley, members of the Executive Council send a *memo* to the Governor for transmission to the Commonwealth Office in London.

''Having studied the text of the broadcast address made by Your Excellency after your return from official "talks" in London, and compared it with draft 'Memorandum of Understanding' at present under discussion between Governments of Britain and Argentina we, the elected and nominated members of your Executive Council are dismayed that so little attention has been or is being paid to the ***wishes*** *(repeat wishes) of the Islanders. ... Your Excellency's broadcast does nothing to reassure Islanders that their expressed wishes to remain under the British flag will be observed. On the contrary the broadcast suggests that British Government proposes to act sooner or later in precisely the opposite manner and does nothing to dispel the atmosphere of uneasiness, speculation and indeed fear of future now prevailing in the Islands due to secrecy enforced by Whitehall in its handling of our affairs.''* [2047]

"Whilst fully appreciating the Governor's efforts on behalf of the Islands, unofficial Members of Council expressed themselves dissatisfied with the secrecy imposed on the Governor and requested him to transmit to the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs a strongly worded memorandum..." [2048]

Hearing that Islanders intend to lobby Parliament, the Commonwealth Office advises Haskard to issue a veiled threat; to the effect that making difficulties for the Government may not be in their best interests.

"Sir Cosmo did nothing of the kind. Instead he asked for a Minister to visit – to see local reaction for himself. But the FO didn't want this until the MOU was agreed. Islanders wanted the Queen to come on her planned Latin-American tour – but both Argentina and the Falklands were deliberately left out." [2049]

February 27th, Governor Haskard telegrams London, with a warning for the Commonwealth Office.

2045 *FCO 42/67.* My emphasis
2046 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.527-528
2047 Quoted in *FCO 42/67.* Signed by A.G. Barton, R.V. Goss, S. Millar and G.C.R. Bonner. My emphasis
2048 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* April 1, 1968 p.1
2049 *UK Considered Handover to Argentina in 1968* Peter Pepper in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* January, 2002 p.20

"… Broadsheet written by unofficial members of the Executive Council can be expected to reach members of British Parliament by air mail leaving Punta Arenas about 2 March. … Potentially embarrassing clauses … Copies of the Broadsheet addressed to Sugg are being brought by Naval Officer due in England next week." [2050]

"On the 27th, unofficial Members airmailed separate letters to approximately 630 Members of Parliament. This letter … was also sent to the Editors of 12 British National Newspapers…"[2051]

March 1st, Haskard sends a further warning.

"It is likely that local correspondents of Reuters, Associated Press, Daily Telegraph and Daily Mirror may telegraph text on 2 March." [2052]

March 4th, in the UK, every Member of Parliament receives a copy of a broadsheet from the Falkland Islands.



DESIRE THE RIGHT

Stanley,
Falkland Islands.
27th February 1968.

To : ..... And all other Members of Parliament.

From : Unofficial Members of Falkland Islands Executive Council (A. G. Barton - R. V. Goss - S. Miller - G. C. R. Bonner)

ARE YOU AWARE THAT —

Negotiations are now proceeding between the British and Argentine Governments which may result at any moment in the handing-over of the Falkland Islands to The Argentine.

TAKE NOTE THAT —

The Inhabitants of the Islands have never yet been consulted regarding their future — they do NOT want to become Argentines — they are as British as you are, mostly of English and Scottish ancestry, even to the 6th generation — five out of six were born in the Islands — many elderly people have never been elsewhere — there is no racial problem — no unemployment — no poverty, AND WE ARE NOT IN DEBT.

ARE YOU AWARE THAT —

The people of these Islands do not wish to submit to a Foreign Language, Law, Customs, and Culture because for 135 years they have happily pursued their own peaceful way of life, a very British way of life, unique in fact, when you consider that the Islands are 8000 miles from the Country which they still call "Home" in spite of the Immigration Act.

Lord Caradon said to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965 *"The people of this territory are not to be betrayed or bartered. Their wishes and their interests are paramount and we shall do our duty in protecting them"*. British Ministers have said the same until 1967 since when there has been silence.

QUESTIONS —

Is our tiny community to be used as a pawn in Power Politics ?

Do you not feel ashamed that this wicked thing may suddenly be foisted on us ?

What can you do to prevent it ? What are you doing ?

WE NEED YOUR HELP !

"To Members of Parliament

ARE YOU AWARE THAT -
Negotiations are now proceeding between the British and Argentine Governments which may result at any moment in the handing-over of the Falkland Islands to The Argentine.

TAKE NOTE THAT -
The Inhabitants of the Islands have never yet been consulted regarding their future – they do NOT want to become Argentines – they are as British as you are, mostly of English and Scottish ancestry, even to the 6th generation – five out of six were born in the Islands – many elderly people have never been elsewhere – there is no racial problem – no unemployment – no poverty, and we are not in debt.

ARE YOU AWARE THAT -
The people of these Islands do not wish to submit to a Foreign Language, Law, Customs, and Culture because for 135 years they have happily pursued their own peaceful way of life, a very British way of life, unique in fact, when you consider that the Islands are 8,000 miles from the Country which they still call 'Home' in spite of the Immigration Act. Lord Caradon said to the General Assembly of the United Nations in 1965: "The people of this territory are not to be betrayed or bartered. Their wishes and their interests are paramount and we shall do our duty in protecting them." British Ministers have said the same until 1967 since when there has been silence.

QUESTIONS -
Is our tiny community to be used as a pawn in Power Politics?
Do you not feel ashamed that this wicked thing may suddenly be foisted on use?
What can you do to prevent it?
What are you doing?

WE NEED YOUR HELP!"

2050 *Falkland Islands to Commonwealth Office February 27, 1968* in *FCO 42/67*
2051 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* April 1, 1968 p.1
2052 *Telno 48* in *FCO 42/67*

"Along comes an incident, affecting a tiny group of people, which can overthrow a government, or throw out of gear its economic planning... We needed the Falklands issue as much as we needed a hole in the head! ..." [2053]

"With alarmist rhetoric and headings in capital letters, the text challenged parliamentarians ... The message stated that the inhabitants of the Islands had never been consulted about their future, that they did not want to become Argentine, and that they were as British as the recipients of that text, ..." [2054]

The potential effects of the broadsheet, cause concern at both Foreign and Commonwealth Offices.

> *"This is bound to cause a revival of Parliamentary interest in this question and there may soon be pressure for Ministers to divulge the substance of these talks, which are being conducted with the Argentine Government on a confidential basis. In particular Ministers may be asked whether sovereignty is being discussed: this has not hitherto been publicly admitted."* [2055]

March 5th, the Commonwealth Office proposes a strategy; *"It must, of course, be fairly obvious that the difficulty of defending the Islands must be one of the main reasons for our seeking to reach agreement with the Argentines. The people of the Islands are, I think, aware of this and a statement about it would endorse their own feelings and fears and help bring them to a realisation that the Islands cannot be as secure in the future as in the past. They may even think that it might be in their long-term interests for the U.K. to come to terms with the Argentine. This will have to be said sooner or later and as the Falkland Islanders have themselves forced the pace, it might be better said sooner than later."* [2056]

March 8th, from London, Governor Haskard is instructed to reassure the Islanders; *"... that the U.K. will continue to attach the same importance to their interests that she has done in the past."* [2057]

> *"3. We do not know whether the Governor approved or otherwise of the recent Broad-Sheet but he might hint that efforts of this sort by making things difficult for the Government in Parliament may not assist in the solution of their problem, although this is not likely to do much good as they will almost certainly continue to bring all pressure they can to retain the status quo."* [2058]

March 12th, in London, the *Times* newspaper confirms that it has received a copy of the Islanders' broadsheet, and quotes a Foreign Office spokesman as saying that the Anglo-Argentine talks are confidential.

The newspaper also reports that Islanders Barton, Goss, Miller and Bonner are travelling to London to address the Conservative 'Commonwealth Affairs Group'.

March 13th, in Britain's House of Lords, Foreign Office Minister Lord Chalfont, is asked whether negotiations are underway with Argentina over the Falklands. Chalfont admits that they are, but declines to elaborate, stating that the talks are; *"confidential between Governments."* He refuses to deny that talks include sovereignty; *"... when the matter was raised in another place on 13th March the evasive answers of the noble Lord, Lord Chalfont served only to heighten the anxiety already felt. We were told then that nothing could be said about confidential talks proceeding between the British and Argentine Governments, but that whatever was decided the principles of consultation and consent would be applied. ..."* [2059]

2053 Barbara Castle quoted in Charlton 1989 p.17
2054 Carassai 2022
2055 *C.W. Wallace March 4, 1968* in *FCO 42/67*
2056 *Sugg A. March 5, 1968* in *FCO 42/67*
2057 *FCO 42/67.* Somebody appears to have missed the point, as it was the Governor's emphasis on the word "*interests*" rather than "*wishes*" that had so roused the Islanders following his radio broadcast.
2058 *Sugg A. March 8, 1968* in *FCO 42/67*
2059 Mr. Bernard Braine MP *HC Deb 26 March 1968 vol.761 cc1446-67*

"The simple fact of the matter is,... that you really cannot, in the long run, conduct the foreign policy of an important international power, according entirely to the interests, and certainly not to the wishes, of a couple of thousand inhabitants of some islands in the South Atlantic." [2060]

March 15th, the *Times* newspaper reports on Stewarts' performance in the House of Lords.

"On 15 March 1968 The Times, in a dramatic leading article, "Betrayal or Barter?" described Lord Chalfont's "flaccid equivocations" in the House of Lords in defence of the Government's position, while highlighting the optimism of the Argentine Foreign Minister Costa Méndez that there might be a favourable outcome to the negotiations. The article noted "suspicious signs that the Government were contemplating a wholly pointless abandonment of people who believe in them and have trusted them"." [2061]

March 16th, Michael Stewart succeeds George Brown as Britain's Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs.

March 25th, in England, a lobby group – the '*Falkland Islands Emergency Committee*' – is formed to promote the wishes of the Islanders. [2062]

"Do you want its earliest roots? I attended a meeting of the Court of the Worshipful Company of Clockmakers, of which I was then a member, and, at the end of the lunch, another member of the Court came up to me. He was a senior officer, serving at that time in the Admiralty, Captain Pennefeather, Royal Navy and a member of the Committee still. And he said, 'Bill, George Brown's gone mad! He wants to sell the Falkland Islands to Argentina. I can't do anything about it. You have to do something about it!'... we got a promise from the Falkland Islands Company that they would pay our expenses. We got Labour members of Parliament to join, we got Conservative and we got Liberal members. And we set to work." [2063]

"It seems that the emergent lobby was motivated by a combination of imperial nostalgia, a sense of obligation to people who wished to remain British, and resentment against the United Nations for appearing to ignore the wishes of peoples in the interests of decolonization... The Falkland Lobby was formalized on 25 March by the formation in London of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee. It was instigated by Bill Hunter Christie, a barrister at Lincoln's Inn. Christie was the Third Secretary at the British Embassy in Buenos Aires between 1946 and 1948. He developed an interest in the Falklands and subsequently wrote an authoritative history of Antarctica. ... On 25 March a meeting was held at the F.I.C.'s London office to consider the manifesto sent by the unofficial members of the Executive Council. It was attended by the Directors of the F.I.C., Barton, Mitchell, Christie, Professor Metford of Bristol University, Dr. Robin of the Scott Polar Research Institute, Falkland landowners and farm managers, and the Labour M. P. Clifford Kenyon and the Conservative M. P. John Smith. A committee was formed composed of Sir John D. Barlow, Bt., (a Director of the F.I.C. and former M.P.), Barton, Christie, Kenyon, Smith and Norman Cameron. Christie persuaded the meeting that the Committee should not be partisan (despite overwhelming Tory support) and should have Labour and Liberal representation. Mitchell was appointed Secretary and Sir John Barlow Chairman." [2064]

2060 Lord Chalfont quoted in Charlton 1989 p.22

2061 Elgood 2025

2062 Arthur Barton, manager of the Falkland Islands Company, had flown from Montevideo to London with the express intention of setting up a group to inform the British public of life in the Falklands; and the Islanders' concerns regarding government negotiations behind their backs.

2063 William Hunter Christie quoted in Charlton 1989 p.78

2064 Ellerby 1990 pp.153 & 154 citing *Nationalism and Internationalism: Britain's Left and Policy towards the F.I.s, 1982-1984'* C. J. Christie 1985 (April) *Hull Papers in Politics* no.37 p.3

"Chalfont complained that Barton and Sid Miller communicated by phone with the Falklands Emergency Committee nearly every day." [2065]

"Knowing that they could not successfully fight the Foreign Office alone, a group of leading Islanders mobilised influential friends in Britain, including back-bench Members of Parliament, into a remarkably effective pressure and lobby group. The Argentines hated the Emergency Committee, as it was known, sneering that it was actually the instrument of the Falkland Islands Company who simply want to continue plundering the Islands' economy. But the committee became a permanent thorn in the side of the Foreign Office." [2066]

"... the "Falklands Lobby" objected to any ceding of sovereignty over the islands, which hampered the flexibility of British negotiators." [2067]

"... a meeting at the Falkland Islands Company's London office was attended by Director Sir John Barlow Bt, former MP and FIC men A.G. Barton and Frank Mitchell, the Labour MP Clifford Kenyon, Conservative MP John Smith, J.C.J. Metford, Professor of Spanish at Bristol University, Dr Robin of the Scott Polar institute, Bill Hunter Christie AND Falkland landowners including Norman Cameron. An all-Party Emergency Committee was formed to support the Islanders." [2068]

"The fate of a small British community under threat from an aggressive neighbour had such an emotive and nationalistic appeal to MPs and the right-wing press that parliament would probably have been sceptical of any Falklands deal even without the encouragement of the Committee,..." [2069]

In London, a well-known naturalist and broadcaster, Peter Scott, writes to *The Times* newspaper.

> *"... in Buenos Aires I found a general impression that any minute now the Islas Malvinas, as they call them, would be part of Argentina."*

Late evening, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart summons the Argentine Ambassador, Brigadier Eduardo McLoughlin, to inform him that a statement is to be made in the Commons the following day. [2070]

March 26th, at the House of Commons, Secretary of State Michael Stewart speaks about the talks that have been taking place with Argentina. He asserts these have not been taking place behind the backs of the Islanders.

> *"It is the normal practice for talks like this to be confidential, but there are some things which it would be appropriate to say about them now. Our object in conducting these talks is to secure a lasting and satisfactory modus vivendi between these islands and Argentina, because we believe this to be a necessary long-term aim of policy. ... We have thought it right, in pursuance of this objective, that the question of sovereignty should be discussed in these talks... if one is genuine in saying that one wants good relations, one cannot refuse to discuss a subject even if one's views and the views of the other party are completely at variance and even if one cannot see, at the beginning of the talks, how those differences are to be reconciled. The House will accept that there was here a genuine problem to be resolved... it would not have been prudent, far sighted and in the interest of the islanders for us to preclude any possibility of discussion by saying that we would not even discuss this*

2065 Pepper 2002. Alun Gwynne Jones, Baron Chalfont, was the Government's spokesman on foreign affairs in the House of Lords. Barton was described by Chalfont as *"irredeemably reactionary"* in his opposition to Argentina.
2066 Bound 2007
2067 *When Governments Collide in the South Atlantic: Britain Coerces Argentina during the Falklands War* Patrick Bratton & Wallace Thies 2011 in *Comparative Strategy* 30:1 1-27
2068 Elgood 2025. Original capitals.
2069 *Britain and the Dictatorships of Argentina and Chile 1973-82: Foreign Policy, Corporations and Social Movements (Security, Conflict & Cooperation in the Contemporary World)* Grace Livingstone 2018
2070 Elgood 2025

question of sovereignty. … I say this quite clearly, Her Majesty's Government would agree to … a cession only, first on the condition I have mentioned that it must be part of an agreement fully satisfactory in other respects, and secondly, only if it were clear to us, to the Government in the United Kingdom, that the islanders themselves regarded such an agreement as satisfactory to their interests."[2071]

During the debate that follows, a number of MPs speak their minds.

"Mr. John Smith (Cities of London and Westminster):… the mere possibility that these islanders should be bartered away to gratify another Government fills me with indignation and shame and I have sat here until a quarter past seven in the morning in order to say so… Mr. Bernard Braine (Essex South-East):… If the Government are not preparing to sell our fellow Britons down the river, why then were their leaders not reassured? Why was the Governor not empowered to inform his Executive Council and to speak to this small community and allay their fears?… If, as I understand it, the negotiations are taking place in pursuance of Resolution 2065 of the United nations General Assembly, which called upon the two Governments to find a peaceful solution to the problem, in what way would the openly expressed views of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands be in conflict with that Resolution? … Does not Aricle 73 of the Charter of the United Nations make it plain that the interests of the people of a colonial territory are paramount and that their political aspirations must be respected? We know the political aspirations of the Falkland Islanders. They have made them quite plain. … what all of us are saying is that the Falkland Islanders are not to be betrayed." [2072]

At the end of an all-night sitting, Michael Stewart responds.

"We have no doubt whatever that the sovereignty is now legally ours. I need not go over all the legal and historical arguments that have been advanced. Since it is in our sovereignty, we have a clear duty, as we have towards any other place in our sovereignty, to defend it. …

We do not want to be at odds with a friendly nation. We do not want to betray people who have a claim on us. This is not a matter which can be quickly dismissed or quickly resolved. I say, in what event or in what time could a transfer of sovereignty be considered? To that my answer would be, first, only as part of an agreement which would secure a permanently satisfactory relationship between the islands and Argentina, in which there would be no harassing, no vexation, no inconveniences, and an arrangement also in which if there were a transfer of sovereignty there would be the fullest safeguards for the special rights of the islanders, the fact of their descent, their language and so on.

That is one condition, that the cession of sovereignty could be considered only as part of an agreement of that nature, but further – notice this – the right to agree to such cession lies with Her Majesty's Government here. That, of course, is a simple point of law, that the actual power to decide over a transfer of sovereignty lies with Her Majesty's Government here. But I say this quite clearly, Her Majesty's Government would agree to such a cession only … only if it were clear to us, to the Government in the United Kingdom, that the Islanders themselves regarded such an agreement as satisfactory to their interests." [2073]

March 27th, in the House of Lords, Foreign Office Minister Lord Chalfont defends the Government.

"Her Majesty's Government believe that a transfer of sovereignty could be considered only as part of an agreement which would secure a permanently satisfactory relationship between the Islands and

2071 *HC Deb 26 March 1968 vol.761 cc1446-67*
2072 *Ibid. cc1454-67*
2073 *Ibid. cc1463-64*

Argentina, and one which would fully safeguard the special rights of the Islanders. That is one condition. The cession of sovereignty could be considered only as part of an agreement of this nature. While the power to decide over a transfer of sovereignty lies with Her Majesty's Government, they would agree to such a cession first on the condition I have mentioned, that it must be part of an agreement fully satisfactory in other respects, and, secondly, only if it were clear to us, to Her Majesty's Government, that the Islanders themselves regarded such an agreement as satisfactory to their interests... My Lords, the legal question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands resides with Her Majesty's Government. It will be for Her Majesty's Government to negotiate and arrive at decisions with the Argentine Government. We shall do so on the basis of the two principles I have already outlined, ...'' [2074]

Bombarded with adverse comments, Lord Chalfont defends himself.

"*There is no question of bartering over the heads of anybody here. All I have said is that we regard the wishes of the Islanders as being of great importance; and, of course, we have studied those wishes constantly in the course of the negotiations. There is continuing consultation all the time with the Governor of the Falkland Islands about this matter; and, as I say, in all this we shall regard their interests as paramount.''*

"The Government had entered into the negotiations with Argentina with the implicit assumption that it was the best judge of the interests of the islanders and that they could be brought to share its judgement. They were soon disabused." [2075]

March 28th, in London, Michael Stewart reports to the cabinet.

"Apparently, the aim of our talks with the Argentine Government has been to get travel restrictions, which the latter had imposed, removed and to establish a more satisfactory long-term relationship between the Islands and Argentina. He had skilfully found a formula to deal with the question of sovereignty, saying we were prepared to recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Islands only if the Islanders themselves considered it to be in their own interests. He was really rather pleased with the way he had managed this so as to prevent talks being called off while firmly standing by the rights of the Islanders ... It was Jim Callaghan who asked solemnly whether the Falkland Islands were any use to us. Apparently, none at all, but there would be one of those absurd Parliamentary rows if we were to try and disembarrass ourselves of them." [2076]

March 30th, Falklands landowner, Norman Cameron, writes to the Emergency Committee with regard to a Foreign and Commonwealth Office meeting.

" ... HMG is prepared to consider a transfer of sovereignty – with safeguards of course, which would in fact be valueless. In effect for the first time HMG has acknowledged that the Argentine claim is as good, indeed presumably stronger than our own. This is an entirely new factor. Hitherto the Argentine claim was resisted both in Whitehall and the Falklands, now Whitehall has thrown in the sponge and the onus for any further resistance to a change of sovereignty is put squarely on the people of the Islands who must expect to be subjected to every sort of pressure from the Argentines and conceivably Whitehall as well." [2077]

March 31st, from London, Arthur Barton, FIC manager, speaks to the Islanders via the BBC radio programme "*Calling the Falklands*".

2074 *HL Deb 27 March 1968 vol.290 cc990-6990*
2075 *Towards Resolution?: Falklands/Malvinas Dispute* Wayne S. Smith 1991
2076 Barbara Castle's Diary quoted in Elgood 2025 citing *Castle* 1984 p.413
2077 Elgood 2025 citing *EP/1968/2*

"*The situation as I see it to-day is just this. The Falkland Islands will remain British unless the day comes when the Islanders, of their own free will, declare they wish to become Argentines; and I cannot see that day ever coming. But we must never slacken our efforts to impress on whatever Government is in power in Britain that we are British and want to remain so. See to it at your end – you have now a host of friends at this end.*

I fully believe that three weeks ago the situation was extremely critical, even worse than Members of Executive Council thought - and, at least, they know more than you. I never realised the full extent of the danger myself or I would never have stopped off in Germany for family reasons. However, those few extra days gave Members of Parliament and national newspapers time to get really worked up, and how magnificently they set about it.

Our manifesto, or plea for help, or whatever you like to call it, dated 27th February, reached London at exactly the right moment - the "Times" took it up in a big way on 12th March and the campaign had started. I kept in touch with London by telephone, and when we arrived in London on 21st the heat was on and has not yet relaxed.

On 21st I had a private meeting with Lord Shepherd, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, and I was as forceful as I knew how, particularly with regard to the unbelievable refusal of the Government to consult the Islanders on their own future. His Lordship passed this aside - he could see no reason for panic, or even fear. He said that any Government which sold even a tiny part of the Commonwealth to a foreign country would be turned out within 24 hours. I got very cross and said we had every reason to fear, and after an hour and a quarter I felt that he and Members of the Commonwealth Office present were doing some quick rethinking, which is why I told the news reporter, when I left the office that I felt slightly happier - I was reported as saying 'much happier' which is untrue, I did not. My diary tells me that on 25th I talked for one and a half hours with a Mr. Schoenfelt, London representative of the leaning Buenos Aires paper 'La Prensa', and later appeared in an interview in the B.B.C. programme 'Twenty four hours', introduced by Cliff Michelmore - I was later told that I won that round. Also on this end the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee was formed - we shall hear much more of this Committee …

For months past there have been references, by Government spokesmen, to the interests of the Islanders - that we are wayward children, not knowing what is good for us - but no notice has been paid to our wishes, strongly expressed many times. Whenever I told Conservative M.P.'s that the United Nations was no friend of ours I was applauded, …

I rest assured that neither the Conservative Party nor the Emergency Committee will let the matter rest or be content until this uncertainty is disposed of once and for all". …" [2078]

"Despite the Falkland Islanders' worries, however, secret negotiations continued…" [2079]

April 1st, criticised over the terminology used by himself and Lord Chalfont, Secretary Stewart informs Parliament that; *"… the wishes of the islanders are an absolute condition…"* [2080]

April 22nd, an editorial in *The Guardian* newspaper asks; *"Are the Falklands for sale?"*

2078 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* May 6, 1968 pp.1-4
2079 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.530
2080 *HC Deb 01 April 1968 vol.762 cc3-5*

"Why have British Ministers taken to being so devious about the Falkland Islands? The Government's policy was laid down quite clearly by Mr Michael Stewart before the negotiations with Argentina began. In January, 1966, he told the Argentine Foreign Minister, Dr Ortiz, that the islands' sovereignty was British and was not negotiable. ... Last year Mr Fred Lee confirmed this on behalf of the Commonwealth Office in a letter to the Falkland Islands Company. Lately the Foreign Office has confirmed it again, to the extent that they agreed that Mr Stewart had made the original remark. Yet in the past four weeks of questioning in Parliament no Minister has ventured to repeat what Mr Stewart said in the beginning. Not even Mr Stewart himself.

What is the Government up to? ... The people who matter are the Falkland Islanders and both Governments have rejected all proposals for a referendum. If they really want a just solution this rejection is incomprehensible. The principle of self-determination should come first ... The Argentines, who seem to fear that the vote would go against them, will not countenance self-determination either (notwithstanding the fact that they claimed this same right for themselves when they threw the Spaniards out). Secret diplomacy is sometimes useful but in the Falklands' case it is doing only harm. The two Governments should explain what they are talking about. Otherwise they will be suspected of doing a deal behind the Falklanders' backs."

April 25th, in the House of Lords, Lord Shepherd answers a question on the possibility of a referendum.

"My Lords, a plebiscite appears to be unnecessary and unsuitable in the circumstances of the Falkland Islands, particularly as we regard consultation with the people as a continuous process. ... a plebiscite is an unusual process within the British Commonwealth. The situation in the Falkland Islands is that there are some 1,200 electors, some 800 of whom are householders.

We believe that the type of consultation we have in mind, which may take place over a period of years, is quite suitable and will be democratic. We believe that by this process – and I give the noble Viscount this assurance – not only Her Majesty's Government, but Parliament also, will be satisfied that the wishes of the people of the Falklands are clearly understood." [2081]

May 1st, in London, Secretary Stewart meets the Argentine Ambassador, Eduardo McLoughlin.

"Stewart strove to convince McLoughlin that the British proposal already went a long way to meet Argentine needs, since "it does not say explicitly that the islanders will be consulted in some particular way about sovereignty." However, he admitted that in reality "Her Majesty's Government would have to take into account the islanders' views on both aspects of the question [the guarantees and the transfer] since they are virtually inseparable",..." [2082]

May 24th, in Stanley, the Falkland Islands Legislative Council urges a visit by a senior Foreign Office official be arranged. To explain what is going on.

July 4th, from Stanley, the Governor's office informs London that Executive Council members are unhappy.

"Council members are becoming increasingly restive and I have received letter from unofficials complaining of lack of information from me. In particular I am asked: (a) explain to public why Her Majesty the Queen cannot visit her subjects in the Falkland Islands; (b) when can we expect visit from senior member of Her Majesty's Government to gain first hand knowledge of our difficulties

2081 *HL Deb 25 April 1968 vol.291 cc738-9*
2082 González 2009

and worries; (c) what financial aid Her Majesty's Government is prepared to extend to accelerate development in farming industry; (d) what consideration is being given to strengthening our defences. …" [2083]

July 5th, from Buenos Aires, Foreign Minister Costa Méndez offers to talk about improving contacts between the Islands and the mainland in an attempt to break the deadlock. With the furore in the press appearing to have died down, negotiations resume.

The deployment of Royal Marines to the Falklands is up-graded to an annual commitment.

"Taking the worst case of an invasion threat, when the Chiefs of Staff last considered the defence of the Falklands in July 1968, they concluded that it would be necessary to station a force of about Brigade-strength on the Islands to provide a militarily convincing deterrent to an officially-backed Argentine invasion and that the problem of transporting such a force to the Falkland Islands and providing accommodation for it, quite apart from the difficulties and cost of logistic support, ruled this out as a practical proposition." [2084]

British press reports denigrate an announcement that the Queen will not visit the Falkland Islands during the forthcoming tour of South American countries. In Buenos Aires, newspapers report a decision to also exclude Argentina.

"… the press here had received very calmly the definite news that The Queen will not be visiting Argentina this year. They have naturally singled out the Falkland islands question as the principal reason for this. … The most helpful and balanced comment is as usual by Manfred Schonfield, writing in La Prensa. The decision not to visit either the Falkland islands or Argentina is, he says, a typical example of British pragmatism and tactfulness although severely criticised by the right wing press in Britain…." [2085]

July 9th, referring to the Governor's request for a Ministerial visit to the archipelago; John Beith pens a Foreign Office *minute*; *"… the Foreign Office had taken the line that a Minister should not go to the Falklands until he could put over to public opinion there the merits of whatever Memorandum of Understanding we might have agreed upon with the Argentines. But the timing of agreement on this memorandum has slipped so far that I think it would be reasonable now to see the visit in slightly different guise. … i) the Minister should be briefed to explain cogently to his audience the facts of present-day life and the need to improve relations with Argentina… ii) the Minister should stop at Buenos Aires on his way back and talk to the Argentines, preferably launching talks about the re-opening of communications if these have not already begun;…"* [2086]

In London, enquiries are made at the Ministry of Power with regard to oil exploration licences for the seas around the Falklands; by a British subsidiary of an American company, controlled by a J. Grynberg, titled the *Atlantic Oceanic Resources Company*. [2087]

Britain's Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, confirms that the UK is tendering to sell frigates to Argentina. [2088]

July 19th, in London, following extensive discussions between the UK and Gibraltar governments, agreement is reached on a new Constitution for Gibraltar.

"… the UK Government agreed to include important guarantees on a new relationship between Britain and Gibraltar in the preamble of the new constitution: Under the terms of the new constitution, Gibraltar's elected

2083 *FCO 7/156.* The Council has both official members and unofficial members.
2084 *Memorandum by Michael Stewart October 21st, 1969* in *FCO 7/1081*
2085 *British Embassy Buenos Aires (J. Martin) to the Foreign Office (M. W. Atkinson) July 8, 1968* in *FCO 7/137*
2086 *Ibid.*
2087 *Annex B to the Memorandum by Michael Stewart October 21, 1969 OPD (69)51* in *FCO 7/1081*
2088 Elgood 2005

government took firm control over Gibraltar's internal affairs, and the territory was renamed the City of Gibraltar. Gibraltarians, who retained their British Citizenship, breathed a sigh of relief that the talks had ended with a positive outcome." [2089]

July 23rd, Governor Haskard writes from Stanley.

> *"Our political problems are being discussed in a realistic way in ExCo these days. We are only five in number at the moment, namely Goss and Pitaluga, both elected, Rowlands, the acting treasurer who is a Falkland Islander, Thompson and myself. The implications of the memorandum of understanding are not welcome to us but members accept that a 'new look' one day is inevitable. None of us like one little bit either the British or the Argentine version of paragraph 4… I may be able to come forward with some practical suggestions from this end.*
>
> *Hitherto it has been left to the British and Argentine Governments to argue the toss, with the Falkland Islands very much on the sidelines. But even here time does not stand completely still and some members of the community are beginning to think in terms other than a complete refusal to face the facts of the situation.*
>
> *I think that everything favours a policy of taking things slowly and allowing thought to mature in the Colony. The object of this letter is therefore merely to ask that everything be done to delay any form of commitment…. Surely it is in the interest of all parties to open up communications first and let people on both sides have a look at each other before scaring everyone here with a declaration of this sort."*[2090]

August 9th, in London, negotiators settle on a form of words for a *'Memorandum of Understanding'* (MoU); "a*d referendum to Ministers*" (subject to agreement by Ministers).

> *"The common objective is to settle definitively and in an amicable manner the dispute over sovereignty, taking duly into account the interests of the population of the Islands....*
>
> *(4) the Government of the United Kingdom as part of such a final settlement will recognise Argentina's sovereignty over the Islands from a date to be agreed. This date will be agreed as soon as possible after (i) the two governments have resolved the present divergence between them as to the criteria according to which the United Kingdom Government shall consider whether the interests of the Islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine Government, and (ii) the Government of the United Kingdom are then satisfied that those interests are so secured...*
>
> *(5) Both Governments will proceed with the present talks in London in order to define the details of the guarantees and safeguards for the interests of the population of the islands to be put forward by the Argentine Government.*
>
> *(6) The two Governments have taken note of each others policies and share the view that a certain period of time should facilitate the development of conditions for a definitive settlement. If no definitive settlement had been reached, a meeting of special representatives could be held at the request of either Government to review progress or to examine the question, at a date not less than four years or not more than ten years from the signature of this Memorandum."* [2091]

2089 *Gibraltar: Closure of the Border 1969-2019* HM Government of Gibraltar 2019
2090 *Haskard to Bennet July 23, 1968* in *FCO 7/1082.* ExCo = Executive Committee.
2091 *FCO 7-1075*. Also *Falkland Islands Review* (Franks Report) Lord Oliver Franks 1983 para.23.

"There is little doubt that this early indication of the United Kingdom's willingness to consider the transfer of sovereignty both coloured subsequent discussions between the two governments and provided fertile soil in which Argentina's subsequent sense of grievance could grow." [2092]

"... some people are aware that in 1968 both Foreign Affairs Ministries, at officer level, wrote a memorandum of mutual understanding which included terms and conditions for a 'surrender' of sovereignty (or, as we would prefer to say, a 'devolution' of sovereignty)." [2093]

"In mid-August of (1968), representatives of Great Britain and Argentina jointly drafted an ad referendum memorandum of understanding, according to which the former would recognise the sovereignty over the Islands of the latter once it deemed appropriate the guarantees and safeguards offered to the islanders. Channel 11 broadcast a special program with interviews with Foreign Minister Costa Méndez, historian Ricardo Callet-Bois and journalist Héctor Ricardo Garcia; the television news program Sucesos Argentos presented 'the most important graphic document on the islands', in which it was stated that "our flag will fly over them again"; the weekly Primera Plana announced on its cover the return of the Islands, without question marks, and the comedian Landrú drew on the cover of his magazine an Onganía dressed as a Santa Claus bringing the archipelago as a gift to the Argentines for that Christmas." [2094]

Britain's Foreign Office seeks a legal opinion on the *Memorandum*.

> *"The Memorandum of Understanding is not a legally enforceable document, and neither imposes any legal obligations nor creates any legal rights; it is merely a record of the degree of understanding which we have reached with the Argentines...*
>
> *We can continue to refuse to transfer sovereignty simply by stating that we are not satisfied. The criteria for our being satisfied lied entirely within our own judgement. ..."* [2095]

"... advice was to the effect that signature of the memorandum could not be held to commit us at any time to transfer sovereignty against the islanders' wishes, that it would not be a legally enforceable document and that it would neither impose any legal obligation nor create any legal rights. Accordingly we have told the Argentines that we would not regard it as registrable as such under Article 102 of the United Nations Charter as a treaty or international agreement." [2096]

To accompany the MoU, separate interpretations of each country's views are prepared.

"... the parties had so little confidence in the common ground they had attained that they "agreed" to complement the Memorandum with unilateral statements that each would make in order to lay out their diametrically different interpretations of the text..." [2097]

Unknown to Argentina at this stage, Britain's *Unilateral Statement* says:

> *"On 26 March and on several other occasions this year Ministers have explained to Parliament their reasons for holding talks with the Argentine Government about the Falkland Islands. In these talks*

2092 *The Falkland Islands, 5th Report from the Foreign Affairs Committee Session 1983-1984 HC 268 25.10.1984* para.29
2093 Jose Octavio Bordon in Lewis & Szusterman (eds) 1996
2094 Carassai 2022
2095 Quoted in *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973) Annex 7* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*
2096 *Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 18(?), 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *154*
2097 González 2009. Quite what had been agreed about the formulation of these would be the subject of later dispute.

Her Majesty's Government have kept constantly in view the need to protect and safeguard the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands now and in the future.

The Foreign Secretary told the House of Commons that for a small community like this to be seriously at variance with a large continental neighbour could be an increasing source of vexation and uncertainty to the Islands and he made it clear that in pursuance of Her Majesty's Government's policy to secure a lasting and satisfactory modus vivendi between these Islands and Argentina they thought it right that the question of sovereignty should be included in the talks with the Argentine Government.

Since that time the talks have continued, and the two Governments have no reached a measure of understanding. This has been set out in a joint Memorandum of Understanding, which the two Governments will in due course communicate to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

2. As can be seen from that Memorandum Her Majesty's Government have made a sincere effort to reach a satisfactory settlement of this dispute which arises from the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the Islands. But Her Majesty's Government have already stated that they could only consider the solution of this dispute by a cession of sovereignty to Argentina first as part of a settlement which would secure a permanently satisfactory relationship between the Islands and Argentina and second, if the Islanders themselves regarded such a settlement as satisfactory to their interests.

3. The memorandum of Understanding contains a conditional undertaking by Her majesty's Government to recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands with effect from a date to be agreed. Her Majesty's Government wish to repeat that they have never had any doubt as to their sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, which will not be affected by the present understanding with Argentina except in the circumstances described in paragraph 4 of the memorandum of Understanding, and in this statement.

4. Paragraph 4 of the memorandum of Understanding refers to a divergence between the two Governments, and indicates that until that divergence has been removed there can be no final settlement. This divergence refers specifically to the role that consultation with the people of the Islands should play in the final decision as to the efficacy of the safeguards and guarantees. Her Majesty's Government would not feel able to regard the safeguards and guarantees referred to in paragraph 4 of the Memorandum of Understanding as satisfactory unless they were first satisfied that the Falkland Islanders themselves regard them as satisfactory.

5. Her Majesty's Government believe that the greatly improved relationship between the Islands and their nearest neighbour, Argentina, is in the best interests of the Islanders. Her Majesty's Government are equally conscious of the close ties between the population of the Islands and the United Kingdom and of their loyalty to the Crown and it is Her Majesty's Government's intention to ensure that the present inhabitants of the Falkland Islands should in any circumstances retain their British nationality for as long as they wish.

6. The questions still to be resolved are complex, particularly those concerning the safeguards and guarantees, about which it will be necessary fully to consult the people of the Islands. As the next step in this process of consultation the Minister of State, ... Office, will visit the colony from ... to ... 1968, to inform the people of the Islands about Her Majesty's Government's policyu in their talks with the Argentine Government. Her Majesty's Government wish to make it clear at once however that throughout this process of consultation they will ask the Islanders to regard the question of the

efficacy of the safeguards and guarantees and that of a possible cession of sovereignty to Argentina as a single issue.

7. ***The practical effect of this would be that sovereignty would not be transferred unless the change were acceptable to the population of the Islands****. As is clear from the memorandum of Understanding, both Government agree that the process of consultation and negotiation of appropriate safeguards and guarantees will take time. When, and only when, they are satisfied that the basis proposed for the transfer of sovereignty is acceptable to the population of the Islands, would the British Government of the day be able to proceed to a final settlement with the Argentines."* [2098]

Unknown to Britain, Argentina's *Unilateral Statement* says:

"The Argentine Government and the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have signed a Memorandum of Understanding on the question of the 'Islas Malvinas' opening a decisive stage in the process of their restitution to the Argentine Republic.

Within the frame of Resolution 1514 (XV) entitled 'Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples' the general Assembly adopted, on the 16th of December 1965, Resolution 2065 (XX) which acknowledges the dispute existing between the Governments of Argentina and of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland regarding the sovereignty on said Islands. In two further occasions, in 1966 and 1967, the Organization of the United nations urged, by way of consensuses, the solution of the problem.

This solution is of the exclusive responsibility of both Government, as been declared by the General Assembly, stated by both Parties and is expressed in the text of the Memorandum of Understanding.

The same document points out the existence of a divergency with regard to the criteria according to which the Government of the United Kingdom shall consider whether the interests of the islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine Government.

The Argentine Government sustains that in this process the principle, that the decisions are of the exclusive and absolute resort of each one of the Governments cannot be impaired, and consequently, in no case the recognition of sovereignty can be submitted, either directly or indirectly, to the consideration of the inhabitants.

The interests of the inhabitants of the Islands have been a constant preoccupation for the Argentine Government throughout this negotiation and it has offered, consequently, to assure them adequately. In doing so the national Government conforms not only to Resolution 2065 (XX) but also and above all to the Argentine Constitution and laws as we have already made known.

The Argentine Government, reiterating previous statements in that sense, wishes to point out again that it is its intention that the interests of the inhabitants may not be impaired because of the recognition by the United Kingdom, of the Argentine sovereignty. It confidently hopes, on the contrary that a stage of harmony, communication and benefits will be opened thus for the inhabitants.

Furthermore, the Argentine Government emphasizes its conviction that this Memorandum of Understanding fully proves that the solution of international controversies can be reached by peaceful means and that, in doing so, Argentina as well as the United Kingdom render an outstanding

2098 *FCO 7-1073.* My emphasis.

contribution towards the improvement of the existing international atmosphere; they also underline the importance of the United nations Organization which has been so effective in the process and consequently contributed to its strengthening.

The friendship and mutual understanding in which the negotiations between Argentina and the United Kingdom have been carried, have helped to the agreement on the memorandum of Understanding. The final settlement of this dispute by way of its definitive solution, within the same climate and with due attention to the interests of the inhabitants, will also signify a contribution and a homage paid to the causes of justice and humanity. By releasing to the Nation the Memorandum of Understanding, the Argentine Government points out that the restitution of the Malvinas is and will continue to be a permanent national objective, until their complete reintegration to the Argentine Republic." [2099]

August 29th, from Buenos Aires, Argentina's *Instituto de las Islas Malvinas y Tierras Australes Argentinas* (Institute for the Malvinas Islands and Southern Argentine Territories), writes to the United Nations. [2100]

"… In view of the statements by the United Kingdom Government and Parliament in connexion with a note submitted by the so-called Executive Council of Port Stanley concerning the diplomatic negotiations to restore Malvinas to Argentina's national territory, this Institute wishes to state…: It considers the petition of the Executive Council to be without legal force; the Council cannot represent the people of the Malvinas, nor can it approach the London Government, since, in accordance with the principles of United Kingdom public law, the British Empire does not exercise sovereignty over the colonists of the Malvinas, who are bound to the Crown solely by an oath of allegiance." [2101]

August 30th, in London, in a confidential *minute* for the Foreign Secretary, Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, MP George Thomson, notes: [2102]

"You will recall that in reply to a question in the House on 2 July about a Ministerial visit to the Falkland Islands I said that I knew such a visit would be welcome… [2103]

3. In regard to the present state of our negotiations with the Argentinians on the memorandum of Understanding the position, as you will know, is that agreement has been reached at the official level on the draft text of the Memorandum. The draft, which is in full accordance with the decisions of the OPD last October, is ad referendum to both Governments. It will shortly be submitted, together with the draft Unilateral Statement (British version), for Ministerial approval here.

4. We have always known that when the time came to publish the memorandum, and thereby confirm our intention to cede sovereignty of the islands to the Argentinians, albeit on conditions, there would be a violent adverse reaction among the Falkland Islanders. The plan we worked out last year to counter this (which is still appropriate in my view) would be for Ministers to introduce and explain the memorandum simultaneously in Parliament here and in the Falkland Islands. This would involve a Minister arriving at Stanley a few days before the Parliamentary statement was made so that he could

2099 *Ibid.*

2100 Signed by Institute President, Alfredo Diaz de Molina

2101 *FCO 7/1082*. One of a number of faintly ridiculous letters sent to the UN at this time. Other Argentine organisations writing in, included the *Committee for the Erection of a Monument to the hero Antonio Rivero and the Restitution of the Malvinas Islands*. Another, the *National Board of the Peoples Party of Argentina*.

2102 A draft for this appears to have been dated July 30th, and forms the basis of an article – *UK planned to give Falklands to Argentina* BBC News January 8, 1999

2103 *HC Deb 02 July 1968 vol 767 cct1290-2*

have confidential discussions with the Executive Council in order to enable final adjustments to be made to the Unilateral Statement if this should be necessary. …

9. My view on balance, based on the foregoing, is that so long as it is felt a premature leakage can be avoided, a Ministerial visit should take place during, or shortly before, the Christmas recess. I hope you will agree.

10. I appreciate that in order to achieve this timing there may have to be on our part some delay in confirming to the Argentine Government our agreement to the Memorandum of Understanding. Alternatively, if we confirm our agreement in the near future, there will be some risk of embarrassing leakage on the Argentine side. …" [2104]

September 6th, in a *minute* considering the timing of a ministerial visit to the Falkland islands, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart notes with regard to the Memorandum of Understanding; *"… their Embassy have just told us that they are now ready to give us their Government's decision and would like to do it as soon as possible."* [2105]

September 20th, British newspapers report rumours that an agreement has been reached.

'Falklands Sell-Out' The Government is to hand over the Falkland Islands to the Argentine. It has now been decided in principle – after a tremendous tussle between Ministers – that the colony must eventually pass under the sovereignty of the Argentine. [2106]

"The FO plan was for Wilson's Government to surrender the Falklands and their population in exchange for orders for Argentine warships to be built in marginal Labour constituencies in northern Britain." [2107]

September 24th, in London, the Cabinet discuss the position reached in the Anglo-Argentine talks together with a Foreign Office briefing paper.

"The colony is no longer of any strategic or economic value to us. It has hitherto been virtually self-supporting, but its economy is largely dependent on wool. The prices of this commodity are now falling in world markets and in future we are likely to have to give budgetary aid to compensate for this." [2108]

"On 24 September Ministers discussed the proposals submitted to them for the signature and publication of an Anglo-Argentine Memorandum of Understanding together with a unilateral statement by Her Majesty's Government. In his summing up of this discussion, the Prime Minister said that it would be easier to accept the proposed agreement if we could ensure that our proposed unilateral statement, which made clear that sovereignty would not be transferred unless the inhabitants themselves were satisfied, was included as an annex in explanation of paragraph 4 of the memorandum. Accordingly, I was asked to seek Argentine agreement to the annexing of Her Majesty's Government's unilateral statement to the Memorandum of Understanding, or to some alternative way of ensuring that "our unilateral statement would have a status as nearly equivalent as possible to that of the proposed agreement itself". It was concluded that when the outcome of this approach and the Argentine attitude to our unilateral statement were known, the cabinet would wish to consider further whether the proposed "agreement" should be signed." [2109]

2104 *FCO 7/156.*
2105 *Ibid.*
2106 *Daily Express* September 20, 1968
2107 Elgood 2005
2108 Quoted in Elgood 2005.
2109 *Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 18(?), 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *154*

"Really the problem of winding up the last outposts of empire is almost ludicrously difficult. I thought to myself that this is a classic example of how on these so-called moral issues one can't win. Which should be our parliamentary priority? To defend to the last ditch the rights of a small group of people to remain Britishers? To do nothing which would increase defence expenditure? Or to observe UN resolutions?" [2110]

"The biggest stumbling block was Britain's wish that any MOU should say that Islanders must consent to any transfer of sovereignty. Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, was adamant about this... This was bitterly opposed by Argentina. Their insistence and British weakness got it removed from the draft memorandum – but not from British policy. So the MOU itself just said that Britain had to be satisfied with the Argentine "safeguards and guarantees" to secure Islander consent. But to put Islander approval back Britain planned to publish a 'Unilateral Statement' at the same time as the MOU stating it would not cede sovereignty without Islander consent." [2111]

September 26th, in New York, both Argentina and the UK present letters to the UN's Fourth Committee.

"... in accordance with the General Assembly's resolution of 16 December 1965 and its consensuses of 20 December 1966 and 19 December 1967, their Governments had continued negotiations for the purpose of reaching a solution to the problem of the dispute over the Islands. They were proceeding with the talks with a view to reaching a peaceful settlement as soon as possible." [2112]

September 30th, in London, Minister of State, Lord Chalfont, tells the Argentine Ambassador, Brigadier McLoughlin, that Britain has not yet made a final decision regarding the MoU.

> *"Lord Chalfont reminded the Ambassador that our basic position was that sovereignty would not be transferred unless it were clear to HMG that the change would be acceptable to the islanders. The Memorandum contained no reference to the wishes of the Islanders and we should therefore depend very largely on our unilateral statement to explain this to our public and Parliamentary opinion. Lord Chalfont said that if our position was to be fully understood it would be necessary for us to give as much attention to our unilateral statement as to the Memorandum. Most important of all, we would not, by signing the Memorandum, commit ourselves to anything which conflicted with our unilateral statement."* [2113]

Chalfont also tells McLoughlin that it was hoped that the texts of the unilateral statements could be exchanged in New York at the UN. Chalfont suggests that the two statements be attached to the MoU as annexes.

October 1st, in Buenos Aires, the Foreign Minister summons Britain's Ambassador.

> *"Foreign Minister asked me to call tonight to discuss our relations in general terms before his departure for New York tomorrow. ... He then turned to the question of the Falkland Island and said he was looking forward to discussing this with you in New York. Despite the disappointing news he had just received, he was still hopeful of finding a satisfactory solution for which the Argentine Government had worked so hard with us, and with such goodwill.*
>
> *2. When I asked him to explain he said he was referring to a telegram from McLoughlin about the unilateral statements (he was no longer apparently worried about the time factor for the Memorandum of Understanding, and said he fully understood the need for us to explain the situation by a Ministerial visit to the islands, and to choose the best time for presentation to Parliament).*

2110 Castle 1984 p.520
2111 Pepper 2002
2112 *UN Yearbook 1968.*
2113 *FCO 7/1073*

3. I pointed out that we had made it clear all along during the negotiations that we would have to make a unilateral statement in order to present the Memorandum to our own public opinion. He did not demur but implied that the statement should not be at variance with the Memorandum itself (I of course denied that this would be the case) and said that there were certain things that it would not be possible for the Argentine Government on their side, to accept. He would have to discuss all this with you.

4. he also said that the Daily Express campaign had done much harm and had come as a shock. I pointed out that there was bound to be pressure on HMG from newspapers and the pressure-group in Parliament, but that you had made our policy quite clear and HMG would not be deflected by newspaper articles and the like." [2114]

October 2nd, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Embassy reports that Argentina's news outlets are quoting information from the UK regarding an appeal by members of the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee; *"… and a report that a Minister would probably visit the Falklands next month in order to assure the inhabitants quote – that the islands would not be handed over without their consent – unquote. To enable the Minister to visit Buenos Aires afterwards I think it will be very important to issue some statement before he goes to Stanley defining the purpose of his visit in more general terms, bearing in mind Argentine opinion."* [2115]

October 3rd, arriving in New York, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, tells reporters that he intends to raise the subject of the Falkland Islands at the General Assembly; before the Fourth Committee and also with the British Minister.

October 9th, the *Daily Express* publishes a photograph of Falkland Islanders with placards declaring their desire to remain British; *"Slowly but surely, British public opinion was becoming aware of the Falkland Islands, and was supportive of their case."* [2116]

October 10th, in New York, at the Argentine Mission, Foreign Secretary Stewart hands a copy of the British unilateral statement to Minister Méndez.

"Dr. Costa Mendez, giving his preliminary reaction, said that in all frankness he felt bound to say that Argentina could not accept deference to the judgement of the Islanders on the question of the transfer of sovereignty and the adequacy of guarantees. This would be altering the whole basis of the Argentine position… Dr. Costa Mendez said that the Argentina side had negotiated all along on the basis of the principle that sovereignty was a question for the two Governments, not for the Islanders. This was a very important principle for Argentina. … Dr. Costa Mendez said that the differences between the two sides must be clarified before the Memorandum could be signed. If the statements were attached to the Memorandum this could be held to mean that both parties accepted the terms defining the divergence. In the light of the Argentine position that the islands belonged to Argentina, deference to the judgement of the Islanders would not be acceptable." [2117]

That same day, Argentina's official response is handed in to the Foreign Office in London.

"This solution is the exclusive responsibility of both Governments, as (has) been declared by the General Assembly, stated by both parties and is expressed in the text of the Memorandum of Understanding. The same document points out the existence of a divergency with regards to the

2114 *Buenos Aires to Foreign Office October 1, 1968* in *FCO 7/137.* Clearly intended for Michael Stewart.
2115 *Buenos Aires to Foreign Office October 3, 1968* in *FCO 7/137*
2116 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.532
2117 *FCO 7/1073*

criteria according to which the Government of the United Kingdom shall consider whether the interests of the Islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine Government. The Argentine Government sustains that in this process the principle, that decisions are of the exclusive and absolute resort of each one of the governments cannot be impaired, and consequently, in no case the recognition of sovereignty can be submitted, either directly or indirectly to the consideration of the inhabitants." [2118]

October 14th, in New York, Michael Stewart, Dr. Méndez and Dr. Ruda meet again.

"As he (Costa Mendez) saw it there would be three stages: (i) The memorandum of understanding. (ii) Some formal documents that would reflect the position of each party. The precise form had not yet been agreed, but each party would have formal cognizance of the other's position as stated. (iii) Further unilateral statements by each side which would be entirely free but would have been cleared with the other party. Talks would begin by 30 October at the latest and would be finished within a month or so, so that the General Assembly could be informed of the position before the present Session came to an end. As regards guidelines for officials, Dr Costa Mendez said that the last part of paragraph 6 and paragraph 7 of the draft unilateral declaration which the United Kingdom side had handed over at the last meeting would not be acceptable to Argentina. The practical effect of these paragraphs would clearly be to defer the question of sovereignty to the judgment of the islanders which the Argentine Government could not accept publicly." [2119]

Stewart responds that he concurs in general with the points made, but as regards Islander agreement; *"It was most unlikely that Her Majesty's Government would not be closely pressed on this point in Parliament. Some Member was almost certain to ask if the statement meant that sovereignty would not be transferred against the wishes of the inhabitants, and Mr. Stewart would have to say that it did."* [2120]

"Dr. Costa Mendez did not commit himself as to the Argentine reaction to a statement in Parliament about the practical effect of the decision on safeguards to which the Argentinians clearly had not subscribed in any way. He said, however, that for the time being Argentina had no Parliament which made things easier, but equally accentuated the need for an early agreement; once there was an Argentine legislative assembly again the position of the Argentine side would be much more difficult."[2121]

"I met the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York on 10-14 October. On the first occasion we exchanged the draft texts of the proposed unilateral statement to be made by the two Governments on publication of the draft Memorandum of Understanding. At the second meeting I found that Dr. Costa Mendez was unwilling to drop his initial opposition to the idea of annexing the unilateral statement to the memorandum; indeed he said that it was "unacceptable" to him. In an attempt to find some other way of ensuring that the two governments should take formal cognizance of each other's view of the divergence expressed in the Memorandum, I agreed that our officials should examine the possibility of an exchange of brief formal documents between the two Governments in order to clarify the nature of this "divergence". It proved impossible to make progress with this idea" [2122]

2118 Quoted in Annex 9 of *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 –1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

2119 *FO 7/3201*

2120 *Ibid.*

2121 *Ibid.*

2122 *Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 18(?), 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *154*

October 15th, in Britain's House of Commons, Fred Mulley speaks on behalf of the absent Foreign Secretary.

> *"It is not the policy of Her Majesty's Government to transfer sovereignty over these Islands against the wishes of the Islanders."* [2123]

From New York, on the same day, the UK's mission to the United Nations write to the Foreign Office; regarding a conversation with Minister Ruda.

> *"He seemed quite happy with the way the meeting had gone on 14 October and had only two things to add. The first was that the Argentine side hoped very much that the United Nations would not play any active role. We should, of course, have to make a formal report but the Argentines thought that there would only be difficulties and complications if the United Nations were given any pretext to concern themselves in any way with any agreement that we might reach between us. Secondly, Costa Mendez thought that it ought not to be too difficult to reach agreement …"* [2124]

October 16th, at the UN, Argentina's Foreign Minister addresses the General Assembly of the United Nations.

> *"The titles on which Argentine sovereignty over these islands is based are well known… our position is thus very clear, but its importance for my government is paramount. It is nothing less than claiming the restitution to the national patrimony of a part of the territory of the Republic, torn away by force. …*
>
> *Argentina demands recognition of its unquestionable sovereignty on the Islas Malvinas. Nevertheless it has accepted to negotiate that recognition with the United Kingdom… but we wish to point out clearly that, in the course of negotiations we will not accept any solution that may depart from the basic principles set by the United Nations not only with reference to the protection of the interests of the population but also as to the integrity of the national territory."* [2125]

The UK immediately responds with a letter to the Secretary-General.

> *"… obliged to state that the United Kingdom Government does not accept the statement of the distinguished Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic in so far as it disputes the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Government over the Falkland Islands.*
>
> *The United Kingdom has no doubt as to its sovereignty over the territory of the Falkland Islands, and I wish formally to reserve the rights of the United Kingdom on this question."* [2126]

October 17th, in the UK, following a civil service reorganisation, the Foreign and Commonwealth Offices merge to become the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart becomes the first Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs.

"… there have been two separate British policies. The Foreign Office believes that it is important to preserve good relations with, say, Argentina. The Commonwealth Office believes that the wishes of the 2,000-odd Falklanders must be respected. There is an attempt to mould the two views into one; it does not seem to have been recognised that the two views may be completely incompatible." [2127]

2123 *Hansard 15 October 1968 col.1468-57 vol.761*
2124 *Hildyard to Beith October 15, 1968* in *FO 7/3201*
2125 *FCO 7/1082*
2126 *Ibid* at *3.* Signed L. C. Glass
2127 *The Spectator Magazine* October 17, 1968

"The Falklands have undoubtedly suffered from the amalgamation of the Commonwealth Office with the Foreign Office; passing under the control of the Latin American Department whose main care is to foster easy relations with those states, not to defend a handful of people's rights to self-determination." [2128]

"After the merger of the foreign and commonwealth offices in 1968, the Falklands were transferred from the Gibraltar and South Atlantic Department to the West Indian and South Atlantic Department. Soon, they would arrive in the hands of the Latin American Department. Administration of the islands was now being conducted in isolation from other colonies." [2129]

October 22nd, at the UN, a letter from the *Committee for the Erection of a Monument to the Hero Antonio Rivero and the Restitution of the Malvinas Islands*, is read to the Special Committee on Decolonization.

"... to request the support of the States Members of the United Nations for the restitution of the Malvinas Islands to the Argentina State without further delay..." [2130]

October 31st, in Britain's House of Commons, MP Michael Hutchinson, asks to be updated on the negotiations.

> *"I greatly regret that there is no mention in the Gracious Speech of the Falkland Islands and the Government's intentions about their future, or of the present state of negotiations with the Argentine Government. Not only I but many other hon. Members have been pressing the Government for more information. We have asked by means of Questions, letters, Motions and debate, because many of us are concerned, but we always get evasive answers. It is like hitting a pillow."* [2131]

November 6th, in London, a draft-statement of acceptance is handed to the Argentine Embassy.

> *"I am glad to confirm to you that Her Majesty's Government is now prepared to sign the Memorandum of Understanding which records the stage reached in the discussions between our two Governments about the Falkland islands, held in accordance with the invitation contained in resolution 2065 (xx) of the United Nations General Assembly. The Memorandum of Understanding refers to a divergence between our two Governments as to the criteria according to which the United Kingdom Government shall consider whether the interests of the Islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered by the Argentine Government.*
>
> *As the Memorandum states, this divergence would have to be resolved as one of the conditions to be fulfilled before Her Majesty's Government could agree to transfer sovereignty to Argentina. I should like to make it clear that, as I told the House of Commons on 27 March this year, Her Majesty's Government could only consider a transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, first as part of an agreement which would secure a permanently satisfactory relationship between the islands and Argentina: and second* ***if it were clear*** *to the Government in the United Kingdom* ***that the Islanders*** *themselves* ***regarded such an agreement as satisfactor****y to their interests."* [2132]

Argentina responds by providing its own draft-statement of acceptance.

> *"I have the honor... to inform you of my Government's decision to approve the Memorandum of Understanding on the Falkland Islands... I consider it appropriate to point out once again to your*

2128 *Falkland Islands: Why do the British want to Quit?* Penelope Tremayne in *The Sunday Times*, Sept 25, 1977
2129 *The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974-79* Aaron Donaghy 2014
2130 Dated August 20, 1968 in *FCO 7/1082*
2131 *HC Deb 31 October 1968 vol.772 cc183-310*
2132 *FCO to Buenos Aires November 6, 1968* in *FCO 7/1073.* My emphasis

Excellency the criteria of the Argentine Government regarding the divergence referred to in paragraph 4 of the said Memorandum of Understanding. The decision for the definitive solution of this dispute falls within the exclusive responsibility of both Governments and both of them have so reaffirmed it.

Consequently, the Argentine Government hold the view that neither is it possible nor will they accept direct or indirect transfer of that responsibility of decision and that, therefore, the consideration by the Government of the UK whether the interests of the Islanders would be secured by the safeguards and guarantees offered by the Argentine Government will have as its sole purpose to assess if those guarantees and safeguards are efficient for the securing of those interests." [2133]

November 11th, on his arrival in Rio de Janeiro, Lord Chalfont speaks to representatives of the press; including *Reuters*, Britain's *Daily Mirror* and the *Daily Telegraph*.

"... we had no doubt about our title to sovereignty over the islands and there was no question of transferring it against the wishes of the Islanders. There would be no Falklands sell-out. Unattributably, Lord Chalfont explained that we were discussing the Argentine claim both because of the UN resolution and because of the interests of the Islanders. The islands communications with the mainland were suffering and there was a balance of interest between British protection and good communications. The interests of the Islanders were paramount in deciding where this balance lay... Lord Chalfont said that we had to think not only of the immediate future, but twenty-five or thirty years ahead. ... The long term interest of the Islands might, in the eyes of a God like observer, perhaps ***lie locally in closer links with South America*** *but the important consideration was obviously the human one. ..."* [2134]

November 12th, in London, after considering the British draft-statement of acceptance, Argentina's Ambassador McLoughlin calls on John Beith at the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO). McLoughlin asserts that his government's view is that Britain's unilateral statement did not conform to the; *"... real terms of the divergence."* The Ambassador notes that the Memorandum of Understanding must state that Britain will recognise Argentina's sovereignty over the archipelago from a date to be agreed and should not refer to a "*transfer of sovereignty*."

"Brigadier McLoughlin... had been instructed by his Government to say that they would not be able to accept an exchange of the documents defining the divergence as long as the British draft were on the lines of that submitted to them on 6 November." [2135]

November 18th, en-route to the Falkland Islands, Lord Chalfont stops off at Santiago de Chile. Asked about his purpose in visiting the Falklands, Chalfont responds.

"The visit really arises out of the discussions that we have been having with the Government of Argentina as a result of a claim which they have made to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. We were required by a United Nations Resolution to discuss that claim… In the whole of this, we have always made it clear that the wishes of the Falkland Islanders would have to be carefully consulted in whatever agreed position we arrived at…" [2136]

2133 *Ibid.*

2134 *Rio de Janeiro to FCO November 11, 1968* in *FCO 7/1347.* My emphasis.

2135 *FCO 7/1073*

2136 *FCO 7/1085.* Chalfont was accompanied by five British journalists. Seaman, of *The Express* was a controversial choice as Argentina viewed that newspaper as particularly hostile; be it over meat exports, the Falklands or even football.

Back in Britain's House of Commons, Under-Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. William Whitlock, addresses MPs and repeats Fred Mulley's assurance of October 15; *"... it is not the policy of Her Majesty's Government to transfer sovereignty over these islands against the wishes of the islanders."* [2137]

November 21st, in London, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office proposes to Argentina's Ambassador that a way around the impasse could simply be to not have any exchange of unilateral statements. McLoughlin says that he will consult with Buenos Aires.

November 23rd, Chalfont arrives off the Falklands archipelago in HMS *Endurance; "... and spent the day touring farms and settlements by helicopter and light aircraft."* [2138] The Minister is accompanied by Diggins and Tait from the FCO's American Desk.

*"I travelled to the Falklands with a group of diplomats **in what was Britain's first and last attempt to get shot of the islands**. Lord Chalfont... had the unenviable task of trying to persuade 2,000 islanders that the British empire might not last for ever – and that they should start to entertain the notion they might be better off being friendly to the near-neighbour, Argentina, which had long claimed the islands... Maybe the islanders could be paid to set up sheep farms in New Zealand. Over 10 days, we visited just about every farm and homestead in the two principal islands. We were greeted everywhere – and we could see the slogans and the union flag from the air before we landed – with the same messages: 'Chalfont Go Home' and sometimes "We Want to Stay British". ..."* [2139]

"He (Chalfont) had a calm and friendly reception, and the islanders appeared to accept his categorical assurances that there would be no transfer of sovereignty against their wishes." [2140]

Arrangements are made to maximise the effect of Lord Chalfont's visit on local leaders; *"For the visit of Lord Chalfont to the Falkland Islands at the end of 1968 members of Legislative Council were invited to sit in on Executive Council."*[2141]

November 24th, in Stanley, at an initial meeting of an enlarged Executive Council, members are provided with copies of the Memorandum of Understanding and Britain's unilateral statement for consideration. They are not made aware of Argentina's unilateral statement.

"Britain attempted to twist the Falkland Islanders' arms into accepting an Argentine takeover of their country, and in November 1968 sent Lord Chalfont to sound out their opinions (and to persuade them to accept a compromise agreement with Argentina). ... " [2142]

2137 *FCO 7/1075*
2138 *FCO 73/72*
2139 *Argentina's claim on the Falklands is still a good one* Richard Gott in *The Guardian* April 2, 2007. My emphasis. This rather sums up Gott's attitude to the Falklands.
2140 *Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 18(?), 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *154*
2141 *FCO 42/429.* The Governor continued with this arrangement well into 1970; even proposing a *'single council'* system.
2142 Pascoe 2020 p.315

"Lord Chalfont broke the British government's plans to the Falkland Islands Council, emphasising however that there would be no transfer of sovereignty to Argentina against their wishes. The news was greeted with a stony silence..." [2143]

November 25th, at a second meeting of the Executive Council, Councillors Barton, Miller, Goss and Pitaluga express their concerns and condemn the agreement. Miller and Barton call the accord a "*sell-out*".

> *"... their initial reactions to the two documents were violent and there appeared even to be a possibility of resignations.... in the course of hard-hitting three hour meeting I believe I have made substantial progress in convincing them of: (a) Her Majesty's Government's good faith; and (b) that nothing in the documents alters or detracts from our assurances that sovereignty will not be transferred against the wishes of the Islanders."* [2144]

"Lord Chalfont said he was extremely surprised at the Executive Council's reactions. He assumed its members were still interested in the welfare of the Falkland Islands, but they would not get far in their present frame of mind. He found quite extraordinary the suggestion that some form of confidence trick had been played on them: He must ask them to believe that HMG was acting in good faith and sincerely. ... He could understand their strong feelings; but if anyone suggested that the assurances that had been given in the British Parliament or elsewhere were in conflict with the two documents, this only showed that the documents had not been properly studied. He repeated that nothing in them conflicted with these assurances that there would be no transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the Falkland Islanders. He would give an undertaking that if anyone could prove the contrary, he would immediately telegraph London and request that the whole policy be abandoned." [2145]

"As we had expected the Executive Council's first reaction to the memorandum was one of violent hostility, but after several hours of discussion they became somewhat more reconciled to it. On 25 November they authorised lord Chalfont to state in his further public meetings that, after a detailed discussion with him about the position reached in the Anglo/Argentine talks, and about the "agreed position" which was likely soon to be reached in them, they accepted Her Majesty's Government had been acting in good faith. They also asked him to state that in their view the "agreed position", if reached, would be fully in keeping with the promise that Her Majesty's Government would not transfer sovereignty against the wishes of the Islanders." [2146]

"Chalfont used his considerable negotiating skill in an attempt to persuade Councillors and the public that it was in their long term interest to come to an accommodation with Argentina. He explained in detail to council members the proposed contents of a memorandum of understanding with the Argentine Government and also of a unilateral statement which could be made in Parliament stressing that sovereignty would not be ceded without Islander consent. However, Chalfont failed to reassure his audiences." [2147]

November 26th, on Falklands Radio, Lord Chalfont answers questions put by Barton (Executive Council), Goss (Legislative Council) and by *Guardian* journalist Richard Gott.

> *"Mr. Gott: Lord Chalfont, you have often said in the last few days, that the way should be left open for a possible change in the views of the islanders; that there might be some stage in the future when they*

2143 Islander Gerald Cheek quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021
2144 *Chalfont to FCO November 25, 1968* in *FCO 7/1075*
2145 *FCO 7/1073*
2146 *Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 18(?), 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *154*
2147 Cosmo Haskard in *The Dictionary of Falklands Biography (including South Georgia): From Discovery up to 1981* D. Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.277

would see their future with the Argentine. Why do you think that the islanders attitude might change? We've had a tremendous lot of evidence that they want to remain British. What makes you think that they might possibly change their minds?

Lord Chalfont: The reason why I want to leave the situation flexible enough to cope with the change of mind if it should happen is that, in my view, a good deal of the attitude of the Falkland Islanders can be traced back to the present lack of communications and unsatisfactory relations between the Islands and the mainland, and especially Argentina….

I think that if there were a period of time (and I don't want to set any limit to it) but if there were a period of time in which the Government of the Argentine adopted an entirely different attitude towards the Falkland Islands, the encouraged good communications, they encouraged better links, cultural links, with the Islands, it seems to me not impossible that the minds of the Falkland islanders might change… and that either this generation, or some future generation, of Falkland Islanders might see this thing in a different light. … I think that they are now genuinely anxious to settle this dispute that we have with them in an amicable and friendly way …" [2148]

"The mission received considerable publicity since five journalists accompanied Lord Chalfont. Their opinions of the dispute were divided. Michael Field, of the Daily Telegraph, was sympathetic to the Islanders and stressed in his reports the Kelpers' suspicions and desire to remain British with headings such as "Falkland Patriots Turn Out" and "Don't Sell us for bully beef, say Islanders," Richard Gott, 'The Guardian' correspondent, sympathized with Chalfont and emphasized the Islanders' need to come to terms with Argentina." [2149]

November 27th, in Buenos Aires, Minister Costa Méndez makes a statement to the local press.

"We insist on the earliest possible recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Islands, without limitations."

In New York, at the United Nations building, the Fourth Committee continues its deliberation with regard to the process of decolonization.

"16. With regard to the Territories of Gibraltar, British Honduras and the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), the question arose whether they were Non-Self-Governing Territories within the meaning of 1514 (XV) or whether they were the subject of disputes over sovereignty between Member States. In the former case, the administering Power should be involved in the process which would lead to self-determination, and in the latter case, a decision on their fate should be taken in some other appropriate forum....

40. Mr. Martinez (Argentina), speaking in exercise of the right of reply, expressed surprise at the doubts which had been expressed by the representative of Barbados on the propriety of dealing with the question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) in the Fourth Committee. The Special Committee, resolution 2065 (XX) and two consensus of the general Assembly had recognised that the Fourth Committee was the forum in which that question should be discussed, a fact that had been also admitted by the representative of the United Kingdom and the Government of Argentina." [2150]

2148 *Extract from Broadcast Interview on Tuesday, 26 November made at Port Stanley* in *FCO 7/1080*

2149 Ellerby 1990 p.161. Over the decades since, Gott proved to be very pro-Argentine and a regular guest at the Argentine Embassy in London during the tenure of Ambassador Alicia Castro.

2150 *UN Document A/C.4/SR.1798* quoted in *FCO 7/1079.* The original speaker was the representative of Barbados, Mr. McComie. If the territories McComie mentioned were a matter of decolonization via self-determination, then they fell under the remit of the Fourth Committee. If they were purely a matter of disputed sovereignty, then they did not.

Miguel Fitzgerald, in a publicity stunt paid for and facilitated by the Argentine newspaper *Cronica*, attempts to repeat his 1964 landing of an aircraft at *Stanley Racecourse*.[2151] Finding obstructions on the track, Fitzgerald crash lands in Eliza Cove Road. The pilot, Fitzgerald, *Cronica's* manager, Hector Garcia, and a journalist, Juan Carlos Navo, are arrested at the scene.

"Incident took place just before I was due to address a public meeting, which I am now doing later tonight after which we shall be better able to assess local reaction. Although no-one was hurt this was good luck rather than doe to any apparent concern on this score by occupants of aircraft. … My own view is that Her Majesty's Ambassador in Buenos Aires should be instructed to lodge a strong formal protest… unless everything possible is done at once to repair damage the incident could prove a serious setback for negotiations we have been having." [2152]

In Buenos Aires, Ambassador Cresswell telephones Méndez at 11.30pm to complain.

> *"He replied rather weakly that he had seen no mention of it in the evening edition of Cronica… He said the Argentine Government could accept no responsibility for acts by individual newspapermen, he had done all he could to keep the press moderate these last days."* [2153]

Fitzgerald is declared a 'prohibited immigrant', together with his two companions, and all three are "*accommodated*" aboard HMS *Endurance* for the journey back to Rio Gallegos.

November 28th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Embassy reports to London.

> *"As was to be expected, this morning's 'Cronica' carries banner headlines about this exploit and photographs of Garcia and Fitzgerald before leaving Buenos Aires airport yesterday for Rio Gallegos. It also publishes messages from Rio Gallegos suggesting that no secret was made there of ultimate destination, that interest was aroused amongst Rio Gallegos population and that pilot remained in radio contact with airport control there, reporting his progress. Argentine aeronautical authorities were therefore in full connivance, if this is true."* [2154]

In Stanley, at a final meeting of the enlarged Executive Council, Lord Chalfont explains the position.

> *"… while HMG had no doubt about their right to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, if another sovereign state such as Argentina made a claim of this kind it was better to discuss the matter with them than to refuse to do so. … The discussions had lasted several months, and it now looked as though they were close to arriving at an agreed position and publishing two documents which would define this position. … He commented that parts of it might at first sight cause some surprise and distress but he believed that, when read as a whole, the apparent concessions in it to Argentina were*

2151 The aircraft, a twin-engined Rockwell Grand Commander, was owned by the newspaper.
2152 *Chalfont to FCO November 27, 1968* in *FCO 7/1347*
2153 *Cresswell to FCO November 28, 1968* in *FCO 7/1347.* Fitzgerald's punishment was a three months suspension of his pilot's licence.
2154 *TelNo777* in *FCO 7/1347* at *23*

heavily qualified. … Finally he said that the Memorandum of Understanding was only a stage in HMG's negotiations with Argentina, and that there would be continuous consultation with the Falkland Islanders at each subsequent stage." [2155]

"The response was one of scepticism, to put it mildly. The view was quite simply, and I thought somewhat simplistically, 'We are British. We are not interested in your plans for any future world in which we should become Argentinians. We are British, that's all there is to it, and will you please take that message back to your masters in London'." [2156]

"Lord Chalfont gave us a very stern talking to, telling us our future lay with Argentina, it was in our best interests, and all the other rubbish they had been feeding us for the last eight years. The theme of his message was you belong to Argentina." [2157]

"The islanders were adamant. They wanted nothing to do with Argentina, and Chalfont left them with a promise that nothing would happen without their agreement." [2158]

December 1st, returning to Britain, Lord Chalfont stops off at Buenos Aires for a meeting with Costa Méndez.

"(Méndez) told me that my visit to the Falkland Islands had been most helpful in making it clear to the Islanders that they would have to face inevitable changes and that their present views should not be allowed to fossilise. But he went on to say that although the Argentine Government liked the Memorandum of Understanding as it was now drafted, it would be pointless for them to sign if it were immediately to be cancelled out by a unilateral statement in Parliament. In answer to my question, he confirmed that he would not be prepared to sign the Memorandum, if a unilateral statement were made on the lines of the draft which he had seen in New York….

Dr. Costa Mendez suggested that a way out of this impasse might be possible if Her Majesty's Government were prepared to water down the unilateral statement and to reserve their position in the course of Parliamentary questions. Failure to sign the memorandum would inevitably result in a worsening of Anglo Argentine relations." [2159]

"In talks in Buenos Aires on December 1st with the Argentine Foreign Minister, Lord Chalfont was unable to persuade the Argentines that the Islanders should be given a chance to make up their minds about their own future. The Argentines reiterated their claim that transfer of sovereignty over the Islands could not be made dependent upon the 'wishes' of the inhabitants." [2160]

"My discussions with Costa Mendez were such as to convince me the line we were taking was the right one. They had a claim to sovereignty which we might not be prepared to accept in legalistic terms but, in realistic terms, for the future of our relations with Argentina and the future prosperity of the Falkland Islands, it seemed to me that we were on the right track." [2161]

British journalists are invited to speak to the Argentina Foreign Ministry. Dr. Ezequiel Pereyra, head of the Falklands Islands and Antarctic Department, answers questions.

2155 *FCO 7/1073*
2156 Lord Chalfont interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.23
2157 *As Ignorant as Sheep* Velma Malcolm 2002 p.87
2158 *Argentina's claim on the Falklands is still a good one* Richard Gott in *The Guardian* April 2, 2007
2159 *FCO 7/1079*
2160 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*
2161 Lord Chalfont quoted in Charlton 1989 p.23

"… we must think whether self-determination should be applied in this case. The isolation, the islands and the character of the population must be taken into account. The population was originally Argentine. It was expelled from the Islands and taken to Montevideo and replaced by British subjects. Looking at history, one saw that the principle of self-determination should have been applied at that time. … Resolution 1514 of the United Nations emphasised two principles, self-determination and territorial integration (sic), and it was the second which should apply here." [2162]

He adds, that the population; *"Changes from year to year. The majority were not born in the Islands but are there with contracts to work. This is not a problem of self-determination, rather a question of sovereignty."* Pereyra asserts that out of a total population of 2,172, 1960 saw 292 leave and 224 arrive; in 1961 this was 326 leaving to 244 arrivals; and that 411 left in 1962 to 268 new arrivals.

"...the Argentine Government was seeking to safeguard the interests of the Islanders and to give them security so that they would not feel themselves affected by any change there might be. … It was a question of looking at different aspects of the situation and studying them individually. There was, in Argentina, an ancient institution, the Municipality, which handled local government. With regard to language, a progressive solution would be sought that would not cause hardship to the Islanders. The ownership of small and large farms, including those belonging to companies in London, would be respected. On the economic side, the Islands would benefit from petrol and gas imported from Comodoro Rivadavia in place of coal from Britain. Tourist trade could be encouraged and a hotel built. [2163]

"Dr. Esequiel Pereira (sic), Head of the Argentine Foreign Ministry's Malvinas (Falklands) Department, pressed home the view that the issue could only be settled by the two Governments and re-stated the principle of territorial integrity, while casting doubt on the principle of self-determination in regard to the Falklands both from the standpoint of Argentina's historical arguments and because, he claimed, an important part of the present population of the Falkland Islands had not been born there." [2164]

December 2nd, Lord Chalfont arrives back in the UK, in time for an evening meeting with the Prime Minister, Sir Harold Wilson, and Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, Fred Mulley.

"It was agreed that statements should be made in identical terms in Both Houses of Parliament tomorrow afternoon. … The Prime Minister said that we could not accept the view expressed by the Argentine Foreign Minister… even if this risked incurring Argentine displeasure. We had fully conformed with the requirements of the United Nations. … the Falkland islands would not be handed over to the Argentine against the wishes of the islanders." [2165]

"Renewed hostility of British public opinion on Lord Chalfont's return. More accusations that Falklanders are to be betrayed. Vociferous press campaign to end negotiations." [2166]

2162 *Buenos Aires to Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Tel. No. 805 December 5, 1968* in *FCO 7/1078.* Pereyra appears to be conflating the raid by the USS *Lexington* in December, 1831 (which took settlers to Montevideo) with the British ejection of a Buenos Airean garrison in January, 1833.

2163 *Priority Buenos Aires to Foreign and Commonwealth Office December 4, 1968* in *FCO 7/1078*

2164 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

2165 *FCO 7/1079* at *118*

2166 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973). Annex 1*

"The newspapers became increasingly critical of Government policy after Lord Chalfont returned. The Guardian editorial stated that, "The option of Argentine sovereignty should never have been opened. It should now be closed". The 'Daily Telegraph announced, "BRITAIN READY TO SURRENDER FALKLANDS," and claimed that Chalfont had left the Islanders in a, "depressed and nervous state". ... The Sunday Times editorial considered that Chalfont's mission was an "unconcealed example of diplomatic ambiguity" and concluded that "Argentina must see London as an astonishingly soft touch"." [2167]

On the same day, Falklands landowner and member of the Emergency Committee, Norman Cameron, writes to Sir Alec Douglas-Home; *"From all the double talk with which Lord Chalfont has dismayed and bewildered the Falkland Islanders one clear message emerges: "there is no longer a place for you in the Commonwealth, please make up your minds to go as soon as possible"."* [2168]

Also on the same day, at a press conference in London, a Scottish company, Alginate Industries, announces that it has applied to the Governor of the Falkland Islands for a concession to exploit seaweed.

> *"The company had surveyed the seaweed beds and estimated that it could harvest seaweed worth £12 million a year, which, after processing in Scotland, would be worth £100 million."* [2169]

December 3rd, in Buenos Aires, after lunching with the President, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Mendez, tells journalists that; *"... an agreement with Britain on the Falkland Islands would be signed only if it conformed to national interests and if it included recognition of Argentine sovereignty. It could not provide for the recognition of sovereignty being made subject to an expression of will of the inhabitants."* [2170]

Britain's Embassy considers the statistics provided to journalists on December 1st by Dr. Ezequiel Pereyra.

> *"These figures were quoted by Dr. Jose Maria Ruda, Argentine representative at the United Nations. They are not, however, supported by the statistics of the Falkland Islands Government. Moreover, the conclusions drawn from the figures quoted are misleading. Looking at the equivalent figures for Argentina, in 1967 we find that out of a total population of 22 million, 1,042,926 left and 1,014,336 arrived. Should we therefore consider that the population of Argentina is transitory?... It is true however that there is evidence to suggest that the (Falklands) population is mobile. Out of the total population of 2,000 odd some 700 are not Islanders born and bred. But self-determination is not a concept that necessarily depends on numbers."* [2171]

In London, Minister Fred Mulley, makes a statement to the House of Commons.

> *"My right hon. and noble friend Lord Chalfont visited the Falkland Islands ... to establish direct ministerial contact with the people of the islands and to explain to them Her Majesty's Government's policy in their talks with the Argentine Government. ... he repeated to them the assurances that Ministers have given this House on many occasions this year, namely, that it is not the policy of Her Majesty's Government to transfer sovereignty over these islands against the wishes of the islanders... we are concerned to restore and improve communications between the islands and the nearest mainland since this would be of great benefit to the islanders. ... I hope that it may shortly be possible to conclude the present stage of the discussions and their outcome will then be reported to the House... Lord Chalfont did not have any formal talks or negotiations in Argentina."* [2172]

2167 Ellerby 1990 p.162
2168 Elgood 2025 citing *UKFIC82* para.41
2169 *UN Working Paper 1969 A/AC.109/L.584*
2170 *Buenos Aires to Foreign and Commonwealth Office December 4, 1968* in *FCO 7/1078*
2171 Draft press release in *Mansfield to Atkinson December 23rd, 1968* in *FCO 7/1085*
2172 Quoted in *FCO 7/1075*

"On this occasion the mood of the House was belligerent, and Mr. Mulley did not succeed entirely in allaying members' suspicions. The fact that fears for the future of the islands were voiced by MPs on both sides lent weight to those advocating a rethinking of policy." [2173]

"... the position has now been transformed by the renewed Parliamentary hostility to any discussion of a possible transfer of sovereignty over the Islands. ... we may well need find some way of putting it (Memorandum of Understanding) into cold storage for the time being,.." [2174]

"On 3 December Tory back-bench MPs replied to Fred Mulley's justification for the sovereignty talks with cries of, 'Resign'." [2175]

Lord Chalfont is interviewed by the BBC.

> *"Michael Barratt: Now, Lord Chalfont, by all reports it was made quite plain to you that the Falkland Islanders do want to remain British, so why in these circumstances are you still making negative statements, why will you not come out quite clearly and say: 'The Falkland Islands is British and will remain so'?*
>
> *Lord Chalfont: Because, you see, we're engaged in discussions with the Argentine Government, partly because there is a United Nations resolution requiring us to do so and partly because we think it is in the long term interests of the Islanders to do so. We are discussing a claim made by the Argentine Government that the sovereignty of the Islands is theirs: now we have no doubt that the legal title to the sovereignty is ours, but like intelligent people behave in private life, we are behaving in diplomatic life, we're discussing the claim with them... What I have made clear to the Falkland Islanders, to Argentina and today, again, to the House of Lords, whatever the future of the Falkland islanders may be, there will be no change of status, no change of sovereignty, against their wishes."* [2176]

December 4th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Embassy reports to London.

> *"Argentine Foreign Ministers position has of course hardened since he saw you in New York in Mid October. He had not earlier gone so far as to say he would not sign unless we recognised Argentine sovereignty virtually unconditionally. 2. Yet I still think he may draw back from this apparent position, ... because I hear that his advisers in the Foreign Ministry strongly deprecated his statement to the reporters..."* [2177]

Ambassador Cresswell adds his concerns that the Memorandum of Understanding, without the unilateral statement would create a legal issue for the UK should Argentina attempt to seek a ruling from the ICJ. Allowing them to claim that the UK had recognised Argentine sovereignty from the date the MoU was signed. [2178]

> *"I remember that, some weeks ago, you were clearly opposed, after the Cabinet had discussed the views of the Law Officers of the Crown, to any possibility of accepting a memorandum of Understanding unqualified by a unilateral statement of equal status. ... Subsequently you seem to have taken a less severe view of this possibility,..."*

2173 *Latin American Department (Diggins) to Buenos Aires (Cresswell) December 18, 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *166*
2174 Charles W. Wallace note in *FCO 7/1079*
2175 Ellerby 1990 p.163
2176 *FCO 7/1085* at *14*
2177 *Buenos Aires to Foreign and Commonwealth Office Telegram no. 811 of December 8, 1968* in *FCO 7/1079*
2178 *Cresswell to Diggins December 4, 1968* in *FCO 7/1080* at *172*

On the same day, Argentine newspaper, *Clarin*, reports; *"There exists among the country's inhabitants an absolute unanimity of criteria that makes the recovery of the islands a belief rooted in the desire since childhood of Argentines of all generations."*

December 5th, Lord Chalfont reports.

> *"I do not believe that the Falkland Islands can continue to exist for many years, as they are presently constituted. I believe one day that the Falkland Islands may be prepared to choose Argentine sovereignty. We must at all costs avoid giving the impression that we want to get rid of them, since that would set up precisely the reaction we would want to avoid."* [2179]

A press report in *The Guardian* notes that Costa Méndez has reiterated that Argentina; *"... would not sign any agreement on the Falkland Islands which did not include recognition of Argentine sovereignty ... his country would only sign an agreement in keeping with national interests which implied recognition of Argentine sovereignty and which did not subject this to the will of the islands' inhabitants."* [2180]

In New York, on the same day, the Special Committee on Decolonization submits its annual report. [2181]

December 6th, from London, Lord Chalfont sends a message to the Secretary of State, who is in India. He outlines his views on the current state of Anglo-Argentine negotiations. After listing the pros and cons of possible ways forward, Chalfont recommends that the UK; *"... disengage for the present from our talks with Argentina while doing all we can to avoid a clear break and to preserve some diplomatic contacts on this question."*

The Minister notes that this would have the advantage of satisfying majority opinion in Parliament while aligning the FCO's position on the Falklands more closely with that of Gibraltar. Among the disadvantages, Chalfont highlights his fear that the Argentines will publish the existing Memorandum of Understanding, unless they can be convinced that any change is merely a suspension. [2182] The message is copied to Buenos Aires for Ambassador Cresswell, and to New York for Lord Caradon; whose response is immediate.

> *"... I would expect the Argentinians who have been so courteous and patient so far to turn on us viciously if they think that we are going to abandon the whole enterprise, and if they do they will certainly carry all of the Latin Americans with them. This will add greatly to our difficulties in dealing with such questions as Gibraltar and British Honduras but that is perhaps the least of considerations...*
>
> *It also seems to me that it will not be possible to prevent publication of the Memorandum of Understanding. I cannot imagine that the Argentinians would fail to publish or leak all or part of it. ... I am bound to say that it seems to me that much the best thing would be to publish and be damned."* [2183]

December 7th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Cresswell responds to Lord Chalfont's suggestions, urging "*perseverance*".

> *"The proposal to +disengage+ and to make a statement in parliament announcing this would be taken by the Argentines as a definite rupture of negotiations on our part. For us to take the initiative*

2179 *Report by Lord Chalfont on the visit to the Falkland Islands 23-28 November 1968* in *PRO FO 42/94*
2180 *FCO 7/1075*
2181 *UN Document A/7200/Rev.1*. The Special Committee presented a Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat which noted that negotiations were ongoing.
2182 *Chalfont to Stewart December 6, 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *101*
2183 *UKMIS to FCO December 6, 1968* in *FCO 7/1079*

of breaking off negotiations in this way would surely be both unnecessary and unduly harmful to Anglo-Argentine relations (and of course to our export trade).

There is no need for us to take onto our shoulders the odium of a break since in fact it is the Argentines who have created this situation: they have known all along that we based our attitude on the Islanders wishes..., and only now have they said that this will prevent them from signing the Memorandum and so cynical and unsound a case can easily be exposed in the United Nations. …

Yet to send them packing as we should do by ourselves breaking off negotiations, would be taken as an open affront and would do far more harm to Anglo-Argentine relations than to let them prove inconclusive, with the process of gradual disengagement continuing next year. The latter situation would really surprise nobody here …" [2184]

In London, an internal FCO *memo* considers the implications of a failure to reach agreement with Argentina.

"… it might be helpful for you to have a brief note of the main UN points that should be taken into account. These are:- a) We and the Argentines have already informed the United Nations, in mutually agreed and identical phraseology, that we hope soon to "report on the subject during the course of the XXIII session of the General Assembly". Although we have entered into no precise commitment, the impression has been created that an amicable settlement is expected. b) If no agreement is reached it is likely that the odium will fall on us and that the Argentines will accuse us of going back on intentions. The furore in Parliament would lend credibility to such an accusation. c) The Argentines are anxious that an agreement should be announced in the United Nations as soon as possible and in any case before the end of the current session on 20 December. It is conceivable that, failing agreement, a resolution hostile to us will be introduced in the Fourth Committee and may command wide support. d) If there is no agreement we would be alienating not only the Argentines but the whole Latin American bloc.

The effect would be that we could not any more count on their 23 votes on a number of GA issues of importance to us (including Law of Treaties). More serious, we would lose their sympathy in the Security Council,.." [2185]

December 8th, Lord Caradon comments on Ambassador Cresswell's views.

"I should comment first on our commitment to report to the Assembly before the end of this session on 20 December. If by then there is no breach with the Argentine Government then all we have to do is to agree on a form of words with the Argentine Mission here jointly reporting that the discussions between the two Governments continue. In effect the United Nations deadline is only significant or dangerous if there is deadlock." [2186]

December 9th, in London, Argentina's Ambassador, Brigadier McLoughlin, approaches John Beith at the FCO.

"With reference to the "bout de papier" you gave me on the 21st of November… I have been instructed to inform you that, after careful consideration, my Government are prepared to accept the British suggestion concerning the setting aside of a formal exchange of Notes at the time of the signature of the

2184 *FCO 7/1075 & FCO 7/1079*

2185 Original emphasis. Only the first page remains in the file. No date, but before the 10th, when it was received by the archives. The wording is reminiscent of Lord Caradon's message of the 6th. See *FCO 7/1079* at *120*

2186 *UKMIS New york to FCO December 8, 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *108*

Memorandum of Understanding. Instead, from the time of the publication of the Memorandum, the Argentine Government intend to make an explanatory public statement, which we understand the British Government will also do … the Memorandum would be signed by the Secretary of State and myself, here in London." [2187]

Beith reports.

"Brigadier McLoughlin spoke from the attached notes, which seemed at first to represent a total acceptance of our proposals but proved to contain one discrepancy ie. that our communication to the Secretary-General of the United Nations should contain only the Memorandum of Understanding, but not any further "statements, comments or annexes". I thanked the Ambassador for his substantive reply to our ideas but pointed out that the above-mentioned discrepancy would certainly create difficulty. It is in fact an essential element of the proposals … I reminded the Ambassador that the Memorandum of Understanding was still <u>ad referendum</u> to Her Majesty's Government as a whole." [2188]

Back from India, Foreign Secretary Michael Stewart, telegrams Dr. Mendez in Buenos Aires.

"During my absence from London I have been kept informed of the progress of Lord Chalfont's visits to the Falkland islands and to Buenos Aires. You will also have learnt of the intense emotions and opposition the Anglo/Argentine talks on the Falkland Islands have evoked in the British Parliament and press during the last few days. You may already know that as a result of this I have been asked to make a further Statement in the House of Commons this week. I hope to give you advance notice of its content as soon as I have conferred with my colleagues …" [2189]

December 10th, from London, Foreign Secretary Stewart telegrams the British Embassy in Buenos Aires.

"The Argentine Ambassador called on Mr. Beith yesterday at his own request quote – to continue discussions – unquote. …

2. After referring to his Government's satisfaction at the recent visit of Lord Chalfont and of British officials to Buenos Aires, he said that the Argentine Government was prepared broadly to accept the procedure set in the bout de papier he had been given on 21 November for the publication of the Memorandum of Understanding. The Argentine Govt., agreed that there should be no additional exchange of letters by the two governments, and that both governments would make untrammelled explanatory statements about the Memorandum when it was published.

3. Brigadier McLoughlin said that he had been authorised to sign the Memorandum on this basis. The Memorandum of Understanding should be sent by the two countries' delegates in New York to the Secretary-General of the United nations on the day of publication under cover of a communication which should not contain further quote – statements, comments or annexes – unquote. He suggested that the two missions to the United Nations should keep in close contact about any further quote – presentational – unquote problems.

4. Mr. Beith thanked the Ambassador for his reply and reminded him that the procedure he had suggested on 21 November, and the text of the Memorandum itself, were still ad referendum to British Ministers. …

2187 *FCO 7/1073*
2188 *Ibid.* Original emphasis
2189 *FCO 7/1079* at *120*

He pointed out that one significant difficulty remained, in that the Argentine Government had not agreed that British Parliamentary statements in explanation of the memorandum should be conveyed to the Secretary-General together with the Memorandum itself, which was an essential element in our position." [2190]

From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Cresswell informs London that Foreign Minister Costa Mendez has repeated to him, that Argentina is ready to sign and accept; *"... the procedure of untrammelled statements being made by both sides."* [2191]

December 11th, in London, a meeting of the Cabinet, chaired by Prime Minister Harold Wilson, decides not to continue attempts to reach agreement on the basis of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding.

"For your own information, position is that because the Argentine Government have made it plain in recent public statements that they would not sign any Memorandum which did not clearly indicate that sovereignty would be transferred, without qualification, to Argentina, Ministers have decided that they could not proceed with the Memorandum in its present form. Ministers' view is that if the Memorandum were to be signed, it would now itself have to make quite clear that sovereignty would not be transferred against the wishes of the Falkland islanders; it would not now suffice for this to be said in the accompanying unilateral statement." [2192]

"... the situation developed rapidly the week before last, and on my return to London on 7 December I found that Cabinet discussions on the problem during the Secretary of State's absence in India and Pakistan had resulted in the conclusion that we should try to disengage from our present series of talks with the Argentine. Ministers had by then come to see serious difficulties about the fact that we were even talking about sovereignty with the Argentines. They found paragraph 4 of the Memorandum of Understanding wholly unacceptable in the present state of Parliamentary feeling here." [2193]

"... the Prime Minister said that the preponderant view in the Cabinet was that, in the political circumstances then prevailing, we could no longer contemplate any Memorandum of Understanding with the Argentine Government which did not make explicit within its text or by means of a specific link between the Memorandum and the unilateral statement, that the decisive voice on the question of sovereignty of the Falkland Islands must be that of the Islanders themselves." [2194]

"Michael Stewart's last attempt to retrieve an agreement was rejected by the Cabinet on 11 December. Castle recorded that, "One by one we all turned on him and he was soon assuring us defensively that he had left Costa-Mendes in no doubt that we would not transfer the Falkland Islands without the agreement of the Islanders."..." [2195]

Argentina's Ambassador McLoughlin is summoned to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office to be told of Britain's decision not to continue negotiations on the basis of the proposed Memorandum of Understanding.

"I began by reminding the Ambassador of the strong feeling in the House of Commons about our discussions with the Argentine Government and that this feeling had been mounting in recent week. In the light of it I felt that I must make a statement to the House of Commons this afternoon. My statement would begin by explaining why we had entered into these discussions. I should go on to say

2190 *FCO 7/1073 & FCO 7/1079* at *130*
2191 *Buenos Aires to FCO December 10, 1968 tel. 817* in *FCO 7/1079*
2192 *Stewart to Haskard December 14, 1968* in *FCO 7/1073*
2193 *Latin American Department (Diggins) to Buenos Aires (Cresswell) December 18, 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *166*
2194 *Memorandum* by Michael Stewart October 21, 1969
2195 Ellerby 1990 p.160 citing *B. Castle, The Castle-Diaries, 1964-1970 (London, 1984), pp. 568-569.*

that some progress had been made, but that there wee still important divergences of opinion. We wished therefore to continue our talks with the object of reconciling these divergences, which hinged on HMG's position that there be no transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the inhabitants. I should have to emphasise that this was still our position. ...

3. I said I should add that any expression of the Falkland islanders' wishes must be genuine: we had not exerted and would not exert pressure or improper influence on them to make a decision which did not reflect their true wishes. ...

6. ... The Ambassador commented that the divergence between us looked wider than he had supposed: he thought we had agreed on the Memorandum of Understanding. He wondered what our decision on the Memorandum of Understanding would be. I replied that this would require examination and I could not give him a precise answer at present. When he raised the question of what should be said to the General Assembly before it went into recess next week, I said that this must depend on the progress reached at that point. But even if our talks went on longer than we had originally expected, I very much hoped that they could nevertheless continue.

7. When the Ambassador asked whether the difficulties we saw were procedural, I said that they went rather further that that. And even the procedural difficulties which still remained in fact reflected the divergence over our view that there could be no transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the inhabitants, and that this must be made clear in any communication to the Secretary General. I believed that we now needed time to take stock and then pursue the talks. I repeated that, if there was to be any hope of obtaining Parliament's agreement, the principle about the paramountcy of the wishes of the inhabitants must be made unmistakeably clear.

Finally, I did not hold out any hope that we could get a final agreement before 20 December, though we should be available at any time to continue the talks." [2196]

From London, Foreign Secretary Stewart sends a telegram to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, for immediate delivery to the Argentine Foreign Ministry.

"In my message of 9 December I said that I hoped to give you advance notice of the content of the statement which I expected to make in the House of Commons this week. I shall be making this statement this afternoon, and I have outlined its general content to your Ambassador here.

2. Nevertheless, I should like to give you the following summary of what I shall be saying. I shall start by explaining the very good reasons why our two governments have been holding talks about the Falkland Islands' question. I shall go on to say that we have reached a measure of understanding, but that there remains an important divergence relating to HMG's insistence that there could be no transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the Falkland Islanders, and that this remains our policy. I shall, however, also make it clear that we are anxious to find a solution of this question and that we therefore propose to continue our talks with your Government to that end.

3. I am sure that you will feel, as I do, that we have made useful progress in this matter, and that you, like ourselves, will wish to continue our talks on the same friendly and constructive basis as before."[2197]

2196 *FCO 7/1079* at *131*
2197 *FCO 7/1073.* Copied to the Falklands Governor and the UK Mission at the United Nations.

From Buenos Aires, after delivering the message to the Argentine Foreign Minister, Cresswell reports; *"He gave me the impression that he was expecting something worse."* [2198]

Later that day, Stewart makes a statement to the House of Commons.

> *"In their talks with the Argentine Government, H.M. Government have been trying to reach an understanding with Argentina with the object of securing a satisfactory relationship between the islands and the nearest continental mainland. Since that time, the talks have continued and the two Governments have reached a measure of understanding although this is not yet complete. There is a basic divergence over H.M. Government's insistence that no transfer of sovereignty could be made against the wishes of the Falkland Islanders… Her Majesty's Government are very conscious of the close ties between the population of the islands and the United Kingdom and of their loyalty to the Crown. It is for this reason that Her Majesty's Government have insisted on the paramountcy of the islanders' wishes. Her Majesty's Government have not exerted any pressure on the islanders to change those wishes nor do they intend to do so."* [2199]

Stewart assures the House that negotiations with Argentina have not included the Dependencies.

"Whatever international law practice may have been in the past, I do not think, in the twentieth century, you go handing people over to a government that they will detest, and which can put up no case in law for the territory either." [2200]

"The paramountcy of the islanders' wishes as reflected in Parliament had been established, and the question of sovereignty over the Falklands had become an issue of domestic politics rather than foreign policy." [2201]

"This was now the crux of the dispute, a dilemma which would bedevil successive governments. For the islanders, the episode served as a catharsis. They had effectively been granted a veto; their wishes were paramount. After 1968, no minister ever forgot that." [2202]

December 12th, from Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Costa Méndez, responds to Stewart's message of the 11th.

> *"I much regret that the British Government has not been able to sign the Memorandum of Understanding concluded on 12 August between the Foreign Office negotiators and those of our Embassy… I shall tonight, 12th, inform Argentine public opinion about the state of the negotiations. …*
>
> *My Government is ready to continue the negotiations, as is laid down in resolution 2065 (XX)."* [2203]

Minister Méndez issues a statement for the press.

> *"After refusing for a century even to discuss this matter, the United Kingdom has finally accepted to discuss it. This new willingness to hear our reasons is in itself sufficient reason for continuing the negotiations and for believing that they will lead to their logical conclusion: recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas, which recognition, moreover, the United Kingdom has not categorically refused to proclaim. … Major differences still exist, of course. …"* [2204]

2198 *FCO 7/1079* at *132*
2199 *HC Deb 11 December 1968 vol.775 cc424-34*
2200 Michael Stewart interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.25
2201 Smith 1991
2202 Donaghy 2014
2203 *Annex 11* of *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*
2204 *UN Doc A7623/Rev.1 vol. 4 chapter 31*

In London, Stewart confirms to the House of Commons, once again, the government's position.

> *"I fear that I must begin by saying, once again, what I have said so often, … It is this: we are not prepared to make any settlement which would oblige us to hand over the Islands against the wishes of the inhabitants. Every other conceivable remark that can be made about the whole matter must be interpreted in the light of that, which is a fixed point."* [2205]

December 13th, from Argentina, Costa Méndez sends a further message to Stewart.

> *"I repeat to you that my Government is anxious to reach an early solution of the question of the Malvinas Islands, as the United Nations have also repeatedly stated. My Government is ready to continue the negotiations, as is laid down in resolution 2065 (XX). I am confident that, by placing the controversy within the strict framework of that resolution it is possible to reach an adequate solution of the difficulties with which the negotiations are faced at this moment."* [2206]

"… Argentina was still anxious to reach an early solution to the problem … but upheld the view that Argentina still could not accept that a transfer of sovereignty should be made dependent upon the wishes of the inhabitants." [2207]

In Buenos Aires, Dr. Costa Mendez speaks to the press.

> *"The Argentine Government has directed its action in the negotiations with the United Kingdom in compliance with the following fundamental principles. 1. The United Kingdom Government should as a definite solution recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Islands and restore them to the Republic. 2. Such recognition should not be made conditional upon the agreement of the present inhabitants of the Islands. 3. The Republic will take into account and will ensure the interests of the inhabitants of the islands by means of the safeguards and guarantees to be agreed. The Argentine Government, in accordance with the principles which have traditionally directed its policy in the matter will welcome these settlers with the most generous disposition. It is disposed to ensure their interests in a satisfactory manner and is confident that overcoming their present isolation will constitute a real benefit for them and their descendants. 4. The conclusion of the agreement as a whole will have as a logical conclusion the development of free communications between the Islands and the rest of the Argentine national territory and the creation of definitive links with them. 5. The negotiations and agreements resulting from them will have to accord with the principles laid down in Resolution 2065 (XX) of the United Nations.…*
>
> *The United Kingdom after a century of refusing even to discuss the point has just admitted its discussion. This new disposition to listen to our case constitutes in itself a sufficient reason to continue the negotiations and to believe that they must reach their logical denouement. - the recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands – a recognition which in other respects the United Kingdom has not positively denied. It is quite true that important divergences still remain.*
>
> *The United Kingdom insists on making the recognition of Argentine sovereignty conditional on the wishes of the inhabitants, a condition which the republic can in no way accept. The British demand exceeds the terms of Resolution 2065 (XX) of the United Nations by virtue of which Argentina and the*

2205 *HC Deb 12 December 1968 vol.775 cc590-716*
2206 *FCO 7/1079* at *137*
2207 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

United Kingdom are negotiating on the question of the Malvinas Islands. This Resolution provides that the peaceful solution of the dispute must take duly into account the interests of the population. It in no way subordinates the recognition of sovereignty to the wishes of the inhabitants. There are then sufficient reasons and convenience in continuing the negotiations with the United Kingdom…." [2208]

Mendez confirms that negotiations will continue at a diplomatic level in London.

From Buenos Aires, Ambassador Creswell telegrams the FCO in London.

"The Argentine statement is uncompromising but less polemical than some previous statements. There is no hint of flexibility on freeing communications before agreement is reached as a whole. … subsequent remarks to the press emphasise in a positive way the Argentine belief that confidential negotiations should be continued but there is no attempt to gloss over the basic differences.

The statement also emphasises the Argentine interpretation of UN resolution 2065 in a way that suggests they will use this argument in what ever statement they make in the General Assembly.

I think that the Argentines have been taken aback by the strength of the Parliamentary and British press opposition … they are under no illusion about the difficulty of reaching an agreement acceptable to both sides." [2209]

Later in the day, Cresswell sends a further message to London; copied to the UK mission in New York.

"Head of UN Department in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs told us today that the Ministry had been disappointed by the recent developments in London which they regarded as a step backwards. They were pessimistic about progress in the future. He said that the Government were seriously considering strong measures in the UN. They would not, however, want to risk a situation where any resolution proposed might secure less support than resolution 2065..." [2210]

December 14th, London informs Governor Haskard.

"We are now considering how best to take matters forward with the Argentines, … We are of course most anxious to avoid a break with the Argentines, because this could hardly fail to increase the risk of adventurist operations against the Falklands. It will clearly be an exceedingly delicate task, … While we quite realise the importance of keeping close contact with your Executive Council so as to maintain a relationship of confidence, you should not repeat not pass on this information to them for the time being. We intend to authorise you to do so, under conditions of strict secrecy, when the situation vis-a-vis Argentina has become clearer and when Parliamentary and Press interest has calmed." [2211]

"... our policy has now received a set-back on two counts:- (a) the recent emotional and ill-informed criticism of our policy in the Press and in Parliament. It is difficult to refute this without revealing the text of the Memorandum of Understanding and showing that it would not commit Her Majesty's Government to any transfer of sovereignty; (b) it is no longer practicable to sign the Memorandum in its present form, and to publish it together with our unilateral statement, because of the Argentines' repeated refusal to "accept" our

2208 *FCO 7/1079* at *138*
2209 *FCO 7/1079* at *141*
2210 *FCO 7/1079* at *143*
2211 *Stewart to Haskard December 14, 1968* in *FCO 7/1080.* The FCO, and the UK's mission to the UN in particular, were opposed to the Executive Council learning that the Islanders had an effective veto over the negotiation process.

draft unilateral statement. In so refusing they have disregarded the fact that we have made it clear to them, both at the beginning of, and during the negotiations, that we have to make a unilateral statement on the lines proposed." [2212]

December 17th, at the UN, Argentina's Ambassador Ruda complains during a decolonization debate, about; *"... recognition of the Argentine sovereignty, as a definite solution, [being] subject to the wishes of the islanders."*[2213]

> *"... it was a dispute of sovereignty. While self-determination was applicable in situations regarding decolonisation the 'Principle of National Unity and Territorial Integrity' should be applied here. The original inhabitants had been replaced by settlers of the occupying power...*
>
> *Resolution 2065 (xx) called for negotiations and referred to the interests, not the wishes of the people."* [2214]

Responding, Britain's representative, Lord Caradon, confirms that the UK has "*no doubts*" about its sovereignty.

> *"I am very grateful to you for allowing me to speak shortly at this point in the debate in reply to my friend the Ambassador of Argentina. It is not my purpose today to enter into any controversy or dispute with him. He has spoken, as we would expect, with a desire to be fair and unprovocative, and certainly he puts his case with his usual persuasiveness and cogency. But on two issues I must reply at once: on the question of sovereignty and on the question of the interests and wishes of the people. And on these two issues I must make very clear the position of my Government.*
>
> *On the question of sovereignty I am obliged to state that the UK Government does not accept the statement to which we have listened insofar as it disputes the sovereignty of the UK Government over the Falkland Islands.*
>
> *The UK Government has no doubt as to its sovereignty over the territory and I wish formally to reserve the rights of my Government on this question."* [2215]

Lord Caradon then reads out the statement made to Parliament by Michael Stewart, on December 11th.

December 18th, at the United Nations, Ambassador Ruda makes a further speech.

> *"Notwithstanding the considerable headway made in the negotiations, important difficulties have arisen... Those difficulties arise from the British claim that recognition of Argentine sovereignty, as a definite solution should be conditioned to the wishes of the present inhabitants of the Islands. ...*
>
> *The Argentine Government is prepared to discuss any type of formula over the criterion by which the interests of the population are to be taken into account. It also maintains that the decision is exclusively a matter for the respective governments, that the United Kingdom may only take into account whether the guarantees and safeguards offered by Argentina are effective and adequate and that, under no circumstances, may the power of decision be transferred."* [2216]

2212 *Memorandum by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs December 18(?), 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *154*
2213 *United Nations: The Question of Malvinas and the Bicentennial, a pending question* Jorge Argüello 2010
2214 Ruda quoted in *FCO 7/1082*
2215 *UK Mission New York to FCO December 17, 1968 TelNo. 3331* in *FCO 7/1079*
2216 *FCO 7/1082*

"... I have had a long heart-to-heart talk with Enrique Ros, the Counsellor in the Argentine Embassy here. I told him a good deal about the present situation in the Falkland islands, based on my visit, and I think he, at least, accepts that no real progress will be made unless and until the Argentines start to do something to remove the Islanders' present almost pathological dislike and distrust of them..." [2217]

On the same day, the UN General Assembly adopts resolution 2429 (XXIII) which calls for the UK to negotiate with Spain over Gibraltar and to; "*terminate the colonial situation in Gibraltar no later than 1 October 1969.*"

"Britain reassured Gibraltar that this would not happen and that Gibraltar would never be turned over to another state against its wishes." [2218]

December 19th, in further letters to the UN, both Argentina and Britain inform the Secretary-General that negotiations are continuing.

> *"I am pleased to inform Your Excellency that, ... Her Majesty's Government has continued negotiations with the Government of the Argentine Republic in accordance with resolution 2065 (XX) and the consensuses approved on 20 December 1966 and 19 December 1967 for the purpose of reaching a solution to the problem of the dispute over the Falkland Islands therein mentioned."* [2219]

"Both Lord Caradon and Senor Jose Ruda, Argentine Representative at the UN, assured the UN Secretary General that both governments wished to continue discussions to enable further progress to be made towards reaching a peaceful solution." [2220]

"... it was recognised that, "failure to reach an understanding with Argentina carried the risks of increased harassment of the islanders and the possibility of an attack". The Government therefore decided to continue negotiations, while making clear the British attitude on sovereignty and that the islanders' wishes were paramount." [2221]

In New York, the General Assembly decides to defer consideration of the Falklands question.

December 20th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Cresswell writes to express his concerns:

> *"... that myths expounded in Ruda's speech should not become part of popular belief."* [2222]

December 23rd, in New York, at the UN building (right), Britain's Permanent Representative Lord Caradon has a meeting with Argentina's Permanent Representative, Ambassador Ruda.

> *"Neither of us had any instructions and we agreed that what we said must be solely on a personal basis. Ruda said that his Foreign Minister had shown some courage in reacting as he had done to the campaign in the British press and Parliament demanding an end to the negotiations. He said that his Foreign Minister had the full confidence of the Argentine Government and that pressure did not come from the military.*

2217 *Latin American Department (Diggins) to Buenos Aires (Cresswell) December 18, 1968* in *FCO 7/1079* at *166*
2218 *Gibraltar: Closure of the Border 1969-2019* HM Government of Gibraltar 2019
2219 *UN Document A7468* of December 21, 1968
2220 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*
2221 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*
2222 *FCO 7/1082*. Cresswell also raised a concern that Lord Caradon had not immediately refuted Ruda's arguments.

There were however powerful civilian interests in his country which were pressing for more vigorous Argentine action … He still hoped that some way forward would be found in the negotiations but could not do nothing indefinitely, for it was unfortunately the fact that the foreign policy of the Argentine in the United nations and elsewhere was more influenced by the Falklands question than by any other issue…. He went on to say that it was necessary to consider what the future of the Falklands Company should be (the Argentine Government would still be prepared to buy it out) particularly bearing in mind that it was the Company, so he understood, which was one of the main instigators of popular feeling in England. Ruda had no positive proposal to put forward now but he said that the need was to open communications between the Argentine and the Islands. This should be the next step." [2223]

An application for an oil exploration licence is submitted to the Governor of the Falkland Islands by Grynberg's US oil company.

December 31st, the Falklands review notes that there have been 42 births, 20 marriages and 32 deaths. [2224]

1969 – January 2nd, from New York, the UK mission to the United Nations telegrams the FCO in London.

"We see… that the Department intends to authorise the Governor to inform the Executive Council in due course of Ministers' view that, if the memorandum of Understanding were to be signed, it would now itself have to make quite clear that sovereignty could not be transferred against the wishes of the Falkland Islanders. There is surely a risk that, if this view were passed on to the Executive Council, it would seriously reduce the chances of an understanding with the Argentine in the future. … we are of course concerned to avoid the consequences which would arise here if there were a complete breakdown in negotiations." [2225]

January 17th, Britain's Foreign & Commonwealth Office debates how to proceed with negotiations. [2226]

"It is in our interests to continue the Anglo/Argentine discussions on the basis laid down by the Prime Minister in his summary of the cabinet's discussion about the Falkland Islands on 11 December, and as defined by the Secretary of State… Our basic objective in the talks is still unchanged, i.e. to create a framework within which a normal relationship between the Islands and Argentina can develop. Our guiding principle throughout any further talks should be that, while we would stand by the commitment that we would not transfer sovereignty over the Islands against the wishes of the Islanders, we would not stand in the way if at any time in the future they were to consider such a transfer to be in their interests." [2227]

The recommendation is for talks to continue, accompanied by a disengagement from the Memorandum of Understanding and with a focus upon a new text. Also, that emphasis should be placed on persuading the Argentines to open up communications with the Islands. The Islands' Executive Council to be kept informed.

However, on being made aware, the UK's mission to the United Nations once again expresses their concerns at the Islanders being told that their approval will be necessary for any transfer of sovereignty to Argentina.

"The discretion of the Falkland Islands Councillors is, as you have said, impressive. Nevertheless, if the information… were passed on to them, they would surely regard it as a commitment on the part of HMG from which we could resile only at the cost of subsequent accusations of bad faith. In short, as

2223 *FCO 7/1073*
2224 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1968 & 1969*
2225 *UKMis to FCO January 2, 1969* in *FCO 7/1080*
2226 *FCO 7/1073*
2227 *Wallace Summary of January 24, 1969* in *FCO 7/1073*

we see it here, to make known in advance our intentions to the Falkland Islanders, even under pledge of secrecy, could not fail to tie our hands for the future and make a solution more difficult." [2228]

In Britain's House of Commons, asked a question by an MP regarding the Falkland Islands value to the nation's future maritime strategy, Defence Secretary Dennis Healey responds; *"These islands do not have any contribution to make to our future strategy."* Standing, Enoch Powell MP says:

"*Let me ask one question: If the Falkland Islands belonged to the Soviet Union, should their Minister of Defence be saying, These Islands do not have any contribution to make to our future strategy?. If the answer is, "No, he would not",then the answer of the British Government must be the wrong one. It sounds all very well for the Government to promise that they will not cede the Islands against the wishes of the inhabitants. In fact, the effect of this is to put the islanders themselves in the jaws of the nutcracker.*

That handful of isolated British people are thereby made the sole impediment to a vaunted settlement with Argentina and to compliance with the decolonisation mania of the United Nations. Thus the entire pressure of the world - UNO, Argentina and Britain herself – is concentrated, like a pyramid inverted upon its point, onto the unlucky islanders. To tell them in these circumstances that they shall not be sold up against their will is a cynicism suitable for a nation bent on demolishing its own assets."[2229]

January 23rd, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador Creswell writes to inform the FCO that the Argentine reaction to the failure of the talks has been more moderate than he had expected. Creswell raises the prospect of buying the Islanders off with financial inducements. [2230]

January 30th, in Stanley, Governor Haskard is informed that there have been no further developments.

During a dispute between Uruguay and Argentina over islands in the Rio de la Plata, a delegate from Montevideo reminds his opposite number of Uruguay's own potential claim to the Falklands based on an - '*inheritance*' from Spain; *"... if he got on to historical precedents, Uruguay would establish her claim to the Falklands and, when she did, would acknowledge British sovereignty."* [2231]

February 4th, in New York, at the UN, Dr. Ruda assures Lord Caradon of Argentina's goodwill and their wish to continue the search for a negotiated settlement. [2232]

"We should now all try to find some formula to save both faces, while pursuing a practical approach to the problem of improving communications and relations. He went on to say that his government has asked him to tell me ... that they considered that this year we would have to put in a substantive report of some kind to the UN;..."

2228 *J.D.B. Shaw (Ukmis) to J.H. Lambert (FCO) January 17, 1969* in *FCO 7/1080* at *183*

2229 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 3, 1969 pp.7-8

2230 *FCO 7/1073* & *FCO 7/1080*

2231 Quoted in *The Falkland Story 1592 – 1982* M. Cawkell 1983 p.31. The people talking were not identified. Spain's Viceroyalty of the Rio de la Plata covered rather more than just Argentina. Uruguay, Paraguay and part of Bolivia also emerged from that Spanish colony. Any claim based upon an alleged 'inheritance' would have to recognise that those other remnants would have an equal claim with Argentina. Montevideo, which administered the Island of Soledad from 1806 to 1811, could also rightly claim to have been the location of the last seat of the Viceroy between 1811 and 1814. See 2013

2232 *New York to FCO March 7, 1969* in *FCO 7/1073*

February 14th, from Stanley, reacting to a suggestion that Falkland Islanders should visit Argentina, the Governor telegrams London to discourage the notion. The Executive Council being disinclined to accept any formal invitation. [2233]

February 17th, in Britain's House of Commons, Foreign Secretary Stewart answers a question.

> *"There can be a question of transfer of sovereignty only as part of an arrangement which will give a permanently satisfactory relationship between the Islands and Argentina, and if the Islanders themselves regard such an arrangement as satisfactory to their interests. I think it will be desirable to resume the discussions, but they are bound all the time by that condition."* [2234]

"... if we'd taken sovereignty off the agenda, we should have found ourselves unable to talk to the Argentines about anything. That would not have been convenient. We were quite prepared to go on discussing sovereignty but what we had to say about it remained the same." [2235]

February 21st, in London, Argentina's Ambassador, Brigadier McLoughlin, recently returned from Buenos Aires, speaks to Lord Chalfont at the Foreign Office.

> *"Lord Chalfont, describing his visit to the Falkland Islands and Buenos Aires, said that the main impression that he had derived from it was the need to open up communications and for better relations between Argentina and the Falkland Islands. The major problem was the islanders' present complete isolation. ... They did not understand the benefits to them, irrespective of the sovereignty issue, of better communications and relations with Argentina. He had done his best to explain this to them, pointing out the dangers of continuing isolation. He now hoped that the Argentine Government would be able to make some positive moves to improve communications and relations generally. In particular, it would be most helpful if progress could be made on the provision of an air service, and also if the Argentine Government could take urgent action to remedy such grievances as interference with Falkland Islands mail passing through Argentina..."* [2236]

It is agreed that talks should continue without publicity.

"... a preliminary exchange of views following the suspension of the talks in December, 1968;... The main encouraging feature of the Argentine position is that they are prepared, despite their disappointment over our inability to sign the draft Memorandum of Understanding, to continue the discussion with us..." [2237]

"Discussions between officials were resumed, strictly ad referendum to Ministers, on the Argentine Ambassador's return in February 1969 after leave and consultations in Buenos Aires. The Argentines had no new proposals to put forward (though they did say that we could not after more than two years of discussions merely continue to repeat to the Secretary General of the United nations that negotiations were still continuing)." [2238]

In Buenos Aires, Foreign Minister Costa Mendez tells Ambassador Cresswell that he had been under pressure before Christmas 1968 to put an end to negotiation and publish the Memorandum of Understanding, unsigned. Mendez had resisted, but hoped that some further step could be taken during March. [2239]

2233 *FCO 7/1073*
2234 *FCO 7/1075*
2235 Michael Stewart interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.25
2236 *Stewart to Creswell February 21, 1969* in *FCO 7/1073*
2237 *Memorandum by C. E. Diggines, Latin American Department, March 18, 1969* in *FCO 7/1076*
2238 Background briefing paper (unsigned & undated but after September, 1969) in *FCO 7/1076*
2239 *FCO 7/1080*

February 24th, Costa Mendez, tells Ambassador Creswell that he believes it now possible for both sides to record, in an agreed document, their respective points of view. [2240]

February 25th, from Argentina, Mendez sends a message to London, via the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, suggesting that talks culminate in July, so that the results can be presented at the United Nations.

March 11th, in Anguilla, William Whitlock, a junior British Minister, arrives as an envoy to resolve the conflict between Anguilla and the nearby Islands of St. Kitts and Nevis. Arrogant and dismissive of Anguillan sensitivities, he is ejected at gunpoint. Returning to the UK, Whitlock claims that the island is being run by a mafia and gangsters. [2241]

March 17th, in London, during a debate in the House of Commons, Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Goronwy Roberts, is asked to assure the House that Falklands sovereignty will not be discussed with Argentina.

> *"It would be impossible to avoid having the question of sovereignty raised by the Argentinians – this is their point of dispute – but ... if that question is raised, our basic and firm position is that no transfer is possible against the wishes of the Islanders."* [2242]

March 19th, a British force of 331 paratroopers, plus 22 Metropolitan Police Officers, invades Anguilla. [2243]

"Perhaps the healthiest result of the Anguillan fiasco is that nobody will ever again attach much credence to information which emanates from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Anybody who had been following the situation as it unfolded would have known immediately that the 'Mafia' story in its original form was, to say the least, implausible. The Parliamentary Committee of the Cabinet, however, accepted it entirely at face value after a few sceptical, even mildly derisive, noises. The fact that it came up before this committee might suggest that the political humiliation of Mr Whitlock's treatment, when he was thrown out of Anguilla on his ear, played a part in their decision to invade Anguilla. But it was Mr Stewart's passionate description of 6,000 cowed Anguillans inside a Mafia stranglehold which really converted them. Now that these stories have been shown to suffer from a remarkable lack of evidence, a search has begun inside the FCO for the source of the intelligence." [2244]

"The invasion of Anguilla on March 19, 1969, by a force of paratroopers and police officers is long forgotten. That's probably because there was very little action and the invasion became farcical – Britain was invading a territory where the people wanted to be British. Not a shot was fired and the laid-back islanders didn't organise any sort of major resistance – not least because there was no telephone system on the island. ... Convinced ... that the island was in the grip of armed madmen and the Mafia, the Wilson Government decided on a show of force, and Operation Sheepskin was born. The Government rushed through an Order in Council to give the invasion a semblance of legality, but the matter was never voted on by the House of Commons. ... The commanding officer, Colonel Richard Dawney, watched the invasion from the deck of HMS Minerva and

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2240 *Diggins to Hayman April 1, 1969* in *FCO 7/1073*

2241 Anguilla had been lumped together with St Kitts and Nevis to form a unit that the British government hoped would be suitable for eventual independence. No account was taken of the feelings of the people of the three islands, who had very different cultures. The events that followed would be described by one journal as, the War of Whitlock's Ear (as he was thrown out on it) in memory of the War of Jenkins Ear 1739. See below

2242 *HC Deb 17 March 1969 vol.780 cc21-2*

2243 Reminiscent, it was suggested in some US newspapers, of the 1959 Peter Sellers movie, *The Mouse that Roared*. Others called it, the Bay of Piglets.

2244 *War of Whitlock's Ear* in *The Spectator* March 28, 1969. See - http://spprd.insec.netcopy.thompsonjames.co.uk/article/28th-march-1969/3/war-of-whitlocks-ear

feared the worst when flashes of light were seen close to his men. They turned out to be flashbulbs from among the press and broadcasters – 60 of them, to be exact – who were there already and soon having a ball at Britain's expense, not least because Anguilla's tiny defence force had been told to stay at home. ... after months of embarrassment for Britain, Tony Lee worked out an 'interim arrangement' with the Anguillans who eventually got what they wanted - to be British." [2245]

In the Falklands, *British Pathé News* records material to air in celebration of the 21st anniversary of the inter-island air service. HMS Arethusa visits Port Stanley.

March 24th, in Paraguay, visiting Asunción, Lord Chalfont holds a press conference.

"Having replied to a question on Anguilla, Minister was asked what information he could give on the problem with the Argentine with regard to the Falkland Islands. Minister replied to the effect that Britain had talked with the Governments of the Countries concerned to try and find a just solution but the British Government had in all instances to take into account the wishes and interests of the Islanders themselves. There had been prolonged negotiations with the Argentine Government, but in this case as in the case of Gibraltar, the Islanders did not wish to change their status. Even though Britain would like to improve her relations with the countries concerned, she could not disregard the wishes of the people in the territories concerned. Minister added that Britain had offered that disputes over both Gibraltar and the Falklands should be referred to the International Court of Justice, but the other parties had not agreed to this." [2246]

On the same day, in London, Goronwy Roberts makes a further statement to Parliament, regarding *in camera* negotiations being held between Sr. Ros, of the Argentine Embassy, and Mr. Diggins, of the FCO.

> *"Further discussions about the Falkland Islands have taken place with the Argentine authorities, and these are continuing; but there is nothing of substance that I can add to the statements which my right hon. Friend made in the House on 11th and 12th December, 1968. ... It is impossible to exclude from these talks the main subject of dispute between us and the Argentine. However, we have made absolutely clear to the Argentine and to the world what our posture is on the question of sovereignty. There are also other questions relating to communications and good and fruitful relations between the islands and the mainland which can very usefully be pursued."* [2247]

"Our initial efforts concentrated on the possibility of evolving a joint draft communique or similar document, which would have the purpose of allaying speculation and suspicion about the nature and scope of the continuing negotiations. The idea was that the document should record the progress so far made in the discussions; set out the position of each party; define the area of agreement reached; but also record the essential divergences; and declare the intention of both sides to continue to work for a peaceful solution to the dispute. We realised, of course, that any such text which might be evolved would have to bear as little resemblance as possible to the earlier Memorandum of Understanding." [2248]

2245 *The National* March 19, 2019

2246 *Telno 35, Asuncion to Foreign Office, March 24, 1969* in *FCO 7/1085.* This message was repeated to Buenos Aires for the information of FCO staff there, and signed off by Brian C. MacDermot, British Ambassador to Paraguay. This last sentence confirms that Britain offered to take the question of Falkland Islands sovereignty to the International Court of Justice. Something that has been much disputed despite earlier conversations within the Foreign and Colonial Offices (1966), that had concluded that if Spain was offered such an opportunity, as they were, then there would be no choice but to put the same offer to Argentina.

2247 *HC Deb 24 March 1969 vol.780 cc1030-1.* No details are available about these discussions other than that, as in previous cases, the form of words was proving challenging. *In camera* is, apparently, not the same as 'secret'.

2248 Background briefing paper (unsigned & undated but after September, 1969) in *FCO 7/1076*

March 28th, Brigadier McLoughlin proposes that the two governments agree upon a joint text.

"The British and Argentine Governments have been holding talks since 1966 with the purpose of reaching their common objective of settling definitively and in an amicable manner their dispute over the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands (Islas Malvinas).

1. To this end during these talks which have been held in accordance with United Nations Resolution 2065 (XX) both Governments have had in mind the interests of the people of the islands and have covered several aspects of the relations between Britain, Argentina and the Islanders, including the establishment of communications and the nature of the safeguards and guarantees which would be offered by the Argentine Government. The following is the position so far reached:

2. The Government of the United Kingdom state that they will recognise Argentina's sovereignty on a date to be agreed between the two Governments as soon as the British Government are satisfied that such an arrangement is not against the interests of the Islanders. In that case they would use their best endeavour to ensure that it took place on the most favourable terms for the people of the Islands.

3. The Argentine Government state that the interests of the Islanders would be duly secured by the safeguards and guarantees to be offered which they are prepared to consult with the British Government, and that the decision to settle definitively this dispute is the responsibility of the two governments and it cannot be transferred directly or indirectly.

4. In order to create conditions in which the present difference can be overcome and the common objective can be achieved, the two governments intend to make early progress with practical measures to promote freedom of communication and movement between the mainland and the Islands, in both directions, in such a way as to encourage the development of cultural, economic and other links. To that effect and in a desire to contribute towards the final settlement, the Government of the Argentine Republic will promote free communication and movement between the mainland and the Islands and the United Kingdom Government will collaborate in the implementation of this policy. To this end further discussions will now take place in Buenos Aires on the practical measures for an early development of communications.

5. Both Governments will proceed with consultations in London in order to define the details of the guarantees and safeguards for the interests of the populations on the Islands to be put forward by the Argentine Government which in principle will cover:- The full enjoyment of Civil Rights: The establishment of a system dealing with the option of citizenship: The exemption from military service: The establishment of a special system regarding the use of the English language: The respect for the right of private property: The payment of a fair price for properties which inhabitants of the Islands wish to sell in order to avoid loss of economic nature resulting from the change in the situation: The establishment of a system which will honour acquired rights: The establishment of a special favourable system of taxation: The operation of a regular air and sea transportation service between the Islands and the mainland.

6. *It is considered that a certain period of time should facilitate the development of conditions for a definitive settlement. Both Governments agree that is no such settlement has been reached within four years of this statement, either Government could request a meeting of representatives to review progress and decide upon it."* [2249]

2249 *Stewart to Buenos Aires (attachment) March 29, 1969* in *FCO 7/1073*

"The Argentine Ambassador called on me this morning as arranged… 2. In his talk with me today, the Ambassador did not explain clearly why the Argentines have suddenly started to take a more uncompromising line. He merely said… that they needed in the document a clear 'decision' on the part of the British Government to transfer sovereignty on a date to be agreed. I can only assume that he is apprehensive that, unless he can report to Dr. Costa Mendez that he has succeeded in inducing us to consider something on the lines of the second paragraph of the latest Argentine draft, his Foreign Minister will be dissatisfied. 3. I am sure that we should continue to resist this latest Argentine pressure and if at all possible to persuade them to revert to the general lines of the document on which Sr. Ros and Mr. Diggins have been working on for the past month." [2250]

"The Argentines are repeating their tactics of last year, i.e. to keep on trying to extract more and more from us while making virtually no substantial concession themselves." [2251]

March 29th, from London, the Secretary of State telegrams Britain's Embassy in Buenos Aires, regarding a request for an update. Stewart attaches a copy of the Argentine revised text.

> *"The progress so far made in the talks which have been going on at Counsellor level was summarised in Diggins' letter of 26 March. Yesterday however the Argentine Counsellor called at short notice and left a completely fresh draft of the proposed joint statement.*
>
> *2. When the Argentine Ambassador called… he explained the sudden production of this draft by claiming that the previous one under discussion represented a change in the 'area of understanding' previously reached. It was necessary from the Argentine point of view to have a clear statement of HMG willingness to recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. He could understand the need to take account of the interests and wishes of the Islanders; but this could not in itself be decisive. …*
>
> *4. The Ambassador … on the presentational problem he said that he realised the need to avoid anything too similar to the Memorandum of Understanding but did not see how the object embodied in para.2 of the new Argentine draft could be changed even if the wording were altered. From the Argentine point of view however, it was necessary to have an unconditional decision from the British Government about an eventual transfer of sovereignty. It would be this decision which would cause his Government to take practical steps regarding communications, safeguards, guarantees, etc."* [2252]

April 1st, in London, Lord Chalfont speaks to Ambassador McLoughlin.

> *"… the latest Argentine draft includes some wording so like the Memorandum of Understanding that HMG could not possibly secure its acceptance by Parliament and public opinion. He could not therefore authorise officials to go any further with discussions based on that draft. There is always the danger of a leak, and if it emerged that there was discussion even at official level on wording of this kind, it would lead to another and perhaps even more severe uproar which could make it impossible to continue talks at all. … There was no prospect of securing Parliamentary acceptance of a document which did not enshrine the point that the Islanders' **wishes** were paramount."* [2253]

Ambassador McLoughlin agrees to convey Chalfont's message to Costa Mendez.

2250 *Hayman to Chalfont March 28, 1969* in *FCO 7/1073*
2251 *Diggins to Harman March 29, 1969* in *FCO 7/1073*
2252 *Stewart to Buenos Aires March 29, 1969* in *FCO 7/1073*
2253 Quoted in *FCO 7/1073. cf. Memorandum of C. D. Wiggin, April 29, 1969* in *FCO 7/1076.* My emphasis

"The Argentine Ambassador… said that Argentina was prepared to agree to a document which did not resemble the Memorandum of Understanding,… but they could not accept any change in the concept that, since the question of sovereignty was the reason for the talks, HMG should state clearly its 'decision' to transfer sovereignty from an agreed date. All other aspects, eg. communications and safeguards, were complimentary and secondary to that of sovereignty.

It appeared from what Lord Chalfont had said that there had in fact been a change of attitude on the part of HMG from the kind of formula offered by Mr. George Brown, and that we were now going back beyond the 'area of agreement' reached by the Memorandum of Understanding. Argentina had accepted the need to put in hand practical measures in order to change the attitude of the Islanders, and had thought that HMG accepted this on the understanding that they stood by their intention to transfer sovereignty in due course." [2254]

"… the Minister of State made it clear that there was no prospect of securing Parliamentary acceptance of a document which did not enshrine the point that in our view the islanders' wishes were paramount. He hoped that the Argentine Foreign Minister would agree that it was useless to negotiate any document which would create a furore in parliament and the result of which could only be to set the sides back even further than the two years during which the negotiations had taken place. It remained our view that if we could concentrate on improving communications with the mainland the whole climate might eventually change and the possibility of a change of sovereignty might one day emerge." [2255]

At the request of the Falkland Islands Government, a member of Britain's Board of Trade (Civil Aviation Department) and another from the Ministry of Public Buildings and Works, commence a feasibility study into the construction of an airfield on the Cape Pembroke Peninsula.

"Most of the cost of the airfield survey carried out in the Islands was paid for by the Falkland Islands Government." [2256]

"… the conclusion was that an air-field, without its ancillary facilities, would cost £230,000 to construct; amphibians were also considered, but found to be expensive. … The last time the construction of an air-field was considered was in 1966 in the context of Defence when, for the reason that it might facilitate invasion, it was discarded." [2257]

April 23rd, Argentine newspapers report that a 14-year old schoolboy from Mendoza, Raúl Espínola, had written a letter to UN Secretary-General U Thant in November, 1968, requesting the return of the Falkland Islands - *"what belongs to us"*.

"To the boy's surprise, U Thant sent the letter to the Special Committee. … he stated that every Argentine had the obligation to raise his voice and demand that the islands become national heritage again." [2258]

April 29th, in London, the FCO's Latin American Department, composes internal – *Notes for Supplementaries* – for use in answering Parliamentary questions.

2254 *Ibid.*

2255 Background briefing paper (unsigned & undated but after September, 1969) in *FCO 7/1076*

2256 Briefing note (unsigned & undated) in *FCO 7/1076*

2257 *FCO 42/429.* The cost estimate, according to the *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1968 & 1969* was *£265,000* or *£335,000* depending on whether there were to be one or two runways.

2258 Carassai 2022 citing *Un nino mendocino de catrce anos origino debate en las Naciones Unidas* in *Los Andes* April 23, 1969 and *Argentinian Boy Appeals to UN* in *St. Maty's Herald* August 15, 1969

"Her Majesty's Government's reasons for going on with the talks are those which prompted them to embark on the discussions with the Argentine authorities in the first place. … 2. Since the dispute is about sovereignty this cannot be excluded from the talks. … a settlement involving the cession of sovereignty, which is what the Argentine Government want, could only be made subject to certain conditions, and we have made those conditions perfectly clear. 3. Her Majesty's Government's policy remains what it has repeatedly been stated to be, namely; that they "could only consider the solution of this dispute by a cession of sovereignty to Argentina first, as part of an arrangement which would secure a permanently satisfactory relationship between the Islands and Argentina, and second, if the Islanders themselves regarded such an agreement as satisfactory to their interests, and if it accorded with their wishes."…" [2259]

May 5th, in Britain's House of Commons, questions are asked about the reason that talks with Argentina continue. Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Goronwy Roberts, replies.

"Clearly it is necessary to talk about the improvement of communications, which at the moment the hon. Gentleman knows are not at all good. There are other aspects of the relationship of these islands and the country nearest to them on the mainland which ought to be discussed. Discussing these matters does not for a moment mean that the position of the future sovereignty of the islands is in any way prejudiced. …

I can say that discussions which have proceeded in the last few weeks have been amicable and reasonable and in no way have prejudiced the position which I have stated." [2260]

May 23rd, Gibraltar's new Constitution is published.

"Whereas Gibraltar is part of Her Majesty's dominions and Her Majesty's Government have given assurances to the people of Gibraltar that Gibraltar will remain part of Her Majesty's dominions unless and until an Act of Parliament otherwise provides, and furthermore that Her Majesty's Government will never enter into arrangements under which the people of Gibraltar would pass under the sovereignty of another state against their freely and democratically expressed wishes:…" [2261]

June 7th, in Spain, *Radio Nacional de Madrid*, announces: *"… it is evident that Spain could not passively accept the unilateral British decision to promulgate a new Constitution for Gibraltar. This is a flagrant defiance of the resolutions passed in the United Nations; a major violation of the Treaty of Utrecht and one more proof of Britain's decision not to negotiate with Spain the decolonization of the Rock."*

June 8th, following the publication of Gibraltar's new Constitution, Spain closes its border with Gibraltar.

"Sixteen days later Spain closed the frontier. This was the culmination of the restrictions that had commenced in 1950 and that had intensified with each passing year. General Franco predicted that Gibraltar would fall like a ripe fruit. He was proved to be mistaken. … Throughout the next 16 years, Gibraltar was a city under siege. For most people, their links with the outside world were air travel to London and a short ferry trip to Morocco." [2262]

June 16th, in London, in preparation for an oral statement in the House of Commons on the 23rd, the FCO's Latin American Department prepares further background information for the Minister.

2259 *FCO 7/1076*
2260 *Hansard vol.783 debated Monday May 5, 1969*
2261 Repealed 2006. See - https://www.gibraltarlaws.gov.gi/legislations/gibraltar-constitution-order-1969-1835/download
2262 *Gibraltar: Closure of the Border 1969-2019* HM Government of Gibraltar 2019

"The Argentines have suggested at various times that the obstacles to communications have not all been erected by them, and that the Falkland Islands have imposed restrictions against Argentines going to the Islands. This is not so; there are no restrictions on Argentines wishing to visit the Islands apart from the normal visa requirements, and even these are waived in the case of passengers on visiting tourist ships." [2263]

June 17th, a motion is presented in the House of Commons, calling for Anglo-Argentine talks to cease. [2264]

June 18th, a response for the Leader of the House is prepared.

"2. No progress on matters of substance has been achieved owing to the impossibility of reconciling the main Argentine condition that Her Majesty's Government should agree in principle to relinquish sovereignty over the Falkland Islands with our own position which is that we could "only consider the solution of this dispute by a cession of sovereignty to Argentina, first, as an arrangement which would secure a permanently satisfactory relationship between the Islands and Argentina, and second, if the islanders themselves regarded such an arrangement as satisfactory to their interests and if it accorded with their wishes".

It follows that no transfer of sovereignty would be possible without the agreement of the islanders. ... there are nevertheless valid reasons why we should go on with the talks. They arise from the need to maintain reasonably friendly relations with Argentina, whose great economic potential offers opportunities for an expansion of British trade; out obligations as a member of the UN; and because of the need to explore ways of improving direct relations between the Falkland Islands and Argentina over such practical matters as the establishment of better communications. ..."[2265]

In Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador Michael Creswell is replaced by (Reginald) Michael Hadow.

June 23rd, in London, still feeling that they are being kept in the dark, probing by MPs in the House of Commons continues. The Government are asked whether sovereignty remains on the agenda. Minister Fred Mulley answers.

"As has been made clear on many occasions, there has been no change in the Government's policy, which is that the question of secession of sovereignty to the Argentine can only arise if two conditions are satisfied—first, there must be a permanently satisfactory relationship between the islands and the Argentine and, secondly, the islanders must regard it as satisfactory, and it must accord with their wishes. That is the situation and that is how it stands." [2266]

June 27th, in Spain, the ferry linking Gibraltar with Algeciras completes a final journey. Gibraltar is now totally cut off from its nearest neighbour.

July 10th, in Britain's House of Lords, a question is raised by Lord Sorensen as to developments in the Anglo-Argentine discussions. Lord Chalfont replies.

"My Lords, ... further talks have taken place with the Argentine authorities. The purpose of these has been to continue to explore possible means of narrowing the differences which exist between the two Governments in this problem, and I hope for that reason that it will be possible to go on with the

2263 *Memorandum by C. D. Wiggin, June 16, 1969* in *FCO 7/1076*
2264 Early Day Motion 336 of June 17, 1969 in *FCO 7/1076*
2265 *Brief for the Leader of the House* (draft) by the FCO dated June 18, 1969 in *FCO 7/1076*
2266 *HC Deb 23 June 1969 vol.785 cc992-3*

discussions. … we shall of course keep the Government and through them, the people of the Falkland Islands in touch with any development that takes place, and there has been no development of any kind which requires that the people of the Falkland Islands should be informed of it." [2267]

July 30th, in New York, the UN Secretariat publishes a *Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Working Paper* based upon information supplied by the UK government in its role as the Administrative Power.

"… 4. As at 31 December 1968 the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas), excluding the Dependencies, was 2,105. The population of the Dependencies fluctuates with the sealing and whaling seasons…. 15. The economy of the territory remains almost entirely based on the export of wool to the United Kingdom. Attempts have been made at sealing and at the production of meat meal and tallow, as well as kelp meal from the vast seaweed beds surrounding the islands, but none of these have been successful." [2268]

In Montevideo, on the same day, at the Ambassador's residence, Counsellor Summerhayes from the UK's Embassy in Buenos Aires, meets with Governor Haskard; who is en-route to the UK.

"The Governor said all was quiet at the moment in the Falklands; the main concern just now was the hard winter, that the sheep farmers were all having to cope with. Argentina had receded rather into the background again, but it was nevertheless true to say that most Islanders were nowadays more open to discussing the political problem than they used to be, and the Governor believed that given time and a sensible attitude from the Argentines, a solution would come." [2269]

Discussing other issues, Governor Haskard recognises that extending the Falklands claim over the continental shelf would be risky at this time, but that it would be difficult to refuse an oil exploration licence for areas already claimed; as such would bring in needed revenue to the Falklands' exchequer.

The Governor also complains about deliberate delays to Falklands mail and the defacement of letters as they pass through the Argentine postal system. Haskard informs Summerhayes that the Islanders remain reluctant to either visit Argentina, or accept visitors from Argentina.

August 7th, writing from Buenos Aires, newly arrived Ambassador Hadow raises the Falklands question.

"I have been doing a lot of reading of back files on the dispute and on the history and it has struck me that there are three fairly consistent factors, one or other of which appear whenever the Argentine Government decide to start making a major issue of their claim. These are:- i) A Government which is in trouble, not widely popular and needing an issue to 'unite the country'. ii) A sector of the population which wishes to attack or weaken the Government, and uses the Falklands as a popular issue with which to do so; and iii) a Foreign Minister who wants to make a name for himself. Without wishing to cry wolf, I think we should be aware that all of these three factors are now present on the Argentine scene" [2270]

August 19th, from London, the FCO respond to Ambassador Hadow's letter; raising concerns about applications for oil exploration licences. [2271]

2267 Noted in *FCO 7/1076*
2268 *A/AC.109/L.584*
2269 *FCO 7/1082*
2270 *Ibid.*
2271 See end of December, 1968, above

"… we have not been inactive since you left, doing our homework and also trying to keep the Argentine Embassy here in play… As for oil, we are still treating that subject on a need-to-know basis here because of its awful implications. … We are under no illusions about the dangers of giving Grynbergs the green light to go ahead, whether or not oil is found and whether or not extension of the Continental Shelf is involved. …

But equally we are under no illusions (nor indeed is Lord Shepherd) as to the domestic Parliamentary implications, once the news gets out, of exercising a governmental veto on licensing exploration/exploitation if the Islanders are keen to go ahead; and according to Haskard they are, for obvious economic reasons. If we do veto, or stall indefinitely, the news is bound to get out. …

In circumstances where one cannot win, one's instinct, inevitably, is to play for time. ***We are searching for reasons to stall which might look reasonably convincing to Parliament and the press****. The best we have been able to think up so far is another geological survey to be financed by ODM which might buy us another year or 18 months."* [2272]

August 25th, in Argentina, a news report from a radio station in Chubut, announces that talks between the British and Argentine governments are about to resume. [2273]

"Is this Argentine propaganda or is the sovereignty of the Falklands going to be discussed again?" [2274]

August 26th, in London, Argentina's Ambassador McLoughlin proposes that the annual joint letters sent to the UN's Secretary-General; *"… should this time include a reference to separate talks on communications."* [2275]

"After a considerable interval the Argentine Ambassador in London tentatively floated the idea that our annual letters to the United Nations should this time include a reference to separate talks on communications. And on his return from leave and consultation in Buenos Aires on 26 August he stated that he had been authorised to confirm this suggestion. His Embassy also produced a draft text of the letters to the United Nations. … there are still some difficulties. The main one is that the Argentines want it understood that the talks on communications should take place in Argentina;.. The Governor, who is home on leave, believes that the idea of holding talks at all would be viewed with suspicion by the Islanders, and that it would be very difficult to persuade them to take part in talks in Argentina. We suggested Montevideo, … but the Argentines rejected this…" [2276]

"Despite Argentina's reluctance to abandon the principle that an unconditional recognition of her sovereignty should precede any further action, the Argentine Government finally agreed, in August 1969, that bilateral talks confined to the subject of communications, and with the participation of representatives from the Falkland Islands, as members of the British Delegation, should be held in 1970." [2277]

August 28th, in London, at the FCO, after seeing Counsellor Ros from the Argentine Embassy, Charles Wiggin completes a *memorandum* for internal circulation.

2272 *Hayman to Hadow August 19, 1969* in *FCO 7/1082.* My emphasis. Further evidence of the FCO's negative attitude towards the Falkland Islands. *Grynberg Oil* was a Denver based company owned by Jack Grynberg.
2273 Carassai 2022
2274 *Are Talks Going On?* in *The Falkland Islands Monthly Review* September 1, 1969 no.129
2275 *FCO 7/1076*
2276 *Memorandum by Michael Stewart October 21st, 1969* in *FCO 7/1081*
2277 *Research Department Memorandum – The Falkland Islands Dispute: Developments from 1965 -1968 (May 3, 1973)* in *FO 7/3201* attached to *281*

"(Ros) said that his Foreign Minister would undoubtedly have to make some reference to the Falkland Islands in his main speech to the General Assembly. … He said that the Argentine Government were not looking for controversy in the United Nations…" [2278]

September 2nd, Argentina's Counsellor Ros calls on the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

"Mr. Ros began by referring to the agreement last year, at official level, on the Memorandum of Understanding and Her Majesty's Government's subsequent decision not to sign that Memorandum. … Mr. Ros then produced a new draft." [2279]

September 5th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Hadow responds to the FCO.

"I well understand your dilemma over the oil exploration question. It could become a most awkward issue and buying time seems to be the only answer for the moment. As it is very much in the Islanders' own interests to keep the temperature down in the dispute with Argentina, ***they should also I think accept that there are limits to their freedom of action*** *in anything concerning sovereignty over the Continental Shelf."* [2280]

In the Falkland Island, overseas education allowances are increased. [2281]

September 12th, in London, further talks between Ros, and Wiggin take place. [2282]

September 16th, *Grynberg Oil*, the US company applying for oil exploration licences around the Falklands archipelago, starts lobbying for a response.

"… latterly Gryberg's have begun to step up the pressure. On 16 September Sir Dingle Foot called on Sir Denis Greenhill to urge favourable consideration of Grynberg's applications." [2283]

"When Sir Dingle Foot (who represents the oil company) came to see me after he had seen Sir Denis Greenhill, he talked of the company investing up to £30 million for the exploration of oil and of providing up to 5,000 new jobs on the Islands if oil were found. I think he may have been talking big in the hope of selling his client's commercial case." [2284]

At Port Stanley, a five-man advisory team, sponsored by the Ministry of Overseas Development, arrive.

"The terms of reference of the team were to study all aspects of sheep and cattle health and production in the Falkland Islands, to make recommendations as to how farmers can best improve the productivity of the sheep industry and to advise on the future production of beef cattle. The Development Committee of the Legislative Council gave the visitors a comprehensive introduction to the background of farming in the Colony, whereafter the team quickly settled down to a most thorough examination of the many problems confronting the industry. A special laboratory was established in the King Edward Memorial Hospital with very modern equipment given by the Ministry of Overseas Development and a programme was planned to cover every farm." [2285]

2278 *Memorandum for the Record* by Charles Wiggin in *FCO 7/1082* at *56*
2279 *FCO 7/1082*
2280 *FCO 7/1081* at *57.* My emphasis. Quite why the Islanders should have accepted any limitation was not explained.
2281 *Falkland Islands Gazette 1970*
2282 *FCO 7/1082*
2283 *Appendix to Memorandum by Michael Stewart October 21st, 1969* in *FCO 7/1081*
2284 *Wiggin Briefing Paper for OPD meeting October 24, 1969* in *FCO 7/1081* at *223*
2285 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1968 & 1969*.

September 21st, during a discussion between Britain's Foreign Secretary and Argentina's Foreign Minister, it is agreed that the differences over where communication talks should take place, should not delay letters to the UN Secretary-General to the effect that they **were** taking place. [2286]

September 25th, in New York, Argentina's Foreign Minister makes a speech at the opening of the UN session.

> *"... if we frame our controversy strictly within the terms of resolution 2065 (XX), and if the United Kingdom is willing to consider this question without preconceived ideas, ... it will be easy to reach a definite settlement which, at the same time, may satisfy and guarantee the interests of the inhabitants..."*

On the same day, internal correspondence within the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office confirm that Argentine Counsellor Ros is fully aware of the difficulties.

> *"Lord Chalfont has commented on your record, dated 16 September, of a meeting with the Argentine Counsellor: "We will not get through Parliament any document that does not include a clear reference to "the wishes" of the Islanders."* [2287]

September 26th, the UK exercises its right of reply in a letter to the UN Secretary-General.

> *"... the United Kingdom and the Argentine Governments have been engaged in talks on this subject in accordance with resolution 2065 (XX) of the General Assembly,... I am, however, obliged to state that the United Kingdom Government does not accept the statement of the distinguished Foreign Minister of the Argentine Republic in so far as it disputes the sovereignty of the United Kingdom Government over the Falkland Islands. ..."* [2288]



October 10th, in London, the Cabinet's Defence & Overseas Policy Committee consider the issue of Falklands oil exploration licenses. [2289]

"The areas are:- (a) An area to the north-west of the Islands is in international law part of the Continental Shelf of the Falkland Islands, but in domestic law has not been so designated. (b) An area (2) which is both part of the Continental Shelf of the Falkland islands in international law and in domestic law within the boundaries of the Falkland Islands. (c) Part of the Burwood Bank to the south of the Islands... Its status in international law is as yet undefined."[2290]

October 21st, for the information of a further Defence & Overseas Policy Committee meeting due on the 24th, Britain's Foreign Secretary, Michael Stewart, prepares a recommendation:

2286 Background briefing paper (unsigned & undated but after September, 1969) in *FCO 7/1076.* Location not stated.
2287 *FCO 7/1083* at *72*
2288 *UN Doc A8023/Rev.1 vol.4 chapter 19*
2289 *FCO 7/1080*
2290 *Annex B to the Memorandum by Michael Stewart October 21, 1969* in *FCO 7/1081*

"I recommend that:- … (b) We should try discretely, through the Governor, to persuade the Islanders that to approve any of the applications for oil exploration would not be in their own interests. (c) We should in the first instance consider refusing Grynberg's application outright and taking no further action on oil even if the Islanders wish exploration to proceed, this on the basis that the responsibility for the exercise of sovereign rights over the Continental Shelf rests with Her Majesty's Government, and that it would not be in the British national interest (or the Islanders' own) to take the risks involved in exploration.

But one difficulty about this line is that under Article 73 of the United Nations Charter the interests of "the inhabitants" are held to be paramount; and that, in the broader context, we take the view that the wishes are an important factor in determining their interests. (d) If, however, my colleagues consider that (c) above is impossible for domestic, parliamentary or other reasons, we should seek to buy a year or more time by undertaking a Government survey of the sea areas in question in order to learn more about the oil prospects there; and perhaps offer the Islanders some additional "inducements" at some stage if necessary in order to help buy time,.." [2291]

October 24th, in London, the Cabinet's Defence & Overseas Policy Committee Committee consider the Falklands' question; hearing views from both Ministers and submissions from FCO officials.

"Some radical ideas have been floated in the past, e.g. sponsored immigration, condominium, leasing a base to the Argentines. They all present awful problems and it is very difficult to visualise any of them as starters at present. But we should not resign ourselves to allow this problem to continue to bedevil our relations with Latin America and to cause us difficulties at the UN, and we must keep trying. We should therefore continue our negotiations…" [2292]

The committee conclude that a decision on oil licensing around the Falklands archipelago should be deferred.

"… a thirty-nine-year-old American was thinking of collaborating with a British company to spend millions on a potential oil strike, apparently based on some geologist's vague talk 50 years ago. … There was an elaborate paper from Michael Stewart saying that if the Argentines suspected an oil strike, they might land an army and then where would we all be if the tried to take over the Islands and the oil? … the striking fact was that the Foreign Office said the only thing to do was to conceal the suggestion and prevent any testing." [2293]

"Exploration would arouse the gravest misgivings in Argentina, the more so if the Continental Shelf were extended in the process… The temptation to take physical action might well become irresistible." [2294]

"Since the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee considered the subject on 24 October we have heard of two more enquiries for exploration licences, one from 'Grynbergs', who were already in the field, and one from a Canadian company which may be a subsidiary of a United States company. There has also apparently been another enquiry from a third company. We are trying to find out more about these newcomers." [2295]

"The British Government was anxious not to antagonize Argentina by initiating major unilateral development in the Falklands. This was illustrated by a meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee on 24 October. Michael Stewart, the Foreign Secretary, feared that Argentina would invade the Falklands if

2291 *Memorandum by Michael Stewart October 21st, 1969* in *FCO 7/1081*
2292 *Wiggin Speaking Notes for OPD meeting October 24, 1969* in *FCO 7/1081* at *223*
2293 *Diaries of a Cabinet Minister. Vol 3: Secretary of State for Social Services `1968-1970* Richard Crossman 1978
2294 *Memorandum by Michael Stewart October 21st, 1969* in *FCO 7/1081*
2295 *Falklands Oil November 24, 1969* in *FCO 7/1076*

approval was given to an American entrepreneur who wanted to drill for oil off the Islands. The meeting agreed to postpone a decision until after the next General Election." [2296]

October 29th, instructions are sent from the FCO, to Governor Haskard.

> *"Ministers have approved proposals for talks on communications and text of United Kingdom draft letter to United Nations' Secretary-General. 2. We shall resume discussions with Argentine Embassy here on Friday, 31 October with a view to reaching agreement on timing of issue of letters in the United nations and venue of communication talks. … 3. Unless you see difficulties please now proceed as follows. 4.Inform member of your Executive Council of contents of UN letter …*
>
> *In talking to Council you should emphasise that:- (a) matter remains strictly confidential… (b) Argentines have assured us that talks on communications will be technical and practical and quite separate from any talks on political issues. (c) We believe this represents a considerable advance on the Argentine side and one which could in time bring concrete advantages to the Islands.*
>
> *5. You may if necessary reassure the Council that there has been no, repeat no, change on the question of sovereignty. This is main reason why Argentine offer of communications talks constitutes an advance. Hitherto they have shown unwillingness to engage in such talks in the absence of agreement on central issues for fear of prejudicing their position on sovereignty….*
>
> *8. We shall also telegraph further shortly on the oil question. Please do not, repeat not, discuss the substance of oil problem with the Council before you receive a further message."* [2297]

October 31st, from Stanley, Governor Haskard informs the FCO that the Executive Council have been made aware of the current situation, and that the general reaction has been; *"… not too unfavourable."* [2298]

November 19th, reports from Buenos Aires suggest that the Argentine Foreign Minister has said that the joint statement due to be delivered to the UN's Secretary-General, would need to be a positive step towards a solution of the conflict over possession of the Islands. [2299]

> *"Is the right hon. Gentleman aware that the Argentine Foreign Minister was reported early yesterday morning to have said that the joint statement would be a positive step towards a solution of the conflict over possession of the islands?*
>
> *Is it not most regrettable that on a matter affecting the interests of British subjects in a British territory this House should learn about the matter first from a spokesman of a foreign Government and not from the right hon. Gentleman?"* [2300]

2296 Ellerby 1990 p.170 citing *R. Crossman, The Diaries of a Cabinet Minister (London, 1977), iii 697.*
2297 *FCO to Falkland Islands TelNo 134 October 29, 1969* in *FCO 7/1081*
2298 *FCO 7/1083* at *81*
2299 *FCO 7/1081*
2300 Mr. Braine MP to Foreign Secretary Stewart on November 20, 1969. See *HC Deb 20 November 1969 vol 791 cc1522-5* See - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1969/nov/20/falkland-islands

November 20th, in London, at the Cabinet's Defence & Overseas Policy Committee meeting, Michael Stewart informs Ministers that the Argentines are offering to discuss communication issues without the need for a prior commitment on the issue of sovereignty.

> *"… this Argentine initiative could in time become of considerable significance. If we are ever to achieve a satisfactory resolution of this difficult problem it can only come about by the process of the Falkland Islanders and the Argentines getting to know each other."* [2301]

In Britain's *Financial Times* newspaper, an article suggests that the British Government is hoping to resolve the Falklands dispute with Argentina through a process of economic attrition; by letting the Islands' economy wither to the point where all the Islanders are obliged to emigrate. [2302]

"This suggestion is unfounded. An economic survey of the islands was carried out in 1967 and following this a soil survey was made. A team of agricultural experts are at present in the Colony studying the wool industry and the prospects for cattle. It is hoped that this will lead to improvements in the islands' economy. A geological map of the islands is at present being compiled here based on field work already done in the islands. These projects were and are being carried out under the auspices of the Ministry of Overseas Development and paid for by her Majesty's Government. Provision of some £40,000 annually in recent years has been made available to the Colony under the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts." [2303]

In Britain's House of Commons, Secretary of State Michael Stewart makes a statement.

> *"With your permission, Mr. Speaker, and that of the House, I should like to make a statement on the Falkland Islands. As I informed the House on the 11th of December, 1968, discussions with the Argentine Government have continued. In accordance with the practice for several years past, letters will be sent by the Argentine Government and ourselves to the Secretary General of the United Nations describing these discussions.*
>
> *The text of these letters will be made public tomorrow at 7.30 p.m. Falkland Islands time, a time agreed by all parties and convenient to the Falkland Islanders. With the permission of the House, I will make a fuller statement on Monday. Meanwhile, I can assure the House that the undertakings which Her Majesty's Government have repeatedly given both to Parliament and to the islanders remain unchanged, namely, that the Governor and his Executive Council have been kept informed and that there can be no transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the islanders. …*
>
> *I made this statement today because I gathered that a report from Buenos Aires alarmed some hon. Members."* [2304]

November 21st, in New York, Lord Caradon writes to the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

> *"Your Excellency,… I now have to inform you that, although divergence remains between the two Governments regarding the circumstances that should exist for a definitive solution of the dispute, it has been agreed that, within the general framework of these negotiations, special talks with a view to reaching agreement on practical measures for the implementation and promotion of free communications and movement in both directions between the mainland and the Islands, will take*

2301 *Wiggin Speaking Notes for OPD meeting November 20, 1969* in *FCO 7/1081* at *230*
2302 *FCO 7/1076*
2303 Briefing note (unsigned & undated) in *FCO 7/1076.* See the *Guillebaud Report* 1967
2304 *HC Deb 20 November 1969 vol 791 cc1522-5.* A reference to reports from Argentina on November 19, 1969.

place early next year at a mutually convenient time. Both Governments will continue their efforts towards a definitive solution of the dispute and will report again to Your Excellency in due course." [2305]

"The expression "Special Conversations" was used by agreement between the two Governments, at Argentine request, to differentiate these conversations from the negotiations on the question of the sovereignty ... According to the interpretation of the parties, "communications and movement between the mainland and the islands in both directions" included movement of persons,.. transport of people and merchandise, as well as other activities." [2306]

In New York, Argentina's Permanent Representative, Jose Ruda, also writes to the Secretary-General.

"I have the honour to address Your Excellency in connexion with the question of the Malvinas Islands. Following my letter of 19 December 1968 to Your Excellency, the Government of the Argentine Republic has continued negotiations with the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland with the common objective of settling as soon as possible the dispute concerning sovereignty over the Malvinas Islands in a definitive and amicable manner, taking duly into account the interests of the inhabitants of the Islands, in accordance with resolution 2065 (XX) and the consensuses adopted by the General Assembly on 20 December 1966 and 19 December 1967.

I now have to inform Your Excellency that, although divergence remains between the two Governments regarding the circumstances that should exist for a definitive solution of the dispute, it has been agreed that, within the general framework of these negotiations, special talks with a view to reaching agreement on practical measures for the implementation and promotion of free communications and movement in both directions between the mainland and the Islands will take place early next year at a mutually convenient time. Both Governments will continue their efforts towards a definitive solution of the dispute and will report again to your Excellency in due course." [2307]

In the Falkland Islands, Governor Haskard speaks to the Islanders via the Falklands' Broadcasting Service.

"I expect that most people in the Colony will have heard the news items which have been coming over the wireless in the last couple of days. A good deal of publicity has been given to the fact that an announcement is to be made on this, this evening and I would say that advance publicity has been somewhat overdone. Modern means of communication result in surmise and conjecture being flashed around the world and stories, often inaccurate, get wide circulation. One such linked my trip home on leave three months ago with political talks on sovereignty. ... The British Government's position has been stated by Ministers in Westminster parliament time and again and was reaffirmed only yesterday by Michael Stewart, the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs, speaking in the House of Commons where he reiterated that there can be no transfer of sovereignty against the wishes of the people of these Islands." [2308]

In Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Minister tells his country's press that it is; *"Argentina's determination to achieve full re-integration of the Islands into the national patrimony."* [2309]

2305 *FCO 7/1076. UN Document A/7786* of November 21, 1969.

2306 *Las "Conversaciones Especiales" Argentina-Gran Bretaña sobre comunicaciones entre el Territorio Continental Argentino y las Islas Malvinas de 1970-72. Una negociacion Diplomatica Tipica* Juan Carlos M. Beltramino 1997. In 1969, Beltramino was employed at the Argentine Embassy in London. He attended all the meetings with the FCO.

2307 *UN Doc A/7785 Letter dated 21 November from the Permanent Representative of Argentina to the United nations addressed to the Secretary-General.*

2308 *FCO 7/1076*

2309 *Ibid.*

November 22nd, Governor Haskard telegrams London.

> *"Rather too early to be able to gauge general public's reaction. Executive Council's reaction cautious and expressed some apprehension regarding possibility of Argentina attaining the position where she could exert increasing political control through domination of communication links."* [2310]

November 24th, in Britain's House Of Commons, Michael Stewart, makes a statement and takes questions.

> *"Last Friday, letters were sent by my right hon. and noble Friend Lord Caradon and by the Argentine representative to the United Nations, to the Secretary-General. The letters were published late that day. The text of my right hon. and noble Friend's letter—and a translation of the other letter—have been placed in the Library, and are being circulated in the official report. The letters state that the two Governments have continued negotiations and that, although divergence remains, special talks will begin early next year to promote free communications and movement in both directions between the mainland and the islands. Her Majesty's Government's position on the central question remains unchanged. I believe that the House will regard this as a welcome development. ...*
>
> *I really cannot say what the prospects are for a definitive solution. At present, we have made our attitude on this quite clear and the Argentine Government have made theirs clear. As the recent letters say, the divergence remains and I think that we must leave it there. On the question of an air link with Chile, there is, of course, at present no airfield in the Falklands, but an airfield feasibility study was carried out by experts of the Board of Trade this year for the islands and their report is under study. ... For some time we have been continuing discussions with the Argentine on the whole issue, including what I call the central issue, but now, within the framework of those negotiations, there will be these special talks which will be concerned solely with the promotion of communications and movement."*[2311]

November 26th, in London, at the FCO, a *Briefing Note* is prepared for the Leader of the House of Commons.

> *"... Some progress... has in fact been made in the latest discussions in that the Argentines suggested that separate talks should be held on how communications between the Islands and Argentine territory might be improved. This represents a definitive advance on the previous Argentine position since they had hitherto always maintained that talks on communications and other practical questions could not proceed a clear and unequivocal recognition of Argentina's claims to sovereignty."* [2312]

November 27th, Britain's *Daily Express* newspaper publishes a claim that oil is to be found near the Falklands.

"This follows a report from geologists to the Government that after making a new study they are convinced oil is present in marketable quantities." [2313]

December 2nd, in London, at an informal lunch, Wiggin of the FCO and Ros of the Argentine Embassy discuss the question of oil at the Falklands.

> *"He (Ros) said that the press and agency reports had put the wind up his Government and implied that his Ambassador had been urging them not to panic and to "trust the FCO." He also expressed puzzlement at the reports, saying that all the Argentines own information suggested that there was no oil in that particular area."* [2314]

2310 *Telno.173 22 November, 1969* in *FCO 7/1076*
2311 *HC Deb 24 November 1969 vol.792 cc36-40.* Also *FCO 7/1081*
2312 Unsigned in *FCO 7/1076*
2313 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* April 6, 1970. The Falkland Islands government responded that it was unaware of any new survey.
2314 *C. D. Wiggin (undated)* in *FCO 7/1074*

In New York, on the same day, the Special Committee on Decolonization presents its report to the UN. [2315]

December 4th, in New York, the General Assembly of the UN adopts resolution 2521 (XXIV) which calls for a programme of activities to celebrate the tenth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in 1970. [2316]

December 11th, at the UN, the General Assembly approves resolution *2548 (XXIV)* on the *Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*. [2317] *Art. 13* invites the Special Committee on Decolonization to; *"... continue to pay particular attention to the small Territories and to recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate methods and also the steps to be taken to enable the populations of those Territories to exercise fully their right to self-determination and independence."* No exceptions are noted.

At Stanley, on the same day, HMS *Endurance* anchors in the harbour.

December 16th, in New York, before deferring the issue to 1970, the General Assembly of the United Nations considers the question of the Falklands.

> *"... note with satisfaction of the progress achieved in the negotiations... and urges the parties, bearing particularly in mind resolution 2065 (xx)... to continue their efforts to reach, as soon as possible, a definitive solution of the dispute..."*

December 31st, a new Argentine law is promulgated (*no.18,513*), known as the Argentine Antarctic Law. [2318]

"At an institutional level, Law No. 18,513, of December 31, 1969, sets the legal, organic, and functional bases for the planning, programming, management, and control of Argentine Antarctic activity. ... By virtue of it, the responsibilities of conducting the foreign affairs policy in the matter will be reserved to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, while the planning, programming, management and control of scientific, technical and logistic activities will correspond to to the Ministry of Defense and the logistical support will be provided by the Armed Forces." [2319]

The biannual review estimates a population in the Islands of 2,098, with 58 births, 30 marriages and 23 deaths during the year.

> *"For medical purposes, the Falklands are divided into three areas: Stanley with the North Camp of the East Falkland, Lafonia and West Falkland. The Senior Medical Officer and one medical officer are stationed in Stanley and see all patients in Stanley and the North Camp. One medical officer lives at Darwin in Lafonia and deals with medical cases in that area; and the third medical officer is stationed at Fox Bay on the West Falkland, and attends patients on the West Falkland and the islands to the north and west of it. All settlements in the main East and West Falkland can communicate with a doctor by telephone. All the inhabited islands are supplied with radio-telephones. Standard medical chests are provided at all settlements.*
>
> *The Government Air Service is available for the transport of doctors and patients. As a rule, the camp doctors travel by Land Rover or aircraft to their patients but still occasionally ride on horse-back. One dentist and a dental technician are stationed in Stanley where there is a modern, fully equipped dental surgery and laboratory in the hospital.*

2315 *UN Document A/7623/Rev.1 [IV]* p.206. The Committee merely referred its Working Paper to the Fourth Committee.
2316 This seems to have arisen as a direct result of a sub-committee of the UN's Special Committee on Decolonization.
2317 See - https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/256/82/pdf/nr025682.pdf
2318 See - http://servicios.infoleg.gob.ar/infolegInternet/anexos/60000-64999/63921/norma.htm
2319 Trevisan 1997

Another dentist makes camp tours, endeavouring to visit each settlement in the course of the year. The staff of the Medical Department includes a Senior Medical Officer, three medical officers, two dental officers, and one dental technician, one matron, three nursing sisters and up to five staff nurses, together with domestic staff and a clerk." [2320]

1970 – January 6th, Argentine journal *Cuarto Nivel* reports; *"Argentines are divided and disunited in everything; however, above all, there is a circumstance, a fact or a name that works the miracle of uniting us, without any discussion. ... we Argentines agree on something, totally and unequivocally,... The Malvinas are Argentine. That is the only thing that authentically unites us, from Misiones to Mendoza, from La Quiaca to Antarctica."* [2321]

January 26th, the *Lindblad Explorer*, a 250-foot long passenger ship capable of carrying 100 tourists, visits West Point Island; the first '*cruise liner*' to do so; *"... She acquired the nickname "The Little Red Ship" and was a familiar sight around the Falklands for 37 years..."* [2322]

January 31st, at Stanley, *Lindblad Explorer* berths alongside the FIC East Jetty. A Tourist Board is organised under the chairmanship of Alexander Sloggie, Colonial Manager at Stanley. [2323]

February 2nd, in London, in a written answer, the House of Commons are informed that there have been no new developments of significance in talks with Argentina. [2324]

February 23rd, in Britain's House of Commons, in response to a question regarding pilot schemes for the extraction and processing of seaweed in the Falklands, a written answer states that; *"Her Majesty's Government are advising the Falkland Islands' Government in their negotiations over royalties with Alginate Industries Ltd. The Falkland Islands' Government have offered to provide free water and electricity on repayment once it has been decided to start a pilot project."*

In a further written answer, the government spokesman confirms that, as regard discussions with Argentina; *"We are in continuing touch with the Argentine Government and the Governor of the Falkland Islands. The talks on communications are still in the preparatory stages, and the time and place of a special meeting on this question have not yet been fixed."* [2325]

In **March**, retired builder and amateur naturalist, Len Hill, purchases the Jason Islands for £5,500.

March 15th, in the UK, the BBC airs a *World About Us* programme, entitled *The Unexpected Isles*.

"Every year the Falkland Islands became just that much less unknown to the outside world and the imaginative project to take the Great Britain back to England has brought the Colony some unlooked for publicity. A film called "The Unsuspected Isles" has been well received on B. B. C. television; the material was fathered last year in the Falklands by Mr Tony Morrison, while Mrs Morrison gave the Colony same unexpected publicity in The Observer." [2326]

2320 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1968 & 1969*
2321 Quoted in Carassai 2022
2322 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.563
2323 *Falkland Islands Gazette* August 17, 1970
2324 *HC Deb 2 February 1970 vol.795*
2325 *HC Deb 23 February 1970 vol.796 c229W*
2326 *Falkland Islands Gazette* August 17, 1970.

Ardent Argentine nationalist, Juan Carlos Moreno, arrives in the Falkland Islands. [2327]

From Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador, Michael Hadow, visits Stanley; *"... to prepare the way for the talks."*

"... that this successful visit was possible is an indication of the move towards a more relaxed and easier relationship with the Coast." [2328]

April 13th, at Port Stanley, the hulk of SS *Great Britain* is lifted onto a pontoon for towing to Bristol. [2329] HMS *Endurance* moors nearby (right).

April 21st, in New York, at the UN, within the Special Committee on Decolonization, an *ad hoc* group is formed to consider an appropriate commemoration for the tenth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples of December 14, 1960 (resolution 1514). [2330]

April 26th, in Argentina, an article in the *Buenos Aires Herald*, by Juan Carlos Moreno, is published - *A Falkland Islander wants to register the birth of his son in Buenos Aires.*

"... we must point out that the parent mentioned in the Herald is of Argentine birth. Mr Moreno, no doubt, wishes to convey a favourable picture to Argentine readers, but as his reported views conflict with those of most Falkland Islanders we offer comments passed on the article. The paper reports that the application for the registration of the child is not the only indication that some of the Islanders were preparing themselves for the "inevitable change" from British to Argentine administration. We are glad to report that there is no open indication of this among the Islanders. Mr Moreno found that "a large number of Islanders, both British and native born, spoke Spanish or were interested in learning the language". This is understandable for two reasons - firstly, many of the Islanders visit Montevideo, or pass through that port en route to other parts of the world, and would like to converse with the residents there; secondly, Spanish, like English, is a universal language. The article further reports that the Professor also said that the Islanders, the authorities and the resident British "no longer deny Argentina's rights over the archipelago, as used to be the case". No true-born Falkland Islander, who looks upon our Mother Country, Britain, with affection and loyalty, would ever agree with this statement. "Keep the Falklands British" is a motto we have adopted in no light frame of mind. It would appear that Professor Moreno came to collect information for the Instituto de Las Islas Malvinas y Tierras Australes Argentinas as he reported to this body that he thought the Islanders were looking forward to the day when communications between Argentina and Port Stanley would be established. Comments locally indicate that such a link would be the "thin edge of the wedge".." [2331]

2327 Journalist and teacher. In 1936, Moreno had been sponsored to visit the Islands by Argentina's National Culture Commission, arriving on December 29, 1936. He published a book about his visit in 1938 – *Nuestras Malvinas*. *cf.* 1936, 1937, 1938 and October, 1939.

2328 Sir Cosmo Haskard addressing the Legislative Council of the Falkland Islands, June 3, 1970

2329 Built in 1845, SS *Great Britain* was famous before she ever sailed. After 40 years of service, she arrived off Stanley in 1886. Found to be unseaworthy, the ship was sold to the Falkland islands Company and used for coal storage until 1937.

2330 Members of this group were Afghanistan, Bulgaria*, Ecuador, Ethiopia, India, Iran, Iraq, Italy, Ivory Coast, Madagascar, Mali, Norway, Poland*, Sierra Leone, Syria, Tanzania, Tunisia, Venezuela, Yugoslavia*, the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (Russia), the UK and the USA. * = satellites of the Soviet Union.

2331 *Falkand Islands Monthly Review* June 1, 1970 citing *The Buenos Aires Herald* April 26, 1970.

May 8th, in Montevideo, delegates from Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Ecuador, El Salvador, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay conclude a conference on the Law of the Sea. Adopted unanimously is a *Declaration of Principles on the Law of the Sea* to be entitled the *Montevideo Declaration on the Law of the Sea*.

> *"Declare the following to be Basic principles of the Law of the Sea:*
>
> *1. the right of coastal States to avail themselves of the natural resources of the sea adjacent to their coasts and of the soil and subsoil thereof in order to promote the maximum development of their economies and to raise the levels of living of their peoples;*
>
> *2. the right to establish the limits of their maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction in accordance with the geographical and geological characteristics and with factors governing the existence of marine resources and the need for rational utilization;*
>
> *3. the right to explore, to conserve the living resources of the sea adjacent to their territories, and to establish regulations for fishing and aquatic hunting;*
>
> *4. the right to explore, conserve and exploit the natural resources of their continental shelves to where the depth of the superjacent waters admits of the exploitation of such resources;*
>
> *5. the right to explore, conserve and exploit the natural resources of the soil and subsoil of the sea-bed and ocean floor up to the limit within which the State exercises its jurisdiction over the sea;*
>
> *6. the right to adopt, for the aforementioned purposes, regulatory measures applicable in areas under their maritime sovereignty and jurisdiction, without prejudice to freedom of navigation by ships and overflying by aircraft of any flag."* [2332]

May 11th, in London, to a question regarding progress on 'unrestricted communications' for the Falkland Islands, a written answer is given in the House of Commons by the Foreign Secretary.

> *"... exchanges have continued... The Falkland Islands Government have been kept fully informed throughout. It has been possible in these exchanges to identify some ways in which free communications and movement in both directions might be promoted, and both sides believe that these deserve detailed study. I expect the talks to proceed on a continuing basis. Meetings will be held from time to time with appropriate participation from the Falkland Islands."* [2333]

"...two Honourable Members, Mr Pitaluga and Mr Hills, are already in the United Kingdom, together with the Senior Unofficial Member of Executive Council, Mr. Barton. There they are soon to be joined by the Colonial Secretary and Major Goss who, with Mr Pitaluga, have been nominated as the Falkland Islands representatives in the British delegation which is to meet in London a delegation from the Argentine Government in a round of talks on communications." [2334]

June 3rd, Governor Haskard addresses the Legislative Council of the Falkland Islands.

> *"We are proud Since 1885 the Colony has been financially self supporting and this is the way we wish it to be. It allows us to stand on our own feet and to look the world in the eye. ...Governors and Colonial Secretaries come and go but it is indeed upon the collective wisdom and ability of the unofficial members of the Executive and Legislative Councils that the well-being of the Colony depends in increasing degree.*

2332 Notified to the United Nations Secretary-General on May 28, 1970
2333 *HC Deb 11 May 1970 vol.801*
2334 *Falkland Islands Gazette* August 17, 1970

Perhaps not everyone realises this and so it is right to say it clearly and without misunderstanding. Our representatives – and I am not forgetting here the Honourable Member Mr. Pitaluga, who has already gone on ahead – will have the benefit in England of consultation with other Council members, Mr. Barton and Mr. Hill; they will bring themselves up to date with the thinking of the London Office of the Falkland Islands Company; they will have close discussion with the Foreign and Commonwealth Office about our communications needs; and then, well prepared, they will as part of the British Government delegation go on to talks with the Argentines, confident in the knowledge that the talks are about communications, not sovereignty; confident in the assurance so often given and once again repeated by the Secretary of State in Parliament on the 20th November last that no transfer of sovereignty can take place against the wishes of the people of the Falkland Islands." [2335]

June 10th, in Argentina activities commemorating the events of 1770 and 1829 are organised.

"... presided over by Professor Caillet-Bois, who was accompanied on the podium by Commodore Raúl Villagra, representing the Commander-in-Chief of the Air Force; Minister Plenipotentiary Juan Carlos Beltramino, representing the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Civil Aviation; Colonel Juan Luis Huarte, Cabinet Advisor to the Secretary of CONASE; and Ambassador Ezequiel Pereyra Zorraquin. Also in attendance were senior officials from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and representatives of cultural institutes, as well as a large audience." [2336]

June 18th, in the UK, a General Election sees a change of Government. The Tory party's Edward Heath becomes Prime Minister, with Sir Alec Douglas Home appointed as Foreign Secretary. Talks with Argentina continue.

"Douglas-Home's only provisos were that sovereignty should not be on the agenda and that the islanders should be involved throughout." [2337]

July 13th, in London, agreement is reached on the conditions for a round of talks regarding communications between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. Amongst a number of decisions on procedure it is decided to announce; *"... that the negotiations are continuous and confidential and that there will be no information to the press on the issues under discussion."* [2338]

"British delegations also included some islanders in their capacity as advisers." [2339]

July 14th, Anglo-Argentine communication negotiations resume with Britain's delegation including two Islanders, Councillors Goss and Pitaluga. Britain's delegation submits an opening statement.

"... if, as we hope, the present round of talks would eventually result in some kind of agreement to promote freedom of communication before any general solution to the dispute has been reached (on sovereignty), then a corresponding agreement would be necessary in one form or another that would be without prejudice to the rights or claims of territorial sovereignty of either party." [2340]

2335 *Ibid*.
2336 Lo Coco 2024. See Vol.1 and Vol.2
2337 Hastings & Jenkins 1997
2338 Beltramino 1997
2339 Ellerby 1990 p.171.
2340 Quoted in Beltramino 1997

"The Government down-graded the importance of the dispute. A Foreign Office junior minister was made responsible for conducting the dialogue. He was assisted by David Scott, the Under-Secretary in charge of dependent territories. The Conservative Government fulfilled its pledge to remove sovereignty from the agenda of the Anglo-Argentine talks and to ensure that representatives of the Islanders participated." [2341]

July 24th, in London, following a week of talks, a final *communique* is published.

> *"Several proposals and ideas for the promotion of free communications were considered. The two delegations discussed problems relating to the movement of persons in both directions, to the establishment of sea and air communications, to postal and telecommunication services, to the development of trade and to the promotion of cultural exchanges. Both sides agreed in principle that there appeared to be considerable scope for the promotion of free communications and that every effort should be made to try and reach agreement on practical measures to that end. ... Both sides agreed ... that there should be further meetings, ... that the next meeting should take place in Buenos Aires, and that thereafter a meeting should be held at Port Stanley."*

In England, the directors of the Falkland Islands Company conclude that, with a fall in wool prices, the company owned vessel, *Darwin*, should be withdrawn from service. Despite the ship being the primary means of communication and transport between the Falklands and South America, the decision is not relayed to the Islands Government. It is, however, sent to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, who sit on it. [2342]

"... the FIC had received reports that three Chilean airlines were interested in providing an air link between Punta Arenas and Stanley, one of which said it would be prepared to pay for an airport in the islands; it is unclear whether the British government deliberately refrained from passing the proposal to Stanley or was simply very slow in digesting them, but the effect was the same, and Sir Cosmo Haskard heard nothing about them before he left the islands." [2343]

August 4th - 8th, in Lima, Peru, a conference takes place attended by 17 South American Nations. [2344]

"Recent events indicate quite clearly that there is no solid Latin American bloc which can be expected to act in concert on Law of the Sea and seabed issues. ... The Lima Meeting was intended by its organisers to widen Latin American support for the Montevideo Declaration, implying approval, at least in principle, of a 200-mile limit. The final result was short of that objective." [2345]

"This meeting in Lima adopted, by overwhelming majority, the so-called "Declaration of Latin American Countries on the Law of the Sea". The signatory States were Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Chile, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru and Uruguay. The Declaration contains, among other things, the following principles: (1) The right of the coastal State to exploit the resources of sea adjacent to its shore in order to develop the economy of its inhabitants and to raise their standard of living. (2) The right of the coastal State to establish the limits of its maritime sovereignty and

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2341 *Ibid.*

2342 See Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.565-569. It is tempting to see a direct connection between negotiations with Argentina on communications, including sea and air links, and the FIC's decision to withdraw the ship. How much knowledge the FIC directors had regarding the negotiations is not known, but the FCO and the FIC were all members of the same clubs.

2343 *Ibid.* p.567

2344 These meetings and conferences would eventually lead to the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS) in 1982, which came into force in 1994 with 60 signatories. The Falklands, as with other small Island territories, would become key beneficiaries.

2345 *Latin American Views on Law of the Sea* Department of State (Legal Advisor) August 28, 1970

jurisdiction according to reasonable criteria, keeping in mind its geographical, geological, and biological characteristics as well as the necessities of the rational utilization of its resources. (3) The right of the coastal State to supervise and protect its waters from contamination. (4) The right of the coastal State to regulate the above-mentioned principles without prejudice of the freedom of navigation." [2346]

September 10th, an unidentified aircraft is seen to overfly Stanley. [2347]

September 27th, Governor Cosmo Haskard retires.

".. much to the relief of the Latin American Department of the FCO." [2348]

Colonial Secretary, John Ashley Jones, takes over as Acting-Governor of the Falkland Islands. [2349]

September 30th, in New York, Argentina's Foreign Minister makes a speech to the UN General Assembly.

> *"(We) agreed to negotiate with the United Kingdom regarding the dispute over the sovereignty of the islands. In so doing, we were interpreting the spirit and the letter of resolution 2065 (XX) and at the same time, we declared our irrevocable decision ... that the Malvinas islands should be restored to our territorial heritage."* [2350]

October 5th, at the UN, the Special Committee on Decolonization publishes a *Special Programme of Activities in Connection with the Tenth Anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.* [2351]

October 12th, the UN General Assembly adopts resolution 2621 (XXV) entitled - *Programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.*

> *"The General Assembly,*
>
> *Having decided to hold a special commemorative session on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,*
>
> *Considering that, by arousing world public opinion and promoting practical action for the speedy liquidation of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations, the Declaration has played and will continue to play an important role in assisting the peoples under colonial domination in their struggle for freedom and independence,*
>
> *Conscious of the fact that, although many colonial countries and peoples have achieved freedom and independence in the last ten years, the system of colonialism continues to exist in many areas of the world,*
>
> *Reaffirming that all peoples have the right to self determination and independence and that the subjection of the peoples to alien domination constitutes a serious impediment to the maintenance of international peace and security and the development of peaceful relations among nations,*
>
> *1. Declares the further continuation of colonialism in all its forms and manifestations a crime which constitutes a violation of the Charter of the United Nations, the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples and the principles of international law;*

2346 Santa-Pinter 2019
2347 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* October 5, 1970
2348 Dodds 2002 p.146
2349 *Falkland Islands Gazette* October 2, 1970
2350 Quoted in *UN Doc A8423/Rev.1 vol.4 chapter 25*
2351 Following on from UN resolution 2521 (XXIV) of December 4, 1969 (see above). For an account in detail (*UN Document A/8086*), see - https://documents.un.org/doc/undoc/gen/nl3/104/81/pdf/nl310481.pdf

2. Reaffirms the inherent right of colonial peoples to struggle by all necessary means at their disposal against colonial Powers which suppress their aspiration for freedom and independence;

3. Adopts the following programme of action to assist in the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples:

(1) Member States shall do their utmost to promote, in the United Nations and the international institutions and organizations within the United Nations system, effective measures for the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples in all Trust Territories, Non-Self-Governing Territories and other colonial Territories, large and small, including the adoption by the Security Council of effective measures against Governments and régimes which engage in any form of repression of colonial peoples, which would seriously impede the maintenance of international peace and security.

(2) Member States shall render all necessary moral and material assistance to the peoples of colonial Territories in their struggle to attain freedom and independence.

(3)(a) Member States shall intensify their efforts to promote the implementation of the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council relating to Territories under colonial domination. ...

(4) Member States shall wage a vigorous and sustained campaign against activities and practices of foreign economic, financial and other interests operating in colonial Territories for the benefit and on behalf of colonial Powers and their allies, as these constitute a major obstacle to the achievement of the goals embodied in resolution 1514 (XV). Member States shall consider the adoption of necessary steps to have their nationals and companies under their jurisdiction discontinue such activities and practices; these steps should also aim at preventing the systematic influx of foreign immigrants into colonial Territories, which disrupts the integrity and social, political and cultural unity of the peoples under colonial domination.

(5) Member States shall carry out a sustained and vigorous campaign against all military activities and arrangements by colonial Powers in Territories under their administration, as such activities and arrangements constitute an obstacle to the full implementation of resolution 1514 (XV).

(6) ... (b) The specialized agencies and international Institutions associated with the United Nations shall intensify their activities related to the implementation of resolution 1514 (XV). ...

(d) Efforts shall be intensified to provide increased educational opportunities for the inhabitants of Non-Self-Governing Territories. All States shall render greater assistance in this field, both individually through programmes in the countries concerned and collectively by contributions through the United Nations.

(7) All States shall undertake measures aimed at enhancing public awareness of the need for active assistance in the achievement of complete decolonization and, in particular, creating satisfactory conditions for activities by national and international non-governmental organizations in support of the peoples under colonial domination.

(8) The United Nations as well as all States shall intensify their efforts in the field of public information in the area of decolonization through all media, including publications, radio and television. Of special importance will be programmes relating to United Nations activities on decolonization, the situation in colonial Territories and the struggle being waged by colonial peoples and the national liberation movements.

(9) The Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples shall continue to examine the full compliance of all States with the Declaration and with other relevant resolutions on the question of decolonization. The question of territorial size, geographical isolation and limited resources should in no way delay the implementation of the Declaration. Where resolution 1514 (XV) has not been fully

implemented with regard to a given Territory, the General Assembly shall continue to bear responsibility for that Territory until such time as the people concerned has had an opportunity to exercise freely its right to self-determination and independence in accordance with the Declaration. The Special Committee is hereby directed:

(a) To continue to assist the General Assembly in finding the best ways and means for the final liquidation of colonialism;

(b) To continue to give special consideration to the views expressed orally or in written communications by representatives of the peoples in the colonial Territories;

(c) To continue to send visiting missions to the colonial Territories and to hold meetings at places where it can best obtain first-hand information on the situation in colonial Territories, as well as to continue to hold meetings away from Headquarters as appropriate;

(d) To assist the General Assembly in making arrangements, in co-operation with the administering Powers, for securing a United Nations presence in the colonial Territories to participate in the elaboration of the procedural measures for the implementation of the Declaration and to observe the final stages of the process of decolonization in the Territories;

(e) To prepare draft rules and regulations for visiting missions for approval by the General Assembly." [2352]

"The programme of action for the full implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, contained in General Assembly resolution 2621 (XXV), had been adopted as a result of the recognition by the General Assembly of the need, on the occasion of the tenth anniversary of the Declaration, to evaluate the progress made so far in the implementation of the Declaration and, taking into account the various existing obstacles, to formulate specific proposals for the elimination of the remaining manifestations of colonialism." [2353]

"This resolution demands close scrutiny, for it purports to state principles of law and practice which have not by any means earned universal acceptance. For example, in No.1 the dominant power of an undefined "world public opinion" is asserted, with no proof that such opinion exists or exerts the assumed power. The second item asserts a right which, ... is accepted by some but denied by others. No.3 expounds the unproved viewpoint that colonialism is currently a major cause of wars. No. 4 reflects Assembly resolutions declaring colonialism to be a crime, but there is nothing in the Charter which gives binding legal status to such an Assembly resolution. ... One questions whether such a resolution accepted international law." [2354]

In Stanley, members of the Falklands Legislative Assembly (LegCo) are informed, in confidence, of the FIC's decision to withdraw *Darwin* from the end of 1771.

2352 Adopted at 1862nd plenary meeting of the General Assembly. This resolution had been composed by the *ad hoc* sub-group formed in April, 1969 (see above). Adopted by the Special Committee on Decolonization (a sub-committee of the Fourth Committee) the draft resolution was presented to the General Assembly. Contentious, because the western European bloc within the *ad hoc* group had been consistently outvoted and ignored when it came to amendment proposals. Controversial, because members of the *ad hoc* group travelled to Africa to make contact with "*national liberation movements*" from colonial territories on that continent (Addis Abab, Dar es Salaam and Lusaka). Frustrated, the adoption of this resolution would lead to the withdrawal of Honduras, Norway and Italy from the Decolonization Committee at the end of the session. UK and USA withdrew in January, 1971.

2353 Secretary-General U Thant (Myanmar) at the opening of the 1971 session of the Special Committee on Decolonization. *UN Doc A8423/Rev.1 vol.1. p.13*

2354 Barber 1975.

October 24th, in New York, UN resolution *2625 (XXV),* approves a *Declaration on Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations*. [2355] The section titled *The principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples* states:

> *"By virtue of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations,* ***all*** *peoples have the right freely to determine, without external interference, their political status and to pursue their economic, social and cultural development, and every State has the duty to respect this right in accordance with the provisions of the Charter... Every State has the duty to promote, through joint and separate action, realization of the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples, ...* [2356] *The establishment of a sovereign and independent State, the free association or integration with an independent State* ***or the emergence into any other political status freely determined by a people*** *constitute modes of implementing the right of self-determination by that people.* [2357]
>
> *Every State has the duty to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples referred to above in the elaboration of the present principle of their right to self-determination and freedom and independence. In their actions against, and resistance to, such forcible action in pursuit of the exercise of their right to self-determination, such peoples are entitled to seek and to receive support in accordance with the purposes and principles of the Charter...*
>
> *The territory of a colony or other Non-Self-Governing Territory has, under the Charter,* ***a status separate and distinct from the territory of the State administering it****; and such separate and distinct status under the Charter shall exist until the people of the colony or Non-Self-Governing Territory have exercised their right of self-determination in accordance with the Charter, and particularly its purposes and principles...*
>
> *Every State shall refrain from any action aimed at the partial or total disruption of the national unity and territorial integrity of any other State or country."* [2358]

"This represents a significant step in the progressive development of international law when compared with the positions taken in 1964. Many states had never before accepted self-determination as a right." [2359]

"It seems clear from this and other formulations of the principle of self-determination that where the principle applies, it does so as a right of the people concerned; it is not a matter simply of rights and obligations as between existing States. Another State well may be interested in the result of an act of self-determination... But to treaty of the alternative options open to the people concerned. ... It may thus be concluded that the people of a Chapter XI territory enjoy a separate legal status, and with it a measure of legal personality." [2360]

2355 See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/2625(XXV)

2356 My emphasis. See 1967

2357 Resolution 1541 of 1960 had established the first 3 criteria for '*decolonisation'*. For a discussion on this see *A Report on the Referendum on the Political Status of the Falkland Islands* Peter Willetts 2013.

2358 My emphasis. A clear reference to the future; not to the past. The UN, in identifying these as *"principles of international law"* clearly sought to influence, if not change, international law for cases arising after 1970.

2359 *The Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations: A Survey* R. Rosenstock 1971. Arguably more important for the right of self-determination than resolution 1514 of 1960. It was this Declaration that would force the UK, after some hesitation, to accept that self-determination was more than just a principle to be aimed for. Self-determination was now recognised as a human right for all peoples. Including those of the Falkland Islands.

2360 Crawford 2007 p.618

"The idea of "any other political status" has never been expanded and it is unclear what it may mean. Presumably, it could cover the use of other existing models, such as the Isle of Man, the Aland Islands, Andorra or Liechtenstein, or some variation of free association, as options for self-determination." [2361]

"Although the islanders are British and identify as such, it would be difficult to argue against their claim that a distinctive society has developed there over the past 200 years... there is no requirement laid down anywhere that the population of a Non-Self-Governing Territory must have suffered alien subjugation or racial discrimination in order to qualify as a 'people'." [2362]

"Like Resolution 1514, Resolution 2625 makes it quite clear that its reference to territorial integrity refers only to future actions (i.e. after 1970) which "would dismember or impair" territorial integrity, and that every State "shall refrain" from such actions (our emphasis). So Resolution 2625 does not apply to past events such as the expulsion of the Argentine garrison from the Falklands in 1833..." [2363]

November 8th, in Argentina, a ceremony is held.

"... sponsored by the Commander-in-Chief of the Navy, Caillet-Bois presided over the ceremony marking the 150th anniversary of the first raising of the national flag on the islands. Caillet-Bois was accompanied on the podium by representatives of the three forces: Admiral Luis Rabbione (Navy), Colonel Fernando Miguel (Army), Commodore Tello Cornejo (Air Force), and Captain Ciro de Martini (Naval Operations).' [2364]

From the Falklands, a three member delegation visits Argentina's Atlantic ports; to seek trading opportunities; *"The Colony required diesel fuel, fencing and food stuffs. Some Argentine nationalists objected to the rapprochement. A federal judge in Bahia Blanca even attempted to have Gleadell arrested."* [2365]

December 4th, the Special Committee on Decolonization presents its annual report to the UN. [2366]

A telegram from the US UN Mission to the US Department of State notes:

> *"... Comite of 24 has sunk into general apathy interrupted by bursts of activity on proposals pressed by Soviets and radical Africans which emerge as its final product. We made extensive and genuine effort this year to reach agreement with moderates on a Program of Action which would be realistic and constructive in terms of working toward the end of colonialism. We were not successful in informal consultations because Tanzanians and Bulgarians, backed by Soviets and other radicals, rejected any attempt to modify Program of Action drafted principally by Tanzania and Bulgaria. Moderates either could not or would not stand up to them. We presented 15 amendments in Comite of 24 and explained them most carefully and in most conciliatory manner possible. Nevertheless all 15 amendments were rejected. ... Nevertheless Comite of 24 now has a Program of Action adopted by GA which virtually ensures it will continue to be unproductive and to detract from the effectiveness and credibility of UN in colonial area. I therefore believe that time has come for us to withdraw from membership on this Comite. I noted that Italy is doing so and UK, which has for ten years rejected even any thought of leaving Comite, is now seriously considering possibility."* [2367]

2361 Willetts 2013
2362 Trinidad 2018 p.150
2363 Pascoe 2020 p.313
2364 Novas Lo Coco 2024
2365 Ellerby 1990 p.172 citing *The Financial Times* November 26, 1970
2366 *UN Document A/8023/Rev.1 [IV]* p.228. Once again the Committee merely forwarded a Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat for the information of the Fourth Committee.
2367 *Telegram 8082 in Foreign Relations,1964–1968, vol. XXXIII, Document 436*. Signed by Yost

The Falkland Islands Company announces that RMS *Darwin*, which carries mail, passengers, fuel supplies and fresh food on monthly voyages around the Islands, is to be withdrawn.

"When in late 1970 the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) announced that they would be withdrawing the small freight/passenger (50) carrying vessel RMS Darwin, which plied monthly between the Islands and Uruguay, it was anticipated by a vast majority of the population that the British Government would automatically, and as a commitment to the colony, provide a similar type ship to continue the service. The Darwin provided the only communication with the outside world, taking around 4 and a half days, in good weather, to reach Montevideo... It brought eagerly awaited 'Air Mail' which would be flown from Britain and then languish in an office in Montevideo for several weeks before the ship arrived... Falklands residents returning home from holiday in Britain relied on the Darwin while Falklands children who attended the British school in Uruguay became regular passengers. However, unknown to the Islanders, the British Government had no intention of funding an expensive replacement vessel and, despite Argentina's long-standing sovereignty claim, approached the Government in Buenos Aires and suggested that they might like to provide an air-link between the Argentine capital and Stanley and so establish a presence in the Islands. Unbeknown to the Falklands population they also hinted that so popular would the service become that it would be just a matter of time before the Islanders would forget about their much loved links with Uruguay, and that this would eventually lead to recognition of Argentina's sovereignty claim." [2368]

"For the Company's purposes the Darwin's functions could be performed more cheaply by a pure cargo ship; a passenger ship was a luxury, and the Darwin used up some of the Company's profits. It was irrelevant that she fulfilled a vital role for the people of the Falklands in providing the only practical way of travelling between the islands and the outside world – she carried passengers to Montevideo, and she occasionally visited other places in South America such as Punta Arenas. The chartered Danish motor Vessel A.E.S. maintained a regular service to Britain and back, usually with four quarterly round trips per year, but few people had the time to spend a full four weeks aboard a ship." [2369]

December 12th, in New York, on the recommendation of the Fourth Committee, the General Assembly decides to defer consideration of the Falkland Islands till 1971.

December 17th, in New York, at the UN, the General Assembly adopts resolution 2749 – *Declaration of Principles Governing the Seabed and the Ocean Floor, and the Subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of National Jurisdiction.*

> *"1. The sea-bed and ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction (hereinafter referred to as the area), as well as the resources of the area, are the common heritage of mankind."* [2370]

In the UK, a report in the *Daily Telegraph* newspaper states that the British Government has rejected an application by the Soviet Union, for the leases of whaling stations on South Georgia.

December 19th, a telegram from the US UN Mission to the US Department of State notes:

> *"UK PermRep Crowe mentioned possible UK withdrawal from Comite of 24 … Amb. Crowe said FCO was considering UKUN suggestion that he be authorized withdraw from Comite, primarily on grounds that UK would not wish to remain associated with decolonization "program of action" approved by*

2368 Patrick Watts MBE quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021
2369 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.566
2370 See - https://documents.un.org/doc/resolution/gen/nr0/350/14/pdf/nr035014.pdf

GA. UK Amb. said timing would be principal problem for his mission since he would want to announce decision before Comite next met, probably during latter part of January 1971." [2371]

December 23rd, Ernest Gordon Lewis is appointed Governor of the Falkland Islands. [2372]

December 28th, in Washington DC, a decision is taken that the USA will withdraw from the United Nations Decolonization Committee effective January, 1971. [2373]

"(a) Since establishment of Committee of 24 US has participated with hope it could make valid and constructive contribution to problems decolonization. We welcomed opportunity to work on these problems with others concerned and hoped our views would be given due consideration in framing serious and workable resolutions. However, as time has passed and as we have stated in Committee, we have had increasingly serious reservations with regard to method of operation as well as conclusions and actions of Committee. Only after consultations with Committee members in early 1968 did USG decide to defer a decision to withdraw from Committee at that time and instead seek, through frank statements of US views, acceptable changes in Committee performance. We have since reiterated these reservations. We have been increasingly concerned at Committee's apparent unwillingness to take US views into account, as in case action program on decolonization in which not single one of some twenty suggested changes submitted by US was reflected in any form in Committee drafting.

(b) Committee has consistently refused to follow course pursued in other committees of consulting on proposed actions and resolutions in order to gain support necessary to insure consensus and effective implementation.

(c) Committee has increasingly advocated extreme and unworkable measures, condoning use of violence, which we unable support. This performance now reflected and in effect codified in (an) unworkable program of action for 10th anniversary Colonialism Declaration which will serve as guideline for future operations of Committee.

(d) In view all these factors, after careful consideration over a considerable period of time, after repeated warnings to Committee and in light recent developments, USG has reluctantly decided that Committee has not allowed US to play constructive role and that goal of practical progress toward decolonization cannot be served by continued US presence on Committee. .." [2374]

December 29th, the US State Department informs the British Foreign Office its decision.

"In accordance earlier undertaking UKUN was being informed confidentially in advance, among other reasons in view possible bearing this might have on FCO consideration of possible UK withdrawal from Committee. Shaw said this info would be of great interest to FCO which he understood was giving most serious consideration ever to question of continued UK participation in Committee. Shaw asked when withdrawal decision would be announced and was told this would probably be in approximately one week, i.e. by middle of week of Jan 4." [2375]

December 31st, the biannual Falklands review notes that there have been 34 births, 15 marriages and 15 deaths in the Falklands during 1970. [2376]

2371 *National Archives (US), RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN. Confidential*
2372 *The London Gazette No. 45280.* For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/lewis_ernest
2373 See - https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d65
2374 See - https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1969-76v05/d67
2375 *Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN.*
2376 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1970 & 1971*

1971 – January 6th, from London, the UK Government notifies the US Secretary of State in Washington DC that it also intends to withdraw from the United Nations' Special Committee on Decolonization.

January 8th, Governor Ernest Gordon Lewis arrives at Port Stanley.

"Toby Lewis was a coercive, duplicitous, old-fashioned colonial governor (January 1971 to 1975) rather than the man benevolently portrayed by a former Falklands governor in the Dictionary of Falklands Biography. His action raise questions about the duty owed to a colonial population by their governor." [2377]

January 11th, in New York, at the UN, the USA announces its withdrawal from the Committee.

> *"(a) Since establishment of Comite of 24 US has participated with hope it could make valid and constructive contribution to problems decolonization. We welcomed opportunity to work on these problems with others concerned and hoped our views would be given due consideration in framing serious and workable resolutions. However, as time has passed and as we have stated in Committee, we have had increasingly serious reservations with regard to method of operation as well as conclusions and actions of Committee. Only after consultations with Comite members in early 1968 did USG decide defer decision to withdraw from Comite at that time and instead seek, through frank statements of US views, acceptable changes in Comite performance. We have since reiterated these reservations. We have been increasingly concerned at Comite's apparent unwillingness to take US views into account, as in case action program on decolonization in which not single one of some twenty suggested changes submitted by US was reflected in any form in Comite drafting.*
>
> *(b) Comite has consistently refused follow course pursued in other committees of consulting on proposed actions and resolutions in order to gain support necessary to insure consensus and effective implementation.*
>
> *(c) Comite has increasingly advocated extreme and unworkable measures, condoning use of violence, which we unable support. This performance now reflected and in effect codified in unworkable program of action for 10th anniversary Colonialism Declaration which will serve as guideline for future operations of Comite.*
>
> *(d) In view all these factors, after careful consideration over a considerable period of time, after repeated warnings to Comite and in light recent developments, USG has reluctantly decided that Comite has not allowed US to play constructive role and that goal of practical progress toward decolonization cannot be served by continued US presence on Comite. We have therefore notified appropriate UN authorities of our withdrawal."* [2378]

In a *caveat*, the US Mission assures the Secretary-General that it will continue to participate in Committee sessions involving American NSGTs.

Shortly after, the UK announces its decision to leave the Special Committee on Decolonization.

> "*The United Kingdom has played a full part in the work of the Committee of 24 since its establishment in 1962. However, our own process of decolonisation has now reached a stage where experience of the Committee's work has led us to question whether it can offer any constructive help in resolving the remaining problems. Our doubts on this point have been reinforced by the recent adoption by the General Assembly of a thoroughly unrealistic Programme of Action intended as a guide to the Committee's future activities. While we shall, of course, continue to observe the provisions of the*

2377 Elgood 2025. For the biography referred to, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/lewis_ernest
2378 *National Archives (US), RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19 UN*

Charter relating to non-self-governing territories, Her Majesty's Government have therefore decided to withdraw from membership of the Committee with immediate effect." [2379]

"In the view of some Committee members, the withdrawal of the administering powers impeded the full and speedy implementation of the General Assembly's resolution of 14 December 1960 concerning the granting of independence." [2380]

"... in 1971 both the United States and the United Kingdom resigned in protest against the Committee's belligerent attitude of confrontation with respect to colonial powers. This committee, which had been the focal point of UN anticolonial activity, often assumed functions which critics thought better left in the hands of the Trusteeship Council or of the Assembly's Fourth Committee." [2381]

"Despite abstaining on the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, and the General Assembly resolution setting up the C24, the UK agreed to join and cooperate with the C24. This it did until 1971, when it left the Committee. The UK was concerned at that time by the Committee's recently adopted "programme of action" to implement 1514 (XV), its reluctance to address the issue of small territories, as well as its unfavourable composition." [2382]

January 12th, the New York Times reports:

"The United States and Britain withdrew today from membership in the United Nations' Colonialism Committee. Both countries have long been critical of the committee's work and have complained, at least privately, that its resolutions are one-sided and forced through by members from the African-Asian and Communist blocs. The United States and Britain informed Secretary General Thant of their decisions in separate letters without offering any specific reason. It has been well known, however, that the two Governments are displeased with the operations of the committee. Both had been members of the committee since it was set up in 1961. It quickly became a forum in which African and Soviet-bloc members aired their grievances against what they called the colonial powers.

Almost two years ago, the United States delegates declined to accompany other committee members to Africa on a trip that it labelled extravagant and of doubtful value. Twenty-one delegation members and a staff of 48 made the four-week trip, which cost more than $142,000. It was designed to take testimony from African leaders of liberation movements in the Portuguese colonies, Rhodesia and South-West Africa, the territory, held by South Africa, that the United Nations calls Namibia. Critics of the committee charged that its junkets turned out to be propaganda trips in which considerable time was spent listening to African and Soviet members attack the United States and Britain. Britain had earlier begun boycotting trips, but the trips have continued, the members arguing that they provide first-hand knowledge of colonial conditions and personal contact with liberation leaders.

Long-standing doubt about the committee boiled up again during the recent session of the General Assembly, mainly because of a resolution against colonialism that was adopted over United States and British objections. A key paragraph said that all forms of colonialism were a crime against humanity and a violation of the Charter.

2379 *Hansard – Written Answers (Commons) – Foreign & Commonwealth Affairs HC Deb 12 January 1971 vol.809 cc30*
2380 *UN Yearbook 1971*
2381 *Decolonization: The Committee of 24* Hollis W. Barber in *World Affairs* 1975 vol.138 no.2. See October, 1971 below.
2382 *Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office O.T.18 May 2011.* See – https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/overseas/ot18.htm

During the last Assembly, Norway, Italy and Honduras decided against continuing to serve on the committee and the President of the Assembly named Sweden and Trinidad and Tobago to fill the first two places, but left the remaining one vacant. The committee, originally formed with 17 members, was raised to 24 in 1963 and is often called the Committee of 24. After Australia resigned in 1968, the seat remained vacant for almost a year until Fiji was named. The withdrawal of the United States and Britain therefore, was not expected to pose constitutional difficulties. …

Both the United States and Britain have complained at times that the committee majority was rigid in its insistence on early independence for all territories, even for so-called ministates. … Britain's decision was said to have been made later and to have been prompted by objections to the program of action that the last Assembly approved —it advocated the use of violence among other things to achieve self-determination."

From the UN building in New York, the US Mission reports on reactions to the withdrawal from the Decolonization Committee of the US and UK delegations.

"Moderate AF's are particularly concerned over US withdrawal. … Most dels were not concerned over UK withdrawal from Comite. At same time, because of seeming simultaneity of announcement, most dels felt there had been collusion between US and UK." [2383]

February 11th, the UN's Secretary General opens the 1971 session of the Decolonization Committee.

"He noted the more recent departure of the United Kingdom and the United States of America, both of which had served on the Special Committee since it was first established eight years before and both of which had played a particularly useful role in the Committee in their position as administering Powers. Their departure was therefore especially regretted because it meant that the Committee would be deprived of the full-time participation of two administering Powers which together were responsible for the administration of the majority of the remaining dependent Territories. … In approaching its tasks in 1971, the Special Committee would no doubt reflect on the present slow rate of progress towards the goal of complete decolonization in the remaining 44 dependent Territories…" [2384]

Newly elected Vice-Chairman Grinberg (Bulgaria) accuses the USA and UK of attempting to make the work of the committee harder. [2385]

The US Mission to the UN, informs the State Department in Washington DC; *"Interesting to note that US willingness cooperate with Comite was emphasized in contrast with absence of UK statement of intentions. Indication of US willingness cooperate with Comite on its territories may have been reason for generally mild statements at opening meeting."* [2386]

February 12th, a consultant firm, *Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co*., are commissioned by the British Government to prepare a study of transportation services for the Falklands.

"… the team has started preliminary planning in London and has had talks with officials of the various ministries and with the Head Office of the Falkland Islands Company and other firms who have interests in the Islands. I have now been informed that the two-man team consisting of Mr. R.F.

2383 *Telegram From the Mission to the United Nations to the Department of State. National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19UN.* AFs appears to be an acronym for African States. Dels = delegations.
2384 *UN Document A8423/Rev.1 vol.1. p.12. cf.* 1974, 1986 & 1999
2385 *US National Archives, RG 59, Central Files 1970–73, POL 19UN*
2386 *Ibid.* See - https://2001-2009.state.gov/r/pa/ho/frus/nixon/v/42663.htm

Morrison and Mr. J.G. Beckett will arrive at the end of March on the "Darwin" and leave on the 10th April. At the same time a third member will proceed to Latin America to carry out further investigations cf the problem at that end. So we can look forward to a busy time in preparing for the arrival of the team but I know that, you will be encouraged by the fact that things are on the move."[2387]

"Of great assistance in preparing the ground for the Buenos Aires round of talks was the investigation by a delegation from the Islands of the facilities available at Patagonian ports and a transportation study carried out by the management consultants, Messrs. Peat Marwick Mitchell, in early 1971; the latter made it clear that the most economic solution to the Island's problems would be an external passenger service by air (preferably to the Argentine if political considerations allowed) and a freight service by sea." [2388]

"The Argentine Government presented proposals for a direct air link with subsidized fares during the team's visit to the Islands." [2389]

In Stanley, Governor Lewis addresses the Legislative Council.

"I see adequate physical communications not simply as an end in themselves but only part of the widening of our horizons so that we can play our role to the full in the world. That is why, in my opinion, we should look forward with confidence to the Talks on Communications with the Argentine. Our position on sovereignty has been made clear and if we can find a way of having more contact with the Argentine it can only be for the good for both parties." [2390]

February 15th, in the Falklands, seriously ill, Matthew McMullen is air lifted off by an Argentine Navy *HU16B* amphibious aircraft (Pilot Carlos Alberto Quaglini) to Comodoro Rivadavia, for transfer to Buenos Aires. [2391]

In **April**, Governor Toby Lewis reveals some details of the communication discussions with Argentina.

"You may recall that in my speech at the last meeting of the Legislative Council I mentioned why, in my opinion - having made clear our position on the sovereignty issue - we should look forward, with confidence, to the talks on communications with the Argentine.

I, and Members of the Executive and Legislative Councils, do understand why members of the public would like to know something of what went on in the talks held in London in July last year, between the representatives of the British and Argentine Governments. As you know the British delegation included three from the Islands, the Colonial Secretary, Major Goss and Mr Pitaluga. Equally you will understand that the talks and the subsequent exchanges between the Governments had to be - in accordance with normal diplomatic practice - confidential, at least in the initial stages; but I can now let you know what has been discussed so far.

Several proposals and ideas for the promotion of free communications were discussed and problems relating to the movement of persons in both directions were discussed. During the course of the meetings the related questions of the following items were examined:

(a) Documentation and special arrangements to facilitate the visit of Islanders;

(b) Exemption from liability for Military Service.

2387 *Falkland Islands Gazette* 1971
2388 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1970 & 1971*
2389 Ellerby 1990 p.173 citing *F.I.A. archive (London), 1(D), Permanent Airfield Study, May 1975.*
2390 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* February 1971
2391 Unconfirmed. McMullen does not appear to have survived.

The Argentine Representatives at the talks made offers to help the Islands by taking part in plans for improving sea and air links with the construction of an airfield, with health services and medical aid (including emergency medical aid), telecommunications and mail services, technical assistance, cultural exchanges and educational scholarships. Other matters touched on of more marginal interest concern banking, commerce, customs and land acquisition. The talks have been purely exploratory and no agreements have been reached. … During the next few weeks members of the Executive Council and myself will be explaining to you in more detail the progress made so far so that you can have an opportunity of making your views known to your representative." [2392]

In an immediate reaction:

"Firstly, everyone is pleased to hear that "no agreements have been reached".

Secondly, Islanders are amazed to learn officially that our delegates permitted such an all-embracing discussion, as Sir Cosmo Haskard, in a speech to Legislative Council on 3rd June 1970, indicated that these gentlemen were going to London solely for the purpose of talks on "communications"; this latter is the only item mentioned by him.

Thirdly, why speak of military service at all - Falkland Islanders are not Argentine subjects. Another criticism is levelled against the item "mail services". We have all been caused annoyance at the hands of the persons who despoil our incoming covers by deletions and the inclusion of the words "Islas Malvinas, Republica Argentina" on them. Subject to any agreement, would our mails be held up until postal workers deleted "Falkland Islands" and scrawled "Islas Malvinas" on letters etc., or would it be a condition of such a service that we must ask our correspondents to address all mail to the Argentine choice of name?" [2393]

April 16th, in the British Indian Ocean Territory (Chagos Islands) an Immigration Ordinance is promulgated to restrict immigration and residence within the territory. This makes it unlawful for any person to enter or remain in the BIOT without a permit. It also provides for the removal of persons in the territory without such a permit.[2394]

May 16th, Falkland Islanders send an open letter to the Governor and Legislative Council.

"As British subjects living in a British Crown Colony, we see no reason why we should accept special documentation to travel to a foreign country, which is not applicable to other British subjects. We regard the carrying of a document of this kind issued by the Argentine authorities as a very clear erosion of our political sovereignty and find it quite unacceptable. We have no wish to deny either our nationality or our country of birth, and regard our British passports, showing both, as adequate and proper travel documentation. We would welcome normal trade and communications with the Argentine but see special arrangements as an acceptance on our part that we are bound to become part of Argentina at some time in the future … Our demands are very, very simple – we wish to be treated as British, nothing else will do." [2395]

May 17th, in Stanley, the Governor reassures the Legislative Council regarding the communications proposals.

2392 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* May 3, 1971
2393 *Ibid*.
2394 The final stage of the Chagos Islands depopulation process would last until 1973. There are no accurate figures but between 1400 and 1700 people are believed to have been removed from the archipelago.
2395 Quoted in Elgood 2025 citing *UKFIC82* paras.65-73

"... any agreement on communications shall be conditional upon an arrangement such as the 'sovereignty umbrella'... HMG sees the whole communications exercise as a way of defusing the sovereignty issue and helping the Islands without any concession on sovereignty or their Britishness. I was not appointed Governor and Commander in Chief of these Islands with a view to assisting in disposing of part of the Queen's realm." [2396]

May 20th, in London, Argentina's Ambassador, General Gustavo Martínez Zuvíria, is reported as saying that; *"... the main aspect of our differences with the United Kingdom, which is sovereignty, is approaching a definitive solution."* [2397]

In **June**, in London, *Peat, Marwick, Mitchell & Co*., submit their findings as to transportation options.

"The firm's report, submitted in June, recommended an air link with Argentine Patagonia supplemented by a maritime service making 12 trips to Puerto Deseado and five return voyages to Europe each year. The total maximum cost of the schemes was £267,000. The financial argument in favour of communications through Argentina was overwhelming, ... The total ordinary revenue of the Falkland Government in 1970/1971 was £489,000, while the present service via Montevideo cost £364,000 annually." [2398]

June 6th, in Stanley, a Foreign Office delegation, led by Under-Secretary D. A. David Scott, arrives.

"*In June 1971 a mission led by Mr David Scott, C.M.G., Assistant Under Secretary of State in the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, visited the Islands. The objectives of the mission were to reassure the Islanders about H.M.G.'s intentions and to gain their confidence before going on, in company with the Colony's delegates, to the second round of talks scheduled to be held in Buenos Aires later in the same month. The Mission was a success and the Islanders looked forward with quiet confidence to the results of the talks in Buenos Aires."* [2399]

"... he (Scott) repeated time and again that he was "not here to sell you the River Plate." He wanted to talk not about sovereignty but about a better standard of living." [2400]

June 9th, from Stanley, David Scott broadcasts to the Islanders.

"*As I think you know I have with me a team, from London, consisting of Fred Burrows, our Legal Counsellor, John Ling, a member of the Latin American Department of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and Angela Lauder, our Secretary. We've already met many people in Port Stanley and we are hoping to pay about three visits to different parts of the Camp. For me, personally, it has been a lifelong ambition to visit the Falkland Islands and all of us are very well aware of the long historical connection between Britain and the Falkland Islands in war and peace. This connection was brought home to millions of people in Britain recently through the splendid television programme, put on by the B.B.C., showing the return of the 'Great Britain' from Stanley to her original dock in Bristol. It is sad in some ways that you no longer have her here but, without a rescue operation, she might well have become a total loss.*

Yesterday I was able at the Meeting of the Executive and Legislative Councils to give His Excellency the Governor and Honourable Members of the Councils messages from the Secretary of State, Sir Alec Douglas Home, and Mr Godber, the Minister of State of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. Both

2396 *Falkland Islands Gazette Supplement* June 1971. *cf.* June, 1987
2397 *Clarin* May 20, 1971
2398 Ellerby 1990 pp.173-174 citing *F.I.A. archive (London), 1(D), Permanent Airfield Study, May 1975.*
2399 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1970 & 1971*
2400 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

of them particularly asked me to emphasise to the Councils and to you that the next round of our talks with the Argentine Government remain entirely connected with communications. There is absolutely no question of any transfer of sovereignty. The purpose of our present visit to the Falkland Islands, therefore, is to learn something of your problems, to discuss the agenda of the talks, and to reach agreement with the Councils, and with those members who will form part of our team in Buenos Aires, on the best way of handling the negotiations. ... the fact that the "Darwin" will be withdrawn at the end of the present year has created a new situation and a whole series of new problems.

As I think you know, at the beginning of this year, the Overseas Development Administration commissioned Messrs. Peat, Marwick & Mitchell to report on the best and most economical transport pattern for the future of the Islands. Peat Marwick's team spent some time in the Islands and also visited ports on the mainland. We received their report just before leaving London. The British Government haven't yet committed themselves to accepting the detailed recommendations of the report. But our first view is that it gives a useful analysis of the present situation and sensible recommendations for the future.

We are all aware that the economic prospects in the Falkland Islands are depressed as a result of the present low price of wool and it is very important in considering any future transport pattern to remember the importance of keeping down the cost of freight for both imports and your exports.

The British Government's view is that, all things considered, the interests of the Falkland Islands will probably be best served by a combination of sea and air links with the outside world. The British Government have looked very carefully at how they can best help in establishing a new transport system. I am glad to say that if you, the Islanders, decide that an air service for passengers and mail is desirable the British Government are prepared to assist with the capital cost of constructing an airfield. Nevertheless, we all know that the annual cost of running an air service will also be very high and the amount of traffic available will probably only justify one service a week, at least in the initial stages. The question of how this service should be provided is one which we have been discussing with His Excellency the Governor and with the Executive and Legislative Councils. Doubtless it is also something on which the Argentine Government will have views when we come to discuss it with them.

The British Government realise that before expecting Falkland Islanders to travel to Argentina by air or sea it will be necessary to obtain assurances from the Argentine authorities that you will not be discriminated against as compared with other visitors to the Argentine. Various methods of documentation have been discussed, and I need not go into these now, but I hope they can be resolved in a way which will be acceptable to all concerned. As I have already said our talks with the Argentines will be about communications. They will be aimed at meeting your urgent requirements for a better communications system.

We shall not discuss the basis of the Argentine claim to the Islands and, as I have said, there is no question whatever of transferring sovereignty. So before any agreement is reached with the Argentines about communications we shall insist that it must contain an article which will protect British sovereignty over the Islands. This is what has been referred to publicly as 'the sovereignty umbrella'.

In reaching any agreement the Argentines also will want to ensure that their own claim is in no way prejudiced. The 'umbrella' is therefore designed to enable both sides to reach a sensible and practical agreement while at the same time leaving their conflicting arguments about sovereignty unaffected. ..."[2401]

2401 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* July 5, 1971 pp.1-4

June 11th, in Argentina, a ceremony is held at the Mitre Museum.

"... the Institute of the Malvinas Islands and Southern Lands held an academic meeting to commemorate the 201st anniversary of the British eviction of Port Egmont and the creation of the Malvinas Command. The figures honored were Francisco de Bucarelli, Martín Rodríguez, and Luis Vernet. Dr. Gómez Langenheim participated in the event, and immediately after, diplomas were presented to José María Ruda, Zavala Ortiz and Miguel Fitzgerald. At the ceremony, José María Ruda expressed: "...as for the inhabitants of the islands, we are sure that once they are returned to the Republic they will find a promising future, overcoming the current isolation in which they live and that under the protection of our laws (...) they will find their well-being and happiness"." [2402]

June 14th, David Scott and his team, plus Dick Goss, Richard Hills and Colonial Secretary John Jones sail for Buenos Aires.

June 21st, in Buenos Aires, a scheduled week of communication talks commence, with Islanders present; *"... the heads of the two delegations made their initial statements and exchanged their respective draft proposals. The British text was centred on the conservation of the status quo on the islands with provisions on particular aspects of communications, and the Argentine text, for its part, on a number of detailed communications proposals."* [2403]

"Two elected 'Councillors' ... Richard Hills and Lt. Colonel Richard Goss journeyed to Buenos Aires as part of the Foreign Office delegation and according to leaked reports they were locked in a room and given 30 minutes in which to accept or reject the proposed Communications Agreement. They had no means of communicating with colleagues back in the Falklands and they were harshly reminded by the leader of the Foreign Office delegation David Scott that should they reject the proposals then they would leave their constituents 'high and dry' and without any external communications whatsoever. The two unfortunate men had little option other than to accept the first stages of Argentine involvement in Falklands affairs..." [2404]

"Councillors Richard Hills and Richard Goss travelled with an FCO delegation to Buenos Aires where Sir David Scott, Assistant Under Secretary of State, locked them in a room and gave them half an hour to agree to the Communication Agreement or, with RMS Darwin removed, they would leave the Islanders without external communications. The Councillors felt they had no option but to accept the proposal before them and signed. In the Falklands they were known afterwards as the "the two Dicks". [2405]

On the same day, at the Hague, the International Court of Justice give an advisory opinion with regard to the Namibia case. [2406]

> *"... the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the principle of self-determination applicable to* ***all of them****."* [2407]

2402 Lo Coco 2024

2403 Beltramino 1997

2404 Patrick Watts MBE quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021

2405 Elgood 2025

2406 *Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970), Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1971*

2407 *Ibid. p.16.* My emphasis. An important decision in which the influence of UN GA resolution 2625 was apparent. No exceptions. The right of self-determination was applicable to ALL the Non-Self Governing Territories. ALL includes the Falkland Islands, despite attempts to paint white, black.

"(The) ICJ determined the right of NSGTs to self-determination under customary international law in 1971 and reiterated that legal finding on a number of occasions over the years." [2408]

In Stanley, Uruguay's Consulate closes after 47 years. [2409]

June 22nd, Argentina and Chile sign an *Arbitration Agreement* under which they commit to place their dispute over the Beagle Channel to international resolution. It is agreed that Queen Elizabeth II should act as arbitrator; that the judges should be drawn from the Hague and that the final decision can only be to accept or reject the panel's conclusion, without an option to modify it. [2410]

The British Government commission geology expert, Professor Donald H. Griffiths, of Birmingham University, to carry out a geological survey and report on the potential for oil around the Falklands archipelago. [2411]

"Oil companies began asking the British government for licences to explore the waters around the Falkland Islands in the late 1960s. The government commissioned geology expert Professor D. H. Griffiths of Birmingham University to carry out a geological survey of area in 1971." [2412]

"...the British government commissioned a 'library study,' led by Birmingham University professor Donald Griffiths, to evaluate the area's oil potential. The survey's results, which were conveyed to the government in 1971, suggested that portions of the Falklands' continental shelf, particularly near Burdwood Bank, approximately 120 miles south of the islands, might contain petroleum resources." [2413]

July 1st, in Buenos Aires, negotiations regarding communications conclude, with a Joint Statement initialled – *ad referendum* to both governments. [2414] The Joint Statement is to say:

> *"Special conversations were continued in Buenos Aires from the 21st until the 30th of June 1971 about communications and movement between the Argentine mainland and the Falkland Islands by delegations of the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and of the Argentine Republic, the former including participants from the Islands.*
>
> *The conversations were within the general framework of the negotiations recommended by Resolution No. 2065 (XX) of the General Assembly of the United Nations and in accordance with letters addressed to the Secretary-General of the Organisation by the Permanent Representatives of both countries on the 21st of November 1969 and the 11th of December 1970.*
>
> *The delegates concluded that, subject to the approval of their Governments, the following measures should adopted on the understanding that they may contribute to the process of a definitive solution to the dispute between the two Governments over the Islands which is referred to in Resolution No. 2065 (XX) mentioned above.*
>
> *1. In order to deal with questions which might arise over the setting up and promotion of communications between the Argentine mainland and the Falkland Islands in both directions, including questions relating to the movement of persons, those which might arise for residents of the Islands while they were on the mainland and those concerning residents of the mainland while they*

2408 Raimondo 2014
2409 Opened in 1924 and a long-standing annoyance to Buenos Aires, which failed to notice its presence until 1952 when it issued a formal protest. See October, 1952.
2410 See 1977.
2411 See 1974 and 1975
2412 *Oil and British Policy towards the Falklands/Malvinas Islands* Grace Livingstone 2020
2413 *The Oil Wars Myth* Emily Meierding 2021 ch.6
2414 See August 5, 1971 below.

were in the Islands, a special consultative committee should be set up, consisting of representatives of the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the British Embassy, with its headquarters in Buenos Aires. The Committee should have its representatives in Port Stanley who would keep it informed.

2. The Argentine Government should issue a document, in the form annexed, to residents of the Falkland Islands irrespective of their nationality who wished to travel to the Argentine mainland, which would allow them free movement within it. A document in the same form issued by the Argentine Government should be the only document needed by residents of the Argentine mainland for journeys to the Falkland Islands.

3. Residents in the Falkland Islands should be exempted by the Argentine Government from all duties, taxes, and any other obligations arising as a result of activities in the Falkland Islands. In addition, residents of the Falkland Islands who go to the Argentine mainland in order to provide services connected with communications should be exempt from taxes on their salaries and other emoluments which they receive from their British employers. The British Government should make no claim on residents of the Argentine mainland who provide services in the Falkland Islands for activities related to communications for taxes on their salaries and other emoluments which they receive from their Argentine employers.

4. The Argentine Government should take the necessary practical measures so that the normal luggage of residents of the Falkland Islands who travel between the Falkland Islands and the Argentine mainland in either direction should be free from the payment of all duties and taxes. Residents of the Falkland islands should be exempted from the payment of all Argentine duties and taxes in respect of their luggage, household effects and motor cars passing directly through the Argentine mainland towards the Falkland Islands or going abroad through the Argentine mainland. The British Government should take the necessary measures so that the normal luggage of residents of the Argentine mainland who travel between the Argentine mainland and the Falkland Islands in either direction will be exempted from the payment of all duties and taxes.

5. The Argentine Government should take the necessary measures so that each resident of the Islands who establishes a permanent residence on the Argentine mainland may bring in once only free of all duties and taxes all personal effects, household effects and a motor car. Equally, the British Government should take the necessary measures so that each resident on the Argentine mainland who establishes a permanent residence in the Falkland Islands may bring in once only free of all duties and taxes all personal effects, household effects and a motor car.

6. The British and Argentine Governments should facilitate in the Falkland Islands and on the Argentine mainland respectively, the transit, residence and work of persons directly concerned with practical measures adopted in order to implement and promote communications and movement.

7. The British Government should take the necessary measures to arrange for a regular shipping service for passengers, cargo and mail between the Falkland Islands and the Argentine mainland.

8. The Argentine Government should take the necessary measures to arrange for a regular service of weekly frequency by air for passengers, cargo and mail between the Argentine mainland and the Falkland Islands.

9. Pending the completion of the airfield at Port Stanley, the Argentine Government should provide a temporary service by amphibian aircraft between the Argentine mainland and the Falkland Islands for passengers, cargo and mail. This service should be reviewed from time to time in the light of progress in the construction of the airfield mentioned above.

10. Both Governments should co-operative over the simplification of administrative practices, regulations and documentation for sea and air transport bearing in mind the need to promote and speed up communications.

11. In order to facilitate the movement of persons born in the Falkland Islands, the Argentine Government should take the necessary measures to exempt them from all obligations related to enlistment and military service. The British Government should declare that in the Falkland Islands no obligations for enlistment for military service exist.

12. Both Governments should study and exchange views on measures to facilitate trade and to permit a greater ease of commercial transactions.

13. The British and Argentine Governments should take the necessary measures so that postal, telegraphic and telephone communications in both directions between the Argentine mainland and the Falkland Islands are as effective and expeditious as possible.

14. The tariff for postal, telegraphic and telephone communications in both direction between the Argentine mainland and the Falkland Islands should be at a rate equivalent to the internal rate at the place of origin of communications.

15. Postage stamps on mail travelling between the Argentine mainland and the Falkland Islands in either direction should be cancelled with a mark referring to this joint statement. Mail bags should be similarly marked.

16. The Argentine Government should be prepared to co-operate in the health, educational, agricultural and technical fields if so requested. The Argentine Government should arrange for places to be available in schools on the Argentine mainland for the children of residents of the Falkland Islands and should offer scholarships which should be published from time to time, the number of which should be decided upon in the light of local requirements. Both Governments should continue to exchange views on the matters referred to in this paragraph.

17. Conversations should be continued through the customary diplomatic channels and the next meeting should be held in Port Stanley in 1972.

18. If either Government should decide to terminate the measures referred to above, it should give six months' notice of its decision to the other Government.

Initialled in Buenos Aires on the 1st day of July 1971 by the Heads of the respective delegations." [2415]

2415 Words are important, particularly in treaties and other diplomatic agreements. The Falkland Islands were the subject of this agreement, not the Dependencies (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands). That Argentina did not understand this small detail, would eventually get good men killed. See - https://www.fiassociation.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/03/2.-1971-Anglo-Argentine-Joint-Statement-on-Communications.pdf

"After ten days of hard negotiations two documents were initialled on 1st July and subsequently approved by both Governments. These were, firstly, a draft Exchange of Notes, which is in the form of a legally binding international agreement, and ensures that the measures on communications set out in the other document should be without prejudice to British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands or to the Argentines' claim. Secondly, a Joint Statement recommending a series of practical measures to encourage travel between the Islands and the Argentine. These measures included provision of an air service by the Argentine Government and the provision of a shipping service by H.M.G. Also, pending the construction of an airfield by H.M.G. at Stanley, the Argentine Government were as an interim measure to provide an air service using amphibian Albatross craft, mainly for the carriage of first class air mail, urgent medical cases and for a few priority passengers." [2416]

"Afterwards, Beltramino told Scott in confidence that he regarded sovereignty as having been shelved for the time being. Scott added his personal view that the islanders would be under an Argentine flag within twenty-five years. Such was the confidence on both sides of the efficacy of the "hearts and minds" policy." [2417]

" ... our foreign affairs officials at the time, headed by a learned lawyer, Luis M. de Pablo Pardo, considered quite unacceptable the British presumption that Argentines should travel using a passport on the grounds that they would be setting foot on a territory considered their own. De Pablo Pardo's counter proposal of using a Cedula de Identidad (Identity Card) was rejected by Britain and a neutral document was devised, the Certificado Provisorio, known as the white card..." [2418]

"In 1971, following more secret talks, the pressure was ratcheted up. Falkland Islanders were told that their subsidised shipping link with Uruguay could not continue. They were presented with a new arrangement, one that pushed them firmly into bed with Buenos Aires. No one in the Islands liked it, but there was no choice. The Communications Agreement was dressed up as a joint commitment to support the Islands. The Argentines would build a temporary airstrip so that its state airline, Lineas Aereas del Estado (LADE), could operate a weekly service to and from the mainland. For its part, Britain would build a permanent airport, and (to counter the argument that too much reliance was being placed on Argentina) also provide a passenger-cargo ship operating to South America. It was implied that the new ship would be capable of trading with Uruguay if the Argentines ever abused their monopoly over air services. This fooled no one. The small print was alarming: to travel through Argentina locals would need a 'tarjeta provisorio', a provisional card, bearing their personal details and the Argentine coat of arms. Issued in Buenos Aires, the much-hated 'white card', as locals knew it, was a de facto Argentine passport." [2419]

"... a substantial development as a consequence of the agreement reached in 1971, thanks to an understanding achieved with the valuable participation of Ambassador Juan Carlos Beltramino, then in charge of the Malvinas issue at the Chancellery, when he addressed a special negotiation that would not prejudge other ongoing conversations." [2420]

"In it, the islanders formed part of the British delegation and signed the agreement. According to the minutes, the islanders travelled from the Malvinas Islands to Buenos Aires for the signing of the treaty at the San Martín Theater and, on their return, in an Argentine Air Force plane." [2421]

2416 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1970 & 1971*
2417 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.28
2418 Argentine diplomat Lucia Garcia del Solar in *Clarin* October 8, 1999. See 1999
2419 Bound 2007
2420 Berasategui 2017
2421 *La Cuestión Malvinas: una hoja de ruta. Herramientas para la política exterior argentina* A. Romero 2020

"The conversations that led to the 1971 joint declaration, ... excluded the question of sovereignty. Why did Argentina lend itself to them, if the only thing that really interested it was left outside (the agreement)? The answer can be guessed (at) in a Foreign Ministry document where it stated that Argentina made that decision "in order to help create an atmosphere favorable to the resumption of negotiations on sovereignty."." [2422]

July 2nd, the motor fishing vessel, *Philomel,* catches fire while at anchor off Stanley. She is towed out to Fairy Cove where the fire rages for two days. [2423]

In Argentina, history manuals are prepared for use in schools.

"... the first manuals that present a revisionist historiographical perspective and that seek to compete with the hegemony of the New Historical School in the school environment begin to appear in the publishing market ... The manuals Historia 2 and 3 by Miretzky, Rollo and Salluzzi (1971) are the ones that give the most importance to the development of the Malvinas question, observed in the space they dedicate to its treatment. In the first of the texts they dedicate three pages to refer to the discovery and occupation of the islands. In the second, they allocate five pages to the context of the British occupation of 1833. ... the question of the Malvinas Islands could have become a "national cause", among other reasons, due to the way in which it was transmitted in schools and because it was the story of a usurpation, of a missing space on the map, which had to be recovered to "be complete" as a nation." [2424]

July 6th, back in Stanley with a copy of the agreement, the Falklands Executive Council discuss the implications.

> *"At this point we show the confusion which exists, in the minds of Islanders, regarding passports -*
>
> *Mr D. Scott: It is proposed that we should issue to Falkland Islanders, British passports which in all cases will omit the words on the cover "Colony of the Falkland Islands". In some cases passports may continue to refer to the Falkland Islands somewhere inside the document as place of birth or place of residence. But in order to avoid any danger of obstruction by Argentine Immigration Authorities on account of Falkland Islands origin there will be a temporary card issued by the Argentine Government ....*
>
> *When you get to the Immigration Officer you merely hand your passport to him, he will take out the travel document and give you back your passport.*
>
> *Mr R. Uigg: The document, issued after the talks, included a specimen of the new "Temporary Card" ... The special card will be issued without interfering with existing passports.*
>
> *Mr A. Graham-Yooll: Argentina has therefore avoided any discussion on passports ... and offered to give Islanders a special travel certificate which would allow them to enter and leave Argentina at any time without ever showing a passport.*
>
> *These words of Mr Wigg and Mr Graham-Yooll reflect the views of all Islanders spoken to on the*

1) El presente certificado provisorio deberá ser exhibido a las autoridades cada vez que se lo requiera.
2) El status del titular de este certificado está contemplado en la Declaración Conjunta de Buenos Aires de 1° de Julio de 1971.
3) Para más información y averiguaciones recurra al Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto.

1) The present temporary card must be produced to the authorities whenever requested.
2) The bearer is covered by the Joint Statement of Buenos Aires of 1st July 1971.
3) For further information of inquiries apply to: Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto.

REPUBLICA ARGENTINA

CERTIFICADO PROVISORIO
EMITIDO DE ACUERDO A LA DECLARACIÓN CONJUNTA DE BUENOS AIRES DE 1971

TEMPORARY CARD
ISSUED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JOINT STATEMENT OF BUENOS AIRES OF 1971

2422 Carassai 2022 citing *Cronologia de acontecimientos con relación a las Islas Malvinas* Ministerio de Relaciones Exteriores y Culto s/f. Archivo Gonzalez Balcarce.

2423 Purchased by the Falkland Islands Government, *Philomel* had arrived in the archipelago in February, 1948 where she operated as a coastal supply ship.

2424 Santos La Rosa 2022

subject who do not wish their present passports defaced - sentimental or not the removal of the words "Falkland Islands" from our passports is tantamount to agreeing that no such place exists."[2425]

"Government has issued documents regarding the discussions - a transcript of a broadcast talk by Mr David Scott, a letter on the "Sovereignty Umbrella", a Joint Statement on Communications, and a copy of the "Travel Document" of which we have heard so much lately. The fact that this document may be accepted is causing concern among Islanders, and many items in the Joint Statement require clarification to the public." [2426]

"Faced with the withdrawal of the Darwin and under pressure from Britain to accept a solution that would not involve Britain in any expense, the Councillors recommended an acceptance under the cover of the "sovereignty umbrella". They had no alternative." [2427]

July 12th, following discussions with the Treasury, the FCO News department issue a press release.

"With reference to the Joint Statement about Falkland Islands communications initialled by British and Argentine delegates in Buenos Aires on 1 July, press reports which have implied that Her Majesty's Government will be taking over the operation of shipping services from the Falkland Islands Company are without foundation. There has been continuing consultation between HMG and the Company who have for many years provided the shipping service from the Falkland Islands.

Even after the construction of an airfield at Port Stanley, for which HMG accept responsibility, and the inauguration of an air service to Argentina, the Falkland Islands Company will continue to operate the external shipping service for cargo, passengers and mail."

"It has been suggested that the British Treasury was responsible for the failure to establish a maritime link with Argentina." [2428]

"The first back-sliding was a British one. Whatever Scott may have signed in Buenos Aires, he was not plenipotentiary over the Treasury. There was no sign of the promised maritime link to a port to replace Darwin. ... The Foreign Office had not secured the necessary finance from the Overseas Development Agency, and were thus unable to honour the British side of the agreement." [2429]

"Britain reneged on the undertaking to provide a sea link, which left the four quarterly trips of the A.E.S. As the islands' only sea link. The failure to provide the sea link that had been agreed gave the British government a powerful instrument for applying pressure in the Falkland Islanders." [2430]

A delegation from Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs visits the Falkland Islands on a 'familiarisation visit'; *"Accompanying the delegation were several representatives of the Argentine Air Force who investigated the facilities available in Stanley for the reception of the amphibian aircraft."* [2431]

July 22nd, Chile and Argentina sign an arbitration agreement, under the auspices of the British Crown, for their dispute over the Beagle Channel Islands to be considered by five judges of the International Court of Justice. Once the Court reaches a decision, the result is to be notified to the British Crown for ratification or rejection. [2432]

2425 *Falkland Islands Monthly Review* August 2, 1971 pp.1-2
2426 *Ibid.*
2427 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.568
2428 Ellerby 1990 p.175 citing *U.K.F.I.C. archive (Sussex), file: Correspondence with F.I.s Government, Christie to Parker, 7 Feb. 1978.*
2429 Hastings & Jenkins 1997
2430 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.569
2431 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1970 & 1971*
2432 See 1976 and 1977.

August 5th, in Argentina, a letter from Britain's Embassy to Argentina's Foreign Ministry, states:

> *"I have the honour to refer to the Resolution of the General Assembly of the United Nations number 2065 (XX) of the 16th of December 1965 and the letters dated the 21st November 1969 and the 11th December 1970 from the Permanent Representative to the United Nations of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Argentine Republic addressed to the Secretary-General of the Organisation on the question of the Falkland Islands, and also to the Joint Statement on communications and movement between the Argentine mainland and the Falkland islands initialled in Buenos Aires by the Representatives of the two Governments on the 1st July 1971, and to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the United Kingdom are prepared to conclude an agreement with the Government of the Argentine Republic in the following terms:*
>
> *1.(a) Since divergence remains between the two Governments regarding the circumstances that should exist for a definitive solution to the dispute concerning sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, nothing contained in the Joint Statement referred to above and approved by our two Governments on today's date shall be interpreted as:*
>
> *(i) a renunciation by either Government of any right of territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islands; or*
>
> *(ii) a recognition of or support for the other Government's position with regard to territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.*
>
> *(b) No acts or activities taking place as a consequence of the Joint Statement referred to above having been put into operation and while it is in operation shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting, or denying the position of either Government with regard to territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islands.*
>
> *2. Either Government may denounce this agreement subject to six months' prior notice in writing.*
>
> *If the foregoing is acceptable to the Government of the Argentine Republic, I have the honour to propose that this Note together with Your Excellency's reply in that sense shall constitute an agreement between the two Government which shall enter into force on the date of your reply. …"* [2433]

Argentina's Foreign Ministry responds by approving the Joint Statement. [2434]

> *"I have the honor to inform Your Excellency that the Government of the Argentine Republic approves the Joint Statement concerning communications between the Falkland Islands and the Argentine mainland, which was initiated by the representatives of our two governments in Buenos Aires on July 1, 1971. The Argentine Government will for its part put into operation the measures referred to in that Joint Statement with effect from today's date. I avail myself of this opportunity to renew to Your Excellency the assurances of my highest consideration. L. M. de Pablo Pardo."*

The Joint Statement is released to the Press.

A Communications Agreement is signed by representatives of Britain and Argentina.

2433 Agreement, as ratified, here – https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/1971-anglo-argentine-joint-statement-on-communications.pdf

2434 See July 1, 1971 above.

"The Heath government signed a communications agreement with Buenos Aires, which effectively ensured Argentine control over air access to the islands. ... this agreement made the islanders "Argentine passport-holders" in all but name." [2435]

"In August 1971 the Communications Agreement was formally signed by representatives of the British and Governments. Within the Falklands population there was a combination of anticipation, excitement and a little trepidation too at the thought of being able to take a 2 hours and 20 minutes flight from Stanley, on a 45-seat turbo-prop aircraft, by the state airlines Lincas Acras Del Estado (LADE) to the city of Comodoro Rivadavia in the southern province of Chubut. Seats could be bought for as little as £15 (but it was not long before the price escalated at an alarming rate and become un-affordable for many people). From Comodoro it was just a short 2 hours flight to the exotic city of Buenos Aires, known universally as the 'Paris of South America' and where most of the world's major airlines offered flights to International destinations. Those who suffered seasickness welcomed the cessation of the 1,000 miles sea journey to Montevideo. The Communications Agreement also provided for Falklands children to attend, at no expense to their parents, British schools in Argentina, for their secondary education. Medical patients were afforded attention at the renowned 'Hospital Britanico' in Buenos Aires while after a period of 130 years of being carried by sea, air mail would be arriving weekly by air. Fresh fruit and vegetables would also be carried on the aircraft. Football mad Argentina would host the World Cup of 1978 and some fans were already making plans to attend the tournament. ... Two attractive Argentine female teachers would be sent across to teach Spanish in Stanley's schools. The Argentine state fuel company YPF was given a monopoly to provide all fuel in the Islands - cheaply at first of course." [2436]

"The islanders ... particularly objected to the "Temporary Card", or "white card" as it was soon called, a flimsy cardboard travel document to be presented by people of all nationalities travelling from the islands to Argentina and vice versa, to obviate the showing of passports. The "white cards" were in two languages, but Spanish came first and the English was defective; they bore the crest and name of Argentina but not Britain, and personal details were entered in Spanish only. ... The islanders protested by failing to sign them as they were supposed to. The "white cards" were issued in Buenos Aires ..." [2437]

August 11th, an Anglo-Argentine team travel to the Falklands to consider the construction of an airfield.

> *"In August 1971 the Islands welcomed a technical mission headed by Group Captain Melrose, Air Attache to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, and Vice Comodoro Degan Lob of the Argentine Air Force; the mission had been formed to study some of the problems involved in the introduction of the interim air service by amphibian craft and to investigate whether it would be possible to find a site for the construction of a temporary air field to take land planes. At the same time arrived Lieutenant Colonel Wheatley of the Royal Engineers, whose main task was to carry out a study of the problems involved in the construction of the permanent air field at Cape Pembroke. A detailed feasibility survey of the Cape Pembroke site was subsequently carried out by the consulting engineers, Messrs. Rendel Palmer and Tritton."* [2438]

"They recommended a 1,250 metre runway costing 351,031,000, which could be used by Focker 27 and HS 748 (Andover) aircraft without a full load. In November Bendel, Palmer and Tritton, a firm of consulting

2435 *The Economist* June 19, 1982
2436 Patrick Watts MBE quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021
2437 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.570-571
2438 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1970 & 1971*

engineers, was commissioned to produce a feasibility study for an airfield to operate regular flights to Commodore Rivadavia, Punta Arenas and (in emergency conditions) Montevideo. Their report concluded that it would cost £1,784,000. An F27 with a full pay load would require a 1,525 metre length runway." [2439]

"Colonel Wheatley of the Royal Engineers proposed a permanent airfield near Cape Pembroke, while the Argentine group, assisted by Group Captain Melrose, air attaché at the British embassy in Buenos Aires, proposed a temporary airstrip on the ridge south-east of Stanley near Hookers Point." [2440]

"In September 1971 (sic), a flight departed carrying representatives from both the Argentine Air Force and the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department. The commission should select an airdrome site suitable for Fokker F-27 aircraft. Headed by the Secretary Carlos Rouge, the entourage was made up of Coronel (R) Luis González Balcarce; Vicecomodoro Alcides A. Degand Löb; Mayor Carlos F. Bloomer Reeve, former Business Manager at Líneas Aéreas del Estado (LADE) headquarters; Mayor Luis A. Remorino, an engineer from the Dirección de Infraestructura (Infrastructure Management) that would carry out the job; and the Royal Air Force (RAF) attaché in Buenos Aires." [2441]

October 1st, in New York, during a speech to the General Assembly, Argentina's Foreign Minister announces the results of the communications negotiations; *"This does not, however, close the chapter of negotiations. These negotiations should continue until full implementation is achieved of the terms of resolution 2065. ..., the problem will soon be definitively solved with the restoration of the Malvinas to the national territory of the Argentine Republic."* [2442]

During **November**, on entering Argentina, three Islanders' are forced to accept Argentine ID cards – contrary to the agreement concerning *'white cards'*.

A delegation from the UK's branch of the *Commonwealth Parliamentary Association*, visits Port Stanley.

"The delegation consisting of Mr Bernard Conlan, M.P., and Mr Richard Luce, M.P., stayed in the Islands for over a week and, in addition to meeting many people in Stanley, made several tours to the Camp. The visit by the delegation was a great success and served a most valuable purpose in strengthening the links with the Association in London and in ensuring that there are now additional Members at Westminster who can represent the Islands' interests with greater authority." [2443]

November 26th, in New York, the Special Committee on Decolonization presents is annual report to the Secretary-General. [2444]

December 20th, at the UN, the General Assembly adopt a consensus noting with "*satisfaction*" the progress achieved on communications, and urges the parties to continue negotiations.

"I remember the 1970s as a time of fear that we were being pushed towards dependence on Argentina, against the wishes of a vast number of Falkland Islanders, if not the majority. I remember personal fear and a fear among the population that the UK Government was wishing to be rid of us and that our sovereignty wishes were going to be ignored or side stepped. The withdrawal of the RMS Darwin and the loss of our link with Uruguay was worrying for a great many as of trade and friendship had been forged. That was being

2439 Ellerby 1990 p.175 citing *F.I.A. archive (London), 1(D), Permanent Airfield Study, May 1975.*
2440 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.569
2441 *The Argentine Air Force during the Malvinas War* Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023. Digital book in English. As yet (2025) incomplete. See - https://www.argentina.gob.ar/sites/default/files/2023/10/faa-malvinas-0-10-en.pdf
2442 *UN Doc A8723/Rev.1 vol.5 chapter 25*
2443 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1970 & 1971*
2444 *UN Document A/8423/Rev.1 [IV]* p.155. Once again the Committee merely forwarded a Working Paper prepared by the Secretariat for the information of the Fourth Committee.

wrenched away and we were going into the unknown. Having said that, we all knew what the ultimate goal of Argentina was with regard to the Islands…" [2445]

December 31st, the biannual review estimates the population of the Falkland islands as 2,020 with 38 births, 21 marriages and 20 deaths during 1970.

> *"During the period under review the judicial system of the Falkland Islands was administered by a Supreme Court and a Court of Summary Jurisdiction both of which usually sit in Stanley. Since the end of 1969 a Magistrate's Court with enhanced powers has been established intermediate between the Court of Summary Jurisdiction and the Supreme Court. A Court of Appeal, constituted in 1965, hears appeals from the Supreme Court. Justices of the Peace, residing in Stanley and in the Camp, have the power to deal with minor offences. The territory retains the part-time services in England of a Legal Adviser. Local ordinances and regulations are in effect. English law applies down to 1900 and subsequently by special application."* [2446]

1972 – January 7th, from Argentina, the cruise shop *Libertad* sails for Antarctica via the Falklands. On board are Britain's Ambassador, Michael Hadow, and Mario Izaguirre, of Argentina's Foreign Ministry. [2447]

In London, a briefing note on the Falklands is prepared by the Foreign & Commonwealth Office (FCO).

> *"At present the Islands are something of a liability to Britain; they no longer have a strategic value and they are difficult and expensive to defend, while remaining a constant source of friction in relations with Argentina and with Latin America as a whole."* [2448]

January 10th, in Stanley, Governor Ernest G. (Toby) Lewis addresses the Falklands Legislative Council.

> *"May I turn now to external affairs, and in particular to our relations with the Argentine, much has been said and written and I do not intend to repeat it all. However, I would like to say that the agreements do reflect a degree of political maturity that is rare in these days and that we should not under-estimate what has been achieved. I would like to pay tribute to the work done by our negotiating team including the members from the Islands for the way in which they handled the talks. On the agreements reached in B.A. in June (1971) of course the acid test is going to be how these agreements work out in practice, …*
>
> *So far the agreements have worked well and we can expect the first regular amphibian flight in a couple of days thus introducing the fortnightly service and there are many other areas in which the provisions of the agreement have been implemented — not quite as spectacular perhaps as the air link but in important fields such as medical, postal, telecommunications and education, We expect that a third round of talks will take place in Stanley in March…"* [2449]

2445 Alisa Heathman quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021

2446 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the Year 1970 & 1971*

2447 *From Chapultepec to the Beagle. Argentine Foreign Policy 1945-1980* Juan A. Lanús 1984 p.478. The vessel carried some 350 tourists. Unconfirmed, as I have found no British source for this visit by Hadow.

2448 *FCO 7/2115 1972* quoted in *Far from Moderate: An account and appraisal of some aspects of the human involvement with the natural environment of the Falkland Islands and South Georgia* S. Palmer 2004.

2449 *Falkland Islands Gazette* 1972. Despite the expectation, I am unable to find any record of negotiations taking place in March, 1972. It appears likely that any discussions focused on the arrangements necessary to facilitate the construction of the temporary airfield at Hookers Point. *cf.* 1971

On the same day, *Libertad* arrives in Port Stanley.

"The first contingent of 300 tourists, mostly Argentines, arrived in January 1972. … Nat Bound, a Port Stanley store owner also added that, the problem was that the population of the town was small and the contingents of tourists were large, consequently they were hard to watch. According to Bound, after a while, the tourists became bored and they didn't know what to do. Then, "they started to knock at the doors of the pubs after closing time, or they, practically 'assaulted' the stores. The worst thing for Bound was that fact many tourists knocked at the doors or ring (bells) at the houses of the islanders with the excuse of (wanting to) fraternize"."[2450]

January 12th, a sea plane arrives in Stanley harbour.

"In January 1972 the Argentine Air Force started a fortnightly service between Comodoro Rivadavia and Port Stanley, using the amphibious Albatross. During most of the year this was the only external carrier and as the pay-load was limited to 6-8 passengers, the demand for seats far exceeded the carrying capacity, and seats had to be allocated on a priority basis. First class mail was the first priority, followed by urgent medical cases. Although the Argentine pilots did a superb job, keeping the link open sometimes in atrocious weather, it became clear that in order to give the service flexibility, land planes would have to be introduced." [2451]

"… on 12 January 1972, a seaplane from the Argentine Air Force landed in Stanley harbour establishing the first regular flight between Comodoro Rivadavia and the Falkland Islands. From then onwards, "sanitary, passenger and general cargo (mail, fresh food, and medicines) became regular flights" … the sea plane was a Grumman HU-16 Albatross, from the Air Force, which was able to operate on land, sea and snow, and could carry some five passengers. Flights linking Stanley with Comodoro Rivadavia took place twice monthly." [2452]

"On 12 January 1972, while the future airstrip was being built, LADE started to operate with an Albatross configured for six and eight passengers. In all, thirty crossings with 203 flight hours were performed. … The personnel who performed as pilots were Mayor Alberto S. Álvarez, Capitanes Ángel G. Toribio and José A. Demarco, Primeros Tenientes Juan M. Maclay and Antonio A. Bruno; as navigators: Primeros Tenientes Héctor González, Francisco F. Mensi and Raúl A. Tamagnone; as mechanics: Suboficiales Mayores Fidel Contino and Rubén C. Bidegain, and Suboficial Auxiliar Néstor Fernández; and as radio operators Suboficial Mayor Julio Martín, Cabos Principales Juan C. Scianca and Eduardo Castilla, Cabo Primero Jorge Morales and Cabo Ricardo del Río." [2453]

January 24th, at Port William, a French liner, *France*, anchors; discharging 500 tourists into Stanley.

January 26th, in London, Viscount Eccles speaks during a House of Lords debate on Latin America.

> *"Your Lordships will be glad to know that our political relations with the countries of Latin America are generally most cordial and there are remarkably few points of difference. … in full consultation with the Islanders, and without prejudice to the question of sovereignty, the Argentine Government and ourselves have made arrangements for modern communications between the Islands, Argentina and the world beyond, both by air and sea. These arrangements when completed will make a material*

2450 *74 days under the Argentine flag: The experiences of occupation during the Falklands/Malvinas War* Alejandro Luis Corbacho 2018 citing *Malvinas, 74 dias alucinantes en Puerto Argentino* Haroldo Foulkes 1984
2451 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1972 & 1973*
2452 *MercoPress* January 13, 2022
2453 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

contribution to the welfare of the Island community. ... Now we are looking forward to a third round to be held in Stanley and we very much hope that holding the talks there will contribute to the process of greater mutual understanding between the inhabitants of the Islands and their Argentine neighbours."[2454]

February 9th, at Port Stanley, Russian merchant ship *Mikhail Kalinin* (Snobkov) rendezvous with Soviet submarine *B-73 Lira* (Petrushikhin). [2455]

May 2nd, following months of deliberations, the Argentine government agrees to construct a temporary airfield at Hooker's Point, near Stanley, to replace the sea-plane service. The steel mesh strip to be obtained by Britain from the USA at a cost of US$1 million. Buenos Aires is to provide the workforce and construction equipment. [2456]

"... given weather conditions, its limited payload, and high operating costs, it was soon decided to replace it with land planes. The Argentines offered to build an aluminium landing strip for this purpose. The proposal ran into local opposition mainly on the grounds that the strip would be an encroachment on sovereignty. As Lewis said in a despatch "the local politicians, not known for their ability to stand up to pressure, immediately took cover and we found the road ahead blocked". It took extensive touring of the settlements by Lewis and his colonial, later chief, secretary (Thomas) Layng, to swing Island opinion in favour of the proposal to which councillors eventually agreed unanimously." [2457]

"The project entailed reaching agreements so that the Argentine ships from Transportes Navales could transport machines, aluminium plates —similar to the ones used in Vietnam— and personnel from the then Argentine Air Force Grupo I de Mantenimiento (Group I Maintenance). Likewise, it would be necessary to get authorization to: Purchase at least three houses (one of them for the technical personnel of Yacimientos Petrolíferos Fiscales) and some premises to establish Líneas Aéreas del Estado office; install two SSB (single side band) communication stations; take two or more vehicles from the continent, including a fuel truck; prepare access to the runway; temporarily house thirty workers (and) reconcile accounting mechanisms for funds transfer... Also, it would be necessary to build a road to connect the airport and the city." [2458]

May 14th, from Buenos Aires, an Argentine transport ship, *Cabo San Gonzalo*, sails with 40 workmen and technicians together with 900 tons of construction equipment. A correspondent for Britain's *Financial Times* watches them sail.

"The Argentines have finally established a beach-head on the Falklands."

From Stanley, Governor Lewis writes to the FCO proposing a permanent airport to eventually replace the airfield about to be built by Argentina.

2454 *HL Deb 26 January 1972 vol.327 cc333-407*
2455 Apparently to effect repairs to the submarine.
2456 Lanús 1984. See August, 1971.
2457 David Tatham (ed) 2008. See - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/home
2458 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

"Whitehall now experienced a severe bout of interdepartmental warfare." [2459]

On East Falkland Island, at the end of its working life, the European Space Research tracking station ceases operations. [2460]

June 6th, at Hookers Point, construction of the airfield gets under way; supervised by engineer Luis Remorino.

"With aluminium plates 3.6 metres long by 60 centimetres wide and 4 centimetres thick imported from Los Angeles and taken to the islands by the Argentine ship San Gonzalo, forty Argentines and seven islanders laid out an 800-meter-long landing strip, by 41 meters wide at Hookers Point, 5 kilometres from Stanley." [2461]

In London, on the same day, the 1971 Anglo-Argentine Communications Agreement is presented to Parliament by the Foreign Secretary.

> *"Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Argentine Republic concerning Communications between the Falkland Islands and the Argentine Mainland signed at Buenos Aires on* ***5 August 1971*** *(with Joint Statement and Related Notes) - The Agreement entered into force on 5 August 1971 and was presented to Parliament by the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs by Command of Her Majesty, June 1972."* [2462]

As regards travel between the Falkland Islands and Argentina, the agreement states:

> *"2. The Argentine Government should issue a document, in the form annexed, to residents of the Falkland Islands irrespective of their nationality who wished to travel to the Argentine mainland, which would allow them free movement within it. A document in the same form issued by the Argentine Government should be the only document needed by residents of the Argentine mainland for journeys to the Falkland Islands"* [2463]

July 24th, in Britain's House of Commons, asked about the prospect of a new airport in the Falkland Islands, Government spokesman, John Anthony Kershaw, MP, responds:

"*The Governor has applied for a grant of £1615 million for the construction of the permanent airfield. This is being considered and I hope that an early decision will be reached. If the application is approved construction could, barring unforeseen difficulties, be started by August, 1973, and completed about May, 1975. ... I think this is the best we can do. It is a big job which will have to be put out to tender properly. Construction difficulties are considerable, but we nevertheless appreciate the importance of this. ... The Argentine Government are co-operating in the provision of a temporary airstrip. I am sure they see that this is for the good of the islanders, and it will give them satisfaction as well as ourselves."* [2464]

In the UK, the Falkland Islands Company (FIC) is acquired by Dundee, Perth and London Securities Ltd. As part of the agreement, the new owners grant the Falkland Islanders' Sheep Owners Association a right of first refusal should they decide to sell.

2459 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.32

2460 In place since 1967

2461 Carassai 2022. The temporary runway was constructed by Grupo I de Construcciones de la Fuerza Aérea (FAA) using aluminum matting from the Harvey Aluminium Company in the USA. It was 730m long by 20m wide.

2462 My emphasis. See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2020/06/1971-anglo-argentine-joint-statement-on-communications.pdf

2463 Only the Falkland Islands, not the dependencies (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands). See July, 1971

2464 *Hansard, Commons Chamber, Oral Answers, Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs vol.841 Monday 24, July 1972*

In **August**, in Uganda, President Idi Amin, declares that the UK will have to take responsibility for British subjects of Asian origin; expelling over 50,000 people. Britain's government contacts the Crown Colonies with regard to settling some of the refugees; *"Only the Falkland Islands gave a positive response, saying they would accept doctors, teachers, domestic servants and farm workers."* [2465]

September 27th, in New York, at the UN, Argentina's representative addresses the General Assembly.

> *".. In order to encourage ties between the Islands and the mainland and as a result of instruments approved by both countries, efforts have been made to allow communications, to increase mutual knowledge and to benefit the population of the Malvinas. Despite these practical steps of undisputed importance, there still are differences outstanding between the two Governments regarding the circumstances that should exist for a final solution to be arrived at over the question of sovereignty. Further talks on the matter are to be held and we trust that they will be fruitful. The result can, in any case, be none other than the return of the Malvinas Islands to the Argentine territorial heritage"*

September 28th, at Port Stanley, a new motor vessel *Monsunen* arrives; intended for coast-wide trade and occasional voyages to South American ports.

October 23rd, in New York, the UK's representative, in a letter addressed to the Secretary-General, responds to Argentina's September 27 statement; *"... the efforts of our two Governments to solve our differences should be pursued in a climate of mutual understanding..."*

October 24th, an Anglo-Argentine agreement is reached to open a Líneas Aéreas del Estado (LADE) office in Stanley; to facilitate a regular air service from Argentina.

> *"Air Lines of the State (LADE), an Argentine Company in charge of the regular as well as the temporary service, referred to in numbers (8) and (9) of the Joint Declaration, will open a commercial and operational agency in Port Stanley ... 3. The crews and air planes with which the services referred to in numeral (2) of this Agreement are used, will carry the same flight documentation that is de rigueur for crews and air planes that perform internal flights over the Argentine continental territory and its operators will be exempt from payment of landing fees, levies or other charges ..."* [2466]

November 9th, in London, tenders for the construction of a permanent airfield in the Falklands are received by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO).

November 14th, at Stanley, six Argentine pilots arrive to familiarize themselves with the new airfield.

"One day before the inauguration event, the I Brigada Aérea (1st Air Brigade) sent six pilots to familiarize them with the airdrome: Vicecomodoros Raúl A. Barcala (Brigade Operations Commander) and Roberto H. López (F-27 Squadron Commander); Mayor Jorge R. Ruiz (LADE Operations Commander); and Capitanes Rubén O. Moro, Carlos G. Novillo and Abel A. Síntora. Pilots had never landed on aluminum plates before. That was why they observed the arrival from the cockpit. The airstrip did not look as short as its 720 meters long indicated because, in perspective, the few 30 meters wide gave the illusion it had a regular size. Landing short, performing a long landing or exceeding the plates would break the landing gear since there were no shoulders or braking areas. Beyond the aluminum plates, everything was spongy humid peat with no consistency to bear a person's weight. That day a crosswind was blowing, at 90º from the airstrip. Anyway,

2465 *Ministers hunted for island to house Asians* in *The Guardian* January 1, 2003.There is no evidence that any Ugandan Asians went to the Falklands.

2466 Lanús 1984 p.496

the Vicecomodoro Barcala, the F-27 Commander, landed without inconvenience and he could stop it right before the final with the brakes applied." [2467]

November 15th, in the Falkland Islands, the new temporary airstrip is officially opened.

"The temporary airfield with its slotted aluminium strip was formally opened in November 1972—just in time for the third round of political talks scheduled to take place in Stanley between the British and Argentine representatives. From that time a regular weekly service has been in operation by the Argentine State Airline (LADE), using Fokker F 27 planes. The temporary airstrip is only 800 metres long, and this limits the pay-load ..." [2468]

"The islanders regarded the arrival of any group of Argentines as an incursion of their territory. The negotiator Scott thought this sensitivity might disappear with time; unfortunately, his assumption was not correct. He may have begun to realize this when the planned ceremony to open the new Port Stanley airstrip turned into a trivial fiasco more humorous than important. The Argentine officials proceeding on the first flight of the air service turned out to be Argentine senior military officers in full uniform. Hearing of this, the Falkland Islands' governor, Toby Lewis, was ordered to hoist the Union Jack and appear at the ceremony himself in full-dress Governor regalia. The islanders themselves feared that ceremonially clad Argentines represented a covert invasion, perhaps even supported by the British Foreign Office. The islands' secretary, John Laing felt a demonstration was likely and called out the Marine guard, a permanent detachment of military stationed on the Falklands to maintain order. Scott's hopes that relations between the islanders and the Argentines would improve must have been dampened as this attempt at a positive step forward fell victim to unfounded fears."[2469]

"Despite the good impression created by the Argentine workforce employed on the construction of the strips, (Governor) Lewis was confronted with the prospect of a demonstration on sovereignty by hardliners at the inaugural ceremony which was to be attended by numerous Argentine visitors, including press. This was only prevented by Lewis' persuasiveness, by a broadcast by a member of LegCo and by tight security measures." [2470]

"At the inauguration, which was witnessed by about three hundred people, the British and Argentine flags flew side by side. Governor Lewis thanked everyone who had worked to make it a reality and awarded Remorino the Shackleton Medal, in recognition of his efforts. The runway received blessings from Monsignor James Ireland, and Reverends Canon Heyler and Robin Forrester, the Ministers of the three Christian cults (sic) in Stanley. Brigadier Major Higinio González, commander of Regiones Aéreas de la Fuerza Aérea Argentina, said on that occasion: "This new milestone in our permanent approach allows us to incorporate conventional

2467 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
2468 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1972 & 1973*
2469 *War since 1945: Offensive Air Operations of the Falklands War* Walter F. DeHoust 1984
2470 David Taylor in Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.338. LegCo was an abbreviation of Legislative Council – the unicameral legislature of the Falkland Islands from November, 1845 until January 2009 when the Council became an Assembly.

aircraft for a greater number of passengers and will allow the movement of cargo between the islands and the Argentine continental zone. May God grant that this airfield consecrated to such a noble purpose serves peace, concord and communication among men of goodwill".” [2471]

“In November a demonstration was planned to show Argentines on the inaugural flight to Stanley that Governor Lewis lacked Islander support, casting doubt on FCO promises to the Argentine government. By the gentle standard of the Islands the Governor's response was excessive. He requested Councillor Syd Miller to appeal for calm over the radio. Marines were mobilised with pickaxe handles available in a nearby truck. Adults and teenagers were warned they would lose their jobs if they attended the demonstration. FCO official Sir David Scott, present for the inaugural flight, was overheard by Mrs Robin Pitaluga who was seated in the row behind telling Sr Juan-Carlos Beltramino of the Argentine Foreign Ministry: "If you go on like this, the Islands will be yours in ten years".” [2472]

November 16th, in the Falklands, the airfield comes into full operation with a weekly air service.

“... quite an event. For the islanders because, from then on, they were communicated weekly with the mainland in a period of two and a half hours, for £9.60 or its equivalent in Argentine pesos ($230). For the Argentine authorities, because the State company LADE would operate the runway, ... Things were going reasonably well. When the Argentine Air Force Team that laid the runway left Stanley, they thanked the islanders for their hospitality and cooperation.” [2473]

“*From that moment on, the F-27 scheduled flight would be performed on Mondays. It departed from Comodoro Rivadavia at 1000, arrived at Stanley at 1230 and returned one hour later. Each crossing cost £9.80 or ARS $ 230 from Buenos Aires to Comodoro Rivadavia. Commercial airlines charged ARS $295 per ticket. In order to travel to Stanley, it was necessary to have an international vaccination certificate and the authorization from the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department. These requirements were only for Argentine citizens and resident foreigners. Foreigners were required to have a passport. Travellers had to carry, at least, £5 per day of stay. At both Comodoro Rivadavia and Stanley, the Customs service fulfilled its functions without further requirements. There, boarding/landing cards were filled out both in Spanish and English, stating nationality, address and identity card number. When travelling to the Argentine mainland, Malvinas settlers had to meet the requirements and get the White Card at the British representative’s office.”* [2474]

Accommodation is provided by the Falkland Islands Government for LADE staff.

“Several Argentine members of staff of LADE naturally had to be resident in the islands; as befitted a military airline they were headed by a vicecomodoro of the Argentine air force, who lived in a house in Stanley provided for him by the Falkland Islands Government, while the remainder lived in rented accommodation in the town.” [2475]

November 21st, in Stanley, a further round of Anglo-Argentine negotiations commences.

2471 Carassai 2022 citing *La Razón* November 18, 1971.

2472 Elgood 2025 citing *UKFIC82* note 35 & para 80. The reference is to the author's private papers which include two volumes of evidence written up by Elgood on behalf of the UK Falkland Islands Committee for submission to the 1982 Franks Committee. The supporting documentary evidence is stored in the Museum at Stanley, with a release date of 2040.

2473 Carassai 2022

2474 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

2475 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.570

"The third round of talks between H.M.G. and the Argentine Government with representatives from the Islands forming part of the British Delegation was a success and helped to smooth out a long list of administrative and political problems. It also enabled our visitors to see something of the Islands at first hand." [2476]

"When the negotiators met.., the practical measures on communications and movement of persons were almost entirely in full implementation." [2477]

November 24th, from Stanley, Governor Lewis informs London of local concerns regarding any Argentine monopoly over fuel supplies in the Islands.

December 3rd, in the Falkland Islands, a census is conducted.

December 18th, in New York, at the United Nations, the General Assembly defer any consideration of the Falklands question until 1973.

December 31st, the Falklands biannual review notes 39 births, 25 marriages and 10 deaths in the territory during 1972.

"Since November 1972 a five-day week of 40 hours has been worked; previously the working week was five-and-a-half days of 45 hours total. Time and a half was paid for overtime, with double time for work on Sundays and public holidays. Hourly paid workers were granted a fully paid holiday of 96 hours annually. There was no night work except in essential services. ... The Government is responsible for education throughout the Colony. All education is free and the Government bears the cost of all books, materials and equipment. The fees for boarding school education are fixed at a maximum of £50 per academic year per family: for the first child £25, for two children £25 and £15 respectively and for three children £25, £15 and £10 respectively. A fourth child is free. There is no regular secondary or higher education in the Colony though special tuition is available and several pupils have obtained Ordinary and Advanced level successfully in the General Certificate of Education." [2478]

1973 – January 1st, the UK joins the European Economic Community (EEC); acceding to the Treaty of Rome (1957). [2479] Britain's dependent territories are 'associated' with the Community and listed under Annex IV to the Treaty of Rome.

In Brussels, Belgium, viewing the Islands inclusion under Annex IV as a consolidation of the UK's sovereignty over the archipelago, Argentina protests to the EEC, arguing that the UK's admission to the Community should not legitimise its control over the Falklands.

March 9th, in Stanley, the results of the December, 1972 census are published, noting a population of 1,957 of which 1,081 are males and 876 females. [2480]

"Included in the total population of 1,957 are 36 Royal Marines stationed in the Colony and 14 members of the Argentine Airfield Construction Team who were in the colony for the purpose of constructing a temporary airfield, but not the crews (67 males) of locally registered ships at sea on Census Day." [2481]

2476 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1972 & 1973*
2477 Beltramino 1997
2478 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1972 & 1973*
2479 Prime Minister Edward Heath signed the Treaty of Accession in January, 1972. Parliament's European Communities Act was passed in October, 1972 and the instrument of ratification deposited with the EEC on October 18, 1972. Coming into effect on January 1, 1973.
2480 The comparative figures for 1962 were 2,172, 1,195 and 977 respectively.
2481 *Report of Census 1972.* See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/report-of-census-1972.pdf

March 11th, in Argentina, Presidential elections are held. Left-wing Peronist, Hector Jóse Cámpora, wins with 49.6% of the vote. Ex-President Juan Domingo Perón, living in exile, is barred from standing. [2482]

In **April**, in London, during preparatory discussions regarding further negotiations, the Argentines indicate that they wish to reintroduce the 1968 *Memorandum* proposals, but are now opposed to any Islander representation at the talks. British negotiators respond that they are only prepared to discuss practical matters; not sovereignty. The UK also insists that Islanders must be present. Negotiations stall. [2483]

> *"At the meeting in London in April 1973,... after a restatement of the views of the United Kingdom Government, the Argentine delegation declined to continue the meeting ..."* [2484]

April 17th, the Falkland Islands Emergency Committee founded in March, 1968, is formally re-established as UK Falkland Islands Committee (UKFIC); "*To assist the people of the Falkland Islands to decide their own future for themselves without being subject to pressure direct or indirect from any quarter.*" Letters are written to the three main political parties with a request that a representative join the Committee. [2485]

"Implementation of the Communications Agreement passed in 1973 to the new head of the Latin America department, Hugh Carless, and his superintending under-secretary, Robin Edmonds. ... To the Falklands Islands Committee, Carless, Edmonds and his successor as under-secretary, George Hall, became the embodiment of the Whitehall Falklands policy." [2486]

May 14th, in New York, at the UN, an Argentine citizen addresses a private petition to the Special Committee on Decolonization.

> *"Mr. Jose Ramon Cornejo maintained that the Argentine claim to the Islands had been based on their proximity to Argentina and the inheritance of title from Spain. He added that the Argentinians did not believe that talks like those recently held between the two Governments could make any progress towards resolving the question of the transfer of the sovereignty of the Territory to Argentina."*

May 25th, in Buenos Aires, Hector Jóse Cámpora is sworn-in as President of Argentina.

"In his inaugural speech, President Héctor J. Cámpora had a few words for the Malvinas. Its recovery would be one of the objectives of his government." [2487]

June 9th, Argentine newspaper, *La Capital*, reports:

> *"Invasion of the Malvinas. A few days ago we invaded the Malvinas. And in a way that makes our chests swell. The first Argentine fuel arrived on the cargo ship Florentino Ameghino. From now onwards, the Malvinas gasoline is Argentine. ... another great Argentine success."*

"And the advertising of the Atma company, an electronics manufacturer, presented the arrival of vehicle batteries to the islands through the image of a parachutist who descended from the heavens with a Atma Chloride in his hands..." [2488]

2482 Forced into exile in 1955, Perón had chosen Cámpora as his "*personal delegate*" in 1971. Living in Paraguay and Spain, Perón had returned to Argentina in November, 1972, for a brief visit, only remaining a few weeks and being watched closely by the army.

2483 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.25

2484 *UN Yearbook 1973*.

2485 An influential cross-party lobby consisting of the great and the good from many walks of life. Notably successful in their various careers, they were people who knew people.

2486 Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997

2487 Lanús 1984 p.479

2488 Carassai 2022

In London, the UK Falkland Islands Committee (UKFIC), write to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO) to explain that its objective is to; *"strengthen links between Britain and the Islands and, where appropriate, to represent the interests and wishes of the people of the Islands in the UK."* [2489]

In its letter, the Committee notes that the requirement for a travel card for Islanders under the Communications Agreement has been unilaterally extended to all visitors with British passports wishing to transit through Argentina to the Islands. The Committee requests information as to any HMG representations regarding this extension by Argentina. UKFIC also note that the Special Consultative Committee created by the Communications Agreement has no Islander representation. [2490]

June 20th, from Spain, former Argentine President, Juan Domingo Perón, returns to Buenos Aires. [2491]

"Juan D. Peron returned to Argentina today, ending almost 18 years of exile, and violence among the more than one million people gathered to welcome him left at least 13 dead and more than 250 injured. ... before Mr. Peron's arrival a number of serious shooting incidents had taken place between left-wing and rightist followers of Mr. Peron. ... In one of the incidents, rival groups exchanged machine-gun fire in front of the stage where Mr. Peron was scheduled to speak. Snipers continued to shoot into the crowd even as ambulances arrived on the scene, to carry away wounded men, women and children. ... after receiving reports of the shooting incidents, the former President ordered his airliner to land at a military air base 15 miles west of the capital, instead of at the international airport about 20 miles south-west of Buenos Aires, where hundreds of leading Government and Peronist officials had gathered to greet Mr. Peron. ..." [2492]

"... (there was) an immediate hardening of the Argentine line." [2493]

"Before Perón returned to Argentina from exile in June 1973 the British Ambassador to Spain met him and discussed the Falklands. The Ambassador reported that while Perón considered the Falklands issue would have to be cleared up one day, there was no urgency." [2494]

July 13th, in Argentina, President Cámpora resigns, to make way for a new Presidential election.

August 10th, Senator Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen calls for a tougher approach to negotiations with London regarding the Falklands archipelago. [2495]

On the same day, Argentina's acting-President Lastiri, together with his Defence Minister, Angel Robledo and Ministers Gelbald, Benitez and Taiana, fly to Antarctica.

"Argentina has openly affirmed, in contravention of Article IV, that specific acts and activities carried out while the treaty is in force do strengthen claims to sovereignty. In 1973 President Lastiri and the entire Argentine cabinet flew to Marimbo Base which was then proclaimed Argentina's temporary capital." [2496]

2489 Elgood 2005
2490 *Ibid.*
2491 From the moment he was sworn-in, Cámpora would seem to have set about arranging Perón's return.
2492 *The New York Times* June 21, 1973
2493 Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.338
2494 Elgood 2025
2495 Carassai 2022 citing *Nuevo camino para integrar las Malvinas* in *La Opinión* August 10, 1973
2496 Hall 1983. Art. IV of the Antarctic Treaty 1959 states: *"No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force."*

August 15th, in New York, Argentina's representative addresses a letter to the UN's Decolonization Committee.

"... his Government regretted to report that the negotiations had been virtually paralysed as a result of the attitude adopted by the United Kingdom, whose position, he said, had changed substantially from that which it had taken since contacts were first established in 1966. When,.. efforts were made to reactivate the negotiations, postponed since 1968, the United Kingdom took the position that the round of meetings could not be called negotiations on sovereignty since in its opinion they involved only talks or discussions, and it was willing to discuss only the collateral question of communications rather than the basic issue of sovereignty over the territory... This position, Argentina considered, was not in conformity with the provisions of the Assembly's resolution of 16 December 1965. Argentina called on the United Kingdom Government to take measures to continue the negotiations without further procrastination, within the framework of that resolution and subsequent decisions, so as to bring about the speedy elimination of the territory's colonial situation." [2497]

In reply, the UK's representative denies; *"... that there had been any change in its consistently upheld position on the scope of the discussions. It reiterated its readiness to renew discussions, bearing in mind that in accordance with the provisions of the United Nations Charter and the principles of the Declaration on the granting of independence, it was essential that any solution should recognize the right of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands to self-determination and should provide for them to express their wishes in this connection."*[2498]

August 17th, at the UN, the Special Committee on Decolonization meet to consider the question of the Falkland Islands. Argentina's Ambassador tells the Committee that; *"... failure to settle this dispute within a short and reasonable time will necessitate a thorough reappraisal of the policy (Argentina) has pursued until now..."* [2499]

August 21st, concluding its debate on the question of the Falkland Islands, the UN's Special Committee adopts a resolution calling for the acceleration of negotiations.[2500] Responding, the UK's Mission writes to the UN Secretary-General.

> *"It has been the common purpose of the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom since the adoption of General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) to explore in accordance with that resolution all possible means of finding a peaceful solution to the problem defined in that resolution. The letters addressed to you and your predecessors in successive years,... constitute a record of progress endorsed by both Governments ... there have been no grounds for supposing that there has been any change in the consistently upheld position of the United Kingdom Government. ...*
>
> *For their part the United Kingdom Government reiterate their readiness to renew discussions bearing in mind that in accordance with the provisions of the Charter of the United Nations and the principles of resolution 1514 (XV) of the General Assembly it is essential that any solution should recognize the right of the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands to self-determination and should provide for them to express their wishes in this connection."* [2501]

2497 *UN Yearbook 1973*
2498 *Ibid.*
2499 *UN Doc A/9023/Rev.1*
2500 *UN Yearbook 1973*. UN Committee resolutions are not UN resolutions unless adopted by the General Assembly.
2501 *Ibid.*

September 5th – 9th, in Algiers the fourth summit of the Non-Aligned Movement is convened. Argentina's membership is approved. [2502]

September 13th, a new Anglo-Argentine agreement facilitates the construction of the *Antares II* fuel depot at Hookers Point airfield; seventeen tanks of aircraft fuel of 30,000 litres each.

"... the construction of Antares II plant —with seventeen fuel, jet fuel, kerosene and gas oil tanks— a laboratory, and a gas station started. Construction works, under YPF direction, involved the participation of sixty four workers during six months." [2503]

October 3rd, in New York, at the opening of a new session of the UN General Assembly, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Alberto Vignes, addresses the assembled members regarding negotiations with the UK over the Falkland Islands; *"My country ... is forced to state that the procedure cannot be indefinitely prolonged,..."*

October 4th, in the UK, *The Times* newspaper reports:

> *"Argentina demands an end to the intolerable anachronism of the colonial status of the British Falkland Islands. Vignes, the Argentine Foreign Minister, said his government favoured the path of negotiation with the occupying power, Britain. This could not be indefinitely prolonged to serve as a means of continuing the present situation, he told the UN Assembly.*
>
> *The survival of the Falklands position at this stage of the twentieth century, when the process of colonialism was reaching its end, was both inexplicable and indefensible.*
>
> *The Minister said an end be put to such an intolerable anachronism that brooks no delay, and it can only be through full restoration of the Islands to the land from which they were torn of which they are, and always have been, an integral part."*

October 5th, in Washington DC, Minister Vignes meets US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger.

Vignes complains that; *"... Argentina is concerned with the indifference of the US regarding the issue of the Falkland Islands, which is a colonial problem within the hemisphere. He could not understand how the US, which was once a colony, could take such an attitude."* [2504]

October 12th, in Argentina, following his success in the elections brought about by Hector Campora's sudden resignation, 78-year old Juan Perón commences his third term as President; with his wife as Vice-President.

"The return of a Peronist Government brought an end to the Anglo-Argentine rapprochement." [2505]

October 19th, in New York, the UK's representative informs the UN Secretary-General that; *"... his Government was reluctant to believe that Argentina would wish for any solution of the differences between the two Governments which was contrary to the expressed wishes of the inhabitants of the territory."* [2506]

2502 From 25 members in 1961, the Non-Aligned Movement had grown to 75 members in 1973. The arrival of Argentina that year marked the beginning of a general policy of supporting Argentine claims to the Falkland Islands that persists to this day (2025). In 1973, the UN's Decolonization Committee (C24) had 24 members, the majority of which were NAM members also.

2503 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

2504 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Documents on South America, 1973-1976 Memorandum of Conversation New York, October 5, 1973, 12.45pm*. Apparently, Kissinger's response was so general in nature, that it was not clear whether he had been listening.

2505 Ellerby 1990 p.178.

2506 UN Yearbook 1973

October 25th, in the Falklands, a *Petroleum Products Bill* is debated at a meeting of the Falklands' Legislative Council (LegCo).[2507] Concerns are raised over Argentina's monopoly of fuel supply to the archipelago.

"... the Chief Secretary argued that Y.P.F. required a monopoly to guarantee a demand for its products. He also claimed that the price of petrol, which had more than doubled in the past two years, would fall by nearly a third. Adrian Monk, elected member for East Falkland, offered the only opposition and abstained in the vote. He stressed that, "What I do not like about it all is that the monopoly has been granted to the country which wants us".The British Government clearly hoped that the Islanders would accept closer ties with Argentina if they were shown the benefits of co-operation." [2508]

"Two supplementary Communications Agreements were reached by the Foreign Office aimed at encouraging economic links with the mainland and permitting the Argentines to build and supply fuel tanks at the airfield. Fuel oil, including that for the islands' modest internal air service, would be provided exclusively by the Argentine state oil concern, YFP, and the base would be staffed by Argentine military personnel. ..." [2509]

"The Argentine State soon became the main engine of communications between the islands and the continent. The national Telecommunications Company (ENTel) put into operation a Buenos Aires-Puerto Stanley telephone circuit and Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales (YPF) built the Antares 1 plant (six tanks of 25,000 litres each) to supply aircraft. Yacimientos Carboniferous Fiscales sent coal from Rio Turbio. The company Transportes Navales, of the Argentine Navy, made part of its fleet available for these projects, which required transfers of material and personnel. ... All this added up was symptomatic of the attitude with which the Argentine government of that time faced the new stage: one that demonstrated to the islanders, the British and the United Nations Decolonization Committee that it could be believed when it promised to look after the interests of the island population." [2510]

November 5th, at the UN, Argentina responds to Britain's August letter to the Secretary-General. Quoting the first paragraph of resolution *2065* of 1965*,* Argentina's representative points out that the resolution makes *"no reference"* to the wishes of the population or any right of self-determination. [2511]

> *"... this tardy and misplaced concern for respect for the right to self-determination would be praiseworthy and legitimate if the United Kingdom had consulted the original population of the Malvinas Islands about their wishes before displacing them by force and replacing them by British settlers in 1833..."* [2512]

"Towards the end of 1973 the (British) Joint Intelligence Committee assessed that Argentine attitudes were hardening and for the first time there were indications that Argentina might be preparing contingency plans for an occupation of the islands." [2513]

In Buenos Aires, on the same day, in Argentina's Congress, Tucumán Deputy Antonio Moreno calls for his Government to cease any further action or investment that seeks to improve the situation of the Islanders.

2507 The Legislative Council was the unicameral legislature of the Falkland Islands from 1845 until 2009, when it was replaced by a Legislative Assembly.

2508 Ellerby 1990 pp.176-177 citing *Leg. Co. minutes, 25 Oct. 1973*

2509 Hastings & S. Jenkins 1997

2510 Carassai 2022

2511 UN resolution 2065 (XX) of 1965 refers to the "interests" of the Islanders, but did not attempt to deny their right to self-determination under both the UN's Charter and UN resolution 1514 (XV) of 1960.

2512 Quoted in *UN Doc A/9623/Rev.1 vol.6 Chapter XXVI p.112.* See 1833

2513 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

"It is not clear how one can believe that in this way, there is a step forward in the recovery of the islands. If someone expels me from my house and I provide him from outside and at my own expense with materials so that he can live better in the usurped house, the usurper will applaud my gesture publicly, but no one will be able to prevent him thinking in his heart that I am an idiot." [2514]

November 6th, in the Falklands, Islanders hear a report by the BBC.

"Much consternation was caused in the islands by a report on Radio Newsreel by Adrian Porter the BBC Latin America correspondent. This was to the effect that there might be a likelihood of the temporary airstrip being 'rolled up' and taken back to Argentina if action is not forthcoming soon on the sovereignty. This was in comment on a Note to the Secretary-General of the United Nations by the Argentine Government about the Falkland Islands. … His Excellency the Governor subsequently issued a statement seeking to pour oil on troubled waters, reminding us in his own words, "in this part of the world we are used to squally weather"..." [2515]

In Stanley, Governor Ernest Gordon Lewis is interviewed by a local journalist, Robin Forrester.

"RF: Home months ago the Argentine Government made a statement to the effect that if something didn't happen about talking on sovereignty soon then maybe they'd do something. What is the reaction to that in London?

HE: You get these emotional terms like the return of the Falklands to the patrimony of the fatherland. To be perfectly frank the reaction was that it wouldn't do any good in improving the climate but you know what it is when people are in the United Nations. That's not to say I'm underestimating the question. It is a very real problem. We are under claim. We are in front of the United Nations. We come up regularly under the Committee of 24, the Fourth Committee and then the General Assembly, and colonialism in all its forms ... is regarded in some quarters as an evil thing. A11 we can do is repeat time and time again that the British Government is on record as saying that if it is the wish of the people of the Falkland Islands to come to some arrangement with the Argentine then so be it. But the British Government is not going to push the islanders into doing anything against their wishes. The Argentine attitude on this is that it is not the wishes of the people that matter, it is the interests of the people that matter. In other words the Argentines start from the legal concept that as successors to the Union of 1816 they are automatically the heirs to these islands. Therefore the people that came in afterwards, in their opinion do not matter - that is their stand. …

RF: Now what would you say to people who have gained this impression, that the British Government doesn't, in fact, want the Falkland Islands?

HE: I would say that this is completely wrong. I think that there is a tremendous amount of understanding for ourselves but we must get it into perspective. We are a small group of islands, with just 2.000 population, situated close to the mainland of Latin America. In the long term there is very little future for places like ourselves if we can't get along with our neighbours. That doesn't mean to say be seduced by them or be taken over by then. Obviously it makes sense to have communications with the Argentine. To say that we are not wanted - we must remember that Britain's role in the world is changing. The days when we could send a fleet down here, when we were a major power I'm afraid, have gone. … The answer in brief is that there is no question of Britain not wanting us. Britain says

2514 *Ladrones y cinicos* in *Crónica* November 5, 1973
2515 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* December 1973 p.7

that it makes sense to be friends with our neighbours and play our part in the world. That doesn't mean to say that they don't take an interest in us." [2516]

November 9th, Argentina's Chamber of Deputies approve a declaration calling for Falkland Islands children to study subjects in school that would encourage integration into Argentine culture. [2517]

November 13th, *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* publishes an editorial:

"People overseas should realise that the majority of residents in the Falklands assume that "they don't want us",'they' being the British Government. Throughout the islands there is growing a general distrust of the British Government. Perhaps this is what they want, who can tell? We must assume that the British Government want this impression to come over otherwise they would put their public relations chaps on to the job of reversing it. Of course the best form of good publicity is promises kept. Here … Argentina shows up very well. Britain shows up poorly. Argentina promised a weekly air service and it is in operation and has now been so for a year. Britain promised a sea connection with the mainland - and we are now told that the 1971 agreement doesn't mean what it quite plainly says and that there will be no sea service unless the Falklands pays for it. Can anyone wonder that some people are sceptical about the promised permanent airfield from Britain? We hope it is falsely based scepticism. Of course the issue is not just fuel supplies. Falkland Island children now go in increasing numbers to Argentina schools for education, which of course involves indoctrination in the Argentine way of life. People cannot enter or leave the islands without the consent of the Argentine Government Airline. And now it is proposed to put our fuel supplies in the hands of our Argentine neighbours."

"... young islanders could go the continent to study at different Argentine schools. The results of the experience were not as positive as the authorities expected. Sydney Miller remembered that "the islanders' kids that went to study to Argentine schools returned complaining that they had been insistently bombarded with the jingoist slogan that the 'Malvinas are Argentines'. That situation bothered the kids a lot...What happened then? They did not want to go back to Argentina, and they are right"." [2518]

November 15th, in the Falklands, the first anniversary of the opening of the Hookers Point airstrip is celebrated; *"... apparently at the request of the Argentine Government."* [2519]

"The Argentine delegation was led by a friendly and fit looking Brigadier D. Roberto Bartot, Chief of Staff of the Argentine Air Force. He was accompanied by various officers, diplomats including Councillor Blanco and reporters. There were also Mr. John Shakespeare and Miss G. Evans from the British Embassy in Buenos Aires. The Governor in his official uniform, and Mrs Lewis, together with Legislative and Executive Council Members and their wives welcomed the visitors... Speeches were made..." [2520]

November 30th, in Buenos Aires, law *20,651* is promulgated establishing June 10th as a Day of Affirmation." [2521]

2516 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* reported November, December 1973 & January 1974
2517 Carassai 2022 citing *Piratas y 'becados'* in *Crónica* November 9, 1974
2518 Corbacho 2018
2519 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* December 1973 p.8
2520 *Ibid.*
2521 *Día de la Afirmación de los Derechos Argentinos sobre las Malvinas, Islas y sector Antártico*. No holiday was announced. In 1983, the date was changed to April 2 and that was made a public holiday. In 1984 the public holiday was moved back to June 10 and in 1992, April 2 became Veterans Day but not a holiday. In 2000, June 10 lost its holiday status and April 2 gained it. Both days are currently celebrated, but only the April day is a public holiday.

"Law No. 20,561
Day for the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector [2522]
Sanctioned: November 14, 1973. Promulgated: November 30, 1973.
Whereas: The Senate and Chamber of Deputies of the Argentine Nation Meeting in Congress Sanction by Force of Law:
Article 1 - Set June 10 as the Day of the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector, an expression of sovereignty that will be celebrated every year throughout the country.
Article 2 - That day and at the same time the celebration will be commemorated in the educational establishments of all cycles, of the State and individuals, units and offices of the Armed Forces, judicial headquarters and dependencies of the public administration, inside and outside the territory, with allusive acts, dictating to the effect: Special classes and conferences in which they will indicate the historical background, the legitimacy of the Argentine titles and the way in which it is exercised in the southern sector.
Article 3 -Likewise, and as a symbolic protest against the attacks suffered by the Republic in the region, all the buildings where official offices function will be mandatorily flagged and illuminated on that date.

"... an official celebration of Argentina's claim to the Falklands, to be held annually on 10 June, the date of the expulsion of the British garrison from Port Egmont in 1770 and of Louis Vernet's appointment as political and military commander in 1829." [2523]

December 5th, the UN's Fourth Committee approves the Special Committee's annual report.

"During discussion of the question .., Venezuela, Peru, Ecuador and Spain were among those supporting the contention of Argentina that the (Falklands) negotiations should be resumed with a view to finding a solution based on recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the islands. Argentina considered that the conflict of sovereignty, which dated from 1833, was the basic point to be resolved if an end was to be put to the colonial situation prevailing in the territory. The United Kingdom did not accept that interpretation; the essential problem was one of self-determination, complicated by a claim to the territory by another Government. The United Kingdom considered that any settlement of the differences between the two Governments must recognize the right of the inhabitants to self-determination and must be in accordance with their expressed wishes." [2524]

December 14th, in New York, taking up recommendations from the Fourth Committee, the UN General Assembly adopts resolution *3160 (XXXVIII) – Question of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas).* [2525]

"... Recalling its resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 containing the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples,

Recalling also its resolution 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965, in which it invited the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to proceed without delay with the negotiations recommended by the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples with a view to finding a peaceful solution to the problem of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

2522 *Fíjase el Día de la Afirmación de los Derechos Argentinos sobre las Malvinas, islas y sector antártico.* Note the comma between Malvinas and islas.
2523 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.575. No mention that the British returned in 1771, or that Vernet departed in 1831.
2524 *UN Yearbook 1973*
2525 116 votes in favour, 0 against and 14 abstentions.

bearing in mind the provisions and objectives of the Charter of the United Nations and of resolution 1514 (XV) and the interests of the population of the Falkland Islands (Malvinas),

Gravely concerned at the fact that eight years have elapsed since the adoption of Resolution 2065 (XX) without any substantial progress having been made in the negotiations.[2526]

Mindful that resolution 2065 (XX) indicates that the way to put an end to this colonial situation is the peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom with regard to the aforementioned islands,

Expressing its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonisation and to promote the well-being of the population of the islands,

1. Approves the chapters of the report of the Special Committee on the Situation with regard to the Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and, in particular, the resolution adopted by the Special Committee on 21 August 1973 concerning the Territory;

2. Declares the need to accelerate the negotiations between the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland called for in General Assembly resolution 2065 (XX) in order to arrive at a peaceful solution of the conflict of sovereignty between them concerning the Falkland Islands (Malvinas);

3. Urges the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom, therefore, to proceed without delay with the negotiations, in accordance with the provisions of the relevant resolutions of the General Assembly, in order to put an end to the colonial situation;

4. Requests both Government to report to the Secretary-General and to the General Assembly as soon as possible, and not later than at its twenty-ninth session, on the results of the recommended negotiations."

"... Argentina had been back to the United Nations and emerged armed with yet another resolution, calling this time for 'accelerated progress' in resolving the Falklands dispute. To meet this pressure Julian Amery had approved exploring the chances of joint sovereignty, or condominium. It was a measure of growing desperation that this was put forward at all. ... For one thing it was regarded as a legal nightmare." [2527]

At Port Stanley, the *Falklands' Sheep Owners' Association* negotiates to sell carcases to *Corporacion Argentina de Productores de Carnes*.

December 18th, in Argentina, a television competition *Odol Pregunta*, concludes a series concerning the history of the Falkland Islands. An amateur historian, 28 year-old José Antonio da Fonseca Figueira, wins ARS$5,000,000. [2528]

December 31st, in the Falklands, the biannual review estimates the population as 1,874 with 39 births, 12 marriages and 12 deaths in the territory during the year. [2529]

2526 Resolution 2065 of 1965 had been the first Falklands specific resolution adopted by the General Assembly. See - https://documents-dds-ny.un.org/doc/RESOLUTION/GEN/NR0/218/28/PDF/NR021828.pdf?OpenElement

2527 Charlton 1989 p.37. Harold Julian Amery was Minister of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs under the government of Edward Heath.

2528 Carassai 2022. The questions had been prepared by a jury of writers, journalists and critics headed by Laurio H. Destéfani, of the National Academy of History. In 1973, the winnings would have amounted to some £170,000.

2529 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1972 & 1973*

1974 – January 3rd, in London, Foreign Secretary Sir Alec Douglas-Home, submits a *memorandum* to the Cabinet regarding the Falklands.

"Douglas-Home concluded that doing nothing would endanger the interests and security of the islands. He believed condominium was the best way of continuing a dialogue with both parties, reasoning that it would have a greater chance of acceptance from islanders than talks on an outright transfer of sovereignty." [2530]

January 4th, in Stanley, a meeting of the Falklands' Legislative Council considers a motion proposed by Mr. Adrian Monk and seconded by Mr. William Bowles; *"That this House objects strongly to any negotiations or talks being held with the Argentine Government which are concerned in any way with the transfer of sovereignty of this Colony."* [2531]

After a short discussion, an amended motion, presented by Mr. Tim Blake and seconded by Mr. Sydney Miller, is adopted; *"That this House objects strongly to any negotiations or talks being held with the Argentine Government without the prior full knowledge of the Falkland Islands people which would involve the transfer of sovereignty of this Colony against the wishes of its inhabitants."* [2532]

A further motion calls for the formation of a select committee, to ascertain the views of the electorate on possible changes to the Islands' Constitution and to make recommendations. [2533]

"... despite 'maximum arm-twisting', Falklands Governor Ernest Lewis was unable to wring concessions from councillors about talks on a possible sovereignty transfer." [2534]

"Motions that did not have the support of the colonial authority were often not approved or were modified. In this case, the motion underwent an amendment by which the British government was recognised as having the power to negotiate any issue as long as the people of the islands were aware. Commenting on this meeting, (the Reverend Robin) Forrester stated that some council members were becoming "increasingly frustrated" with their attempts to serve the people. In part, he explained, this frustration was due to the fact that there were "invisible people" in the meetings, the "faceless men" of Whitehall who, in his view, dominated the sessions." [2535]

In Argentina, news journal *Mayoría* reports: *"... (with) a hundred armed and courageous men provided perhaps, by the Zeronist youth, the islands are recoverable."*

January 11th, a Japanese ship, *Taiyo Maru 82*, arrives in Stanley. Charted by a British fisheries company to assess fish stocks around the archipelago in summer. [2536]

January 21st, Britain's Ambassador to Argentina, Sir Donald Hopson, together with his wife, arrive in Stanley for a fortnight's tour around the archipelago.

Notices confirming British sovereignty are cemented onto the Shag Rocks by a Royal Navy expedition. Six small islets, they are situated some 150 miles to the west of South Georgia (below). [2537]

2530 *The British Government and the Falkland Islands, 1974-79* A. Donaghy 2014
2531 *The Falkland Islands Gazette 1974*
2532 *Ibid.* The Council was split 50/50 on the amendment which passed with the President's (Governor's) casting vote.
2533 *The Falkland Islands Gazette* 1974. Also *HC Deb 18 December 1974 vol.883 cc1565-6.* Passed unanimously.
2534 Donaghy 2014
2535 Caressai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* January, 1774. Forrester was the owner and publisher of the *Times*.
2536 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* February 1974 p.5.
2537 Symmons 1984 p.729.

January 25th, in Britain's House of Commons, the Government announce that they expect the contract for a permanent airfield in the islands to be awarded - *"shortly."* The project to be completed within two years.



In the Falkland Islands, geology expert, Donald Griffiths, arrives to explore the potential for oil resources around the archipelago. [2538]

"Oil companies began asking the British government for licences to explore the waters around the Falkland Islands in the late 1960s." [2539]

"In the midst of these investigations, the first energy crisis struck. Between October 1973 and January 1974, the price of oil quadrupled. Suddenly, interest in petroleum resources around the Falklands skyrocketed. A 1974 report from the US Geological Survey asserted that the continental shelf between Tierra del Fuego and the Falklands might contain 40 billion to 200 billion barrels of oil. That would be more than the 35 billion barrels purportedly contained in the North Sea and perhaps even greater than Saudi Arabia's reserves, estimated at the time at 119 billion barrels." [2540]

February 20th, in Stanley, a first public meeting to discuss constitutional changes is held.

On the same day, a strike takes place in Stanley following the refusal of employers of workers with the General Employees Union, to consider a wage increase. [2541]

February 22nd, in London, the UKFIC write to Julian Amery, Minister of State at the FCO, to argue that Argentina becoming the exclusive supplier of "*petroleum products*" in the Falklands, acts to the detriment of the Islanders.[2542]

"Councillors were easily outmanoeuvred by their British administrators. Matters were decided in London, where Islanders had no representative and were reliant on UKFIC to assist them. Minister Julian Amery adjourned a meeting with members of the Committee when he discovered discrepancies between his brief and the evidence provided by the Committee. He subsequently stated in the presence of his officials that he had been misled by members of his department." [2543]

February 26th, in the Falklands, Vice-Commodore Carlos Bloomer Reeve arrives in Stanley to take over management of the LADE airline operation from Vice-Commodore De la Colina.

"Bloomer Reeve had experience on issues related to Malvinas islands. In 1969, while he was working as LADE Business Manager, and the only Argentine newspaper reaching Stanley was the Buenos Aires Herald, he recommended the morning newspaper Director to publish an article about the development line. The journalist Bonnie Tucker interviewed LADE Directors, who declared their conviction that the Argentine Air Force operated company was the most suitable instrument to establish a regular connection between Malvinas

2538 Griffiths had originally been commissioned by the UK Government in 1971 to conduct a library survey. That survey had been submitted that same year and suggested that oil resources were likely to be found around Burwood Bank, some 120 miles south of the archipelago. *cf.* 1971 & 1975

2539 Livingstone 2020

2540 Meierding 2020

2541 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1974 & 1975.* Following arbitration, an increase was given to hourly aid workers.

2542 Elgood 2025 citing *UKFIC82* paras. 95-6

2543 *Ibid* citing *UKFIC82* paras.102-3

Islands and Comodoro Rivadavia. For the same reason, he had been designated by the Air Force to be a member of the joint commission with the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department." [2544]

February 28th, in Stanley, a second public meeting is held to consider changes to the Falklands constitution. Suggestions from the public include wider representation, a reduction in the voting age and an increase in the residence requirement to seven years before a person can vote. Also a further transfer of powers from the UK to the local legislature. [2545]

February 28th, in the UK, a General Election returns a minority Labour Government under Prime Minister Harold Wilson. [2546]

March 5th, James Callaghan is appointed Foreign Secretary. [2547]

At Port Stanley, the ARA *Bahia Buen Suceso* arrives with four Grumete sailing yachts; *"Among the most significant activities that sought to bring both shores closer is the sailing regatta in Stanley Bay, held in March 1974. Organized by the Nautical Department of the Argentine Navy, it was carried out under the motto "The sea unites us" and the University Club of Buenos Aires (CUBA), the Southern Maritime Center of Rio Gallegos and the Ushuaia Nautical Club participated in it."* [2548]

"In March, the ARA Bahía Buen Suceso transported three grumete sailboats for the islands youth group, a donation from San Isidro and Ushuaia yacht clubs. Some months later, they were returned for repair purposes." [2549]

At the end of the event, Governor Lewis makes a speech.

> *"Much has been done in recent years to improve the links between us and the continent, but there are limits to what politicians and diplomats can do. There comes a time where real links are strengthened, when ordinary people meet and I consider sporting bonding the best method of all. That is why over the past week we have enjoyed seeing you all in your colourful yacht gear walking the streets of Stanley, and it has been a pleasure to see the white sails of the cabin boys against the background of our port."* [2550]

April 8th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador to Argentina, Donald Charles Hopson, reports a conversation with Minister Manuel de Anchorena, in which the latter insisted that negotiations needed to resume.

"One of the problems about the Falkland Islands was that from Her Majesty's government's point of view it was a marginal problem... always dogged by lack of ministerial time. In addition it was viewed by some senior people in the Foreign Office as an intractable problem about which nothing could be done." [2551]

May 1st, at a meeting of the Organisation of American States (OAS), Argentina's Foreign Minister, Vignes, referring to the Falkland Islands, demands the end of "*this anachronistic colonial situation*."

2544 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

2545 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 1974 p.16-19

2546 Unusual for a British Prime Minister, Harold Wilson had never served as Foreign Secretary. His knowledge of foreign affairs was thereby limited.

2547 Ex-trade unionist, Callaghan had previously served as Chancellor of the Exchequer and Home Secretary.

2548 Carassai 2022

2549 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

2550 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* April 1774. Two sailing yachts and 4 rowing boats were donated by the Argentine Navy for use by Islands children.

2551 Hugh Carless quoted in Donaghy 2014. In 1974, Carless was head of the FCO's Latin American Department.

May 3rd, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan submits an assessment of the Falklands issue to Cabinet.

"Callaghan's conclusion was forbidding: 'A policy of inaction would surely result in the Argentines progressively withdrawing their cooperation (e.g. the air service) and in a weakening of our position at the UN.' The ultimate political, financial and commercial penalties could be severe." [2552]

Callaghan's proposals call for the inclusion of Island councillors as delegates at any talks. Also full consultation with the Islanders throughout any negotiation.

May 10th, after some debate, Britain's Cabinet approve Callaghan's proposals.

"Callaghan therefore recommended that (Ambassador Hopson) call on Vignes and explain that Britain would shortly resume a dialogue. There would be no mention of condominium until the islanders had been consulted by the governor. Care was also taken to avoid use of the term 'negotiations'. Callaghan believed its inclusion would only alarm islanders and give rise to hostile questions in Parliament…" [2553]

May 22nd, in London, the British government approves the spending of £4.2 million on permanent airport facilities for the Falkland Islands. [2554]

June 3rd, at Stanley, two Spanish-language teachers arrive – María Teresa and María Fernanda Cañás. [2555]

"Colonel Luis González Balcarce, first advisor of the General Directorate of Antarctica and Malvinas, dependent on the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship, was in charge of the selection… the Argentine teachers taught Spanish in Stanley's two schools, offered a free, optional evening course twice a week for adults, and recorded lessons to play on the radio. … almost all the teachers ended up married to British men, whether marines, technicians or professionals who temporarily resided on the islands." [2556]

June 4th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Donald Hopson informs Minister Vignes that Britain is working on a proposal to form the basis of renewed talks.

June 7th, in Stanley, Falkland Island councillors are informed of Callaghan's proposals by the Governor.

"Lewis described the councillors' reaction as predictable, in that they saw acceptance of it, as infringing on their sovereignty. … Adrian Monk, an outspoken opponent of Argentina's territorial claims, referred to the proposals as a 'dilution of sovereignty'. … Councillors were reluctant to go far without consulting their constituents… The councillors did not object to the Foreign Office approaching Argentina, but acceptance of the proposal would ultimately depend on the attitudes of the 1,900 islanders." [2557]

"In other words, the councillors would not go in to bat at any stage without a prior mandate." [2558]

June 10th, Argentina celebrates its first "Day for the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector."

"Reports came in over the BBC World News that June 10th had been observed as a 'Day of Affirmation' by the Argentine when they reiterated their "irrevocable determination to recover their Malvinas Islands and it is likewise determined to discharge its actions to obtain their National objective", in the words of the Argentine

2552 Donaghy 2014
2553 *Ibid*
2554 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* June 1974 p.1
2555 Supplied and salaried by the Argentine Government.
2556 Carassai 2022. Between 1974 and 1982, Argentina supplied some ten teachers to the Islands, including one married couple.
2557 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* June 1974 p.1
2558 *FO 7/3198* March 8, 1976

Ambassador in London. The report said that ceremonies were held in Argentine Embassies in many parts of the world. A newspaper report said that ceremonies were held in schools and all units of the armed forces and continued that 'is seen as a result of resurgent nationalism since the Peronista party returned...'...” [2559]

June 11th, a detailed proposal from the UK is handed to the Foreign Ministry by Ambassador Hobson. [2560]

> *“I have now received instructions from Her Majesty's Government to propose that the discussions between Britain and the Falkland Islands should be resumed on the basis of the safeguards and guarantees to be extended to the Islanders in the **hypothesised** event of a condominium. These discussions would be without prejudice to the respective positions of the United Kingdom and the Argentine Governments with regard to territorial sovereignty over the Falkland Islanders. I am to explain that the main aim of Her Majesty's Government in entering into negotiations on the basis of a condominium would be to settle the dispute about sovereignty by accepting Argentine co-sovereignty over the Islands, and that the end product might be a treaty resolving the Anglo-Argentine dispute and creating a favourable atmosphere in which the Islanders could develop according to their interests. For the duration of the Treaty the the two parties would accept shared sovereignty over the Islands. The co-domini would be Her Majesty The Queen and His Excellency the President of the Argentina Nation.*
>
> *There are several forms which a condominium might take but the basic elements might include the following:*
>
> *1) The British and Argentine flags would fly side by side and the official language would be English and Spanish;*
>
> *2) All 'belongers' of the Islands would possess dual nationality;*
>
> *3) Existing colony passports would be replaced by travel documents issued in the co-domini;*
>
> *4) The present constitution, administration and legal system would have to be adapted to the needs of a condominium. The Governor might be appointed alternatively by the Queen and the President of Argentina;*
>
> *5) Further constitutional change would require the agreement of the co-domini.*
>
> *I also have to inform you that a Joint Session of the Executive and Legislative Councils of the Islands have informed the Governor that they had no objection to talks being held with the Argentine Government on the safeguards and guarantees required in a condominium. However, I am to state that Her Majesty's Government would feel free to invite representatives of the Islands to form part of the British delegation, and that before final agreement the Islanders would have to be formally consulted and **their acceptance sought by some form of popular representation**. On this basis, Her Majesty's Government propose that, if the Argentine Government agree, official or preliminary official talks should take place in Buenos Aires as soon as possible.”* [2561]

2559 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* July 1974 p.16. The event had been re-established in November, 1973.

2560 In an article in the *La Nacion* newspaper on March 13, 2012, ex-Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rosas, stated that the British Ambassador handed the 'non-paper' to President Péron personally at a secret meeting where the Argentine Foreign Minister was also present. See Donaghy 2014.

2561 *La Nacion* March 13, 1974. My emphasis throughout.

"This, the secret document detailing Britain's offer to share the Falkland Islands with Argentina in 1974. Harold Wilson's Labour government approached President Juan Domingo Perón with a confidential plan for shared rule. ... Argentine newspaper La Nación today published what it said was a 'non-official document' from the British Foreign Office. It shows that Britain made the offer to then President Perón, ..., on June 11, 1974. The British Ambassador in Buenos Aires, James Hutton,[2562] *gave Argentine Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes the text in a secret meeting. The proposals would see both flags being flown over the islands, and Spanish and English being made dual official language. A governor would also be put in place - who would be decided, on a rotating basis, by the British monarch and the Argentine President. The proposal would 'create a favourable atmosphere in which the islanders could develop according to their interests'. It would also 'put an end to the dispute over sovereignty'. It concluded: 'Covering these terms, the government of Her Majesty proposes that, if the Argentine government agrees, we should realise official conversations in Buenos Aires as soon as possible'. ..."* [2563]

"Vignes responded cautiously. He promised to put the proposal to Perón, but believed that in view of Argentina's repeated declarations in the UN and elsewhere, it would be 'extremely difficult' to agree to share sovereignty with Britain." [2564]

June 12th, from the Falklands, news of the offer by the British Government leaks out.

> *"Despite the fact that I stressed the secrecy of the discussions... some of our members are incapable of keeping quiet. On this occasion the leak may have been deliberate with a view to sabotaging our initiative."* [2565]

June 20th, from Buenos Aires, the Argentine Government responds to the condominium proposal by suggesting a fixed term of joint administration preceded by recognition of Argentine sovereignty. Minister Vignes assures Ambassador Hopson that his country's response is only a starting position, and that Argentina would not insist upon a prior recognition of sovereignty. That could be delayed to the end of the joint sovereignty period – 4 or 5 years. [2566]

"This prior recognition of sovereignty, prior to any discussion, was unacceptable, obviously,.." [2567]

"Perón is said to have reacted with 'euphoria', according to veteran diplomat Carlos Ortiz de Rozas who today spoke to La Nación. Perón is said to have told his confidante: 'We accept. Once we get a foot on the Falklands no-one will remove us. Shortly after the sovereignty will belong to Argentina alone." [2568]

"It (Argentina) proposed that recognition of Argentine sovereignty should be followed by a period of 'joint administration' for a term to be fixed in the negotiations... The fundamental objectives of the joint administration would be to facilitate the gradual integration of the population of the Islands into the political, social and institutional life of the Argentine Republic. ... (And) in his meeting with Vignes, Hopson found there was more room for manoeuvre. His optimism was not shared in Stanley, however, where Lewis was far less

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2562 The British Ambassador to Argentina in 1974 was Sir Donald Hopson (died unexpectedly August 26, 1974 of a heart attack). I can find no record of a James Hutton.

2563 *Pictured for the first time: The secret document showing Britain's offer to SHARE Falklands with Argentina* Lee Moran in *The Daily Mail* March 13, 2012. My emphasis

2564 Donaghy 2014

2565 *Gove Lewis to Callaghan & Hopson June 12, 1974* in *FO 7/2699*

2566 *FO 7/2699*

2567 James Callaghan quoted in Charlton 1989 p.37

2568 Lee Moran in the *Daily Mail* March 13, 2012 *op cit*.

upbeat. The governor ... was pessimistic about the islander response. "I am certain that this would not be acceptable locally", he declared." [2569]

In London, on the same day, in Britain's House of Commons, Joan Lestor MP, speaking on behalf of the Government, confirms that there will be no change in the status of the Falkland Islands without the consent of the Islanders.[2570]

June 24th, Foreign Secretary Callaghan writes to Ambassador Hopson.

> *"The Argentine counterproposal certainly has constructive features… and we note his evident flexibility and readiness to compromise… (However) If the Foreign Minister and President Peron insist on including recognition of Argentine sovereignty in the basis for initiating talks, the islanders will refuse to take part: and* ***we cannot move without them****."* [2571]

June 26th, in London, an announcement is made to Parliament.

> *"With the agreement of the Falkland Islands Executive Council, we have been in touch with the Argentine Government about the possible resumption of discussions between our two Governments in connection with United Nations resolution 3160. If discussions are resumed, representatives of the Islanders will be invited to join the United Kingdom delegation."*

'Dundee, Perth and London Securities Ltd', owners of the 'Falkland Islands Company' since 1972, is itself taken over by 'Charington, Gardner and Locket'.

July 1st, in Buenos Aires, President Juan Perón dies of a heart attack. His third wife and deputy, Isabel Martinez de Peron, assumes the Presidency.

"... the deal, agreed by the then Argentine leader, was scuppered when he died just 20 days later. Britain was said not to trust his successor, his widow María Estela Martínez, and so cut contact with the South American country." [2572]

"The Foreign Office was eager to act quickly. 'Unless we seize this opportunity, there may be a coup or change of government in Buenos Aires within a matter of weeks', Carless warned. 'If so, we shall lose all the momentum we have gained'..." [2573]

"Argentina's Foreign Ministry documents reportedly reveal that the British secretly offered former president Juan Perón ... shared control of the Islands on 11 June 1974, with a carefully considered proposal and concrete plans for making it a reality. The plan only failed to materialise because Perón died three weeks later, otherwise the course of history would have been quite different." [2574]

July 5th, from Stanley, Governor Lewis reports that attitudes are hardening against the proposals.

> *"... it is most unlikely any councillor will be willing to join a British delegation to discuss condominium."* [2575]

2569 Donaghy 2014

2570 *HC Deb 20 June 1974 vol 875 c240W.* In answer to a question from Sir Nigel Fisher.

2571 *FO 7/2700.* My emphasis.

2572 Lee Moran in the *Daily Mail* March 13, 2012 *op cit.*

2573 Donaghy 2014. Hugh Carless was described as the "*diplomat most prominently associated with manoeuvring the Islanders into a position where they had no choice but to accept Argentine sovereignty*" by British Intelligence Officer Hugh Bicheno in Elgood 2025.

2574 Levey & Ozarow 2021. This actually appears to date from 2013, when a version appeared as an opinion piece in *Al Jazeera* of March 17, 2013.

2575 *Lewis to Callaghan July 5, 1974* in *FO 7/2700*

"The proposal was for a condominium where the Islands would be ruled partially by Argentina and partially by Great Britain. We at the time in Joint Council decided that this wasn't on and did everything we could to throw it out, which we did. It just wasn't going to work; we knew that, so we threw it out." [2576]

July 10th, in London, the Falkland Islands Committee host a reception at Lincoln's Inn attended by Earl Mountbatten of Burma and members of both Houses of Parliament. [2577] A message from Queen Elizabeth II is read to those present.

"... attended by 50 MPs of all parties, 10 Members of the House of Lords, 20 representatives of the press and media, 10 Commonwealth representatives, 10 civil servants (including former Governors of the Falklands), and about 30 Islanders and Committee members. The presence of the Earl Mountbatten of Burma as special guest reflected the British Government's approval of the campaign. It was stated that the purpose of the gathering was, "... the rallying of support for the Islanders and of providing visiting Islanders with the opportunity of meeting people friendly to their cause." The reunion became an annual event." [2578]

"It was an astonishing example of the committee's organistion and influence." [2579]

July 15th, Foreign Secretary Callaghan concludes that talks on condominium cannot proceed. [2580]

"... Lord Goronwy-Roberts, the Foreign Office Minister in the Lords, advised the British government in July 1974 that Argentine foreign minister Vignes should be told that no progress could be made without the islanders' agreement, since otherwise: both the Argentine and the UK would be seen to be engaged in one of the worst forms of "imperialism" i.e. disposing of a people without their consent or even their participation in a discussion on their future." [2581]

July 29th, in the Falkland Islands, representatives of 'Johnston Construction Ltd' arrive to plan the development of a permanent airfield.

"By the spring of 1975 there may be up to 90 people working on the airport – both local and expatriate workers. It is expected that 12-15 families will be coming out. ... Setting out work will begin as soon as engineers start to arrive. Specialist machinery required will arrive by ship in late November. " [2582]

August 2nd, a letter is published in the *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review:*

> *"I am Argentine, married to a Falkland Islander, with two Argentine born children and a third a Kelper, ... What never ceases to amaze me is that many of those people who so fervently say "We want to remain British" are the same ones who accept Argentine scholarships for their children.*
>
> *Surely they must see that their children are being taught to hold a viewpoint contrary to their own. These children, particularly as they move up into secondary education, are learning all about the Argentine's claim to these Islands. I think parents will be dismayed to find that next time the say "we*

2576 Ex-councillor William Bowles quoted in *MercoPress* April 13, 2006. This article followed an assertion in 2006 by ex-Ambassador Carlos Ortiz de Rosas that the Islanders had been willing to accept the condominium proposal. An assertion repeated on June 14, 2012, when Argentina's President Cristina Kirchner, presented this *"secret document"* to the UN's Special Committee on Decolonization; erroneously suggesting that it was only Peron's death that had caused the proposal to fail.

2577 Initiated by UKFIC's Secretary Bill Christie. These events continue to this day albeit attended by lesser mortals (I have been present on two occasions).

2578 Ellerby 1990 p.181

2579 Donaghy 2014

2580 *Falkland Islands Review Committee Report* Franks Committee 1983 para. 29

2581 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.579 citing Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.35

2582 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* August 1974 pp.11

want to remain British" the first ones to shout them down will be their own children. Has this not occurred to anyone else?" [2583]

August 8th, Argentina's National Academy of History convenes to consider a paper by Ernesto Fitte entitled *'The National Academy of History and the blood in 1833 Malvinas'*. Controversially within Argentina, this concludes that the Falklands riot of August, 1833, had no political character. [2584]

"Two gauchos five Charruas Indians led by Antonio Rivero, who worked the cattle in the field, arrived in Port Soledad and because Juan Simon, had denied the change of metallic money, rather than vouchers they made a killing in cold blood of Vernet's men namely the foreman Juan Simon, ..., Brisbane, Vernet's henchman, one German, one Spanish and Scottish Dickson." [2585]

August 14th, from London, reacting to Governor Lewis's letter of July 5th, Foreign Secretary Callaghan writes to Ambassador Hopson in Buenos Aires, asking that a message be given to the Argentine Foreign Minister.

"Given the sensitivity of Parliamentary opinion in the UK to the issue of self-determination, HMG cannot possibly proceed without the concurrence of the islanders." [2586]

August 22nd, in New York, Argentina's representative informs the UN Secretary-General that contact with the UK has been re-established regarding future Falklands negotiations. [2587]

" ... a note to Kurt Waldheim, Secretary General of the United Nations, highlighted the "innumerable evidence of restraint and consideration" by Argentina "despite the legitimate impatience and emotional fervor that the Argentine people feel regarding the recovery of a part of their national territory"." [2588]

At the UN, having ceased its participation in 1971, Britain resumes limited collaboration with the Special Committee on Decolonization; albeit only to the extent of providing the information required under the terms of *Art. 73* of the UN Charter. The UK reserves a right to speak on matters concerning the Falkland Islands. [2589]

"In 1974 the UK resumed cooperation with the Committee, without rejoining. The US and France were not members either." [2590]

August 27th, in Buenos Aires, following the unexpected death of Ambassador Hopson, Britain's *charge d'affaires*, Frank Maynard, informs Argentina's Foreign Minister of Britain's abandonment of the condominium proposal. [2591]

September 5th, at the UN, the Special Committee on Decolonization decides to defer the Falklands question until 1975.

2583 *Ibid*. pp.5 & 6

2584 The murders of the managers of Luis Vernet's cattle business on East Falkland Island was over unpaid wages. *cf.* August, 1833, March, 1956, November, 1965, January, 1966, April, 1966, April 1982, August 2012 and March 2015

2585 Historian, and Academy member, Laurio H. Destefani. Dickson was Irish. See Vol.2

2586 Callaghan quoted in *FO 7/2700*

2587 Before Minister Vignes became aware of the collapse of the condominium proposal.

2588 Carassai 2022

2589 Every year a place is set out for the UK's representative, but not taken up. If someone from the British mission does attend, they sit at the back among the public. *cf.* 1971

2590 *Memorandum by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office O.T.18 May 2011. cf.* 1971, 1986 & 1999. See – https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm201012/cmselect/cmfaff/writev/overseas/ot18.htm

2591 Surprisingly, Vignes appears to have kept this information to himself; not informing anyone else at Argentina's Foreign Ministry. His reasoning isn't clear, and some confusion arose as a result.

September 13th, an agreement is quietly signed between Argentina and Great Britain, allowing for the continued supply of fuels and gas to the Falklands by Argentina. [2592]

"... the Foreign Office reacts feebly to Argentinian encroachment, ... for instance, in the September 1974 Agreement, signed by our Secretary of State, giving the Argentine YPF government department the right to erect a fuel storage tank in Port Stanley with a monopoly of petrol and diesel oil throughout the islands." [2593]

"... agreed by the British and Argentine Governments in 1974 with regrettably little explanation or reference to the people of the Falkland Islands. The YPF (Yacimientos Petroliferos Fiscales) company was allowed to install a Plant at Port Stanley, which required a number of Argentine technical staff to be here permanently to look after it. This seemed to us to be the thin end of the wedge." [2594]

"It's purpose was to reduce high costs, by allowing the Argentine state oil company (YPF) to supply oil fuels to the islands at Argentine mainland prices. Yet there were more than fiscal concerns at hand. It was designed to demonstrate the government's willingness to cooperate with Argentina, as well as buttress its position at the United Nations." [2595]

September 23rd, in New York, at the opening of a new session of the United Nations General Assembly, Ministers Callaghan and Vignes meet in the sidelines; *"Vignes was downcast, ominously remarking that the situation 'could not be held indefinitely'."* [2596]

September 24th, speaking before the UN's General Assembly, Argentina's Foreign Minister; *"... made a moderate speech, which included the obligatory Argentine claim to sovereignty."* [2597]

October 17th, in Stanley, a local committee is formed to liaise with the UK Falkland Islands Committee (UKFIC) in London; *"... a ten member Falkland Islands Committee (Local Branch) was formed at a public meeting in Stanley with Jack Abbott (an expatriate of independent means who had married an Islander) as Chairman and Sydney Miller (a former Executive Councillor and farmer) as Secretary. The purpose of the Committee was to liaise with the UK (Committee)."* [2598]

The FIG consider a general problem in the recruitment of medical staff.

"Some of us have long suspected that there is a deliberate opposition from some influential civil servant in the FCO or ODA to successful recruiting of medical staff. Now even the Governor, Mr Lewis, has said the same thing. Miss Forster who has just arrived in the colony was interviewed by a Miss Schofield who kept suggesting that Miss Forster could get better terms and a more hospitable position elsewhere. Dr Cox was advised by Dr Evans, the ODA interviewer, that his talents would be wasted in the Falklands and that he could do better elsewhere. We cannot help feeling that FCO is using this insidious method of forcing us to try and get our medical staff from the Argentine ... our position for medical service is becoming quite desperate; it would seem the FCO couldn't care less." [2599]

2592 *Exchange of Notes between the Government of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland and the Government of the Argentine Republic on the Supply and Marketing in the Falkland Islands of Argentine Petroleum-based Products* September 13, 1974 Treaty Series No.30 1975
2593 *Infamous White Card* Molly Mortimer 1975 in *The Spectator* July 11, 1975 p.12
2594 *74 Days: An Islander's Diary of the Falklands Occupation* John Smith 1984
2595 Donaghy 2014
2596 *Ibid.*
2597 *Ibid.*
2598 Ellerby 1990 p.182
2599 Councillor Syd Miller quoted in Elgood 2025

An Islander, Peter McLeod, accepts Argentine citizenship; taking up Argentine ID Card 12,045,643. [2600] Presented by President Maria Perón.[2601]

"The Falkland Islands are Argentine or they ought to be. I didn't do it, like the world supposes, as a challenge to Argentine sovereignty in the Islands. Simply, because I can see with my own eyes the advantages etc. ... Recently they (the Islanders) are taking much more interest in the Argentine. Negotiations are going on at official levels for establishing relations and for the Falkland Islands and Argentines to know each other...." [2602]

October 18th, from Stanley, Governor Lewis writes to the Foreign Office .

> *"I see no likelihood of islanders agreeing to participate in talks before the end of the year. In fact, unless we are prepared to tell the committee in London the facts of life, I see no hope of any dialogue being renewed with the Argentines in the foreseeable future."* [2603]

October 24th, the UK government writes to the United Nations Secretary General confirming that contact with Argentina continues regarding the question of the Falkland Islands.

In London, it is announced that Mr. Neville Arthur Irvin French is appointed to be the next Governor of the Falkland Islands commencing January 1975. [2604]

October 30th, Argentina also informs the UN Secretary-General that talks with the UK are on-going.

"... the Government of the United Kingdom insists that the solution must be consonant with the 'wishes' of the inhabitants of the Malvinas... the Argentine Government wishes to reiterate that, ... the negotiations must take place exclusively between the Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom. ..." [2605]

In **November**, from Argentina, 'YPF' inform the 'Falkland Islands Company' that they plan to reconstruct the Company's jetty to install pipes for oil, gas and aviation fuel.

"... the construction of Antares II plant —with seventeen fuel, jet fuel, kerosene and gas oil tanks— a laboratory, and a gas station started. Construction works, under YPF direction, involved the participation of sixty four workers during six months. The vessel ARA Cabo San Gonzalo performed two crossings transporting materials. At the facilities, a pipeline supply system was established from the Falkland Islands Company dock. Once it was set up, the British company did not authorize its operation alleging safety reasons, breaching the initial agreement." [2606]

2600 McLeod would seem to have been born in the Islands and employed 1957 to 1961 as a radio operator on South Georgia. After accepting Argentine citizenship, he was employed by YPF – in the Falklands.

2601 Well known for personally issuing ID cards (sorry). Clearly a propaganda event.

2602 McLeod quoted in Argentine magazine *GENTE* (October 1974) republished in *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* November/December 1974 pp.17.

2603 *Lewis to Callaghan October 18, 1974* in *FO 7/2701*

2604 *The London Gazette No. 46481.* For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/french_neville

2605 *UN Doc A10023/Rev.1 vol.4*

2606 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023.

"FIC considered the proposals a fire risk to Stanley and refused permission. An official pressured FIC's local manager, saying "if the company did not approve of the installation, it would be extremely troublesome" … An expert endorsed the Company's view." [2607]

November 18th, in London, at a UKFIC meeting in the House of Commons; *"Bill Christie reported that an American consortium, Ashland Oil Canada Ltd, Asamora Oil Corp Ltd and Coral Petroleum Inc., had made a formal offer to the British Government to explore onshore and offshore for oil and gas. The Committee was well informed, having met the consortium's representative."* [2608]

December 4th, in Stanley, a Legislative Council meeting considers a question of oil exploration licences.

> *"… the Colonial Government should take immediate steps to invite interested parties to apply for licences to examine the possibilities of drilling for oil, both on-shore and within territorial waters."*

"Acting in tandem with the Committee, in December 1974 Bill Luxton and Tim Blake in legislative Council requested that the Colonial Government take immediate steps to invite interested parties to apply for licences for drilling on shore and in territorial waters. This made no progress, the FCO hoping to exploit any oil potential in partnership with Argentina as leverage in a sovereignty settlement." [2609]

Almost immediately, Argentina reacts.

"Within two weeks a bill had been presented to the Argentine Congress which would, if passed, 'authorise the government to use force to recover the Islands'. Maynard warned that supplying licences in Falkland waters 'would be an act of the utmost provocation'…" [2610]

"In late 1974, the Falkland Island Times reported that the islands' government had received multiple new permit requests. In December, the Falklands' legislative council met to discuss the oil issue. Eager to exploit any potential resources, the council passed two motions asking the governor of the islands, a British official, to invite applications for exploration licenses. Although the governor did not support the initiatives, oil companies continued to submit inquiries." [2611]

From London, Argentina's Ambassador, Manuel Anchorena, is summoned back to Buenos Aires, where he is publicly insulted as being a "*lawyer for the British.*" [2612]

December 7th, in Lima, Peru, Argentine Minister Vignes has a conversation with Britain's Minister of State for the Foreign & Commonwealth Office, David Ennals. Vignes repeats that there are only two real options – negotiation or invasion.

"Whatever might have been the rhythm implied by the Scott-Beltramino accords, it was now replaced by an ad hoc combination of sticks and carrots, largely directed at breaking down Falklander intransigence." [2613]

"Vignes was in a truculent mood, perhaps conditioned by an incident in Stanley earlier that morning, when the FIC had blocked an Argentine cargo of goods from docking. He complained that islanders opinion was monopolised by the FIC who were determined to prevent progress." [2614]

2607 Elgood 2025
2608 *Ibid.*
2609 *Ibid.*
2610 Donaghy 2014. Maynard was the British *charge d'affairs* in Buenos Aires.
2611 Meierding 2020
2612 Hastings & Jenkins 1997
2613 *Ibid.*
2614 Donaghy 2014.

In London, a meeting of the Commonwealth Parliamentary Association hears from Argentine Senator Hipólito Solari Yrigoyen, who claims that the UK is shedding colonies, and the Falklands "*would go*." [2615]

"The reception was very successful. The Parliamentarians present are all friends of the Colony but, if anything, they were even more determined to ensure that the Islanders' wishes would be honoured." [2616]

"(Solari Yrigoyen) ... roundly denounced the British position. Among other things, he said there were only 2,000 people in the colony, so the Argentine to sovereignty was not an important matter for Britain; the "vast majority of nations had decided that a solution to the problem must be achieved and that solution was transfer of sovereignty and the end of Colonialism"; that Britain could no longer afford to keep the Falklands, and that "With a transfer of sovereignty the Islanders would enjoy all the benefits of Argentine citizenship and would be looked after". The MPs present were clearly annoyed..." [2617]

December 13th, in Buenos Aires, at a press conference, Foreign Minister Vignes states that there are only two ways to recover the Falkland Islands; *"invading them or negotiating them"*. [2618]

December 16th, in Argentina, journal *Cronica* mounts a campaign advocating an invasion of the Falklands. [2619]

"For its efforts the newspaper was provisionally closed by the administration of Mrs Peron for 'endangering peaceful relations with foreign countries', and legal proceedings were initiated according to the Penal Code and Law 20,840." [2620]

"In less than 48 hours, the newspaper counted 16,000 volunteers, among whom were figures of sport and entertainment, among them, the boxer Oscar "Ringo" Bonavena, the soccer players Héctor Scotta, Carlos García Cambón, Enrique Chazarreta, Roberto Telch and Carlos Avanzi, the actresses Mercedes Carreras and Linda Peretz, the actors Carlos Cores and Aldolfo García Grau, the comedian Jorge Porcel and the winner of Ordol Pregunta 1973, Da Fonesca." [2621]

"At the end of 1974, when criticism of the stalemate in negotiations regarding sovereignty over the archipelago was mounting, the cover of the fifth edition of Crónica, with its usual disastrous typography, urged the nation's president, María Estela Martínez de Perón, to take the archipelago by force of arms: "Dare, Isabel! We will all support you! Invade the Malvinas. Enough with the words, speeches, and demands: 'Crónica' offers to recruit volunteers" ("Dare, Isabel!", 1974). The newspaper opened a volunteer registry and offered its plane to transport them to the islands. Three days after the campaign was launched, it reported that nearly 20,000 citizens had signed up to participate in the invasion—men and women of different professions, ages, and geographical origins, whose personal details were published. Sports and entertainment personalities, such as boxer Oscar "Ringo" Bonavena, singer Roberto Rimoldi Fraga, and actors Adolfo García Grau and Mercedes Carreras, expressed their willingness to volunteer. Crónica's initiative was supported by unions, civil associations, and politicians of diverse political persuasions." [2622]

2615 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* January/February 1975 p.21. Twenty MPs attended.
2616 *Ibid.* p.24
2617 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.580
2618 *Vignes reiteró la soberanía sobre las Islas Malvinas* in *La Opinión* December 15, 1974
2619 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.580. Newspapers owner, Hector Ricardo Garcia was accused of interfering with negotiations by the National Executive.
2620 Makin 1983 p.396. Makin erroneously gives the year as 1975. See *The Falklands, Politics and War* G. M. Dillon 1989
2621 Caressai 2022
2622 Tato 2025

"Cronica, a Perónist paper, launched a campaign through its pages to recruit "volunteers for the conquest of the Malvinas". Foreign Minister Vignes disassociated his government from the campaign and closed the paper, saying he preferred negotiation to invasion. Argentines campaigned to end the 1971 Communications Agreement and to blockade the Islands." [2623]

At Port Stanley, *Hercules Scan* arrives with the heavy equipment for the new airstrip. [2624]

December 18th, in London, responding to a question in Britain's House of Commons, David Ennals MP, speaking for the government, says; *"There have been several discussions between Ministers of Her Majesty's Government and Ministers of the Argentine, one occasion being as recent as last week. It is the wish of both Governments to keep in touch and I assure the House that it remains the policy of this Government, as of previous Governments, that no change in the present British Sovereignty over the Falkland Islands shall be made against the wishes of the Islanders."* [2625]

In Buenos Aires, a federal Judge orders the closure of news journal *Cronica*'; *"..., a federal judge on hearing the case agreed that there had been an infringement of Article 219 of the Penal Code. Sr Hector Ricardo Garcia, the editor, was only released after paying a high sum and the case continued its normal procedural course."* [2626]

December 30th, in the Falklands, a Geoffrey Deroath and his partner, Gillian Lipscombe, arrive at Stanley from Argentina. Found to be in possession of a revolver and .22 ammunition, their documentation is checked.

"The couple bluffed their way here without white cards by showing LADE officials a leather passport cover with City of London crest on it, convincing them that they were Embassy Officials!" [2627]

In Buenos Aires, in Congress, a bill is introduced to seize, when deemed appropriate, the Falkland Islands.

> *"Hypocrisy, deceit, duplicity, and delays are the constants that mark the usurper's behavior, and it would be almost suicidal naivety to think that it could change. It's not a matter of succumbing to warmongering patriotism. It's simply a matter of grounding things in reality and proceeding accordingly."* [2628]

"Several politicians made statements about the alternative mentioned by Vignes. Juan Carlos Cárdenas, of Vanguardia Federal, said that the islands were a casus belli (reason for war) and presented a bill to authorise Isabel to declare war without resorting to Parliament. ... When the controversy reached the Senate of the Nation, the senators unanimously approved a declaration of support for "all popular mobilization actions in defense of the archipelago as part of Argentine territory", ..." [2629]

December 31st, the biannual review notes 39 births, 25 marriages and 24 deaths during 1975. [2630]

2623 Elgood 2025
2624 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1974 & 1975*
2625 Quoted in *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* January/February 1975 p.9
2626 Makin 1983 p.396. See also Dillon 1989
2627 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* January/February 1975 p.14. Arrested and deported.
2628 National Deputy Juan Carlos Cardenas quoted in Tato 2025
2629 Carassai 2022
2630 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1974 & 1975*

1975 – January 3rd, in Buenos Aires, on the 142nd anniversary of the ejection of a Buenos Airean garrison from East Falkland (Soledad) Island, Argentina's Foreign Minister holds a press conference. [2631]

> *"Argentina has decided in this case, even though there is usurpation, to continue to negotiate according to the Argentine pacifist tradition in the solution of international controversies."* [2632]

Argentina unilaterally imposes immigration controls on all air travel between it and the Falkland Islands.

"In 1971 Great Britain and Argentina signed, under UN auspices, a communication agreement... The use of only a 'white card' permitted open movement between the Islands and Argentina by both Argentine and Falklands Islands residents. The card contained no fingerprints, no nationality, and no expiration date." [2633]

"In January 1975 the Argentine Government imposed immigration controls on air travel to the Falklands in breach of the Communications Agreement. A declaration that the holder was an Argentine citizen of the Malvinas was added to the 'white card.'..." [2634]

"The 'white card' was now replaced by one declaring the holder to be an Argentine citizen of the Malvinas." [2635]

In Buenos Aires, the government of Isabel Martinez de Peron indicates its frustration with the lack of progress in negotiations over the Islands; *"... the Ministry of Social Welfare instructed Argentine cruise ships not to show a courtesy Red Ensign when they entered Stanley harbour."* [2636]

At Stanley, Secretary of the UK Falkland Islands Committee, E. W. (Bill) Hunter Christie, arrives in the Islands.[2637]

"Bill Christie, on his first visit, was very busy whilst here. He made a long Camp trip ... to visit 11 settlements and to speak to over 300 people. ... In Stanley Mr. Christie busied himself with brief visits to many people both in their homes and in public places such as bars. The major public event was an open meeting in the Town Hall which was very well attended." [2638]

"Christie spent three weeks in the Falkland Islands. ... He concluded that the people of the Islands were adamant in their desire to remain British and that strong indirect pressure had been put on the people of this small community to change their allegiance against their will." [2639]

January 20th, in London, aware that Prof. Donald Griffiths is compiling his report, the Department of Energy write to the Foreign & Commonwealth Office; *"Ministers are very interested in the possibility of exploring offshore oil around the Falkland Islands."*[2640]

From Port Stanley, on the same day, Governor Ernest (Toby) Lewis leaves the Falkland Islands.

"In general Lewis appears to have coped well with the successive changes and chances of his period of office. Invariably loyal to FCO policy on Argentina as the FCO twisted and turned to keep the Argentines in play, he seems to have gone to considerable pains to explain the rationale for each new step to Islanders, albeit making a virtue of necessity. Whilst doing everything possible to run the Islands better, he appeared genuinely to think

2631 See January, 1833
2632 *La Nacion* January 3, 1975
2633 *An Analysis of the Falkland/Malvinas Campaign* Admiral Harry D. Train 1988
2634 Ellerby 1990 p.178
2635 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.34
2636 Ellerby 2009 p.178 citing *The Daily Telegraph* March 5, 1975
2637 For a biography see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/christie_eric
2638 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March/April 1975 p.24
2639 Merle Christie in Tatham (ed.) 2008 p.151
2640 *Lindley to Carless January 20, 1975 FCO 96/369*

that contact and collaboration with Argentina on the lines of the Communications Agreement was the best way ahead. He was at the same time mindful of Islands opinion and firm on sovereignty." [2641]

"Toby Lewis was a coercive, duplicitous, old-fashioned colonial governor (January 1971-1975)..." [2642]

On his return to London, UKFIC Secretary Bill Christie submits a report to the Committee, concluding that a) on the YPF monopoly of fuel supplies, the Islanders have no say; b) no ex-official member of the Executive or Legislative Councils have seen a copy of the YPF agreement; c) members of the Executive Council have been ordered by the Governor to vote as per his instructions; d) 49 oil companies have applied for prospecting licences without any being granted permission and without the Islanders being made aware.

"The Executive Council, a minority of whom are elected, are subject to an oath of secrecy. I am satisfied that (a) facts have not been given to them which they should have been told (b) they have been given inaccurate information in important matters. I have no doubt that the Secretariat are responsible for misleading the Unofficial members both over the Fuel Agreement and the serious nature of applications for oil prospecting licences. It appears to me that a deliberate attempt is being made by two large powers, acting in concert, to subvert the Islanders' basic right to self-determination." [2643]

January 28th, at Stanley, Neville Arthur Irwin French, the new Governor of the Falkland Islands, arrives. [2644]

"He appears to have brought to his governorship of the Falklands many of the characteristics which had served him so ill in Tanganyika in 1958, nearly twenty years before: a single mindedness in carrying out what he correctly conceived to be his duty to his masters coupled with a strong authoritarian streak and lack of judgment. His obsessions about security and secrecy set up a barrier between him and the Islanders. He was openly criticised by the Falkland Islands Committee in London. His previous experience in Latin America (which the FCO doubtless thought appropriate and relevant) probably added to local suspicions." [2645]

"To the fury of the Islanders he put notices in Spanish on the gates of Government House, gates which for the only time in Island memory were kept locked. ... His strongly authoritarian behaviour and lack of judgement, the cause of trouble in an earlier colonial posting, made him highly unsuitable to promote Islander confidence in the FCO or closer ties with Argentina. The Times commented that the Islanders were governed by an undemocratic body under an openly pro-Argentine Governor." [2646]

January 31st, in London, Minister David Ennals, writes to Foreign Secretary James (Jim) Callaghan.

> *"I am now moving towards the view that the best long-term aim might be a long-term leasing arrangement by which, under a treaty, we would cede sovereignty but would otherwise retain virtually all the arrangements on the Islands which exist now."* [2647]

"The foreign secretary reacted to the leaseback suggestion with disdain. ... Callaghan felt that Ennals overestimated Britain's hurdle at the UN, and underestimated its capability to counter an Argentine attack and the parliamentary difficulties which would arise." [2648]

2641 David Taylor in Tatham (ed) 2008 pp.337-341
2642 Elgood 2025
2643 Bill Christie quoted in Elgood 2025
2644 *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* May-July 1975 p.26
2645 David Taylor in Tatham (ed) 2008 pp.231-233
2646 Elgood 2025
2647 Quoted in *FO 7/2964*
2648 Donaghy 2014

February 13th, in Stanley, *Regina Prima* anchors without the courtesy Red Ensign. Shops close in protest.

"Cruise Ship 'Regina Prima' visited Stanley for the 5th time. However the nearly 500 passengers found all shops but three were closed. 'Regina Prima; is Greek owned and Panamanian registered and was chartered to an Argentine Government company. It had two captains. The Argentine one had refused to allow the courtesy British flag, Red Ensign, to be flown, maintaining Stanley is an Argentine port for each visit here. Many residents had expressed anger at the local governments refusal to take action and its willingness to grant clearance to the ship for the previous four visits. Finally traders took matters into their own hands and closed down for the day. It was felt that this was hard on the tourists who were ordinary holidaymakers but that a protest had to be made. The incident captured the international news headlines for a day. We heard later that the refusal to fly the flag was the result of non-cooperation between different Government departments in Buenos Aires." [2649]

"Upon her return to the continent, the ship was festively received by Argentine citizens and officials, led by the Secretary of Sports and Tourism, in charge organising the cruises." [2650]

March 2nd, on returning to the Falklands, the captain of *Regina Prima*, refuses yet again to fly the Red Ensign when entering Port Stanley. [2651]

"On its final visit the 'Regina Prima' still did not fly the courtesy flag, in spite of the intervention of the F.I. Chief Secretary, and the ship was not cleared and sailed without landing any tourists." [2652]

March 9th, in the UK, the *Sunday Telegraph* newspaper, speculates that competition over oil licences for the Falklands could provoke a military clash with Argentina.

March 13th, British intelligence reports indicate that, without negotiations, Argentina is likely to resort to force in the case of oil being discovered near the Falklands archipelago. [2653]

March 18th, in Britain's Parliament, the Government confirms that it has received Professor Griffiths's report into the potential for oil exploration around the Falklands. No further details are given.

"Griffiths reported in early 1975 that the prognosis was 'sufficiently promising to encourage further commercial exploration'. The government submitted the findings to Sir Peter Kent, a former chief geologist at BP, who agreed..." [2654]

March 19th, from Buenos Aires, aware of Griffiths' report, Argentina's Foreign Ministry issues a *communique*.

> *"According to cabled information published in the press, the United Kingdom Foreign Office has received a scientific report, ... concerning the possible existence of petroleum deposits under the Argentine continental shelf near the Malvinas Islands. Since the Malvinas Islands and the above-mentioned areas constitute an integral part of the national territory, the Government of Argentina wishes to state that it does not and will not recognize the right of any foreign Government to explore for or extract minerals or hydrocarbons....*

2649 *Falkland Island Times* January/February 1975. Traditionally a ship, on entering a port, displays the flag of that port.
2650 Carassai 2022
2651 Destefani 1982.
2652 *Falkland Island Times* January/February 1975
2653 *FO 7/2949*
2654 Livingstone 2018 citing *Geology of the Region Around the Falkland Islands: Summary of Report by P.F. Barker, J. Burrell, F. Simpson and D.H. Griffiths April 11, 1975* and *Review of Birmingham Report of Geology of the Falkland Islands Region by Peter Kent June 2, 1975* in *FCO 96/369*

Furthermore, the Argentine Government will regard the carrying out of activities of the kind referred to above to be contrary to United Nations resolutions and consensuses on the Malvinas Islands, …"

"… at a press conference… Vignes suggested that if Britain was unwilling to negotiate, "the only other option open to the Argentine government is a resort to force."… Vignes said his remarks were made unwillingly, forced upon him by public pressure. "People are burning my feet", he claimed, warning that unless there was progress, grave consequences would ensue: "It would be the big thing, the breaking off of diplomatic relations and an armed conflict"…" [2655]

March 24th, from London, a diplomatic cable is sent to the US Secretary of State.

"1. FCO official responsible for Falkland Islands (external relations), Welton, told emboff March 21 that talks with Argentines on Falkland Islands have been halted since last August. Instructions given to new British Ambassador, due to arrive Buenos Aires March 21, are that British are willing to talk only if opinion in Falkland Islands allows them, which is not the case at present time. British Ambassador will not raise issue, but will reply along this line if, as expected, Argentines raise the issue with him. 2. British remain unwilling to act against wishes of Islanders on question of sovereignty and believe opinion in Islands has hardened to point where they preclude from going on with negotiations. Island residents have strong and effective lobby in both major parties in House of Commons and in Press. For this reason, British Ambassador had been instructed not to continue discussions." [2656]

March 26th, considering the Griffiths Report on the potential for Falklands' oil, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office notes; *"Of one thing we can be certain: there can be no exploration of any oil there may be around the Falklands except in collaboration with the Argentines."* [2657]

April 3rd, Britain's *Financial Times* newspaper claims that progress towards greater contact between the Falklands and Argentina has been delayed. Due to the possible existence of oil deposits.

Britain's new Ambassador to Buenos Aires, David Ashe, receives instructions to issue a warning that any military action will be met with force.

"The foreign secretary felt that an aggressive approach was required:.." [2658]

"In April 1975, the then head of the Foreign Office and future prime minister, James Callaghan, ordered his ambassador to Argentina, Derick Ashe (sic), to tell his Argentine counterpart that no future reference to "invasion or negotiation" would go unanswered. … (Callaghan) on this occasion gave express instructions to make it clear that "an attack by Argentina would meet with a military response" and that, "unless Argentina wanted a war," the only alternative Vignes had was negotiation." [2659]

April 7th, from the Falklands, Governor French submits a report concerning proposed changes to the Islands' Constitution.

April 10th, in Britain's House of Lords, spokesman Goronwy-Roberts confirms that if negotiations between the UK and Argentina take place, Islanders will be invited to attend. [2660]

2655 Donaghy 2014
2656 Quoted in Elgood 2025
2657 *Coles to Collins March 26, 1975 FCO 96/369*. Conspiracy theorists may perceive a concerted effort (plot?) by the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office to subvert the Islanders' right, as made out by UN resolutions, to exploit their own resources. Conspiracy theorists, may have a point.
2658 Donaghy 2014
2659 Carassai 2022
2660 *HL Deb 10 April 1975 vol.359 cc180-1*

April 14th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador Ashe delivers Britain's warning to the Foreign Ministry.

> *"The Argentine Government must clearly understand that an attack on the Islands would be met with a military response. At the same time Her Majesty's Government wished to avoid any confrontation with Argentina. The only alternative to confrontation was negotiation and they stood ready to examine any proposal which the Argentine Government might wish to put forward."* [2661]

April 16th, in London, a meeting between Prime Minister Wilson, Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Minister David Ennals considers the policy to adopt with regard to oil deposits on the Islands' continental shelf. Callaghan notes that the current Argentine regime is; *"... so unstable that it was questionable whether a negotiated settlement would stand the test of time."*

> *"If we receive no warning of an invasion and we are obliged to liberate the Islands from an Argentine occupation, our political task at the United Nations, and in Washington, would be formidable.*
>
> *The Secretary of State for Defence should therefore advise on the practical aspects of defending the Islands."* [2662]

Between them, they decide; *"... that economic cooperation and joint oil exploration would provide the basis for a new Anglo-Argentine dialogue, with the sovereignty issue being withheld for a later date."* [2663]

April 25th, in Buenos Aires, a car bomb explodes outside the British Embassy Residence, killing a guard and injuring two others. Ambassador Ashe and his family are unhurt. [2664]

May 5th, in New York, Britain informs the UN that it has no doubts about its exclusive sovereign rights to explore for natural resources on the continental shelf around the Falklands' archipelago. [2665]

May 8th, in London, at the Foreign Office, Minister David Ennals hosts an informal seminar attended by the UK Falkland Islands Committee (UKFIC).

"The agenda covered oil exploration, alginates, fisheries, welfare, the constitution and restrictions on foreigners owning land. There was no attempt to reach conclusions or recommendations, although ideas discussed were passed on to Governor French." [2666]

"The U.K.F.I.C's representatives included Bill Hunter Christie, Frank Mitchell, Sir John Barlow and Jack Abbott (from the Local Branch in Stanley). Professor Donald Griffiths, a geologist from Birmingham University, and Dr. Peter Calvert, a Politics Lecturer at Southampton University, contributed their specialist knowledge of the region. Commercial interests were represented by the Chairman of the F.I.C., the Chief Manager of Lloyds Bank International Latin American Section, the Managing Director of the Baring Bank, and a consultant for the Argentine National Bank. Twelve Members of Parliament attended including John

2661 Quoted in Charlton 1989 pp.42-43

2662 Callaghan interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.44

2663 Donaghy 2014

2664 *Chronicles of Modern Terrorism* Barry & Judith Rubin 2009. Surprisingly little information is available regarding this attack, the attackers or its objective. No group appears to have claimed responsibility.

2665 *UN Yearbook 1975.* In December, 1950 a British *Order in Council* had extended the borders of the colony to include the adjacent continental shelf areas. This was followed in 1958 by the UN's *Convention on the Continental Shelf* which recognised that, for the purposes of international law, islands had their own shelf areas. Unsurprisingly, Argentina declined to sign that convention. Also, geologically, it appears that the archipelago sits upon its own micro-plate. See May 9 below. Also - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2021/03/geology-of-the-falkland-islands-1999.pdf

2666 Ellerby 1990 p.200 citing *U.K.F.I.C. archive (Sussex), group D, file 9: Coles to Christie, 7 Apr. 1975.* Also *Christie to Hall, 31 Dec. 1974*

Biggs-Davison, James Johnson, Nigel Fisher and Tam Dalyell. Finally, there were officials from the Foreign Office, Ministry of Defence and Department of Energy." [2667]

"Large British corporations with investments in Latin America argued that Britain's commercial interests were being put at risk by the failure to resolve the sovereignty dispute with Argentina. This was the argument put forward by executives of Barings Bank, Lloyds Bank and a former director of Shell at a secret seminar on the Falklands organised by the FCO on 8 May 1975. The only business executive at the meeting who was in favour of maintaining the status quo was the chairman of the Falkland Islands Company." [2668]

May 9th, in Switzerland, the UN's Geneva conference on the Law of the Sea closes.

"... the Geneva Session confirmed universal support of the 12 nautical mile territorial sea and also of a 200 nautical mile economic zone." [2669]

"During the 1970s, the United Nations was coordinating negotiations on a new Convention on the Law of the Sea, which included the concept of an Economic Exclusion Zone (EEZ) in which a sovereign state had the right to explore and exploit the maritime resources within 200 nautical miles. Although negotiations on the Convention (UNCLOS) did not end until 1982 and did not come into force until 1994, the concept of 200-mile maritime zones was very much in the minds of officials ..." [2670]

In Britain, the UKFIC requests a consideration of the defence of the Falklands from Major General Gribbon, former Assistant Chief of Staff at SHAPE. [2671]

"We do not consider a large garrison is required: but we do consider that one officer and 30 Royal Marines is too few ... We consider that the present garrison of the Falklands backed by the very small and ill-equipped Defence Force is totally inadequate to counter the immediate threat and leaves the Islands wide open to attack by any potential aggressor. Furthermore, the visible weakness is a positive invitation to the Argentines to attack, with or without Argentine Government involvement." [2672]

May 14th, Foreign Secretary James Callaghan proposes to Prime Minister Wilson that dialogue with Argentina should proceed through the offices of Britain's Ambassador in Buenos Aires; in strict secrecy, to avoid leaks.[2673]

"Foreign Secretary James Callaghan wrote to the Prime Minister in early 1975 warning that if Britain refused to talk to Argentina, not only would it lead to confrontation, but it 'would also preclude any possibility of exploring or exploiting either oil deposits on the Falkland Islands Continental Shelf or the resources of the South Atlantic as a whole'. The paragraph on oil in this letter is completely redacted – as are many of the references to oil in the National Archives collection of government papers,..." [2674]

Callaghan also suggests that tensions could be eased by an offer of joint oil exploration. [2675]

"Foreign Secretary James Callaghan considered what instructions should be given to Ashe and wrote a seventeen-page discussion paper in May for the Prime Minister. This noted the instability of the Argentine

2667 *Ibid.*
2668 Livingstone 2018 citing *FCO 7/2958.* Hardly a secret.
2669 *Third United nations Conference on the Law of the Sea* Milenko Milic 1976. The UN Convention on the Law of the Sea was not finalized until 1982. Argentine signed, but did not ratify. *cf.* 1966 & 1977
2670 Livingstone 2018
2671 Supreme Headquarters Allied Powers Europe (NATO).
2672 Quoted in Elgood 2025
2673 *FO 7/2950*
2674 Livingstone 2018 citing *Callaghan to Wilson PM/75/38 May 14, 1975* in *FCO 7/3373*
2675 A suggestion approved by the Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee in July, 1975. Until 1992, the membership of Cabinet Committees, their remits and decisions, were not made public.

Government, its impatience and their modernised navy. It also pointed to the probability of an Argentine invasion plan, the difficulties in recapturing the Islands and argued the need to reinforce the 33-man Royal Marine garrison. Economic cooperation with Argentina seemed the obvious if imperfect way forward. Regarding sovereignty the Foreign Secretary was minded to "leave this poisoned chalice alone".” [2676]

From Argentina, a group of actors fly into Port Stanley to stage a series of theatrical, cultural and musical events in the Town Hall; organised by LADE. [2677]

May 18th, in Washington DC, Argentina's Foreign Minister Alberto Vignes has lunch with the US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. The situation regarding the Falkland Islands is briefly discussed. [2678]

May 24th, in Buenos Aires, during an meeting with Vignes, Ambassador Ashe proposes *in camera* discussions with regard to a joint development of the resources of the south-west Atlantic. Vignes promptly counter proposes that any negotiations on economic cooperation should be linked to the immediate transfer of sovereignty followed by simultaneous leaseback for a period of 15 years.

May 27th, in Stanley, Island Councillors propose that an *'economic study*' be pursued to advise on the long term prospects of both the Falklands, and the Dependencies. [2679]

> *“On the length of the airstrip at Stanley, lies the Falkland Islands' future. An entirely unpublicised, unofficial delegation from the islands is, I understand, currently engaged in discussion of the matter with the Foreign Office. There is no other British territory which can only be reached by courtesy of a foreign country.*
>
> *The present airstrip being inadequate for the landing of long international-flight aircraft, islanders can only leave and return home by way of Argentina. Furthermore, these British, either leaving or entering their Islands, are obliged to get a White Card permit either from the Argentine Office in the Islands or in Buenos Aires, before the Argentine airline (LADE) will confirm a booking. Adding insult to injury, Argentine personnel enter the Islands without it. No such right is granted to Argentina by the Communications Agreement of 1971 with Britain.*
>
> *In present circumstances, Argentinians can enter the Islands and could well form a nucleus for takeover, before counter-action could be taken... The key to development and control lies in communications. Conditions for these were laid down by the 1971 Agreement, by which the British government undertook to replace the temporary airstrip by a permanent airfield. Work on it is expected to start this year, but Argentina has refused any aid which will make an international airport and allow the Islanders direct flights to Ascension or the Cape (though this would be cheaper).*
>
> *The current field under construction has a runway of only 1,250 metres; 2,000 metres are needed for international jets. The Seychelles were provided with an international port by British aid; why not the Falklands? In the meantime, it has cost about £1 million to get Johnston Construction and their machinery to the Islands, and the decision whether to do the job properly or not must be made in the next few months.”* [2680]

2676 Elgood 2025
2677 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
2678 *US National Archives, RG 59, Central Foreign Policy File, P820125–0187.* No details provided. The primary conversations appears to have focused on Cuba.
2679 *Ibid.* See October
2680 *Infamous White Card* Molly Mortimer 1975 in *The Spectator* July 11, 1975 p.12

June 10th, Argentina celebrates its **"**Day for the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector."

"... commemorated in the educational establishments of all cycles, of the State and individuals, units and offices of the Armed Forces, judicial headquarters and dependencies of the public administration, inside and outside the territory,..."

June 19th, in Buenos Aires, Ambassador David Ashe again meets with the Foreign Minister. Vignes indicates that Argentina is prepared to start a discussion on economic cooperation. A condition, however, is that Argentina is allowed to occupy the uninhabited islands of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, without condemnation by the UK.

"That proposal was unacceptable to Britain and the absence of talks on sovereignty unacceptable to the Argentines. For some time following that there were no negotiations." [2681]

"We have undertaken a careful examination of the resolutions in question. They refer only to the Falkland Islands and do not explicitly mention the Dependencies. Moreover, the list of non-self-governing territories compiled by General Assembly Committees in 1946 and subsequently in 1964 referred exclusively to the "Falkland Islands."..." [2682]

July 14th, in London, an announcement regarding the EEC is made to Parliament.

"The association of the Falkland Islands, as a dependent territory for whose external affairs the United Kingdom remains responsible, will, in accordance with Article 117 of the Act of Accession to the Community Treaties, take effect upon a decision of the Council of the European Communities. The Falklands Executive Council has approved." [2683]

July 16th, in Buenos Aires, Minister Vignes repeats to Ambassador Ashe that talks on economic cooperation alone hold no interest for Argentina.

July 31st, Ashe informs London that the Perónist administration is unlikely to last much longer. However, Argentina's Foreign Ministry is demanding that sovereignty talks resume before September, when a meeting between Foreign Secretary Callaghan and Argentina's Foreign Minister is scheduled to take place at the United Nations building in New York.

August 11th, in Buenos Aires, Alberto Vignes is replaced as Foreign Minister by Angel Frederico Robledo.

> *"We have been some way across a diplomatic minefield with an Argentine foreign minister who has been thrown out of office just at the moment when there was a chance of launching a new dialogue. We must be extremely cautious before attempting to relaunch it."* [2684]

August 18th, in the UK, an article in *The Times* newspaper reports on the activities of the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Committee (UKFIC); *"... in the autumn they will lead a political campaign to challenge the Foreign and Commonwealth Office's view of the immediate and future needs of the Falkland Islands..."*

August 20th, in New York, at the UN building, the Special Committee on Decolonization refers the question of the Falkland Islands to the General Assembly.

2681 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*
2682 *PREM 19-0625 6 May 1982*
2683 *HC Deb 14 July 1975 vol.895 cc324-5W*
2684 *Callaghan to Ashe August 15, 1975* in *FO 7/2952*

In the Falkland Islands, it is noted that tourism from Argentina has increased.

"Tourism increased exponentially. In 1970 only 146 people visited the islands; in 1975, 6201. The three tourist attraction that the islands offered were wildlife, trout fishing and a duty free shop. The chronicles of the island press reflect that the last one was the one that most attracted Argentine tourism that "left nothing in the stores, which is why in 1975 the colonial government decided to no longer accept Argentine currency for transactions made in the archipelago, because later it could not be sold at a reasonable rate (in Argentina there was rate control)." [2685]

September 9th, in London, at a meeting of the International Parliamentary Union,[2686] Argentina accuses Britain of an act of *'international piracy'* in establishing a colony on the Falklands. Forewarned, the meeting is picketed by Falkland Islanders and their supporters.

September 16th, in Argentina, in an interview with the press, newly appointed Foreign Minister Robledo describes the wishes of the Falkland Islanders as "*irrelevant*."

September 18th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador protests Robledo's comments. Robledo responds by questioning Britain's insistence on Islander consent for talks to proceed.

In the Falkland Islands, *Gas del Estado* holds an exhibition to promote the advantages of liquefied gas over the tradition peat fuel used by the Islanders. Sixteen Islanders, and the Governor, express an interest.

"... "The Argentine presence is already accepted in the Falklands as a normal fact" reported González Balcarce." [2687]

"... Gas del Estado rendered a gas tube service, and, also, authorized the use of thirty heaters and stoves. It built some distribution premises and two islanders received installation training on the mainland. LADE was in charge of the management and, by May, it reinforced the personnel with Suboficial Principal Jorge Sossa, who was responsible for communications and operation assistant tasks." [2688]

September 23rd, in New York, in a speech at the opening session of the UN General Assembly, Argentina's Foreign Minister Robledo raises the question of the Falklands.

> *"We are a people convinced of the merits of negotiation. We apply this to what concerns us most directly. As is well known, my country suffers from the usurpation by a foreign Power of a part of its territory, namely the Malvinas Islands. For that question to be settled, there is no solution other than the return of those islands to the territorial patrimony of the Republic, since their occupation by force was carried out against every law..."*

Robledo claims that the application of self-determination to the Falklands; *"... was excluded, in view of the fact that the British occupation constitutes a violation of the principle of territorial integrity specifically laid down in resolution 1514."* [2689] He also asserts that Argentina has the support of the Non-Aligned Movement. [2690]

September 25th, Britain's Foreign Secretary meets with Minister Robledo at the Waldorf Towers, in New York.

2685 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* August-September 1975
2686 Founded in 1889, this is an international organisation for Parliaments.
2687 Carassia 2022.
2688 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
2689 *UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4.* See 1960 for comments on the non-retroactive nature of resolution *1514*.
2690 A forum for the UN members which are not formally aligned with any major power bloc.

"Robledo conveyed an invitation to Callaghan and the Queen to visit Argentina. He gave no commitment to Callaghan's proposals for economic cooperation, agreeing only to "consider them urgently." Consequently, Callaghan's suggestion that a senior official might go to Buenos Aires to discuss an agenda also went unanswered. Robledo accepted that economic cooperation would be mutually beneficial to promote stability and progress. He did not adopt the hard-line approach expected, nor emphasise the need for early progress on sovereignty. Far from being a source of distraction it appeared that the Falklands might even take a back-seat, as Argentina confronted its domestic woes. Like his predecessor, Robledo saw condominium as providing Argentina's best hope, suggesting that negotiations might be renewed in the near future..." [2691]

Minister Robledo assures the Foreign Secretary that there is; *"... (no) question of an Argentine invasion of the Islands, nor of an attempt to solve the problem by force."* [2692]

Responding, Callaghan informs the Foreign Minister of plans for an economic survey, at the request of the Islanders; *"... Its purpose is to quantify the options for future economic development..."* [2693]

"There is no record of a response from Robledo to this, indicating that he had not grasped the magnitude of the enterprise to be undertaken." [2694]

In Montreal, Canada, on the same day, a protocol is signed concerning the internation carriage of parcels by air. On signing, Argentina protests the UK's inclusion of the Falkland Islands, South Georgia, the South Sandwich Islands and the British Antarctica Territory. The UK submits a counter declaration:

> *"In reference to the declaration made by the Argentine Republic when depositing the instruments of ratification of Protocols Nos. 1, 2 and 3 as well as Montreal Protocol No. 4, signed at Montreal on 25 September 1975, the position of the United Kingdom is well known and remains unchanged. The United Kingdom has no doubt of its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands and its incontestable right to apply the treaties thereto. As for the part of the declaration concerning the British Antarctic Territory, the Embassy recalls the contents of the Antarctic Treaty and particularly the provisions of Article IV of the said Treaty."*

October 2nd, in Buenos Aires, after less than two months in office, Frederico Robledo is replaced as Argentina's Foreign Minister by Arauz Castex.

October 9th, from the Mar de la Plata naval base, Argentine submarine ARA *San Luis* (S32) departs for a fifty-day mission to reconnoitre the South Atlantic and survey the coasts of the Falkland Islands.

October 16th, in London, following the suggestions in May from the Islanders, the British Government announces a comprehensive economic survey; to be led by Lord Shackleton; to inquire into development possibilities in the Falkland Islands. [2695]

> *"Terms of Reference: In the light of the weakening of the colony's economy and the decline in population, and taking into consideration previous reports including those of Theophilus, Armstrong, Comben/Waller and Davies:-* [2696]

2691 Donaghy 2014
2692 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.38
2693 *HC Deb 14 January 1976 vol.903 cc391*
2694 Donaghy 2014
2695 *Falkland Islands Review Committee Report* Franks Committee 1983, para.34. Son of the explorer, and a respected Labour peer, Shackleton was under no illusions that his report was to emphasise the importance of Argentine/Island relations and to included the possibility of a take-over.
2696 Theophilus had reported on sheep farming (*The Economics Of Wool Production In The Falkland Islands* 1972). William Davies on grasslands (*The Grasslands of the Falkland Islands* 1939). The other names are proving elusive.

1. To examine the resources of the colony and the dependencies and the prospects for economic development with particular reference to agriculture, the wool industry, the need for diversification and possible developments in oil, minerals, fisheries, and alginates and to make recommendations.

2. In this context to examine the present fiscal structure and the provision of government services in the colony and dependencies in the light of the present uncertain economic climate and to make recommendations. To advise on priorities for capital expenditure over the next five years with particular reference to the need for improved infrastructure and to programmes for public utility development and housing.

3. To assess the financial, manpower and social obligations of any recommended economic strategy, with particular reference to the encouragement of small scale enterprise and scope for local investment, and the extent to which all these needs can be met from local resources and to the degree which recourse to all potential external resources may be necessary."

"It appears that the economic survey was sanctioned by the British Government in response to the increase in Argentine hostility. In April 1975 the British Embassy in Buenos Aires reported the need for a diplomatic initiative after the Argentine Government warned that the only option open was a resort to force. ... The Government wanted to persuade Parliament and the Islanders through an "informed approach" that collaboration with Argentina was the answer." [2697]

"Concerned about the continuing decline of the local economy, councillors had requested 'a comprehensive economic study' of the Falklands region, which would advise on long-term prospects and include the Dependencies. But for the British Government there were different motives at hand. The Foreign Secretary saw this as an ideal way to show the islanders that future development rested on cooperation with Argentina rather than dependence on Britain, and thereby encourage closer links... by the Autumn of 1975, certain factors had convinced the Foreign Office that the councillor's proposals justified investigation." [2698]

"The Argentines were furious, regarding this as evidence of long-term commitment to develop the Islands and maintain British sovereignty. Castex told the British Ambassador that if the British Government refused to resume negotiations: "We were rapidly moving towards a head-on collision ... in the end he could only see one course open to Argentina irrespective of what Government might be in power"." [2699]

From Edinburgh, Scotland, the firm of 'Christian Salvesen' informs the British Foreign Office that they now own two old whaling staions on South Georgia; and are trying to acquire two more; *"It is a long shot, but I think that sometime in the future there may be use for these bases, either for fishing or for oil. I hope that HMG will not absent-mindedly hand it over to Argentina."*

In the Netherlands, at the Hague, the International Court of Justice (ICJ) presents an Advisory Opinion (AO) regarding the situation in Western Sahara.

"54. The Charter of the United Nations, in Article 1, paragraph 2, indicates, as one of the purposes of the United Nations: "To develop friendly relations among nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-determination of peoples..."

This purpose is further developed in Articles 55 and 56 of the Charter. Those provisions have direct and particular relevance for non-self-governing territories, which are dealt with in Chapter XI of the Charter. As the Court stated in its Advisory Opinion of 21 June 1971 on The Legal Consequences for

2697 Ellerby 1990 p.201 citing *Time and Chance* J. Callaghan 1987
2698 Donaghy 2014
2699 Elgood 2025

States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276 (1970):

> *"... the subsequent development of international law in regard to non-self-governing territories, as enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, made the **principle of self-determination applicable to all of them**. (ICJ reports 1971. p.31)"*

55. The principle of self-determination as a right of peoples, and its application for the purpose of bringing all colonial situations to a speedy end, were enunciated in the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, General Assembly resolution 1514 (XV). In this resolution the General Assembly proclaims "the necessity of bringing to a speedy and unconditional end colonialism in al1 its forms and manifestations". To this end the resolution provides inter alia:

> *"2. **All peoples have the right to self-determination**; by virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development*

*The above provisions, in particular paragraph 2, thus confirm and emphasize that the application of **the right of self-determination requires a free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples concerned**. ...*

59. *The validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples, **is not affected** by the fact that in certain cases the General Assembly has dispensed with the requirement of consulting the inhabitants of a given territory. Those instances were based either on the consideration that a certain population did not constitute a 'people' entitled to self-determination or on the conviction that a consultation was totally unnecessary, in view of special circumstances"* [2700]

As is usual, some of the judges publish separate opinions.

> *"... it is for the people to determine the destiny of the territory and not the territory the destiny of the people."* [2701]

> *"... it follows ... that the principle of self-determination could be dispensed with only if the free expression of the will of the people was found to be axiomatic in the sense that the result was known to be a foregone conclusion or that consultations had already taken place in some form or that special features of the case rendered it unnecessary."* [2702]

"... (an) exception exist(s), for example, in the case of Gibraltar or Malvinas (Falkland Islands) where the General Assembly has requested the States concerned to negotiate the issue of sovereignty and the transfer of territory, and they have refused to accept the effects of a referendum or consultation to the present inhabitants of these territories." [2703]

"The self-proclamation of a "people" and a subsequent claim of entitlement to the right to self-determination are ... insufficient." [2704]

2700 *Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975* (advisory opinions have no mandatory effect). My emphasis. For the full ICJ report see https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf

2701 Judge Dillard *ICJ ref: 061-19751016-ADV-01-07*

2702 Judge Nagendra Singh quoted in Trinidad 2018 p.57

2703 *Los Derechos Argentinas Sobre Las Islas Malvinas* Alfredo Bruno Bologna 1982 (2). Not true.

2704 Kohen & Rodríguez 2017 p.214. *cf.* January, 1952 & August, 1982

"., it cannot be denied that self-determination has, at the very least, attained a position of high normative regard, being seen as a peremptory norm with regard to the issue of decolonisation." [2705]

"Although the ICJ approved of its earlier opinion in the Namibia proceedings that the principle of self-determination applied to 'all' Chapter XI Non-Self-Governing Territories, it cast doubt on the generality of this proposition in what is arguably the most ambiguous passage in the Western Sahara Opinion:... (para. 59) ... The fact that the passage is not supported by factual examples makes it particularly prone to a wide range of interpretations and to speculation regarding the specific anomalous cases the ICJ had in mind. ... it is important to recall that in the ICJ's view, the fact that the General Assembly dispensed with a consultation of the inhabitants does not affect '[t]he validity of the principle of self-determination, defined as the need to pay regard to the freely expressed will of peoples.'..." [2706]

"... in its decision the Court explicitly upheld the Saharawis' right of self-determination, in paragraphs 70 and 162 of its Advisory Opinion of 16 October 1975 ... If the Falklands case were taken to the ICJ, the Court might decide along similar lines: that there were certain historical links between Argentina and the Falklands, but they were not sufficient to override the self-determination of the Falkland Islanders." [2707]

"... following the Chagos opinion (2019), a persuasive argument can be made that self-determination and the right to decolonization come close to being one and the same thing,.. Identifying the right to self-determination with colonization has the further advantage that all the traditional and difficult questions relating to self-determination no longer pose insurmountable obstacles. If self-determination is essentially limited to non-self-governing territories (i.e. colonies), there is no need to figure out what on earth the notion of 'peoples' means, as in the phrase 'all peoples have a right to self-determination'. ... the identity of the right-holder is now clear: the right-holder is the non-self-governing territory. Secondly, the consequence of self-determination has become clear as well: the self-determination of non-self-governing territories will ideally materialize in their independence, unless they themselves opt freely for association or integration with another state, in accordance with General Assembly resolution 1541 (XV)." [2708]

October 22nd, from Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry comments regarding the Shackleton mission.

> *"In response to the proposal made by the British Government to send a mission to the Islas Malvinas with the object of carrying out an economic and financial survey of the archipelago and the surrounding areas, the Ministry of External Relations and Worship states that:-*
>
> *1) It reiterates in full the communique issued by the Foreign Ministry on 19 March 1975;*
>
> *2) Contrary to a report appearing in a London newspaper, the Argentine Government has on no occasion given its consent to the mission in question;*
>
> *3) Since the question of the Malvinas Islands is subject to the procedure recommended by the United Nations General Assembly in its resolution 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII), the parties to the dispute must abstain from any new unilateral action affecting the basic aspects of the question. Any such action will undermine the clear objective of the resolutions in question and will be contrary to the spirit which has prevailed in all the dealings so far between the two countries concerning the archipelago, and also is unacceptable to the Argentine Government;*

2705 *Uti Possidetis: The Procrustean Bed of International Law?* M. Wesley 2017
2706 *Self-determination in Disputed Colonial Territories* Jamie Trinidad 2018 p.56 & 58
2707 Pascoe 2020 p.317
2708 *Shrinking Self-determination – The Chagos Opinion of the International Court of Justice* Prof. Jan Klabbers in *European Society of International Law ESIL Reflections* 2019 vol 8, issue 2.

4) The mission which Great Britain proposes to send would not be welcome because investigations to assess the possibility of the economic exploration of the natural resources of the Malvinas Islands – resources which therefore belong to the Argentine Republic – would violate the principle of not undertaking new action. Consequently, the sending of this mission constitutes an inconsiderate act which the Argentine Foreign Ministry would not wish to interpret as an attitude of provocation because this would imply that Great Britain does not accept the normal continuation of bilateral negotiations, a fact which could have unforeseeable and certainly serious consequences for which Great Britain alone would be responsible;

5) The essential factor in the process of reaching a final settlement of the dispute is negotiation between the two Governments and hence the initiation of acts which may prejudice this process will upset relations between the Argentine Republic and Great Britain and will impede the achievement of a peaceful settlement of the Malvinas question;

6) Once more, Argentina urges Great Britain to take the view that negotiations to settle the dispute concerning sovereignty over the archipelago is the best procedure and is in conformity with the decisions of the United Nations and the recognized standards of the civilized world."

In Buenos Aires, Ambassador David Ashe is summoned to the Foreign Ministry. To be presented with a communique complaining that the Shackleton mission; *"... represents a step not previously concerted with the Argentine Government."* Ashe responds that the the Foreign Minister, Robledo, had been informed in September, without making any objection.

October 23rd, Ambassador Ashe informs London, warning that Shackleton's plans need to ensure that he does not pass through Argentina, as he would make a "*sensational hostage*." [2709]

October 28th, from London, Argentina's Ambassador, Manuel de Anchorena, is summoned back to Buenos Aires for '*consultations*.'

November 5th, in Buenos Aires, Anchorena and Ambassador Ashe meet. Anchorena complains about Britain's insistence that Islander consent is required before any progress can be made; and the emphasis that is placed upon their '*wishes*', rather than their interests. [2710]

"It is of course impossible to rule a people according to their interests but against their wishes, since their wishes define what their interests are. Interests are not an objective reality; they are defined by the perspective of the person defining them." [2711]

November 10th, Argentina's Ministry of Foreign Affairs announces that Lord Shackleton will not be permitted to transit through Argentina.

Off the north-eastern coast of East Falkland, Argentine submarine ARA *San Luis*, covertly photographs the Cape Pembroke lighthouse (right).

November 13th, in Buenos Aires, British Ambassador David Ashe meets with ex-Minister Robledo and his successor, Arauz Castex; to seek an explanation as to why Argentina suddenly objects to the economic survey and why Robledo had not argued against the idea in September. Initially Robledo denies that Callaghan had mentioned

2709 *FO 7/2961*
2710 *FO 7/2954*
2711 Pascoe 2020 p.311

the survey but then, on seeing the notes from the meeting, excuses himself by saying that there had been too much to take in at that time, and there had been no talk of appointing Lord Shackleton.[2712]

November 14th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry informs the British Embassy that the research ship, RSS *Shackleton,* will require Argentine permission to carry out any activity within 200 miles of the Argentine coast. Also that *'Argentine waters'* is being interpreted to include the area around the archipelago in accordance with *"Argentine law."* Britain's Ambassador informs Foreign Secretary Callaghan.

"So, what had seemed to be a very fruitful means of keeping the Argentines engaged, and recognising some of their legitimate interests in the waters around the Falklands, disappeared. The Argentine government raised a lot of difficulty about the Shackleton expedition,..." [2713]

In Stanley, on the same day, elections for the Legislative Council are postponed until January 1976. [2714]

November 21st, in Buenos Aires, Britain's naval *attaché* receives a warning that RSS *Shackleton* will be '*arrested'* if found in seas that Argentina claims as its own; *"... by which he included the ocean around the Falklands ... Furthermore, Britain would inevitably forfeit valuable Argentine navy contracts."* [2715]

December 5th, at the UN, the Fourth Committee recommend that the Falklands' issue be deferred till 1976. [2716]

December 8th, Britain informs the General Assembly that; *"... exchanges between the United Kingdom Government and the Argentine Government have continued over the past year with a view to finding a settlement of the differences between us. In seeking a solution, my Government has said repeatedly that we wish to observe the terms of resolution 1514 (XV). It is therefore the wishes of the people of the island which must be paramount, not an arbitrary idea of what their interests might be..."* [2717]

Britain's representative also informs the Assembly that all information regarding possible oil deposits around the Falklands have been shared with Argentina, and that the UK has no intention of acting unilaterally; *"My Government has similarly informed the Argentine Government, as a courtesy about its proposal for a survey of the economy of the island, and we regret that this survey is apparently regarded by the Argentine Government as an unacceptable innovation."*

Exercising a right of reply, Argentina's mission writes to the Secretary-General; "*The Argentine Government reserves its position regarding the responsibility which rests with the British Government for the breaking-off of negotiations and will not fail to assert its rights in the form which it deems most appropriate."*

"On December 8, without conditional verbs, Ortiz de Rozas denounced at the United Nations that the United Kingdom had unilaterally abandoned the negotiations arranged by that organization in 1965 (sic) and issued a tacit ultimatum, "The negotiating stage within the United Nations framework is rapidly running out," he said, "and despite of its desire for a peaceful settlement, the Argentine government ... will not fail to assert its rights in the way it deems most appropriate"." [2718]

December 9th, in the Falkland Islands, a building used by Argentine YPF staff burns down. [2719]

2712 Donaghy 2014. Neither side had taken an interpreter for the September meeting.
2713 James Callaghan quoted in Charlton 1989 p.47
2714 *The Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order 1975 (no.1706)*. Delay was an attempt to hold the elections under a new Constitution; then waiting approval in the UK. See below.
2715 Elgood 2025
2716 *UN Yearbook 1975*
2717 *Ibid.*
2718 Carassai 2022
2719 Cause unknown, although a number of Argentine journals implied a deliberate act of arson.

December 12th, in Buenos Aires, newspaper *La Nacion* reports comments by Minister Ortiz de Rozas: *"... The limits of our patience and tolerance must not be underestimated should we be confronted with an obstinate and unjustified refusal to negotiate."* [2720]

December 17th, in Paris, France, during an International Economic Cooperation conference, Britain's Foreign Secretary James Callaghan talks to Argentina's Foreign Minister, Arauz Castex. Callaghan indicates his belief that progress can be made concerning economic co-operation. Castex suggests that if Argentine scientists are added to Shackleton's team, it would change the surveys' image in Buenos Aires. Callaghan expresses his doubts, but agrees to put the proposal to Lord Shackleton.

"The purpose of the Shackleton Commission to Stanley ... had been to spike rather than stimulate Falklanders' dreams of economic grandeur. Callaghan explained the intention of the commission to Foreign Minister Castex when they met at the Paris Conference on International Economic Cooperation in December." [2721]

December 18th, in London, Shackleton agrees to accept the addition of a small Argentine contingent to his team. Informed, Castex, suggests that a retired Argentine Admiral, Jose Alvarez, be added to the party, but demands that he be given the position of *'deputy leader.'* Castex also adds that Shackleton's conclusions, to be sent to both Governments, must be followed by sovereignty negotiations.

"(Shackleton) was portrayed as a 'pirate and buccaneer' to his evident delight." [2722]

Callaghan offers to take Alvarez on as '*chief Argentine scientist*', but declines to reopen talks. Minister Arauz Castex protests. [2723]

"(Castex) said that he would not want to interpret the British decision as a provocative attitude, because in that case Great Britain would actually be interrupting the bilateral negotiation and this could "have unforeseeable and surely serious consequences, for which only Great Britain would be responsible"." [2724]

December 29th, in Brazil, Shackleton's team arrive before joining HMS *Endurance*. [2725]

"... the mission was composed of five experts entrusted with assessing and making recommendations concerning the prospects for development in oil, minerals, fisheries, wool and alginates. The mission was further requested to advise on the need for capital expenditure over the next five years, and to assess the financial and social implications of any recommendations." [2726]

December 31st, the estimated population of the Falkland Islands is 1,967 with 32 births, 15 marriages and 15 deaths during 1975. [2727]

2720 Ortiz de Rozas in *La Nacion* December 12, 1975

2721 American diplomatic telegram quoted in Elgood 2025 citing *1976LONDON00819_b* Wikileaks

2722 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

2723 Dodds 2002 p.151. Also Donaghy 2014

2724 Carassai 2022 citing *Revista de Polica Internacional* Sept 1977 no.153, vol.3 pp.36-37

2725 The original plan was that the team join *Endurance* at Montevideo. However, Uruguay was unwilling to offend Argentina, at least publicly. It was later claimed in South America's press that *Endurance* waited at Montevideo for the arrival of Shackleton, before sailing to meet an airlift. Other sources suggest that the team boarded the British ship at Montevideo as planned, but under some secrecy.

2726 *UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4*

2727 *Foreign and Commonwealth Office: Falkland Islands and Dependencies Report for the years 1974 & 1975*. This appears to be the last year that this review was published.

1976 – January 2nd, from Buenos Aires, Argentina's Government issues a statement asserting; *"... that the United Kingdom representatives had finally stated that they were not in a position to accept the reopening of negotiations aimed at solving the dispute on sovereignty;..."*

January 3rd, at Stanley, Shackleton and HMS *Endurance* arrive in the harbour.

"About 200 people waited for them at the entrance to the governor's house, "I shall do everything I can to help them", Shackleton declared." [2728]

Argentina's Foreign Minister Castex describes the timing as "*unfriendly and unthoughtful."* [2729] Castex adds that, if the British Government refuses to resume negotiations, then the two countries are; "*... rapidly moving towards a head-on collision ... his Government could accept no responsibility for such a disastrous outcome."*

"... the Argentine Foreign Ministry issued a new statement, signed by Minister Arauz Castex, which added a warning to the Argentine people. As a consequence of this "unilateral rupture of the negotiations that had been maintained or pretended to be maintained for five years", said the statement, attributing probable bad faith to the United Kingdom, "the people of the Republic must be warned that their government, together with the Armed Forces and other organizations that structure the Argentine State, unwaveringly share the latter's zeal for the defence of the dignity and rights of the Nation and of that; they will act without haste, but with all the persistence, prudence and energy that are necessary to achieve justice"." [2730]

January 8th, in London, intelligence reports suggest that an invasion by Argentina remains unlikely.

"... the JIC assessed that a sudden invasion was unlikely, but that there was an increased likelihood of Argentine political and economic action against British interests and that, as the sequence of Argentine measures proceeded, the possibility of military operations must be regarded as that much nearer." [2731]

January 12th, from London. James Callaghan writes to Arauz Castex, referring to the dispute as "*sterile*." [2732]

"Great Britain, ... contrary to the letter and the spirit of Resolution 2065, at the beginning of 1976, insisted upon the right of self-determination of the Malvinas, refused to discuss the problem in-depth and attempted to replace the subject of sovereignty with Argentine-British economic cooperation in the region of the south-western Atlantic." [2733]

In the South Atlantic, as military aircraft overfly the Falklands, Argentina indicates that its Ambassador to London, on leave in Buenos Aires, will not be returning and suggests that Britain's Ambassador be recalled; *"... the Argentine Government have evidently reached the conclusion that they must make a gesture."* [2734]

January 14th, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan makes a statement to Parliament.

> *"Our traditional friendship with Argentina is marred only by issues arising from the Argentine claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, whose inhabitants wish to remain British. Successive British Governments have undertaken to respect their wishes. ... As the House is aware, the Argentine Government have stated that the Argentine ambassador, who returned to Argentina in October, will remain in Buenos Aires until further notice and that, in view of the present state of affairs over the*

2728 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* February 2, 1976 and *Crónica* January 3, 1976.
2729 On January 3, 1833, HMS *Clio* had arrived at Port Louis to eject a trespassing Argentine garrison. Warnings having been given to Buenos Aires in 1829 and 1832. See 1829, 1832 & 1833
2730 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* February 2, 1976 and *Crónica* January 3, 1976.
2731 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*
2732 Dillon 1989
2733 General Juan E. Gugliamelli in *Estarategia* No. 43-44 1977
2734 *FO 7/3208.* There was not, however, a breach in diplomatic relations, just the absence of senior appointees.

Falklands question, it would be advisable for the British Government to withdraw our Ambassador. … I shall shortly be recalling Her Majesty's ambassador for consultations." [2735]

"Mr. Callaghan noted that the HMS Endurance of the Royal Navy was in the vicinity of the archipelago and that two other vessels were ready to proceed there,…" [2736]

"In a press interview the Minister for Foreign Affairs of Argentina said that the decision to request the recall of the United Kingdom Ambassador did not mean a break in diplomatic relations with that country." [2737]

"Staff who remained .., monitored these reports but they concluded that the tenor of press comment was predictable and that the Argentine Government seemed willing to control displays of anti-British sentiment. There had been no threats or demonstrations against the Embassy itself, for example, and no repetition of Cronica's invasion campaign of December 1974." [2738]

January 15th, in Argentina, Arauz Castex is dismissed and replaced as Foreign Minister by Raúl Quijano.

"The withdrawal of Ambassadors, which had a favourable response in nationalist sectors, cost Arauz Castex his position…" [2739]

In London, on the same day, members of Britain's Foreign Office discuss the possibility that the prospect of oil exploration may sway the attitudes of the Islanders towards Argentina; *"Some in the FCO saw oil primarily – in the words of one official – as 'a lever to cajole the Islanders into accepting that there could be … benefit from closer relations with Argentina'. …"* [2740]

January 16th, in Rio de Janeiro, at a regular meeting of the Inter-American Juridical Committee of the Organisation of American State (OAS) the presence of oil reserves near the Falklands is considered.

"On 16 January 1976, the OAS Inter-American Juridical Committee stated that exploring the potential of energy resources on the Malvinas islands was a threat to hemispheric security and, at Rio de Janeiro, it declared that Argentina had unobjectionable sovereignty rights over the Malvinas archipelago." [2741]

January 17th, in Buenos Aires, British Ambassador Ashe presents a diplomatic *Note* to Foreign Minister Quijano to inform the Argentine Government of his recall to the UK. Ashe refers to the Falklands sovereignty dispute as "*unproductive*".

January 19th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Ashe returns to London, leaving *charge d'affaires* John Shakespeare as the senior position at the Embassy.

At Port Stanley, following on from that of November 1975, a new *Statutory Instrument* further delays elections for the Legislative Council of the Falkland Islands, until February, 1976. [2742]

January 20th, in London, *The Times* newspaper suggests that the Falkland Islanders are merely 'pawns'. [2743]

2735 *HC Deb 14 January 1976 vol.903 cc391*
2736 *Permanent Representative of Argentina to the Chairman of the Special Committee on Decolonization May 6th 1976*
2737 *UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4.*
2738 Dillon 1989
2739 Carassai 2022
2740 Livingstone 2018 citing *Heap to Hall January 15, 1976 FCO 7/3234*
2741 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
2742 *The Falkland Islands (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order 1976 (no.52)*. A further delay in the hope that the Islands' new Constitution would be approved. Not approved until 1977. *cf.* February 27, 1976 below.
2743 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islanders may be no more than pawns in a game Britain does not want to win* Michael Frenchman January 20, 1976 p.12

January 23rd, a Foreign Office official complains about the UKFIC's effectiveness in Parliament; *"... their ability to manipulate a dedicated and vocal parliamentary lobby could limit severely HMG's room for manoeuvre."* [2744]

January 27th, the US *charge d'affaires* in London, has a meeting with Parliamentary Under-Secretary Ted Rowlands; *"The Shackleton Commission to Port Stanley was devised to reinforce Falkland-Argentine cooperation by demonstrating that economic development for the archipelago could only be found in closer ties with the mainland. Yet, Rowlands laments, the Argentines have chosen to misinterpret HMG's intentions despite numerous assurances."* [2745]

February 4th, in the South Atlantic, an Argentine destroyer, *Almirante Storni* (Capt. Ramón Arosa), attempts to stop and *'arrest'* the unarmed RRS *Shackleton*. The British ship is 78 miles south of Stanley and some 450 miles east of the Argentine coast. Capt. Arosa instructs the British vessel to steer for Ushuaia. From the RRS *Shackleton*, Capt. Philip Warne radios the Governor in Stanley before responding to Arosa; *"We are not in Argentine waters; we are more than 200 miles from the Argentine mainland and the British Government does not recognise these as Argentine waters. I have no intention of stopping."*

Shots are fired across *Shackleton's* bows; an action observed by helicopters from HMS *Endurance*.

"... an instruction was given for the vessel Shackleton to be intercepted for the purpose of inspecting the vessel. On 4 February the Argentine naval destroyer Almirante Storni approached the Shackleton and told it to stop its engines and to permit boarding for inspection, as is customary in these cases. The captain of the United Kingdom ship continued his course, disregarding the instruction and thus endangering the lives of the crew and the safety of the ship. In accordance with existing rules, warning shots were fired from small arms, but, in the knowledge that the United Kingdom vessel was carrying explosives and in order to exercise maximum prudence, the commander of the Argentine vessel was instructed not to use force., as would have been appropriate in the circumstances. The reckless and provocative attitude of the British captain is clearly indicative of the intention to conceal the activities in which the Shackleton had been engaged." [2746]

"In the first few days of February 1976, an Argentine Navy ship fired warning shots at RRS Shackleton which had refused to be boarded and inspected. This incident occurred 87 miles from the coast of East Falkland and was a clear sign that Buenos Aires was demonstrating that the waters around the archipelago were Argentine." [2747]

"... to fire five shots at an unarmed research ship, and to threaten to fire to hit it, cannot be said to be part of a "peaceful solution" as required under Resolution 2065 – Argentina was treating Resolution 2065 as void." [2748]

"On the continent, the Navy congratulated the captain of the Storni and the Chamber of Deputies, at the same time, sent the Navy "its most energetic congratulations"." [2749]

Throughout the time it takes to sail to Stanley, RSS *Shackleton* is continually harassed by the *Almirante Storni* and by Argentine aircraft. One of these, a *Neptune*, flies at mast height above the British vessel.

"The British captain, under orders radioed by the Malvinas governor, Neville French, given on the radio, did not come to a halt and refused to receive a group of inspectors on board, or to continue sailing up to Ushuaia

2744 *Hall to Carless January 23, 1976 FCO 7/3232*
2745 Elgood 2025 citing *1976London01376_b* Wikileaks
2746 *Permanent Representative of Argentina to the Secretary-General of the United Nations February 23rd 1976*
2747 *The British Political Parties & the Falklands War* Domenico M. Bruni 2018
2748 Pascoe 2020 p.316
2749 Carassai 2022

guided by the Storni. In order to pressure further, the Argentine destroyer actions were supported by an SP-2H Neptune aircraft, while the Storni was firing at the Shackleton bow, which continued towards Port Stanley." [2750]

Almirante Storni only breaks away some six miles from the archipelago. [2751]

"London's intelligence sources later confirmed that the plan to intercept the vessel had been in existence for about six weeks prior to the incident, and that the action had been inspired by the armed forces rather than the Argentine Government. The JIC concluded, nevertheless, that Argentina's military commanders were opposed to military invasion and that a policy of 'continued pin-pricks' rather than a precipitated attack was likely." [2752]

"On 4 February 1976, the oceanographic vessel RRS Shackleton was intercepted on the high seas by the Argentine Navy destroyer Almirante Storni. This ***unjustifiable*** *action by the Argentine warship was a serious obstacle for the rapprochement policy. The British vessel just refused to stop and continued sailing and the Argentine ship did not take any punitive actions. When they arrived at Stanley and the news was disseminated, Argentina's opponents found the argument they needed to express themselves against (our) country."* [2753]

In Buenos Aires, with Ambassador Ashe now in London, *charge d'affairs* John Shakespeare receives instructions to register a formal protest. Before he can leave the Embassy, Shakespeare receives a summons to attend Argentina's Foreign Ministry to see the new Foreign Minister, Raul Quijano; *"I had not been with him more than thirty seconds before I realised that he in fact had summoned me to hand over an Argentine protest."* [2754]

"When the charge d'affaires sought an explanation in Buenos Aires, he discovered that the new Foreign Minister Raul Quijano had pre-empted his visit... Quijano blamed the British government for the incident..." [2755]

Shakespeare tells Quijano that the British Government; *"... took the gravest view of the incident which, in other times, might well have been regarded as an act of war."*

In London, Argentina's *chargé d'affairs* is also summoned to the Foreign Office to receive a copy of Britain's protest. The *chargé,* Rafael Gowland, claims that the incident took place within Argentine waters.

February 5th, in Britain's House of Commons, the incident is reported to MPs by Edward Rowlands.

> "*The incident took place 78 miles south of Cape Pembroke as "Shackleton" was returning from a period of scientific work in the South-West Atlantic under an international programme. On learning of the incident, my right hon. Friend immediately instructed the chargé d'affaires at Buenos Aires to deliver the strongest protest to the Argentine Government and to request that the Argentine destroyer immediately be ordered to stop harassing the "Shackleton".*
>
> *I also protested to the Argentine chargé here in equally vigorous terms. The Argentine Government have been left in no doubt of the serious view we take of this incident."* [2756]

2750 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

2751 Beck 1987. Anecdotal accounts have it that the two vessels came close enough together for the British sailors to respond by throwing turnips and potatoes at *Almirante Storni*.

2752 Dillon 1989. The same policy that Argentina had employed in the 1930s when the term '*pin-pricks*' was first used.. JIC = Joint Intelligence Committee

2753 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023 My emphasis. Little love lost between Argentina's Air Force and its Navy.

2754 Shakespeare quoted in Donaghy 2014

2755 Donaghy 2014

2756 *HC Deb 05 February 1976 vol.904 cc1414-7*

In Buenos Aires, Argentina responds to the UK's protest with a formal *note verbale.* [2757]

> *"The Ministry of Foreign Affairs ... has the honour to refer to the activities of the British ship Shackleton in maritime areas under the jurisdiction of the Argentine Republic. The Argentine Government is aware of the fact that the said ship has been engaged in scientific research activities geophysical and geological surveys – on the Argentine continental shelf, without having complied with the prior requirements of Argentine legislation on the matter, which is in conformity with existing international law. In view of these activities an Argentine naval vessel told it to stop, with a view to exercising the right to inspect and board. This order was disregarded by the British vessel, which thus incurred another violation of the pertinent law. ... The situation is all the more serious in that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship had already reminded the Embassy, in its note of 14 November 1975, that if the planned research activities were to be conducted, the requirements of Argentine law must be respected, which was not done. In view of the foregoing, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Worship lodges the most formal and vigorous protest of the Argentine Government and demands, without prejudice to the continued exercise of the rights on which it is relying, that the British Government take measures to punish those responsible and to prevent the recurrence of such acts."* [2758]

In London, Britain's Defence Secretary agrees "*reluctantly*" to keep *Endurance* in service for another year. [2759]

"Every year from 1975 onwards the Defence Ministry announced that they wished to withdraw her (Endurance) from service. Every year, I replied in the same manner, namely that their proposal would have serious consequences for our policy of sustaining the (Falkland) Islands, and I would consent only if she were replaced by a ship of similar or improved capabilities." [2760]

February 6th, the UK writes to the President of the United Nations Security Council complaining of; *"... an unlawful, and dangerous action by a warship of the Republic of Argentina against the Royal Research Ship Shackleton peacefully in passage on the high seas ... engaged in scientific research connected with the theories of the continental drift and was a British contribution to the International Geo-dynamics Project."* The letter contains a demand that Argentina *"... refrain from further harassment on the high seas of peaceful vessels in contravention of recognized international law, and reserved the right to request at a later stage appropriate action by the Security Council on this matter."*

In Buenos Aires, newspaper *La Nacion* reports; *"In spite of a request by the Command of Naval Operations, the Navy was not allowed to take more drastic action."*

"In the short term the incident prompted not only the precautionary deployment of a British frigate to the area and a reprieve for HMS Endurance (whose presence in the region was threatened by the 1974 Defence Review) but also the resumption of more meaningful negotiations on sovereignty." [2761]

February 9th, on completing their mission, the Shackleton team return to the UK.

2757 A diplomatic communication drafted in the third person and unsigned. This is more formal than an *aide-memoire* but less formal than a *note*.

2758 *UN Doc A3125/Rev.1 vol.4 Appendix II*. It is actually the South American Continental Shelf and international law did not (and does not) recognise Argentina's outlandish claims regarding that platform.

2759 As ever, Britain's defence budget was under scrutiny. Despite there being little enthusiasm within the MOD for keeping a force in the South Atlantic, the deployment of a support vessel of the Royal Fleet Auxiliary was also approved.

2760 James Callaghan quoted in *Britain's 1981 Defence Review* 1992 citing Callaghan 1987 p.375

2761 Beck 1987

February 10th, in New York, Argentina also complains to the UN Security Council of a; *"... serious violation of the legislation concerning Argentine maritime jurisdiction committed by the United Kingdom vessel Shackleton in consequence of the scientific-geophysical and geological research activities undertaken by that vessel on the Argentine continental shelf which were clearly directed towards geological surveying, with a view to the exploitation of hydrocarbons, if found."*

February 11th, from London, Edward 'Ted' Rowlands flies into the USA with instructions to inform Minister Quijano, and the UN, that the British are fully prepared to defend the Islands with force if necessary.

"In February 1976 the chiefs of staff produced a paper on military options. It was the first of four such papers. According to the report all were similar in scope and the language used was substantially the same. Having noted the limitations of the airstrip at Port Stanley and other difficulties, the 1976 paper continued, it would not be practicable to provide, transport and support the force necessary in the Islands to ensure that a determined Argentine attempt to eject the British garrison was unsuccessful." [2762]

"At their rendezvous on 11 February, Quijano assured Rowlands that British ships would not be harassed 'provided they took no survey work in the critical area'.... Quijano wanted to return the dialogue along the lines of earlier formulas. Yet he did not suggest any particular proposal... Quijano was open to the idea of returning the ambassadors once a basis for resuming talks had been reached." [2763]

"On 11 February Ted Rowlands,.. held talks with the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York. He was instructed to ascertain Argentina's views on future sovereignty discussions and restate that the Islands would be defended. ... Ted Rowlands commented eleven years later that the Government had, "... no clear goal... [we] had to feel our way."..." [2764]

In Port Stanley, Vice-Commodore Bloomer Reeves is replaced by Vice-Commodore Rodolfo Abel Carnelli. [2765]

"At the beginning, thirty young people made use of the study scholarships. In the end, the FIC's speeches convinced them that accepting said scholarships amounted to treason. As a result, only a few students received education in Argentina. Another sign of dislike was observed when they left a considerable amount of empty beer cans at Carnelli's doorstep or when the Vicecomodoro noticed that if he ran into a neighbor, he would greet him politely, but if said neighbor was accompanied by someone from the FIC, he would ignore him and even deny him a greeting." [2766]

February 17th, in Buenos Aires, newspaper, *La Nacion,* reports that the British Government, in a *quid pro quo*, has promised that RRS *Shackleton* will not operate in Argentine waters. A report immediately denied by Rowlands.

Argentina writes to the UN's Special Committee on Decolonisation disputing the UK's interpretation of UN General Assembly resolutions.

> *"In presenting its case, the United Kingdom ... persists in citing resolution 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII) in such a way as to suggest that the question of the Malvinas is one involving self-determination. Both of these resolutions clearly refer to the "interests" of the population of the islands and not to its "wishes". When it is considered that Argentina was deprived of the islands by an illegitimate act of force, it becomes clear that the governing principle here is that of territorial*

2762 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*
2763 Donaghy 2014
2764 Ellerby 1990 p.212 citing *Rowlands interview with Charlton, The Little Platoon (BBC Radio 3),* broadcast on 3.5.87
2765 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
2766 *Ibid.*

integrity … to take any other view would mean accepting this act of force, which also entailed the expulsion of the indigenous Argentine population and its replacement by subjects of the colonial Power." [2767]

February 19th, in the UK, the Chiefs of Staff inform the government that it is not feasible to establish and maintain a garrison capable of repulsing a determined Argentine attack on the archipelago. [2768]

In Stanley, Legislative Council elections are again delayed.

February 22nd, the Falkland Islands Local Committee write to MPs to complain that they are being made reliant upon Argentina against their will. Also that; *"There is no independent radio station or daily newspaper in the Falkland Islands to carry current information on events between Britain and Argentina. We have to rely solely on what is issued by the Governor of the Falkland Islands in radio communiqués. This lack of information results in what is often taken to be apathy and complacency on the part of the Islanders. This is totally a wrong impression in every way. Why should the people of the Falkland Islands be continually forced into a liaison with Argentina whose culture and way of life is so totally alien from that in the colony?"* [2769]

February 27th, in the Falklands, it is announced that approval of the new draft-constitution has been delayed.

"What was not announced and yet what would probably not have been very surprising was the reason for the delay; it being that the new Constitution was not acceptable to a foreign country who want a bigger say in our affairs - Argentina. Apparently some Councillors (elected ones)wanted His Excellency to tell us why the new Constitution had not been approved by the British Government - and this he was not prepared to do. Had he broadcast the truth on our own radio station it would have caused noises in Buencs Aires and this our Masters would not like.

The report of the Select Committee on the Constitution was submitted to Her Majesty's Govt., some time ago and there has been ample time in which to make the necessary amendments before the next General Election. It seems that the approval was stalled last December when the British Ambassador in Bogota gave a press conference in which he happened to mention that the Falkland Islands was soon to have a new Constitution. Argentina saw this change in our Constitution as a deliberate attempt to forge closer links between ourselves and the Motherland which of course our 'neighbours' do not want. They hastily made it known that such a move would cause further deterioration in Anglo-Argentine relations - the result being that the British Government have not recommended approval of our new Constitution to the Privy Council.

As a result of this fiasco we are obliged to hold a General Election (the date of which has now been set for I7th - 2Ist May) under the existing Constitution which means that out of the nine members of the Legislature (including the Governor who is President) only four will be elected by the populace - the other four members being the Chief Secretary the Financial Secretary and two nominated by the Governor. Had the new Constitution been approved we would have still had a Legislative Council of nine but six of the members would have been Elected Members." [2770]

2767 *A/AC.109/520.* Those settlers to be found on East Falkland (Soledad) Island in 1833 were from France, Germany, Britain, Uruguay and the Argentine Confederation. They were certainly not '*indigenous*.' Nor were the members of the garrison from Buenos Aires in 1832, the only '*population*' to be told to leave. *cf.* 1833

2768 Ellerby 1990 p.212

2769 Quoted in Elgood 2025 citing *UKFIC82 Appendix*

2770 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 11, 1976 p.1

"My Lords, we are anxious not to postpone the implementation of these changes, which have been asked for by the Falkland Islanders, for longer than is necessary. The noble Lord will, of course, recall that there will be a General Election in the Falkland Islands in May, and it seems to us appropriate that these changes should then be the subject of discussion and confirmation by the popular vote. Secondly, my noble friend Lord Shackleton has rendered very great service to the Islands by visiting them and reporting back on certain economic possibilities to help the islanders. These recommendations are now expected fairly soon. They may require further constitutional changes for their implementation. For those two reasons, it therefore seems that we should postpone the implementation, at least for the next few months." [2771]

March 3rd, at the United Nations, and responding to Argentina's February letter, the UK tells the Special Committee on Decolonization that it does; *"... not accept that resolutions 2065 and 3160 entail a commitment ... to transfer sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. ... (and) they cannot agree to any settlement of those differences which is not in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders..."* [2772]

> *"It may also be helpful (to) comment on the incident in 1833, ... when British sovereignty was confirmed. In January 1833, a British naval vessel peaceably reasserted British sovereignty, which was first established in 1765. ...*
>
> *It is a demonstrable fact that since 1833, that is to say for nearly a century-and-a-half, a period which, coincides very closely with the period during which the nation States of Latin America have been able to assert their own right to self-determination, the United Kingdom has maintained an open, continuous, effective and peaceful possession of the Falkland Islands."* [2773]

March 4th, in London, Foreign Secretary Callaghan, after speaking to Lord Shackleton, suggests that the runway on East Falkland Island be extended. Reg Prentice, the Minister for Overseas Development, from whose budget the costs are likely to come, is less than enthusiastic.

"Shackleton pointed out privately that a longer runway would make rapid troop deployment possible in the event of a threatened invasion from the mainland." [2774]

During the first two weeks of **March**, judges from the International Court of Justice (ICJ) visit the disputed Beagle Channel Islands as part of the arbitration process commenced in 1971 between Argentina and Chile. [2775]

"Chile presented evidence from maps including the 1882 Latzina map, which showed the PNL group (and incidently the Falklands too) as being outside Argentina, and pointed out that these maps only later began to show the islands as Argentinian." [2776]

March 10th, in London, following a review of policy initiated by Foreign Secretary James Callaghan, Britain's Cabinet approves proposals for fresh dialogue with Argentina on all aspects of the dispute.

To include the possibility of Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation in the South West Atlantic, and "*the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship."* [2777]

2771 Lord Goronwy-Roberts (on behalf of the UK Government) in the House of Lords March 17, 1976. Hansard vol.369

2772 Quoted in *UN Yearbook 1976*

2773 *Ibid.* English involvement in the Falkland Islands actually went back to 1592, when they were first sighted, and 1594 when they were first claimed. Argentina was not recognised as existing by any British government before 1823. *cf.* 2012

2774 Hastings & Jenkins 1997

2775 Set up under the auspices of the British Crown as a result of a treaty in 1902, the arbitration panel of five ICJ judges was tasked to decide sovereignty over the Beagle Channel Islands, *aka* the PNL Group (Picton, Nueva and Lennox). See February, 1977

2776 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.594.

2777 Franks Committee 1983 para.48

"Any agreement we reach eventually with the Argentines will still be subject to the islanders' concurrence..." [2778]

"... the then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary was given a mandate to send a personal message to the Argentine Foreign Minister proposing that the two governments should start a fresh dialogue..." [2779]

"The closest Argentina has yet come to military action against the Falklands was in the months before the 1976 coup, ie at a time when the Government of the day were anxious to divert attention from internal problems. The heat was only taken out of the Falklands dispute in 1976 when HMG showed a willingness to negotiate."[2780]

"As the Cabinet prepared to launch a fresh initiative to discuss the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands with Argentina in March 1976, the FCO's speaking notes for Foreign Secretary James Callaghan warned that if Britain did not start serious negotiations, Argentina might attack the Islands or 'a lesser but still harmful option open to the Argentines would be to terminate... valuable contracts for the equipment of their navy and merchant marine'. The rather strange logic was that the Argentine military posed a threat to the Falkland Islands; therefore talks should be pursued which would then enable Britain to sell more military equipment to Argentina." [2781]

"At this time the UKFIC received an off-the-record opinion by an FCO Department head: "The collective opinion inside the Foreign Office was that it was too late and that nothing could save the Falkland Islands. Secondly that the British Government would resist a takeover of Gibraltar because Gibraltar had a value as a naval base and because there was still distrust of Spain. The Falkland Islands were of no comparable value to the British and had only a few hundred inhabitants. It was said that the Foreign Office was not going to let the Falkland Islands stand in the way of good relations with Argentina and that the Falkland Islands had had it."[2782]

At the Falklands, on the same day, LADE announce price increases on its flights to and from Comodoro Rivadavia on the mainland.

"To many people in the Islands tonight's Broadcast Announcement from L.A.D.E. in which they referred to the F27 service as an 'internal' flight, must have been yet another irritating and provocative statement in the great Malvinas Saga. What may have escaped their notice is the amazing way in which our 'friendly neighbours' are trying to influence our choice of sovereignty. Whilst the flight, to the Argentinians is 'internal' we may not pay for the service in pesos nor indeed at the same price! For, although the cost of a ticket to Buenos Aires from here now costs £100.10 (an increase of nearly 100%) and which must be paid in sterling, the same journey paid for in pesos in Argentina costs under 6,000 pesos or, at our exchange rate approximately £10. Now that's what I call neighbourly!" [2783]

March 16th, Britain's Prime Minister, Harold Wilson, announces his resignation.[2784]

2778 Callaghan *memorandum* quoted in *FO 7/3198*

2779 Hugh Carless *memorandum* in *FO 7/3201* at *304a*

2780 *ALW 0420/325/1 (FCO 07-3801)* entitled *UK/Argentina dispute over the Falkland Islands – Policy 1980*

2781 Livingstone 2018 citing *Speaking Notes for Secretary of State OPD(76)14: The Falkland Islands: Future Policy March 10, 1976 FCO 7/3198*

2782 Elgood 2025 citing *UKFIC82* para.196

2783 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 11, 1976 p.2

2784 Something of a sensation at the time as the announcement was unexpected, although Wilson had warned the Queen of his intention some three months before. Many conspiracy theories followed, but after 13 years as Labour leader and nearly eight years as PM, it would seem that he'd simply had enough.

March 23rd, Argentina is informed of the willingness of the British government to enter into new talks, although it is made clear that discussions are to be on a '*without prejudice*' basis. Also that - "*at the appropriate stage*" - the British delegation will include Islander representation; *"Leaseback was not mentioned, I may say, at any time to the Argentines, even though I was prepared to consider it..."* [2785]

On the same day, the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* of *1966* (CCPR) enters into force. [2786]

> *"Article 1 –*
>
> *1. All peoples have the right of self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development.*
>
> *2. All peoples may, for their own ends, freely dispose of their natural wealth and resources without prejudice to any obligations arising out of international economic co-operation, based upon the principle of mutual benefit, and international law. In no case may a people be deprived of its own means of subsistence.*
>
> *3. The States Parties to the present Covenant, including those having responsibility for the administration of Non-Self-Governing and Trust Territories, shall promote the realization of the right of self-determination, and shall respect that right, in conformity with the provisions of the Charter.*
> *..."* [2787]

"Self-determination was thereby confirmed as a right of all peoples including those of non-self governing territories, and it became an obligation on states responsible for such territories to promote "the realization of the right of self-determination" for the peoples living in them. ... Thus Britain is obliged to promote external self-determination for the Falkland Islanders. To hand the islands to Argentina would be a breach of that obligation..." [2788]

March 24th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's President, Isabella Perón, is ousted in a military coup. [2789]

"The Argentines have long held that they have only two possible policies: negotiation or invasion. We believe that invasion was spoken of, though not prepared for, during the last confused weeks of Isabel Perón's administration." [2790]

A military junta[2791] consisting of General Jorge Rafael Videla (army), Brigadier-General Orlando Agosti (air force) and Admiral Emilio Massera (navy), take command of the country. Videla takes the position of President with Admiral César Guzzetti as Foreign Minister.

2785 Callaghan interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.53. Elgood (2025) dates this to March 20th.

2786 The commencement of the International Covenant needs to be recognised for the effect it had on Britain's thinking regarding the Falkland Islands, and indeed, all of its old colonies. Before 1976, UK governments had tended to consider self-determination as a principle rather than a right held by the peoples of Britain's territories. After the Covenant was ratified by the UK (see May 20, below), Britain's administration had little choice but to acknowledge self-determination as a human right; specifically held by those Non-Self Governing Territories listed at the United Nations. Compliance with the CCPR is monitored by the United Nations Human Rights Committee. See December 16, 1966 & May 20, 1976.

2787 The UK ratified the Covenant on May 20, 1976 (below).

2788 Pascoe 2020 p.312

2789 The sixth coup in Argentina in seventy-five years – 1930, 1943, 1955, 1962 and 1966. Isabella Perón was held, either in detention centres or, finally, under house arrest, until July 9, 1981, when she went into exile in Spain.

2790 Hugh Carless *memorandum* in *FO 7/3201* at *304a*

2791 The term means 'meeting/committee or board' and originated in the national and local groups organised during Spain's resistance to Napoleon's invasion of the Iberian Peninsula in 1808.

"The three commanders of Argentina's armed forces took office as a governing junta today 10 hours after overthrowing and arresting President Isabel Martinez de Perón. The long-awaited military takeover, meticulously planned, was swift and smooth when it came after midnight. The only resistance came in a brief shooting incident at a union headquarters. Numerous Peronist union leaders and political figures were being arrested, both here and in Cordoba, Argentina's second largest city. Martial law was proclaimed and communiques were broadcast threatening terrorists and saboteurs with death. Troops and tanks guarded public buildings, banks and transport services. …

A proclamation was issued saying that the armed forces had taken power "to restore the essential values" of the nation, eradicate left-wing subversion, promote economic development and "assure subsequently the establishment of a republican, representative and federal democracy". The Argentine economy is in serious difficulties. Inflation raised prices 335 percent last year, and $1 billion in foreign debts must be met by May. … The United States today recognized the new military Government in Argentina..." [2792]

"... a ruthless dictatorship with a narrow-minded, nationalistic, anti-democratic, anti-socialist, "statist" ideology similar to that of the Fascist regime in Italy under Mussolini, except that whereas Mussolini's dictatorship was essentially secular, the Argentine junta professed an ultra-conservative hardline Roman Catholicism. It was not long before people began to die in large numbers, as the regime stepped up the so-called "Dirty War" ("La Guerra Sucia") against "subversion"." [2793]

"Admiral Massera arranged for the navy's control of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to continue." [2794]

Admiral Massera immediately proposes an invasion of the Falkland Islands – *Plan Goa*. Requiring a surprise landing on the archipelago; the removal of the existing population to Montevideo and the introduction of Argentine settlers which would; *"... neatly reverse the 1833 action and forestall any wrangling about the status of the islanders under Argentine rule."* [2795] Concerns are expressed regarding Britain's submarine force, and Massera's plan is not adopted by the junta.

March 26th, Britain formally recognises the new Argentine government.

"The day before (sic) the military took power, the British Government had given a message to the Argentine foreign minister offering secret talks on the Falklands. The Foreign Office's top priority, therefore, on hearing of Isabel Peron's overthrow, was to recognise the regime 'as soon as practicable' in order to ensure that Argentina's new military leaders did not make Britain's secret communication public." [2796]

April 5th, in Britain, James Callaghan becomes Labour Party leader and Prime Minister. Anthony Crosland is appointed Foreign Secretary; *"Prime Minister Callaghan decided to undertake a major policy review. He suggested a fresh dialogue with Argentina on all aspects of the dispute, including possible economic cooperation and "the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship"..."* [2797]

Speaking in Parliament, Viscount Boyd refers to the rights of the Islanders; quoting a Canadian newspaper.

2792 *The New York Times* March 25, 1976

2793 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.587. During the lifetime of this regime, 1976-1983, it is estimated that up to 30,000 people may have "*disappeared*". Not all of them Argentines.

2794 Elgood 2025

2795 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.39

2796 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to Lamour March 26, 1976 FCO 7/3027.* See March 23, 1976 above.

2797 *Peaceful Territorial Change* Arie Marcelo Kacowiz 1994 p.155

"*Somewhere in the Third World there must be hidden away the secret rules about who is entitled to self-determination. One suspects that they consist of just one rule and one exception. The rule seems to be that any colonial territory, however minuscule, is not only entitled to independence but obliged to demand it. The exception simply states that European populated territories are different.*" [2798]

On the same day, representations are made via the Foreign Office in London, and the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, with regard to the large increase in the costs of air travel on the Stanley-Comodoro Rivadavia route. [2799]

In Argentina, the military junta introduce a compulsory course on geopolitics in secondary schools. Designed to teach students about; *'Argentine National Sovereignty'*. [2800]

"... Argentines argue that their country was the rightful heir to the entire Viceroyalty and that all those countries that were once a part of the Viceroyalty and which are now independent states – Bolivia, Paraguay and Uruguay – must be computed as territorial losses. This is a deeply entrenched perception in Argentine culture, ... The perception of huge territorial losses makes the Argentines extremely sensitive to territorial disputes. Insignificant controversies, ... acquire a disproportionate importance..." [2801]

April 12th, in London, the Foreign Office proposes that Britain's Ambassador return to Buenos Aires; *"The new government has made a most promising start and hardly put a foot wrong during its first month in power."*[2802]

"The Foreign Office had suggested reinstating a British ambassador to Argentina less than a month after the March 1976 coup, but Labour minister Ted Rowlands wanted to wait to see how talks on the Falklands progressed." [2803]

April 29th, from Buenos Aires, Argentina's new Foreign Minister, Admiral César Guzzetti, responds to Britain's message of March 23rd.

"Unlike his predecessor, Guzzetti sought clarification on the phrase about the future relationship between the Falklands and Argentina. He also ruled out the return of ambassadors until a basis for a new dialogue had been reached. Guzzetti did not object to islanders participating as part of a British delegation in talks over economic cooperation. However, this did not extend ... (to) sovereignty." [2804]

In London, Lord Shackleton submits his 400-page report to the Government – *Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands*. [2805]

"*To guide the reader through what is a lengthy report, the following remarks may be of assistance. Volume One contains an introduction by the Chairman and under various chapter headings: a. an analysis of the overall economy of the Falkland Islands; b. description of the resources of the Islands and their surrounding waters; c. an assessment of their development potential, pointing out opportunities, constraints and the impact of any development.*

2798 *Falkland Islanders cling to Britain* in the *Alberta* newspaper. *HL Deb 20 April 1977 vol.382 cc222-66*
2799 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* April 15, 1976.
2800 Dodds 2002 p.161
2801 *Argentine Territorial Nationalism* Carlos Escude 1988 in *Journal of Latin American Studies* 1988 (May 1988, vol.20. no.1 pp.139-165
2802 *Shakespeare to FCO April 24, 1976 FCO 7/3034* quoted in Livingstone 2018. *Charge d'affaires* Shakespeare was Britain's most senior official at the Buenos Aires Embassy at that time.
2803 Livingstone 2018 p.152 citing *Carless to Larmour April 12, 1976 FCO 7/3029*
2804 Donaghy 2014
2805 Published July 20, 1976. A copy of *Volume 1 Resources and Development Potential* (361 pages) can be found here - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2023/07/shackleton-report-1976-vol-1.pdf

Volume Two begins by summarising the findings of Volume One, then goes on to discuss and propose a development strategy, and finally presents recommendations for a policy and programme of economic development, together with the financial implications and implementation arrangements which we judge to be necessary for them to be carried out." [2806]

Unexpectedly, Shackleton's report reveals that, contrary to previous assertions by the Foreign Office, the Islands are not only self-supporting but making a profit for the Exchequer.

"I would now like to point briefly to one or two important conclusions that emerged from our Survey. The Falkland Islands economy has suffered historically from a lack of local investment and a continual flow of private funds out of the Islands to the United Kingdom. The transfer of company funds alone over the last twenty years has amounted to over £5 million in current prices. A result of this has been that the UK Exchequer has substantially benefited from tax, on both the profits and private dividends remitted to the UK. It is against this economic background, as well as the evaluation of the resource potential of the Islands, that we have put forward recommendations for a development programme which will call for certain UK expenditure, capital and recurrent, over the next five years (see Chapter 20). The major item is the extension of the runway of the new airfield, without which any substantial new development would, in our judgement, be greatly handicapped." [2807]

Shackleton estimates that UK based companies have made a £4 million *'profit'* between 1950 and 1970, even after defence costs, subsidies and grants had been taken into account. Shackleton is critical of the powers that the 'Falkland Islands Company' (FIC) has to make decisions affecting the lives of the Islanders, noting that between 1951 and 1974 absentee landowners had taken out £11.5 million more in profit than they had invested. [2808] Most controversially, Lord Shackleton recommends public investment projects totalling £13 million, in addition to the cost of the proposed runway extension. [2809]

"The main points of the Shackleton report, which was produced in collaboration with The Economist Intelligence Unit and was published on July 20, 1976 ... pointed principally to the fact that there had been a flow of resources out of the Falklands and a decline in the population, especially a drop in the proportion of native-born to overseas-born inhabitants, and devoted a section to fishing and oil policy." [2810]

"A lot of the report was about the tremendous opportunities and enormous potential for development... our particular appreciation of the Shackleton Report,.. was that it would be just frankly physically, politically, militarily impossible to adopt. It was a grand scale concept of development without any form of negotiated settlement on the other issues." [2811]

"As the Shackleton Report showed, Britain exploited the Falklands for decades and made a handsome profit out of them, while at the same time strangling their growth and increasing the hardship of the Falkland Islanders. For over a century British officials filled the important executive positions and treated the Falklands like any other colonial territory in the British Empire, discriminating against the native-born islanders and keeping them out of participation in decision making." [2812]

2806 *Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands* vol.1 p.i. Sadly, *Volume 2 Strategy, Recommendations and Implementation* (108 pages) is not available in a digitised format.

2807 *Ibid.* vol.1 p.iv

2808 The FIC's response can be found here - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2023/07/fic-on-the-shackleton-survey-1976.pdf

2809 The runway extension, was the only sentence in the entire report that Shackleton underlined.

2810 *Keesings Contemporary Archives* June 24, 1977 p.28406

2811 Minister Ted Rowlands interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.48

2812 Pascoe 2020 p.296

"Shackleton later informed a friend that his positive recommendations had been greeted with surprise by the Prime Minister, James Callaghan … and with no little concern by the FCO." [2813]

May 7th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's *charge d'affairs,* Shakespeare, considers Shackleton's conclusions.

> *"It will be highly unpalatable… It will hardly escape their notice that the whole thrust of the report's recommendations is in the direction of greater self-sufficiency for the Falkland Islands and thus greater independence from Argentina – the opposite, in fact, of what Argentina and, paradoxically, HMG have been trying to achieve…"* [2814]

"*Argentina wallows in a legalistic and declarative policy on the South Atlantic, ill-designed to profit from the crucial point made by Lord Shackleton that the Falkland Islands were neither economically nor demographically feasible unless they integrated with Argentina."* [2815]

May 20th, the United Kingdom ratifies the *International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (1966). Under the act of ratification, the terms of the ICCPR are extended to Britain's Overseas Territories – including the Falkland Islands. However, Argentina declines to ratify the Covenant as it objects to the emphasis on the right of self-determination. [2816]

From Buenos Aires, Argentina imposes customs charges on goods entering the Falkland Islands.

"From time to time we in the Falklands are subjected to bullying tactics from our 'neighbours' control of external travel in the form of the infamous 'white card' and the dictating of the air fares for the service they operate the prevention of the Shackleton Team to travel here by air and the act of aggression on the RRS Shackleton. The latest one is the imposition of a 'customs charge' on a 1 kg package consigned from England that arrived: last Thursday May 20th.The package contained veterinary vaccine and when the consignee went to collect it from the LADE office they were told that there was a charge of approx £14 in respect of Argentine customs charges as it was deemed necessary to inspect it in Comodoro Rivadavia to make sure that it did not contain prohibited drugs. To add insult to injury it was quite obvious that the Package had not been opened en route, only the address altered from Falkland Islands to Islas Malvinas. The cost of the customs 'inspection' was about 1,600 pesos which in Argentina would amount to approx £4 at the official rate - but then of course not being Argentine we are expected to use the strange, unexplained and 'special' rate of about 98 pesos to the £." [2817]

May 21st, in the Falklands, elections are finally held for seats on the Legislative Council.

"The final results of our General Elections held under the old Constitution were announced last Friday evening … Fortunately the system by which the Governor nominates two members to the Legislative Council will be abolished under the new Constitution." [2818]

"The May 1976 elections were held with the old constitution, which accentuated island discontent, especially when the rumour emerged that the cause of the delay was opposition in Buenos Aires. The colonial authorities

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2813 Elgood 2025

2814 *Shakespeare to Crosland* May 7, 1976 in *FO 7/3226*

2815 *Macri's victory – the first election won by the establishment: Argentina now to be managed by its proprietors* Guillermo Makin 2015. Not what Lord Shackleton said. Shackleton's conclusions remain misunderstood in Argentina to this day.

2816 Argentina eventually ratified the covenant on August 8, 1986

2817 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* May 25, 1976.

2818 *Ibid*.

had changed: Lewis had been replaced by Neville Arthur Irwin French, the new governor, and Lyng by Arthur Monk, the new chief secretary. According to The Falkland Islands Times, French was asked about that rumour but did not respond." [2819]

May 24th, in London, at the Foreign Office, a policy paper is drawn up by Hugh Carless on Britain's relations with the new regime in Argentina and sent to Minister Ted Rowlands.

"The ideal policy objective was to 'establish an across-the-board dialogue with Argentina … with the aim of reducing the Falkland Islands dispute to more reasonable proportions'…." [2820]

May 25th, Rowlands speaks to Lord Shackleton regarding the report's conclusions.

"*Rowlands felt it was a fantasy to consider proposals without close cooperation from Argentina, and spelled out to Shackleton the international political repercussions which could arise.*" [2821]

June 2nd, in Buenos Aires, *charge d'affairs* Shakespeare is informed by the Foreign Ministry that the junta wish to reopen talks; suggesting that a forthcoming conference in Paris may present a suitable opportunity.

June 10th, Argentina celebrates its **"**Day for the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector."

In Santiago, Chile, US Secretary of State Kissinger and Argentine Foreign Minister Guzzetti meet. Guzzetti tells Kissinger; *"Until now, the United States Government has abstained on the Falkland Island issue. The issue is very important to Argentina. We hope that the United States Government would reconsider its position and help us."* Kissinger responds*; "It is difficult for us to get involved... But I suspect that, even so, over time the problem can be solved. The original purpose of the British presence is no longer being served by the Falklands, which are no longer necessary to protect sea lanes."*

Guzzetti answers; *"That is true, but what troubles us is that Great Britain wants self-determination for 2,000 people — and 1,600 of them are employees of the Falkland Island Company. This is not a question of historic rights. So long as this uncertain situation is unresolved it can always be complicated by collateral issues."* [2822]

June 11th, in London, Ted Rowlands notes that Lord Shackleton's report is likely; *"… to embarrass and endanger HMG's policy of opening a new dialogue with Argentina… the inference that any Argentine government will draw is that this report is nothing more than an assertion of British sovereignty…"* [2823]

On the same day, the Foreign Office respond to the junta's requests for talks in Paris; agreeing to a conversation taking place provided that such is as; "*informal and free-ranging as possible.*" Most importantly any conversation has to be, *"in confidence."* Informed by *charge d'affairs* Shakespeare, Ezequiel Pereyra responds that the delegation will be briefed only to cover the issue of sovereignty in any depth.

June 22nd, in London, Shackleton acknowledges that his views are *"not palatable,"* coming at an, *"awkward moment."* [2824]

2819 Carassai 2022. The rumour presumably being about the reasons for the new constitution's delay.
2820 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to PS/Rowlands May 24, 1976 FCO 7/3029*
2821 Donaghy 2014
2822 *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969-1976, Documents on South America, 1973-1976 Memorandum of Conversation, Santiago, June 10, 1976 8:10-9:15am*
2823 *Rowlands to Croskland, June 11, 1976* in *FO 7/3200*
2824 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.45

Under pressure from the FCO, Lord Shackleton agrees to amend his introduction to the report; to include a paragraph acknowledging a need for cooperation with Argentina. [2825]

> *"..., the hopeful development in international affairs which has led to regional cooperation between different nations is as relevant to this part of the world as to other areas where economic cooperation has been achieved, It is logical therefore that in any major new developments of the Islands economy, especially those relating to the exploitation of offshore resources, cooperation with Argentina - even participation - should, if possible, be secured. The sovereignty issue overhangs our Report, as it does the Falklands, and the absence of a settlement could well inhibit the full development of the Islands."*[2826]

June 29th, a Foreign Office official, Hall, submits his thoughts on how handle the UK Falkland Islands Committee; *"We should not underestimate these people. They are skilled and persistent interrogators ... but they have a human weakness for flattery – which may be of use, must be subtle and I would like to see a rather broader based contact with them. A little pretence at consultation and some modest hospitality ... might pay dividends."* [2827]

In early **July** in London, Falkland Islanders speak to Members of Parliament and the FCO. They are not told of the Anglo-Argentine meeting proposed to take place in Paris. [2828]

July 10th, in Paris, France, delegates from Britain and Argentina sit down for informal, exploratory, talks. Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister, Gualter Allara, proposes that the two countries return to the idea of a joint administration of the Islands, similar to the previously abandoned condominium. Britain's Robin Edmonds points out that Islander objection caused this to fail, and that the Islands' lobby could not be easily ignored.

A copy of Lord Shackleton's report is handed over to the Argentine team.

> *"The exploratory talks ... have so far remained strictly confidential and we have not informed the Islanders. They have been of use in initiating the fresh dialogue proposed by the then Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary in March ... the Argentines have predictably concentrated on moving towards their aim of bringing us to negotiate about the transfer of sovereignty. But, in contrast to their Peronist predecessors, they have shown some understanding of our position. In particular, they seem to accept that future discussions/negotiations should cover our theme of economic co-operation ... as well as their theme of sovereignty – which we have so far insisted on referring to as "the nature of a hypothetical future constitutional relationship between Argentina and the Falkland Islands."..."* [2829]

July 13th, from Paris, Minister Allara travels to London to speak to Rowlands. An agreement is reached that negotiations on the future of the Falklands should resume in August.

July 20th, in the UK, Shackleton's report is published. Lord Shackleton speaks to the Press. [2830]

> *"In recent years instead of the Islands living on Great Britain, Great Britain has been living on the Islands. More has come out as taxes than has gone in as aid."*

2825 Donaghy 2014
2826 *Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands* vol.1 p.iii
2827 *Hall to Sindall, Carless and Edmonds June 29, 1976 FCO 7/3232* quoted in Livingstone 2018. Which Hall is not clear, possibly George Hall.
2828 *The Friends of the Falkland Islands: Newsletter* Nov 1976
2829 Hugh Carless *memorandum* in *FO 7/3201* at *304a*
2830 For comments by Lord Shackleton in the *Geographical Journal*, see https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/1977-shackleton-report.pdf

"The 450 odd page report compos(es) of two volumes - the first containing some 344 pages devoted to an analysis of the overall economy of the Falklands and their surrounding watery assesses the development potential and points out opportunities constraints and the likely impact of development, and the second containing 108 pages summarising the first volume and goes on to discuss and propose development strategy, presents recommendations for a policy and programme for economic development and discusses the financial implications and the arrangements which the Team judge to be necessary to implement them ... Publication of the Survey was widely reported in the British press. The possibility of off-shore oil and the fisheries potential was the main lead. There were comments on the financial gains to Britain from taxation of remittances sent to this country and on possible future problems with Argentina." [2831]

"The Argentine Foreign Ministry said after the publication of the report that it could not comment on proposals for co-operation until the 'sovereignty dispute' had been resolved." [2832]

"Shackleton rejected at a news conference the idea that development was doomed without Argentine collaboration, but thought it would be "foolish" not to seek it." [2833]

"In Argentina, the report was immediately translated, published and analysed by Strategy, the magazine of the Argentine Institute of Strategic Studies and International Relations – influential in military circles – and its conclusions were commented upon by the press." [2834]

On the same day, at No. 11 Downing Street, Argentina's Minister of Finance is treated to lunch by Britain's Chancellor of the Exchequer, Dennis Healey. [2835]

"British banks, including Lloyds, Barclays, Midland and Natwest, showed their confidence in the new regime by offering US$60m of new loans to the Argentine junta." [2836]

August 2nd, from Colombia, Britain's Ambassador Geoffrey Crossley, writes to the Foreign Office.

> *"It is ludicrous that the interests of less than 2000 persons... should be allowed to be a thorn in the flesh of Anglo-Latin American relations... Surely the time has come for HMG to let the inhabitants of the Islands know that they are a nuisance..."* [2837]

August 7th, in the port of Buenos Aires, *in-camera* negotiations between Britain and Argentina are held aboard *Fragata Sarmiento*. Argentina proposes a gradual transfer of sovereignty, with a provisional administration lasting for a single period of eight years under alternating British/Argentine Governors. Each serving for 2 years. Britain's delegation raise the need for further Islander consultation, asking; "*What means were envisaged for ascertaining the views of the islanders both during the negotiations of the proposed Agreement and prior to the specified date?"* [2838] *"This question was avoided by the Argentines in their answer..."* [2839]

August 8th, talks continue off Buenos Aires. Minister Allara asserts that resolution *1514* limits the question to a matter of territorial integrity and that self-determination is inapplicable in this case. He considers the dispute,

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2831 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* July 30, 1976.
2832 *Keesings Contemporary Archives* June 24, 1977 p28406
2833 Ellerby 1990 p.205
2834 Carassai 2022
2835 Martinez de Hoz was on a tour of Europe, in an attempt to persuade creditors to reschedule Argentina's debts.
2836 Livingstone 2018
2837 *Crossley to Carless, August 2, 1976* in *FO 7/3229*
2838 Quoted in *FO 7/3201* at *283a*
2839 Legal advice in *FO 7/3201* at *283a*

therefore, as a bilateral one that cannot involve the islanders, whose 'interests', only, may be considered. Allara adds that his proposals extend to the Dependencies.

> *"At the second round of talks, the Argentines produced a paper proposing joint administration of the Islands to be followed, after 8 years, by the transfer of sovereignty to Argentina. As it stands, this paper is quite unacceptable."* [2840]

"... the British delegation made no written commitments. But Edmonds concluded by repeating that whatever the sovereignty model proposed, it would be examined by two interrelated criteria of great importance to the British government. (a) What was likely to be acceptable to the islanders? (b) What was likely to be acceptable to the British Parliament and public." [2841]

August 26th, in Britain, an article in *The Times* newspaper considers the Shackleton report and suggests that the Islands' Governor is in favour of an Argentine take-over. [2842]

September 14th, in London, advice from the Foreign Office's legal advisers is sought and given.

> *"... an agreement on the lines of the proposal as it now stands would contain an unconditional undertaking by HMG to cede the Islands on a specified future date. ... such an agreement could only be implemented by Act of Parliament,.. It would also be necessary to use an Act of Parliament if the new arrangements for the Falkland Islands had the effect of restricting the right of Parliament or the Sovereign to legislate for the territory, or were repugnant to any previous Act of Parliament."* [2843]

September 17th, in New York, the United Nations Special Committee on Decolonization adopt a draft-resolution calling for the UK and Argentina to expedite negotiations concerning the dispute over sovereignty.

At the end of **September**, Argentina's Minister for Marine Resources, Capt. Noe Guevara, visits the UK to discuss the purchase of ships and the regulation of fishing in the South Atlantic. During the visit, Guevara meets with the head of the Foreign Office's Polar Regions Section, John Heap. [2844]

October 8th, in London, Hugh Carless submits an assessment of the situation for the Foreign Secretary.

> *"We have now reached a turning point where we must decide about the next stage in the dialogue. We cannot embark on a third round of talks without having some idea of where we intend to go thereafter, since our tactics will to some extent vary according to the strategy we choose."* [2845]

Carless lists four options; *"... in the short term."* The first calls for talks to be stopped on the basis that the British side cannot accept any development into negotiations over sovereignty. His second option is to play for time - *"The aim would be to persuade the Argentines that we were serious about making progress, without in fact taking any substantive steps forward."* Third is to develop the present talks into; *"... substantive, but still secret, negotiations..."* with the aim of securing Argentine acceptance of terms of reference for a series of negotiations about Anglo-Argentine interests. Finally, Carless suggests the option of going public about the intention to negotiate.

2840 Hugh Carless *memorandum* in *FO 7/3201* at *304a*

2841 Donaghy 2014

2842 *Governor: We must have cooperation with Argentina* Michael Frenchman *The Times* August 26, 1976. This two page report would seem to have been sponsored by the UKFIC, which also commenced the publication of a bi-annual newsletter "*The Friends of the Falkland Islands*".

2843 *FO 7/3201* at *283a & 304a*

2844 Livingstone 2018. If Guevara was aware of the Southern Thule operation, he does not appear to have mentioned it.

2845 Hugh Carless *memorandum* in *FO 7/3201* at *283a*

"If we chose this course, we must recognise (and probably state) that these negotiations could not exclude the question of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The experiences of Mr. Michael Stewart in the House in 1968 show that it would be essential to give assurances from its outset that we were being frank about the subject matter for negotiation and that the wishes of the Islanders would not be disregarded at any stage... This option would allow us to retain the initiative and of reducing the Falklands lobby's ability to launch accusations of planning a secret sell-out." [2846]

Listing longer term objectives, Carless mentions '*leaseback*', '*joint sovereignty/condominium*', a '*buy-out'* of the Islanders and '*transfer of sovereignty*.' Concluding, he suggests that a public round of negotiations take place (option 4) with the long term aim of some '*leaseback*' or '*condominium*' arrangement.

"At every stage it will be essential to pay particular attention to nursing Islander opinion. Our ability to bring them along with us will be crucial to the success or failure of our strategy. Given that the Islanders are likely to reject the idea of an early transfer of sovereignty to Argentina, however qualified, we may have to adopt a two-stage approach to negotiations. This would mean concentrating initially on a politico-economic package which would fall short of full transfer of sovereignty but which the Argentines would see as a stepping-stone to a fuller settlement at a later stage – by which time the Islanders would, we hope, have adjusted to the prospect of a change in sovereignty status." [2847]

On seeing the Carless assessment, Robin Edmonds, writes; *"The Falklands problem taken as a whole is complicated, but the nub of it is simple: Parliament."* [2848]

October 14th, at London's Foreign Office, Minister Ted Rowlands notes; *"All that can be said of successive British Governments is that they avoided war and brought the Islanders and Argentines marginally closer together... we are trying to reconcile two apparently irreconcilable demands: the Argentine demand for us to hand over sovereignty – or at least to talk about handing it over – and the demand of the Islanders and the Lobby here that we do no such thing."* [2849]

On the same day, the UKFIC severs its link with the 'Falkland Islands Company'. [2850]

Britain's Department of Overseas Development rejects Shackleton's Report as overambitious. However, as regards the recommendations for an airport, a '*feasibility study*' is promised. [2851]

"The British government was presented with a report containing proposals which it was incapable of fulfilling, and this could only spell further trouble for its relationship with the Islanders..." [2852]

In the Falklands, in poor weather conditions, a Beaver aircraft goes missing with two on board - its pilot, Capt. Ian Campbell and one passenger Dr. Bernard Lee.

October 15th, following a search and rescue operation, the missing aircraft is found. Dr. Lee is alive, however Capt. Campbell is still missing. [2853]

2846 *Ibid.*
2847 *Ibid*
2848 Edmonds quoted in Livingstone 2018 citing *FCO 7/3201*
2849 *FO 7/3201/307*
2850 Recognising a need to be seen as independent from the primary commercial operation in the Falklands.
2851 It was likely to be their funds that would have been used to implement Shackleton's recommendations.
2852 Donaghy 2014
2853 Campbell's body was recovered on November 2, 1976.

"Vicecomodoro Bloomer Reeve (sic) requested the search and rescue from the Air Force, which assigned the mission to an F-27 equipped with external auxiliary tanks. Commanded by Mayor Alfredo Cano, the plane took off at 0625 on 15 October from the I Brigada Aérea, carrying doctors, survival specialists, and photographers. ... They initiated a parallel exploration pattern in a north-south direction. At around 1600, they spotted a strong reflection on the surface of the sea at Punta Aguda, Bougainville Island. The sun glinted on the polished pontoons of the airplane, which remained afloat, inverted and half sunken. Just a few meters away, the sole survivor was waving for help. The discovery was immediately reported to Comodoro Rivadavia, from where the rescue was coordinated with Malvinas Islands. The F-27 remained flying, orbiting until a speedboat arrived. The Beaver had experienced an in-flight engine flameout. In the emergency, the pilot headed towards the only protruding rock nearby, and attempted ditching. Unfortunately, the plane landed on an algae carpet, the pontoons got entangled, and the aircraft flipped over. The pilot drowned while trying to escape, while his companion survived and reached the rocky outcrop. The F-27 landed in Malvinas Islands, where Vicecomodoro Bloomer Reeve (sic) awaited them and extended the crew an invitation from the governor to visit his house. Once the overnight stay had been authorized, they were accommodated at the Upland Goose hotel. At dusk, as they walked towards the governor's residence, they received unusual displays of affection from the settlers." [2854]

October 18th, in Stanley, following an emergency Executive Council meeting, two Councillors walk out after a disagreement with Governor French over an official inquiry into the loss of the Islands' Beaver aircraft and the death of Capt. Campbell.

October 20th, at Stanley, a crowd of some 200 Islanders demonstrate against the Governor.

"On 21st October it was announced that a team of three from the Accident Investigation Branch of the Dept, of Trade in London and headed by Mr G.C. Wilkinson would be arriving on the 28th." [2855]

October 26th, in the Falkland Islands; *"It was announced on 26th October that Her Majesty the Queen has been pleased to approve the appointment of Mr James Roland Walter Parker OBE as our next Governor and Commander in Chief."* [2856]

In **November**, Argentina lands a military expedition on Morrell Island in the Southern Thule group of the South Sandwich Islands. Twenty soldiers under the command of a Major. Weather and radio stations are established, jointly given the name Corbeta Uruguay. [2857]

"The idea of landing at Thule island allegedly dates back to 1974 and was first suggested to then president Juan Peron, by captain Juan Jose Lombardo (who later played a role as head of South Atlantic Theatre of Operations during the Falklands conflict). The purpose of such an action in the island of Thule was to test and assess the UK's reaction. However Operation Sun did not receive the kick-off and full support until 1976, when a new military Junta was again in control of Argentina." [2858]

2854 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023. Bloomer Reeve had left the Islands in February 1976. Vice-Commodore Rodolfo Abel Carnelli was running the LADE operation in October, 1976.

2855 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* November 6, 1976. The inquiry subsequent concluded that Dr. Lee, who had been piloting the aircraft, had lost control while attempting a landing.

2856 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* November 6, 1976. For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/parker_james

2857 Exact date unknown. The Southern Thule group consists of three islands.

2858 *Thule island occupation: Argentine navy tested UK's resolve as part of its long term plan to take the Falklands* in *MercoPress* August 29, 2019. Inaccurate. Morrell Island had first been occupied by Argentina in 1955. Abandoned in 1956 due to volcanic activity *cf.* 1955 & 1956

"Southern Thule was the kind of territory the Labour Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland favoured giving to Argentina as part of a compromise. It also fitted precisely the scenario that Argentine Admiral Juan Jose Lombardo revealed to me after the (1982) conflict – that Argentina's long term plan, code named Project Alpha, was to continue to occupy isolated British Islands so long as there was no British reaction. He mischievously described the South Sandwich landing as the 'first bite of the sandwich'!..." [2859]

November 4th, in the UK, three by-elections eliminate the Labour Party's thin majority, increasing the power of Parliament.

November 15th, in New York, at the UN, the Fourth Committee reviews the work of the Special Committee on Decolonization. Argentina's representative makes a statement.

> *"... resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960 established quite clearly, in paragraph 6, that in certain circumstances – including without any doubt, those deriving from acts of territorial usurpation against a country – the applicable principle was territorial integrity and not self-determination."* [2860]

He also refers to the 1975 International Court of Justice (ICJ) opinion concerning Western Sahara.

"... the Court, while recognizing the important role of the principle of self-determination, had pointed out that on a number of occasions the General Assembly had given priority to the principle of territorial integrity, particularly when the colonial Territory had been created to the prejudice of the country to which the Territory belonged originally. Furthermore, in paragraph 87 of the opinion, the Court had affirmed quite clearly that in all cases the "special characteristics" of the Territory should borne in mind. [2861] *However, the most decisive paragraph on the subject was paragraph 162, from a reading of which it was perfectly clear that in those situations where there was a dispute regarding sovereignty over a colonial Territory, whether or not the principle of self-determination should be applied depended on the nature of the link between the Territory in question and the State in question at the moment of colonization."* [2862]

2859 *Fight for Falklands Freedom: Reporting Live from Argentina and the Islands* Harold Briley 2022

2860 Resolution 1514 was only applicable to the Non-Self-Governing Territories. It offered no protection to Argentina and was not, in any case, retrospective. See 2019 when the ICJ gave its advisory opinion on the Mauritian decolonization in relation to the Chagos Islands.

2861 Inaccurate. What para.87 actually said was – *"Western Sahara (Rio de Oro and Sakiet El Hamra) is a territory having very special characteristics which, at the time of colonization by Spain, largely determined the way of life and social and political organization of the peoples inhabiting it. In consequence, the legal régime of Western Sahara, including its legal relations with neighbouring territories, cannot properly be appreciated without reference to these special characteristics. The territory forms part of the great Sahara desert which extends from the Atlantic Coast of Africa to Egypt and the Sudan. At the time of its colonization by Spain, the area of this desert with which the Court is concerned was being exploited, because of its low and spasmodic rainfall, almost exclusively by nomads, pasturing their animals or growing crops as and where conditions were favourable. It may be said that the territory, at the time of its colonization, had a sparse population that, for the most part, consisted of nomadic tribes the members of which traversed the desert on more or less regular routes dictated by the seasons and the wells or water-holes available to them. In general, the Court was informed, the right of pasture was enjoyed in common by these tribes; some areas suitable for cultivation, on the other hand, were subject to a greater degree to separate rights. Perennial water-holes were in principle considered the property of the tribe which put them into commission, though their use also was open to all, subject to certain customs as to priorities and the amount of water taken. Similarly, many tribes were said to have their recognized burial grounds, which constituted a rallying point for themselves and for allied tribes. Another feature of life in the region, according to the information before the Court, was that inter-tribal conflict was not infrequent."* (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975 para.87) See https://www.icj-cij.org/files/case-related/61/061-19751016-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf

2862 Again inaccurate. Para.162 actually said – "*The materials and information presented to the Court show the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization, of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and some of the tribes*

Britain's representative exercises a right of reply:

> *"The United Kingdom delegation was told that the Falkland Islands was a special case. It did not accept that. …*
>
> *The people of the Falkland Islands had the right to be consulted and to have their wishes about their own future taken into account. Yet, the draft which was before the General Assembly deliberately set those wishes aside as though the views of the people of the Falkland Islands were of no account."* [2863]

The draft-resolution calling for negotiations on the issue of sovereignty receives the Fourth Committee's approval; however, more nations abstain than Argentina had anticipated, causing some consternation.

"While his delegation respected the right of every delegation to change its position on a particular question when and for whatever reasons it deemed appropriate, he said that his delegation was surprised at the decision of certain countries which, having voted in favour of resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII), had, on the current occasion, taken a different position." [2864]

In London, on the same day, Lord Shackleton presents his findings regarding the Falkland Islands to the Royal Geographical Society. [2865]

"Lord Shackleton highlighted this important but little-known (outside the Islands) and well-concealed (inside the British Treasury and FCO) fact "Far from living off the British, the British have been doing very nicely out of the Falkland Islanders … Far more has come back to Britain in the way of profits than has gone out in the way of investment. More importantly, we concluded that the Chancellor of the Exchequer has, over the years, taken twice as much out in tax as has gone in in the form of aid to develop the Falkland Islands"." [2866]

November 16th, in Stanley, Governor French announces that he is to return to the UK. [2867]

December 1st, in New York, the General Assembly of the United Nations adopts *Resolution 31/49 (XXXI).* [2868]

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living in the territory of Western Sahara. They equally show the existence of rights, including some rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's conclusion is that the materials and information presented to it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity. Thus the court has not found legal ties of such a nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514 (XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara, and, in particular, of the principle of self-determination through the free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the Territory." (Western Sahara, Advisory Opinion, ICJ Reports 1975 para.162). Link above.

2863 *UN Doc A32/23/Rev.1 Chapter 28*

2864 This resolution passed 102:1 (UK) with 36 abstentions. 13 Commonwealth countries voted in favour – Bangladesh, Cyprus, Ghana, India, Lesotho, Malaysia, Malta, Mauritius, Sri Lanka, Swaziland, Uganda, Tanzania & Zambia.

2865 See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2018/01/1977-shackleton-report.pdf

2866 *Reasons in Writing: A Commandos View of the Falklands War* E. Southby-Tailyour 1990

2867 Ostensibly for consultations regarding the Shackleton Report, however, French's replacement had already been announced on October 26, 1976. More likely associated with the protests against French and his authoritarian attitude.

2868 102 votes in favour, 1 against and 32 abstentions No UN resolution referring to the Falkland Islands has ever employed the phrase "*special and particular case*". The references to the Non-Aligned Movement's declarations of 1975 and 1976 in this resolution's preambular paragraphs is about as close as the General Assembly came. See next page.

"... Recalling its Resolutions 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960, 2065 (XX) of 16 December 1965 and 3160 (XXVIII) of 14 December 1973,

Bearing in mind the paragraphs related to this question contained in the Political Declaration adopted by the Conference of Ministers for Foreign Affairs of Non-Aligned Countries, held at Lima from 25 to 30 August 1975,[2869] *and in the Political Declaration adopted by the Fifth Conference of Heads of State or Government of Non-Aligned countries, held at Colombo from 16 to 19 August 1976,*[2870]

Having regard to the chapter of the report of the Special Committee ... relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and, in particular, the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee concerning the Territory,

1. Approves the chapter of the report of the Special Committee ... relating to the Falkland Islands (Malvinas) and, in particular, the conclusions and recommendations of the Special Committee concerning the Territory;

2. Expresses its gratitude for the continuous efforts made by the Government of Argentina, in accordance with the relevant decisions of the General Assembly, to facilitate the process of decolonisation and to promote the well-being of the populations of the islands;

3. Requests the Governments of Argentina and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to expedite the negotiations concerning the dispute over sovereignty, as requested in General Assembly resolutions 2065 (XX) and 3160 (XXVIII); [2871]

4. Calls upon the two parties to refrain from taking decisions that would imply introducing unilateral modifications in the situation while the islands are going through the process recommended in the above-mentioned resolutions;.." [2872]

"Paragraph 2 is absurdly one-sided in thanking only Argentina – it was actually Britain that had been making efforts to "promote the well-being of the populations of the islands" .., whereas Argentina's efforts had been devoted to taking over the territory against the wishes of those populations. ... Argentina continues to demand that Britain should respect Resolution 31/49 – an impossible demand since the premise on which it is based (ongoing negotiations) no longer applies." [2873]

2869 *UN Doc A/10217 "Paragraph 87: The Non-Aligned Countries, without prejudice to ratifying the validity of the principle of self-determination as a general principle for other territories, strongly support in the* ***special and particular*** *case of the Malvinas Islands, the just claim of the Argentine Republic, and urge the United Kingdom to actively continue the negotiations recommended by the United nations in order to restore the said territory to the Argentine sovereignty and thus put an end to that illegal situation, which still persists in the southern part of the American continent."* My emphasis.

2870 *UN Doc A/31/197 "Paragraph 119: In the* ***special and particular case*** *of the Malvinas (Falkland Islands), the Conference firmly supported the just claim of the Argentine Republic, and urged the United Kingdom to actively continue the negotiations recommended by the United nations in order to restore the said territory to the Argentine sovereignty and thus put an end to that illegal situation, which still persists in the southern part of the American continent."* My emphasis.

2871 By mentioning previous resolutions, this new resolution cannot be considered as a replacement but rather as a continuation. However, see 1985.

2872 Operative paragraph 4 is described in Ellerby 1990 (p.213) as a; *"veiled reference to the Shackleton Report.*" See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/31/49

2873 Pascoe 2020 pp.319-320

"... in December 1976, Resolution 31/49 was the first to reference the decisions of the Non-Aligned Movement, which had recognised that the Malvinas constituted a particular case in which the right to self-determination did not apply. The rejection of the self-determination principle proved controversial, and there were many more abstentions on this vote than on previous resolutions, including members of the NAM and countries of the Anglophone Caribbean." [2874]

December 2nd, Governor French departs the Falkland Islands.

"French had not been responsible for any single catastrophic decision and there is no evidence that he had any agenda apart from the implementation of British policy. His style, however, had increased Islanders' suspicions and apprehensions about that policy when what they needed was reassurance. French was governor of the Falkland Islands from 27 January 1975 until 2 December, 1976, the shortest tenure of any governor of recent times." [2875]

"Never had a governor remained in office for such a short time (less than two years), ..." [2876]

"His strongly authoritarian behaviour and lack of judgement, the cause of trouble in an earlier colonial posting, made him highly unsuitable to promote Islander confidence in the FCO or closer ties with Argentina."[2877]

December 8th, in London, the Cabinet approve a mixed approach to future talks with Argentina. [2878]

"It included two courses of action in the event of continued islander objections to leaseback. Firstly, the government would tell Argentina that it could not proceed with the negotiations against the islanders' wishes. It could then buy time by making a series of minor arrangements (e.g. shared administration of the Dependencies) or a single large concession, such as an Argentine sovereign base on these uninhabited islands. In exchange Britain would seek Argentine economic cooperation covering fishing, oil exploration and research... This was to be followed by a ministerial visit to Stanley and Buenos Aires in February, the second stage of Crosland's formula. Rowlands brief would be 'to establish prospects for a move forward into some form of negotiations in 1977 which might lead towards the [politico-economic] package deal" [2879]

"... in December 1976, cabinet ministers noted that if they were to 'state plainly' their intention to talk to Argentina, there would be a 'political storm', so they agreed instead to play for time." [2880]

In the Falkland Islands, the Royal Marines are granted the Freedom of Stanley. Col. Sir Stuart Pringle RM presents a sword to the Government and the People of the Falkland Islands.

December 16th, at Stanley, James Roland Walter Parker arrives; Governor of the Falkland Islands.[2881]

"His Excellency gave an impressive speech in which he said that it was his hope that he would discharge the responsibilities to the Government and people of the Colony to the best of his ability . and hoped that at the end of his 'several years' stay he would have some satisfaction at doing his best? Mr Parker also said he regarded himself as a Civil Servant brought up in the discipline that by his duty to the Queen his concern was the welfare

2874 *Anti-Colonialism Versus Self-Determination: International Alliance Dynamics in the 1982 Falklands/Malvinas War* Michelle Paranzino 2023 in *International Journal of Military History & Historiography* 43 (2023) pp.108-136. In 1973, the vote had been 116 in favour, nil against and 14 abstentions.
2875 Tatham (ed.) 2008
2876 Carassai 2022
2877 Elgood 2025
2878 *CAB/128/60/20*
2879 Donaghy 2014
2880 Livingstone 2018
2881 *The London Gazette No. 47113.* For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/parker_james

and well-being of the people amongst whom he was required to serve and that this would be the abiding purpose of his activities whilst here. In what could be described as an astute awareness of the low morale of Islanders in their relations with the Administration, His Excellency asked us to express our views frankly to him…"[2882]

"Parker … took over at a time when Argentine pressure on the Islands was steadily increasing." [2883]

"… in 1977 (sic), Governor Neville A. French was replaced by James R. Parker, who arrived with instructions to harden relations. Among other measures, he created the Deputy Governor position, thus breaking off direct contact with the Vicecomodoro. Conditions became stricter: only Transportes Navales' vessels that had requested permission in advance were authorized to dock at the pier." [2884]

At a reception for the new Governor, consulting engineer, F. A. Fisher, notes; *"Mr Rowlands, who was then the Minister responsible, was at the reception and throughout the evening he was pressed by many present to confirm clearly that it was the intention of the British Government to retain the Falklands and not to hand them over; this he evaded doing so obviously that it was clear that the Government did not really want to keep them and the fears of the Islanders were justified. … While I was in the Falklands the Chief Secretary actually remarked to me that the only thing to do with the place was to give it to the Argentine…"* [2885]

In Argentina, two British Petroleum (BP) executives seek meetings to discuss the prospect of a joint approach to oil exploration. [2886]

December 20th, on Morrell Island in the Southern Thule group, a helicopter crew from HMS *Endurance,* visiting to retrieve scientific equipment left earlier in the year, discovers the Argentine military presence.

December 31st, in London, Britain's Secretary of State for Defence, Fred Mulley, proposes that, with tensions easing, now is the time for *Endurance* to be withdrawn.

> *"… when I have been obliged to accept cuts in the defence budget for 1977/78 and 1978/79, I cannot justify the expenditure of an estimated £1.8m for a purpose which has no relations to our NATO commitments…"* [2887]

2882 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* January 20, 1977
2883 Tatham (ed) 2008. See - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/parker_james
2884 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
2885 Fisher to Peter Horden MP, April 5, 1982 quoted in Elgood 2025 citing *UKFIC82 Appendix.*
2886 Livingstone 2018
2887 *Mulley to Crosland December 31, 1976 DEFE 24/911*. Quoted in Donaghy 2014.

1977 – January 5th, in London, Argentina's *charge d'affaires* is summoned to the Foreign Office to explain the presence of a military base in Southern Thule.

"A JIC assessment in January 1977 concluded that the Argentine Government were unlikely to order withdrawal until it suited them to do so and, depending on the British Government's actions in the situation, could be encouraged to attempt further military measures against British interests in the area." [2888]

"The JIC correctly judged that the junta had authorised the seizure of Southern Thule to test the British Government's reaction and to gain a bargaining chip in negotiations; but depending on HMG's reaction, further moves against British interests in the region might follow." [2889]

January 7th, in London, executives from the BP oil company meet with Foreign Office officials to discuss the possibility of oil exploration around the Falkland Islands. [2890]

January 14th, Argentina informs the UK Government that the purpose of the Southern Thule operation is to establish a scientific station within the jurisdiction of Argentine sovereignty. They express the hope that nothing will cloud the, *"auspicious perspectives"* for negotiations. News of the landing is not made public within the UK.

"On January 5, 1977, Britain requested that Buenos Aires explain its presence on the Dependency. Nine days later, the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs told its British counterparts that the work on the island was scientific in nature and implied that its presence would not be permanent." [2891]

"Within days it became clear the Argentine presence was larger than disclosed and that they were wearing uniform. Intelligence sources discovered the plan had been to announce the existence of the base in March, winter in the southern hemisphere, and that a strong British reaction was expected. If the party on Southern Thule was arrested, the Argentines intended to seize the civilian British Antarctic Survey team on South Georgia as hostages. There was evidence of a joint Argentine Navy and Air Force plan to invade the Falkland Islands with supporting diplomacy at the UN, but later intelligence indicated that this plan had been shelved, not because of any action by the British Government but because Argentina could not count on the support of the Third World or Communist bloc." [2892]

In London, the UKFIC open a 'Falkland Islands Office'. [2893]

"... by 1977 alarm bells were beginning to ring as the Argentine Military Junta, which had over-thrown the civilian Government of President Isabel Peron, widow of the famous Juan Peron, started demanding a return for their investment in the Falklands. Had not the British Foreign Office promised that the naive Islanders would by now be totally receptive of the Argentine and be prepared to accept some form of acceptance of the long standing sovereignty claim? Also it was presumed that the younger members of the community were supposed, by now, to be speaking fluent Spanish while a vast majority of the population would have enjoyed the many delights which Buenos Aires offered. A vast majority of the Islands population suddenly realized that they had been lured into a trap which was going to be difficult to extract themselves from." [2894]

2888 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*
2889 Elgood 2025
2890 *Hall to Anglin January 7, 1977 FCO 7/3409*
2891 *Re-examining the Falkland Islands War: The necessity for multi-level deterrence in preventing wars of aggression* Steven G. Stransky 2012
2892 Elgood 2025
2893 This was under the control of the UK Falkland Islands Committee, not the Falkland Islands Government, whose representative office opened in 1983
2894 Patrick Watts MBE quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021

January 19th, Britain's Government formally protests the violation of British sovereignty on Morrell Island in Southern Thule. [2895]

"... (Admiral) Guzzetti said to Rowlands, "These Argentine scientists are only going to be there for a short summer season". We accepted that explanation at the time. We accepted it because we were at the beginning of the Crosland concept of long-term negotiation... We agonised over it considerably. But if we had made a public song and dance about it, we would then have had to decide whether to break off the whole negotiating process. We decided that negotiation was more important." [2896]

January 31st, following reports that Argentina is commissioning two American oil companies – Geophysical Services International and Western Geophysical – to carry out seismic surveys in the seas off the Argentine coast, a Labour MP, Colin Phipps, sends a warning to the Foreign Office.

"The British were concerned that the Argentine-sponsored seismic studies would cross the (unofficial) median line between Argentina and the Falkland Islands. Although the British government had not formally claimed the waters beyond the 200-metre isobath from the islands, it wanted to reserve its rights to up to 200 miles of the continental-shelf." [2897]

February 1st, Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) assesses the Southern Thule occupation; describing it as a political act that may be considered so successful by Argentina as to encourage further displays.

February 2nd, Foreign Secretary Anthony Crosland, reads out a statement to the House of Commons with regard to the Shackleton Report. [2898]

> "*... Lord Shackleton has presented his 'Economic Survey of the Falkland Islands'. The whole House will join me in warmly thanking him and his colleagues for this immensely thorough and wide-ranging report. The Survey paints a vivid picture of this small community of 1,900 people, 7,500 miles away, yet staunchly British and with rich potential in the seas around them. But currently they face an uncertain economic future. The economy, essentially a mono-culture based on wool, is stagnant; the resources do not exist to exploit the new potential in other fields; and emigration is increasing. To remedy this situation, Lord Shackleton made a large number of recommendations, many of which will require further study and detailed consultation with the Islanders.Meanwhile, the Government will proceed to implement those internal constitutional changes which have already been approved by the Falkland Islands Legislative Council. The recommendations on development aid will fall to my honourable friend the Minister for Overseas Development to implement. But I can say now that the Government are ready to consider, after such pre-investment studies as may be required, agricultural diversification, mutton freezing, knitwear production and improvements to education. We also propose to pay special and urgent attention to the Islands' internal communications, with particular reference to the availability and maintenance of an efficient local air service.*
>
> *The Survey further recommends certain major capital projects, notably an enlargement of the airport and a pilot fishing project, which would bring the total recommended expenditure by the United*

2895 Britain's Labour Government not only acted inadequately in the face of an Argentine invasion of British territory, but then compounded the offence by keeping it a secret from the British public. More importantly, kept secret from Parliament and there is no doubt that the Commons would have erupted. How this could have been viewed as a reasonable policy under any circumstances is unfathomable. It would be 1982 before the Argentines were ejected from their Corbeta Uruguay base.

2896 Hugh Carless, head of the Latin American Department, quoted in Charlton 1989 p.60

2897 Livingstone 2018 citing *Philips to Rowlands January 31, 1977 FCO 7/3409*

2898 Repeated in the House of Lords by Lord Goronwy-Williams. For the Commons statement, see - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1977/feb/02/falkland-islands

Kingdom up to some £13–£14 million. The Government, like Lord Shackleton and his colleagues, are in no doubt that the potential for development is there, and they will at the appropriate moment commission the essential preliminary studies to determine whether airport enlargement is likely to be practicable and cost-effective. But for the rest, we cannot at this time accept the more costly recommendations. The overseas aid budget, recently cut in the December public expenditure exercise, would not stand it. There are more urgent claims from much poorer communities. And the right political circumstances do not exist. ... The Government has therefore decided that the time has come to consider both with the Islanders and the Argentine Government whether a climate exists for discussing the broad issues which bear on the future of the Falkland Islands, and the possibilities of co-operation between Britain and Argentina in the region of the South West Atlantic...

I must make certain things absolutely clear. First, any such discussion, which would inevitably raise fundamental questions in the relationship between the Islands, Britain and Argentina, would take place under a sovereignty umbrella; that is, Her Majesty's Government would wholly reserve their position on the issue of sovereignty, which would in no way be prejudiced. Secondly, any changes which might be proposed must be acceptable to the Islanders, whose interests and well-being remain our prime concern. In consequence, thirdly, there must be full consultation with the Islanders at every stage; nothing will be done behind their backs."

"At the same time he announced that the Government did not accept the more costly recommendations in the Shackleton Report, notably the enlargement of the airport and the lengthening of the runway. At a time when Argentina had just occupied British territory, what sort of a signal was that?" [2899]

Anthony Crosland also responds to a question regarding a 200 mile fisheries limit.

"The situation with regard to the 200-mile fishing limit is unbelievably complicated. Argentina has claimed a 200-mile limit round the Falkland Islands as part of her claim to sovereignty. There is a complication inside UNLOSC, there are complications within the EEC about this, and there are possible analogies with Rockall which need careful study. I should not like to give a definite answer on the subject except to say that what is essential is that we have a de facto agreement on the question of fisheries." [2900]

February 4th, in the Falkland Islands, a message from Alginate Industries Limited is reported in the local press.

"As the Islanders will know, Humphries and Glasgow carried out a feasibility study on Alginate Industries behalf in 1974 covering the production of dried milled seaweed, and also the production of calcium alginate. At the time of the Shackleton report it was considered that only the production of-dried milled seaweed would be a viable proposition. It is now considered that sodium alginate, worth even more than calcium alginate since it is an end product and is worth around £2000 per ton, can be produced in the Falkland Islands. ...

The overriding question is the political future of the islands vis a vis the Argentine and Alginate Industries has made it clear to H.M. Government that, an assurance regarding the continued British Sovereignty of the Islands is essential. The Shackleton report considered, that it would be logical for

2899 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

2900 *HC Deb 02 February 1977 vol 925 cc550-61.* See link above. Lord Morris, in a debate in May, 1979, (*HL Deb 22 May 1979 vol.400 cc233*-432) referred to an Argentine claim to a 200-mile limit having been declared from Buenos Aires in 1977. In fact, Argentina made its 200-mile limit claim in December, 1966.

any major new developments of the Falkland Islands economy, especially those relating to offshore resources such as oil and,fish, if possible to be carried out in cooperation - even participation - with Argentina. This, must not apply, nor does Alginate Industries believe that it is intended to apply, to seaweed resources or any inshore operations. Furthermore no alginate development could take place without the recommended extension of the airstrip" [2901]

February 7th, in the UK, reports suggests that Argentina's *Plan Goa*, the seizure of the Falkland Islands, has been placed on hold over fears of a lack of support at the United Nations.

"... later intelligence indicated that this plan had been shelved, not because of any action by the then British Government but because Argentina could not count on the support of the Third World or the Communist bloc."[2902]

"Argentina could count on 'qualified' support: backing its claim in the fight against colonialism, but (this) was not considered strong enough to .... achieve a fait accompli." [2903]

February 10th, from New York, Keith Unwin, Britain's delegate to the UN Commission on Human Rights, seeks guidance from the Foreign Office on the subject of human rights in Argentina. [2904]

In London, on the same day, the Falkland islands Company issue a statement.

"The Falkland Islands Company Ltd, welcomes the forthcoming visit to the Islands of the Minister of State, Mr, Edward Rowlands. The Minister has taken a close personal interest in the Islands and has availed himself of every opportunity of meeting Islanders in this country.

In the discussion in the House of Commons yesterday at which the announcement of the Ministerial visit was made, the Foreign Secretary stated that the economy of the Islands was stagnant and that without political and economic co-operation with Argentina the outlook for the Islands is bleak.

The Company does not share this view although it does wholly accept Lord Shackleton's statement that no off-shore developments are likely to take place without a form of co-operation agreement with Argentina. Since publication of the Shackleton Report the Gross National Revenue of the Colony has increased by 80% in 1976, and a further increase of between 50 and 40% is anticipated this year, The outlook for Falklands wool, over the next few years is very favourable.

The Company, in common with Islanders, wishes to continue friendly relationships with Argentina but considers that any Argentine involvement, other than on a commercial basis, within Falklands territorial waters impinges on British Sovereignty. The Company, as has previously been announced, is currently considering joint participation with non-Argentine interests in in-shore fishing which is. likely to have a significant effect on the Colony's economy. British Government aid would not be required for the venture which involves fish meal and shell-fish." [2905]

February 11th, the *Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* reports:

"The forthcoming visit by Mr. Ted Rowlands has, for some islanders, signalled the turning point in our fortunes. However, there are many who don't seem to be very optimistic at the out-come and this view is understandable for various reasons. It was a Labour Government Minister of State (in the form of

2901 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* February 11, 1977 p.7
2902 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*
2903 Donaghy 2014
2904 *Unwin to Callan February 10, 1977 FCO 58/1165* in Livingstone 2018
2905 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* February 11, 1977 p.3

Lord Chalfont) who came here in 1968 hoping that it would take little persuasion to get us to embrace Argentina like some kind of foster parents. … None of us expect Ted Rowlands to come out next week with a magic wand – but I wouldn't say that he won't be carrying thirty pieces of silver."

February 15th, in Buenos Aires, Minister of State Edward 'Ted' Rowlands, lands en-route to the Falklands. He holds brief talks with the Argentine Foreign Minister before moving on.

"Just before he died, Tony Crosland asked me to go to the Falkland Islands and to Argentina. The reason for my visit was the statement he made on 2nd February, when he described the Government's attitude to the economic and political problems facing the 1,900 islanders. He spoke of the limited prospects that he saw for them without some form of political and economic co-operation with Argentina. He contrasted that with the considerable potential of the area that was identified in the Shackleton Report and that could be the salvation of the island. The object of my visit was to discuss with the islanders and the Argentine Government whether a broad climate existed for discussing the future of the Falkland Islands. Mr. Crosland also said that any such discussions would inevitably raise the fundamental relationship between Britain, Argentina and the Falklands." [2906]

"... Buenos Aires, where he held conversations with Captain Gualter Allara and other Argentine officials. Rumours abounded on the islands and London's plans were suspected. An Islander who preserved his identity wrote a "welcome" article to the British minister, published days before his arrival, in which he not only assured that the United Kingdom preferred good relations with 23 million Argentines to the "well-being of 1,900 islanders," but, conceding that London would not do "anything behind the islanders' backs", … he predicted that, instead, "(London) would do it right under their noses"!" [2907]

February 16th, in Stanley, on his arrival, Rowlands is met by a crowd of some 400 Islanders waving Union Jacks and shouting "*We want to stay British*." [2908]

"Rowlands was a voluble Welshman who talked far more than he listened, and his visit was remembered with some bitterness in the islands." [2909]

"Rowlands, however, had gone with questions, not answers. And the main question revolved around whether the islanders would agree to explore negotiations with Argentina, in which the question of sovereignty was included." [2910]

In Argentina, on the same day, General Jorge R. Videla, declares that the Falklands question is; *"... a problem of purely and exclusively territorial integrity and that, therefore, since the islands were Argentine in Foreign hands, the solution was none other than restitution. Sovereignty is not discussed or negotiated."* [2911]

February 17th, in Stanley, Minister Rowlands speaks to local Councillors.

"I had five days in the Falkland Islands and four days of full and close consultations with the Governor, the joint councils and people in all walks of life." [2912]

2906 Rowlands addressing the Commons on March 1, 1977 in *Hansard: Commons: 1 March 1977 – Commons Chamber – Foreign Affairs vol. 927 col.318.* See link below.

2907 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* February 11, 1977

2908 Letter in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 8, 1977 p.6 complaining about Argentine news reports that the Minister was only met by local dignitaries and a party of 10 children waving flags.

2909 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.610

2910 Carassai 2022

2911 *Crónica* February 16, 1977

2912 Rowlands addressing the Commons on March 1, 1977 in *Hansard: Commons: 1 March 1977 – Commons Chamber – Foreign Affairs vol. 927 col.318.* See link below.

"Initially councillors were non-committal, seeking to circumvent the sovereignty debate by stressing the need for a referendum. Yet Rowland's patient, frank explanation turned their stance,.." [2913]

"A Labour Foreign Office Minister Ted Rowlands arrived in the Falklands and emphatically warned members of the Legislative Council that unless they agreed to talks on sovereignty being initiated then it was likely that LADE would withdraw their air link and the British Government was not prepared to come to the aid of the ever-diminishing Islands population." [2914]

On the same day, Britain's Foreign Office responds to Unwin's letter of the 10th; *"We had in mind (a) general statement to the effect that HMG deplore violations of human rights wherever they occur rather than a statement specifically relating to the situation in Argentina. As you know, our relations with Argentina are especially sensitive in view of the Falkland Islands dispute."* [2915]

February 18th, in the Falklands, Minister Rowlands tours the Islands meeting local people.

"In a score or so meetings I met and talked with as many islanders as I think it was physically possible for me to meet during the time available to me. Their numbers ran into several hundred. I talked to individual groups in their homes. I had meetings in the wool sheds and in the community halls and in the farmyards. I do not think that anyone can challenge the claim that my consultations were unprecedented in the history of the colony and as comprehensive as is humanly and physically possible. I put to everyone absolutely straight what Tony Crosland saw and the Government see as the main issue: the development of potential resources and the investment which could be severely inhibited if a hostile political climate and relations persisted, punctuated periodically by mini-crises that have been a feature of the situation not for just one or two years but over many years, as the Opposition spokesman explained. I put forward that we should try to find a way forward to create a stable relationship that would encourage young islanders to stay—because they have been leaving—to see their future in and around the islands and not thousands of miles away and that would also ensure the continuation of a way of life which generations of kelpers have enjoyed. In all my meetings I made clear that any negotiations would have to include the issue of sovereignty, and that it would be a part of the negotiations on the twin themes of political and economic co-operation." [2916]

At the Hague, the Beagle Channel (PNL) arbitration group of judges submit their final decision to the British Crown – ruling in Chile's favour. [2917]

> *"... the Parties were agreed in principle that their rights in the matter of claims or title to territory were governed prima facie by the doctrine of the uti possidetis juris of 1810. This doctrine – possibly, at least at first, a political tenet rather than a true rule of law – is peculiar to the field of the Spanish-American States whose territories were formerly under the rule of the Spanish Crown, and even if both*

2913 Donaghy 2014. This does not accord with the position outlined in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly* Reviews of March 8 and March 28, 1977 which suggests that the Islanders were distinctly unimpressed with the Minister's visit. See (from p.21 of the pdf.) - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/falkland-islands-times-falkland-islands-monthly-1977-to-1979.pdf

2914 Patrick Watts MBE quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021

2915 *Callan to Unwin February 17, 1977 FCO 58/1165* in Livingstone 2018

2916 Rowlands addressing the Commons on March 1, 1977 in *Hansard: Commons: 1 March 1977 – Commons Chamber – Foreign Affairs vol. 927 col.318.* See link below

2917 Queen Elizabeth II signed the ratification on April 18, 1977. There was no immediate response from either of the parties. In January 1978, a letter was sent to both Chile and Argentina to discover whether they were content that the arbitration process had been completed. Chile answered in the positive and to say that, as far as it was concerned the award had been duly implemented. Argentina did not reply. Nor did Argentina reply to a further inquiry in March, 1978. On July 10, 1978, the President of the Court of Arbitration notified Queen Elizabeth II that, in its opinion, *"... the Award stands fully and materially executed."* The arbitration panel then stood down. *cf.* 1848, 1971, 1976 & 1978

the scope and applicability of the doctrine were somewhat uncertain, particularly in such far-distant regions of the continent as are those in issue in the present case, it undoubtedly constituted an important element in the inter-relationships of the continent. As the Court understand the matter, the doctrine has two aspects:

First, all territory in Spanish-America, however remote or inhospitable, is deemed to have been part of one of the former administrative divisions of Spanish colonial rule (vice-royalties, captaincies-general, etc.). Hence there is no territory in Spanish-America that has the status of res nullius open to an acquisition of title by occupation. Secondly, the title to any given locality is deemed to have become automatically vested in whatever Spanish-American State inherited or took over the former Spanish administrative division in which the locality concerned was stipulated (uti possidetis, ita possideatis, – the full formula). Looked at in another way, uti possidetis was a convenient method of establishing the boundaries of the young Spanish-American States on the same basis as those of the old Spanish administrative divisions, except that the latter were themselves often uncertain or ill-defined or, in the less accessible regions, not factually established at all, – or again underwent various changes." [2918]

"... essentially an accord on boundaries between successor states of the same (Spanish) empire, not an assertion of sovereignty against outsiders." [2919]

"As a principle, it could be applied only to a dispute between Latin American nations... Whether it is applicable in a dispute with a non-Spanish American nation is open to doubt." [2920]

"In 1977, an arbitration award was favorable to Chile, but as soon as the Videla government received the result, it rejected it and declared its nullity. For its part, the Chilean government issued a statement stating that it was unwilling to restart discussions on an area that it now considered legitimately its own. This hardened relations between the two countries again..." [2921]

"The Falklands were not at issue, but the evidence from history and maps applied to them exactly as it did to the PNL group." [2922]

February 19th, in the Falklands, Minister Rowlands continues his tour.

"... the islanders also left me in no doubt that they were worried about their future. They have lived in proximity to Argentina for many years, and I found that many of them appreciate the practical realities which arise from their geographical location. One major consideration to emerge from my talks is that many islanders, in considering their future, are looking not for a grand design or major projects—but for developments on their doorstep before the long-term development of offshore resources. The problems of internal communications, travel between Darwin and Port Stanley, small local industries, better schools and education and the problems of a few people trying to service a community are their main priorities." [2923]

In London, on the same day, a military assessment of the situation in the Falkland Islands is circulated by the Chiefs of Staff.

2918 For the full report, see - https://legal.un.org/riaa/cases/vol_XXI/53-264.pdf
2919 *Falklands Title Deeds* M. Deas 1982
2920 Metford 1968
2921 *Génesis de la Guerra de Malvinas (1976-1982)* Valeria Lourdes Carbone 2008
2922 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.594.
2923 Rowlands addressing the Commons on March 1, 1977 in *Hansard: Commons: 1 March 1977 – Commons Chamber – Foreign Affairs vol. 927 col.318.* See link below

"(Which) drew attention to the fact that air reinforcement was ruled out by the limitations of the airstrip at Port Stanley, and likely unavailability of South American airfields in the event of a conflict. To dislodge Argentine occupation of part of the Falkland Islands or the Dependencies would require an amphibious force with embarked troops. It would not be possible to provide transport and support the force necessary to the Islands to ensure that a determined Argentine attempt to eject the British garrison was unsuccessful. To recover the Islands by military means, though far from impossible, would be a major operation at very long range. The least force for this purpose would be of Brigade Group strength, the transport of which would entail the use of all the Navy's amphibious resources, a sizeable task force, including HMS Ark Royal, and substantial logistic support." [2924]

Foreign Secretary, Anthony Crosland (59 yrs), dies suddenly of a cerebral haemorrhage.

February 20th, in Stanley, Rowlands hold final meeting with Councillors.

> *"We understand that the Minister will have to have discussions on the sovereignty question while in Argentina. We realise that these discussions will take place under the sovereignty umbrella and so the stand of all parties concerned will remain unaffected..."* [2925]

"I found a general acceptance among the islanders that I should go to Buenos Aires to talk to the Argentine Government to see whether terms of reference for formal negotiations could be established. At the conclusion of my tour, however, it was for the islands' councils to say finally whether, in the light of my discussions with them direct and how they viewed islander reaction to the meetings I held, I should try to have discussions to see whether we could set up negotiations with the Argentine. The councils informed me that, in the light of all my consultations during my five days in Stanley and in the farm settlements, they could approve the Government's intention to try to establish a basis for negotiations with the Argentine. I should like to pay tribute to the spirit of realism and understanding and to the seriousness of approach to their problems which all those I met and who live and work on the islands have demonstrated." [2926]

February 21st, as Rowlands leaves Stanley, he is met by a large crowd of Islanders and handed a letter.

> *"We all wish you a safe and pleasant journey back to Britain and hope you will always remember your visit to the Falkland Islands.*
>
> *(Keep the Falklands Islands British)*
>
> *We fervently hope that you will recommend an extension to our airfield - this appears to be the only way that development of the Colony can take place.*
>
> *(Support the Falkland Islands' wish to stay British)*
>
> *We do not believe our economy to be stagnant. The wool industry is holding its value - in fact its value is increasing. This means more assistance to your balance of payments through increased hard currency and taxation.*
>
> *(The Falkland Islands want to stay British)*
>
> *We wish to have co-operation with Argentina only in the form of a normal relationship between any two countries.*

2924 Quoted in Elgood 2025 citing the Franks Committee 1983 p.13 para.36-37

2925 Statement by the Legislative Council.

2926 Rowlands addressing the Commons on March 1, 1977 in *Hansard: Commons: 1 March 1977 – Commons Chamber – Foreign Affairs vol. 927 col.320.* See link below

(Keep the Falkland Islands British)

We would like to see the infamous 'White Card' abolished'

(Support the Falkland Islands' wish to stay British)

We do not want Argentine participation within these Islands and only accept it in off-shore ventures insofar as within a fully international legal framework.

(The Falkland Islands want to stay British)

The South American way of life is as foreign to us as the oriental one is to you. Our cultures, laws, politics, language etc., are entirely different. If we wanted the South American way of life we would go there and live.

(Support the Falkland Islands' wish to remain British)

We do not acknowledge that Argentina has any legitimate claim on our Islands.

(Keep the Falkland Islands British)" [2927]

"Great Britain has begun the path towards the restitution of the Islands." [2928]

"The four and a half day visit by the Minister and two officials from the FCO was well covered by the British and Argentine press and international news agencies. Reports indicate that the Argentine press have distorted facts to support the Argentine propaganda machine." [2929]

"Dear Editor, Yes some of us did get a chance to meet Lord Ted Runway (sic) but had a job to get a word in as he talked so much that he filled the airspace. By the time he'd said how he'd come to listen, that "our hopes lie on the doorstep" (whatever that means!) twenty times, and how Wales' international airport is a "huge white elephant", he was off ... As a result of this morale boosting visit by one of our great chiefs and his entourage the Argentines are now claiming to be about to discuss our Constitution (Thank you BBC)." [2930]

In Buenos Aires, Minister Rowlands arrives for talks at Argentina's Foreign Ministry.

"I went to Buenos Aires and held two days of substantive talks with representatives of the Argentine Government. I gave an account of my visit to the islands and stressed the assurances given to the islanders by the Government that there would be full consultation throughout any negotiations and that any such negotiations would be conducted under the sovereignty umbrella. My talks in Buenos Aires were solely intended to establish whether terms of reference could be agreed for subsequent negotiations. I believe that, as a result of the talks that I held, we shall be able to make progress towards a possible agreement on future negotiations. However, there is still some way to go before concrete terms of reference can be agreed. ... We shall be exchanging further views with the Argentine Government on terms of reference through diplomatic channels and as a follow-up to my own talks." [2931]

2927 Quoted in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland islands Monthly Review* March 8, 1977 p.2. Also Ellerby 1990 p.214

2928 *Somos* February 25, 1977 no.23 pp.10-14

2929 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland islands Monthly Review* March 8, 1977 p.1 & p.6.

2930 Letter by A. Chater in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland islands Monthly Review* March 28, 1977 p.3

2931 Rowlands addressing the Commons on March 1, 1977 in *Hansard: Commons: 1 March 1977 – Commons Chamber – Foreign Affairs vol. 927 col.320.* See - https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1977-03-01/debates/d5a19852-49c9-47b6-9f34-15426596c567/ForeignAffairs

"I came back convinced that it was a perfectly legitimate and, in my opinion, important right of British foreign policy to defend the rights of a minority. ... I was also convinced that we could not actually over-rule the Islanders." [2932]

"In Buenos Aires, Rowlands confirmed Britain's willingness to discuss sovereignty but his visit to the Islands had changed him and he became a member of the UKFIC after he left office." [2933]

In London, after the unforeseen death of Anthony Crosland, Dr. David Owen takes over as Foreign Secretary.

> *"It seemed to me that we had an obligation to try and ensure the economic prosperity of the islanders, to reduce its isolation, and to accept that they would live happily in the region if there could be a mutual understanding with Argentina. Did I believe that the Islanders should have a veto on negotiations? My answer to that, ... was no."* [2934]

February 22nd, in Buenos Aires, following two days of talks between Rowlands and Minister Allara, a joint-statement is released while Rowlands flies back to the UK.

> *"The purpose of the meetings was to consider all aspects of the future of the Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, and Argentine-British economic cooperation in the area of the South-West Atlantic and to explore the possibility of establishing terms of reference for subsequent negotiations."*[2935]

".., the talks were much stickier than expected. It does not bode well for the next round, when the really difficult stage – of substantive negotiations – begins." [2936]

February 23rd, in London, *Guardian* newspaper journalist Richard Gott, in a piece on Rowland's round-trip, writes about the islanders.

> *"...(They) need to be told quite firmly.. that although they wish the islands to remain a British colony, the British in 1977 plainly do not. The Falkland Islands are an absurd colonial anachronism."*

February 28th, an editorial in the *Scotsman* newspaper suggests that the UK could insist on joint sovereignty.

"This proposal seems to have been rejected outright by Argentina, ..." [2937]

March 1st, in Britain's House of Commons, foreign affairs are debated. [2938] Answering questions, Foreign Secretary Dr. Owen refers to the Falkland Islands.

> *"It is concern for the rights of the individual that govern our policies towards our few remaining dependent territories. We cannot avoid responding to changing circumstances but we must consider at all times the wishes and interests of the people who are dependent upon us. ... The Government believe that a framework of greater political and economic co-operation in the region of the South-West Atlantic is necessary if we are to have any prospect of achieving a prosperous and durable future for the Islands.*

2932 Ted Rowlands interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.57
2933 Elgood 2025
2934 Owen quoted in Donaghy 2014
2935 Quoted in Bologna 1981
2936 *Charge d'Affaires* Shakespeare quoted in Donaghy 2014
2937 Bologna 1981 citing *La Nacion* March 1, 1977
2938 *Commons: 1 March 1977 – Commons Chamber – Foreign Affairs vol. 927 col.317 - 322*

The Government therefore decided that the time had come to consider both with the Islanders and with the Argentine Government whether a climate existed for discussing the broad issues which bear on the future of the Falkland Islands and the possibilities of co-operation between Britain and Argentina in the region of the South-West Atlantic. ..., any such discussions would inevitably raise fundamental questions in the relationship between the Islands, Britain and Argentina.

However, any changes which might be proposed must be acceptable to the Islanders whose interest and well-being are our main concern. In consequence there must be full consultation with the Islanders at every stage; nothing will be done behind their backs.

I now reaffirm these pledges. ... on the understanding that there would be full consultation at every stage, the Joint Legislative and Executive Council of the Islands gave their approval for the Minister of State to hold talks in Buenos Aires to try to establish a basis for negotiation with the Government of Argentina. These talks have not yet been concluded but I can assure the House that there has been and there will be no sell-out. That would be to betray the very principles which I believe guide our British foreign policy." [2939]

Minister Rowlands also takes questions.

"A number of hon. Members have raised questions about sovereignty, particularly the Government's attitude to bringing proposals to the House. The right hon. Member for Chipping Barnet (Mr. Maudling) asked for a specific assurance that the Government will not propose to Parliament a transfer of sovereignty without the full acceptance of the islanders. I can readily confirm that that is the Government's position, and I should like to emphasise that during any negotiations, as well as towards the end of the negotiations, there will be close and continual consultation with the islands' councils and their people. ...

I can assure the islanders that, before any decisions are made as a result of any negotiations, a Minister will return to the islands. The islanders deserve a relationship that is better than the one we have created between them and ourselves. They deserve a better relationship with those here who have a say in their future and their destiny. ... I have read a number of descriptions of our motives. They have described our discussions and possible negotiations. Some of the motives that have been described are not mine or the Government's. Neither I nor my right hon. Friend would be party to any sell-out of the islanders." [2940]

March 3rd, the 'Falkland Islands Research & Development Association' is incorporated as a non-profit making business into the UKFIC.

"This Association has been formed to represent the interests of the Falkland Islands Worldwide and to help to promote their development in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders." [2941]

*"Its objectives were to represent the interests of the Falklands and to promote the economic, social and cultural development of the Islands for the benefit of the inhabitants. The Association had four functions. First, to provide the **U.K.F.I.C.** and affiliated groups with an office and salaried staff in London. Secondly, to*

2939 *Commons: 1 March 1977 – Commons Chamber – Foreign Affairs vol. 927 col.207.* See - https://hansard.parliament.uk/commons/1977-03-01/debates/d5a19852-49c9-47b6-9f34-15426596c567/ForeignAffairs

2940 *Ibid. col.321*

2941 *Friends of the Falkland Islands Newsletter* June, 1977 no.1b. By no.2 (November, 1977), this had become the *Falkland Islands Newsletter.*

incorporate a members' organization to which sympathizers in Britain and the people of the Falklands could subscribe. Thirdly, to provide Islanders visiting Britain and anyone interested in the Falklands with an information centre. Fourthly, to stimulate the commercial implementation of the Shackleton Report's recommendations in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders." [2942]

March 4th, from the Embassy in Buenos Aires, a confidential cable to Dr. Owen warns that any negotiations could quickly come to a halt if Argentina's; *"human tights image in the UK worsened to the point that voices were raised in Parliament or Press about horrors of handing over Islanders to Mercies of Argentine Secret Police."* [2943]

March 11th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry proposes that there should be one set of negotiations; to include both sovereignty and economic cooperation. The UK government agrees.

"Allara was delighted. He emphasised the need to make a statement soon, since public opinion was getting 'restless.'... Shakespeare believed his desire for an early announcement was linked to his government's need to have something favourable to give the public, and offset the 'disastrous effect' of the forthcoming award to Chile." [2944]

March 16th, in the Falklands, in a broadcast, the Governor tells the Islanders that changes to the Constitution are being proposed which include the inclusion of six elected members to the legislature and the reduction of the voting age to 18.

March 18th, in Britain's *Private Eye* magazine;

> *"Connoisseurs of the Foreign Office news management will have noticed how the Falkland islands story has been handled. The F.O. considers that compared to British interests in the Argentine and assorted other dictatorships, the Falkland Islands are a drop in the bucket. Unfortunately for the F.O. the Shackleton Report made it perfectly clear that the Falklands had a viable economic future. In order to get around this, the F.O. assisted by the loyal hacks of the diplomatic lobby, have started to misquote the report. Contrary to the F.O. handouts, the report did not recommend £14 million expenditure, nor did it say that Argentinian co-operation was essential to future development. Instead it spoke of a small-scale £5.4 million development project spread over five years, to bring profitable industry to the Islands. The Islanders remain rightly suspicious of the F.O.'s interventions. The F.O. Have decided that rather than be seen to sell the Falklanders out, they should complicate or hinder all future development and thus let the Islands die a slow death."* [2945]

In London, the UKFIC receive a letter from Falklands Local Committee providing confidential details about the Argentine occupation of Morrell Island in Southern Thule. [2946]

March 23rd, in Britain's House of Commons, a written question is put down by John Biggs-Davison MP asking the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs what representations Minister Rowlands had received at Goose Green. Rowlands responds.

> *"During the public discussions I held with the Falkland Islanders at Goose Green, the local branch of the Falkland Island Committee read out an eight point statement, prepared before my arrival, which*

2942 Ellerby 1990 p.240. My emphasis. This would become the Falkland Islands Association.
2943 Elgood 2025 citing *Wikileaks 1977BUENOS1727_c*
2944 Donaghy 2014. The Beagle Channel arbitration decision had actually been reached *3* weeks before, but was not formally ratified by Queen Elizabeth II until April, 1977 and only announced in May, 1977.
2945 Quoted in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* August 31, 1977 pp.4 & 5
2946 Elgood 2025

expressed concern over discussion of the Falkland Islands sovereignty dispute with Argentina. I assured those present that, contrary to the suggestion in the statement, I had not discussed sovereignty with the Argentine Government en route to the Islands. I explained why the Government thought it right to establish whether Anglo-Argentine negotiations might be held and how United Kingdom sovereignty ever the Islands and the position of the Islanders would be fully protected. Those present at the Goose Green meeting indicated their satisfaction with these explanations and with the Government's intention to see whether a climate for Anglo-Argentine negotiations existed." [2947]

March 30th, in Britain's House of Commons, oral questions are put to Ministers. Rowland, answering a group of questions, assures the House that no negotiations have begun and that there will be full consultations with the Islanders. He adds; *"The extension of the runway, costing more than £5 million on current estimates, is a serious and important project, but it seems to us that on present evidence it would be hard to justify it. It could bear very heavily on the current revenue problems of the Islands. We have not closed the door to the project, but we need more convincing that it is viable."* [2948]

April 6th, in London, the UKFIC have a meeting at the FCO during which they mention the Argentine occupation in Southern Thule (Morrell Island); *"... the Committee was asked to keep the matter secret to avoid compromising negotiations. The request, which the FCO later denied making, was honoured. ... The FCO proposed making South Georgia Britain's gateway to Antarctica in the event of the Falklands becoming Argentine."* [2949]

In the UK, it is reported that a prominent Argentine businessman, César Cao Saravia is prepared to pay $US 10 million for the Falkland Islands Company; at least$1 million more than the asking price. [2950]

"The Board of Directors of the Company announced that they would not agree to a transfer of ownership to Argentine interests and pointed out that in any event a pre-emptive right to purchase the Company is vested in the Falkland Islands Sheep Owners' Association Ltd. and that the Islands Government would need to approve any transfer of control to an alien." [2951]

"The Falkland Islands Company, which exercised a strong oligopoly over the islands economic activity, received a British government's subsidy to stay in business. In view of that weakness, in 1977, the then President of the Board of Banco Tornquist, Héctor F. D. Capozzolo, conceived an oblique approach to recover Malvinas islands. The banker estimated that shareholders, who were receiving meagre dividends from their investment, could very well be tempted to sell their shares. He presented the plan to Minister Martínez de Hoz, who agreed on it and committed to financing the operation through the Argentine National Treasury. To conceal Argentina's intention, the negotiation was entrusted in the greatest secrecy to Mrs. Beau, president of France's Banque Occidentale. The transactions were well underway, even an approving nod from the British government had been received, until the local newspaper La Opinión disseminated the project and caused an immediate reaction in the House of Commons." [2952]

2947 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* March 28, 1977 p.6

2948 See (*cols 393 to 396*) - https://hansard.parliament.uk/Commons/1977-03-30/debates/e53a4059-851b-44ce-a957-1ebcf6129051/CommonsChamber

2949 Elgood 2025. Foreign Secretary Dr. Owen would later claim that he was not informed of the Morrell Island occupation until June, 1977. An omission by senior FCO officials that Owen believed was deliberate. Difficult to believe.

2950 There is some evidence that another Argentine entrepreneur, Hector Francisco Capozzolo was involved in the offer. In 1978, Capozzolo also attempted to purchase a Falklands Farm – Douglas Station. See below.

2951 *The Friends of the Falkland Islands: Newsletter* June 1977.See - https://www.fiassociation.com/wp-content/uploads/2023/10/FIA-NL-01B.pdf *cf.* July, 1972

2952 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023. Nod? No supporting evidence.

In London, Minister Ted Rowlands makes a statement regarding Saravia's offer.

> *"... no land can be alienated on Falkland Islands without the permission of the Falkland Islands Government itself; the British Government would not support such a move."*

April 20th, in Britain's House of Lords, the Falkland islands are debated. Viscount Boyd of Merton addresses the Chamber; [2953]

> *"The Shackleton inquiry, as noble Lords know, was conducted on the assumption that the political status of the Islands and their dependencies would remain the same as during the last century and a half, and this is what the islanders passionately desire for the future. The report stresses what it calls, "a striking vigour of feeling about sovereignty". Of course, as the report points out: Regional co-operation between different nations is as relevant to this part of the world as to other areas". But I was somewhat surprised to read in February some words said by the late Foreign Secretary, whose death grieved us all, and was a great loss to our country. He said that it was: "... implicit in many of the things Lord Shackleton says about tourism, fisheries, airport enlargement and so on, that in practice they can go ahead only in the framework of a wider economic co-operation in the South-West Atlantic." But that is not really what the report said. I refreshed my memory. It said: It is logical that in any major new development of the Islands' economy, especially those relating to the exploitation of the off-shore resources, co-operation with Argentine, even participation, should if possible be secured". There is a lot of difference between offshore and onshore development and if we want—and I shall refer to this briefly later on—to develop, for example, the largest concentration of seaweed (kelp) resources in the world, we can go ahead with the islanders with the infrastructure needed, and with the continuing development, without the consent of the Argentine."*

Lord Shackleton addresses the Chamber;

> *"I should like to stress one or two points on which I believe there are misconceptions. I have heard it said by certain people who ought to have known better that there is no real future in the land of the Falkland Islands. Nothing could be less true, and the potential for development and the already high quality (not the moderate quality, as has been suggested) is very great. But of course more needs to be done, and it has mystified us, as it mystified the noble Viscount, Lord Boyd of Merton, why some of the many recommendations in the past, with which we very largely agreed and which we reflected, have not been carried out. Overhanging everything is, first, the cost and, secondly, political uncertainty,... much of the off-shore development will call for international co-operation. I passionately desire to seek cooperation with the Argentine in these areas, but I must say that politics in the Argentine do not make this very easy. I should say to those who think that there is a short cut to viability through oil, that we made it very clear that it is in co-operation with the Argentine, with British expertise now in the matter of off-shore oil, that we can hope to see a useful development, both political and in terms of wealth. But while we have stressed the fact that there are areas in which development will proceed much faster with co-operation, we have also indicated, as the noble Viscount, Lord Boyd of Merton, made clear, that though that development could be faster, it is possible for development to proceed, with or without Argentine development, provided there is the will in this country.*

2953 *HL Deb 20 April 1977 vol 382 cc222-66.* See - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1977/apr/20/the-falkland-islands

... it has not been sufficiently appreciated that over the last 30 years the outflow of funds to the United Kingdom, largely in the form of company dividends and undistributed profits, has greatly exceeded the inflow made up of United Kingdom aid and Falkland Islands Government income from their United Kingdom investments. Successive United Kingdom Chancellors of the Exchequer, of all Governments, have gained substantial amounts from taxes on this outflow, particularly on dividends and profits. It is estimated very approximately that between 1951 and 1973 the United Kingdom direct tax take was about £1.9 million on dividends and profits—twice the amount given as United Kingdom aid to the Falklands. There are those people who think that, somehow, the Falklands have been living off the British: it is, in fact, the United Kingdom which has been living off the Falklands."

Representing the Government, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, Minister of State Foreign and Commonwealth Office, makes a statement.

"I have noted the emphasis placed by a number of speakers on the need for an extension of the airfield and the terms and manner employed by my noble friend in making this point. My honourable friend the Minister of State in the other place has said that the viability of such an extension would depend on a development of the major resources of the area, and the islanders themselves accept that the development of offshore resources depends very much on Argentine co-operation. ...[2954]

There is absolutely no doubt in this country in legal or Government circles about where sovereignty lies. It is here, in the United Kingdom. Having made that clear in every discussion we have had with the Argentine, we propose to go on making it clear as and when necessary. Successive Governments have made it clear, and all Ministers in this Government have made it clear that there will be no transfer except in the terms which my honourable friend used in the other place." [2955]

April 26th, simultaneously in Buenos Aires and London, a *Joint Communique* is released. Read to the House of Commons by Foreign Secretary, Dr Owen.

"The Governments of the Argentine Republic and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland have agreed to hold negotiations from June or July 1977 which will concern future political relations, including sovereignty, with regard to the Falkland Islands, ***South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands****, and economic co-operation with regard to the said territories, in particular, and the South West Atlantic, in general. In these negotiations the issues affecting the future of the Islands will be discussed and negotiations will be directed to the working out of a peaceful solution to the existing dispute on sovereignty between the two states, and the establishment of a framework for Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation which will contribute substantially to the development of the islands, and the region as a whole.*[2956]

A major objective of the negotiations will be to achieve a stable, prosperous and politically durable future for the Islands, whose people the Government of the United Kingdom will consult during the course of the negotiations. The agreement to hold these negotiations, and the negotiations themselves, are without prejudice to the position of either Government with regard to sovereignty over the Islands. The level at which the negotiations will be conducted, and the times and places at which they will be

2954 Moot, at best.

2955 *HL Deb 20 April 1977 vol.382 cc222-66.* For the full debate, see - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1977/apr/20/the-falkland-islands

2956 My emphasis. Not listed at the UN for decolonization, Dr. Owen's willing inclusion of South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands was not explained. It would cause some confusion after 1979.

held, will be determined by agreement between the two Governments. If necessary, special Working Groups will be established." [2957]

"There was no possibility of the Government getting the Islanders' agreement or legislation through the Commons. Nevertheless, on 26 April the FCO announced that the British and Argentine Governments had "Agreed to hold negotiations ..."." [2958]

May 6th, Britain's Department of Energy urge the Foreign Office to ensure that Argentina's planned seismic studies off its continental shelf, do not cross the median line between the Patagonian coastline and the Falklands archipelago; *"The worst would be to do nothing, ... as this could lead to 'our giving up without so much as a whisper the title to any oil which might lie beneath the sea outside the 200 metres line'. ..."* [2959]

"The FCO did nothing." [2960]

May 7th, in Argentina, following an attempted assassination of the Foreign Minister, the Montoneros Group claim responsibility. They assert that Guzetti had been negotiating a deal with Britain over the Falklands that would reduce Argentine sovereignty and allow for the exploitation of oil and the fisheries by British interests.

May 9th, in the UK, a British Petroleum (BP) executive, Dr. J. Birks, writes to the Foreign Office to seek an opinion on the likely attitude to BP setting up a consortium with Argentine companies in the search for oil around the Falklands. [2961]

"Birks added that the Falkland Islands Company had expressed an interest in joining such a consortium." [2962]

May 18th, in London, a cross-departmental meeting to discuss negotiations, is held at the Foreign Office.

"... Hugh Carless explained that the FCO envisaged splitting British possessions in the South Atlantic into four areas of consideration: the Falkland Islands; the 200 miles of sea around the Falkland Islands including their maritime and subterranean resources (oil and fish); the Dependencies of the Falkland Islands (South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands); and their 200-mile maritime zones. While leaseback would be the most appropriate solution for the Falkland Islands themselves, said Carless, there should also be a separate leaseback arrangement for the maritime zones, 'which would allow Britain to exploit the resources of the area'. In regard to the Dependencies and their maritime zones, Britain's aims should be 'to retain access to the economic resources'. ..." [2963]

May 20th, Britain's Ministry of Defence warns the Foreign Office that it intends to withdraw HMS *Endurance* in May, 1978. [2964]

May 23rd, in Buenos Aires, Vice-Admiral Oscar Montes is appointed as Argentina's Foreign Minister. [2965]

2957 *UN Doc A/37/553/Add.1*. Also quoted in *FCO 76/1892 Annex 2,* and Franks 1983 para.60.
2958 Elgood 2025
2959 Livingstone 2018 citing *Brown to Cortazzi May 6, 1977* in *EG 14/38*
2960 Elgood 2025
2961 *Birks to Rowlands May 9, 1977 FCO 7/3409*
2962 Livingstone 2018
2963 *Ibid.* citing *Record of a Meeting to discuss Anglo/Argentine Negotiations on the Falkland Islands Dispute May 18, 1977* in *EG 14/38*
2964 The Prime Minister refused to allow it. *cf.* February, 1976 above & November, 1977, below.
2965 Indicted in 2009 for crimes against humanity, including torture and murder, Montes died in September, 2012 before he could be sentenced.

May 31st, in Buenos Aires, John Shakespeare receives instructions from London to make a formal protest to the Argentine government regarding any seismic oil studies carried out in Falklands waters.

"The FCO also feared that inaction would weaken Britain's sovereignty claim, so in May 1977, it instructed its charge d'affaires to deliver a formal protest to the Argentine Government, noting: 'We must make sure that we do not prejudice our rights ... over the Falkland Islands Continental shelf in advance'. ..." [2966]

'Dundee Perth and London Shipping Company', owners of the 'Falkland Islands Company', are purchased by the 'Coalite Group PLC'.

June 10th, in a press release, the Argentine government reminds the populace that it is the **"**Day for the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector." [2967]

June 13th, in London, the Falkland Islands are discussed at a meeting of the Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee; *"The Committee decided that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going."* [2968]

"... Foreign Secretary David Owen felt that in order to secure the main objective of retaining the sovereignty over the Falkland Islands themselves, Britain should be prepared to concede sovereignty over the Dependencies and the maritime resources of both the Islands and the Dependencies. ... In speaking notes prepared for Owen, his case was made more explicit: "We have to get it across to Argentina that we are not after economic advantage at their expense, and that our concern for the Islanders is our real and genuine concern. I do not in any case believe that it is right for us to seek to secure for ourselves, economic resources 7000 miles away ... we should not lay ourselves open to accusations ... that we are economic imperialists."." [2969]

In the House of Commons, questions are asked of the Minister of Overseas Development by Sir Nigel Fisher MP.

> *"1. When will the four feasibility studies which she is undertaking arising from the Shackleton Report, and recommended by the Falkland Islands Government, be completed; 2. What plans she has to implement the recommendations contained in the Shackleton Report on the Falkland Islands.*
>
> *Mrs Hart replied: "Certain recommendations fall either to the private sector to implement or to the Falkland Islands Government themselves. Some of- the major suggestions which do or might involve aid, such as a possible extension of the Airport and the development of fisheries and tourism would require prior investigation which I would be prepared to initiate only when a framework of political and economic cooperation with Argentina has been established. My Advisers are at present considering a proposal from the Falkland Islands Government for a new school hostel in Stanley. At the Government's request I am setting up a study of internal communications covering the Air Service, roads and coastal shipping, to see what the needs in this field are and how they can best be met. I hope it will be completed not later than early next year. I am prepared to set up feasibility studies in other areas recommended in the Shackleton Report when the Falkland Islands Government request them, including sheepskin processing, mutton freezing and local television. I have also offered to provide advice to the Government if and when they enter into negotiations with any commercial enterprises that are prepared to explore those Shackleton recommendations which fall outside the aid programme.*

2966 Livingstone 2018 citing *FCO to British Embassy May 31, 1977 FCO 7/3409.* The protest was ignored, so Britain gave its own authorisation to the two American oil companies commissioned by Argentina, to survey within Falklands waters.

2967 It was not a public holiday and apparently most people paid no attention.

2968 Livingstone 2018

2969 Donaghy 2014 citing *Secretary of State's Meeting on the Falkland Islands June 13, 1977* in *FCO 76/1616.* Both noteworthy, and appalling. Dr. David Owen was prepared to give away British territory to appease a murderous dictatorship in South America. Most of Owen's arguments remain embargoed – i.e. unpublished, even today. An embarrassment, for any government.

The already considerable technical cooperation programme in the Falklands covers several of the Shackleton proposals, including an expanding Grasslands Trials Unit and the provision of fiscal advice, which is an essential preliminary to any social and economic development."..." [2970]

June 14th, in Stanley, the annual budget session of the Falklands Legislative Council commences.

"In reply to questions from Councillors, the Chief Secretary informed them that the Government hoped that the new Stanley airport would be acceptable for operation by LADE aircraft during July, that Camp mail drops would continue to receive very high priority and that it was hoped that all Camp settlements would be equipped with the new radio/telephone sets (AEL) within eight to nine months." [2971]

July 4th, in London, following a further discussion by the Cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee, the Foreign Office prepares for negotiations with Argentina. [2972]

"... serious and substantive negotiations were necessary to keep the Argentines in play, since the Islands were militarily indefensible except by a major, costly and unacceptable diversion of current resources." [2973]

"In July 1977, the then Labour Foreign Secretary, the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen), presented a paper to the Overseas and Defence Policy Committee which, as the report states "argued that serious and substantive negotiations were necessary to keep the Argentines in play, since the Islands were militarily indefensible except by a major costly and unacceptable diversion of current resources". The committee decided that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going. ... "Broadly speaking, the Government's strategy was to retain sovereignty as long as possible, if necessary making concessions in respect of the Dependencies and the maritime resources in the area, while recognising that ultimately only some form of leaseback arrangement was likely to satisfy Argentina"." [2974]

"A proposal to offer 'concessions over maritime resources' was put to the cabinet's Defence and Oversea policy Committee in July 1977. The Department of Energy was vehemently against this; a briefing note for Tony Benn noted that separating the continental shelf from the Islands could set a dangerous precedent for British claims in other areas... David Owen's DOP paper argued that if concessions on maritime resources were not enough, Britain should consider offering full leaseback of the Islands themselves." [2975]

"... from the mid 1970 onwards, British Ministers turned a blind eye to the cruel and repulsive nature of the military regime in Argentina and continued to negotiate with it, although it should have been plain to them that as repression grew the resolution of the Falkland Islanders to retain their links with Britain would be stiffened and opposition in both Houses of Parliament would gather momentum" [2976]

July 13th, in Rome, Italy, delegations from Argentina and the UK meet for three days of talks.

"A change of location did not alter proceedings... minimal progress was being made. Allara repeated that the principle of self-determination was 'absolutely inapplicable' to the Falkland Islands archipelago, and that the

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2970 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* June 15, 1977 p.5
2971 *Ibid.* July 18, 1977 p.2
2972 As of 2020, the minutes of this OD Committee meeting were still embargoed.
2973 Quoted by Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*
2974 *Falkland Islands (Franks report) HC Deb 15 January 1983 vol.35 cc789.870.* See - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/commons/1983/jan/25/falkland-islands-franks-report
2975 Livingstone 2018
2976 Sir Bernard Braine MP quoted in Elgood 2025.

restitution of Argentine sovereignty took priority over the economic dimension. … The British team were unimpressed. Cortazzi … (re-emphasised) that no British government could conform to proposals which were being forced on the Islanders." [2977]

"… the British put forward the 'mixed approach' in general terms (i.e. separating the Islands from their maritime zones and from the Dependencies), but did not make a specific offer to cede the sovereignty of the maritime zones. … The 'mixed approach' concept bemused the Argentine delegation, which continued to demand sovereignty over the whole area,…" [2978]

In London, on the same day, at the House of Commons, questions are put for the Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs. Questions refer to the right of self-determination; the discussion with Argentina and the new airport. Edward Rowlands MP responds on behalf of the Foreign Secretary;

> *"As was announced yesterday, the first round in Anglo-Argentine negotiations on the Falkland Islands dispute is taking place in Rome from 13th to 15th July. The topics for discussion are set out in the terms of reference for these negotiations which were announced on 26th April. The Government's commitment to the principle of self-determination will once again be made clear to the Argentine during the current negotiations. …*
>
> *We shall of course inform the Falkland Islanders about our actions and our approach to the talks. I have myself sent a message to the Island Council informing it in advance of the first round of talks. I made it very clear to the House when we debated the matter on 1st March that the Government would not even bring proposals to the House unless they had received the acceptance of the islanders themselves. …*
>
> *We have already carried out one extension of the airfield, which has only just been completed. The idea of extending it considerably to take very large international airliners has been the subject of considerable debate. It would be extremely expensive —a multimillion pound project—and on the basis of existing evidence we could not commit ourselves to it. However, we are willing to commission, when it seems appropriate, any preliminary studies necessary to investigate the matter further. …"* [2979]

"On the day that the talks commenced, questions by Members of Parliament were put to Mr Ted Rowlands in the House of Commons. In replying, Mr Rowlands gave assurance that the British Government would, once again, make clear to the Argentines its commitment to the principle of self-determination for Islanders and that HMG would inform Islanders about its actions and approach to the talks. Once again questions were asked about the possible extension to the permanent airport and the Minister of State said that he was a keen supporter of the Falkland Islanders' welfare but an extension would be a multi-million £ project and HMG feared that if the runway was extended and it turned out to be a white elephant it would be a considerable burden to the Islanders." [2980]

July 14th, *The Daily Mail* newspaper complains that talks are taking place "*behind Islanders' backs*."

"The (Falkland Islands) Committee's relationship with the Foreign Office was contradictory … antagonism derived from the campaign's propaganda, which centred on the accusation that the Foreign Office was secretly trying to persuade ministers to 'sell out' the Falklands – a charge FCO officials resented." [2981]

2977 Donaghy 2014
2978 Livingstone 2018
2979 *Commons Chamber vol 935 debated on Wednesday 13 July 1977 col.406*
2980 *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* July 18, 1977 p.1
2981 *Ibid.* Bill Hunter Christie, the Falkland Islands Committee founder and Chairman (from 1976), was a particular cause for concern at the FCO. An informal Foreign Office rule required that no official should meet him unaccompanied.

The British Labour Party's National Executive Council publish a resolution. [2982]

> *"We call on the Government to ensure that under no circumstances will the inhabitants of the Falkland Islands be handed over to any Argentine regime which violates human and civil right."*

"... while the Labour party's official statements did not persuade ministers to halt talks with Argentina, they did make them more cautious in their approach..." [2983]

July 15th, in Rome, talks end without any progress. A communique is issued.

> "*In accordance with the announcement made simultaneously by the Argentine and British Governments on 26th April 1977, delegations representing the two Governments met in Rome from 13th-15th July 1977 in order to conduct the first round of negotiations concerning future political relations; including Sovereignty, with regard to the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, and Anglo-Argentine economic co-operation with regard to the said territories in particular and the South West Atlantic in general.*
>
> *The two delegations were led respectively by Capt. Gualter Oscar Allara, Under Secretary for Foreign Relations of the Republic of Argentine and by Mr H.A.H. Cortazzi, Deputy Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.*
>
> *In accordance with the terms of reference for negotiations announced in the statement of 26th April 1977 the two sides conducted a full exchange of views in order to agree on the procedure for defining the issues to be covered in their negotiations.*
>
> *The discussions between the two delegations were conducted in a positive spirit. They led to a better awareness of the position of each side as a basis to continue to seek understanding. It was agreed that the negotiations now established should be continued at a further high level meeting to be held at the beginning of November. The venue for this second meeting would be decided upon through the diplomatic channel."* [2984]

"We are told that in the talks the British side put forward the idea that the sovereignty of the uninhabited dependencies might be "looked at separately" from the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands themselves. The Argentine reaction to that further signal is not recorded." [2985]

"Argentine proposals to establish 'working groups' were rejected by Cortazzi, who felt the gap was too large to begin discussing compromises. Allara suggested further negotiations in September but Cortazzi, citing party conferences and South Africa, said there would be no ministerial time until November. Allara accepted this and the talks fizzled out." [2986]

In London, Hugh Michael Carless, head of the Foreign Office's Latin America Department, is appointed *charge d'affairs* at Buenos Aires.

"During July, Hugh Carless assumed the thankless job of chargé d'affaires in Buenos Aires. He spent his first few weeks writing of Argentine dismay at the outcome of Rome. ... Carless was gloomy about the prospects: "I believe that, unless progress on some aspect of sovereignty can be achieved at the next round in November,

2982 *Argentina, Chile, Brazil: A Statement by the NEC of the Labour Party* July, 1977
2983 Livingstone 2018
2984 Quoted in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* July 18, 1977 p.1
2985 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*
2986 Donaghy 2014

there is a probability that they will consider whether to switch from a policy of negotiation to a policy of pressure". This was not an isolated report." [2987]

July 18th, in Argentina, President General Videla signs decree *2085* (unpublished) authorising the Navy Command to continue to occupy Morrell Island in Southern Thule.

"According to Secret Decree 2085, from 18 July 1977, and signed by then head of the military General Junta, Jorge Rafael Videla, the Ministry of Defense through the Navy's Command was authorized to continue and complete the logistic tasks and aspects for the mounting and necessary equipment leading to the effective and peaceful occupation of the island of Thule, part of South Sandwich islands. Through "Operation Sun", Argentina will reaffirm with scientific activities its rights and sovereignty over the South Atlantic islands occupied by the United Kingdom, added the decree. The foreign ministry considered these activities as necessary in support of Argentine foreign policy reaffirming National Sovereignty, underlined the secret decree. The first steps of Operation Sun had started during 1975 and 1976. The decree also provides funds from the 1977 Budget destined to Jurisdiction 47 of the Navy's commander in chief, some 300 million Argentine Pesos and US$ 100.000." [2988]

"The FCO kept the matter secret for sixteen months." [2989]

July 27th, in Britain's House of Commons, 140 backbenchers from all parties sign a motion acknowledging the Falkland Islanders' wish to remain British.

"The fear of a 'political storm' was uppermost in ministers' minds throughout the dispute. Every cabinet meeting which discussed the Falklands problem during Callaghan's period of office discussed the possible reaction of parliament." [2990]

July 28th, a meeting is held at the House of Commons, attended by the Falkland Islands Company, the Foreign Office and representatives of Britain's fishing industry.

"It was sponsored by James Johnson, the Labour M P for Kingston-upon-Hull West (a constituency seriously affected by the decline in the distant-water fishing fleet) and chaired by Bill Hunter Christie. As a result the S.A.F.C. [2991] *was formed composed of representatives from British United Trawlers, Christian Salvesens Ltd.., the Confederation of Fried Fish Caterers' Associations, the National Farmers' Union, the National Fish Fryers' Federation, the White Fish Authority, Alginate Industries Ltd. and the F.I.C."* [2992]

In the Falklands, in **August**, an expedition from Cambridge University arrives to collect data on wrecks. [2993]

In London a 'Falkland Islands Week' is held; *"... which included the presentation of a petition to 10 Downing Street. National newspapers produced photographs of Sukie Cameron, a daughter of Norman Cameron, modelling a 'Keep the Falkland Islands British' T-shirt."* [2994]

2987 *Ibid.* Carless had been dealing with the Falklands issue since 1973.
2988 *MercoPress* August 29, 2019
2989 Elgood 2025
2990 Livingstone 2018
2991 South Atlantic Fisheries Committee
2992 Ellerby 1990 p.250 citing *F.G. Mitchell papers, S.A.F.C. minutes, 28 July 1977. cf.* 1980
2993 *Cambridge Expedition to the Falkland Islands 1977: Report to the National Maritime Museum*
2994 Ellerby 1990 p.244

"... there are certain powerful influences whose intentions seem to conflict with opinion in the Islands. As an example, the Argentine government has appointed the second largest public relations company in the world to sway public opinion, principally through the media." [2995]

In **September**, in Falklands waters, Argentine Navy ships fire on Russian and Bulgarian fishing vessels.

In Ottawa, Canada, Adrian Monk, representing the Falkland Islands Legislative Council, attends the *23rd* Commonwealth Parliamentary Conference.

> *"We ... wonder why, when the Argentinian claim to our country is discussed in the United Nations and elsewhere, so few Commonwealth countries support our desire to retain our democratic, British way of life. We are continually being pressured to join with that country, whose way of life is alien to us, a country often without even the pretence of a democratic government, a country where human rights are virtually non-existent, a country with different cultures and a different language. ..."*

September 25th, in Britain, the *Observer* newspaper, asks whether the Foreign Office are intent upon "*giving away*" the archipelago. In *The Sunday Times*:

> *"The Falkland Islands have undoubtedly suffered from the amalgamation of the Commonwealth Office with the Foreign Office; passing under the control of the Latin American department whose main care is to foster easy relations with those States, not to defend a handful of people's rights to self determination."* [2996]

In the South Atlantic, Argentina's navy '*arrest*' two Soviet and two Bulgarian fishing vessels operating within 170 miles of the Argentine coast near Comodoro Rivadavia. Two Bulgarian trawlers *Aurelia* and *Ofelia* are hit by cannon fire and damaged. [2997]

October 4th, Britain's Foreign Office prepare for a new round of talks with Argentina, scheduled for November.

"Rowlands sent Owen a four-page minute outlining the FCO position. It contrasted sharply with the cautious approach adopted at Rome. Leaseback was now being pushed to the front of the agenda; a development which would again illustrate the differing views of Foreign Office diplomats and senior ministers." [2998]

October 6th, in the Falkland Islands, Legislative Council elections are held under the new constitution. Six councillors are elected. [2999]

"In October, the Argentines caused petrol rationing by failing to deliver supplies: Argentine tankers refused to fly the Red Ensign courtesy flag. ... Since may 1977, when the monopoly was applied, the price of petrol has been increased by about 33 percent. Exercising her monopoly of transport, the Argentine has raised the price of air fares no less than nine times this year." [3000]

October 24th, November negotiations are postponed until December.

2995 *Falkland Islands Committee – Letter from London August 11, 1977* in *The Falkland Islands Times & Falkland Islands Monthly Review* August 31, 1977 p.8

2996 *Why do the British want to Quit* Penelope Tremayne in *The Sunday Times* September 25, 1977

2997 One Bulgarian sailor was injured while three Argentines drowned when their boarding launch capsized. Speculation at the time placed the incident within Falklands waters.

2998 Donaghy 2014

2999 Held under the *Falkland islands (Legislative Council) (Amendment) Order 1977.*

3000 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November, 1977 no.2

October 26th, in Buenos Aires, Britain's *charge d'affairs* Hugh Carless is summoned to the Foreign Ministry; to be told that Argentina intends to complete its installation on Morrell Island in the Southern Thule group.

> *''Unless we are prepared to deploy sufficient power physically to dislodge the Argentines from Southern Thule, we must surely tolerate them as squatters...''* [3001]

October 28th, in London, Britain's Joint Intelligence Committee (JIC) reports its concern regarding Argentina's increasingly hostile attitude. In particular, the belligerence of the Argentine Navy which has announced its refusal to fly the Falklands' red ensign while in Port Stanley.

On the same day, the House of Commons rises at the end of its 1976-1977 parliamentary session.

"Just before the House rose at the end of 1977, Sir Bernard Braine tabled an Early Day Motion of support for the Islanders which attracted 180 MPs signatures in a very short time. No fewer that 37 former ministers gave their support. Yet within a few days FCO Minister Ted Rowlands met the Argentines in New York and reached an agreement on setting up two joint working parties, one on sovereignty and the other on (the) economic development of the Falklands. The working parties met in Lima on 17 February 1978." [3002]

November 3rd, in the House of Commons, during the debate on the Loyal Address, Michael Clark Hutchinson MP raises the proposed Anglo-Argentine talks.

"I view the development with suspicion and distaste. The talks are not necessary. However, if they are to take place, I urge the government to ensure that representatives of the Falkland Islands Government attend the talks, that they have full status, that their voice is heard and that their standing is equal to that of any ministers or officials from this country." [3003]

November 10th, in New York, at the United Nations building, the Fourth Committee considers the report of the Special Committee on Decolonization. Representatives of Ghana and Zaire assert the self-determination rights of the inhabitants of the Falklands. Argentina claims that three General Assembly resolutions have established that the dispute could only be resolved through negotiations between itself and the UK; taking into account the '*interests*' of the inhabitants, but with no application of self-determination.

In London, on the same day, during a House of Lords debate, Lord Morris speaks at length on the subject of the Falkland Islands,

"Lord Morris ... demanded to know whether representatives of the Islanders would be present at negotiations. Lord Morris said that the government had shown little evidence of good faith or good will in their actions since the publication of the Shackleton Report, in particular their lack of action on the airfield extension." [3004]

November 16th, in London, the Secretary of Defence reluctantly accepts the need to retain HMS *Endurance* in the South Atlantic for the foreseeable future.

November 21st, following an intelligence assessment concluding that Argentina may be planning an incident along the lines of the Southern Thule encroachment, British Ministers decide to establish a military presence in the area.

3001 *Carless to Owen October 27, 1977* in *FO 7/3375*
3002 Elgood 2025
3003 Quoted in the *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November, 1977 no.2
3004 *Ibid.*

"We deployed forces in 1977 because we discovered that there were to be major problems in the negotiations. At that time I was an inexperienced Minister and therefore I approached the then Prime Minister, my right hon. Friend the Member for Cardiff, South-East (Mr. Callaghan), ... I put it to my right hon. Friend that the deployment of force could be an over-reaction that would lead to a reaction that would trigger a host of uncontrollable events. ... My right hon. Friend asked me, "Can you guarantee or assure me that there will not be a threatened invasion and that you will be able to keep the talks going?". I replied, "No, Prime Minister, I cannot guarantee that". My right hon. Friend responded by saying "Let me remind you of an old truth: it is better to be safe than sorry"..." [3005]

From Stanley, the Legislative Council urge the British Government to implement Shackleton's proposals.

> *"We must not be deterred from initiating and developing such ventures as coastal and off-shore fishing and similar activities merely because this would be against the appeasement policy of the British Government towards Argentina."* [3006]

November 22nd, Britain's FCO decide that Islands' representatives should not attend talks with Argentina.[3007]

"The newly elected councils had given no indication that islanders wished to participate at these talks (a similar stance to Rome). Instead it was agreed that Ted Rowlands, popular after his successful February visit, would meet islander representatives in Rio de Janeiro shortly after the New York summit had been concluded."[3008]

November 24th, frigates HMS *Alacrity* and HMS *Phoebe* are ordered to proceed to the South Atlantic, and to stand-off about a thousand miles distant from the Falklands (*Operation Journeyman*). [3009]

November 26th, from Gibraltar, nuclear submarine HMS *Dreadnought,* is ordered to close on the Falklands.

> *"Commanding officers and aircraft captains are to respond to any aggression with tactful firmness and are to exhibit a determination to meet any escalation, though not to exceed that already carried out by the enemy. All use of force must be governed by the principle of using only the minimum force necessary to achieve the aim."* [3010]

*"The papers, released to the National Archives, show that Lord Owen insisted the mission be conducted in intense secrecy, with not even the crews being told where they going. While **the Argentinian government was privately warned** by the British that there was a **nuclear submarine in the area**, the rest of the world was unaware of what was going on. The papers show a high degree of nervousness within Whitehall over the operation - not least about its legality. Ministers wanted to be able to declare an exclusion zone around the islands - as was done in 1982 - but the suggestion was met with concern among officials. A handwritten note by one warned that it could be "politically escalatory, probably illegal and could set an unwelcome precedent" as well as possibly requiring British ships to fire the first shot. The problem was, he warned, was that it would be "dependent on intelligence" that an actual Argentine invasion force was approaching the islands. He suggested they could get round some of the difficulties by not calling it an exclusion zone and not making it public, with the Argentinians being told only when they were told of the*

3005 Rowlands in the House of Commons – *HC Deb 03 April 1982 vol 21 cc633-68.*
3006 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.218 citing *Leg.Co. minutes, 21 Nov. 1977.*
3007 Despite previous assurances to both Houses of Parliament.
3008 Donaghy 2014.
3009 *Operation Journeyman.* James Callaghan only revealed this operation to Parliament in 1982.
3010 Quoted in *Secret Falklands task force revealed* Ben Fenton in *The Telegraph* June 1, 2005

presence of the submarine. In the event, the issue was "deliberately fudged", while the then attorney general Sam Silkin was only asked for his advice on the legality of the operation after the ships had sailed. The concerns were such that HMS Dreadnought was told in its rules of engagement that if it was attacked by Argentine anti-submarine weapons it should "surface or withdraw at high speed submerged, whichever will be of least risk to life".” [3011]

“The run up to the first round of talks with the Argentines, fixed for December 1977 proved as fraught and intense as the earlier contacts. Intelligence emphasized the mercurial role played by Admiral Massera, impatient with the lack of progress in the negotiations and, seemingly, with his fellow Junta members. The incident involving the Admiral Storni in 1976 and the occupation of Southern Thule were attributed to him and the naval 'hawks'. Following detailed discussions within the department and with the Ministry of Defence, Prime Minister Callaghan and Foreign Secretary Owen, all concerned agreed that a task force including a nuclear submarine should support the talks; if they went badly the Argentines would be told of the Force's presence.” [3012]

“In mid-Atlantic we rendezvoused with "HMS Alacrity", RFAs "Resource" and "Owen" were to join us later,... At that stage the ship’s companies were briefed on our mission. We were told that Operation Journeyman had been ordered by the then Prime Minister, James Callaghan, as fifty Argentine ‘scientists’ had landed on Southern Thule in the South Sandwich Islands, prompting fears of an Argentine invasion of the Falklands. Apparently the Argentines had set up a military base on Thule. ... We were to set up a 50 mile security zone and any ships entering the zone were to be asked to identify themselves and state their intentions....” [3013]

“The rules were quite explicit... If Argentine ships came within 50 miles of the Falkland Islands and were believed to have displayed hostile intent, the submarine was to open fire.” [3014]

“During 1976-77, Argentina had challenged Britain's claims to the Falkland islands. The Labour government had responded with firm diplomacy, silently backed by deploying a nuclear-powered attack submarine and a ten-man GCHQ team to the area. This combination of force and intelligence trumped any likely Argentine attack, but Argentina did not know of their presence, and folded in the face of British determination rather than through deterrence.” [3015]

In the Falkland Islands, Stanley Airport officially opens for operations. [3016]

“The airport was first used on November 24, 1977 ... Bill Luxton tells the story of the airport’s first use - "The day before the flight Jim Kerr had heard that the Argentines were planning to officially land at the airport. ...(so) Jim telephoned me later

3011 *How Britain averted a Falklands invasion in 1977* in *The Guardian* June 1, 2005. A similar article by the BBC on the same date, employed exactly the same words, possibly suggesting that the released file provided few details. Whether or not the Argentines were warned, privately or otherwise, remains moot. See below.

3012 *Rowlands, Edward (Ted)* in *Dictionary of Falklands Biography* Tatham (ed) 2008. Authored by Ted Rowlands. See https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/rowlands_edward

3013 Chris Cole, Supply Officer aboard HMS *Phoebe* quoted in *Mercopress* August 8, 2012 citing the July 2012 edition of the *South Georgia Newsletter.*

3014 Foreign Secretary David Owen quoted in Donaghy 2014. Following the revelation in 1982 of this task force’s deployment there was some controversy over the accuracy of Owen’s memory regarding the rules of engagement. See Donaghy 2014, for a full account.

3015 *Behind the Enigma: The Authorised History of GCHQ, Britain's Secret Cyber-Intelligence Agency* John Ferris 2020

3016 At the last minute, LADE cancelled the first flight citing 'administrative difficulties.'

and said the Argentines were planning to make the first landing and asked me, 'How do you feel about pre-empting them?' My response was, 'absolutely" so we met down near the Hookers Point strip the next morning. We went in and landed there and left the aircraft on the airfield that night. The Argentines were bloody furious; they had wanted a senior Argentine air force officer to open the airport."..” [3017]

November 28th, in New York, at the UN, the General Assembly defer consideration of the Falkland Islands until 1978.

December 1st, in Britain, the *Financial Times* reports that *“major international oil companies”* are to carry out seismic exploration for oil in the waters around the archipelago.

A week later than announced, LADE makes its first landing at Stanley Airport.

December 7th, in Britain's House of Commons, the Government is questioned as to why it is prepared to negotiate with a *“Fascist-type dictatorship about the future of a democratic British community.”* [3018] Minister of State, Ted Rowlands, responds:

> *“... we are negotiating because, following my visit to the islands and by agreement with the islands council, it was decided that it was necessary to have negotiations on the economic and sovereignty issues. Otherwise we would let the stalemate of the position of the islands continue, and that would be a much worse prospect for the islanders themselves. ...”*

MP Jeremy Thorpe asks:

> *“Will he confirm that Argentina has not accepted that part of the Hague Convention whereby it agreed to be bound by the decision of the International Court? Does this not shed some light on its lack of competence in international law in laying claim to the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands? May we take it that the question of sovereignty is not a matter that the Minister regards as being for negotiation in his New York meetings later this month?”*

Ted Rowlands replies:

> *“On the first part of the question, yes, that is the position... Sovereignty has been part and parcel of the terms of reference of the negotiations and will therefore be subject to negotiation in New York. ... They are not just about sovereignty they are about the whole issue of political and economic cooperation between Britain, Argentina and the Falkland Islands. ... Sovereignty issues are also involved. I repeat yet again that we shall not bring any proposals to the House unless they are acceptable to the islanders.”* [3019]

“The Labour government also accepted the FCO's argument that Britain needed to pursue good relations with Argentina in order to resolve the Falklands dispute – ignoring the party's official policy that the Islanders should not be handed over to a regime that abused human rights.” [3020]

December 8th, the London Falkland Islands Office organises a ceremony at the Cenotaph to commemorate Falkland Islands Battle Day 1914. [3021]

3017 *Penguin News* December 6, 2002
3018 Sir Bernard Braine in *HC Deb 07 December 1977 vol.940 cc1359-64*
3019 *HC Deb 07 December 1977 vol.940 cc1359-64*
3020 Livingstone 2018 p. 153
3021 Now an annual event

December 12th, reported in *The New York Times* -

> *"Britain begins high level negotiations in New York tomorrow that may well lead to a change in the status of the Falkland Islands, one of the 15 remaining colonial fragments, of the British Empire. ... But Argentina has claimed the Falklands, on and off, since 1828 (sic). Now the British have finally agreed to discuss with the Argentines, at the ministerial level, the questions of sovereignty and economic development. ... But the issues to be discussed are as tangled and as hotly argued as the ones in a nuclear weapons negotiation. ... The Falkland islanders know perfectly well that they could not survive as an independent state, especially with a hostile Argentina close by. What they want, as they regularly make clear in petitions to Parliament signed by almost every one of them, is to remain a colony, no matter how anachronistic that seems to outsiders. British governments used to pledge that they would never yield sovereignty against the wishes of the islanders, and that no pressure would be nut on the islanders to change their views. But the islanders, who will not be present at the meeting in New York, are already under pressure. ... Only the stable political situation that the British Government can insure, say the islanders' supporters, will attract the foreign investment needed to exploit the economic opportunities. The Government, on the other hand, apparently believes that the best hope lies in a wide-ranging agreement between Britain and Argentina for joint economic development and gradual political transition.*
>
> *So when Ted Rowlands, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, sits down opposite Capt. Oscar Allara, the Argentine deputy Foreign Minister, for three days of negotiations, the questions of sovereignty and development will be intertwined. The British want economic cooperation first, with political change coming later, while the Argentines put things in the reverse order."* [3022]

"... it had been quite clear from the main FCO briefing that, had they not been under government pressure, the officials concerned, being apparently heartily sick of the subject, would have let the Argentinians have the Islands. One diplomat said to me privately, as we left the 12 December meeting, that he wasn't sure that any long-lasting effects would be felt if we abandoned the Islands to the Argentinians. Disgracefully, he wasn't thinking about the inhabitants or their wishes!" [3023]

December 13th, in New York, two days of Anglo-Argentina talks commence.

"Gaulter Allara opened proceedings by venting frustration over the lack of progress on sovereignty. ... Rowlands assured the captain that his government had no desire to conduct Byzantine (never ending) talks, pointing out that it had 'crossed the Rubicon' in February by taking the decision to discuss sovereignty. The Argentine premise, Rowlands argued, was that the negotiations were simply related to how and when Britain would transfer sovereignty. But the British government's concern was with how a compromise could be reached.... If the issue was the principle of sovereignty there could be scope for discussion. But if Argentina wished to 'transform the islanders, exercise all the actual attributes of sovereignty over them', then there would be considerable difficulty." [3024]

The Argentine delegation propose an 8-year joint administration before a recognition of total Argentine sovereignty by Britain. Rowlands rejects this; instead offering a '*mixed approach*' - involving economic cooperation and the possibility of cessions from amongst the Dependencies. Allara rejects these proposals.

3022 *British, Argentines Hold Falkland Talks* in *The New York Times* December 13, 1977.

3023 Southby-Tailyour 1990. In December, 1977, Southby-Tailyour was being briefed to take over command of NP-8901 in March, 1978.

3024 Donaghy 2014. Also *Minutes of Anglo-Argentine Talks, December 13-15, 1977* in *FO 7/3394*

The Argentines are not informed about the squadron lying off the Falkland Islands.

"... there seems to be a difference of view between the then Prime Minister and the then Foreign Secretary about the events in 1977. The right hon. Member for Cardiff, South-East (Callaghan) said that this (task) force in 1977 became known and that a diplomatic solution followed, whereas the right hon. Member for Plymouth, Devonport (Dr. Owen) said yesterday on the radio that it was done in total secrecy but he added that it gave him confidence in his negotiations, whatever that might mean." [3025]

"The Argentine government was privately warned by the UK that a nuclear submarine was in the area, but other countries were said to be unaware." [3026]

December 14th, in New York, a final statement emerges from the negotiation.

> *"The two sides recognized that there was a wide range of issues involved which would require detailed study. They accordingly agreed to establish at official level two parallel working groups on political relations, including sovereignty, and on economic co-operation, to pursue these studies in depth and to report back to the heads of delegations. ... A further round of negotiations will be held ..."* [3027]

"The broad Falkland Islands 'lobby' had both parliamentary leverage and informal social access to influence policy makers. It was strong enough to make ministers and officials extremely cautious in negotiations with Argentina and helped to ensure that no agreement on sovereignty was ever reached. Although the Cabinet had agreed in principle to explore leaseback, it was never formally proposed to Argentina during Labour's period of office." [3028]

"*At the New York talks in December Rowlands tabled a paper expressing HMG's willingness to discuss fresh sovereignty arrangements in favour of Argentina in relation to the dependencies, and to explore cooperation to develop the continental shelf resources. However, the paper asserted that it was essential that sovereign rights in respect of the Falkland Islands should continue to rest with Britain, and that the present system of administration and government of the Islands should be maintained. Rowlands did not include in the discussions the other possible arrangement - leaseback - having been convinced that such a proposal would have been totally unacceptable to the Islanders. Fortunately, there was sufficient interest within the Argentine delegation in the novel proposals on sovereignty to agree a communiqué setting up two working parties - economic cooperation and political development."* [3029]

December 16th, in Britain's House of Commons, a debate is held to consider Lord Shackleton's report. MP Hugh Fraser raises the Falklands negotiations.

> *"Today, we have had an announcement in The Times of what has happened in the joint talks. It seems that the British and the Argentine Governments have agreed to form two joint working parties on the issues of sovereignty and economic development. I do not want to go into the issue of sovereignty, but I do not see how we can have an effective working party on a matter which should be a subject for a judicial decision. A working party seems to be a bit of a nonsense. The subject of that working party, I would have thought, should be one for The Hague court.*

3025 Defence Secretary John Nott in the House of Commons debate of April 3, 1982. See December 20, below.
3026 *Secret Falklands fleet revealed* BBC News June 1, 2005. Unsupported by the available evidence.
3027 *UN Doc A3323/Rev.1 vol.4*
3028 Livingstone 2018
3029 *Rowlands, Edward (Ted)* in Tatham (ed) 2008 pp.465-468. Authored by Ted Rowlands.

With regard to the second working party, I would have thought that there was grave danger of burying the Shackleton Report before it is implemented. Lord Shackleton spent four months finding out what the developments were. I suggest that a further working party on economic development would only support what Lord Shackleton, recalling the 20 earlier reports, said in his report.

When asked to define the Falkland Islands, he said: "The Falkland Islands is a piece of land entirely surrounded by advice". There is far too much of that already." [3030]

Responding, Parliamentary Secretary to the Ministry of Overseas Aid, John Tomlinson, makes a statement.

"British aid is not imposed on the Falkland Islands but is provided at the request of, and after discussion with, the Falkland Islands Government – we have to consider the amount of aid which the Falkland Islands can absorb without putting strains on its economy. The islands have hitherto been self-supporting, in the sense that the United Kingdom has not provided them with financial means to balance the budget." [3031]

December 18th, in Rio de Janeiro, Edward Rowlands meets with the Governor and Falkland Island Councillors. To update them on the progress of negotiations.

"Rowlands remained in New York anxiously awaiting news of the Junta's reaction to this communiqué and only when it was favourable did he leave to brief the Islanders' deputation in Río. They accepted his exploring these proposals further." [3032]

December 20th, in the South Atlantic, the Royal Navy squadron receives instructions to quietly retire. [3033]

"66. Cabinet Committee papers show clearly that it was agreed that the force should remain covert. We have found no evidence that the Argentine Government ever came to know of its existence." ... In the event the negotiations went reasonably well. The Argentine threat receded, and it was agreed after the talks that the naval force could be withdrawn." [3034]

"According to the report, Ministers accepted that, such a force would not be able to deal with a determined Argentine attack"..." [3035]

"No evidence has emerged that Argentina was made aware of the British defence plans... Owen, a close friend of Callaghan has always maintained that Operation Journeyman remained covert." [3036]

"The more I consider the 1977 deployment, the more I realise what an irresponsible and useless act it was." [3037]

3030 *HC Deb 16 December 1977 vol.941 cc1226-36*

3031 *Ibid*

3032 *Rowlands, Edward (Ted)* in Tatham (ed) 2008. Written by Rowlands. Link above

3033 *Owen to Callaghan, January 6, 1978* in *PREM 16/1504.* On March 30, 1982, with an Argentine force approaching the Falklands, this deployment was revealed by James Callaghan in the House of Commons.

3034 *Franks Committee (UK) Falkland Islands Review Committee Report* 1983. During the hearings held by the Franks Committee in 1982, Callaghan declined to give any evidence; forcing the Committee to conclude that there was nothing to suggest that the information had been supplied to Argentina. In the debate of January, 1983, following the publication of the Franks Report into the origins of the 1982 war, ex-PM Callaghan again declined to answer clearly whether or not the 1977 deployment had been made known to Argentine negotiators. Despite being pressed on the inconsistencies in Labour's 1982 claims, Callaghan remained evasive on the issue, before finally refusing to answer any and all questions. Argentina denied having been informed.

3035 Baroness Young during the debate on the Franks Report – *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

3036 Donaghy 2014

3037 John Nott quoted in Donaghy 2014 p.17

"It is disputed whether the Argentine Government was warned of their presence. Bichenco and others claim Callaghan lied when he said in the House of Commons that the Argentines were notified." [3038]

December 24th, press reports speculate that the Foreign Office is intent on pressurising the Falkland Islanders into accepting a reduction in the level of sovereignty over the archipelago. [3039]

1978 – January 7th, in Antarctica, at Argentina's *Esperanza* base, a boy – Emilio Marcos Des Palma Morella – is born. [3040]

> *"2. No acts or activities taking place while the present Treaty is in force shall constitute a basis for asserting, supporting or denying a claim to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica or create any rights of sovereignty in Antarctica. No new claim, or enlargement of an existing claim, to territorial sovereignty in Antarctica shall be asserted while the present Treaty is in force."* [3041]

"In 1978 the world's first Antarctic baby was born at Esperanza Base. Esperanza Base has also been the site of a wedding carried out by an official of the Argentine government. As (a) specific instance for asserting sovereignty during the treaty period (this is) of little consequence. However, they do demonstrate Argentinian intentions and will by means of demonstrating occupation, Argentina intends to emerge from a treaty period in the strongest possible position. In the event of treaty termination, or withdrawal from the treaty, the mere continuation of Argentina's considerable activities would have relevance to the validity of claim under international law. Argentina's long-range objective is to emerge from the treaty period with a predominant presence in the Antarctic." [3042]

"In the case of the "Antarctic question", it should be taken into account that, if traditionally this was an area where the Armed Forces perceived they had a "special responsibility", this feeling increased considerably in the reference period. It could be affirmed that Argentina followed a "double standard" policy in relation to Antarctica, that is, continuity in participation within the Antarctic System but, at the same time, a high "consumption" of the image of sovereignty at the internal level. The latter can be found in a "multiplicity of measures and actions tending to affirm Argentine rights in the claimed Antarctic sector. Among them stands out, without a doubt, the implementation, at the beginning of 1978, of a "population policy" through the settlement of families at the Esperanza Base, marriages and the first births were registered, inaugurating, in May of the same year, the First Antarctic School for its inhabitants." [3043]

"As well as claiming the Beagle Channel islands, the Argentine junta sought to strengthen Argentina's claim to a segment of Antarctica by arranging for the wives of several military officers to give birth to their babies in the maternity facilities at the Argentine army Antarctic base "Esperanza". In the course of this exercise in what may be called a "claim by parturition", eight babies were born between 1978 and 1983." [3044]

January 9th, Argentina presses for talks to take place earlier than planned. Foreign Secretary Owen accepts the proposal.

3038 Elgood 2025

3039 Mentioned in a House of Lords debate on January 25, 1978 (*vol.388 col.339*)

3040 Not the first person born in Antarctica however. An Australian, James Robinson, was born to the wife of a sealing captain on March 11, 1859. The first British birth certificate for Antarctica was issued to Solveig Jaconsen, born October 8, 1913. It seems unlikely that getting born somewhere, gives sovereignty rights to the country of the child's mother.

3041 *Antarctic Treaty 1959* Article.4

3042 Hall 1983

3043 *Cambios y continuidades en la política antártica argentina, 1959-1983* Miryam Colacrai de Trevisan 1997

3044 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.617

January 25th, in a letter to Chile, Argentina formally rejects the decision of the arbitral Court regarding its dispute over the Beagle Channel (PNL) Islands. Argentina, however, fails to inform the arbitration panel or the Hague judges of its decision. [3045]

> *"... the Government of the Argentine Republic, after carefully studying the arbitral Award by Her Britannic Majesty on the Beagle Channel dispute, has decided to declare the Arbitrator's decision irrevocably null and void under international law."* [3046]

"... they would consider the violation of a treaty no greater offence than a lie told by schoolboy. With the Bey of Tripoli or the Emperor of Morocco we might for a time maintain unviolated the provisions of a Treaty but with these people if a temporary advantage could be gained they would violate a treaty on the day of its ratification." [3047]

"Argentina repudiated today an international arbitration decision awarding three disputed islands to Chile, but, according to military sources here, it will not press its claims by armed force. The dispute over the 1slands Nueva, Picton and Lennox at the eastern entrance to the Beagle Channel in Tierra del Fuego has led to tension between the military Governments of Argentina and Chile and fears of armed conflict. The arbitration decision was issued on May 2 and is due to go into effect next week. The Argentine decision to reject the ruling is a drastic move under inter- national law, since both Argentina and Chile agreed to accept it. Vice Adm. Oscar Montes, Argentina's Foreign Minister, announced the rejection on television tonight 12 hours after informing Chiles Ambassador." [3048]



"The strategic importance of the Falkland Islands is recognised in a recent issue of the U.S. Military magazine "Parameters". A lengthy article on the dispute between Chile and Argentina over the Beagle Channel,... states that "if Argentina loses her dispute with Chile, her interests in the Falkland Islands will also be jeopardized". [3049]

"., Argentina, having accepted the jurisdiction of an international court of arbitration on the Beagle Channel dispute with Chile, then refused to accept its results. It is difficult to believe in Argentina's good faith with that very recent example in mind. ... it would be hard to have confidence that Argentina would respect a judgement that it did not like." [3050]

3045 Argentina's reasoning included a) Deformation of arguments in that the arbitral tribunal had distorted and misrepresented its legal and historical claims to the islands. b) Internal contradictions which had undermined the awards logical and legal coherence. c) Bias due to the influence of the UK. d) Errors in interpreting historical treaties and e) procedural irregularities. The rejection was a breach of International Law, as the 1971 Arbitration Agreement was binding on both parties. See March 8, 1978, below.

3046 *Minister for Foreign Affairs of the Argentine Republic to the Ambassador of Chile in Argentina January 25, 1978*

3047 US *charge d'affaires* to Buenos Aires, Francis Baylies, speaking of the possibility of a treaty between the USA and the Argentina Confederation in July, 1832. Quoted in Caillet-Bois 1982 (6th ed.) p.252

3048 *Rthe New York Times* January 26, 1978

3049 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November, 1978

3050 Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher speaking to the House of Commons *HC Deb 29 April 1982 vol.22 cc980-1059*

In the UK, reviewing the situation following Argentina's Beagle Channel decision, Britain's Foreign Office conclude that Argentina's failure in its dispute with Chile has increased pressure on the junta to gain some success elsewhere. The Falkland Islands are mentioned.

"This dispute, in fact, impacted upon the Anglo-Argentine exchanges in Lima when, surprisingly, the Argentines insisted that the Islands did not generate a continental shelf, a factor in the Beagle Channel issue."[3051]

On the same day, in Britain's House of Lords, Lord Mottistone refers to rumours and asks about the *"present position regarding the Falkland Islands."*

> *"Lord Goronwy-Roberts: My Lords, the position is clear. With the agreement of the Falkland Islands Council, we are conducting negotiations with Argentina covering political relations, including sovereignty and economic co-operation. As the terms of reference state, a major objective of the negotiations is to achieve a stable, prosperous and politically durable future for the Falkland Islands. The Islanders are being fully informed and consulted as the negotiations proceed. ...*
>
> *My Lords, I can assure the noble Lord and the House that those rumours were groundless. I hasten to repeat once more the categorical assurance given by my right honourable friend in the other place, and by myself in this House. The Government have given full assurances to the Islanders that no proposals affecting the future status of the Falkland Islands will be brought before Parliament unless they are acceptable to the Islanders themselves. ... these discussions (with Argentina) are mainly, in our view, aimed at ensuring the right sort of climate and opportunity for such developments not just in the Falkland Islands but in the South-West Atlantic generally.*
>
> *We feel that we, Argentina and the Falklands could very profitably engage in consortial action to develop the undoubted riches of this area with benefit to all three peoples."*[3052]

Lord Hailsham adds; *"... is it not a fact that these Islands of English-speaking people in or near the South American continent are not simply relics of colonialism, but small peoples whose rights and culture and right to self-determination should be accepted, irrespective of the character of the regimes to which they are neighbours? Will Her Majesty's Government – I am sure they will - constantly bear in mind that British people all over the world are not for sale?"*

In **February**, in the Falkland Islands, Vice-Commodore Carnelli is replaced by Vice Commodore Eduardo Julian Canosa who takes charge of the LADE air transport operation.

"He held the position from February 1978 to 1980. During the Advisory Commission's first official meeting, he expressed the need for finding some land, within the airport area, to build an aviation fuel plant. Furthermore, he required that radio frequencies of Comodoro Rivadavia Flight Information Region (FIR) and of the Search and Rescue service should be answered in both English and Spanish to ensure scheduled flight operation; that the Transportes Navales vessel be granted greater accessibility at the FIC dock; and that a new house or a building site for constructing one —intended for the Argentine representative— was purchased." [3053]

Around the Falklands archipelago, a seismic survey is conducted by 'Western Geophysical' and 'GSI' over an area of 21,652 km with line spacings of up to 90 km.

3051 *Rowlands, Edward (Ted)* in Tatham (ed) 2008. Link above
3052 *Hansard, Lords: 25 January 1978, Lords Chamber, The Falkland Islands*
3053 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

"Eight years after the fatuous discussion of Falklands oil recorded by Crossman, a seismic survey was carried out on behalf of the British Government by Western Geophysical. The Islanders, whose oil it is, were neither consulted nor informed by the Labour Government, the result remaining secret. After Britain and Argentina re-established ambassadors it was admitted that results had been "more encouraging than discouraging". [3054]

February 15th, in Lima, Peru, Anglo-Argentine talks on economic cooperation resume. Argentina's head of delegation is Medina Muñoz, while for Britain, the delegation is led by George Hall of the FCO's Americas Desk.

"No sooner had the British delegation taken their seats than a further complication arose. The head of the Malvinas department was attempting to separate the question of the continental shelf from the negotiations; a stance which would jeopardise any hope of reaching an agreement on economic or scientific cooperation." [3055]

Argentina's representatives refuses to acknowledge that the Falklands have any continental shelf rights despite the 1958 Geneva Conventions. [3056]

"Islands generate their own territorial sea and continental shelf. Furthermore, the principle that islands should be treated as any other land territory for the purpose of delimiting the territorial sea, contiguous zone and continental shelf was expressly recognised in Article 10(1) of the 1958 Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone, and Article 1 of the 1958 Convention on the Continental Shelf. In so far as the continental shelf is concerned, the Convention on the Continental Shelf 1958, at Article 1(b) provided that the term 'continental shelf' is used as referring inter alia 'to the seabed and subsoil of similar submarine areas adjacent to the coasts of islands'. Any insular formation, which is above water at high tide, therefore possesses a territorial sea and a continental shelf." [3057]

"Britain... could claim that, as the sole UN-recognised administering power of the South Atlantic Islands, it had a legitimate title to the rights prescribed by the conventions. Moreover, in its Article 6 the convention outlined the process whereby a continental shelf adjacent to two or more states could be divided between them and provided that, in the absence of an agreement, the boundary would be the median. This last proviso suggested that the convention applied even to those states, like Argentina, which had refrained from signing it." [3058]

"Argentina's new stance was linked to its quarrel over the Beagle Channel. If Britain were to cede sovereignty over the continental shelf, the Argentine position in the dispute with Chile would be strengthened." [3059]

In the South Atlantic, Argentina's military base on Morrell Island is seen by the crew of Antarctic survey ship RRS *Bransfield*. This information is quickly relayed to London where Foreign Secretary David Owen, fearing a back-lash once the occupation becomes public knowledge, warns the British Embassy in Buenos Aires.

> *"... the crew might talk about this on their arrival in Port Stanley on February 20th."* [3060]

"Ministers were informed and it set in train a series of urgent messages between London and negotiators in Lima highlighting a possible plan to legitimise the base as a joint scientific station before it came to light.

3054 Elgood 2025. Details are few, and more than 45 years later (2025), the results remain unreleased.
3055 Donaghy 2014
3056 Including the *Convention on the Territorial Sea and the Contiguous Zone* and the *Convention on the Continental Shelf*. *cf.* April & June 1958
3057 *Islands* Andrew J. Jacovides in *Peaceful Order in the World's Oceans: Essays in Honor of Satya N. Nandan* Michael Lodge & Myron Nordquist (eds) 2014
3058 González 2014 p.109
3059 Donaghy 2014
3060 Owen quoted in *Royal Prayer: A Surprising History* David Baldwin 2009 p.25. *cf.* September & December, 1976

Officials warned the Argentines of the "danger of a leak" and urged them to agree quickly. … In the event of a leak … the British Government would need to make it clear publicly that they had protested to Argentina about a violation of British sovereignty. It would be a complicating factor in our negotiations." [3061]

"When RRS Bransfield sighted the Argentine base, the crew were sworn to silence, but the philatelic officer on board talked back in Stanley." [3062]

February 17th, in Lima, talks finish abruptly with no joint communique issued. Britain's delegation reports back to London; *"Medina Muñoz made it absolutely clear that they saw these negotiations as a long process which should not be hurried…"* [3063]

"Previous negotiations on the colony's future broke down earlier in the year, when the Argentine delegation walked out of a meeting in Lima, Peru." [3064]

"Regarding the Lima meeting, in one of his documents González Balcarce wrote a brief note: "not very encouraging about sovereignty. Incident in Thule." [3065]

March 8th, at the Hague, the arbitral court that had awarded the Beagle Channel Islands to Chile reaffirms its decision and declares Argentina's rejections as *"devoid of all legal form or effect."*

March 23rd, in London, addressing the House of Commons, Minister Ted Rowlands raises the question of continental shelf rights; *"As a consequence of its sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the United Kingdom enjoys sovereign rights over the continental shelf…"* [3066]

April 7th, Argentina once again refuses to accept that the Falkland Islands have their own continental shelf. [3067]

May 7th, in the UK, news of the Argentine base on Morrell Island appears in newspapers.

"On 7 May 1978 The Observer published their scoop."Anticipating a parliamentary row the FCO warned the Argentine Government they should avoid inflammatory statements in the interest of avoiding a breakdown in talks" – talks which included negotiations to purchase a large number of warships from Britain. The FCO spun the story that the occupation should not be regarded as having sovereignty implications and was a "temporary, purely scientific programme in support of the wider Argentine Antarctic programme", which they tried to bring under the … Antarctic Treaty." [3068]

May 10th, in Britain's House of Lords, Lord Carrington[3069] asks whether the newspaper reports are true regarding an Argentine presence in Southern Thule. Lord Goronwy-Roberts responds for the Government.

> *"… it would be incorrect to assume that these activities were in any way concealed from public knowledge. **I understand that they were reported at the time in the news media**; that is, towards the end of 1976. …. It is a fact that we are pursuing negotiations across the board on all outstanding issues, including the general issue of the future of that part of the world, with the Argentinians. Indeed, we expect that the two working groups on political and economic matters will reconvene this summer,*

3061 *The Telegraph* December 29th, 2008
3062 Elgood 2025
3063 *FO 7/3528*. An optimistic interpretation, not supported by other evidence.
3064 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November, 1978
3065 Carassai 2022 citing *Linea de tiempo 1945-1982* archivo González Balcarce.
3066 Quoted in the *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978. If anything, it was Argentina's raising of the issue that appears to have reminded the UK that it had continental shelf rights. A shot in the foot by Argentina?
3067 Livingstone 2018 citing *Owen to Callaghan April 7, 1978 PREM 16/1504. cf.* April, 1958
3068 Elgood 2025
3069 Peter Carington (one 'r'), 6th Baron Carrington (two 'r's).

followed by a ministerial meeting. It is in that context that an incident or a situation like this – which, again, I agree is a serious matter and should not be allowed to prejudice the success of the larger negotiations – will be viewed...

The Argentinians established a research station on Thule Island some time in 1976. We protested, and in that way protected our legal claim to sovereignty. We understood that the residence, if I may call it that, was to be temporary; and it is a fact that, because of climatic conditions, seasonal adversity, it is practically impossible to be there all the year round. In that sense, it is a non-continuous residence. However, it is important, in the context of the larger negotiation now proceeding, in which we are seeking general accord and general co-operation for the development of the South-West Atlantic area, to the mutual benefit of all three countries – the United Kingdom, the Falkland Islands and Argentina – that incidents or situations like this, whether temporary or not, should not be allowed to grow out of proportion and imperil those larger and vital negotiations." [3070]

In Buenos Aires, on the same day, the Argentine Government issue a statement affirming their sovereignty claim to Southern Thule and the South Sandwich Islands; rejecting Britain's protest of January, 1977.

"On 10 May the official Argentine Press agency declared that the Foreign Ministry had "energetically rejected a British protest and declared Southern Thule ... an inseparable part of Argentine territory." [3071]

May 13th, in the Falklands, in Berkeley Sound, a Polish fishery vessel, *Zulawy*, is harassed by an Argentine aircraft; *"We have formally protested to the Argentine Government about this violation of Falkland Islands airspace and left them in no doubt of our concern about unauthorised overflights of any kind and the need to avoid their repetition."* [3072]

On the same day, fishing some 63 miles from the archipelago, a Polish trawler, *Otol*, is stopped and boarded by marines from an Argentine destroyer. *Otol*'s Captain is told that he is fishing in Argentine waters and ordered to leave the area. [3073]

"... may I ask the noble Lord whether Her Majesty's Government would not agree that the Argentinians' somewhat petulant belligerence, their recent boarding of a trawler under the threat of traversing guns, their buzzing of a trawler in Berkeley Sound, their continued occupation of Southern Thule... together indicate Argentinian frustration at Her Majesty's Government's most praiseworthy resolution and diplomatic determination over the question of the sovereign integrity of British possessions in the South-West Atlantic?"[3074]

May 16th, in London, Lord Avery, a Liberal Peer in the House of Lords, writes to the Foreign Secretary.

"I enclose a letter I have had from the Director General of the Falkland Islands Office, Air Commodore Frow, about the recent announcement of the occupation by Argentina of some islands which are part of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. I should be grateful if you would explain why your Department has attempted to conceal a development of such major public interest for a period of 18 months..." [3075]

3070 *HL Deb 10 May 1978 vol.391 cc976-81*. My emphasis. A lie.
3071 Elgood 2025. *cf.* June, 1982
3072 Mr. Luard MP in *HC Deb 19 June 1978 vol.952 cc79-80W*
3073 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 18, 1978
3074 Lord Morris *HL Deb 13 June 1978 vol.393 cc175-80.* The muted response referred to *"current negotiations."*
3075 Quoted in Elgood 2025 citing *UKFIC82* para.193

Minister Rowlands addresses the House of Commons with regard to Morrell Island in Southern Thule.

> *"The Argentines carried out scientific work on Southern Thule in the 1954 and 1956 Antarctic seasons and established their present scientific station in late 1976. There have been no other cases of unauthorised foreign activity in the Falkland Islands, South Georgia or the South Sandwich Islands. Argentine Service personnel provide logistic support for Argentina's Antarctic scientific activities. We have remained in communication with the Governor throughout, and he has reported that the Islands councillors know of and fully support our actions to protect British sovereignty."* [3076]

May 17th, in addition to the weekly Saturday flight of a Fokker F-27 from Comodoro Rivadavia, the Argentine air force introduce a further F-28 flight from Buenos Aires.

"It is difficult to see the commercial reason or viability for this; ... There were hardly enough passengers to warrant one aircraft and certainly not two. As it is the F28 often arrives with one or two people and occasionally none. The thing I do not like is the number of pilots getting practice landing at the airport." [3077]

"On 17 May 1978, the Argentine Air Force's twin-engine jet aircraft Fokker F-28, registration mark TC-52, landed at the newly authorized airdrome, thus inaugurating the new LADE service. The crew consisted of aircraft commander, Mayor Armando E. Buira; co-pilot, Capitán Luis C. Sabolo; aircraft mechanic, Suboficial Auxiliar González; and the cargo handling assistant, Suboficial Mayor Antonio Pereyra. A new period to integrate islanders to the mainland was beginning. Thanks to the airstrip and the radio navigation (VOR) established by the Argentine Air Force, the advanced Fokker F-28 left islanders just one hour and twenty minutes away from Comodoro Rivadavia healthcare services, the thriving oil capital of southern Argentina. ... The F-28 service made a most auspicious start. In spite of that, Canosa was concerned about the islanders' attitude who were displeased with the negotiations progress. The British part of the Advisory Commission expressed dissatisfaction with aircraft lack of punctuality, and, furthermore, with the pollution caused by Transportes Navales." [3078]

May 24th, in London, Ted Rowlands further informs Parliament that the Argentines have not left the Southern Thule base, and that a further protest has been sent to the Argentine Government.

June 10th, in Buenos Aires, President Vidella reaffirms his country's claim to the Falklands on the "Día de la Afirmación de los Derechos Argentinos sobre las Malvinas, islas y sector antártico". [3079] Admiral Massera, is more aggressive.

> *"The Malvinas are an open wound in the dignity of the Republic, and we Argentines are disposed to correct what negligence, cultural submission and a mistaken concept of international good manners have kept segregated from the metaphysical map of the Fatherland. The Malvinas are not a fragment of soil. The Malvinas are a fragment of our soul and we must go forth to find them because sovereignty, like dignity, is not negotiable."* [3080]

3076 *HC Deb 16 May 1978 vol.950 cc160-1W*
3077 Report by Major Ewan Southby-Tailyour to MOD May, 1978 in Southby-Tailyour 1990
3078 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
3079 See November 30, 1973
3080 Quoted in Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.606

"... on Malvinas Day, which they celebrated recently, President Videla referred to the successful outcome, as he hoped, of current negotiations;... This gives hope that the current negotiations based on the two working groups, political and economic, may possibly bear fruit." [3081]

In London, Air Marshall Sir John Lapsley meets with Adrian Sindall of the FCO South American Department.

"Sindall said "pressure of the Argentine claim was rising" and that "anything done to improve the economy or develop the resources of the Islands would exacerbate Argentina's anger ..." He said the FCO had "sought support through their embassies without result and doubted that the Islands would be accepted as an independent member of the United Nations". For this reason, it was felt that a "Falkland Islands must remain British" policy would cause their economy to stagnate. The FCO believed that an international airport would not provide an answer without a degree of cooperation having first been established. ... The UKFIC interpreted this as the FCO threatening that if the Falkland Islands could not be traded away it would be allowed to stagnate." [3082]

June 13th, in Britain's House of Lords, Lord Morris asks; *"Her Majesty's Government what progress has been made at the current negotiations with the Argentine Government on the question of the Falkland Islands."* [3083] Lord Goronwy-Roberts, Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office, responds for the Government; *"My Lords, our negotiations with Argentina are still at an early stage. Following the first meeting of working groups in February, we are discussing with the Argentine Government arrangements for carrying forward the negotiating process."*

Lord Avebury then asks; *"My Lords, is the Minister aware that when I took the deputation from the Argentine Human Rights Committee to see his colleague, Mr. Ted Rowlands, one of the points we made to him very strongly was that weapons should not be sold to the Argentinian regime in case, among other things, they might be used against the Falklands—and we were talking particularly about the proposed contract with Vosper Thorneycroft for the sale of frigates—and that the Minister then replied that there was no question of them using for hostile action against the Falkland Islands naval vessels that we might be in the course of selling them? Yet, immediately after that we opened our newspapers and we found that some of these islands had been occupied by Argentinian military forces for the last 18 months. Why was this not revealed to the British public, and what steps is the Minister going to take, if arms are to be sold to the Argentinian authorities, to prevent them being used in hostile action against the Falklands?"*

Lord Gorony-Roberts responds:

> *"My Lords, I think I explained on a fairly recent occasion what had happened about the alleged occupation of Southern Thule, to which I presume the noble Lord is referring. It was in fact a scientific activity, and I have no evidence to disprove that. We have received assurances —indeed, detailed assurances—from the Argentine Government that this was so. We have made our protest in order to safeguard our sovereignty in that part of the Dependencies, as in every part of the Falkland Islands and its Dependencies."* [3084]

3081 Lord Goronwy-Roberts *HL Deb 13 June 1978 vol.393 cc175-80*
3082 Elgood 2025 citing *UKFIC1982* para.177
3083 *HL Deb 13 June 1978 vol 393 cc175-80*. See - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1978/jun/13/the-falkland-islands-negotiations
3084 *Ibid.*

"Goronwy-Roberts's statement encapsulated the FCO's mendacity. The Callaghan Government failed the Argentine test, fostering the belief that the British would not fight for her territory in the South Atlantic, earning the contempt of Admirals Massera and Anaya. Britain's feeble diplomacy left the Argentine flag flying over the illegal military base until the 1982 war ..." [3085]

June 15th, in London, during a Commons debate regarding fishing, it is asserted that the British fishing fleet is failing to tap into the resources around the Falkland Islands. Patrick Wall MP, claims that; *"... the Foreign Office is discouraging British fishing in the area because it might annoy Argentina."* [3086]

"... a junior Minister stated in April; "All the evidence is that this area is unlikely to provide the domestic British industry with viable fishing opportunities." She did not say what was the evidence she had in mind." [3087]

"West German trawlers are now fishing the waters around the Falkland Islands under Argentine colours. Reports from the Islands confirm that the fishing grounds are densely stocked and according to one German skipper, processed hake are selling Europe for £1,000 per ton. The German vessel could process 20 tons a day, he said. Under an agreement with Argentina, the West Germans are fishing waters in the 'Argentine Sea' for the export trade4, but the fish must be registered as exports from Argentina, where the ships are registered."[3088]

"In June, Judith Hart, Minister for Overseas Development, said in the Commons that "investigations into government aid for the airfield extension, tourism and fisheries would only be initiated when a framework of political and economic co-operation was established with Argentina". Remarkably, ships paid no dues for fishing around the Islands; and tourism was not viable without a longer runway." [3089]

June 16th, Britain declines to issue a licence for the purchase of a Falklands farm – Douglas Station – by Argentine businessman Hector Francisco Capozzolo. [3090]

"Undaunted, (Harland) Greenshields has tried to talk the council into purchasing his 135,000 acre 500,000 dollar farm if they will not allow him to sell it. A recent article by Michael Frenchman in the Times of London (written before Capozzolo's application for a licence had been turned down) said: "Undoubtedly pressure will be exerted by the Argentine government in their talks with Britain to get the sale accepted. Captain Walter Allare, under-secretary for foreign affairs, said that future business between Britain and Argentina depended to a large extent on a satisfactory outcome."... " [3091]

June 19th, in Britain's House of Commons, Mr. Evan Luard MP, states that British officials in Argentina have been given fresh instructions to "*reaffirm our sovereignty*" over the Falklands archipelago. This following the 'buzzing' of trawlers by Argentine aircraft near the Islands. [3092]

June 22nd, in the House of Lords, Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, speaks regarding the measures proposed in Shackleton's report.

3085 Elgood 2025
3086 *HC Deb 15 June 1978 vol.951 col.1231* in Hansard
3087 *Falkland Islands – Why do the British want to quit?* Penelope Tremaine in *The Falkland Islands Times* May 1978 p.3
3088 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1
3089 Elgood 2025
3090 Harland Greenshields had spent eight years attempting to sell his farm, but as every offer he received involved Argentina he was rebuffed by the Foreign Office. The farm was eventually sold in early 1982. Capozzola has been implicated in a 1977 attempt to purchase the Falkland Islands Company. See above.
3091 *The Falkland Islands Times* August 24, 1978 p.1
3092 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1

"... we have made further progress. We are financing the construction of an all-weather road from Darwin to Stanley and of a new school hostel in Stanley. We are also ... carrying forward our urgent discussions with the Falkland Island Government on expanding the internal air service..."

June 25th, in Argentina, after the host nation wins the FIFA World Cup, Admiral Massera suggests that *Plan Goa* – the invasion of the Falkland Islands – should be authorised. [3093]

In **July**, from Argentina, Constantino Davidoff, a Buenos Aires scrap metal merchant, contacts 'Christian Salvesen' seeking a contract to remove the old equipment and scrap metal from the whaling stations at Leith, Stromness and Husvik on South Georgia. Gerald Elliot, managing director of 'Christian Salvesen', seeks advice from the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, who refer the question to Governor Parker in the Falkland Islands. Parker advises against. [3094]

"When approached by Salvesens in 1978, the British Foreign Office were not happy about allowing an Argentine citizen to do the salvage work – but did not raise any serious objections, ..." [3095]

July 5th, in Britain's House of Commons, Ted Rowlands again addresses the situation in Southern Thule.

"We are not dealing with an illegal occupation of the Falkland Islands themselves. ... Nor are we dealing at this time with a military occupation. It is important to say that. Although the Argentines use service personnel for logistic support in their Antarctic work, their activities on Thule are purely scientific. I do not think that anybody has challenged that assumption. ... We object to the fact that they are being carried out on British territory without our permission. That is the bone of contention ... What the Argentines are doing there does indeed constitute a violation of our sovereignty, and, as hon. Members are already aware, we have firmly protested to them about this. Our sovereignty position has thus been protected fully and explicitly... When we learnt of it, we pursued the matter immediately. We are going back 18 months, but at that time we had reason to believe that the dispute would be resolved speedily and satisfactorily. I had a difficult decision to make on how to handle the issue. I thought that it would be wrong for us to have a slanging match with the Argentine Government..." [3096]

In London, Argentina's Admiral Massera visits, holding meetings with the First Sea Lord, Sir Terence Lewin and senior officials at the Department of Trade and the Foreign Office. The Foreign Secretary, however, declines a meeting.[3097]

"It is extraordinary that the commander of the Argentine navy met the commander of the British navy four years before the Falklands war, yet all official files relating to the visit have been destroyed." [3098]

July 26th, in the Islands, Colonel Richard Sidwell and Major Timothy Downs arrive to assess defence options.[3099]

3093 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.39. See March, 1976 above.
3094 Freedman 2005 vol.1 p.146. Further negotiations resulted in a contract signed in September, 1979. See below.
3095 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.616
3096 *HC Deb 05 July 1978 vol.953 cc620-30*
3097 Owen was criticised for this decision by those vested interests that wished to sell arms to Argentina. No records survive, but Owen would later describe Massera as a "*little shit*". See Livingstone 2018.
3098 Livingstone 2018
3099 Southby-Tailyour 1990

July 31st, In the UK, in the House of Commons, the Minister of Overseas Development, Mr. Tomlinson, is asked what further plans there are for the economic development of the Falkland Islands and whether these include an extension to the runway so that it can accommodate international aircraft.

> *"We are providing funds for the reorganisation and re-equipment of the public works department, which is to begin construction of a road across East Falkland in September. A new school hostel is to be built shortly in Stanley. We propose to increase support of the grasslands trial unit and the possibilities of salmon ranching and inshore fishing are now being examined. A newly appointed development officer will take up his post in the autumn. There are no plans for extending the runway."*[3100]

August 4th, in Rugby, England, a 1933 £1 Falklands centenary stamp sells for £875 at a philatelic auction. [3101]

August 17th, *Offshore Oil Weekly* reports that the 'British National Oil Corporation' could form a joint venture with Argentina's state oil company, 'YPF', to develop potential oil fields around the Falkland Islands. [3102]

> *"The oil exploration plan is part of an overall package under which the Falklands will be handed over to Argentinian sovereignty … British representatives in Buenos Aires have already informed the Argentinian Government that a handover will take place shortly and without any difficulties, according to sources in the Argentine capital and in London. … Another part of the 'package' will be important warship orders placed by Argentina with British shipbuilders. These orders could, in fact, save several of Britain's ailing shipyards. …*
>
> *HMS Endurance, the Royal navy's ice patrol ship, which spends six months of each year during the southern hemisphere summer based on Port Stanley in the Falklands, will be making her last cruise of these regions in the autumn."* [3103]

In response, UKFIC members including Air Commodore Frow, Director of the Association; Bill Christie and Colin Phipps MP write to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office seeking clarification. Replies state that negotiations are at an early stage. There are no clear denials.

August 24th, in London, Foreign Secretary Owen suggests that talks resume towards the end of September.

"The Argentines are known to have been putting their case within the United Nations and wrote a letter in August to Dr. Kurt Waldheim, General Secretary of the UN, stating that Britain's intention to extend her territorial limits around the Falkland Islands was prejudicial to any negotiation." [3104]

August 31st, from Buenos Aires, Britain's naval attaché, Capt. Leggatt, writes to the FCO to complain that a recent failure to win a contract to supply frigates to Argentina's Navy was as a result of "*the Falklands issue*". [3105]

September 29th, in New York, at the United Nations building, Dr. Owen and Oscar Montes agree that Anglo-Argentine negotiations will resume in December.

3100 *Hansard Written Answers (Commons)* July 31, 1978 col.3w
3101 *Birmingham Evening Mail* August 4, 1978. See 1933
3102 *Latest Move on Falklands Oil 'Pact' with Argentina* in *Offshore Oil Weekly* August 17, 1978.
3103 *Ibid* quoted in Elgood 2025
3104 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1
3105 *Leggatt to Carless August 31, 1978 FCO 7/3450*

"Doctor David Owen, Britain's Foreign Secretary, has announced that a review of the routine diplomatic exchanges on the future of the Falkland Islands will be made at a one day meeting in December between Mr. Ted Rowlands MP (Minister of State, FCO) and his Argentine counterpart Sr. Gaulter Allara." [3106]

"I made no secret of the fact that I would not transfer sovereignty to Argentina. ... I must make it clear that when in office I was never prepared to contemplate it. I never accepted lease-back, and have great difficulty with it. The furthest that I was prepared to go was a sharing of sovereignty. In those days, one of the options that I thought was most hopeful was that sovereignty over the uninhabited islands would be transferred to Argentina, and the inhabited islands—the greater space, I admit—would remain with Britain, with a shared economic unit covering all the islands, inhabited and uninhabited, and the territorial waters..." [3107]

October 8th, Britain's *Observer* newspaper reports that the Foreign Secretary and his Argentine counterpart have agreed to Argentine sovereignty for the Islands, but continued British sovereignty for their inhabitants. [3108]

"A meeting of Members of Parliament, Peers and Falkland islanders concluded that a referendum should be held in the Falkland Islands. At a Commonwealth Parliamentary Association meeting in the House of Commons, it was suggested that the only way to prove the wishes of the islanders was by following the example set in Northern Ireland, when a referendum on constitutional reform was held. The Ulster referendum showed that a majority in the province wished to retain links with the United Kingdom. The colony of Gibraltar recently held a referendum to confirm the people's overwhelming preference for British, rather than Spanish sovereignty and the British colony of Belize has been promised a referendum on any proposals worked out with neighbouring Guatemala, which has territorial ambitions over Belize. Ninety seven per cent of the people in the Falkland Islands are of British stock." [3109]

October 12th, in London, an inter-departmental request is submitted for permission to allow the testing of a French *Exocet* missile at a British firing range, for a group of Argentine military observers.

"The Defence sales department ... asked that the Argentine navy be allowed to test Exocet missiles in Cardigan Bay, because 'unless we demonstrate to the Argentinians our willingness to be helpful in all requests of a military nature then our chances of securing substantial military contracts likely to be awarded in the future are considerably diminished'. The French-made Exocet missiles were, of course, used to lethal effect against British forces in the Falklands War." [3110]

October 20th, in Buenos Aires, a new Argentine Presidential decree is promulgated.

"Government House has just received details of a decree published in the official Argentine bulletin on the concerning the issue of the controversial "White Card". The main points of this decree are as follows:- Presidential decree 20th of October, concerning the issue of the controversial "White Card" travel permit. The main points of this decree are as follows:- White cards for residents of the Islands and of Argentina are unchanged. An '"embarkation and disembarkation card" is to be issued to non-residents. They will complete it in duplicate when they purchase their air or sea tickets, and will retain one copy. The retained copy will be checked by the airport or port police at the point of departure for the Falklands. On return from the Islands the retained copy will be checked by the same authorities and given back to the non-resident. It will be surrendered at the point of final departure from Argentina. If a non-resident leaves the Islands without

3106 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1
3107 Dr. David Owen speaking in 1985 in *Falkland Islands (Foreign Affairs Committee Report) HC Deb 14 March 1985 vol.75 cc492-530.* All evidence to the contrary.
3108 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978 p.1. The *Observer*'s source was not identified.
3109 *Ibid*
3110 Livingstone 2018 citing *Spencer to Keeling October 12, 1978 DEFE 68/377*

passing through Argentina again, the Argentine Representative of the Special Consultative Committee in Port Stanley shall, whenever possible, ask for the return of the retained copy. Government is waiting for more information concerning the new non-resident regulations and details will be published as soon as they are known. It is understood that these regulations will come into effect as from January the 1st 1979." [3111]

November 1st, in Britain's House of Commons, during a Debate on the Address (Loyal Address)[3112], MP Michael Clark Hutchinson speaks regarding the Falklands and the outstanding question of Southern Thule.

> *"I much regret that no mention of the Falkland Islands was made in the Gracious Speech. It is extremely difficult to obtain any information from the Government about proposed developments there and about what is generally in the Government's mind concerning the islands. Open government seems to be all the rage these days. The word "open" is the latest watchword, but it certainty does not apply to Government thinking about the Falklands.*
>
> *Hon. Members will recall that in December 1976 there began an illegal occupation by Argentine citizens of Southern Thule island in the South Sandwich Islands, controlled by the Falkland Islands. The people concerned were supposed to be scientists. We did not learn about the occupation until several months later. Then we were told that the Foreign and Commonwealth Office had made a protest, that there was not much need to worry, as so few people were involved, and that our legal position was covered.*
>
> *But I do worry. I am not convinced that a protest is sufficient. If the Argentine party has been in the island for more than 12 months, that strengthens Argentina's position and weakens ours. International law is by no means united on what the exact position is. Therefore, I should very much welcome a statement from the Minister concerned. It seems to me that there are two courses open to deal with the matter.*
>
> *One is to mount a small police expedition to remove the intruders. That is my instinctive reaction and choice. The other is to set up our own scientific party and to land it in the island so that the Argentine claim is reduced. ... I am extremely concerned about the general stranglehold that the Argentine Republic is exerting over the Falkland Islands. The white card system still exists, air communication with the mainland is in Argentine hands, as is the supply of petrol and oil to the islands, and the Argentine people offer certain educational facilities. Those are merely some examples. Why should that be so? It would seem that there is a lack of interest or of will. ...*
>
> *The Falklands are British. The inhabitants wish to keep their ties with us. The islanders have many friends in this country, including many friends in the House, and they have backing from the British public. I believe it to be entirely wrong that Parliament should not be fully in the picture about what is happening there. I resent the Government's air of mystery—indeed, secrecy—about the islands' future. Therefore, I ask for more open government and a very strong policy, and for there to be no truck whatsoever with the "phoney" Argentine claims."* [3113]

In the Falkland islands, on the same day, the old Hookers Point temporary airstrip is ripped up by a severe gale.

3111 *The Falkland Islands Times* November 10, 1978 p.1

3112 The Debate on the Address (or Loyal Address) is the formal name for the Queen's/King's Speech debates that are held over several days in both Houses at the start of a new session of Parliament. The debates takes place on the motion: 'That an humble Address be presented to Her/His Majesty' thanking the monarch for the speech'. They are also an opportunity to discuss what the Speech contained: specifically the Government's programme for the year ahead.

3113 *HC Deb 01 November 1978 vol.957 cc9-156*

"At about 0300 a sixty to seventy knot gust of wind from the south lifted the whole of the temporary airstrip like an enormous wing (it was cambered along both edges) and flipped it over to the north for almost its whole length... It must have weighed 1,300 tons. ... The Argentine press accuse the Chileans of sabotage!" [3114]

The Falkland Islands Newsletter reports:

> *"We have not yet made the progress for which we had hoped in achieving the implementation of the recommendations in Lord Shackleton's Report. The British Government has moved exceedingly slowly .... It is worth noting that, under pressure in particular from those in this country who have now for ten years supported the Islands, some £9½ million of aid has been provided by the Ministry of Overseas Development."*[3115]

In the UK, Britain's Labour Government approves the sale of *Blowpipe* surface-to-air missiles to Argentina; *"... in order to protect employment at the Shorts Brothers factory in Belfast..."* [3116]

November 6th, in Buenos Aires, Brigadier Carlos Washington Pastor, of the Argentine Air Force, takes over as Foreign Minister.

In early **December**, in London, the UKFIC receive a copy of an internal Air Canada letter.

> *"On my last trip to Argentina, the Argentine Air Force, who are the only airline serving the area known as the Falkland Islands, made it abundantly clear that the islands have changed ownership and now belong to the State of Argentina – rather than Britain. Therefore, in future, it is pertinent that any reference to Falkland Islands to be avoided on all paperwork... The new name of the Islands is Islas Malvinas and unless this name appears on all documents covering future shipments the Fuerza Aerea Argentina Lineas del Estado cannot guarantee delivery."* [3117]

December 9th, Argentina sends a naval force south towards Chile's Beagle (PNL) islands, intending to occupy the islands group on December 22. [3118] Chile, warned by its intelligence network, despatches a force of its own.

"In November and December 1978 a propaganda campaign was organised by the Argentines, with Army, Navy and Air Force units prepared to fight a just war against Chilean territorial encroachment." [3119]

"The Plan provided for starting the war "quickly and violently" to gain greater control over Chilean territories in the early days invasion, impose that status quo and force Chile to negotiate from a position of strength..." [3120]

December 13th, in New York, at the United Nations, the General Assembly defers consideration of the Falkland Islands question until its 1979 session.

3114 Southby-Tailyour 1990

3115 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* November 1978. Link above

3116 Livingstone 2018 p.151

3117 Quoted in Elgood 2025. Date uncertain.

3118 *Operación Soberania*. What is known, all of it unconfirmed, is that the plan involved a number of incursions into Chilean territory in an attempt to force them into accepting Argentina's terms. All three forces – navy, air force and army – were to be employed. Argentina's success in maintaining troops in the South Thule group of British islands may have emboldened it to try force with the Chileans. See below.

3119 *The Falklands War* D. George Boyce 2005

3120 *Conflicto de límites con Chile y operaciones militares de las Fuerzas Armadas argentinas en 1978. Experiencias de la artillería de campaña en el «Operativo Soberanía»* Germán Soprano 2021. Available here - https://ri.conicet.gov.ar/bitstream/handle/11336/176919/CONICET_Digital_Nro.da114069-39f4-4d1c-95aa-18fa2125ee8a_C.pdf?sequence=5&isAllowed=y

December 18th, in Geneva, Switzerland, three days of Anglo-Argentine negotiations commence.

"The more problematic issue was co-administration of the Dependencies maritime zones. Allara agreed that Argentina and Britain should jointly declare a 200-mile fishing zone, but failed to explain how he planned to reconcile this with Argentina's own sovereignty claim... Allara held out for a transfer of the Dependencies as his price for an agreement to the co-administration of a fisheries zone. Rowlands rejected this out of hand." [3121]

December 20th, On the final day of the Geneva talks, some agreement is reached over scientific activities on Southern Thule and within the Dependencies.

> *"Southern Thule: We and the Argentines both tabled outline papers for a scientific co-operation agreement. The Argentines accepted that, under such an agreement, these activities – including their station on Thule, would have no implications for sovereignty. Their thinking was also close to ours on the mechanics of such a scheme. But we came up against two difficulties.*
>
> *First, the Argentines had envisaged an agreement applying to land based operations only. We said we wanted the scheme to apply to maritime areas as well, since both we and they already conducted scientific work off-shore. The Argentines saw the logic of this, but were unhappy about the legal problems of defining maritime areas … In particular, they wanted to exclude the continental shelf. In the end, I obtained Allara's agreement to the broad formulation that that the agreement would apply to "surrounding maritime areas"; this should not prejudice either the Argentine position or ours on delimitation.*
>
> *Secondly, the Argentines dug their heels in on the clause I wanted which would have prevented their setting up other stations. … Allara said that the Argentines could not give up their right in principle to have other stations, but they were not planning any … I agreed to drop it.*
>
> *Co-administration of the Dependencies maritime Zones: Again, both we and the Argentines tabled an outline paper. The Argentines saw no problem over the mechanics as far as fishing was concerned, and agreed on the need for urgent action to deal with third parties. The Argentines agreed that action would be required to declare a 200 mile fishing zone. They suggested this should be done jointly; but did not explain how they would reconcile this with their own sovereignty claim and existing zone. The major stumbling block which emerged was that they rejected the idea of a co-administration scheme being under the sovereignty umbrella. Instead, they wanted a transfer of sovereignty over the Dependencies themselves to Argentina as the price for co-administration of a fishing zone; and they wanted to exclude the continental shelf from the arrangement. I told Allara firmly that non of this was on. …*
>
> *Sovereignty: … the Argentines repeated their positions on principle on sovereignty and tried to draw us out on the sovereignty changes we had in mind in the working paper which I gave Allara in the New York talks in December 1977. We rejected the idea that the aim of the negotiations was simply to transfer sovereignty to Argentina. …"* [3122]

The two sides agree to meet again towards the end of March.

"Agreement between Britain and Argentina on scientific cooperation in the Malvinas (Falkland) Island dependencies constitutes a first step to affirm Argentine presence in the region, Argentine sources said yesterday. Commenting on the three-day talks here, the sources said the negotiators discussed all issues,

3121 Donaghy 2014. See also *ALW 0420/325/1*
3122 *Rowlands minute to Owen January 5, 1979* in *ALW 045/325/1 Part A* filed at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

including sovereignty over the islands and the dependencies of South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands, all ruled by Britain and claimed by Argentina. A press communique issued on Wednesday night on the talks made no specific mention of the sovereignty issue. It said the delegations "reached agreement in principle on the outline of a scheme or cooperation in their scientific research activities in the island dependencies". The sources said Argentina saw this as a "first step towards affirming our presence in an area where other countries are carrying out fishing activities without accepting any regulation or control, leading to possible prejudicial effects on the preservation of the natural resources of the region".” [3123]

In London, under pressure from Defence Secretary Mulley, and Trade Secretary Edmund Dell, Britain's Foreign Secretary Davis Owen agrees to invite General Orlando Agosti, Argentina's Air Force chief, to visit London. To discuss the sale of Lynx helicopters and Hawk trainer jets. [3124] General Agosti initially accepts the invitation but then suddenly cancels, citing 'domestic' reasons.

"Although the Agosti visit was cancelled, there were numerous other visits by Argentine officers to the UK during Labour's period of office and many British defence officials visited Argentina." [3125]

December 21st, from Rome, the Vatican makes an offer to both Argentina and Chile to mediate the Beagle Channel dispute between the two nations.

December 22nd, in the South Atlantic, discovering that a landing will not be unopposed and with poor weather conditions, Argentina's task force is withdrawn. Argentina subsequently cites the offer by the Vatican as its reason for pulling back.

"... an important by-product of this tension was that the Argentine Government spent billions of dollars on arms procurement, including 40 A-4 Skyhawk aircraft and five Chinook helicopters bought from the United States, and 42 Dagger aircraft purchased from Israel. The Argentine armed forces were therefore mentally and physically prepared for war..." [3126]

"The operation most probably would have caused full-scale war had it not been suspended twenty nautical miles off the coast of Chile due to a fierce storm. In the next hours the "divine" intervention of the Pope as a mediator averted the conflict, but the Argentine navy was hours- some claim minutes- away from starting a war in the Southern Cone." [3127]

"In 1978, the dictatorship led the country to the brink of war with Chile by rejecting the arbitration convened in 1971 and delivered to the parties in 1977. ... In the conflict with Chile, ... much of the problem on the Argentine side was the bureaucratic and complex way that the Argentine military junta made its decisions. ... The 'war that was not' is an indispensable step towards understanding the war that did take place." [3128]

"... in the early morning of D-Day (December 22), the vanguard of the troops stationed in the province of Neuquén began to advance towards the border and some elements of it reached to enter Chilean territory for about three or four kilometers, until they received a counter-order and withdrew. There the implementation of Operación Soberania stopped." [3129]

3123 *A first step towards affirming our presence in the Malvinas* Buenos Aires Herald December 21, 1979
3124 Two Lynx helicopters had been sold to Argentina earlier in 1978. It was hoped to sell eight more.
3125 Livingston 2018
3126 *The Falklands War* D. G. Boyce 2005
3127 *Was the Malvinas/Falklands a Diversionary War? A prospect-theory reinterpretation of Argentina's decline* Luis S. Schenoni, Sean Braniff & Jorge Battaglino 2020
3128 *State, national identity and power: a historical tour in search of the causes of the Falklands–Malvinas War* Guillermo Mira and Fernando Pedrosa 2021
3129 Soprano 2021.

"The Catholic Church leaders of Argentina and Chile, aware of the dangers of war between their countries, had been trying for months to provoke Pope John Paul II into intervention. The combination of the South Atlantic storm, which created serious difficulties for maritime operations, and the fact that on December 22, 1978, John Paul II telephoned the Casa Rosada (Argentine presidential palace) and La Moneda (Chilean presidential palace) to inform the military leaders of both countries that he was sending a personal envoy (Cardinal Antonio Samoré) to mediate the conflict between the two countries, defused the crisis and averted war.." [3130]

1979 – January 7th, in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, Falklands Councillors meet Minister Rowlands for an update.

"During the Geneva talks, proposals for scientific cooperation in the Falklands were drawn up between Britain and Argentina. Legislative Councillors were briefed by Mr. Ted Rowlands MP, the minister responsible, in Rio on January 7 but have not disclosed the proposals or their attitude towards them. The Falklands Office in London is concerned and the situation is being closely watched." [3131]

In London, Britain's Labour Government issues guidelines restricting arms sales to Argentina. The Ministry of Defence is told that sales cannot be approved if they include equipment that could be directly used for internal repression, or which could threaten the Falkland Islands; *"In fact, as soon as they were introduced, Labour's Defence Secretary, Fred Mulley said that, while he accepted the guidelines, each order should be looked at on a case by case basis, because "we would be reluctant to take any action which would seriously damage our prospects of obtaining at least a reasonable share of this market". Mulley then asked the FCO to approve sales of ammunition by British companies for use with weapons that had already been sold. Owen agreed... the first of many instances when the guidelines were bent."* [3132]

January 8th, in Uruguay, with the Act of Montevideo, Argentina reaches an agreement with Chile to refer their Beagle Channel dispute to arbitration by Pope john Paul II. Mediation to cover the islands of Picton, Nueva and Lennox and also the delimitation of maritime boundaries in the Beagle Channel and adjacent Atlantic waters. Unlike the 1977 agreement, the Vatican mediation is to be non-binding. Both Argentina and Chile agree to refrain from military action. [3133]

January 13th, in Stanley, the agreements achieved at Geneva are rejected by the Falkland Islands Government, with Councillors fearing an erosion of British sovereignty over both the Islands and Dependencies.

> *"Here there has been a set-back. … The meeting (in Rio) went well and the delegation raised no objection to the Southern Thule scheme. But when they reported back to their colleagues in Port Stanley the Falklands Councils as a whole decided they could not accept the schemes at all. Their objections are, firstly that unless the scheme applies only to Thule we are in effect giving the Argentines some sort of status in the rest of the Dependencies and, secondly, that it represents the beginning of a process of concession to the Argentines which will lead to the loss of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. … Councillors have agreed to maintain confidentiality over their objections, and that they and we should take the line in public that the scheme has been left on the table for further consideration. So we have, so far, prevented this disagreement coming into the open."* [3134]

3130 *El rol de Chile en la Guerra de Malvinas* Mario Sznajder 2022 in *A 40 años de la Guerra de Malvinas: una mirada diferente* Marcos Pablo Moloeznik & José Gabriel Paz (Coordinadores) 2022. The Pope had previously made an offer to negotiate in October, 1978, which Chile accepted while Argentina declined to answer. See Soprano 2021.

3131 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6

3132 *Rowlands, Edward (Ted)* in Tatham (ed) 2008. Authored by Ted Rowlands. Link above

3133 The Pope appointed Cardinal Antonio Samoré as his Special Envoy.

3134 *Owen to Callaghan March 13, 1979* at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

"The occupation of South Thule Island, the most southerly of the Falklands group, was described by Islanders as the 'thin end of the wedge'. Islanders fear continued Argentine encroachment, even under the name of science." [3135]

"The Islanders are loathe to admit any Argentine foothold in the archipelago. When after the December, 1978 round of talks, the sides announced tentative agreement toward potential cooperation in scientific research in the outer island dependencies, the Islanders emphatically rejected the proposal." [3136]

".., following the talks, Rowlands met the Island councillors in Río in early January 1979 to report the outcome. However, at a subsequent joint meeting of ExCo and LegCo councillors objected to the proposed terms and, particularly, feared that the Argentines would extend their activities to other parts of the dependencies. The UK government subsequently agreed not to sign the agreement but to pursue further exploratory talks." [3137]

"An Anglo-Argentine agreement over Southern Thule would have been difficult to digest; the inclusion of South Georgia made it nigh impossible." [3138]

From Buenos Aires, Argentina expresses an interest in the restoration of Ambassadors with the UK.

"Towards the end of Labour's period of office, Argentina expressed an interest in restoring ambassadors. The head of the FCO's Latin America department, John Ure, advised that reinstating ambassadors could facilitate talks over the Falklands, but that such a move could provoke criticism from the 'human rights lobby' and the 'Falkland Islanders and their lobby'. He suggested that Argentina be invited to appoint an ambassador to Britain, after which the British would consider re-appointing their ambassador. David Owen approved this, although his political advisor told FCO officials that this needed 'very careful' press handling. But a leaked press report, announcing that an exchange of ambassadors had been agreed to, led to an angry response from the Labour party. The party's national executive passed a resolution calling it 'totally inappropriate'. With just weeks to go until the general election, the British ambassador was not reinstated until the Conservatives came to power, but Labour ministers had not objected, in principle, to the move." [3139]

January 16th, in Britain's House of Lords, Government spokesman, Lord Goronwy-Roberts notes, in answer to a question, that the aid provision to the Falkland Islands is greater *per capita* than that made to any other territory. Baroness Elles points out that with a population of only 1800, that figure was too easy to achieve. The Baroness seeks assurances that no decision will be taken regarding the future of the Falklands without a full and public consultation. Lord Goronwy-Roberts confirms that; *"Proposals will not even be put to Parliament without the full acceptance of the Falkland Islanders."* [3140]

Responding to a question from Lord Morris concerning the December negotiations, Goronwy-Roberts states; *"I am not yet in a position to say what are the results of that consideration by those Governments; but as soon as it is clear what the conclusions are by those various Governments, a full statement will be made to the House in accordance with the noble Lord's very proper request."* [3141]

3135 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6
3136 *Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State* Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984*
3137 *Rowlands, Edward (Ted)* in Tatham (ed) 2008. Authored by Ted Rowlands. Link above
3138 Donaghy 2014
3139 Livingstone 2018 p.152
3140 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6
3141 *HL Deb 16 January 1979 vol 397 cc843-6*

In London, at the Ministry of Defence, the *Concept of Operations* for Marine detachment NP 8901 is approved. Requiring that they offer a more active defence in the case of invasion, and defend the seat of the Falklands Government to *"buy three weeks bargaining time in the United Nations".* [3142]

"Defence was the responsibility of the small Royal Marines detachment, NP 8901." [3143]

January 24th, in Stanley, a group from the USA arrives; to prepare a report for the US State Department. [3144]

"American businessmen, American historians and marine architects, American conservationists, American journalists and tourists, and resident American settlers met in Stanley expressed an interest in having on record at the State Department basic information on the Islands, including travel, communications, documentation, and visitors' facilities. ... The paper concludes that Argentina will eventually regain political sovereignty over the disputed Malvinas Islands, as a result of gradualist bilateral negotiations with Great Britain. Deterioration of the current talks could postpone but probably not avoid the eventual end of Britain's admittedly anachronistic colonial rule. It is less clear whether the Argentines will be successful in populating and rejuvenating the Islands' economy over the long term. As long as the Malvinas do not fall into unfriendly hands or are not exploited for harmful strategic and military ends, US interests are unlikely to be adversely affected by future disposition of the Islands." [3145]

The American team note that there are ten US citizens living on the Islands, and that all but one of these are associated with the *Bahá'í* religious sect.

"Members abstain from political activity and alcohol, but are not rigidly organized or segregated. The reporting officer did not detect any aberration or coercion in connection with their presence or activities in Stanley." [3146]

February 6th, in Britain's House of Lords, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, speaking on behalf of the Government, explains the agreement concerning scientific activities in the Falklands Dependencies; discussed with Argentina in December, 1978. [3147]

> *"... it relates to a wide range of scientific questions, from meteorology to Antarctic questions generally. It is the kind of question that arises in conditions and circumstances of this geographical sort. The scope of the discussions, while not including hydro-carbons, is sufficiently wide not only to offer hope for development in the Dependencies but also perhaps to give added strength and confidence to the larger discussions which are proceeding amicably between us and Argentina in regard to the future of the Falklands. ...*
>
> *The illegal station in South Thule remains illegal. We have asserted, and continue to assert without reservation, our claim to sovereignty over South Thule, as indeed over these Dependencies generally. However, any discussions specifically aimed at advancing matters in the Dependencies can only help to resolve not only the disagreement about the station in South Thule but, as I said, the larger question of our relations with Argentina, a country with which, historically, we have for many years enjoyed close and fruitful relations."*

3142 Southby-Tailyour 1990. NP8901 was the Marine detachment at the Falkland Islands.
3143 Freedman 2005 vol.2.
3144 See - https://history.state.gov/historicaldocuments/frus1981-88v13/d1
3145 *Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State* Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol. XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984*
3146 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol. XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.9. A religion originating in Persia (Iran) in 1844. The first follower to arrive in the Falklands in 1954, was a John Leonard.
3147 *HL Deb 06 February 1979 vol.398 cc589-91. cf.* 1958

No mention is made of the objections of Islands Councillors, although Goronwy-Roberts does confirm that the Government regards the continental shelf around the Falklands as British sovereign territory. [3148]

"It was admitted in the House of Lords on February 7 (sic) by Lord Goronwy Roberts that the scientific cooperation proposals would legitimise the illegal occupation by Argentine scientists of South Thule Island in the Falkland Islands Dependencies." [3149]

February 19th, at the Foreign Office, UKFIC members meet with Ted Rowlands to discuss a fisheries conservation zone around the archipelago. Rowlands responds that; *"any unilateral declaration of a 200-mile limit by UK would represent a confrontation which should be avoided."* [3150]

February 23rd, in Britain's House of Commons, in a written answer, Foreign Secretary Dr. David Owen states that the 1978 seismic surveys around the Falklands, are still being evaluated.

"Whatever the outcome of the evaluations and in spite of the close and continuing interest of oil companies and the certainty of a world oil shortage by 1985, the true potential of the Falklands will not be known until exploratory drilling takes place, at a cost of approximately £7.5m." [3151]

On the same day, in the same place, a question on defence, is answered.

"Falkland Islands: Mr Gow asked the Secretary of State for Defence what proposals he has for improving Moody Brook Camp in the Falkland Islands: whether he has any plans to re-build the Royal Marines camp at a site closer to the airfield: whether he will list the special allowances paid to Her Majesty's forces in the Falkland Islands: what criteria he applied when deciding on the rate of those allowances. Mr. Wellbeloved: The Property Services Agency is to undertake a feasibility study in the near future into ways of improving accommodation at Moody Brook camp. At the same time an assessment will be made of the possibilities of rebuilding alternative sites. Members of Her Majesty's Forces in the Falkland Islands receive the normal allowances to which they are entitled: There are no special allowances for Her Majesty's forces in the Falkland Islands." [3152]

March 13th, in a letter to the Prime Minister, the Foreign Secretary sets out his future plans regarding talks.

> *"The Islanders' position is a problem. I am satisfied however, that, even though we cannot sign an agreement, our own sovereignty position over Thule is still not seriously eroded. I have considered whether Ted Rowlands should go out to the Islands in a further attempt to win Councillors over. But such a Ministerial visit would inevitably attract publicity and speculation and would focus attention on the Falklands when we want to avoid this.*
>
> *We have therefore told Councillors that we shall need to meet the Argentines again soon and that we will discuss their reservations about the scheme and report back to them. …*
>
> *Meanwhile, the Argentines have proposed that the next negotiating round should be at official level in New York from 21-23 March.... There is no question of any decisions being taken in New York this month; our intention is to pre-empt trouble and continue talking."* [3153]

3148 *Ibid*. at *cc.591*
3149 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6
3150 Elgood 2025 citing *EP/1968/5*
3151 *Ibid.* Findings withheld, costs emphasised and likely exaggerated.
3152 Quoted in Southby-Tailyour 1990. See *Hansard–Commons:23 February 1979–Written Answers–Defence vol.963*
3153 *Owen to Callaghan March 13, 1979* at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation

March 22nd, in London, a petition signed by 36 members of the Trades Union Council (TUC) and several MPs is handed in to the Argentine Embassy calling for information regarding the fate of some 25,000 Argentines who have 'disappeared' during a period of three years of military rule.

"The protest coincided with the announcement that Argentina and Britain were considering the re-establishment of full diplomatic relations, broken off in 1976..." [3154]

March 21st, in New York, three days of Anglo-Argentine talks commence.

> *"Sr. Oliveri Lopez suggested that the talks should continue from those of December 1978 in Geneva, on particular they should deal with: a) the agreement on scientific co-operation in the dependencies; and b) a regime covering the territory of the Dependencies and their maritime spaces. He also said that this meeting should be regarded as a formal one.*
>
> *Mr Hall agreed that the discussions should be formal and could cover anything which fell within the terms of reference for the negotiations. But on (b) he recalled that the UK proposals covered only the maritime zones and not the territory, though he would be willing to hear any proposals from Sr. Oliveri Lopex on a regime covering territory."* [3155]

"Domestic considerations hindered meaningful dialogue... Hall explained that the scientific cooperation agreement could not proceed, due to the islanders' 'deep suspicion' of Argentine motives... Subsequent discussions yielded no progress." [3156]

March 23rd, at the UN building, negotiations end with a press *communique*:

> *"In accordance with the announcement made simultaneously by British and Argentine Governments on 16 March 1979, delegations representing the two countries met in New York from 21/23 March 1979 in order to conduct a fourth round of negotiations on the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands in accordance with the terms of reference for these negotiation announced on 26 April 1977. The two delegations were led respectively by Mr. George Hall, Assistant Under Secretary of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, and by Sr. Oliveri Lopez, Head of the Antarctic and Falklands department at the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There was a wide exchange of views and the two delegation discussed the main issue with which the negotiations are concerned. The date, place and level of a future meeting were left to be discussed through the diplomatic channel."*

From the UN, the UK Mission telegrams London.

> *"To sum up, whilst the Argentine's were clearly disappointed about the scientific agreement and taken aback by the strength of our rejection of their position over sovereignty, they are unlikely to take any action which could lead to a breakdown in the negotiations and they still see some possibilities of reaching a mutually satisfactory settlement in due course."* [3157]

"Talks between the British and Argentine governments over the future of the Falkland Islands appear to have failed. The most recent meeting took place in New York on March 21-23 between Mr. George Hall of the Foreign Office and his Argentine counterpart, Senor Lopez. The communique issued following the discussions gave no indication of their substance and was markedly less cooperative in tone than the statement issued following the previous round of talks in Geneva during December." [3158]

3154 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6.
3155 *FCO Record on Anglo-Argentine Negotiations on the Falkland Islands in New York (21-23 March 1979)*.
3156 Donaghy 2014
3157 *UKMIS New York telegram to FCO* in *ALW 040/325/10* at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation.
3158 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6

"The communique released after the last round of talks in New York in March, 1979 conspicuously omitted any mention of joint scientific cooperation and announced only that the talks were held and another session would be scheduled later in the year. Argentina is clearly annoyed at British foot dragging on the question. It also feared a Conservative victory in the upcoming British elections. The Conservative Party has traditionally shown far less willingness than the Laborites to discuss the future political disposition of the Islands. In the meantime, however, Argentina is following a patient, multi-front policy designed to build international pressure to force Britain into speeding negotiations on the sovereignty question while, at the same time, steadily seeking to win the Islanders' confidence if not their loyalty." [3159]

"Anglo/Argentine exchanges on the Falklands date from 1966,... The most active periods have been 1967/8, 1972/3 and 1977/9. Differences over sovereignty have been central: we have never been able to get the Argentines to accept our view that sovereignty cannot be transferred against the wishes of the Islanders; we have refused to accept the Argentine formula recognising only the "interests" of the Islanders." [3160]

An Argentine stamp-set celebrates 150 years since the *'Civil and Military Command of the Malvinas.'* [3161]

In **April**, the Falkland Islands Legislative Council calls for a 200-mile maritime limit around the archipelago; *"to replace the existing three-mile limit.* [3162]

In London, 118 MPs sign a Commons *motion* demanding that the Government implement the Shackleton recommendations. Britain's Ministry of Agriculture commissions a 'desk study' into the fisheries potential in the South Atlantic.

April 27, in London, the UKFIC Director, Air Commodore Frow, speaks to Conservative MP, Ray Witney; *"who claimed that Argentine human rights abuses were exaggerated, that Islanders self-determination was not viable and that British interests should come first. The UKFIC ... concluded that career diplomat Witney's views mirrored those of the FCO."* [3163]

May 1st, in the Islands, the new airport at Cape Pembroke is officially opened by polar explorer Sir Vivian Fuchs.

"The construction of the permanent airfield had just been completed at a final cost of £6m million. Yet the new runway, measuring 1,370 yards, could only take short and medium-haul aircraft. The islanders thus remained reliant on the airport at Comodoro Rivadavia, southern Argentina, as their only available staging post for reaching the outside world." [3164]

May 2nd, from the UN in New York, a record of a meeting between Britain's newly appointed Permanent Representative to the UN, Anthony Parsons, and Martinez de Hoz, Argentina's Economy Minister, is forwarded to London.

> *"I made clear to Dr Martinez that no Argentine Government could expect any change in our position on sovereignty. He of all people would understand that the claims of small, distant and loyal communities of British descent were extremely emotive in the British political context. ...*

3159 *Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State* Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol. XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984*
3160 *FCO 76/1892 Annex 3.* See October, 1979
3161 See 1829
3162 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* April 1979 no.6
3163 Elgood 2025 citing *UKFIC82* para 201
3164 Donaghy 2014.

Dr Martinez did not contest what I said. He speculated about the possibility that the islanders might eventually change their views and regretted the fact that the practical contacts i.e. visits by islanders to Argentina seemed to have died down." [3165]

May 3rd, in the UK, following a General Election, Margaret Hilda Thatcher, Leader of the Conservative Party, becomes Prime Minister. [3166]

Peter Carington, Lord Carrinton, is appointed Foreign Secretary. [3167] Nicholas Ridley is appointed Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office, with responsibility for the Falkland Islands. [3168]

"Fellow MP and contemporary at Eton, Tam Dalyell, described (Ridley) as a man who was 'gratuitously confrontational', and who 'enjoyed being rude'." [3169]

"Carless wrote again soon after Margaret Thatcher's election, saying: 'Since the British elections ... the concept of Argentina opting for a closer relationship with Britain would seem to have gained ground here.' He suggested that in exchange for granting Argentina 'political recognition as a valid partner', sharing military and nuclear technology, and a 'symbolic' agreement on the Falklands, British business could win lucrative contracts." [3170]

"(Thatcher) allowed Carrington to pick his junior Ministers, adding Nicholas Ridley as her watchdog in an organisation she greatly distrusted." [3171]

May 10th, in London, John Ure, Under-Secretary in the Foreign Office's South American Department, *minutes* Nicholas Ridley regarding the UKFIC.

"There is a vociferous and highly organised Falkland Islands lobby in this country with the capacity to enlist considerable support in Parliament and the media. Its function, in the name of the Falkland Islanders, is to monitor and oppose any attempt by the British Government to establish closer links between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. ... The Argentine claim enjoys widespread international support..." [3172]

May 14th, Minister Ridley responds to Ure.

"... I would hope to preserve the Falklands as British – maybe it's not possible – in return for helping Argentina to carve up the Antarctic with us as a partner. I do think its important for me to go a) to the Falklands, b) to Argentina."

3165 *FCO7/3676 (f136)*available at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation.

3166 Secretary of State for Education and Science (1970-1974), Thatcher had never been Foreign Secretary which was unusual for modern Prime Ministers. Wilson had been another. Neither had experience of dealing with foreign relations or the secret world of intelligence that goes hand-in-hand with foreign affairs.

3167 6th Baron Carrington, Carrington of Upton, a hereditary Peer at the time of his appointment. His family name, however, has only one 'r'. Lord Carrington would later refer to the Falklands question, on becoming Foreign Secretary, as having been "*number 249*" on his list of priorities.

3168 For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/ridley_nicholas

3169 *Ridley, Nicholas* Graham Bound in Tatham (ed) 2008

3170 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to FCO June 11, 1979 FCO 7/3573*. Carless was still *charge d'affires* in Buenos Aires.

3171 Elgood 2025

3172 *ALW 045/325/1 Part B*

"The Foreign Office argued that good relations with Argentina were necessary in order to resolve the dispute – an assertion with which Nicholas Ridley agreed – noting, in an early meeting with officials, that it might be possible to persuade Argentina to accept a continuation of British sovereignty 'if we acted in a friendlier fashion and tried to help them in other areas', ..." [3173]

May 16th, from Buenos Aires, a paper entitled, '*The Malvinas (Falkland) Islands: A Political and Social Review*' is transmitted by the US Embassy to the Department of State in Washington DC. [3174]

> *"The Embassy predicts, based on contacts and information available here, that eventually Argentina will regain political sovereignty over the Malvinas, most likely with solid guarantees conserving the Islanders' patrimony and life style and bilateral agreements for joint economic and scientific exploitation of the area. The opposition of the new Conservative government in Britain could delay that outcome, but it is clear that the continued decline and depopulation of the Islands will require some accommodation if the Islands are to remain viable at all. Another outburst of Argentine impatience and revanchism could, however, upset and maybe destroy the delicate gradualist approach underway today. Such an event would probably stiffen British backs and public opinion from letting go of the Islands and bring about further deterioration in bilateral UK-Argentine relations.*
>
> *It appears unlikely at this writing that Argentina would attempt an armed occupation of the Islands, which would only bring international sympathy to the stalwart Islanders as an endangered species. The Argentine Foreign Ministry officials currently responsible for the Malvinas negotiations have expressed to an Embassy officer their support for the present gradualist process and their confidence that the Islands will revert to Argentina sooner or later.*
>
> *The recent unnerving near-war with Chile over conflicting Beagle Channel claims may have also helped to temper Argentine officials' impatience in pursuing a Malvinas solution. At the same time, Argentine diplomats will be compelled to demonstrate to the home audience real progress in the ongoing talks, balancing that off against potential British backlash at any sign of a "selling-out" of the Islanders."* [3175]

May 22nd, in London, the issue of the Falklands is raised in the Lords during a debate on the Address.

> *"Lord Morris: My Lords, I should like to confine my contribution to matters concerning the South-West Atlantic. ... It must be as apparent to noble Lords as it is apparent to me that the commercial and strategic importance of these waters is evidenced by the attention being paid to them by nations other than the United Kingdom, and in particular by the merchant fleets of the Warsaw Pact countries. The South-West Atlantic fishing grounds are being exploited concentratedly by the merchant fleets of Russia, Poland, Bulgaria, East Germany, Japan and West Germany. At this very moment there are two Polish supply ships permanently based at Port William in the Falkland Islands. Yet there is not one British fishing vessel, or any other vessel for that matter, in sight.*
>
> *In the light of that, I beseech the Conservative Administration as a matter of urgency to review, report back upon and act upon the desk survey by the White Fish Authority, which was commissioned by the former Administration, and to do so in conjunction with the most admirable report of the noble Lord, Lord Shackleton. Although I appreciate that* ***the survey has been on the Minister's desk only since 14th May last****, many believe, as I do, that time is of the essence.*

3173 Livingstone 2018 citing *Minister of State's meeting, minutes May 16, 1979 FCO 7/3573*

3174 Authored by Maxwell Chaplin, Deputy Chief of the US Mission to Argentina 1976-1980.

3175 *Airgram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State* Buenos Aires, May 16, 1979 in *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol.XIII: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984.*

Noble Lords will recall that early last December, as a result of a Question tabled by my noble kinsman, the Earl of Lauderdale, it was learned that Her Majesty's Government had received a hydrocarbons survey of some 200,000 square miles around the Falkland Islands. Furthermore, on 13th March last the noble Lord, Lord Goronwy-Roberts, declared that the results of the survey would be forthcoming "in the near future". Bearing in mind that some six months have passed since Her Majesty's Government received that survey, may I ask the Minister whether the Conservative Administration will be as coy as their predecessors were about informing your Lordships' House of the result of this survey?" [3176]

May 24th, in the UK, Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher invites Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington, and Home Secretary William Whitelaw, to a working lunch at Chequers. [3177]

"Carrington mentioned that one of the problems he faced was what to do about the Falklands. "I think we will soon be in trouble if we go on having meetings about them with the Argentines without saying anything at all," Carrington said. "One of the options which seems to me worth exploring is a leaseback arrangement similar to what we have in Hong Kong." Lady Thatcher "erupted in anger", ... She spent the next ten minutes denouncing the very idea of exploring a Hong Kong solution. "That's the trouble with your Foreign Office," she said. "Everyone in it is so bloody wet!" [3178]

"Thatcher thought "Carrington instinctively Foreign Office man and therefore, as a matter of course, on the side of foreigners". Dennis Healey told the Commons: "The style and temperament of the Prime Minister ... is a total disaster when applied to foreign affairs"." [3179]

May 25th, in Britain's House of Lords, Sir Ian Gilmour responds to questions with a written answer:

"Successive British Governments have left the Argentine Government in no doubt as to British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. The majority of the recommendations put forward by Lord Shackleton in his economic survey of the Falkland Islands have now been implemented.[3180] *The Government will continue to maintain a close interests in the development of the Falkland Islands. We are looking closely at the problems of the Falkland Islands but no change of policy is currently planned."* [3181]

June 4th, in London, Nicholas Ridley *minutes* Lord Carrington, seeking a decision as to the policy to be adopted.

"I have been looking at the various options open to us. These seem to be: (a) thumbing our noses at the Argentines and provisioning and defending the Falkland islands – the "Fortress Falkland" option: (b) selling out the Falkland Islanders: (c) negotiating with Argentina.

I think that negotiation is the only valid option. The Argentines will not negotiate unless the negotiations include questions of sovereignty so, although I am much more interested in negotiating with them about economic co-operation, we will have to agree to discuss sovereignty. If we are going to do this we must keep the Falkland islanders with us. If we do not they will complain and we will have a blow up in Parliament and in the press. I am therefore proposing to go out to the Islands in July..." [3182]

3176 My emphasis. Lord Morris in *HL Deb 22 May 1979 vol.400 cc233-432*
3177 The official country residence of British Prime Ministers
3178 *The Telegraph* October 12th, 2013
3179 Elgood 2025
3180 Not true.
3181 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 19, 1979. See - https://www.fiassociation.com/newsletter/FIA-NL-06A.pdf
3182 *ALW 045/325/1 Part B*

"Senior Conservative backbenchers left Ridley in no doubt they saw no future in continued sovereignty discussions. If the FCO abandoned the principle of self-determination and surrendered sovereignty it would encourage the use of force and lend legitimacy to other claims against British territory…" [3183]

June 7th, in Buenos Aires, *La Prensa* newspaper reports that a further meeting has been arranged for later in the month between Deputy Foreign Minister Cavándoli and Nicholas Ridley. Topics are to include; *"… an analysis of the state of negotiations on the Falkland Islands, the establishment of the basis for a formal meeting to be held at Buenos Aires in July 1979 following Mr. Ridley's visit to the Territory, and the resumption of bilateral relations at the ambassadorial level."*

June 10th, in Argentina it is the "Día de la Afirmación de los Derechos Argentinos sobre las Malvinas, islas y sector antártico" [3184]

June 12th, from Buenos Aires, Minister Cavándoli informs Ridley that his Government requires sovereignty to be central to negotiations.

June 14th, from london, Lord Carrington responds to Cavándoli that Britain is willing to continue discussions.

"We kept the Argentines in play only with difficulty and there was continuing suspicion among the Argentine officials about the genuineness of our intentions." [3185]

June 19th, in Port Stanley, the Islanders celebrate Falkland Islands Day. [3186]

"The Falkland Islanders are determined to remain British – but they look forward to increasing cooperation with Argentina in the development of the South West Atlantic in the interests of the Falkland Islands, of Argentina and of Britain in two sectors: fishing and the possibility of finding oil in commercial quantities." [3187]

June 26th, speaking in Cordoba, Dr. Carlos Helbling, calls for; *"The reconquest of the Malvinas; effective control of the Antarctic and the reoccupation of the geopolitical area belonging to the nation."* [3188]

July 4th, from Buenos Aires, Britain's *charge d'affaires* reports to London on the visit to Argentina by the Chairman of General Electric Company, Lord Nelson, who has held meetings with the junta's military staff.

"Lord Nelson,.. met the chief of the Argentine air force in July 1979 to discuss a nuclear contract and was told that 'Britain would never win any major contracts in Argentina unless progress were made over the Falkland Islands'…" [3189]

In Britain's House of Lords, a question is asked by Lord Morris regarding the government's progress in implementing the recommendations of the Shackleton report. Lord Trefgarne, responding for the Government, insists that a "*majority of the recommendations have now been implemented.*" An assessment challenged by Lord Morris and the author of the report, Lord Shackleton. [3190]

Lord Trefgarne responds:

3183 Elgood 2025
3184 Day for the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector
3185 *FCO 07-3801 1980*
3186 After the 1982 war, this was changed to June 14.
3187 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 19, 1979. See - https://www.fiassociation.com/newsletter/FIA-NL-06A.pdf
3188 *FCO ALA 020/1 Part A Political Relations between UK and Argentina File No. 141/1.* Helbling would seem, at that time, to have been Baring Bank agent in Buenos Aires.
3189 Livingstone 2018 citing *Carless to FCO July 4, 1979 FCO 7/3574*
3190 *Hansard. Lords Chamber July 4, 1979 vol.401* See - https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1979-07-04/debates/f535937e-2449-479b-b5a9-0309fe878608/FalklandIslandsShackletonRecommendations

"My Lords, I suppose there is some room for variation in interpretation of what constitutes a recommendation, but we certainly maintain that, quantitatively, a majority of the recommendations have been implemented." [3191]

"... for reasons which are not clear, the Foreign and Commonwealth Office have given the wrong impression to Parliament and the public. Moreover, in terms of importance, the majority of the major recommendations of the Shackleton report have not been implemented. The matter is still being pursued at parliamentary level." [3192]

July 11th, in Argentina, a draft executive decree announces; *"... the concession contract for the Rio Gallegos Area (8,700 km2) and the Magellan Area (4,700 km2) of the Austral Basin to Shell Hydrocarbons and Shell Argentina. This contract is closely related to the proposal of the Foreign Office to postpone any claim on our sovereignty in the Malvinas and to enter into negotiations on a vast program of (economic) cooperation, related in the first instance to the exploitation of oil in the Marine Basin Austral and Falklands Basin. ... the Minister of the Economy Dr. (Jose Alfredo) Martinez de Hoz in his various trips to London, has unconditionally accepted the program of "economic cooperation". So the contract with Shell is the principle of execution of a tacit agreement."* [3193]

In Mendoza, some 26 Islanders, including 11 children, visit the Iguazú waterfalls.

"In 1979, the director of the Army's Remonta y Veterinaria del Ejercito launched an initiative for islanders to travel to Buenos Aires, to get to know the Rur de Palermo and receive some horses as a donation. The idea was to offer the population of the islands "a quick overview showing diversified Argentine advancement in different areas and environments". ... The event caused accusations between those who considered (the participants) as 'traitors' and those who understood it as a possibility to know something more ... Desmond Peck dedicated a poem to the episode, pointing out that the "trick" had already been tried a few years ago, when the (Argentine) Navy gave away two cabin boys at the end of the regatta... With macho humor, Peck stated that the Argentines should try tempting the islanders with women, since horses were not a universal hobby." [3194]

"After a visit from Remonta y Veterinaria del Ejército, a trip was planned with about fifty islanders to visit Argentine cities and the Rural Exhibition. The organization was flawless and, for most of them, it was their first trip to the mainland. Upon returning, the pro-British group received them with signs accusing them of traitors. Travelers answered by laughing and clapping." [3195]

July 20th, at Port Stanley, Minister of State Nicolas Ridley arrives for "*consultations*."

"... the party drove into Stanley where many houses were decked out with stickers such as 'Keep the Falklands British' and 'God Bless Our Queen.' Around about 50 people gathered at the entrance to Government House drive and although it was raining quite heavily, the Minister along with His Excellency the Governor, got down from the official car to talk with the crowd. The early arrival of the aircraft meant that some people were a little late in arriving at the drive but the Minister moved around quite freely and spoke with many of the late-comers. Mrs. Betty Miller unfurled one of the biggest banners which read: "We want our 200 miles, for

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3191 *Ibid*. Comment by Lord Trefgarne, following Lord Shackleton asking if he was being accused of lying.

3192 *Falkland islands Newsletter* November 1979 no.7. This gives an annotated breakdown of Shackleton's recommendations. See - https://www.fiassociation.com/newsletter/FIA-NL-07.pdf

3193 *Contrato con Shell coopera con los ocupantes de las Malvinas* in *El Diario del fin del mundo* July 7, 2017, quoting Adolfo Silenzi de Stagni of the *Politica Petrolera y la Cuenca Marina Austral* from July 7, 1979. The implication was that this decree was prepared for the benefit of Ridley's visit, but there is no evidence that he was ever made aware of it.

3194 Carassai 2022 citing *La Capital* August 11, 1979 and *The Falkland Islands Times* August, 1979.

3195 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

Falklands Fish are British Fish". The Minister admired the banner and wanted to know who had thought up the slogan. He also observed another banner which said 'Long to reign over us, God bless our Queen.' … The crowd meanwhile had swelled to about 80 and in answer to some questions Mr. Ridley said that he was pleased to be in the Falklands. … Mr. Ridley referred to the possibility of an exchange of Ambassadors during his recent visit. It was understood that Her Majesty's Government are responding to an Argentine request: it was they who originally withdraw their Ambassador from London and asked for the withdrawal of the British Ambassador and the first move for a restoration of Ambassadors has properly to come from them. What Her Majesty's Government are agreeing to is simply a return to normal full diplomatic relations." [3196]

"He considered 'lease back' the best available option, … but Thatcher was hostile and could sense unease among Conservative MPs who already resented the compromises that had been made to arrange a settlement in Rhodesia. Ridley was sent to the Falklands in July 1979 … for discussions. The islanders were still firmly against a transfer of sovereignty." [3197]

"Ridley found a more demanding community than Rowlands. With the technical endorsement of the Shackleton Report, the Islanders asked that the United Kingdom declare the extension of the maritime zone to 200 nautical miles (at that time it was 12), explore fishing agreements with Japan, Poland and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, and not only expand the airport, as Rowlands had been asked to do, but also implement a direct air service between Stanley and London. Ridley, whose government was in negotiations to re-establish ambassador with Argentina … could not commit to any of it." [3198]

"The first the Islanders knew of Ridley's July 1979 visit was an article in La Nacion." [3199]

July 21st, Nicolas Ridley meets with Islands Councillors; *"The Argentines had been charming to him, and he did not wish to suggest that they had demonstrated any belligerence; nevertheless he judged that if we did not talk seriously to Argentina concerning the Islands, their patience would run out, and they would adopt confrontational postures. … Later this year he would like to start talks with the Argentines on the whole range of issues concerning the Falkland Islands. It would be more difficult for him is the Islanders refused the LADE house, or rejected the draft scientific co-operation agreement."*

"For FCO policy to prevail it was necessary to persuade the Islanders to abandon British sovereignty, though keeping British administration in place for many years. This required the Islanders to trust the Argentines not to treat leaseback as a brief staging point to total control, which they were unwilling to do." [3200]

July 25th, Minister Ridley holds a further meeting with Islands Councillors.

"On the political side he had identified three themes. The first was that the dispute with Argentina overhung everything; … Secondly he was struck by the shortage of capital in the Islands. British aid, averaging £1 million per annum was high; but in terms of the overall needs was woefully inadequate. It would be better to improve access to commercial capital. He believed that the FIC activities were not helpful, in that the Company took money out, and did not sufficiently discourage agricultural development. His third impression concerned the labour shortage… he suggested that Islanders could be more active in recruitment. … He repeated his twin assurances a) that he would conclude no agreement which did not meet the Islanders wishes, and b) that he would keep Councillors fully informed through the Governor."

3196 *The Falkland Islands Times* August 13, 1979 no.11/79
3197 *Britain's International Role 1970 – 1991* Michael J. Turner 2010 p.207
3198 Carassai 2022
3199 Elgood 2025
3200 *Ibid.*

From Stanley, Ridley flies to Buenos Aries for preliminary talks with the Argentine Foreign Ministry. Agreement is reached on the reinstatement of Ambassadors – but little else. As Ridley is about to depart, the Argentine Foreign Ministry present an *aide-memoire* stating that they will find it unacceptable for the Islanders to become *'third parties'* to any negotiations. Also that Argentina *"demands"* that negotiations move at a more dynamic pace.

"Ridley returned to London determined to sort this one out once and for all." [3201]

"The Argentines were beginning to be convinced that what the United Kingdom was seeking was to gain time … The Islanders had become convinced that … the United Kingdom was gradually forcing them to accept Argentina as their new administration." [3202]

"On Ridley's return to London, the UKFIC chairman wrote requesting a meeting … When he met UKFIC he was extremely cordial, saying he had been misrepresented. He was not believed." [3203]

August 16th, in New York, at the United Nations building, the Special Committee on Decolonization decide to defer consideration of the Falkland Islands until the next session in 1980. [3204]

August 17th, in London, an internal Foreign Office *minute* considers negotiations.

> *"… we need to clear our lines with Cabinet on the next moves in our dispute with Argentina on sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. I recommend that the Secretary of State write to the Prime Minister and her OD colleagues seeking their agreement to resume negotiations with Argentina in the autumn, to see whether an overall solution involving a leaseback, or some other special status, is possible. … No solution stands any chance of success if we do not take the Islanders with us."* [3205]

"The Argentine effort to win over Kelper, however, was already seen by many as a ruse whose sole purpose was sovereignty. "Free rides in Buenos Aires, cheap flights, subsidised freight, fuels and oils, temporary runway, scholarships", reflected another islander … "Argentine national Pride demands complete control of the Malvinas Islands by the Government of Buenos Aires and it is to that end that all previous Argentine actions have been directed". Islanders and Argentines could no longer deceive each other …" [3206]

Following enquiries by the arms manufacturer Marconi, with regard to the promotion of the Stingray lightweight torpedo in Argentina, the Ministry of Defence argue that a sale will not be permitted. One of the factors presented is the possible threat to the Falkland Islands.

"An MOD sales representative responded by saying: 'I was surprised to see you making so much of a military threat against the Falkland Islands,' adding: 'I was under the impression that … we had accepted that the Argentinians could take the Falkland Islands at any time they wish.' …" [3207]

August 28th, in London, Minister Ridley meets with the UK Falkland Islands Committee.

3201 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.47
3202 Carassai 2022
3203 Elgood 2025
3204 *UN Doc A/34/23/REV.1[VOL.IV](Supp)*
3205 *Ure to Hall August 17, 1979 ALW 045/325/1 Part C. OD* is short for the *Defence and Overseas Policy Committee.*
3206 Carassai 2022 citing *The Falkland Islands Times* September, 1979
3207 Livingstone 2018 citing *J.R. Hill to The Secretary RMI Sub-Committee, MOD August 21, 1979 DEFE 678/378.* After some lobbying, the sale of one version of the torpedo was approved.

"(Ridley) believed that he had moved Islander opinion to the extent that progress may now be made towards solving the dispute with Argentina. … Mr Ridley said that the Islanders as a whole recognised that their future was inhibited by the dispute. They also recognised their vulnerability as regards communications and travel. But, more importantly, they recognised the dead hand of the dispute on investment and development in the Islands. … 'Leaseback' might be worth considering…" [3208]

August 30th, in a *minute* to Ridley, Lord Carrington requests more information on how 'leaseback' would work.

"The Secretary of State is not convinced that leaseback is the only or the right solution. He – and he thinks OD colleagues will feel the same – would like to consider other options before reaching a conclusion on leaseback."[3209]

September 3rd, in Havana, Cuba, the sixth conference of the Non-Aligned Movement convenes.

"168. In the special and particular case of 'the Malvinas Islands, the Heads of State or Government firmly reiterated their support for the Argentine Republic's right to the restitution of that territory and sovereignty over it and requested that the negotiations in this regard be speeded up." [3210]

September 4th, Ridley's staff prepare a response to Carrington's request for further information.

"2. The options must be measured against our objective. Our objective is a solution with which the Argentines might agree (which means concessions on sovereignty) and which the Islanders will accept (which means the maintenance of their way of life). Any option that does not meet this objective is useless. We cannot sell out the Islanders to Argentina and we have to give the Argentine something on sovereignty. 3. The proposal put is that we should concede to Argentina sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, the Dependencies and their Maritime Zones. Argentina should simultaneously give HMG a perpetual lease over the Falkland Islands and South Georgia and their territorial waters and agree on equal co-administration of the economic resources of the maritime zones and seabed pertaining to al the Falkland Islands and Dependencies.

The Argentines should also undertake to continue to provide services (eg air services and oil supplies) to the Islands and for the Islanders in Argentina (e.g. schooling, medical services, etc.) 4. This proposal would provide what the Islanders have said they must have and would make possible increased economic development. It would give the Argentines concessions on sovereignty which they may be brought to accept as sufficient, although they may not meet their ambitions even if, as a fall back position, we were to agree to a lease limited to 100 or 50 years and left out South Georgia." [3211]

September 18th, in New York, at the opening of a new session of the United Nations, Argentina's Foreign Minister, Brigadier Carlos Washington Pastor, addresses the General Assembly regarding the Falkland Islands.

"My government … reiterates its firm decision to persevere in the search for a prompt and just solution to this problem. But the Argentine decision cannot be unilateral. It has to be matched by a similar spirit on behalf of the British authorities."

3208 *FCO73/713-16 (f178)*

3209 *Wall to Duggan August 30, 1979* in *ALW 045/325/1 Part C* at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation.

3210 *Letter dated 1 October 1979 from the Permanent Representative of Cuba to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General UN Doc A/34/542*. Worthy of note that NAM members dominate on the UN's Decolonization Committee (C24). See 1961, 1973 and 1983.

3211 *Hall to Ridley September 4, 1979* in *FCO7/3677 (f200)*

"In response, the Foreign & Commonwealth Office stated that Britain's position had not changed. A spokesman said that it was evident that Britain had exercised sovereignty over the Islands for 150 years and it was equally obvious that the Islanders, being of British descent, wished to remain under British rule. Despite this statement, it is known that Lord Carrington, the Foreign Secretary, agreed at the UN General Assembly in private talks with his Argentine counterpart that the negotiations on the future sovereignty and economic status of the Falkland Islands will be resumed." [3212]

On the same day, in London, Lord Carrington requests that the explanation regarding leaseback be redrafted to make it sound more positive; *"The Secretary of State does not wish the minute to sound defeatist."* [3213]

September 19th, following extensive talks, Constantino Davidoff contracts with the company of 'Christian Salvesen' to recover whaling equipment at the stations at Leith harbour, Stromness and Husvik on South Georgia. [3214] Under the contract, Davidoff agrees to comply with all British entry conditions at South Georgia, and accepts that any equipment remaining after March 1982 reverts to Salvesen. [3215]

"I can confirm that in the period leading up to the conclusion of the contract there were a number of exchanges between Salvesens, the FCO and the then Governor of the Falkland Islands. Mr. Davidoff also contacted the Embassy in Buenos Aires. ... While there were misgivings about the political implications of the contract, legal advice was that there was no lawful way of preventing Salvesens concluding the agreement if they were determined to do so. Accordingly Salvesens were not obstructed in their pursuit of a contract. Ministers were consulted at the time and approved. There is no letter from the FCO to Salvesens acquiescing in the arrangement." [3216]

"Thatcher's Foreign Office not only cleared the way for Salvesens to enter into a salvaging contract, but it also sweetened the deal. First the Foreign Office authorized Salvesens to acquire the Albion Star leases at Husvik and Grytviken, giving the company control over all four of the whaling stations on the island. Then, Salvesens offered Davidoff an option contract to dismantle the stations at Leith, Stromness, and Husvik, all located at Stromness Bay and one more than Davidoff originally sought. The fourth station, at Grytviken, twenty miles away from the other three, where the BAS were located, was excluded from the deal... Although Davidoff signed a three-year contract with Salvesens in September 1979, and despite the fact that scrap metal prices reached their historic peak in 1981, Davidoff's enterprise lay dormant until activated in late 1981." [3217]

"The company signed a contract with Davidoff for £115,000, to remove machinery and other metal from the deserted whaling stations on South Georgia at Leith Harbour, Stromness and Husvik, and Davidoff was given three years to complete the job ... For several years he made no progress, but he did not give up the project." [3218]

September 20th, in London, Lord Carrington seeks consensus on a Falklands policy within the Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee. He puts forward options: 1) *Fortress Falklands'*; 2) protracted negotiations with no concession on sovereignty; or 3) substantive negotiations on sovereignty. [3219]

3212 *Falkland islands Newsletter* November 1979 no.7
3213 *ALW 040/325/14*
3214 *Davidoff to Williams March 25, 1982* in *AW 040/325.12.* The station at Grytviken was not included, possibly because it was the base for the British Antarctic Survey (BAS).
3215 This was subsequently extended to December 31, 1982 and then to March 31, 1983
3216 *Falkland Island Dependencies: Whaling Stations February 1, 1983* FCO note to Downing Street.
3217 *The Reagan Revolution II: Rebuilding the Western Alliance* Richard C. Thornton 2004
3218 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.616
3219 *PM/79/81*

Carrington favours the last option and again suggests that the best solution is some kind of leaseback arrangement with a preferred term of 99 years. He highlights that it will be necessary to ensure that the leaseback option has the support of the Islanders, and of Parliament. [3220]

> *"NO!… I could not possibly agree to the line the foreign secretary is proposing. Nor would it ever get through the H of C – let alone the parliamentary party."* [3221]

"… Mr. Ridley took a proposal that he pursue the leaseback option to the cabinet's overseas and defence (OD) committee. The foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, supported him in this, though did little to conceal the view that it was a brave but hopeless cause: Mrs. Thatcher was less tolerant. … She could see no reason for giving anything to the Argentines and certainly no reason for further arousing back-bench sentiment already seething over Rhodesia/Zimbabwe. Mr. Ridley … was given what one present calls a "fearful mauling" in committee." [3222]

"(Margaret Thatcher) … wrote angry notes on Carrington's draft, rejecting the entire leaseback idea…" [3223]

September 21st, in London, Cabinet Secretary John Hunt, *minutes* the Prime Minister.

> *"Lord Carrington… proposes that in the margin of the UN General Assembly meeting next week he should suggest to his Argentine Foreign Minister that negotiations should start soon … In these negotiations we should, for the first time, formally put to the Argentine the suggestion that we might concede sovereignty over the Falklands and the Dependencies in return for a leaseback to ensure continued British rule for as long as possible,…"*

Thatcher writes on the top of the *minute*; *"I cannot possibly agree to the proposed course of action."* [3224]

September 22nd, in the UK, Energy Secretary David Howell, also writes to Thatcher.

> *"I have seen Peter Carrington's (sic) paper to you on the subject of the Falkland Islands … It is true that the presence of oil (or gas) has yet to be proven, but the continued interest of the oil companies and the results of recent geophysical surveys … lead us to think that there is at least a good chance that hydrocarbons are there.*
>
> *We ought to be very careful about adopting a course which could lead to British oil companies losing a favourable position …"* [3225]

"When, in late 1979, Lord Carrington proposed a 99-year lease-back formula, the Secretary of State for Energy, David Howell, wrote to Margaret Thatcher … He called for a full discussion of the economic implications of leaseback, warning that if sovereignty was transferred "it could also involve a substantial loss to the British economy if oil were found". … The Chancellor of the Exchequer, Geoffrey Howe, agreed…" [3226]

September 25th, after speaking to Thatcher, Carrington informs Ridley that the Prime Minister will not be rushed into making a decision on his proposals and that Ridley should inform Argentina that this; *"complex problem"* was being considered. [3227]

3220 A lease arrangement had been first mooted in January, 1975. See above
3221 *Carrington to Thatcher September 20, 1979 PREM 19/656*
3222 *Falkland Islands: Origins of the War* in *The Economist* June 19, 1982
3223 Livingstone 2018
3224 *PREM 19/656 f1 14* Margaret Thatcher Foundation
3225 *PREM 19/612.* Lord Carrington's family name, has only one 'r'.
3226 Livingstone 2018 citing *Howell to Thatcher September 22, 1979 PREM 19/612*
3227 Franks 1983 para.73

Lord Carrington telegrams the UK Mission at the United Nations; *"... the Prime Minister would prefer that when you see the Argentine Foreign Minister you should confine yourself to saying that HMG have not completed their consideration of this complex problem.... Nor would it be appropriate to speak at this stage about negotiations on sovereignty."*

In New York, at the UN, Argentina's Foreign Ministry proposes a *"programme of work"* in which Secretary of State Ridley meets with Argentina's Deputy Foreign Minister informally twice a year with an open agenda. [3228]

October 1st, in London, anticipating a discussion on the Falklands at the next Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee, John Ure circulates a *memo*. [3229]

> *"On historical and legal grounds we are confident that our sovereignty is soundly based. Nothing in the negotiations so far has eroded this. Equally, no progress has been made. ...*
>
> *Our objectives in the dispute include the following (i) To defend the right of the British settlers to remain under British administration. (ii) To end a dispute which is damaging to trade; damaging to international relations (most of the UN vote against us) and politically explosive at home... (iii) To ensure that the UK derives advantage from the economic resources of the area: possibly oil and certainly fish.*
>
> *Argentine objectives appear to include: (i) achieving nominal sovereignty for reasons of national pride. (ii) Securing a share of the economic offshore resources. (iii) A possible non-national objective in providing a cause to further the ambitions of individual Argentine officers."* [3230]

Three options are raised for discussion: a refusal to negotiate; negotiation but a refusal to make concessions on sovereignty; or the adoption of: *"... a more constructive approach... insisting on preserving our essential interests... On sovereignty, we could explore various arrangements, the most promising of which would appear to be a "leaseback" analogous to the New Territories in Hong Kong, under which Argentina would acquire nominal sovereignty while the Islanders continued to enjoy the security of British rule. ..."* [3231]

Annex 3 to Ure's *memo* notes; *"The question of British sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and their Dependencies has not been submitted to the International Court of Justice or to any other international arbitration. Since Argentina has not accepted the compulsory jurisdiction of the International Court of Justice, and reference to the Court could only be made with the agreement of the Argentine Government."* [3232]

October 2nd, John Grundon, an Exploration and Commercial Manager for British Petroleum, informs the Government's Energy, Science and Space Department that; *"... BP had all but written off the Falkland Islands as a prospective offshore oil area. This was not because of the political obstacles... The main reason for BP lack of interest was geological."* [3233]

October 3rd, in the Falklands, the first edition of the *Penguin News* is published. Founded by Graham Bound.

From Buenos Aires, Constantino Davidoff writes to the Falkland Islands Government.

3228 See November 12, 1979, below.
3229 An OD Committee meeting was scheduled for October 4, 1979. As yet, I have found no record. See October 15, 1979
3230 *FCO 76/1892.* Original emphasis.
3231 *Ibid.*
3232 *Ibid.* In *Annex 3,* 1947's decision of the Law Officer was highlighted; while the 1966 legal advice which broadly agreed with that of 1947, was only mentioned. *cf.* 1947 & 1966
3233 *Ibid.*

"175. Mr. Davidoff signed a contract with the company "Salvensen Limited" of Edinburgh, which was notarized before the notary public Ian Roger Frame on 19-SEP-79 with validity until 31-MAR-83. In October 1979, the Argentine merchant contacted the authorities of Port Stanley, in order to inform them of the existence of the aforementioned contract and explore the possibility of renting a boat to transport the scrap metal obtained from the scrapping of the factories. To which the local authorities refused." [3234]

October 12th, in London, Lord Carrington again seeks a decision from Cabinet.

> *"I … invite my colleagues to agree that the FCO should resume talks with the Argentines at Ministerial level. The purpose of the talks in the first instance would be to explore, without commitment, political and economic solutions… We would seek not to rush matters: so long as the Argentines believe we are negotiating seriously, they will desist from precipitate action."* [3235]

"A memorandum by Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington in late 1979 warned that if Britain refused to negotiate, the Islands could be blockaded or even invaded. But he also argued that is an agreement was not reached with Argentina, the Islands could fall into economic decline, British trade with Argentina could be damaged and that it would be impossible to exploit the economic resources (primarily oil and fish) of the South Atlantic. Long annexes attached to the memorandum outlined not only the cost of defending the Islands militarily, but also the threat to British commercial interests in Argentina,…" [3236]

October 15th, in London, PM Thatcher defers the Falklands question.

"The Prime Minister has seen the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary's memorandum of 12 October… She has asked that discussion of the Falkland Islands by OD should be postponed until after the Rhodesia issue has been settled." [3237]

Also in London, Argentina's recently retired Admiral Massera has a meeting with Minister Ridley.

"During their meeting, the retired Admiral told Ridley that in ideal "military terms", Argentina wanted to "take" the Islands, but as this was 'unrealistic' they were seeking a compromise with Britain. The Foreign Office hosted a lunch for Massera at the Savoy…" [3238]

"Ridley invited Admiral Massera to Britain, hosting a lunch for him at the Savoy in October 1979. Mastermind of the 1976 Argentine coup and leading figure in the Dirty War, Massera … was said to be surprised by the invitation and reception he received. … Ridley was Carrington's closest confidant; both were committed to handing the Islands to Argentina. The invitation was to further that aim. … The invitation opened a back channel between Carrington, Admiral Anaya and the junta." [3239]

October 20th, from Argentina's Antarctic Base Esperanza, a radio station - '*Arcángel San Gabriel*' - commences operation under the auspices of the Ministry of Communications.

3234 *Comisión de Análisis y Evaluación de las Responsabilidades Políticas y Estratégico-Militares en el Conflicto del Atlántico Sur* General Benjamin Rattenbach 1983. Commissioned by the Argentine Junta after the 1982 war, a final, official, version was published in 2012. This appears to be earlier. See - https://www.casarosada.gob.ar/pdf/InformeRattenbach/01-InformeFinal.pdf

3235 *CAB 148/183*

3236 Livingston 2018 citing *DOP Committee October 12, 1979 CAB 148/183*

3237 *ALW 040/325/14*

3238 Livingston 2018 citing *Temple to Ure October 31, 1979 FCO 7/3589*

3239 Elgood 2025

November 2nd, in London, Argentina's *charge d'affaires* invites Minister Ridley to meet with Deputy Foreign Minister Cavándoli. [3240]

November 8th, a draft Joint Intelligence Committee/Ministry of Defence assessment of the Argentine threat to the Falkland islands is circulated; *"If negotiations break down, or if the Argentinians conclude that there is no prospect of real progress towards a negotiated transfer of sovereignty, some form of diplomatic, political or commercial pressure is inevitable, ans some military action cannot be discounted,"* [3241]

November 12th, an FCO *minute* notes;

> *"When the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary saw the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York at the end of September, Brigadier Pastor suggested a "programme of work", which included Mr Ridley meeting with the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister twice a year very informally with an open agenda, switching to official meetings when there was something agreed to be formalised. The Argentine Charge d'Affaires called on Mr Ridley on 2 November to convey an invitation from the Deputy Foreign Minister, Commodore Cavandoli, to meet him in New York … We do not know for sure why the Argentines have suggested this meeting at this time. We have repeatedly made clear to them that we are not yet ready to discuss the Falkland Islands question. There is some possibility that the Air Force, now in charge of the Argentine Foreign Ministry wants to be able to show that they are doing no less well than their Navy predecessors and that discussions with us on Falklands matters are in progress. … To decline this invitation runs the risk of awakening Argentine suspicions that we are simply stringing them along. … However, we are not in favour of a meeting which has no substance. … Mr Ridley has, therefore, … sent the Argentine Deputy Foreign Minister a polite but gentle message of regret."* [3242]

From Buenos Aires, after a gap of some three years, an Argentine Ambassador – Carlos Ortiz de Rozas – returns to London.

"A memo instructed diplomats how to handle this controversial topic. Q. "How can the Government contemplate appointment of Ambassadors in light of the human rights situation in Argentina"? A. "Ministers on several occasions made our views on violations of human rights very plain to the Argentine Government. Restoration of Ambassadors is not an indicator of approval of any government's policies and does not signify any change in HMG's stance vis-a-vis abuses of human rights in Argentina. Exchanges with the Argentine Government on this and other issues will be helped not hindered by the appointment of Ambassadors". Q. "What are the implications for the Falklands"? A. "There are no implications. We have no doubt about our sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. But on a practical plane, to restore relations to Ambassadorial level will improve the capacity at both ends for dialogue on a whole range of complex matters"." [3243]

November 21st, in New York, the UN General Assembly defer consideration of the Falklands until 1980.

From London, a JIC threat assessment is forwarded to the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires; *"Direct military action against British shipping or against the Falkland Islands cannot be discounted, but we generally believe the risk of such action would not be as high as hitherto."* [3244]

3240 See November 12, 1979, below
3241 *FCO7/3677 (f86)* as amended
3242 *PREM19/656/f98*
3243 Elgood 2025
3244 *FCO7/3677 (f70)*

November 27th, from Stanley, the Governor of the Falklands writes to 'Christian Salvesen Ltd' to express his "*reservations*" regarding that company's contract with Constantino Davidoff. [3245]

"176. Mr. Davidoff's next step was to formalize a company for the entity "Islas Georgias de Sur Sociedad Anónima" (in formation) with two more partners. Subsequently, he tried to hire a transporter that would allow him to observe "in situ" the magnitude and tools necessary for the work to be carried out in the whaling factories." [3246]

In **December**, in Finland, the Argentine Embassy complains about a television programme to be aired on MAINOS-TV; *Falkland Islands: Summer in the middle of Winter*. This refers to the archipelago as British. As a result of the protest, the recording is re-edited to avoid any political references.

"The (Finnish) Foreign Ministry's rather silly reaction no doubt gave the Argentinians immense satisfaction."[3247]

1980 – January 1st, in Argentina, General Leopoldo Galtieri takes over as Commander-in-Chief of the army.

January 9th, from Stanley, Governor Parker gives his response to the suggestion of a *lease-back* arrangement; *"... maybe I have been here too long but after even only three years among the Islanders I would instinctively find it as difficult to accept as they would."* [3248]

In London, facing pressure from arms manufacturers unhappy that the Foreign Office keeps blocking sales to Argentina, Minister Nicholas Ridley notes; *"The prime minister was most insistent when I saw her about the Falkland Islands that we should not sell Argentina <u>any</u> arms."* [3249]

January 14th, in London, Argentina's newly arrived Ambassador Ortiz de Rozas, introduces himself to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

"He said that he had been particularly delighted with his appointment to the Embassy in London, which he knew very well, because he thought the prospect of improving intensifying relations between Argentina and Britain across the board had never been better than now. ... The only cloud on the horizon in our relations lay, as we all knew, in the Falkland Islands dispute. ... He did not see either the possibility or the necessity of making rapid progress. What was important was that we should be seen to be moving forward across a broad front." [3250]

January 15th, from Stanley, Governor Parker telegrams the FCO with his thoughts on talks with Argentina.

"The whole policy has seemed from the start to have been based on one fallacious premise: that, given time, the Islanders would eventually resign themselves to an Argentine future, however grudgingly. As events have shown, their British ties are far too strong to allow any such time to work." [3251]

January 24th, in London, a confidential Foreign Office *memo* sums up an internal debate on whether or not the UK should recognise Indonesia's *de facto* possession of East Timor. Occupied by force in 1975, Foreign Office mandarins suggest that the result of such recognition could set an embarrassing precedent, the *memo* notes:

3245 *Falkland Island Dependencies: Whaling Stations February 1, 1983* FCO note to Downing Street. *cf.* September, 1979
3246 General Benjamin Rattenbach 1983 See August, 1981 below
3247 *ALW 0420/325/1*
3248 *FCO73/713-16*
3249 Notes dated January 14, 1980 in *FCO 7/3730* and quoted in Livingstone 2018. Despite the Prime Minister's views, several arms contracts were approved in 1980 and export licences granted for military aircraft, surveillance equipment and a missile control system. It is not clear what was eventually supplied. See Livingston 2018.
3250 *FCO7/3726 (f20)*
3251 *FCO73/713-16 (f59)*

"... there is a residual danger of an Argentine invasion of the Falkland Islands and should this take place, Britain's UN case would be seriously flawed were we to accord full legal recognition to the Indonesian seizure;..." [3252]

January 25th, the Cabinet Secretary, Robert Armstrong, writes to Thatcher to remind her that any discussions on the Falklands should include the question of oil.

"... ministers needed to consider 'the possible oil and fishery benefits at stake' and 'the implications for our oil and fishery interests elsewhere of the possible cession of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands continental shelf'. ..." [3253]

January 28th, from Stanley, Governor Parker, coming to the end of a three year term, sends a valedictory despatch to London.

"(The) greater part of a Governor's time is taken up by the day-to-day maintenance of the community's services ... it is a necessary part of the job also devote time to the planning of the further improvement of those services, alongside long term schemes for urban and rural development - just as if the place had the longest of all futures. And then the cold thought comes: that all this work and planning could be set at naught because of the need to meet the emotional and nationalistic demands of a country, Argentina, 400 miles away across the sea ... It might clarify thinking considerably if Britain were to drop her attitude of apparent detachment, assess her advantages and interests, and openly meet the Argentines on the same terms in the dispute as they have chosen for themselves." [3254]

In London, Robin Fearn, head of the FCO's South America Department, receives Parker's communications.

"Mr Parker tends to look at the problem from the islanders' viewpoint. ... We must try to ensure that the new Governor retains a more objective view of his mission and of the need to bring the Islanders to recognise the narrow options open to them and to us." [3255]

January 29th, at Downing Street, London, a Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee meeting considers the relative strengths of claims regarding the Falklands.

"Argentina's legal claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands was very weak. That was why they did not wish to let the matter go to arbitration. Any agreement to discuss sovereignty might damage Britain's strong legal position." [3256]

Summing up the debate, PM Thatcher says; *"... that the nub of the problem lay in the danger that any resumption of talks might appear to foreshadow a surrender of sovereignty over the Falkland Islands at some time in the future. There was no legal basis for such a surrender."* The meeting agrees to a new round of talks, but asks Lord Carrington to seek Islanders' agreement that negotiations with Argentina resume.

"Department of Energy officials, however, were concerned that the commitment to preserving Britain's oil rights was not strong enough when ministers agreed, in January 1980, to start exploratory ministerial talks with Argentina." [3257]

3252 *ALW 0420/325/1* at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation
3253 Livingston 2018 citing *Armstrong to Thatcher January 25, 1980 PREM 19/656*
3254 Quoted in Parris & Bryson 2012
3255 *Ibid*
3256 *CAB 148/189* at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation
3257 Livingston 2018 citing *Birchmore to D'Ancona January 30, 1980 EG 14/92*

February 5th, Energy Secretary David Howell writes to Lord Carrington to emphasise the importance of retaining access for the UK, to any potential oil fields around the Falklands. [3258]

February 7th, Stanley's *Penguin News* editorial reports:

> *"We can trust the British Government as little as we trust the Argentina Government and feeble cries of 'Keep the Falklands British' and other cliches will win us no support. Instead we should look to ourselves and proclaim the Falklands belong to us, and not to Britain, Argentina or any other foreign country. ... independence."*

February 11th, in London, an internal FCO *memo* notes that with regard to Britain's dependent territories:

> *"The present British Government are fully committed to the policy followed by successive Governments since 1945 of giving every help and encouragement to those Dependent Territories which wish to become independent, while not forcing independence on those which do not wish it... Where local government have made it clear that they do not wish their territories to become independent, we are content to retain sovereignty for the time being. But we must also retain the legal powers necessary to ensure that we are able to fulfil the responsibilities that sovereignty entails. ... Each case will be considered on its merits, bearing in mind the constraints imposed by external political circumstances and the wishes of the local population....*
>
> *Responsibility and power must go together. Political development must therefore stop some way short of full internal self-government where territories choose to remain dependent. In such cases the British Government, through the Governor, will retain overall responsibility for:-*
>
> *(i) external affairs;*
>
> *(ii) defence;*
>
> *(iii) internal security, ...;*
>
> *(iv) the administration of the police;*
>
> *(v) the administration of the public service;*
>
> *(vi) the judiciary..."* [3259]

In Buenos Aires, Anthony Williams arrives as British Ambassador to Argentina, re-establishing formal diplomatic relations. [3260]

"... a consistent advocate of closer ties with Argentina." [3261]

"... Ambassador Anthony Williams said the Islanders could not continue to use facilities provided by Argentina – such as air service, supplies of fuel, food and other freight – whilst 'insulting' the Argentines. He wanted to visit the Islands 'to install fear in them of the consequences'. He was criticised by the islanders for appeasement." [3262]

3258 *Ibid.* citing *Howell to Carington February 5, 1980 PREM 19/612*
3259 *ALW 040/325/1*
3260 His predecessor had been recalled in 1977.
3261 Livingstone 2018
3262 Briley 2022

February 13th, in Stanley, the Councils agree to renewed negotiations, provided that an Islander is present and that the talks remain '*general*,' '*exploratory*' and '*without commitment*.' [3263]

In London, briefing notes issued by the FCO call into question Argentina's interpretation of UN resolutions.

> *"The UK does not accept the assertion by Argentina that the "illegality of the occupation of the Falkland, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands by the United Kingdom has been recognised by the United Nations". Resolutions have simply called for the settlement of the dispute by negotiation between the two Governments."* [3264]

In the Falkland Islands, Vice Commodore Héctor Ricardo Gilobert arrives to assume command of LADE air transport operations.

"The new Vice-Commodoro here said he volunteered for the post because it is so quiet and peaceful and his children have much more freedom here than on the mainland." [3265]

"A decade after LADE flights had started operating, Malvinas settlers openly enjoyed the goods they received from Argentina. ... Gilobert's wife was three months pregnant when she arrived. As medical care on the island was good, she decided to give birth in Malvinas. By mid-July 1980, Mariana was born in the King Edward Memorial Hospital. The birth accelerated the family's integration into the community, although at first Gilobert family's decision had caused resentment since it was feared that a propaganda manoeuvrer with the baby's Argentine citizenship would be used. Once they were convinced that would not occur, they showed friendliness towards the family. ... Beyond their pleasant attitude, Malvinas settlers traditionally rejected the sovereignty change. They resisted any actions that would represent an advance in negotiations. ... They did not understand or justify the Argentine claims based on history or on titles inherited from Spain. Furthermore, being receptive to propaganda, they considered Argentina a strange country, with a different language, religion, different costumes and habits. The few pieces of news they heard referred to the military government, inflation, strikes and other problems they did not experience because they lived on those far away islands. They suspected the British would abandon them and feared an Argentine invasion." [3266]

February 27th, at Port Stanley, Rex Masterman Hunt arrives as Governor of the Falkland Islands. [3267]

"The point that strikes one immediately, whether in town or in Camp, is the shortage of people, and not only working men but men, women and children of all ages." [3268]

"By 1980 there were only three British territories whose governors merited a full-dress ceremonial uniform: Bermuda, Hong Kong and the Falklands, so he was duly measured for his uniform at Messers Hogg and Johnston of Sackville Street." [3269]

March 18th, in London, an internal FCO *memorandum* notes that British businesses are likely to side with Argentina on the subject of Falklands sovereignty. The dispute being viewed as an obstacle to a good trading relationship.[3270]

3263 *PREM19/656 f86* at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation
3264 *A4 ALW 0420/325/1*
3265 *Hunt to Fearn March 19, 1980* in *ALW 040/325/1*
3266 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
3267 *The London Gazette* August 13, 1980. For a biography, see - https://www.falklandsbiographies.org/biographies/hunt_sir
3268 *Hunt to Fearn March 19, 1980* in *ALW 040/325/1*
3269 Pascoe 2022 vol.2 p.622
3270 *Malcomson to Bright, Duggan and Fearn March 18, 1980 FCO 7/3726*

In **April**, a study into fish resources around the Falklands archipelago is finally released.

"The study concluded that there were two principal species of fish found within 200 miles of the Falklands. Patagonian hake was fished intensively by Argentine, German, Japanese and Spanish vessels and was thought to have reached the maximum sustainable yield. The unexploited blue whiting stocks could produce an estimated yield of 800,000 to 1 million tonnes a year. There was an urgent need for conservation measures. The White Fish Authority identified a number of problems with the S.A.F.C.'s proposals. The fillet freezer trawlers, which were required for the exploratory voyage, had nearly all been sold or converted to whole fish freezing. The development of the fisheries would be constrained by Port Stanley's limited facilities. Finally, the declaration of a 200 mile fishing zone would be unprofitable to police." [3271]

April 27th, in New York, the day before Britain and Argentina renew negotiations over the Falkland Islands, Minister Ridley is presented with briefing notes by his Foreign Office staff: [3272]

> *"Sovereignty Options: Points to Make (only if raised by Argentines)... this exploratory round is not the place to undertake any substantive discussion of sovereignty proposals. 3. All these have to be seen in the context of the paramountcy of Islanders' wishes... International Arbitration: Points to make (Defensive) 1. We should not raise this question and it is most unlikely that the Argentines will. If they do ask whether we would consider taking the dispute to an international tribunal, Mr. Ridley should say that he will need time to consult his Ministerial colleagues before giving HMG's answer. ... Legal Advisers do not dissent from the views expressed by the Law Officers in 1966, nor do they consider the composition of the ICJ as any more favourable to the UK position than in 1966."* [3273]

On the issue of a *leaseback* option.

> *"It would be a formidable task to negotiate an agreement of this kind acceptable to Britain, Argentina and the Islanders. It would require Argentine agreement to leave the administration and way of life of the Islanders unchanged throughout the period of the lease. It would probably also require outside guarantees."*

April 28th, in New York, British and Argentine delegations meet for two days of talks. Britain's delegation includes Minister Nicholas Ridley, Ambassador Williams from the Buenos Aires Embassy, Councillor Monk representing the Islanders and three other civil servants. On the Argentine side is the Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs, Carlos Cavandoli, Carlos Ortiz de Rozas (Ambassador to the UK), Ambassador Oliveri Lopez, Commodore Carlos Bloomer-Reeve, Colonel Luis Balcarce and one other. [3274]

> *"Comodoro Cavandoli welcomed Mr Ridley and said he was very hopeful about the talks ... He would like to underline Argentine satisfaction with Ambassador Williams. He looked forward to working with him and was grateful to have him. ... He emphasised the absolute confidentiality of the talks which had always been guaranteed. ... Mr Ridley expressed thanks for the welcome and said he was pleased to be*

3271 Ellerby 1990 p.252 citing *F.I.A. archive (London), box file 6, V.F.A., Fisheries Dec. 1979.* A surprising conclusion considering the success of the subsequent EEZ declared around the Islands in 1991; with fishing revenues by 2020 accounting for a large part of the Islands' GDP. See - https://www.thetimes.co.uk/article/how-the-falkland-islands-became-one-of-the-worlds-most-affluent-places-f9kc8fzjk

3272 *Brief No. A4 – A6 ALW 0420/325/1 (FCO 07-3801) 1980*

3273 Legal advice provided in 1966 remains embargoed (2025), but is understood to confirm the opinion given in 1947 which favoured British sovereignty based upon acquisitive prescription (effective possession from 1833). *cf.* 1947 & 1966

3274 Argentina's Air Force was responsible for the Foreign Ministry at this time.

sitting around a table with the Argentines. … Only the problem of the Islands stood in the way of improving our relations and he hoped for frank and wide ranging discussions to day covering all aspects of the question." [3275]

Ridley suggests that the discussions focus on – i) the search for oil in disputed seas, ii) fishing in the same areas, iii) the Islands themselves, iv) scientific co-operation and Southern Thule, v & vi) Conventions due to be signed relative to Antarctica, vii) co-operation between the Islands and Argentina and viii) plans for the development of the Islands. Cavandoli, in general terms, agrees. With regard to the Falkland Islands, Cavandoli first provides Ridley with an Argentine history lesson; *"There was only one outstanding problem, the Islands as they belonged to Argentina and had been taken from Argentina by force."* Responding, Ridley says that he wants; *"… to separate out that part of the Argentine attitude to the Islands which had to do with the long-standing public and political problem, seen in the way children were educated in schools to believe that the Islands were Argentine, from any possible solution to the future of the Islands. … we should forget the past: we had only the future to consider."* [3276]

April 29th, in New York, on the second day of talks, Councillor Monk addresses the delegates.

"Mr Monk said he believed the discussion had been both frank and far reaching. He thought that the central question should not be elaborated further. But this did not mean that relations and economic co-operation could not be improved. Often in the past misunderstandings had been caused by insufficient communications between the Islanders and the Argentines. … He was sure that the majority of Islanders would welcome increased co-operation on economic matters, without prejudice to the sovereignty position."

Argentina's Minister Cavándoli tells the meeting; *"Sovereignty was a sine qua non, an underlying condition, for progress on the other questions. … Everything was possible, and all other matters could immediately be put into action, if we operated on the assumption that sovereignty would one day be returned to Argentina."*. [3277]

At the end of the day, with little achieved, an impasse arises over the wording of the final joint *communique*. Britain wishes to refer to the meetings as *'discussions'* while the Argentine's want to call them, *'negotiations'*. A decision is deferred to the next day.

"An April 1980 meeting between the Argentines and Nicholas Ridley in New York failed to agree co-operation on fishing, oil exploration and improved communications. The Islanders' representative, Legislative Councillor Adrian Monk, a tough-talking farmer and anti-Argentine critic, was refused access to the briefing notes, with the excuse that he did not have security clearance." [3278]

A decision, supported by Monk, the direct communications be established between Islanders and Argentines, was subsequently rejected by Councillors. The New York talks were exploratory, but future talks would have to be substantive." [3279]

April 30th, in New York, after both delegations have left the city, an agreed *communique* is released.

"In accordance with separate announcements in London and Buenos Aires on April 15th 1980 by the Argentine and UK Governments, a Ministerial meeting was held in New York on 28 and 29 April to discuss the Falkland Islands question and related issues in the South Atlantic within the negotiating framework referred to in relevant Resolutions of the United Nations General Assembly.

3275 Link to the full record, below.
3276 *PREM 19/612 f41.*
3277 *Ibid.*
3278 Briley 2022
3279 Elgood 2025

The British and Argentine Delegations were led respectively by Mr Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London, and Comodoro Carlos R. Cavandoli, Under Secretary of State at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Buenos Aires.

The discussions were of a comprehensive and wide-ranging nature and were conducted in a cordial and positive spirit. The two Government intend to hold future meetings in order to continue these exchanges."

"Ridley said that his recent meeting with the Argentines should be called "talks" rather than negotiations. He met with the Argentine Foreign Minister Cavandoli to test the Argentine position and report back to his government. An anodyne communique had been issued at the conclusion of the talks. The Argentine position is that they want to have a solution which enables them to say that the Islands have been returned to them. For the 1,850 British residents on the Islands, the problem is one of their interest which is not to be Argentinian. This is also an emotional political issue in the UK all out of proportion to the number of people involved. However, if nothing is done, the Argentines might harass the British on the Island. Ridley said that both sides would have to be flexible. He commented that perhaps one solution might be for the UK to recognize Argentine sovereignty, then lease the Islands, since no Argentines live on them; however, this raises questions of oil rights, etc." [3280]

"In a written answer to a parliamentary question from Mr. Ted Rowlands MP, Mr Ridley's predecessor and now a member of the Falkland Islands Committee, the Foreign Office replied that the talks in New York were 'wide ranging and exploratory'. The exchanges were conducted in a cordial and positive spirit and each side was able to reach a better understanding of the other's position. No decisions were taken at the talks although it was agreed that contact on 'day to day' matters between the Islands and Argentina should be expanded. Each delegation is reporting back to its government. It is hoped to continue exchanges, said the Foreign Office." [3281]

May 2nd, in London, an internal FCO minute considers the presence of Adrian Monk, the Islands' Councillor, at the UN meeting; *"He did not seek to take or to claim an independent position and accepted his role as a member of Mr Ridley's delegation. ... On the one occasion on which we touched on lease-back within the delegation, Mr. Monk commented that this would instantly recognise Argentine sovereignty and was not acceptable to the Islanders. ... The Argentine seemed more than content with Mr Monk's presence and with Mr Monk personally. Mr Monk has been friendly over some time with some members of the Argentine delegation e.g. Colonel Balcarce and Comodoro Bloomer Reeve."* [3282]

May 5th, in Canberra, Australia, an Antarctic Treaty conference opens.

May 8th, in Stanley, the new Falkland's Governor is interviewed by *Penguin News*. Regarding the possibility of the UK government handing over the islands to Argentina, Hunt responds; *"I don't see any government in the United Kingdom doing anything that is unacceptable to the Islanders."* [3283]

May 20th, in Australia, the Antarctic conference results in a Convention that includes South Georgia and the South Sandwich Islands, despite them being above the Antarctic Treaty area's outer limit of 60°S. [3284]

3280 *Telegram From the Department of State to the Embassy in Argentina May 7, 1980* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

3281 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1980 no.8. See also *HC Deb 14 May 1980 vol 984 cc.1476-1479*

3282 *FCO7/3804 (f111)*. Adrian Monk was not made privy to the FCO briefing papers, which were kept out of his sight.

3283 Quoted in Carassai 2-22 citing *Penguin News* May 8, 1980

3284 Resulting in the Convention on the Conservation of Antarctic Marine Living Resources. Entered into force April 7, 1982. See - https://documents.ats.aq/keydocs/vol_1/vol1_12_CCAMLR_CCAMLR_e.pdf

"The Antarctic Treaty powers have signed a convention which will bring the Falkland Islands Dependencies into the Treaty Zone – a protected area under the 1959 pact between Russia, the United States, Britain, France, Norway, Argentina, Chile, New Zealand, Australia, Belgium, Japan, Poland, South Africa. The Treaty Powers are seeking agreement on the future developments of the area, which is of unique scientific importance but also of significant economic potential. The United Nations Law of the Sea conference is watching developments closely." [3285]



May 21st, in Britain's House of Lords, during a debate on the Canberra Conference relating to Antarctic fishing and marine conservation, Lord Trefgarne offers assurances with regard to the Falklands; *"There is no question of any change in sovereignty arising from this convention. Furthermore, the Falkland Islands fishing rights in the seas around the dependencies remain unaffected by this new convention."* [3286]

May 27th, an internal FCO minute considers the lobbying activities of the Falkland Islands Committee; *"It would clearly be useful to obtain a better parliamentary understanding on these issues and thus limit the FIC's scope for mischief-making. ... Meanwhile it would seem right to proceed cautiously and to confine informal briefing to the practical problem of developing the Falklands economy."* [3287]

June 5th, visiting London, Dr. Jose de Hoz, Argentina's Minister for the Economy, meets with PM Thatcher.

> *"Yesterday, Dr Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz, the Argentine Minister of the Economy, who is on an official visit to Britain had discussions with ministers and officials and called on Mrs Thatcher, ... He said in an interview: "For the first time some progress has been made and there is a little light on the horizon ... and I think the economic side can help. We have two common interests, which could be oil and fishing. So long as some sort of discussions on sovereignty can go on at the same time we might be able to reach some kind of agreement on joint oil exploration or fishing which would be the beginning of a get-together on this issue". ..."* [3288]

Dr. Hoz also speaks to Minister Nicholas Ridley.

> *"(Ridley) understood that the Argentines' main problem remained the question of sovereignty over the Islands, but he had stressed to Comodoro Cavandoli that the dispute was a major political issue both in the UK and in the Islands and that it would be very difficult for HMG to make concessions on sovereignty."* [3289]

"... most controversially, and barely featuring in British collective memory, Sir Lawrence Freedman, professor of War Studies at King's College London recounts how Margaret Thatcher's government offered to hand over sovereignty of the Islands at a clandestine meeting with a senior member of the Argentine military junta in

3285 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1980 no.8
3286 *HL Deb 21 May 1980 vol.409 cc955-1004*
3287 *Fearn to Harding May 27, 1980* in *FCO7/3804 (f33).* This followed an article on fishing in *The Daily Express* newspaper.
3288 *The Times* June 6, 1980
3289 *FCO73*

June 1980, less than two years before the conflict in the South Atlantic and, unlike in 1974, to a dictatorship rather than a democratically elected government." [3290]

June 6th, Britain's *The Times* newspaper reports:

> *"New moves are taking place between Argentina and Britain over the disputed Falkland Islands colony in the South Atlantic. Yesterday, Dr Jose Alfredo Martinez de Hoz , the Argentine Minister of the Economy, who is on an official visit to Britain had discussions with ministers and officials and called on Mrs Thatcher, the Prime Minister. Dr Martinez de Hoz said he would be discussing the possibility of Anglo-Argentine ventures in offshore oil exploration and the development of fishing off the Falklands. He said in an interview: "For the first time some progress has been made and there is a little light on the horizon ... and I think the economic side can help.*
>
> *We have two common interests, which could be oil and fishing. So long as some sort of discussions on sovereignty can go on at the same time we might be able to reach some kind of agreement on joint oil exploration or fishing which would be the beginning of a get-together on this issue. We want you British to hurry up and be partners in our economic development".*
>
> *With Britain's recession there was an opportunity to develop further markets in his country, he said. He thought that because of the Falklands issue British investment had been losing its place in the Argentine economy, but the British Government now seemed determined to make up lost ground. ..."*

June 10th, in Argentina, a press release announces the "Day for the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector".

June 27th, Lord Carrington, in a *memo* circulated to OD Committee members, proposes an agreement involving transfer of title over the Falklands and the Dependencies, provided that these were immediately *'leased back'* to the UK for an indefinite period. Arrangements could then be made regarding co-operation on fishing and oil exploration. [3291]

July 1st, in Downing Street, the Cabinet Secretary, Robert Armstrong, submits a brief to PM Margaret Thatcher on the Falklands, ahead of the OD Committee meeting scheduled for the next day.

> *"The basic question posed by the Foreign and Commonwealth Secretary is whether we should be prepared on an exploratory basis to discuss with the Argentines the surrender of United Kingdom sovereignty over the Falkland Islands. The legal justification for the Argentine claim to sovereignty is weak. The reasons for the United Kingdom taking this course of action are the entirely practical ones of saving ourselves money (both in maintaining the economy of the Islands and in defending them, if the Argentines threatened to attack them), solving a residual colonial problem, improving our relations with the Argentine, opening the way to developing the resources of the South-West Atlantic, and improving the economic prospects for the Islanders. But despite these practical arguments, there may well be considerable concern expressed in OD about the point of principle involved in a British surrender of sovereignty in these circumstances."* [3292]

July 2nd, the Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee consider Carrington's proposals.

3290 Levey & Ozarow 2021 citing Freedman 2005 p.698. I can find no reference to this in Freedman's 2005 work.
3291 *CAB 148/191*
3292 *PREM19/656 f82*

"In discussion there was general agreement with the practical advantages of the course of action proposed although considerable misgivings were expressed about its domestic political implications. The following points were made -

a. Argentina had a very weak legal claim to the Falkland Islands. Unfortunately the United Nations ignored this fact and sided with her over this issue.

b. Although the Islanders might be prepared to accept a surrender of sovereignty and lease back arrangement, it would be difficult to convince their lobby in this country that this course of action reflected the wishes of the Islanders. There would probably be difficulties in the House of Commons. …

f. Any further exploratory discussions with the Argentines that involved any consideration of sovereignty would need to be carried out on an entirely confidential basis. Otherwise they would get nowhere…" [3293]

At the end of the debate, Carrington is authorised to initiate '*exploratory*' and '*confidential*' talks with Argentina.

"Margaret Thatcher and members of the cabinet's Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) Committee … agreed, in July 1980, to begin exploratory discussions on a solution that could include a 'surrender of sovereignty and simultaneous leaseback arrangements'…" [3294]

July 7th, from London, a message is sent via the British Embassy in Buenos Aires, to Cavandoli, proposing a further round of "*private meetings*". [3295]

July 30th, Parliament is notified that it is the government's intentions to publish a White Paper on the issue of nationality; with proposals for new legislation. [3296]

"We have, … been impressed with the argument that a separate citizenship should be established for the dependencies as a whole. We propose that this should be called citizenship of the British dependent territories. I emphasise that the establishment of this separate citizenship will not alter the United Kingdom's obligations and commitments to our overseas territories. Those who are now citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies but do not qualify for British citizenship or for citizenship of the British dependent territories will become British overseas citizens." [3297]

"Nobody would doubt that, by 1981, British Nationality Law was in need of reform. The problem was, where to begin. … For the Government matter were quite simple. The chief problem about existing nationality law was that it provided no clear statement as to who had the right of unrestricted entry." [3298]

"The perception of the Government trying to get rid of the islands was reinforced in 1980 when its work on a reformed British Nationality Law was widely discussed. …" [3299]

In **August**, in Buenos Aires, Britain's Minister for Trade, Cecil Parkinson, arrives with company executives from Lloyds Bank, Hawker Sidley, GEC and Wimpey.

3293 *CAB 148/189*
3294 Livingstone 2018
3295 *FCO7/3808 (f196)*
3296 See below. Also January, July and October, 1981
3297 *HL Debate 30 July 1980 Hansard vol.412 cc891-8*
3298 *Citizenship, Law and the State: The British nationality Act 1981* Charles Blake in *The Modern Law Revue* 1982 vol.45 no.2 March pp.179-197. The previous Labour Government had considered changes and produced a Green Paper which failed to gain support.
3299 *The Sovereignty Dispute over the Falkland (Malvinas) Islands* L. S. Gustafson 1988

"Neither the Falkland Islands nor human rights featured strongly in discussions…" [3300]

"The drive to capture more of Argentina's lucrative market was reflected in the growing number of British trade missions sent to Argentina in the Thatcher years: these rose from four in 1978 to eight in 1979, and ten in 1980. But … British diplomats continued to lament that the Falklands factor inhibited trade and prevented British companies from winning large state contracts from the regime." [3301]

August 9th, in the Falklands, Royal Marine Alan Addis, a member of NP 8901, is reported missing. Following an evening with other marines and locals at North Arm in Lafonia. [3302]

August 29th, in London, an FCO briefing is handed to Minister Ridley for his upcoming talks with Cavandoli.

"1. I recommend that Mr Ridley be guided broadly by the following in his talks with Comodoro Cavandoli. 2. Aim To explore with Comodoro Cavandoli the possibilities for a solution to the dispute, including a surrender of sovereignty and a simultaneous leaseback. 3. Nature of the Exchanges Secret, exploratory and ***deniable****. …"* [3303]

September 10th, near Geneva, Switzerland, Nicholas Ridley and Minister Cavándoli meet for two days of talks at the Hotel du Lac.

"It was agreed at the outset that complete secrecy was essential to both sides. Mr. Ridley was ostensibly on holiday with his wife at the Hotel de Lac at Coppet. Comodoro Cavandoli and Comandante Bloomer-Reeve were on their way back to Buenos Aires from Cyprus, where they had been attending an Argentine Regional Heads of Mission conference …

Mr Ridley opened the proceedings by saying that he had the authority of his Ministerial colleagues to put forward the ideas which he was about to explain but that anything agreed at this meeting would have to be ad referendum and would be subject to endorsement by the British Cabinet and, no less important, would have to be acceptable to the Islanders." [3304]

Ridley suggests a handover followed by a leaseback with a 200 year lease. Minister Cavándoli responds that; *"The only difficulty he saw was in the length of the lease … a period of, say, 20 years would have to be ruled out as being much too short for the Islanders. We ought to think of some median figure (Comandante Bloomer-Reeve suggests 75 years)."* [3305]

Cavándoli goes on to propose that the British Government remove the Royal Marine detachment from the Islands, to underline to Islanders that Argentina was no longer viewed as a threat; and to please Argentine public opinion. He also suggests that the terms of any lease should include an Argentine right to buy or rent land.

3300 *Ambassador Williams to FCO August 11, 1980 FCO 7/3728*

3301 Livingstone 2018

3302 Naval Party 8901 was the name given to the detachment of Royal Marines based on the Islands from 1966: generally 43 marines on an annual rotation. The steamer MV *Forrest* was half an hour out of North Arm that morning, before Addis's absence was noticed and reported. Last confirmed sighting of the 19 year-old marine was established to be around 0130 that morning, following a function at the local social club. No body was ever found and no further information has ever come to light. Foul play or misadventure? Theories abound.

3303 *FCO7/3808 (f148)*. My emphasis.

3304 A*LW 040/325/10* & *FCO 7/3808 (Received in Registry 15 Sep 1980.).* See - https://falklandstimeline.files.wordpress.com/2022/06/summary-record-of-a-confidential-meeting-between-the-minister-of-state-and-the-argentine-deputy-foreign-minister-at-geneva-on-10-and-11-september-1980.pdf

3305 *Ibid.*

September 11th, Ridley hands over an *'exploratory proposal'* to Cavandoli suggesting:-

1. Titular sovereignty to be transferred to Argentina;
2. Continued British administration via a lease-back arrangement for 99 years. Subject to periodic review;
3. British and Argentine flags to be flown side-by-side;
4. British Governor with locally elected Council responsible for the administration of the islands;
5. Argentina to be represented by a Commissioner-General;
6. A Joint-Council to arrange co-operation over economic development.

It is agreed that both parties will report back to their respective Governments.

"In The Official History of the Falklands Campaign, Freedman explains how the Foreign Office devised a plan to cede sovereignty to Argentina with a leaseback agreement to Britain for 99 years. This was agreed (sic) at a secret meeting between Foreign Secretary, Nicholas Ridley and his opposite number, Comodoro Cavandoli in Switzerland. Given that Britain had already enjoyed a cosy relationship with the ruling dictatorship, having sold Lynx helicopters and naval missiles (which were later used against the British forces in 1982) to the regime, the deal was a master-stroke from a business perspective as it would lay the ground for further multi-million pound arms sales for as long as the Junta remained in power." [3306]

September 12th, on his arrival back in London, Minister Ridley reports to Lord Carrington.

> *"... we are left with a clear option ... We can either seek a solution by negotiation along the lines of the Geneva talks (to which I think we could get Argentina to agree), or we could say that the concessions are beyond our political ability to deliver, and break off the talks (with all the obvious consequences). I do not think that there is much to gain by attempting to find a different package: both sides are close to their rock bottom positions. ... I believe it can be sold to the Islanders, but I am not certain."*

Carrington telegrams the British Embassy in Buenos Aires.

> *"Talks with Cavandoli went well ... Cavandoli thought leaseback of 99 years could be acceptable to it was agreed exchanges were secret and ad referendum and that Islanders acquiescence in proposals as basis for negotiation would be required before formal negotiation could be undertaken. Argentine hope is for substantive and public progress before new President takes office in March, 1981."* [3307]

In London, a letter concerning the British Nationality White Paper, is published in *The Times* newspaper. [3308]

"The Government White Paper – British Nationality Law (Cmnd 7987) – effectively reduces many Falkland Islanders to second class citizens. The White paper defines three classes of citizenship: British Citizenship, Citizenship of British Dependent Territories and British Overseas Citizenship. Falkland islanders whose parents were born, adopted, naturalized or registered in the United Kingdom qualify for British Citizenship, but there are several hundred Falkland islanders who only qualify for citizenship of British Dependent Territories and thus have no right of abode in the United Kingdom. The Islanders' case is different from other citizens of British Dependent Territories for several reasons. There was no indigenous population when the

3306 Levey & Ozarow 2021. In reality, nothing had been '*agreed*' as everything was subject to referral.
3307 *FCO7/3808 (f137)*
3308 Signed by Sir John Lapsey who had been brought up in the Islands, and Lionel Daillie and Patrick Vincent, who were both born there.

Islands were first settled by Britain. Falkland Islanders have no 'mother country' except the United Kingdom. There is no question of the Falkland Islanders seeking independence and the Service pensioner settlers who came out in 1832 (sic) were promised the right to retain full British citizenship. The Falkland Islands Office believe that Falkland islanders are British and should be given the full right of entry and abode in their mother country." [3309]

"... second class citizenship (would be imposed) on several hundred Falkland islanders who do not have grandparents who were born in the United Kingdom, but whose pure British nationality extends unbroken since the early nineteenth century, ..." [3310]

September 22nd, Minister Nicholas Ridley sends a message for Lord Carrington:

> *"We are uncommitted and unencumbered ... So we are left with a clear option to decide what to do on the merits of the problem. We can either seek a solution along the lines of the Geneva talks (to which I think we can get Argentina to agree), or we could say that the concessions are beyond our political ability to deliver, and break off talks (with all the obvious consequences). ... I believe the key to this is the attitude of the Islanders. If we cannot sell it to them it is hopeless."* [3311]

September 25th, in New York, Lord Carrington and Argentine Foreign Minister Carlos Pastor meet. [3312]

"While the meeting with Pastor went well climatically, there remains fuzziness on where we go from here. ... the Argentines now seem to want to reopen the Geneva package: and there is a risk of a misunderstanding developing on next steps. It is not clear whether Pastor believed that he was giving the Secretary of State the expected Argentine reply. If so, it does not provide a sufficient basis on which to go back to OD: and we will have to try and straighten this out. As far as we are concerned, what we want is a formal indication from the Argentines of their view of the Geneva formula: without this we cannot go to Cabinet. We do not want any further clandestine meeting, nor do we want any further bargaining on the terms. It is important that the Argentines realise that we cannot agree to any shorter lease as a basis for formal negotiations: we could not sell that one to Cabinet, let alone the Islanders. Nor are we likely to be able to (or want to) move ahead at quite the brisk pace which Pastor and Cavandoli are hoping for." [3313]

"In September 1980, during the United Nations General Assembly, at New York, the Argentine Minister of Foreign Affairs, Brigadier Carlos W. Pastor, met with his British counterpart, lord Peter A. Carrington and expressed that the Malvinas issue was vital for Buenos Aires. On the contrary, Carrington replied that the South Atlantic issue was almost at the end of the Foreign Office list." [3314]

September 30th, Minister Ridley speaks to Argentina's Ambassador to the UK, Ortiz de Rozas.

"Sr. Ortiz de Rozas said that the Argentine Foreign Minister had wanted him... to follow up some points arising from the meeting between the Secretary of State and Sr Pastor. When Mr Ridley explained that he had not heard more than the briefest outline account of that meeting, Sr Ortiz de Rozas gave the following summary account... According to him, Sr Pastor had expressed satisfaction to Lord Carrington, especially over the

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3309 Quoted in the *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1980 no.9
3310 Gustafson 1988
3311 *FCO7/3808 (f128)*
3312 *UN Doc. A.AC.109/670 Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Working Paper by the Secretariat* August 5, 1981.
3313 *Fearn to Ambassador Williams October 1, 1980* in *FCO7/3808 (f120).* This letter refers to an attachment relating to the conversation between Carrington and Pastor on September 25, which is missing from the file.
3314 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

Geneva meeting. In the view of the Argentine Government this was the first serious attempt to solve the question on a basis that was mutually acceptable. The formula of a lease back presented 'good solid ground' to form an agreement. One point of difficulty for Argentina was the duration of the lease back, but aside from that it was a real step forward. Lord Carrington had made clear that he needed the agreement of the Cabinet on what had been discussed in Geneva, and then it was paramount that the Islanders should agree to those ideas. This would be difficult, but not impossible. Sr. Pastor had then asked what the next steps would be, and Lord Carrington had explained that first he would need to report to Cabinet, then Mr Ridley would need to go to the Falkland Islands, and then a further meeting between Mr Ridley and Comodoro Cavandoli could follow."[3315]

October 2nd, an internal FCO minute notes; *"The Argentines may believe that Sr Pastor has given their official reply to the proposal, ie the suggestion to hold a further meeting to discuss the one apparent sticking point – the length of the lease. Whether or not this is the case, we require a more formal indication of the Argentines' views and we need to disabuse them of any idea about further negotiation on the terms of the proposal. This is best done by an approach in Buenos Aires by HM Ambassador."* [3316]

October 3rd, from Buenos Aires, British Ambassador Williams write to the FCO.

> *"I now have very close relations with Cavandoli and, if you give me a formula, I think I can say whether I can make him buy it or not. But really, I think that you have what you want already – that the concept (lease back) is not only clever, but a solid basis for negotiation with the prospect of serious progress. The fact that the only cavil is over length of lease implies acceptance of the principle … you should bear in mind that, while we are ad referendum to the Cabinet and the Islanders, the Argentines are ad referendum to the Junta."* [3317]

October 7th, in London, Lord Carrington defers any further approach to the Argentines until the situation has been discussed at the next Cabinet Defence & Overseas Policy Committee meeting in November.

October 29th, following a question asked by Minister Ridley, a Foreign Office official explains to him that the proceeds of any oil found around the Falklands would, by precedent, be paid to the Falkland Islands Government; *"(However)… in practical terms, we ought to be able to ensure … that we get a substantial share of the action and the profit."* [3318]

On the same day, an internal FCO note raises the prospect of a problem if negotiations linger too far into 1981; *" … the authority of the people with whom we had dealt would shortly begin to diminish with the change of Presidency and of Ministers in March. The Foreign Ministry could pass from the Air Force either to the Navy, which traditionally adopted a harder nationalistic attitude than the Air Force of South Atlantic matters; or to a civilian who would have little authority."* [3319]

November 2nd, in Argentine, *La Prensa* publishes a map of the Falklands archipelago which employs Spanish language names for places in the Islands; many from the 18th century. [3320]

3315 *FCO record of conversation* in *FCO7/3808 (f115)*
3316 *Fearn minute for Ridley October 6, 1980* in *FCO7/3808 (f104)*
3317 *Williams to Fearn October 3, 1980* in *FCO7/3808 (f100)*
3318 *Duggan to Ridley October 29, 1980 EG 14/93*
3319 *FCO7/3808 (f85)*
3320 Based, seemingly, on a 1973 map produced by the Instituto Geografico Militar (Hoja 5260).

" … it called Port Egmont "Puerto de la Cruzada" and Kepple Sound "Bahia de la Cruzada" … However, … the 1973 map retained a few original English names, including Darwin, Fitzroy, "Puerto Howard" and "Puerto Stanley" … The new maps … look as if they were produced in preparation for taking the islands over. That was now becoming a confident expectation in Argentine government circles.". [3321]

November 3rd, in London, an internal FCO *memo* considers the Falkland Islands Dependencies.

"1. … (i) in our recent contacts, the Argentines have surprised us by showing (and saying specifically that) there was little Argentine interest in the Dependencies; (ii) in any settlement, however, it is likely that the Dependencies, their territorial waters and the seabed would form part of a sovereignty transfer and leaseback; (iii) the Dependencies are not entirely worthless: South Georgia is an important expression of our legal claims in the area; there are fish, which, if not of interest immediately to the UK industry, could generate licensing revenue; our all-year-round British Antarctic Survey scientific base at Grytviken in South Georgia is an influential part of our scientific effort in Antarctica and of political significance for our voice in Antarctic councils; (iv) there is (curiously) something of a South Georgia lobby in the House of Lords: Lord Shackleton's father is buried in South Georgia. 2. In sum, therefore, the Dependencies represent if not an asset at least a bargaining chip which may prove of some value in reaching an eventual settlement. It is clearly not in our interest to give them away in advance …" [3322]

November 4th, in the US, Ronald Reagan is elected to the Presidency.

November 5th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams reports that the Argentine junta have been consulted and have endorsed the concept of *lease-back,* subject to negotiation over the length of the lease. [3323]

November 6th, in America's *Herald Tribune* newspaper, Argentina's State Petroleum Company (YPF) advertises for tenders for oil exploration licences over an area it calls, *'Magalenes Este.'* This extends to within 96 miles of the Falklands archipelago – crossing the median line between Argentina and the archipelago.

November 7th, in London, at an Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy Committee meeting, PM Thatcher is again presented with '*leaseback*' as the only viable option. The Committee decide that Minister Ridley should visit the Falkland Islands; *"… in order to discover whether his proposals would command a sufficient degree of support there, and to report the outcome…"* [3324] A note on the record of the OD Committee's conclusion, states: *"The discussions and conclusions of a Ministers Confidential Report has been produced, a copy of which is held in the private office of the cabinet Office."*

> *"It seemed likely that, on balance, given the bleakness of their present situation, the majority of Islanders would be ready to support negotiations with Argentina on the lines proposed, recognising that, while the Government would not go back on its commitment to defend them, it was not able to offer alternative ways of improving their position."* [3325]

".., Margaret Thatcher and the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee (DOP) agreed to seek the Islanders' approval of leaseback. During this DOP meeting, ministers also noted: 'It would be important to make satisfactory arrangements for any oil that might be discovered … (and that) further thought should be given to

3321 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.624
3322 *Duggan to Day November 3, 1980* in *FCO7/3808 (f70)*
3323 *Fearn to Ridley November 5, 1980* in *FCO7/3808 (f65)*
3324 *CAB 148/189 & CAB148/196*
3325 *OD (80) 23rd Meeting, Confidential Record November 7, 1980 CAB 148/196* quoted in Livingstone 2018

ways in which the United Kingdom might be guaranteed entitlement to a substantial part of the revenues.'…"[3326]

"… it is clear from the official record that, while she had misgivings, she saw no other alternative. Nor did any of the other ministers present at the meeting. But when Ridley proposed the plan to the House of Commons three weeks later, no other minister came to his defence." [3327]

"The Foreign Office told Ridley to paint a grim picture of the alternatives of economic decline and Argentine aggression to make Falklands 'Councillors flesh creep'. He had to avoid accusations of conspiracy and keep secret the progress with Cavandoli." [3328]

November 11th, in New York, the UN General Assembly defers the question of the Falklands until 1981. [3329]

From Port Stanley, Governor Hunt telegrams the FCO in London.

> *"1. Spruce, Vice-Chairman of local Falkland Islands Committee, showed me Telex from Frow stating that the London Falkland Islands Committee were in favour of a Leaseback arrangement provided that it was for a minimum of 99 years ad that it included rights to exploit oil and fisheries resources in a 200 mile exclusive economic zone.*
>
> *2. Spruce said his Committee would be meeting this week-end to consider the Telex but present line-up was two for the Leaseback option and eight against.*
>
> *3. Of the Councillors, Monk has stated at public meetings in Camp that he is in favour of the Freeze option and totally opposed to Leaseback, other Councillors remain indecisive.*
>
> *4. Candidates for the West Falkland bye-election are Peter Robertson (Port Stephens) and Tim Blake (Hill Cove). Former is strongly in favour of Leaseback: latter is in favour of talks but undecided between Freeze and Leaseback.*
>
> *5. Ex-officio members of Executive Council report that majority of people they have sounded out are against Leaseback."* [3330]

In the South Atlantic, RRS *Shackleton* (Warne) sails on a research cruise to the Scotia and Weddell Seas. [3331]

"… the Foreign and Commonwealth Office not only applied for clearance from the Buenos Aires authorities – but also offered them the facility of having an Argentine observer on board. The offer was taken up for the second half of the cruise. … the FCO was virtually saying that the ship was working in Argentine waters. Most of her work was, in fact, in the triangle between South Georgia, South Sandwich Islands and South Orkney Islands. To my mind, FCO was implying that all these island groups were Argentina's and not ours! The original cruise programming included a call at Stanley for bunkers. This was changed to Montevideo." [3332]

3326 *CAB 148/189 & CAB148/196*

3327 Livingstone 2018. Margaret Thatcher is often accused of being willing to hand over the Islands to Argentina in 1980 without the support of the Falklands people. Not true. Carrington, Ridley and the FCO attempted to railroad the Prime Minister, against her better instincts, into the leaseback option. Fortunately, the FCO had underestimated the resilience of the Islanders. Thatcher's instincts would be proven correct.

3328 Briley 2022

3329 *UN Doc. A.AC.109/670 Falkland Islands (Malvinas) Working Paper by the Secretariat* August 5, 1981.

3330 *ALW 040/325/12*

3331 Other than a vague 1980/81, I am unable to find exact dates.

3332 *Warne to Elgood June 27, 1982* in Elgood 2025

November 18th, Britain's *The Times* newspaper reports.

> *"... it is stressed in London that British policy towards the Falklands remains as it has always been, that no solution would be acceptable that was not agreed by both the islanders and the British Parliament."*

November 19th, in London, an internal FCO *minute* considers tactics for Ridley's visit to the Falklands.

> *"Mr Ridley has asked, ... whether we might not induce the Argentines to take a tougher and more critical line on his arrival in Buenos Aires. It would clearly help Mr Ridley when talking to the Islanders to be able to refer to signs of Argentine impatience. Conversely the Argentine public line suggested by Sr Ortiz de Rozas that Mr Ridley's visit to the Islands was a welcome indication that negotiations were moving forward – would be counter-productive. ... The most suitable occasion for signs of Argentine impatience to surface would be in Foreign Ministry press comment following Mr Ridley's courtesy call at the MFA."* [3333]

November 20th, from London, the FCO America's Desk, telegrams the British Ambassador in Buenos Aires.

> *"... I do not think it fair to describe those in the know in London as a cohort. Knowledge of our clandestine activity has in fact been kept to the lowest number feasible in a direct chain leading between the Secretary of State and the desk officer, plus the Lord Privy Seal and the PUS. No other Under-Secretaries or Departments in the FCO are aware of it, nor is any other Ministry. Even other Ministers involved have been informed orally, not in writing. I naturally have no objection to your informing John Chick and Andrew Murray, provided that they fully understand that no word of what has already taken place must ever leak out, no matter what Mr Ridley manages to achieve in the Islands. We may now be going public on the leaseback concept; but the run-up must remain secret."* [3334]

November 21st, in Buenos Aires, Minister Nicholas Ridley, en-route to the Falklands, stops off to speak to the Foreign Minister. Seemingly (?) unaware that he had intended to do so, Argentine authorities appear irritated.[3335] However, Cavandoli and Ridley have a private meeting. [3336]

"Ridley travelled to the Falklands through Buenos Aires, where he had a 'quiet drink' with Cavandoli and presented him with a silver spoon for his newly born grandson. Ridley urged the Argentines, not to be 'nice to him in public' but maintain antagonism and complain about 'lack of progress'..." [3337]

"... Ridley mentioned to Cavandoli that he favored the leasing alternative and that, although the Prime Minister, Ms. Thatcher, did not support those negotiations, he had managed to get the Cabinet's approval to ask for the opinion of the Islanders on a basic plan towards that solution. ... Ridley's negotiations and proposals transformed the dispute since the Government of the United Kingdom publicly stated its disposition to consider handing over the sovereignty to the Argentine Republic."[3338]

3333 *Fearn to Harding November 19, 1980* in *FCO7/3808 (f59)*

3334 *Harding to Williams November 20, 1980* in FCO7/3808 (f50)

3335 *Falkland Islanders at War* Graham Bound 2002. Ministers do not just 'turn up' in a foreign country. Farce or conspiracy? Perhaps a little of both.

3336 At an International Conference concerning the Falklands in 1990, Argentine author Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse claimed that Ridley agreed the *'lease-back'* arrangement with Argentina, before going to the Islands. Unlikely. *cf.* January 29, 1981

3337 Briley 2022

3338 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023

Before leaving, Ridley speaks to journalists.

"Mr Ridley told reporters that he had come to meet the islanders on whose total acceptance depended any solution to the dispute. Argentine feathers have been ruffled ... The local press enjoyed an orgy of indignation, and the Foreign Ministry replied in a communiqué that the British Government had not made one positive move to solve the sovereignty question." [3339]

"He made it clear that the Islanders' wishes would be paramount and that their readiness to contemplate lease-back could not be taken for granted. He also made it clear that the concept was not regarded with any enthusiasm in London and it would not be easy to satisfy Parliament..."[3340]

November 22nd, at Port Stanley, Minister Ridley arrives with a set of objectives agreed in London.

> *"i) to persuade Councillors (and through them Islanders) that the prolongation of the dispute is not in their interests or those of HMG: and that we must work towards a negotiated settlement with the Argentines; ii) therefore to obtain their agreement that we should enter into negotiations with Argentina to explore the scope for a settlement based on leaseback; iii) to impress upon them our respect for their wishes to remain British, our interests in their welfare and our concern for their future."* [3341]

"When Ridley arrived in Stanley, the local paper Penguin News reported that "the burning question is, what is he here for?"." [3342]

November 23rd, on his first full day in the Falkland Islands, Minister Ridley, spends the morning fishing, followed by lunch with the Stanley manager of the Falkland Islands Company.

November 24th, in the morning, Nicholas Ridley meets Councillors at Government House.

> *"After the Governor had welcomed Mr Ridley on behalf of the Councillors, Mr Ridley explained why he had come. ... there was continuing pressure from the Argentines to resume negotiations. This pressure had been expressed when Lord Carrington met the Argentine Foreign Minister in New York in September, and again when he had passed through Buenos Aires on his way to the Islands. ... if we refused another round, we could expect the Argentines to become belligerent. ...*



VISIT OF THE HONOURABLE NICHOLAS RIDLEY, M.P.
MINISTER OF STATE FOR FOREIGN AND COMMONWEALTH AFFAIRS,
22–29 NOVEMBER, 1980

PROGRAMME

Saturday 22 November
1525 hrs: Arrived Stanley airport. Met by HE the Governor and the Acting Chief Secretary and introduced to Executive and Legislative Councillors.
1900 hrs: Drinks party to meet Councillors and their wives at the home of the Acting Chief Secretary.
2030 hrs: Dinner party at Government House.

Sunday 23 November
0800 hrs: Fishing on river Murrell.
1200 hrs: Call on Mrs. Perry (90th birthday).
1230 hrs: Lunch with Mr. Milne, Stanley Manager, Falkland Islands Company.
1430 hrs: Visit to site of new school hostel.
1530 hrs: Inspection of Darwin Road.
1930 hrs: Visit to m.y. *Copious*. Host: Mr. Julian Fitter.
2030 hrs: Dinner at Government House.

Monday 24 November
1100 hrs: Joint Councils' meeting in Government House Conference Room.
1300 hrs: Buffet lunch for Councillors at Government House.
1500 hrs: Visit to Sheep Owners Association at Barton House.
1630 hrs: Interviews with Mrs. Blyth, Mr. A. Betts.
1900 hrs: Drinks party at Government House.
2100 hrs: Dinner at Government House.

Tuesday 25 November
0930 hrs: Joint Councils' meeting in Government House Conference Room.
1130 hrs: Meeting with General Employees Union at their Office.
1230 hrs: Visit Royal Marines Detachment NP8901 for lunch. OC Major Robin Gilding, 2 i/c Lt. Philip Whitcombe.
1500 hrs: Meeting with Falkland Islands Committee at Rose Hotel.
1645 hrs: Meeting with young people of Stanley at Stanley Social Club.
1745 hrs: Taped radio broadcast for Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service.
1900 hrs: Reception at Town Hall to meet the general public. Host: Falkland Islands Government.
2100 hrs: Dinner at Government House.

Wednesday 26 November
0945 hrs: To Stanley airport.
1000 hrs: Flight to Darwin by Islander aircraft.
0920 hrs (Camp time): Met by Mr. and Mrs. Hardcastle, General Manager, Falkland Islands Company. Public meeting in Darwin and Goose Green Community Hall.
1145 hrs (Camp time): By Islander to Fox Bay East.
1205 hrs (Camp time): Met by Mr. and Mrs. Cockwell, Manager, Packe Bros. and Company Ltd.
1430 hrs (Camp time): Public meeting with people of Fox Bay East.
1630 hrs (Camp time): By boat to Fox Bay West. Met by Mr. and Mrs. Knight, Manager, FIC, Fox Bay West. Public meeting with people of Fox Bay West.
2000 hrs (Camp time): Dinner party given by Mr. and Mrs. Cockwell.

3339 *The Times* November 23, 1980
3340 *PREM 19/656 f62* at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation.
3341 *ALW 040/325/1*
3342 *Invasion 1982: the Falkland islanders' Story* Graham Bound 2007

If we filibustered, it was open to the Argentines to interrupt communications, withdraw medical services etc., while appearing not unreasonable in international opinion....

Mr. Bennet asked if the question could be taken to the ICJ. Mr. Ridley said that internationally, we were in a minority of one on the issue. The Argentines would not accept ICJ arbitration.... Mr Ridley said he believed that the Argentines were mainly interested in the political problem of sovereignty, rather than any oil or fish resources the Islands might have. ... Mr Ridley believed that Islanders were not aware of the extent of Argentine pressure. He could not for ever do nothing. In any case doing nothing itself had implications for the Islands. He was not seeking to bounce the Councillors, rather seeking their advice as to what he should do with them." [3343]

After the Councillors, Ridley meets with the Sheep Owners Association.

"During his meeting with the Sheep-owners, Mr Ridley said that another option would be to break off talks altogether but he felt that this might antagonize the Argentine Government." [3344]

November 25th, Minister Ridley holds a second session with Islands Councillors.

"Mr Wallace said ... They had reached no decision on the proposals Mr Ridley had put forward, and would like time to consider them further and for the public to react. Generally, their view was that preference should be given to freeze than to leaseback. Mr Goss personally felt that the Islanders were being bulldozed ... Mr Evan said that more than a week was needed to consider what Mr Ridley had said. If Islanders eventually allowed Mr Ridley to go ahead and discuss the freeze or leaseback with the Argentines, the islanders would be giving away a lot and it was not clear to him what they would be receiving. ... Mr Bowles ... could not see people agreeing to what Mr Ridley had suggested until the Argentines came up with some better ideas. Mr Miller said that if a leaseback agreement was eventually made, it would have to be so worded as to avoid admitting that Argentina had had rights to the islands in the past. Such an admission would be a betrayal of the last 140 years."

The Minister, tapes a message for the Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service: *"... People seemed well acquainted with the three proposals as explained on the radio. Station managers seemed strongly in favour of some form of settlement. ... There was a general acceptance that something needed to be done; but people looked first for the solution which was not available, ie. that the problem would simply go away."*

In the evening, at a public meeting in the Town Hall, Ridley puts forward his three proposals.

"There was the 'freeze' idea, whereby both sides would agree to disagree and take no action to further their claims for a specified time. But the minister pointed out that at the end of the moratorium period the old problem would return with a vengeance. Then there was the possibility of 'condominium', joint government. The Argentine flag would need to fly alongside the Union Flag. There would also need to be two police forces, two governors, and two official languages. Even Ridley believed this was a non-starter. Finally he explained his preferred idea: 'leaseback'. This, he suggested, was a workable solution. Britain would formally cede sovereignty to Buenos Aires, and before the ink had dried on that document would sign another, leasing the Islands back for an agreed period, say 99 years. The Falklands' way of life would be maintained and everyone would be happy. Across Ridley's face spread a cadaverous grimace, which was as near as he could get to a smile." [3345]

3343 *ALW 0400/352/12*
3344 *The Times* November 26, 1980
3345 Bound 2007

Nicholas Ridley's proposals are met with annoyance and anger by his audience. He is shouted down. Clearly not expecting such a response, Ridley loses his temper and shouts back; *"They (Argentina) cannot be strung along for much longer."* [3346] Ridley then asserts that the Islanders' would be to blame for any consequences.

"Reports of Mr. Ridley's performance are mixed. His bravery was perhaps not matched by his tact in dealing with a simple but worried people whose one security was Britain's determination to defend their loyalty." [3347]

"To many he had seemed aloof and intolerant of what he regarded as the short-sightedness of many Falklanders. ... A future member of the Islands Council, John Cheek, was harsher: "If anyone other than Ridley had tried to sell us leaseback, then it would have had a chance."..." [3348]

"His audience did indeed appear bellicose, but their bellicosity was directed at the British Minister. It was clear that few in the Town Hall and throughout the Islands would accept leaseback." [3349]

"Meeting 400 Islanders in Stanley Town Hall, Ridley curtly rejected their objections." [3350]

November 26th - 28th, Ridley extends his meetings into the countryside.

"He then visited eight settlements in Camp together with Hunt, trying to "sell" the idea of leaseback, but was not noticeably successful. In meetings at Green Patch and Fox Bay he lost his temper and shouted at the islanders, banging his fist on the table; small wonder that they remained suspicious that he was preparing them for an Argentine takeover." [3351]

"At a meeting in Green Patch, East Falkland, Ridley hammered on the table with his fists, audible in a tape recording which reached the UKFIC's London office. All 40 Islanders there rejected his proposal." [3352]

In the UK, *The Times* newspaper reports:

> *"Britain is suggesting that the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands be transferred to Argentina, according to a report reaching London last night. The islands, which are in the South Atlantic some 450 miles off the coast of Argentina, have been the subject of a 100-year-old dispute between Argentina and Britain. This is said to be one of a number of options which are being put to the islanders by Mr Nicholas Ridley, Minister of State in the Foreign Office, responsible for Latin America, who is now in the Falklands.*
>
> *According to Air Commodore B. G. Frow, of the Falkland Island Office in London, Mr Ridley addressed a meeting of the islands' Sheepowners Association and told them that Argentina was getting impatient at the lack of progress in the attempts to solve the problem. Mr Ridley suggested that it would be in the islanders' best interest if they agreed to a transfer of sovereignty. The other options are a 25-year freeze over the sovereignty issue, and a lease of the islands similar to that in force for Hong Kong. Air Commodore Frow said that the lease-back solution, which has. been raised before, is the one which is preferred by Whitehall.*
>
> *A spokesman at the Foreign Office said last night that he could neither confirm nor deny the reports as they were awaiting a report themselves on the results of Mr Ridley's talks. ... When asked if Britain intended to cede the sovereignty of the islands to Argentina the spokesman said they were looking for a*

3346 Quoted in Bound 2007
3347 *Falkland Islands: Origins of the War* in *The Economist* June 19, 1982
3348 *Falkland Islanders at War* G. Bound 2002 p.10. Also Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.49
3349 Graham Bound in Tatham (ed) 2008 p.440
3350 Briley 2022
3351 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.626
3352 Elgood 2025

solution which everyone could live with. He added: 'The important thing is the wishes of the islanders. If they agree, we can explore the possible basis for a solution. However, no solution can be finally agreed without the endorsement of the islanders and Parliament."

November 27th, in London, newspaper reports of Ridley's reception in the Islands are raised in Parliament. Both MP's and Lords demand a statement from the government. In the Lords:

"(The Earl of Lauderdale) My Lords, is my noble friend aware that following the visit of Mr. Ridley leaks have begun to appear in the London press in a fashion all too familiar to those of us who are Whitehall-watchers; and will he give us an assurance that this Government will put absolutely no pressure on the islanders to accede to whatever may be the Whitehall view?

(Lord Paget of Northamton) My Lords, why are we talking to the Argentine at all? What is their locus standi here? They are 500 miles away from islands which, when uninhabited, were occupied by British people and have, in the period since then, been British territory. What has it got to do with the Argentine?

(Lord Carrington) My Lords, like it or not, over a great many years the Argentinians have claimed the Falkland Islands. We of course do not admit that claim, but the fact that there has been that claim has cast an economic blight over the Falkland Islands, as anybody who knows the subject will be well aware. Consequently, if an agreement could be reached which is acceptable to the Falkland islanders, to the Argentinians and to ourselves, it will be greatly to the benefit of all of us.

(Viscount Thurso) My Lords, can the noble Lord give us an assurance that before assuming that we know the views of the Falkland islanders they will be given some chance of being heard by a referendum or by a means that ascertains their views person by person?

(Lord Carrington) My Lords, I think that at this moment we had better take one thing at a time. I have no idea at the moment what the views of the Falkland islanders are, but I should like to hear what my honourable friend the Minister of State says when he comes back to England, and then we can discuss it all. But certainly there will be a lot of opportunity in your Lordships' House to discuss how we go, if we go anywhere." [3353]



Thursday 27 November

1000 hrs: (Camp time)	Flight by Beaver aircraft to Chartres. Met by Mr. and Mrs Luxton, Chartres Sheep Farming Co. Ltd.
1100 hrs: (Camp time)	Public meeting in Chartres shearing shed.
1230 hrs: (Camp time)	Lunch with Mr. and Mrs. Luxton.
1400 hrs: (Camp time)	Flight by Islander aircraft to Hill Cove. Met by Mr. and Mrs. Blake, Manager, Holmsted Blake and Co. Ltd.
1500 hrs: (Camp time)	Public meeting in Hill Cove Community Hall.
1630 hrs: (Camp time)	By Land Rover overland to Roy Cove. Met by Mr. and Mrs. J. Newell, Manager, Bertrand and Felton Ltd.
1930 hrs: (Camp time)	Dinner given by Mr. and Mrs. Newell.
2000 hrs: (Camp time)	Public meeting in Roy Cove Community Hall.

Friday 28 November

0930 hrs: (Camp time)	Flight by Beaver aircraft to Carcass Island. Met by Mr. and Mrs. McGill, Owner, Carcass Island. Tour of the Island followed by lunch.
1400 hrs: (Camp time)	Flight by Beaver aircraft to Green Patch Settlement to meet the new owners of the farms within the Green Patch Scheme. Met by Mr. and Mrs. McPhee, Owner, Whitington's Rincon.
1500 hrs: (Camp time)	Public meeting in Green Patch Community Hall.
1630 hrs: (Camp time)	Depart by Beaver aircraft for Stanley.
1750 hrs:	Arrive Stanley.
1900 hrs:	Meeting with commercial community at Upland Goose Hotel.
2000 hrs:	Dinner with Mr. and Mrs. Growcott.

Saturday 29 November

0900 hrs:	Interviews with Mrs. Stewart, Mrs. Hirtle.
1000 hrs:	Joint Councils' meeting in Government House Conference Room.
1130 hrs:	Interview with Mr. Patrick Watts for the Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service at Government House.
1200 hrs:	Press conference. Drinks with Councillors.
1430 hrs:	Depart for Stanley airport.
1445 hrs:	Farewell to Councillors in airport control tower.
1520 hrs:	Departed for Comodoro Rivadavia.

From Stanley, unaware of the reaction in Britain, Ridley's staff send an optimistic telegram back to London.

"It will take time for a clear reaction to emerge and one cannot be optimistic on the prospects for leaseback." [3354]

3353 *Hansard. Lords Chamber November 27, 1980. vol.415 col.200*
3354 *PREM 19/656 Telegram No.183 of 27 November*

Governor Rex Hunt telegrams his own thoughts; *"... In general he is receiving a serious and sensible response ... It will however take time for a clear reaction to emerge and one cannot be optimistic on the prospects of leaseback."* [3355]

"The mission was attended, however, by up to 60 Argentine journalists, giving it a flavour unlikely to allay islanders' fears." [3356]

November 28th, in the UK, *The Times* newspaper reports:

> *"The Falklands are one of those difficult issues that have hung fire for many years and, while there can be no easy solution, it is healthy that their future should be openly discussed. The various possibilities, however unpalatable they may be to many people, have at least to be examined. ... The starting point must be the principle, restated by Lord Carrington this week, that nothing will be done against the wishes of the islanders themselves. They are a small and isolated community, of almost entirely British origin, and there can be no question of simply handing them over to Argentina against their will. This would be true whatever the type of government that held office in Argentina, and is particularly true in view of the bloodstained record of the present military regime, itself the product of extraordinary political instability over many years.*

November 29th, in Stanley, Ridley's final meeting with the Islands Councils fails to result in any decision. [3357]

"Mr Ridley held final meeting with Councillors before departure on 29 November. Discussion was inconclusive with most Councillors (Monk and Luxton absent) taking cover and reluctant to take a personal position on negotiating options. ...Councillors' general assessment was that of those in Port Stanley who had already declared their views the majority was strongly opposed to the leaseback concept ... There was however real division of opinion and everyone needed more time for thought. Opposition to leaseback rested principally on emotional hostility to any idea of ceding sovereignty. In final radio broadcast on 29 November Mt Ridley concentrated on HMG's wish genuinely to seek Islander opinion: on need for clear appreciation of effects of dispute and for thorough and careful debate in what should be done." [3358]

Interviewed by *Penguin News*, Ridley is asked whether Argentina was prepared to make life difficult.

> *"I am a man of peace. I would feel that I had failed if that happened. I can't foresee what Argentina would do, your guess is as good as mine, because you live near them and know them perhaps better even than I do. I merely say that in the long term one has to come to terms with one's neighbours and one has to live in peace with them. What one cannot do is live in a perpetual state of siege and antagonism, suspicion and bellicosity."* [3359]

"Ridley was not going to stay a day longer than necessary, but shortly before leaving he told Penguin News of his assessment of the situation. He studiously avoided the 'I-word', but in doing so could not find another to adequately describe the threat. "It's a mood of impatience, " he said of the climate in Argentina. "No, not of impatience; it's a mood of sooner or later, sometime, one way or another, we have to get further on. We have to make more progress. That's their mood, not my mood."..." [3360]

3355 *FCO7/3809 (f127)*
3356 *Falkland Islands: Origins of the War* in *The Economist* June 19, 1982
3357 *ALW 040/325/12*
3358 *British Embassy, Buenos Aires to FCO November 30, 1980 FCO 7/3809*. Also *ALW 040/325/12*
3359 Ridley quoted in Bound 2002 p.10
3360 *Ibid*.

As Minister Ridley departs on a *LADE* flight back to Argentina, he is jeered by an angry crowd of Islanders.

"Ridley left Stanley Airport - ironically, aboard an aircraft of LADE, the Argentine Air Force airline - to the sound of furious demonstrators and the rare sight of normally rather supine Islanders waving banners and fists." [3361]

"His view as he departed ignominiously in an Argentine Air Force plane (LADE) was of furious islanders shaking their fists at him, singing Rule Britannia. ... The Green Patch recording circulated widely. Franks Committee member Lord Watkins said: "Why we are interested in it (is that) is was thought that that tape was in fact re-played in Argentina". If so, it showed the Argentines that Ridley was lying." [3362]

In Buenos Aires, on the same day, it is reported that Argentina's State Petroleum Company has submitted a bid to drill for oil in an area straddling the median line between the Falklands and Patagonia.

November 30th, in Buenos Aires, Minister Ridley speaks to the Foreign Ministry.

"Ridley speciously told his Argentina Ministry of Foreign Affairs hosts: "it was right to talk about the dispute and his visit to the Falklands had convinced him of this. Discussions in the Islands had made him believe that some solution was just possible, but both sides would have to make concessions." [3363]

On the same day, the British Embassy inform London that the Islanders remain divided on the subject of leaseback. [3364]

"There are conflicting accounts of the islanders stance before the Ridley debate, some asserting that the population were always steadfastly opposed to leaseback. The correspondence in the newly-opened FCO files suggest a more mixed response: officials in the British embassy in Buenos Aires reported that four Island councillors would be ready to see leaseback explored, four were undecided and two against." [3365]

"Ridley had told Councillors there was no way the British Government could defend them. Faced with this, some Islanders were prepared to accept leaseback. Councillor Robin Pitaluga supported it in FIBS." [3366]

December 2nd, back in London, Minister Nicholas Ridley makes a statement to the House of Commons.

> *"We have no doubt about our sovereignty over the islands. The Argentines, however, continue to press their claim. The dispute is causing continuing uncertainty, emigration and economic stagnation in the islands. Following my exploratory talks with the Argentines in April, the Government have been considering possible ways of achieving a solution which would be acceptable to all parties. In this, the essential is that we should be guided by the wishes of the islanders themselves.*
>
> *I therefore visited the islands between 22 and 29 November in order to consult island councillors and subsequently, at their express request, all islanders on how we should proceed. Various possible bases for seeking a negotiated settlement were discussed. These included both a way of freezing the dispute for a period or exchanging the title of sovereignty against a long lease of the islands back to Her Majesty's Government. The essential elements of any solution would be that it should preserve British administration, law and way of life for the islanders while releasing the potential of the islands' economy and of their maritime resources, at present blighted by the dispute.*

3361 Bound in Tatham (ed) 2008
3362 Elgood 2025
3363 *Ibid.*
3364 *FCO 7/3809*. Also *ALW 040/325/12.* See November 29, 1980, above. Ambassador Williams would later be accused by Lord Carrington, of providing misleading information.
3365 Livingstone 2018 citing *British Embassy, Buenos Aires to FCO November 30, 1980 FCO 7/3809.*
3366 Elgood 2025. FIBS = Falkland Islands Broadcasting Service

It is for the islanders to advise on which, if any, option should be explored in negotiations with the Argentines. I have asked them to let me have their views in due course. Any eventual settlement would have to be endorsed by the islanders and by this House" [3367]

In the debate that follows, nine Conservative MPs denounce the 'leaseback' proposal, as do six Labour MPs. Among the latter is Labour's shadow Foreign Affairs spokesman, Peter Shore.

"This is a worrying statement. Will the Minister confirm that involved here are the rights and future of 1,800 people of British descent in a territory which was originally uninhabited—people who, above all, wish to preserve their present relationship with the United Kingdom? Will he reaffirm that there is no question of proceeding with any proposal contrary to the wishes of the Falkland islanders? Their wishes are surely not just "guidance" to the British Government. Surely, they must be of paramount importance. Has the hon. Gentleman made that absolutely clear to the Argentine Government?

Is not the Minister aware that proposals for a leasing arrangement represent a major weakening of our long-held position on sovereignty in the Falkland Islands, and chat to make them in so specific and public a manner is likely only to harden Argentine policy and to undermine the confidence of the Falkland islanders? Will he, therefore, make it dear that we shall uphold the rights of the islanders to continue to make a genuinely free choice about their future, that we shall not abandon them and that, in spite of all the logistical difficulties, we shall continue to support and sustain them?" [3368]

No Conservative MP speaks in support of Nicholas Ridley. [3369]

"Mr Ridley's report back to the house of commons on December 2, 1980, was greeted with howls of outrage, not helped by his studied evasiveness on the issue of paramountcy. Every speaker from all sides of the house expressed concern... The attitudes of MPs were well cummed up by Mr. Douglas Jay, who asked bluntly: "Why can't the foreign office leave the matter alone"? ... Mr Ridley appeared at the despatch box shattered and uncertain and many observers were astonished that he should have apparently wrecked his career on such a hopeless little venture." [3370]

"No one listened. Alerted by the Falkland Islands Committee to the Minister's leaseback enthusiasm, MPs gave Ridley a battering worse than anything MPs could recall in the course of the Parliament.... One MP said that he had just watched a man wreck his career on a pile of rock." [3371]

"I have never seen such a mauling, of any of my colleagues, in all my life. Nicholas Ridley, who had shown great courage in putting this forward, was looking pretty white by the end of it, poor chap.... Now that rough ride was not just from the Conservative side; it was from the Labour side; it was from the Liberals. It was absolutely united in its violent sense of opposition to the idea of leaseback." [3372]

"Back in the UK, the strong pro-Falklands lobby had been galvanised into action, and Ridley was savaged in a debate in the House of Commons on 2 December for his alleged treachery." [3373]

3367 *HC Deb 02 December 1980 vol.995 cc128-34*. See - https://hansard.millbanksystems.com/commons/1980/dec/02/falkland-islands
3368 *Ibid.*
3369 See p.3 - https://www.fiassociation.com/newsletter/FIA-NL-09.pdf
3370 *Falkland Islands: Origins of the War* in *The Economist* June 19, 1982
3371 Hastings & Jenkins 1997 p.50
3372 Richard Luce quoted in Charlton 1989 p74
3373 Bound in Tatham (ed) 2008 p.439

"The leaseback plan, … was effectively killed on 2 December 1980 when MPs from all parties reacted with horror when it was proposed by Ridley in the House of Commons. … Almost half of MPs who spoke were supporters of the Falkland Islands Committee or had previously taken a strong interest in the Falklands, which suggests that the Falklands 'lobby' was influential" [3374]

In Downing Street, a minute on the day's events is prepared for the Prime Minister.

> *"Mr. Ridley had an awful time in the House this afternoon, following his statement. I do not immediately recollect an occasion when a statement has been greeted with such a degree of hostility from the Government benches – to the extent that not a single Government backbencher supported it."* [3375]

December 3rd, in London, *The Times* newspaper reports:

> *"The House of Commons came together in total concord yesterday to voice its deep suspicion of the intentions of the Foreign Office and of Mr Nicholas Ridley, a Minister of State, for the future of the Falkland Islands and their relationship with the Argentine. Seldom can a minister have had such a drubbing from all sides of the House, and Mr Ridley was left in no doubt that whatever Machiavellian intrigues he and the Foreign Office may be up to, they will come to nothing if they involve harming a hair on the heads of the islanders. …*
>
> *From the Conservative benches, Mr Julian Amery told the minister that his statement was profoundly disturbing. For years the Foreign Office had wanted to get rid of this commitment, although the islands had an important part to play in the future of the South Atlantic…*
>
> *A few moments later, Mr Ridley floundered into deeper water when he was asked whether the Government would accept the views of the islanders if they opted for the maintenance of the status quo. The minister seemed to many to be dodging the issue…"*

During the morning, the UK Falkland Islands Committee (UKFIC) have a meeting with Minister Ridley. [3376]

"The meeting was most cordial, and it was clear that the Committee members were considering carefully, without emotion, the various ideas that Mr Ridley had put forward in the Islands during his visit." [3377]

Minister Ridley sends a message for Argentina's Minister Cavándoli via the British Embassy in Buenos Aires.

> *"… it became clear after my arrival in the Islands, that the issue had to be dealt with fully and in public. I cannot at this stage predict the outcome. I encountered a general recognition of the need to solve the dispute. But, as you know, emotions and distrust run deep, both here and in the Islands, and it will require time as well as patience to resolve the problem. I appreciate that this leaves the future timetable uncertain. As you are aware, we cannot on our side proceed until we have the Islanders' concurrence."* [3378]

At Downing Street, the Cabinet Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee considers the situation. [3379]

3374 Livingstone 2018
3375 PREM19/656 f63
3376 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1980 no.9. See December 17, below.
3377 *FCO7/3805 (f90)*
3378 *FCO7/3808 (f51)*
3379 *CAB 148/189*

"In discussion the following points were made -

a. In Her Majesty's Government's view, there was no legal doubt about British sovereignty over the islands. This view was not accepted by the Argentine Government, but they were unwilling to see the matter referred to the International Court.

b. There had been good reasons for the Government's decision to explore the possible basis for a settlement which, because they underlined the extent of the islands' dependence on Argentina, it was impossible to develop in public.

c. It would be necessary, in the islands' own interests, to keep the Argentine Government in play. The latter would no doubt be content to wait until the islanders' considered views were known, but they would not be easy to handle thereafter, if the islanders rejected any idea of seeking a settlement. ...

The Prime Minister, summing up the discussion, said that the Committee would wish to resume consideration of the subject when the Islanders' leaders had reported further on local opinion. Unfortunately, Parliamentary hostility to the idea of a settlement was now so strong that, even if the Islanders considered view was that one should be sought, this might be regarded as merely the result of pressure from Government. It should therefore be made clear that, if the islanders favoured maintaining the status quo, they would be fully supported. Further thought would need to be given to the way in which the proposed nationality Bill would affect the Islanders..."

"It agreed that this was a highly emotive issue for parliamentary and public opinion, while noting that the Islanders' hostility to Ridley's appeal seemed to have been exaggerated; and concluded that it would be 'tragic' if the Islanders' chances of escaping from economic blight were to be dismissed by the attitude of their champions at Westminster. This was not quite to appreciate the depth of the Islanders' feelings..." [3380]

In the evening, Minister Ridley speaks to Sir Nigel Fisher MP, a member of UKFIC.

"Sir Nigel Fisher last night told Mr Ridley that the Committee had concluded that it would advise Islanders that they should ask Mr Ridley to explore the possibilities of leaseback in negotiations with Argentina. But according to Sir Nigel Fisher, the Committee would suggest that Islanders should seek concessions in return, namely unrestricted right of abode in the UK for Islanders, and some improved financial provisions (whether increased aid or assistance in access to capital was not clear). ... This is good news. Sir Nigel Fisher also told Mr Ridley that Lord Shackleton is close to deciding in favour of exploring leaseback.... If we could persuade him to come out in favour of negotiations on the basis of leaseback, it would have enormous influence both in the Falkland Islands and in the lobby here." [3381]

December 4th, in Downing Street, at a full Cabinet meeting, it is noted that: *"... while there was no legitimacy in Argentina's claim to the Falkland Islands, her stranglehold over their communications and supply routes was having a blighting effect on their prospects."* [3382]

December 5th, from London, Lord Carrington telegrams the UK Embassy in Buenos Aires; *"... we understand and sympathise with Cavandoli's domestic difficulties: but it is politically impossible for Mr Ridley to meet him, either openly or otherwise."* [3383]

3380 Boyce 2005
3381 *FCO7/3805 (f90)*
3382 *CAB128/68*
3383 *FCO7/3808 (f43)*

December 9th, in Buenos Aires, Britain Embassy formally protests to Argentina regarding licences issued for oil exploration in areas that cross into Falklands waters; *"The Argentinians refused the British note as 'flatly unacceptable' and went on to say 'there does not exist any boundary dispute in the area in question, for the simple reason that the whole area corresponds to Argentine sovereignty'. ..."* [3384]

December 11th, in New York, the United Nations adopt *Resolution 35/118* entitled - *'Plan of Action for the Full Implementation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples.'* [3385]

> *"Annex – 8. Member States shall adopt the necessary measures to **discourage** or prevent the systematic influx of outside immigrants and settlers into Territories under colonial domination, which disrupts the demographic composition of those Territories and may constitute a major obstacle to the genuine exercise of the right to self determination and independence by the people of those Territories."* [3386]

In London, on the same day, Argentina's Ambassador Ortiz urges Minister Ridley to arrange more talks. [3387]

"I am not at all sure ... about postponing discussions with the Argentines until after the change of Government in Buenos Aires. The present Air Force team at the Foreign Ministry have shown unexpected prudence and good sense in their dealings with us on this complex issue. ... If and when we have to beak to them the unpleasant news that the Islanders will not stomach lease-back, even as an avenue of exploration at the negotiating table, we shall need to draw on whatever goodwill we can muster on the Argentine side. The Air Force would, I am pretty sure, do their best to present such a disappointing reply to the Junta in sympathetic terms. .. I think that the Minister of State should, even in the case of a 'no' from the Islanders, offer to meet Comodoro Cavandoli for another round of negotiations, with Islanders present. The aim of such a meeting would be to maintain contact ... and at the same time to expose the Islanders to the full force of Argentine reaction to their 'no'." [3388]

In the Falkland Islands, police are called to the scene of a crime.

"On the 11th December 1980 occurred one of the most tragic crimes in the history of the Falklands. Early on the morning of that day an urgent telephone call was received at the Police Station summoning them to the residence of Mrs Gladys Minto. Two officers rushing to the house where they found Mrs Minto mortally injured with knife wounds. Yet alive lay the body of her estranged husband Len, who was also severely injured by the same means. The couple had not been living together for some time. When medical assistance arrived shortly afterwards, Mrs Minto was found to be dead but Mr Minto, though in a critical state, was alive. Later on in hospital his condition was stabilised and he has now made a full recovery. Mr Minto has now been committed by the Senior Magistrate sitting as Examining Justice to the Supreme Court on a charge of murder." [3389]

3384 *Towards a Theory of State and Sovereignty in Contemporary Britain* Ellen Kennedy in *Britain in the World* Lawrence Freedman (ed) 2010 p.154

3385 See https://www.un.org/en/ga/search/view_doc.asp?symbol=A/RES/35/118

3386 My emphasis. Worthy of note, as Argentina regularly argues that its citizens have never been allowed to settle in the Falklands archipelago.

3387 *FCO7/3808 (f31)*

3388 *Harding to Temple December 18, 1980* in *FCO7/3808 (f20).* Temple was Ridley's personal secretary.

3389 *Penguin News* February 5, 1981. Leonard Minto was found guilty of murder in the Falkland Islands Supreme Court. Reduced to manslaughter on appeal in the UK in 1982. Writing in June, 2025, this would appear to have been the last confirmed homicide in the Falkland Islands.

December 12th, a Papal arbitration panel considering the Beagle Channel dispute between Argentina and Chile, presents its proposals. As with the 1977 arbitration decision, these favour Chile. The proposals award the three Islands (Picton, Lennox and Nueva) to Chile with Argentina maintaining some limited facilities including radar and weather stations situated on the islands. Argentina is given important navigation rights in the area. The proposals also create a "Sea of Peace" to the east and south-east of the islands. Chilean territorial waters are limited and shared with Argentina for the exploitation of mineral resources. Chile's government accept the proposals with some reservations. Argentina, does not reply. [3390]

December 15th, in Britain's House of Lords, answering a question regarding Argentina's advertisement for oil tenders on November 6th, Lord Carrington states:

> *"No agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and Argentine Governments on the delimitation of the continental shelf as between the Falkland islands and Argentina. In the absence of an agreed boundary, neither party, in Her Majesty's Government's view, would be entitled to exercise continental shelf rights beyond the median line between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. We have protested to the Argentines about the YPF tender which does indeed go beyond the median line ..."* [3391]

December 17th, in London, during an unattributable press briefing, Minister Ridley tells selected journalists that the dispute with Argentina blights the daily lives of the Islanders and cannot be ignored.

"The Islanders were, (Governor) Hunt said, 'mature, intelligent, law-abiding people, not a bunch of impossible schoolchildren who need to be told what is in their best interests.'.." [3392]

December 18th, in Britain's House of Commons, Minister Ridley answers MPs' questions.

> *"... we want to maintain the British link, British rule and the British way of life, of which my hon. Friend and I are so proud. We desperately want to develop the economy of the islands. My hon. Friend mentioned improved farming and markets for farming produce. A great deal of credit is needed to open up those possibilities, and we must get commercial banks to perform their functions in the islands. There is also the question of revenue from the rich harvest of fish and the possibility – there can be no certainty – of finding oil.*
>
> *My hon. Friend wanted us to exert our undoubted rights over the fishing zones and the economic zones that surround not only the islands but our dependencies. My hon. Friend mentioned the vexed question of Magellanes Este, the oil block that straddles the median line. Nothing would give us more pleasure than to be able to say that we had agreed the median line and that we and the Argentine respected that median line, so that oil exploration and exploitation could go ahead. That is also common ground. We hold the same view about control of the seas. There have been two incidents recently, when seas that would have been in the Falkland Islands maritime zone were subject to harassment by Argentine vessels.*
>
> *My hon. Friend was right to raise the question of Southern Thule. At the talks in New York in April, I protested again to the Argentine Foreign Minister about the presence of the Argentine mission on Southern Thule without the permission or consent of the British Government.*

3390 Controversial in Argentina, and ultimately rejected by Argentina's government despite the proposals chipping away at the earlier arbitration award in Chile's favour. See 1977, January, 1978, 1980, March, 1981, January, 1982 & November, 1984

3391 *HL Deb 15 December 1980 vol.415 col.972*

3392 Boyce 2005

It is impossible to establish any of these things because the Argentine Government have never conceded our sovereignty over either the Falkland Islands or the dependencies, nor have they agreed that we should declare the various zones of the seas around them to which we would normally be entitled...

At present, the relationship between Great Britain and Argentina is good and friendly. We are still negotiating in a series of talks with the Argentine Government, as we were for many years before this Government took over. In spite of that, it is still not possible to declare those 200-mile fishery zones, to get the licence fees from foreigners fishing in those zones, to explore or exploit oil or to legalise the position of Southern Thule. Even the commercial banks are unwilling to set up in the islands because of the political risks. These hazards are real. It must be recognised that solving these problems requires an overall political settlement." [3393]

With regard to Shackleton's Report, Ridley adds; *"... a very large number of the recommendations have been implemented – 49 out of 90. Of the remainder, 14 have been rejected, 20 are in train and 7 are undecided. I concede that the bulk of the recommendations in terms of money have not been implemented because we come immediately to the question of the runway."* [3394]

"Unable to sway the Commons, Carrington and Ridley ignored its views." [3395]

At its London office, the UKFIC meet to discuss leaseback; after which a statement is issued.

"That the London Committee, as requested by the Islanders, have considered the political, social and economic alternatives available to the people of the Falkland Islands, in great detail during recent weeks, both informally and in formal discussions. They unanimously agreed to the following: That the intentions of the Government of Argentina on the proposal to cede sovereignty and immediate leaseback to the United Kingdom should be publicly known before we can comment, or anyone else in the Falkland Islands Government and Falkland Islanders should comment or advise on such a course. Moreover, the Committee consider that there is no urgency in deciding this issue or other options, and that the people of the Falkland Islands demand more time (possibly six months or more) for the matters to be discussed and [it] probably necessitates a formal referendum under the United Nations auspices once the issues have been properly studied and all the various options examined. Finally, the Committee unanimously agreed that the principle of full rights of class-one British Citizenship under the terms of the recent White Paper should be a prerequisite in any further discussions."

"Ridley told Sir Bernard Braine incorrectly that the UKFIC supported leaseback and told a backbench meeting of his party to "stop rocking the boat at the behest of the Falkland Islands Office"." [3396]

December 31st, in the Falklands, Islander Adrian Monk is interviewed on local radio.

"I think the whole campaign stinks... Don't be misled. Don't be worried about the consequences of saying "We are British." Our country will remain British." [3397]

"(It) certainly changed the minds of a lot of people in the Falklands without doubt, and a lot of people will not now admit that they considered leaseback as a possibility." [3398]

3393 *HC Deb 18 December 1980 vol.996 cc647-52*
3394 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.218
3395 Elgood 2025
3396 *Ibid*. Also *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1980 no.9 p.1
3397 Quoted in Ellerby 1990 p.260. Also *United Nations A.AC.109/670*
3398 *P. Watts interview, H. of C. Foreign Affairs Committee, Session 1982-83, Falkland. H.M.S.O., London, 4 Feb. 1983)*

"But for the intervention of Councillor Adrian Monk the "lease back" proposal may have obtained enough support to encourage the British Government to approach the Argentines and seek their cooperation with the plan. Mr. Monk, who lived at San Carlos, and fearing censorship, secretly recorded a message on a cassette which he sent for broadcast to the Radio Station in Stanley. He urged the inhabitants not to accept any form of lease-back and that in the event of any aggression by Argentina that the British Government had a duty to defend the Falklands in the future. His words changed the mood and attitude of the population and within a few days it was obvious that leaseback back was a dead duck in the water." [3399]

1981 — January 1st, Councillor Monk's radio broadcast is reproduced in the *The Falkland Times*:

"... "You all know what would happen if we agreed to negotiate a leaseback", Monk said, "no matter how favourable the final terms of the contract are for us ... we will be living in a borrowed, rented country". ... The argument that London would negotiate a long leaseback period did not satisfy him. "Not even a million years would be enough for me", he said. ... The conclusion, therefore, was to confront London: "... We may have opposition from the Foreign & Commonwealth Office and some Ministers, but we have enormous support in Parliament"." [3400]

"Through the analysis of the recording, the Dirección General de Antártida y Malvinas de la Cancillería (Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs Malvinas and Antarctica General Directorate) was able to know the opinion of the population. The Malvinas settlers did not spare their condemnation at Nicholas Ridley's farewell either. In short, the islanders only accepted having commercial relationships with Argentina." [3401]

January 6th, in Buenos Aires, newspaper *Clarin* reports that the new Reagan administration in the US is anxious to resolve conflicts between its allies, including that over the Falkland Islands.

January 7th, in Stanley, Councillors pass a motion.

> "*While this House does not like any of the ideas put forward by Mr. Ridley for a possible settlement of the sovereignty dispute with Argentina, it agrees that Her Majesty's Government should hold further talks with the Argentines at which this House should be represented and at which the British delegation should seek an agreement to freeze the dispute over sovereignty for a specified period of time."* [3402]

"In withholding support for leaseback, Councillors' response is less than we had originally hoped. But it could have been worse. A mandate for further talks has been given: and leaseback has not been ruled out for the future. ... It is necessary to allow time and the realities of the Argentine position to sink into Islander opinion. ... Our aim must now be to keep negotiations going: and, while applying no pressure, to let the Islanders come to see the need to explore a realistic settlement based on leaseback" [3403]

"At their next meeting in January 1981, a little over a year before the invasion, councillors agreed a motion stating that they did not like any of the Ridley proposals but that they could reluctantly accept a moratorium, or freeze. Only Adrian Monk opposed the motion. Of course this was a failure for London. The hopeless freeze concept had only been included in the Ridley package to make leaseback look more attractive." [3404]

3399 Patrick Watts MBE quoted in *Penguin News* February 26, 2021
3400 Caressai 2022 citing *The Falkland Times* January 1981
3401 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
3402 Quoted by Sir Ian Gilmour in *HC Deb 21 January 1981 vol.997 cc248-9*
3403 *CAB 148/197.* Memorandum by Lord Carrington for the OD Committee meeting scheduled for January 29, 1981.
3404 Bound 2007

"... the Legislative Council voted by 7 votes to 1 for the option that they knew would not be acceptable to Argentina: freezing negotiations on the question of sovereignty for twenty-five years. The lone vote was that of Monk who proposed no further discussion on the issue with Argentina." [3405]

The same day marks the 10th anniversary of the commencement of Argentine air services to the Falkland Islands.

"The opening of LADE House residence coincided with the tenth anniversary of air services to Malvinas and generated another disagreement. A social meeting that would be attended by authorities of the Argentine Air Force, the Argentine Foreign Office and the islands was organized. Upon learning about it, UKFIC's members showed their opposition and threatened to manifest repudiating Argentina's representatives. The reaction was so hard and determined that the local government and the Vicecomodoro were concerned about it: the celebration could turn into an embarrassing episode and complicate relations. The previous week to the scheduled date, tension had risen so much that the British proposed to cancel the ceremony and, in replacement, hold a modest open house without the presence of Argentines. Gilobert, who was about to accept that condition, visited the UKFIC's most influential members to especially invite them; he nicely appealed to the proverbial British chivalry. The celebration was a success. Most people attended and fraternized with the authorities." [3406]

January 12th, in London, Britain's Home Secretary, William Whitelaw, responds to questions regarding the status of the Falkland Islanders under the proposed Nationality Bill.

> *"I am of the firm opinion that no special provision can be made in the Nationality Bill to accommodate the Islanders. Almost all the Islanders are citizens of the United Kingdom and Colonies and it is estimated that about 65% of them are exempt from immigration control under the patriality provisions of the Immigration Act 1971.*
>
> *Islanders who are patrial will become British Citizens under the new nationality provisions (and retain their exemption from immigration control) as well as Citizens of the British Dependent Territories."* [3407]

"However, the position of the 600-700 Islanders with no right of abode in the UK is likely to provide a further, and emotional, argument for those who oppose the Government's current initiative over the Falkland Islands. Mr Ridley has already encountered considerable hostility on both sides of the House and feelings on the Nationality Bill point could make matters worse." [3408]

January 13th, from London, Carrington sends a message to Cavándoli in Buenos Aires.

> *"Ministers will need to give careful consideration to the Islanders' response and to next steps before any decision can be taken on a meeting... we may be unable to present firm proposals before the end of the month."*

In Buenos Aires, the Foreign Ministry issue a statement rejecting Islander opinion.

> *"15 years of useless negotiation: London's proposals are unacceptable from every point of view."* [3409]

3405 Caressai 2022

3406 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023. The authors appear confused regarding the designation UKFIC. The UKFI Committee was based in London. The Falkland Islands Local Committee was based in Stanley.

3407 *PREM19/656 f52.* Requests for special treatment had also been received from Gibraltar and the Cayman Islands.

3408 *Cabinet Office Minuite* in *PREM19/656 f39*

3409 *La Prensa* newspaper

"In Buenos Aires the British Ambassador, Anthony Williams, fussed around the Argentine Foreign Office, apologising for Islanders' hostility and trying to patch up relations. The Argentines issued a statement dismissing the importance of Islanders' opinions. They would, they said, only negotiate with Britain." [3410]

In Britain, Secretary for Defence, John Nott, orders a review of Britain's defence capabilities.

"The review which took place under Sir John Nott's tenure at the MOD ran from January to June 1981. It was conducted in the international context of a Soviet military build-up and the domestic context of a severe economic downturn and the introduction of cash planning to control public spending." [3411]

"In 1981 the Prime Minister wanted to buy very expensive American Trident missiles to replace the ageing Polaris system and was seeking cuts based on the 1974 Defence White Paper which concentrated resources on NATO. When Francis Pym, then Defence Secretary, resisted these, Thatcher replaced him with John Nott ..."[3412]

January 20th, from London, the US Embassy sends an assessment of the situation to Washington DC.

"The end-of-year push to achieve some movement toward a settlement with Argentina on the Falklands dispute came to naught. Ridley's efforts to employ a forcing strategy in negotiations with the Islanders were thwarted by a small but highly-effective Falklands lobby in London, concentrated in the House of Lords and the Conservative media. As a result, Ridley was forced to back off and give public assurances that nothing would be done to change the status of the Islanders without their express approval. The Foreign Office, though discouraged, will probably have another go at moving things off dead centre before the current Parliament is dismissed. Ridley may have decided it is simply not worth the trouble." [3413]

January 21st, in Britain's House of Commons, William Shelton MP asks if the Government has received the views of the Falkland Islanders regarding the proposals presented to them by Nicholas Ridley.

Responding, Sir Ian Gilmour quotes the Council motion from the Falklands (above) before confirming that the "*interests*" of the islanders remain paramount. He does, however, confirm that the leaseback proposal is not currently on the government's agenda. [3414]

January 27th, from Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry demands that negotiations on sovereignty are resumed, *"sooner, rather than later."*

They also complain about a group of new emigrants to the archipelago. [3415]

"The Falkland government's plans to obtain a small number of immigrants from St. Helena have met with a large stumbling block in the form of Argentine official anger. Commodore Carlos Cavandoli told the British Ambassador to Buenos Aires that his government was concerned at reports from various sources of migratory movements towards the Falklands. Many Argentine newspapers appear to be disturbed that the potential immigrants may be black and are somewhat obsessed with the fact. There are very few black people in Argentina. The Penguin News has checked with the government here, and they have confidence that the race of potential immigrants is not being taken into consideration, and providing they are suitable in other ways, they

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3410 Bound 2007

3411 Select Committee on Defence 8th Report. See - https://publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm199798/cmselect/cmdfence/138/13804.htm

3412 Elgood 2025

3413 *Telegram 1165 from London, Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File D810029-0299*

3414 *HC Deb 21 January 1981 vol.997 cc248-9*

3415 *PREM 19/656 Telegram No. 27 of 27 January.* In 1980, the FIG had advertised in St. Helena for people willing to live and work in the Falklands. With spare housing for three families, the FIG expected to get few applications. In fact, over 300 Saints applied to move.

will be welcomed regardless of race. Only four families are to be accepted for the present. Should this pilot scheme prove successful more families could follow at a later date." [3416]

"The Argentines were in a belligerent mood even before the talks began. They were incensed by a proposal being considered by the Islanders to encourage the immigration of laborers from the British dependency of St. Helena. The Falklands have a labor shortage and St. Helena has a labor surplus. What the Islanders viewed as a mutually beneficial economic arrangement sent the Argentines straight up the wall. They regarded it either as a scheme to ensure long-term British domination or as an insidious plot "to dilute Argentina's racial stock". Not the best way to start negotiations." [3417]

January 28th, in London, the British Nationality Bill has its second reading in the House of Commons; moved by the Secretary of State for the Home Department – William Whitelaw.

> *"The first is that the Bill provides for a composite citizenship covering all the dependent territories. I am sure that this is right. ... I should like to reaffirm that the proposed legislation is in no way intended to weaken those links to which we attach great importance. I do, however understand the feelings of some of the dependencies which feel that their particular situation is special.*
>
> *We have taken with great seriousness the approaches which have been made to us by Gibraltar. It is obviously important that the Gibraltar House of Assembly has unanimously passed a motion asking us to reconsider the position so as to categorise them as British citizens. The position of the Falkland Islands also commands a great deal of sympathy. Nevertheless, it remains right that the citizenship of our dependent territories should apply in a uniform way throughout those territories. Unimaginable confusion would result if this were not so.*
>
> *What I want to stress, however, is that the Bill in no way alters the position as regards the United Kingdom's moral and constitutional responsibilities for the territories in question. Nor does it in any way affect the special position of Gibraltar as part of the European Community.*
>
> *On the Falkland Islands, I want to say this. In December 1979, following the publication of the White Paper on the revision of the immigration rules, my hon. Friend the Minister of State, Foreign and Commonwealth Office sent a message to the people of the Falkland Islands assuring them that in the event of an emergency the problems of any islander who did not possess the right of abode in the United Kingdom and who was in trouble at that time would be most carefully and sympathetically considered. In the light of the concern recently expressed on behalf of the islanders, I wish to reaffirm that pledge and assure the islanders that in such circumstances they can depend upon the most sympathetic consideration of their position."* [3418]

"An amendment to the Nationality Bill claiming special status for Falkland Islanders was put down by Mr Michael Shersby MP (Con – Uxbridge) during the Committee stage, but was not carried." [3419]

3416 *The Penguin News* March 5, 1981. I can find no records of anyone moving from St. Helena to the Falklands in 1981. The first significant immigration was in 1986, when 28 Saints moved to the Falklands. Followed by 99 in 1988, 449 in 2000, and 458 in 2001.

3417 *Foreign Relations of the United States 1981-89 (Volume XIII) Conflict in the South Atlantic (2015) p14*.

3418 Hansard *HC Deb 28 January 1981 vol.997 cc935-1047*. *cf.* July, 1980, July & October 1981

3419 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10

In Britain's House of Commons, Michael Brown MP puts down a question for a Written Answer the next day; prompting a reaction at the Foreign and Commonwealth Office.

> *"Mr Michael Brown MP has tabled a Question for Written Answer on 29 January to ask whether there have been talks with the Argentines on leaseback. … The talks which Mr Ridley held with Comodoro Cavandoli in Geneva last September were secret. The fact that they even took place is known to very few people in Buenos Aires and London.*
>
> *When OD agreed in July 1980 that leaseback should be explored with the Argentines on a confidential basis, it was recognised that, if the talks ever became public knowledge, this would not only prejudice our hopes of making headway in the dispute, but also lay the Government open to severe criticism from public and Parliamentary opinion. It was agreed with the Argentines at Geneva that the talks "should never become public knowledge". So far as we know, there have been no leaks. Lord Trefgarne has already denied that there have been such talks …* [3420]
>
> *If we were now to reveal that leaseback had been discussed with the Argentines before Mr Ridley's visit to the Islands last November, the repercussions in Parliament and in the Islands would be very damaging. Suspicions of a "sell-out" would appear to be confirmed.... Ministers will not however wish to answer Mr Brown's direct question untruthfully … The draft reply therefore does no more than concede that the Argentines have shown interest in the substance of Mr Ridley's proposal following his visit to the Islands. While a pis aller, this is true so far as it goes. …"* [3421]

"(Ref) Mr. Fearn's submission of 28 January, … Mr Ridley considers that the aim in answering the question should be: (a) to be as open as possible to MPs, and not to appear devious; (b) to avoid arousing the suspicions of MPs and Islanders…; (c) to cause as little difficulty for Argentina as possible." [3422]

January 29th, at Downing Street, the Defence and Overseas Policy (OD) Committee meet; *"(Mr Ridley) said that the Islanders were* ***slowly coming to see that lease-back would be an essential element*** *in the negotiated settlement they required."* [3423]

"In January 1981 at a further meeting of that committee – the eighth collective discussion – was held to review the situation in the light of the islanders' reactions to the leaseback proposal and the comments in both Houses on the Statement of December 1980. The committee endorsed the noble Lord, Lord Carrington's, proposal that the aim should be to keep the negotiations going with a view to finding an acceptable basis for a negotiated settlement. They agreed to early talks for which Argentina was pressing, and at which the islanders were to be represented." [3424]

"On 29 January 1981 the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee, chaired by the Prime Minister, endorsed Lord Carrington's recommendation that the aim should be to keep the talks going and to let the Islanders come to see the need to explore a solution based on leaseback." [3425]

3420 OD is short for the Cabinet's Defence & Overseas Policy Committee

3421 *FCO7/3808 (f6)* at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, albeit misfiled under January, 1980. Original emphasis. A *pis aller* is a course of action followed as a last resort. The original *memo* also has the words "*To be destroyed when weeding 1980 file*" written on the top. A clear indication of FCO concern. For the original, see - https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/wp-content/uploads/2024/08/fearn-for-ridley-january-28-1981.pdf

3422 T*emple (Ridley's private secretary) to Fearn January 29, 1981 FCO 3808 f9*

3423 *CAB 148/197.* My emphasis. All evidence to the contrary.

3424 Baroness Young in *HL Deb 25 January 1983 vol.438 cc136-247*

3425 Ellerby 1990 p.260

In the House of Commons, a written Answer is provided to Michael Brown's question.

> *"Since May 1979 there has been one round of formal talks on the Falkland Islands dispute with the Argentine government. In addition in the frequent contacts which we have with the Argentine government over the whole range of Anglo-Argentine relations many possible approaches to the solution of the Falklands dispute have been mentioned informally."*

A note states; *"Mr Ridley considers this to be a true answer..."* [3426]

January 30th, from London, in reference to Michael Brown's question, Lord Carrington sends a message to the UK's Embassy in Buenos Aires for Ambassador Williams.

*"Grateful if you would inform Cavandoli immediately that Ministers cannot deny outright in the House that any discussions have been held and tell him we propose to answer thus: Begins. Quote there has been one round of **formal** talks on the Falkland islands dispute with the Argentine Government in April 1980. In addition. In the frequent contacts which we have with the Argentine Government over the whole range of Anglo-Argentine relations many possible approaches to the solution of the Falklands dispute have been mentioned **informally**. Unquote."* [3427]

February 23rd, in New York, at the UK Mission, representatives from Argentina and Britain meet for two days of talks. Adrian Monk and Stuart Wallace represent the Islanders. Britain's delegation reports back promptly.

> *"Comodoro Cavándoli ... could not understand or accept that Argentina's one requirement, sovereignty, should be ignored permanently. The British side had said that Islander wishes had to be taken into account; why could not Argentine wishes be taken into account? ... any progress had to include the question of sovereignty... The two sides could not go on endlessly meeting in New York. Time for Argentina had now run out; these meetings could not continue year after year simply expressing views ...*
>
> ***Mr. Ridley wanted to make it quite clear that the British Government had no doubt at all of the legality and strength of their title to the Islands.** He had always said to the Islanders that the legal position was not in doubt. It would indeed be possible to go on resting on that position for all time....*
>
> *Mr. Monk pointed out that one of the UN's basic principles was the right to self-determination. Why were the Argentines not prepared to accept the Islanders' rights to determine their own future? Sr. Ortiz de Rozas said that the relevant UN resolutions referred to the principle of territorial integrity. Argentina's had been harmed.Mr. Ridley said that the principle of self-determination was nevertheless overriding; ..."* [3428]

3426 *Ibid.*

3427 *Carrington telegram to UKE Buenos Aires* in *FCO7/3808 (f10).* My emphasis. Cavandoli agreed to follow the line laid out by Lord Carrington.

3428 *PREM 19/612*. My emphasis.



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ANGLO-ARGENTINE MINISTERIAL TALKS ON THE FALKLAND ISLANDS: NEW YORK, 23/24 FEBRUARY 1981

Present:

Mr Nicholas Ridley MP (Minister of State)
Mr Williams (HMA Buenos Aires)
Mr Ure (AUSS)
Mr Temple (PS/Mr Ridley)
Mr Bright (SAmD)
Mr Maclay (UKMIS New York)
Mr Penney (Research Department: Interpreter)

Mr Monk (Falkland Islands Councillor)
Mr Wallace (Falkland Islands Councillor)

Comodoro Cavandoli (Under-Secretary for Foreign Affairs)
Sr Ortiz de Rozas (Argentine Ambassador in London)
Comodoro Bloomer-Reeve (Chef de Cabinet)
Col Balcarce (Malvinas Department)
Sr Forester (Malvinas Department)
Sr Ricardes (Argentine UN Mission: Interpreter)

February 24th, on the second day of talks, Minister Cavándoli speaks directly to the Islanders' representatives.

> *"Comodoro Cavandoli … thought the Argentines understood perfectly what the needs of the Islanders were. In particular, he could understand their fears. But he thought that both parties could be confident that anything that was agreed between them would be observed. …*
>
> *Mr Wallace was grateful for the Argentine assurances but regretted that no details had been given as to how to put these sentiments into practical effect. He was also disappointed that the Comodoro should feel it necessary to talk even at this early stage about putting limits on any agreement. …*
>
> *Finally he wanted … it clearly understood that most Falklands' public opinion was opposed to any concessions on sovereignty to Argentina."* [3429]

"The leader of the Argentine delegation reaffirmed the Argentine rights of sovereignty over the Falkland islands... He went on to explain that the British proposal for a freeze on the sovereignty issue was unacceptable to the Argentine delegation, because it disregarded the request addressed to both parties by resolution 31/49 of the United Nations General Assembly to expedite negotiations with a view to resolving the dispute." [3430]

"At these talks, Mr Ridley played one last card. Asserting yet again that no agreement could be reached without the islanders' consent, he encouraged the Argentines to talk directly with the two members of the island's council with him in New York. ... One of the islanders, Mr Adrian Monk, said afterwards that they had been offered a guarantee of a "democratic form of government, a different legal system, different customs, a

3429 *PREM19/612 f8.* As regards UN resolutions and 'territorial integrity', see 2019 for the Chagos Advisory opinion from the ICJ

3430 *The Penguin News* March 5, 1981

different form of education. The only thing they wanted was sovereignty". As Mr Cavandoli said time and time again to Mr Ridley: "Just give me something to take back home". The islanders replied that they could offer nothing before the outcome of the islands council election in November (sic). Leaseback as such was never even discussed." [3431]

"He offered them 'most pampered region status' within Argentina; they could keep their laws, local government, language and customs, yet receive roads, school, television. Just let him have the one word: sovereignty." [3432]

"It was a dismal meeting and it was announced on 24 February that the Argentines had thrown out the freeze concept. That was no surprise. Of more interest was the desperate personal appeal by the leader of the Argentine delegation to the two Islanders. Recognising that they hobbled British policy, Wallace and Monk were told that Argentina would give them all the material comforts and special status that they wanted in exchange for some symbolic gesture over sovereignty. Any mealy-mouthed mumbo-jumbo would do so long as the Argentines could hold a piece of paper up to their people saying that the 1833 score had been settled. It was clear that leaseback would have been seized enthusiastically by the Argentines." [3433]

"The Argentine ambassador promised the Islanders all sorts of advantages if sovereignty was transferred, but Falkland Islands councillor Stuart Wallace impressed on the Argentines that the Islanders "were primarily concerned with the structure of their way of life; that came before any economic benefit". ..." [3434]

"On 23/24 February 1981 Islanders Adrian Monk and Stuart Wallace met Ridley and Cavandoli in New York. Ridley said the British government would do nothing that was unacceptable to the Islanders, pointing out that condominium had already been ruled out, Councillors had rejected leaseback which only left a sovereignty freeze, for which the Islanders had voted. Cavandoli rejected this as unacceptable to the UN or Argentina." [3435]

February 26th, from New York, a final *communique* is released. Following a last minute intervention by the Argentine Embassy, this is a dramatically shorter version than the one agreed by the delegates. Amended, all the final *communique* has to say is that the question will be examined in *"further negotiations."* [3436]

"With the failure of the talks in New York we are faced with the problem of deciding what to offer them (the British and the Argentines) next. The choice has been narrowed down, and of the Ridley proposals we are left with only one: leaseback. There is, however, one other choice that was not offered in Mr. Ridley's package. That is independence. More and more people are now beginning to give the idea some consideration and we have seen the subject brought up at recent Council meetings and even at the negotiations in New York. It is certainly not as ridiculous as many people like to think." [3437]

"The victor in the sterile talks had been Britain, since she had won time." [3438]

"Argentine Government hopes that recent New York talks have convinced Falkland Islanders and HMG that freeze in the status quo is unacceptable. The GOA would be willing to consider a lease-back arrangement.

3431 *Falkland Islands: Origins of the War* in *The Economist* June 19, 1982. Elections were held on October 1, 1981. See below.

3432 Jenkins & Hastings 1997

3433 Bound 2007

3434 Livingstone 2018 citing *Anglo-Argentine ministerial Talks on the Falkland Islands February 23/24 1981 PREM 19/612*

3435 Elgood 2025.

3436 See *PREM 19/612 Annex B (Original Joint Communique) and Annex C (Agreed Joint Communique).*

3437 Editorial in *The Penguin News no.12* March 5, 1981

3438 Editorial in *La Prensa* March 6, 1981 quoted in *ALW 040/325/2 Part B 76-150*

EmbOff called on Ricardo Forrester of the Foreign Ministry's Office of Antarctic and Malvinas Affairs. Although Argentines firmly maintain that the negotiations are bilateral between the UK and Argentina, Forrester did not indicate that GOA is miffed at the participation in the UK Delegation of the two Islanders, known as "Kelpers" (for the seaweed that grows along the Islands' shorelines). Noting that the Kelper lobby is strong in London, he implicitly acknowledged that Islander attitudes are an important factor in finding a solution. He said he hopes that a more realistic debate will now take place on the Islands. An Argentine Army Colonel who works on Malvinas matters told EmbOff that he was cautiously optimistic that negotiations would not get off dead center, although, he added, previous talks have gone through cycles of hope and disillusion in the past. Argentines, therefore, seem to approach a new phase in the discussion with circumspection." [3439]

February 27th, in Washington DC, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and US Secretary Haig meet.

> *"Carrington briefly outlined what he regards as the principal elements of the UK dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands.* ***Argentina will not agree to put its claims before the International Court because they are not valid****. Problem for Britain is similar to what they frequently encounter when they try to cast off a colony: The people who live on the Falkland Islands do not want to become Argentines. The British tactic is to keep the ball in the air as long as possible in order to avoid a showdown with Argentina. One idea the British are considering is to cede sovereignty of the Falkland Islands to Argentina on the understanding that Argentina would lease back the Islands to Britain for 99 years. The Falkland Islanders don't like this idea."* [3440]

February 28th, in New York, at the UN building, Islanders Adrian Monk and Stuart Wallace hold a press conference; attracting international attention. This raises some political issues within Argentina, as the negotiations have not been made public there.

March 6th, in Buenos Aires, Argentina's Foreign Ministry issues a communique referring to rumours regarding the status of negotiations with the UK; declaring that they reject any proposal that does not recognise Argentine sovereignty over the Islands as a first principle. [3441]

"Late on Friday 6 March the Foreign Ministry issued a statement making three points: (A) The Argentine claim for the restitution of sovereignty had not changed and any proposal which did not give priority to this Argentine right of restitution had been completely rejected. (B) the negotiations had intensified since April 1983. (C) The negotiations were being held within the framework established by resolutions of the United Nations and, on the basis of confidentiality as agreed with the British in 1977." [3442]

Argentine newspapers pick up the story; *"La Nacion ran an interesting article, in their edition of 6 March. Based on sources close to the Argentine delegation to the New York talks, the newspaper commented briefly on the leaseback idea stating that the persistence of this suggestion meant that it had taken on the nature of a British proposal … The editorial in La Prensa … discussed British motives in putting forward a freeze. The paper concluded that the proposal was a front … trying to obstruct and postpone indefinitely a final solution to the dispute."* [3443]

3439 *Telegram From the US Embassy in Argentina to the US Department of State March 30, 1981* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

3440 *Foreign Relations of the United States: 1981-1988 vol. xiii: Conflict in the South Atlantic 1981 – 1984* p.13. My emphasis.

3441 *Telegram From the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State March 30, 1981* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

3442 *UKE Buenos Aires to FCO March 10, 1981* in *ALW 040/325/2 Part B 76 - 150*

3443 Noted in *ALW 040/325/2 Part B 76 - 150*

March 7th, in the Falklands, an Argentine ship *Yehuin*, is ordered away from Weddell Island.

"The Captain of Yehuin said that he was sheltering from south-westerly gales and he was instructed by the Master of Endurance to leave the harbour as soon as weather permitted. Weddell Island Manager Bob Ferguson reported that the Argentine ship had left later that day." [3444]

March 8th, in Buenos Aires, at Velez Sarsfield sports ground, Argentine footballer Diego Maradona appears briefly on stage with the British rock band Queen. [3445]

March 10th, Britain's Foreign Office speak to the US Embassy in London.

"*On March 10, Ron Deare, Head of the Foreign Office's West Indian and Atlantic Department, reviewed the status of discussions with Argentina on the future of the Falkland Islands. The ministerial level talks in New York at the end of February produced a stalemate. Argentina still insisted on its sovereignty, and the Islanders were determined to remain British. Minister of State Nicholas Ridley had carried a mandate from London to support the Islanders. ... There was, however, a positive aspect. The inclusion of two Islanders on the British side of the table was a useful educational device. They were "shocked" to learn first hand of the depth of the Argentine feeling on the sovereignty issue. They went home in a sober mood. Through them, Deare opined, the Islanders may finally realize that the status quo cannot be maintained indefinitely."* [3446]

March 12th, from the US Embassy in London, a telegram is sent to the State Department in Washington DC.

> *"Summary: Although last month's talks in New York produced no progress toward a settlement of Britain's dispute with Argentina over the Falkland Islands, they may have served a useful purpose. Island negotiators may finally realize that the current arrangement cannot be maintained indefinitely. The Islanders are considering new proposals as a basis for further discussions with the Argentines. Another round of talks, however, is unlikely before the end of the year. While the search for a settlement continues, the status quo serves as a useful reminder to Britain of its continuing responsibilities in the Western Hemisphere. End summary."* [3447]

March 13th, in London, Lord Carrington tells the Prime Minister that there is little point in further talks while the Islanders remained hostile to the leaseback proposal.

> *"We can reach no conclusions now;... If in the end the Islanders decide that they would prefer the status quo to any deal involving cession of sovereignty, then we must prepare for the possibility of a deterioration of our relations with Argentina:..."* [3448]

March 17th, from Buenos Aires, the Argentine Government reject the proposals of the Papal arbitration panel regarding the Beagle Channel Islands as being, "*unsatisfactory*". [3449]

3444 *The Penguin News no.13* April 19, 1981

3445 Included only because, over the years, the photograph has somehow come to be seen as an endorsement of Argentina's claims to the Falklands. At the time, there was no mention of the Islands and no band member gave an opinion.

3446 *Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State March 12, 1981* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

3447 *Foreign Relations of the United States 1981-89 (Volume XIII) Conflict in the South Atlantic (2015) p14*

3448 *Carrington minute to MT March 13, 1981* in *PREM19/656 f39*

3449 Argentina was particularly annoyed about Chile's retention of territory in the Atlantic Ocean, which the Argentine government viewed as its sole preserve. See December 12, 1980, above.

March 18th, in London, HM Treasury requests an assessment of costs from the FCO in the event of Argentine non-co-operation in the Falkland Islands. [3450]

March 29th, in Buenos Aires, Lt.-General Roberto Eduardo Viola is sworn in as the 37th President of Argentina.

> *"At 10:15, Army Commander Leopoldo Galtieri draped the blue-and-white sash of the presidency over Viola's white-jacketed chest. Then he handed Viola the presidential scepter and shook his hand. With that, Viola became the second Army general to rule Argentina since the military took power in a 1976 coup. The general who led that coup, retiring president Jorge R. Videla, embraced Viola moments after the presidency was officially handed over. Like Videla, Viola was selected as president by the three-man military junta that officially is to share power with the president until the restoration of a "republican and representative democracy" some time in the future."* [3451]

Oscar Héctor Camilión is appointed Foreign Minister, with Enrique Jorge Ros as his deputy. [3452]

"The developments of the ever more difficult situation (in the Islands) were sent to the Argentine Ministry of Foreign Affairs and the Argentine Air Force, once a week and through diplomatic channels. A file summarized the approach actions as compared to the profits. Results were poor due to the fact that the beneficiaries themselves blocked the actions and no support could be expected from them unless they were offered some advantage. Given the state of things, from the Malvinas settlers' point of view, they had everything to lose. The conclusion awoke Foreign Minister Oscar Camilión's interest so much that he met with Gilobert and listened to his reasons. For the first time after Capozzolo's initiative, the idea of offering financial compensation as an incentive for the islanders to reconsider their rejection was entertained. Camilión was not excited about it but he had no objections." [3453]

March 30th, in London, at the Foreign Office, British National Oil Company (BNOC) executives meet officials.

"During a meeting at the FCO, a BNOC executive emphasised: "The Government should be careful not to give away what could be of great worth i.e. the prospects for oil finds in the Falklands Continental Shelf". The chairman of the company, Philip Shelbourne, added: "Above all BNOC did not want to wake up one day to find that someone else had picked up concessions in Falkland Islands waters without their having been given a chance to compete"." [3454]

From Buenos Aires, on the same day, the US Embassy telegrams Washington DC with their perspective on Anglo-Argentine negotiations.

> *"EmbOff called on Ricardo Forrester of the Foreign Ministry's Office of Antarctic and Malvinas Affairs. Although Argentines firmly maintain that the negotiations are bilateral between the UK and Argentina, Forrester did not indicate that GOA is miffed at the participation in the UK Delegation of the two Islanders, known as "Kelpers" (for the seaweed that grows along the Islands' shorelines). Noting that the Kelper lobby is strong in London, he implicitly acknowledged that Islander attitudes are an important factor in finding a solution. He said he hopes that a more realistic debate will now take place on the Islands.*

3450 *ALW 040/325/2 Part B 76 - 150*

3451 *The Washington Post*

3452 Previously Ambassador to Brazil, Camilión was not a member of the armed forces. Nor was Ros. The importance of the Foreign Ministry to the junta was therefore effectively downgraded.

3453 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023. The reference to Capazolla is a reference to the suggestion that an Argentine businesman purchase the Falkland Islands Company. See above.

3454 Livingstone 2018 citing *Record of Meeting with BNOC March 30, 1981 FCO 7/3984*

An Argentine Army Colonel who works on Malvinas matters told EmbOff that he was cautiously optimistic that negotiations would not get off dead center, although, he added, previous talks have gone through cycles of hope and disillusion in the past. Argentines, therefore, seem to approach a new phase in the discussion with circumspection. …

The Argentines are prepared to wait a while, but their patience is limited, according to Forrester. He acknowledged that Argentina would be willing to consider a lease-back arrangement, depending on the formulation. Economic decline of the Islands is of concern to all parties, although he noted that in addition to promising geological structures indicating that the area has petroleum potential, there are substantial fishing resources. These at present are exploited mostly by the Poles and Soviets. Argentina and the UK, according to Forrester, share the hope that the sovereignty issue can finally be resolved so that progress can be made on economic problems." [3455]

April 30th, in London, following an expression of interest by the oil company Shell to Argentina's invitation for oil exploration tenders, the UK takes out an advert in the *International Herald Tribune*. This restates Lord Carrington's announcement of December 15, 1980.

"No agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and Argentine Governments on the delimitation of the continental shelf as between the Falkland islands and Argentina. In the absence of an agreed boundary, neither party, in Her Majesty's Government's view, would be entitled to exercise continental shelf rights beyond the median line between the Falkland Islands and Argentina. We have protested to the Argentines about the YPF tender which does indeed go beyond the median line. Her Majesty's Government assume that oil companies will take the above into full account in considering whether to place tenders to drill for oil in the Magallanes Este block." [3456]

"Emphasising a need for action, a Foreign Office official wrote: 'We must maintain that any oil in the Falkland Islands continental shelf is British, without specifying whether we mean HMG or Falkland Islands have the right to exploit it. The important point is that it is ours not Argentine.' …" [3457]

May 5th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams telegrams the Foreign Office to urge a further round of talks, which he sees as necessary to keep diplomatic channels open.

"Not only the Argentines, but the majority of the UN membership including the USA and most of our western allies are openly sceptical about the legitimacy of our positions in the Falklands and have only really kept the dogs off us on the understanding that we have committed ourselves to significant negotiations of the issue. We had already stretched this understanding over some 14 years when the last Labour Government fell … No negotiations can be convincingly confined for long to one day-and-a-half session a year, particularly when it has been 16 years a-starting. We shall not, consequently, look reasonable in either Argentine or world eyes, if we are not even prepared to contemplate another round this year." [3458]

Argentine Admiral, Armando Lambruschini, speaks to an audience at the *Centro de Estudios Estratégicos de la Escuela Superior de Guerra* (Center for Strategic Studies of the Superior School of War). [3459]

3455 *Foreign Relations of the United States 1981-89 (Volume XIII) Conflict in the South Atlantic (2015) p16*
3456 Quoted in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10 See*. HL Deb 10.11.1981 vol.425 c170 Hansard*
3457 Livingstone 2018 citing *Smith to Williams December 4, 1981 FCO 7/3985*
3458 *ALW 040/325/2 Part B 76 - 150*
3459 Lambruschini was head of the Navy Chiefs of Staff. Jailed following the 1982 war, he was pardoned in 1990.

"... as a sovereign nation, we must place ourselves on the international stage in our rightful position and play our rightful role accordingly... the South Atlantic is a vital area for the Argentine Republic, it has political, economic and strategic rights that arise from its geography, its history, its future projection, all of which legitimize and impose an adequate national presence in the area.... an approach to the current situation in the strategic area of the South Atlantic cannot dispense with the historical imperative of the return of the Malvinas Islands to the national heritage, as these represent a key factor in our strategic conception." [3460]

In the UK, HMS *Endurance* returns; *"HMS Endurance, the Royal navy's ice patrol ship, and the British Antarctic Survey ship Bransfield, have recently returned to British ports after seven-month voyages throughout the Falkland Islands and Dependencies."* [3461]

May 18th, in London, Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Defence Keith Speed, is removed from his position for criticising the government's proposed defence cuts, and, in particular, the withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* from the South Atlantic.

"Speed had protested vehemently against the proposed cuts in the Royal Navy – and was sacked for his pains in May 1981." [3462]

"In May 1981, Navy Minister Keith Speed criticised the cuts and the Prime Minister asked him to resign. When he refused, she sacked him. ... The cuts included axing HMS Endurance, a £3 million economy supported by the Treasury. ... The MOD's decision to scrap Endurance and not to replace the Royal marines rundown barracks at Moody Brook outside Stanley suggested the British did not intend to stay." [3463]

May 28th, reported in Britain's *Financial Times:*

"(The) idea of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation has come to birth successfully, if a little furtively, this week in Buenos Aires, despite the fact that its parents are somewhat shy of acknowledging parenthood. Called together under the auspices of private institutions in Argentina and the US, strategic experts from Washington, South Africa, Argentina, Paraguay, Uruguay and Brazil are meeting in the Argentine capital to consider the next steps in a plan, long proposed, to link the armed forces of the US, South Africa and Latin America in an effort to counter a perceived Soviet threat in the South Atlantic. ...

A notable absentee from the reported meeting is Chile, which is in dispute with Argentina over the ownership of three islands in the Beagle Channel... The importance of the Falkland Islands within the sphere of activity of such a group cannot be understated. The Islands ... would be an ideal base for such a force. ... The strategic value of the Falkland Islands to a naval power has never been in doubt." [3464]

May 29th, in Argentina, General Galtieri, Commander in Chief of the Army, refers to the dispute in a speech.

"Neither are we prepared to allow those who are discussing with us the return of island territories that are Argentine by historical inheritance and legal right to interfere in the slightest way with the search for and exploitation of the wealth of our continental shelf...

3460 Quoted in Carbone 2008
3461 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10
3462 *The Postwar Legacy of Appeasement: British Foreign Policy since 1945* R. Gerald Hughes 2014
3463 Elgood 2025
3464 Quoted in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10

Nobody can or will be able to say that we have not been extremely calm and patient in our handling of international problems, which in no way stem from any appetite for territory on our part. However, after a century and a half they are becoming more and more unbearable."

In London, the Ministry of Defence is asked by the Foreign Office for a short assessment of the UK's ability to respond to military acts by Argentina in the South Atlantic in light of Defence Secretary John Nott's defence review. [3465]

"Admiral Leach sent the prime minister a forthright note in May 1981 regretting that she was too busy to see him ... "The [defence cuts programme] has been devised ad hoc in two months" he wrote. "It has neither been validated nor studied in depth. No alternative options have been considered."... His note was copied to the defence secretary, John Nott, ..." [3466]

"Before the 1982 crisis, the JIC (Joint Intelligence Committee) had placed the Falkland Islands in 'Priority 4', the lowest group of intelligence priorities, alongside Brunei and below Belize, Gibraltar or Hong Kong. ... In 1981, the MOD's Defence Intelligence Staff (DIS) tried to place the islands in Priority 2, without noticeable effect on what the DCDS(I) later described as a 'complacent' level of collection and analysis effort. These decisions were wrong, so too was GCHQ's belief that it would predict hostility in time to deter Argentine action." [3467]

June 1st, Argentina's new Foreign Minister, Oscar Camilión, is quoted in Britain's *Daily Express* newspaper:

"I can understand the Islanders ... and I can understand that this very peculiar isolation of the Islanders creates a very peculiar attitude to the world. We are the eighth largest country in the world and the islands are just a fragment of what we regard as our territory. They are outmoded – an anachronism, some people say." [3468]

June 2nd, Robin Fearn, head of the South American Department, lists the Foreign Office's objectives for a possible oil deal with Argentina.

"1. We get the maximum possible preferential treatment for British companies in the issue of licences... 2. British equipment is used as much as possible. 3. A share of the oil goes to the UK... 4. FIG obtain an appropriate share of the proceeds consistent with its developmental needs and its capacity for absorption... 5. The impact of oil related development on the Islanders traditional way of life should be kept to a minimum. 6.The Argentines should not benefit to any greater extent that we can help..." [3469]

June 5th, in London, Lord Carrington writes to Defence Secretary John Nott regarding the proposal to withdraw HMS *Endurance*.

"Finally, HMS Endurance, which plays a vital role in both political and defence terms in the Falkland Islands, their Dependencies and the British Antarctic Territory (BAT). Although we continue to seek a solution to the dispute with Argentina it cannot at present be said that a solution is in sight....

Unless and until the dispute is settled, it will be important to maintain our normal presence in the area at the current level." [3470]

3465 See June 25, 1981, below.
3466 *Thatcher warned of defence cuts danger before Falklands War* in *The Guardian* December 30, 2011
3467 John Ferris 2020 citing *memorandum by DCDS(I), 'Operation Corporate – the Intelligence Lessons, December 21, 1982 P/8210/7/1 Pt.1.*
3468 Quoted in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* June 1981 no.10
3469 Quoted in Livingstone 2018 citing *Fearn to P. Harding June 2, 1981 FCO 7/3984*
3470 *PREM19/416 f129*

"... any reduction would be interpreted by both the Islanders and Argentina as a reduction in Britain's commitment to the Islands and in its willingness to defend them." [3471]

"One aspect of the Navy response ... was its proposed reduction in the 'teeth' rather than the 'tail' of the naval programme. The Navy report cut the number of frigates to thirty, cancelled the carrier Ark Royal, and abandoned the Mine Counter Measures Vessel (MCMV) programme. In addition, the Antarctic Survey ship HNS Endurance and the royal yacht, HMS Britannia, both high-profile politically important vessels, were placed on the list of proposed cuts. ... The rationale for cutting Endurance and Britannia was that these ships had little military value and were thus less important to the Navy than they might be, for instance, to the Foreign Office. The Navy had proposed cutting Endurance previously, only to have the Foreign Office argue that the cut was unacceptable." [3472]

"Lord Peter Carrington, foreign secretary, wrote in a letter to Sir John Nott, the defence secretary, in June 1981 that "any reduction [of military force in the region] would be interpreted by both islanders and the Argentines as a reduction in commitment to the island and our willingness to defend them"..." [3473]

June 8th, in Buenos Aires, Foreign Office Assistant Under-Secretary John Ure arrives for two days of talks.

"In Argentina, I found the Ministers and officials with whom I spoke reasonably relaxed about the progress – or lack of progress – on the Falklands negotiations and well disposed towards the lease-back idea... while they themselves appreciated the constraints on our progress in the Falklands negotiations, their military masters were less patient and might require a more "forward" policy at any time." [3474]

June 9th, at Grytviken, South Georgia, the base commander reports that an Argentine *C130 Hercules* aircraft, with military markings, has flown over the facility.

"It would seem that despite our protests Argentina overflights of Falkland islands and Dependencies are increasing. Such incidents only harden the Islanders' resolve to stand firm against any proposal to have closer links with the Argentines." [3475]

John Ure arrives in Port Stanley.

"In the Falkland Islands, I found that Mr Adrian Monk (a member of both the Legislative and Executive Councils) had been campaigning vigorously and fairly successfully since his return from New York talks last February, against the concept of lease-back. He had been instrumental in turning Mr Stuart Wallace – his fellow Councillor – against the idea, and had aroused much emotional feeling on the Islands to this effect. Without any justification, he had accused both the Governor and the British Government of pressurising the islanders in favour of a lease-back. ... However, I formed the impression that opinion was not yet irrevocably hardened against the lease-back proposal and that many of the better informed and more progressive islanders recognised that an accommodation with Argentina was necessary to secure the continuance and development of their existing way of life. A number of people, ... told me privately that they thought it should not be beyond the capacity of the British Government to convince the majority of the elected representatives to the new Councils that they should authorise a realistic dialogue and negotiation with the Argentine Government designed to secure the best possible lease-back arrangements for the islands." [3476]

3471 Franks Committee 1983 para.114
3472 Boren 1992
3473 *Ministers were warned of Falklands threat* Michael Stothard in *Financial Times*, December 30, 2011
3474 *Ure to Ridley June 26, 1981* in *ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 - 225*
3475 *ALW 040/325/5*
3476 *Ure to Ridley June 26, 1981* in *ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 – 225*

June 10th, in London, Foreign Office and Defence Department officials meet to discuss retaining HMS *Endurance*; *"... following which Foreign and Commonwealth Office officials judged that there was no prospect of the decision being reversed..."* [3477]

In Argentina, a press release announces the "Day for the Affirmation of Argentine Rights over the Malvinas, Islands and Antarctic sector".

June 15th, in Paris, France, Minister Nicholas Ridley meets with Deputy Foreign Minister Enrique Ros. [3478]

"There had been two main purposes: to establish a personal relationship with Comodoro Cavandoli's successor, and to convince the Argentines of our determination to reach a settlement. Both sides confirmed their view that leaseback seemed to provide the best basis for a solution. Mr Ridley had made it plain to Sr Ros that, while we understood the difficulties faced by the Argentine Government, there could be no question of our acting other than in accordance with the Islanders' wishes. ... Sr Ros had been generally relaxed, but it was clear that they expected a further round of talks to take place after the Islands' elections in October. One point of particular interest was the emphasis placed by Sr Ros on the question of oil exploration in the South Atlantic. ...There was only one point which might have been interpreted as an Argentine threat: Sr Ros' comment on the widespread feeling in Argentina that all Argentine attempts to soften Islanders' hearts by providing essential services met only a negative response and that there might in consequence be no purpose in continuing negotiations." [3479]

"The informal talks broke no new ground but gave the British side (an) opportunity to assure the Argentines that Britain was serious about transferring sovereignty. The Argentines accepted that they needed to await the outcome of the Islands' election in September or October." [3480]

June 16th, in London, aware of Ure's visit to the South Atlantic, Britain's Department of Energy suggests that the Falkland Islands Continental Shelf should be excluded from any deal on leaseback with Argentina.

"... an official noting, 'Such a surrender of sovereignty must surely make more difficult ... an oil regime which secures HMG <u>control</u> over those rights (e.g. to petroleum exploration and production activities).' The Department recommended that, if the continental shelf were included in the leaseback, then Britain should have the 'exclusive' right to explore for oil within it and that there should be no joint administration with Argentina. ... while British oil companies had been a lobbying force for a sovereignty deal with Argentina in the 1970s, they had now become, if anything, a gentle brake on the process." [3481]

From the Falklands, John Ure departs for Chile.

"... I think we should explore urgently the possibility of developing communication links between the Islands and Chile or Uruguay. This would not be easy and indeed might not be possible. For instance, the Chilean officials and Naval officers with whom I talked ... were unanimous that, although the idea of providing logistical support to the Falklands was an attractive one to them, it would be too explosive in the context of their relations with Argentina to be contemplated ..." [3482]

3477 Franks Committee 1983 para.114

3478 There is no record of this meeting at the Margaret Thatcher Foundation, but it was mentioned at the June 30, 1981, review. See below.

3479 *ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 – 225*. Link below.

3480 Elgood 2025.

3481 Livingstone 2018 citing *H.M.L. Ross to Mary Dickson June 16, 1981 EG 14/93* and *Dickson to Fearn July 22, 1981 FCO 7/3985*. Original emphasis.

3482 *Ure to Ridley June 26, 1981* in *ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 - 225*

June 18th, in London, First Lord of the Admiralty Sir Henry Leach, has a meeting with PM Thatcher regarding defence cut proposals; "*The point he wished to emphasise was the most serious miscalculation which we would be making [if] we disregarded the deterrent effect of a major maritime capability in peacetime.*" [3483]

June 25th, in Britain's House of Commons, Defence Secretary John Nott presents the results of his defence review – *The United Kingdom Defence Programme: The Way Forward*. [3484]

> *"The Secretary of State for Defence (Mr. John Nott): With permission, Mr. Speaker, I should like to make a statement. The Government have reviewed the defence programme, and a full account of our conclusions is contained in a White Paper, which will be available shortly in the Vote Office.*
>
> *The Government intend to honour the NATO aim of 3 per cent. real growth in defence expenditure, and have, exceptionally, taken a firm decision now to plan to implement the increase until 1985–86, a full four years forward and two years beyond the published plans for public spending generally. This may mean that defence absorbs an even greater share of our gross domestic product, and, while it will be necessary to curb several of our forward plans and aspirations, the additional funding should enable us to enhance our front-line capability above its present level in very many areas. The House knows of our basic problems, which are not unique to Britain.*
>
> *We have a defence programme which is unbalanced and over-extended. Last year, we suffered from severe cash problems, and similar difficulties are already emerging in the current year. We cannot go on like this. We have no choice in the longer term but to move towards a better balance between the various components of our effort—front-line numbers, quantity and quality in equipment, and military and civilian support. We must determine this balance in terms of real defence capability rather than as the outcome of a debilitating argument over each Service's budgetary share. ..."* [3485]

"The 1981 review took place during a major shift of influence within the ministry away from the Service Departments and toward the central staffs. Previously the Chiefs of Staff had assessed Britain's strategic priorities, but in 1981 this was done by the central staffs. This informal shift in responsibility took place due to growing economic constraints which created pressure for deep cuts in the defence budget." [3486]

"So far as deterrence was concerned in those far off islands, I don't think I ever thought about it. I don't think it ever passed through my mind that we needed to deter an invasion of the Falklands. As for deterrence in the Falklands, I never ever thought about it. I didn't even know, frankly, where the Falklands were." [3487]

"In December 1982 President Bignone asked General Benjamin Rattenbach to investigate the defeat. 'Interservice Commission of Analysis and Evaluation of Political and Military Responsibilities in the war of the South Atlantic' states that Nott's defence review and Government statements in Parliamentary debates encouraged the Argentine decision to invade." [3488]

June 26th, in Stanley, aware of the proposal to withdraw HMS *Endurance* from the South Atlantic, the Falkland Islands Councils hold a joint meeting. Their conclusions are transmitted to Lord Carrington.

3483 *Thatcher warned of defence cuts danger before Falklands War* in *The Guardian* December 30, 2011
3484 For the Defence Review report see - https://archive.margaretthatcher.org/doc02/991284B4011C44C9AEB423DA04A7D54B.pdf
3485 *HC Deb 25 June 1981 vol 7 cc385-400.*
3486 Boren 1992
3487 Freedman 2002 p.18. Lacks the ring of truth, as Nott was a full member of the Cabinet and was present when the Falklands were discussed, as they were often during 1981. Nott had one job – to defend British territory.
3488 Elgood 2025

"The people of the Falkland Islands deplore in the strongest terms the decision to withdraw HMS Endurance from service. They express extreme concern that Britain appears to be abandoning its defence of British interests in the South Atlantic and Antarctic at a time when other powers are strengthening their position in these areas. They feel that such a withdrawal will further weaken British sovereignty in this area in the eyes not only of islanders but of the world. They urge that all possible endeavours be made to secure a reversal of this decision." [3489]

June 30th, in London, a review of policy takes place in Carleton Gardens in a meeting chaired by Secretary of State Nicholas Ridley. Falklands' Governor Rex Hunt is present, as is Ambassador Williams from Buenos Aires. Also Parliamentary Under Secretary Michael Palliser, Deputy Under Secretary Derek Day, Assistant Under Secretary John Ure, and Robin Fearn, Rowland Smith and G. Bright of the FCO's South America Desk. [3490]

Addressing the meeting, Governor Hunt makes it clear that the Islanders wish to have nothing whatsoever to do with Argentina, and that they do not believe that a leaseback settlement can provide the guarantees they want.

"The new Legislative Council was bound to be more difficult than the present one. Adrian Monk and Stuart Wallace were campaigning strongly on the platform that sovereignty was not for sale at any price. Most of the other candidates take the same line. … None of this meant that Councillors would be against further talks with the Argentines, but there was no support for talks on the cession of sovereignty." [3491]

Minister Ridley tells the meeting that with the other political parties opposed, there was little scope to do anything that did not have the support of the Islanders. Even if the Islanders could be persuaded, it appeared likely that the Labour Party would still vote against. The meeting concludes that the British Government should play for time; that the new Legislative Council, when elected, should be persuaded to allow negotiations to continue; that the Islanders should be educated as to the various pros and cons; and that contingency defence plans should be updated. [3492]

"We agreed that there was no alternative to the leaseback idea which stood any chance of solving the dispute. However, the prospects for negotiating a sovereignty solution with Islander agreement have receded in recent months. … partly because of the Islanders' ostrich-like mentality and partly because of active campaigning by some Island Councillors…" [3493]

"While on leave in Britain, (Rex Hunt) attended a meeting with Nicholas Ridley, the British Ambassador to Argentina and other senior officials, at which the prevalent view was that Islanders should still be pressed to make concessions to the Argentines. It was reported that Argentina was well disposed towards the leaseback idea and that they were 'reasonably relaxed' about the progress of negotiations. However, Argentine diplomats had said their military compatriots were less patient. Rex Hunt listened, amazed, as the diplomats disregarded all the evidence that must have been gathered by Ridley and subsequently by a senior Foreign Office official who visited Stanley to quietly confirm opinion. The tack was to change slightly. Rather than emphasising the supposed benefits of friendship with Argentina, Islanders should be educated about the dangers of hostility to change. It was suggested that Islander confidence could also be secured with offers of resettlement in the UK for those who could not accept leaseback, promises of more distribution of farming land

3489 *ALW 076/1 Part A 1 - 50*
3490 Much of the conversation would appear to have been reported back to the UKFIC. See Elgood 2025.
3491 Rex Hunt quoted in Elgood 2025.
3492 *ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 – 225*. The conclusion regarding an education campaign was over-ruled by Carrington.
3493 *ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 - 225*

and economic development initiatives. To his credit, Rex – who clearly risked confirming he had gone native – repeated the message that had been reiterated many times: Islanders were not going to buy any of this. "There was an air of unreality in the meeting, far removed from the realities of the situation in the Falklands", he wrote. Pouring cold water on the Foreign Office dogma might have had some impact. Rex recalled that by the end of the meeting it had simply been decided to play for time with Argentina, and persuade the new Falklands Council, when elected, to allow talks to continue." [3494]

"The ambassador (Williams) said: "If we allowed the leaseback initiative to die then we would be left with no way out of our dilemma", while Assistant Under Secretary John Ure, warned: "Time is running out". Ure argued that "the most important single factor in influencing the Islanders views was the public debate in the UK". Ridley was insistent that the Islanders should not be seen to be put under pressure, but agreed that a public relations campaign explaining leaseback should be launched." [3495]

On the same day, the House of Lords debates the question of the Falkland Islands.[3496]

At the end, Lord Trefgarne, speaking for the government, sums up the debate.

> *"I can confirm that HMS "Endurance" will be paid off in 1982 on her return to the United Kingdom, following her deployment in the South Atlantic and the Antarctic Region later this year. There are no plans to replace her. However, the Royal Marines garrison in the Falkland Islands will be maintained at its present strength, and from time to time Her Majesty's ships will be deployed in the area. ... we have every wish to continue the discussions with the Argentines in order to solve the sovereignty dispute. The decision does not, however, lie entirely in our hands: the Islanders have to decide for themselves which avenues they wish us to explore for them, in the knowledge that the situations has to change if the dispute is not to be allowed to stifle all hopes of development. The Islanders have to be the best judges of their own interests. We await their decision."* [3497]

"Next year the British Navy will give up vigilance over the Falklands and Antarctic Territories claimed by that country when the patrol ship Endurance goes." [3498]

"(Lord) Shackleton told the House of Lords that when the decision to withdraw Endurance was announced, he was phoned by an Argentine diplomat enquiring whether this signified that Britain really intended to withdraw from the Falkland Islands." [3499]

July 1st, in Argentina, a type 42 destroyer, *Santísima Trinidad*, is commissioned. [3500]

"Argentina rapidly modernized its armed forces in the 1970s, buying two submarines from the United States in 1974, four destroyers from Germany in 1978, and two more from the United Kingdom in 1977 and 1981 (sic). Considering the bulk of the Argentine navy at the time of the invasion was composed of one aircraft carrier,

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3494 Bound 2007

3495 Livingstone 2018 citing *Record of a Meeting held in 1 Carlton Gardens on 30 June 1981 FCO 7/3964*

3496 *HL Deb 30 June 1981 vol.422 cc166-87*. For the full record, see - https://hansard.parliament.uk/Lords/1981-06-30/debates/1c0a9643-ff36-494a-8897-a99f5206bc2f/TheFalklandIslandsSovereignty

3497 *HL Deb 30 June 1981 vol.422 cc185-187*

3498 Unnamed Argentine newspaper quoted in *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December, 1981, no.11. A number of protest letters were published in *The Times* and other British newspapers.

3499 Elgood 2025 citing *UKFIC82* note 84

3500 Constructed at the Rio Santiago shipyard under licence from the British Government. Keel laid on October 11, 1971. Launched November 1974. Construction delayed by financial difficulties. Damaged in May, 1982, supposedly by a limpet mine whilst at the Rio Grande naval base. Unconfirmed.

one cruiser, seven destroyers, and four submarines, it is reasonable to conclude that had Argentina not bought these ships, the prospects of a successful invasion would have been meagre." [3501]

July 9th, in London, the Cabinet are informed that intelligence threat assessments suggest that Argentina is more likely to pursue diplomatic and economic measures than any use of force. However, an attempt to establish a foothold on one of the Dependencies, or even on one of the more remote Falklands Islands, is considered a possibility. [3502]

"The last JIC Report prior to the invasion was submitted on 9 July 1981, dismissed by one reader as a rewrite of an earlier report with the names brought up to date. It argued that if negotiations broke down, the Argentines would bring pressure on Britain by incremental stages, but: ".. if Argentina concluded that there was no hope of a peaceful transfer of sovereignty, there would be a high risk of its resorting to more forcible measures against British interests, and that it might act swiftly and without warning. In such circumstances military action against British shipping or a full-scale invasion of the Falklands could not be discounted." [3503]

From Buenos Aires, the British Embassy report that several Argentine newspapers are carrying articles about the withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* from the South Atlantic – claiming that Britain is; *"abandoning the protection of the Falkland islands."* [3504]

July 20th, in London, Minister Ridley writes to Lord Carrington:

> *"If the Argentines conclude, possibly by early next year, that we are unable or unwilling to negotiate seriously, we must expect retaliatory action: in the first instance through the withdrawal of communications, fuel and other facilities, which the Argentines now provide: in the longer run through some form of military action."* [3505]

"Ridley wrote to Carington recommending that a PR campaign should be discussed at a meeting of the Defence and Overseas Policy (DOP) Committee. Officials drafted a paper for the committee, which said it was 'increasingly urgent' to find a solution, adding: 'Simply playing for time ... is not a viable option.' Three possibilities were outlined • to talk to Argentina without Islander concurrence. • to launch a PR campaign explaining leaseback; • or to break off negotiations and take contingency defence measures." [3506]

July 22nd, from Buenos Aires, the Government of Argentina (GOA) urges the British Government to *"accelerate the pace of negotiations over the Falkland Islands"*.

"The announcement revealed some details of a strong and detailed reiteration of the GOA's position contained in a note handed to the British Ambassador here. The timing and vigorous tone of the statement took the British here somewhat by surprise, but the substance was not new, according to a source at UK Embassy. FonMin Camilion said that the GOA acted now because the Falklanders will hold municipal elections in September... Key points of the GOA note are: (A) No significant progress has occurred since the recommencement of Falkland negotiations in 1977. (B) Better communications between the Islands and South

3501 Schenoni, Braniff & Battaglino 2020. I can find no record of the sale of a British destroyer to Argentina in 1981. This construction under licence may be the cause of the confusion.

3502 Franks Committee 1983 para.94

3503 Elgood 2025 citing *Falkland Islands Review (Franks Report)* January 1983 p.37. Prior to the submission of its report, the Joint Intelligence Committee had taken evidence from a number of experts. Royal Navy Captain Jonathan Tod, who was serving as head of the Cabinet Office assessment team for the Caribbean, Central and South America, warned the JIC that Argentina's increasing assertiveness regarding the Falkland Islands suggested a possible invasion. JIC Chairman Sir Patrick Wright did not give Tod's warning the weight it was subsequently proven to deserve.

3504 *Ibid.* para.116

3505 *FCO 7/3964.* Also *ALW 040/325/2 Part C 151 - 225*

3506 Livingstone 2018. See September 7 below

America have not produced the intended results of "improving mutual understanding" and "contributing to a successful negotiation". (C) The question of Island sovereignty is a subject for bilateral negotiation between GOA and HMG exclusively; Islander attitudes are not a factor. (D) There are only two alternatives: effective Argentine sovereignty over the Falklands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands or a continuation of the status quo, and the latter is not only intolerable to GOA and world community but also means a constant deterioration in the economy of the Islands. The note goes on to state the long-standing GOA position on sovereignty and willingness to respect the interests of the Falklanders. It adds that Argentina will continue to provide services to the Islanders (among other things, air transport, fuel and some foodstuffs) as long as there is "an evident British political will to advance constructively" in the negotiations. The GOA states that it is prepared to have the United Nations guarantee that the interests of the Islanders will be protected. … Finally, the communique indicates that "Argentina will consider practical arrangements that take into account the interests of those who could benefit from the development of the Islands' resources"." [3507]

July 27th, in Buenos Aires, Dr. Oscar Camilion writes to Ambassador Williams expressing his concern at the lack of progress in the decade following the communication agreements.

> "*… to postpone further a profound and serious discussion of the complex essential constituents of the negotiations – sovereignty and economic co-operation – in a simultaneous and global fashion with the express intention of achieving concrete results shortly. A resolute impetus must therefore be given to the negotiations. The next round of negotiations cannot be another mere exploratory exercise, but must mark the beginning of a decisive stage towards the definitive termination of the dispute.*"

That same day, in a press statement, the Argentine Government declares that negotiations to have become; "… *an unpostponable priority for its foreign policy … it is not possible to defer this question which affects territorial integrity and national dignity.*"

"Ominously, there was an understated reminder that the air and fuel services could be withdrawn if there was no progress. These veiled threats were precisely what many Islanders had feared since the Communications Agreement was signed in 1972." [3508]

July 28th, in London, in the House of Lords, during a debate on the proposed British Nationality legislation, an amendment to give the Falkland Islanders full British citizenship is withdrawn. [3509]

> *"Lord Trefgarne … It was argued that Gibraltar was thus a special case; now it is being argued that the Falkland Islands are another special case. Nearly all the dependencies believe that they have a special case to make for exceptional treatment in this Bill and they have represented their views to us. But if we are to have a distinctive citizenship for the United Kingdom, then we must have another citizenship for the dependencies, not an inferior or second-class citizenship but a parallel citizenship, and having created that citizenship all the people of the dependencies should be entitled to it.*
>
> *It would be invidious and discriminatory to make exceptions, especially if these were on grounds of race, as has been alleged. ….*
>
> *We are very conscious of the problems that the people of the Falkland Islands face, and we are concerned to help them with these, but we do not believe the grant of British citizenship to them, with all*

3507 *Telegram from the Embassy in Argentina to the Department of State July 30, 1981* in *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*

3508 Bound 2007

3509 *Hansard HL Deb 28 July 1981 vol.423 cc694-732*. Introduced by Baroness Vickers but, on the day, moved by Lord Mishcon. Full debate here - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1981/jul/28/british-nationality-bill-1

the anomalies that would cause elsewhere in the dependencies, can be justified. We believe that the pledges we have given to the Falkland Islanders are much to be preferred to measures which, however well intentioned, would have consequences which could go a long way to nullifying the objectives of this long overdue legislation. I am afraid the Government see very real difficulties with these amendments. I hope that, in the light of what I have been able to say and the pledges I have been able to repeat, the noble Baroness and her noble friends will not press them." [3510]

"When the Bill reached the House of Lords, an amendment was put down ... by Baroness Vickers with all-party support. This was later withdrawn as the debate took place. On July 28th, the night before the Royal Wedding and the House was not well attended." [3511]

In Buenos Aires, Argentine scrap metal dealer, Constantino Davidoff, applies to the Argentine Navy for permission to use one of its Antarctic transport ships to get to South Georgia. The stated purpose is to inspect the whaling stations in order to assess what needs to be done in fulfilment of his contract with 'Christian Salvesen'.

Argentina's government recognises an opportunity.

"177. Informed our Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Mr. Davidoff's activities, the Director of Antardida and Malvinas of said Portfolio of State, Ambassador Blanco, sent a memorandum dated 10-AUG-81 to the Undersecretary of Foreign Relations, by which he recommended the approval of the activities of the Argentine private company in the South Georgia Islands and advised the Navy to give it its support." [3512]

"Ministry officials, acting on the perceptions of the moment regarding the need to reaffirm an Argentinian presence on all South Atlantic islands, enthusiastically recommended Davidoff to the Transportation Bureau of the Navy (auxiliary ships). The legal presence of Davidoff's men would prevail long after the British Antarctic Survey left the place, ... In international forums this action would reassert Argentina's interests in the sub-Antarctic." [3513]

"... in August 1981 (Davidoff) applied to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and to the Argentine Navy for permission to use its Antarctic transport ships at a favourable rate. This would involve a place on the ship to get to the Islands and then subsequent logistic runs over the four-year span of the contract. It was quite standard for naval transports to be used in this way in the Sub-Antarctic. When they were approached by Davidoff the Argentine authorities were aware that the British Antarctic base at Grytviken could be removed in the near future, and that the decision had been made to withdraw Endurance from the South Atlantic. An Argentine presence for the next four years, with yearly runs by transports to the Islands, under a legal contract between a British and an Argentine company, offered a way of strengthening their position in the disputed territories while setting precedents for joint ventures in the South Atlantic. The Ministry of Foreign Affairs therefore recommended to the Navy that it agree to Davidoff's request." [3514]

"In August 1981 Constantino Davidoff, having failed to obtain any civilian means of transport, applied to the Argentine navy for permission to use Argentine naval ships to go to South Georgia to assess the potential to make a big profit from recovering scrap metal at the derelict whaling stations." [3515]

3510 *HL Deb 28 July 1981 vol.423 cc694-732.* Where the Falkland Islanders simply too white?
3511 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1981 no.11
3512 General Benjamin Rattenbach 1983
3513 *The Falklands/Malvinas War: A Model for North-South Crisis Prevention* Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse 1987 p.121.
3514 *Signals of War: The Falklands Conflicts* Lawrence Freedman & Virginia Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.40
3515 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 p.633

"... in 1976, the Argentine Navy (ARA) had established a scientific base on the South Sandwich Islands. This action only triggered a tepid reaction from Britain. In August 1981, in view of this alleged lack of interest, the Navy, in mutual agreement with the Argentine Foreign Affairs Department, planned a similar operation on the South Georgias, occupied by the British Antarctic Survey. In order to carry it out, a Task Group made up of ten scientists and military personnel was drafted, known as Grupo Alfa (Alpha Group)." [3516]

From France, the first of five Super Éntendard fighter aircraft, together with five anti-ship, sea-skimming *Exocet* missiles are transported to Argentina. [3517]

In **August**, in the UK, the Ministry of Defence Sales Department seek permission to promote the sale and supply of either HMS *Hermes* or an *Invincible* class aircraft carrier, with *Sea Harriers*, to Argentina. [3518]


Mr Wré
PS/Mr Ridley

ARGENTINA: DEFENCE SALES

ALA 087/2
RECEIVED IN REGISTRY NO. 18
-5 AUG 1981
DESK OFFICER | REGISTRY
INDEX | PA | Action Taken

Problem

1. MOD (Sales) are seeking authority to promote the sale and supply of either HMS Hermes or an Invincible Class aircraft carrier to the Argentines and for the supply of Sea Harriers, either separately or as part of a carrier/aircraft package, to Argentina.

Recommendation

2. I recommend that we reject this request. Defence Department concur.

September 4th, in Britain, the Ministry of Defence consider a Foreign Office request for an assessment of the implications of any Argentine military action against the Falkland Islands.

> *"Military measures to deter or counter Argentine military action against the Falkland Islands would require the despatch to the area of additional forces, primarily naval, and possibly on a substantial scale. Any such deployment would be costly and pose considerable logistical difficulties. To deter or repel even a small scale invasion would require a significant commitment of naval resources, at the expense of commitments elsewhere, for a period of uncertain duration. To deal with a full scale invasion would require naval and land forces with organic air support on a very substantial scale, and the logistical problems of such an operation would be formidable."* [3519]

"They, ... concluded that to deter a full-scale invasion, a large balanced force would be required, ... There was a danger that its dispatch could precipitate the very action it was intended to deter." [3520]

September 7th, in London, at a meeting with Sir Ian Gilmour MP,[3521] Lord Carrington decides to ask for a review of the possibility of taking the Falklands dispute to the ICJ. [3522]

September 11th, in Buenos Aires, Admiral Jorge Anaya is sworn in as Commander-in-Chief of the Argentine Navy. He almost immediately instructs his planning staff to consider the options for establishing a presence on South Georgia - *'Project Alpha.'* [3523]

3516 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023. See December 20, 1981, below.

3517 Part of an order for 14 of each, the last of the first five aircraft arrived in Argentina in November, 1981. The arms embargo imposed by the EU in April, 1982, then delayed completion of the order for both the aircraft and the missiles. After the war, France recommenced deliveries in November, 1982 and the order was finally completed by 1984.

3518 Request was rejected. What were they thinking?

3519 *ALW 040/325/10*

3520 Charlton 1989 p.141

3521 Lord Carrington's spokesman in the House of Commons

3522 Livingstone 2018 citing *Fearn to Williams September 23, 1981 FCO 7/3965*. Also *ALW 040/325/1 Part B 26.* Noted in the Franks Report, there is no official record of the meeting between Carrington and Gilmour. However, see October 14, 1981, below.

3523 *Painful Choices: A Theory of Foreign Policy Change* David A. Welch 2005 p.78

"... there was ... a scheme to take advantage of the Davidoff venture to establish a base covertly. ... This was to replicate the successful venture in 1976 when, in one of the first Junta's earliest acts a presence had been established on South Thule in the South Sandwich Islands. ... The precedent was enticing. ... The plan was to infiltrate Davidoff's workforce with military 'scientists' who would then be part of the 'legal' landing party on South Georgia. They would later be joined by a group of marines ... and establish a more permanent military base of some fourteen men from April onwards." [3524]

"The Argentine Navy saw Davidoff's contract as an opportunity to assert Argentine sovereignty over South Georgia and, in September 1981, began planning 'Project Alpha' to infiltrate Argentine marines into Davidoff's team of workers and establish a permanent presence on the island." [3525]

"Anaya, ... was considered an officer who was not very flexible and had little judgment for difficult issues. It was known that one of his obsessions was the question of the Malvinas Islands," [3526]

Davidoff is informed that he can use a Naval ice-breaker, the *Almirante Irizar*, from the Antarctic Squadron to get to South Georgia. [3527]

From Buenos Aires, Britain's *defence attache* supports an Argentine request to purchase 12 *Vulcan* bombers from the UK. He confirms that the aircraft would not be appropriate for use against the Falkland Islands. [3528]

In the UK, Argentina's *naval attach*, Rear-Admiral Walter Alara, is invited aboard HMS *Invincible,* to watch a *Sea Harrier* display.

September 14th, Lord Carrington *minutes* the Prime Minister with an update regarding the Falkland Islands.

> *"... the Argentines are showing renewed impatience for an accelerated rate of progress. They have sent us a Note and circulated a communique at the United Nations deploring the hitherto slow speed of negotiations and the lack of results and making clear that, if progress is not made soon, they may have to look to other means of achieving their purpose.*
>
> *I remain convinced that a leaseback, ... provides the most likely, and perhaps the only, basis for an agreed solution to the dispute. ...*
>
> *Unless and until the Islanders modify their views, there is little we can do beyond trying to keep some sort of negotiation with Argentina going (and even for this we cannot take Islander concurrence for granted). ... when I see him in New York, the Foreign Minister will undoubtedly ask for early British pressure on the new Councillors to bring them to the negotiating table. I propose to tell him that we want to end the dispute: but that we can act only in accordance with the wishes of the Islanders. ...*
>
> *The Argentines will not like this. ... Furthermore, we cannot discount the risk that we might ultimately become involved in a military confrontation with Argentina."* [3529]

Britain's Ministry of Defence announces that HMS *Endurance* will be withdrawn before the end of March, 1982.

"Her withdrawal is taken to be an indication that Britain will be less committed in the future to the Falkland Islands and the South Atlantic. Islanders are also convinced that the British Government is not taking account

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3524 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990
3525 *Remember the Falklands? Missed Lessons of a Misunderstood War* David A. Welch 1997
3526 *1982: Los documentos secretos de la guerra Malvinas/Falklands y el derrumbe del pro* J. B. Yofre 2011
3527 See November, 1981 below.
3528 *The Daily Express* September 6, 2015. In fact these long-range aircraft could have been easily adapted to take a conventional bomb load. The purchase was cancelled in early 1982.
3529 *ALW 040/325/2 Part D 226.*

of the massive economic potential of the waters surrounding the Falkland Islands, where there are vast fish stocks and known hydrocarbon resources." [3530]

An intelligence report quotes Argentine diplomatic correspondence as believing that; *"... the withdrawal of HMS Endurance had been construed ... as a deliberate political gesture."* [3531]

September 22nd, in New York, Argentina's Foreign Minister addresses the UN General Assembly.

> *"It is a strange paradox that our country, which was in the vanguard of the struggle for national independence, should still suffer from a breach of its territorial integrity, and anachronistic persistence of colonialism. The Malvinas Islands have not been restored to Argentina in spite of the long time elapsed since this General Assembly adopted Resolution 2065 (XX) in 1965.*
>
> *The Malvinas are still a colony to this day, with a formal status of one, basically exploited by a company built on the pattern of those of the times of the mercantilist States. Perhaps a unique case in the times of demographic explosion, the Malvinas at present have a smaller population than that which inhabited them at the time of the above mentioned revolution. Large food and energy resources are awaiting their exploitation, which is not possible as long as the present illegal occupation continues.*
>
> *This situation is still less understandable when the Islanders have had every practical means to understand that their association with Argentina is a source of benefits that are otherwise unobtainable. Obviously, Mr President, the Malvinas cannot remain a colony, nor can Argentina passively accept that part of its territory be one of the last colonies.*
>
> *I would also like to inform this Assembly that Argentina has addressed the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland to propose a decisive impetus to the negotiations regarding sovereignty over the Malvinas, South Sandwich and South Georgia Islands. The Argentine Republic hopes to be able to report in due course to the General Assembly that this series of negotiations concerning the Malvinas, South Sandwich and South Georgia Islands, which we hope will begin soon, was the last one."* [3532]

September 23rd, at the UN, Lord Carrington informs Dr. Camilion that the British Government cannot coerce the Islanders and that, therefore, it would be preferable if Argentina put forward proposals when talks resumed. Camilion responds that the key question remains that of sovereignty, which can only be negotiated between the UK and Argentina; and that the Islanders cannot be allowed a veto. [3533]

> *"For the British, the Falklands are item 242 in the order of priorities in foreign policy."* [3534]

"*HMG's Ambassador here (Buenos Aires), Anthony Williams, told me that Lord Carrington made clear to Camilion in New York that the question is not one of respecting the "interests" of the Islanders, but rather of respecting their "desires". Williams says that the current elections in the Islands seem to be producing an even harder line there. The general sentiment in his understanding is against any more talks whatsoever with the Argentines. Williams nevertheless expects a new negotiating session, if not before the end of the year, in the*

3530 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1981 no.11

3531 *Falkland Islands Review (Franks Report)* January 1983

3532 *UK MIS (Parsons) to FCO September 22, 1981* in *ALW 040/522/1.* UN resolution 2065 (XX) called for negotiations. It did not demand a hand-over to Argentina. *cf.* 1965

3533 *ALW 040/522/1 Telegram No. 909*

3534 Camilion quoted in *Falklands: The Secret Plot* Oscar Cardoso, Ricardo Kirschbaum & Eduardo van der Kooy 1983. This appears to have been 'borrowed' from a statement by Carrington referring to his appointment as Foreign Secretary.

early months of 1982. But he looks for nothing positive by way of results. In his view HMG has about exhausted its ingenuity, particularly with the idea of ceding sovereignty and then leasing back the Islands. The Argentines, on the other hand, seem unwilling or unable to go beyond saying "the Malvinas are ours."…" [3535]

September 24th, in the Argentine press, Dr. Camilion is quoted as saying that; *"Lord Carrington advanced to the point of saying that the present status quo is difficult to sustain today."* Camilion is also reported as dismissing the forthcoming Island elections as of no importance to Argentina. [3536] When questioned about this by the British press, Lord Carrington responds that the Argentine Minister; *"… can have been left in no doubt about our commitments to respect the wishes of the Islanders."*

September 30th, in London, Minister Nicholas Ridley is transferred to the Treasury. Richard Luce MP is promoted to Minister of State for Foreign Affairs; *"… arguably a less reckless political adventurer."* [3537]

"The unfortunate Luce, a long-time supporter of the Islanders, studied the situation with his officials and "felt very boxed in". [3538]

In Stanley, an editorial in the *Falkland Islands Times* asks:

> *"How can a military dictatorship – and one that shows many similarities to Nazi Germany in the 1930s – guarantee or underwrite our freedom, our laws and customs etc., when they cannot provide even basic human rights for their own people?"*

October 1st, in the Falkland Islands, elections are held for positions on the Legislative Council. Elected, following a brief campaign, are Anthony Thomas Blake (Camp), Ronald Eric Binnie (East Falkland), William Henry Goss (East Stanley), Terence John Peck (Stanley), Lionel Geoffrey Blake (West Falkland) and John Edward Cheek (West Stanley).

"Two representatives regarded as moderates, including Mr Stuart Wallace who had been at the New York talks, lost their seats and two hardliners were voted in instead. None of (this) was lost on the Argentines." [3539]

"The conflict with Argentina had lit the flame of patriotism in the islands. The campaign for the November (sic) 1981 elections to the Legislative Council was so anti-Argentina that it angered Argentines in the islands and on the mainland." [3540]

October 2nd, from Buenos Aires, Britain's Ambassador Williams expresses his opinion that there is now a clear risk that Argentina will conclude that talking is a waste of time. He believes it better to speak frankly, and face the consequences. [3541]

October 4th, in Buenos Aires, following his return from the USA, Oscar Camilion, is interviewed.

"The Minister replied to a question on the attitude of the inhabitants of the Islands with the statement that Argentina is committed to respect their interests but will not consult them. In his view, the Islanders have no right to veto in a negotiation that is between the UK and Argentina. According to the press, the Minister became irritated and refused to answer when questioned as to what specific steps the GOA (Gov of Argentina) might take to resolve the issue." [3542]

3535 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810469–0965*
3536 *PREM 19/656 Telegram No. 259 of 24 September*
3537 *Falkland Islands: Origins of the War* in *The Economist* June 19, 1982
3538 Elgood 2025
3539 *Falkland Islands: Origins of the War* in *The Economist* June 19, 1982
3540 Carassai 2022
3541 *Williams to Fearn October 2, 1981* in *ALW 040/325/2 Part D 226*
3542 *Department of State, Central Foreign Policy File, D810469–0965*

October 7th, in London, in the House of Lords, a *British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Amendment Bill* is laid before the House by Baroness Vickers. [3543]

> *"Today's debate, therefore, provides our first opportunity to debate the matter thoroughly. We do so on the basis of my noble friend's Bill, which seeks to ensure that all the Falkland Islanders become British citizens. As things stand, about three-quarters of all Falkland Islanders will become British citizens when the British Nationality Act 1981 comes into force on 1st January next year. That will be the case whether my noble friend's Bill becomes law or not. But the remainder, about 400 people in all, may not do so because their ties are mainly with the Falkland Islands, while their connections with the United Kingdom are more distant. Those 400 would therefore hold the important parallel citizenship which is called British Dependent Territories citizenship."* [3544]

"On October 7th, Baroness Vickers reintroduced the amendment. After a debate which lasted over an hour the vote was 90 'contents' and 90 'non-contents', an almost unprecedented occurrence in the House of Lords. Understanding orders, a casting vote from the Chair disagreed the amendment." [3545]

"The Act adversely affected about a third of the population because elderly Islanders usually handed their farms to their Falklands-born children and retired to Britain, a home from home. On 7 October an amendment to the nationality Bill preserving full British citizenship for Falkland Islanders was moved in the House of Lords which the Government opposed. The vote was a tie, 90 content and 90 non-content. Lord Alport presiding, by tradition cast his vote against and the amendment was defeated." [3546]

October 8th, from London, Lord Carrington telegrams Governor Hunt in the Falkland Islands.

> *"... our aim remains to solve the dispute by negotiation. But we recognise the hardening of opinion in the Islands against substantive sovereignty negotiations: and, given the likely positions of the new Councillors, we cannot realistically expect to make quick and easy conversions. Our minimum objective however must be to obtain Councillor's early agreement to a further round of talks in order to listen to what the Argentines have to say and to avoid the consequences of a breakdown in the dialogue. ... Councillors should be clear that we have no doubt about our sovereignty, but they should also be reminded of the advantages which a settlement would bring in terms of expanding the economy and exploiting natural resources. ... There have been no overt threats yet, but implicit in all the Argentine pressure on us has been the thought that they have the means to make Islanders' lives difficult. ... There is, also, ultimately, the risk of military confrontation."* [3547]

October 9th, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams writes to the FCO.

"For ourselves, the risk is mainly ... that we perpetuate the myth that consenting to "have talks" is a conciliatory gesture on our part in itself – and can be maintained without putting in anything to talk about which is of interest to our interlocutors. ... I feel I must write it firmly into the record that "talks for the sake of talking" is something the Argentines concede to us and not vice cersa; and I am dubious about their being ready to concede it any longer." [3548]

3543 In the House of Lords, the *Nationality Bill* had its Second Reading on July 7, 1982 followed by a Committee Stage July 21-22, 1982 and October 7, 1981. The Lords Third Reading was on October 13, 1981, after which the *Bill* returned to the Commons.

3544 *HL Deb 29 November 1982 vol 436 cc1076-106*. Lord Elton opening the debate. See - https://api.parliament.uk/historic-hansard/lords/1982/nov/29/british-nationality-falkland-islands

3545 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1981 no.11

3546 Elgood 2025

3547 *PREM19/656 f21*

3548 Quoted in Elgood 2025 citing *Williams to Fearn October 9, 1981* in *ALW 040/325/2 part,D 226*

October 13th, from Portsmouth, HMS *Endurance* (Capt. Barker) sails for the Falkland Islands.

> *"... the decision to pay her off next year was not an easy one to take. But the Government has to see to it that the resources allocated to defence are spent to the very best effect. ... the relatively limited contribution made by HMS Endurance to our defence capability does not justify the continued expense of running her. I regret this as much as you do. ... I cannot accept your view that paying her off will be tantamount to surrendering any stake we may have in Antarctica's resources. ... the decision to pay off Endurance was a collective Government decision. ... I would ask you to believe that this does not foreshadow any loss of interest on the Government's part in the Falkland Islands, their dependencies or our important stake in Antarctica."* [3549]

October 14th, in London, having reviewed a possible submission to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) regarding the Falkland Islands, the Foreign Office reports.

> *"... 2. The **attached paper**, prepared for the last round of negotiations with the Argentines, sets out our view of the legal position on the Falkland Islands and Dependencies. [REDACTED].* [3550]
>
> *3. The question of British sovereignty in the area has not been submitted to the ICJ or to any other international tribunal. In 1947 and subsequently HMG offered to submit the dispute over Argentine claims in the Dependencies to the ICJ; and in 1955 HMG applied unilaterally to the Court against encroachments on British sovereignty in the Dependencies by Argentina and Chile. However, the matter could not be pursued since both Argentina and Chile declined to submit to the Court's jurisdiction in the matter.* [3551]
>
> *4. In 1966 the question arose as to whether in the course of negotiations with the Argentines, the UK should offer to refer the dispute over the Falkland Islands to the ICJ. The Law Officers were asked to advise whether the strength in law of the British case for sovereignty over the Falkland Islands and Dependencies was sufficient to justify such a reference. [REDACTED]...* [3552]
>
> *5. The question was not, however, pursued further. This was partly because reference to the Court would have had no attraction for Argentina (as Argentina does not accept the compulsory jurisdiction of the ICJ, any reference to the Court could only be made with the agreement of the Argentine Government.), [REDACTED]...*
>
> *6. [REDACTED] If for political reasons it seemed advisable to offer international adjudication or arbitration to the Argentines again as a method of resolving the dispute, the Law Officers would first need to be consulted. Legal Advisers also consider that reference to an ad hoc arbitration tribunal might be preferable to reference to the ICJ since the composition of the former would have to be agreed between us and the Argentines. But given the Argentines repudiation of the award made by an arbitration tribunal in the Beagle Channel case, despite their prior agreement to accept its findings, no reference to international arbitration is likely to help solve the dispute. The Argentines would be*

3549 *Thatcher to Lord Buxton October 13, 1982. Thatcher MSS (Churchill Archive Centre): THCR 3/2/71 f31*. Thatcher was responding to a letter from Lord Buxton of September, 1981.

3550 There is no attachment now with this file.

3551 See 1947 & 1955.

3552 The first round of negotiations with Argentina commenced in July, 1966. The legal advice which predates that (exact date in 1966 unknown) remains embargoed. What is known, however, is that the 1966 opinion generally approved of the legal advice provided in 1947; which was favourable to the UK. This 1981 letter confirms that the 1966 legal opinion dealt specifically with an approach to the ICJ and the possible outcome. *cf.* 1947, June, 1966 & March 24, 1969.

unlikely to accept a ruling that the Islands were British and it would be politically very difficult for the UK to hand them over to Argentina, if the ruling went the other way. If arbitration went in our favour we might gain some advantage at the UN, but this would be only temporary as the great majority of UN member-states will continue to see the dispute as a colonial problem." [3553]

"Thank you for your secret and personal letter FST.462/47/09 of 24th June (1966) regarding the Anglo-Argentine talks on the subject of the Falkland Islands. I note that the memorandum summarising the opinions of the Law Officers is for my personal information only." [3554]

From Buenos Aires, on the same day, from Buenos Aires, Ambassador Williams reports on a conversation with Dr. Camilión; *"For serious and constructive negotiations it was necessary to tackle all the component parts of what was a complex issue."* [3555]

"I was trying to convey first of all that it was necessary to start meaningful negotiations, and it was necessary to find a new approach. In those days I was toying with something like a Hong Kong style approach ..." [3556]

October 25th, in the UK, a documentary is aired on London Weekend Television television – *More British than the British* – concerning the political issues facing Falkland Islanders.

October 29th, from Buenos Aires, the British Embassy requests information from the FCO as regards the legal status of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. [3557]

In London, in the House of Commons, the *Nationality Bill* returns for considerations of any Lords amendments. Michael Shersby MP attempts to lay an amendment to the *Bill*. [3558]

"The Bill went back to the Commons towards the close of the Parliamentary session and Mr Shersby put an amendment to give (Falkland) Islanders the same status as the Gibraltarians who had won their amendment in the House of Lords... However, the Falkland Islands amendment was not called during the proceedings and when Mr Shersby tried to raise it, he was ruled out of order." [3559]

October 30th, in Britain, the *British Nationality Act* receives Royal Assent; to take effect on January 1st, 1983.[3560]

"The British Government, by successfully blocking every attempt to modify the Nationality Bill in favour of Falkland Islanders who do not have grandparents born in the United Kingdom, has forced some 300 or so to accept second class citizenship. This gives them no right of abode and employment in the United Kingdom" [3561]

3553 *ALW 040/325/1 Part B 26.*
3554 *Haskard to Bennet July 31, 1966* in *CO 1024/585*
3555 Charlton 1989 p.106
3556 Oscar Camilion interviewed in Charlton 1989 p.107
3557 Referred to in *FCO to UKE Buenos Aires November 26, 1981* in *ALW 040/325/5.* See below. This appears to have arisen as a result of an editorial in the *La Nacion* newspaper, which discusses a suggestion that if Argentina gained the Falkland islands, then the UK would automatically lose all rights to the Dependencies and the British Antarctic Sector.
3558 Shersby was a member of the UKFIC lobby group.
3559 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1981 no.11
3560 Section 14 was the relevant part of this legislation for the Dependent Territories. For those with a strong constitution, and a lawyer's eye, it can be viewed here - https://www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/1981/61/section/14#:~:text=14 Meaning of British citizen (by descent).&text=(b)in service under a,a member of the Communities.&text=(b)service of any description,under section 2(3). The Falkland Islanders would be removed from the provisions of this enactment by the British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act 1983. See March, 1983.
3561 *Falkland Islands Newsletter* December 1981 no.11

"... Margaret Thatcher stripped them – and all other overseas territories – of (full UK citizenship) in 1981 in order to stop the people of Hong Kong moving to Britain before the handover to China." [3562]

"Its main purpose was to prevent millions of Hong Kong citizens from coming to Britain before and after the return of the territory to China in 1997, but some 600-700 native born Falkland Islanders who were not "patrial", i.e. who did not have at least one British parent or grand parent (precisely those who had lived longest in the islands), also lost their full British citizenship including their right of abode in Britain. ... The Act was seen both in the Falklands and in Argentina as a step on the road towards the abrogation of all responsibility for the islanders by Britain." [3563]

November 9th, in Buenos Aires, President Viola, is rushed to hospital with excessively high blood pressure.

November 10th, in Britain's House of Lords, the proposed withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* is again opposed.

> *"... Argentina continues to press her claims to the Falkland Islands. The recent argument put forward is that they form part of the Argentinian continental shelf.... Against the general background of uncertainty in the region it seems improvident of the Ministry of Defence – one presumes with the tacit acceptance of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office – to withdraw the Royal Naval Ice Patrol Ship HMS "Endurance" from Antarctica in 1982 as part of the wider decision to reduce the size of the active fleet. ...*
>
> *Could this decision not be interpreted by all other involved nations as a sign of declining interest in the Antarctic by Great Britain? Obviously there can be no such intention. But the best and most obvious way to prove it, in my view, is to reverse the decision to scrap HMS Endurance."* [3564]

In Argentina, on the same day, Army General Leopoldo Fortunato Galtieri returns following a successful trip to the USA.

"Galtieri was warmly received on his 1981 visit to Washington and returned convinced the US would turn a blind eye to the invasion." [3565]

November 16th, in Buenos Aires, US envoy, Vernon Walters, arrives for discussions with General Galtieri.

"Walters was in Buenos Aires, intermittently, for many days, between October 1981 and February 1982. He discussed, inter alia, the establishment of a South Atlantic Treaty Organisation. He also discussed the advantages for such an organisation of an island-base in the Falklands, somewhat along the lines of Diego Garcia. However, the understanding was that the agreement on Hemispheric and other grounds should be between the United States and Argentina, the bulwark of American policy in the South Atlantic, and not between the US and Britain. Asked by the Argentine Military what Britain would do, the American replied to the effect that the British would huff, puff and protest, and do nothing, with the implication that the Americans could soothe ruffled British feathers." [3566]

3562 *Banished Islanders are Citizens Again* Anthony Browne in *The Guardian* May 12, 2002. This appears to be a likely assessment. In the early 1980s, Hong Kong had a populations of some 5 million people and the territory's return to Chinese sovereignty was scheduled for 1997 under the Sino-British Joint Declaration.

3563 Pascoe 2022 vol.3 pp.629-630.

3564 Lord Murton in *HL Deb 10.11.1981 vol.425* Hansard

3565 Galtieri obituary in *The Guardian*, January 13, 2003. Galtieri had held meetings with a number of American diplomats including Vice-President George Bush, but there is nothing to suggest that the Falklands were ever discussed. Galtieri's ego, however, had certainly been massaged by effusive comments to the press; Galtieri being described as "*majestic*".

3566 *One Man's Falklands* Tam Dalyell 1982 pp.133-4

"When asked whether the United States would remain neutral in the event of a conflict, Walters intimated that neutrality would be contingent upon the absence of any British casualties from Argentine military action." [3567]

"... Galtieri unjustifiably trusted that the United States would appreciate the role played by the Argentine army in the armed repression of Honduras and the fight against Sandinismo in Nicaragua – in the so-called "Plan Charlie". This Argentine role in Central America – carried out at the instigation of the United States – together with Galtieri's radical anti-communist discourse, made him believe, in Cold War logic, that US support for his cause would be unconditional. ... It should not be forgotten that the close alliance between the United States and England was a long-standing reality, especially during the history of the 20th century. Therefore, to suppose that the North American country would support Argentina to the detriment of England was one of the great strategic errors of the Military Junta." [3568]

"(Tam) Dalyell's evidence to Franks makes the crucial point: "my American sources insist that the 'British Government' – maybe, not the prime Minister herself – knew as long ago as the end of 1981, about the idea of an American-Argentinian Falkland Base, and that for political hemispheric OAS reasons, any notion of an Anglo-American Falklands base was a non-starter"." [3569]

At the Navy Mechanics School (ESMA) in Buenos Aires, meetings are held for senior military officers to consider Argentina's role in the South Atlantic. [3570]

"Between November 16 and December 4, a series of conferences was held at the Navy Mechanics School (ESMA), the contents of which were not published in the media. ... These were titled 'Argentine Objectives in the South Atlantic' and (in attendance) you could see the most qualified of the Argentine leadership ... They talked about Patagonian development, oil exploitation and fishing resources; the relevance of the merchant fleet, the South Atlantic and its geopolitical projection ..." [3571]

November 25th, at the UN, the General Assembly defer consideration of the Falklands' question until 1982.

In London, on the same day, a petition signed by 1100 Falkland Islanders is delivered to 10, Downing Street, requesting that the rights of citizenship removed by the *Nationality Act* be restored.

November 26th, from Britain's Foreign Office, responding to the British Embassy in Buenos Aires' request for information, a review of sovereignty over the Falklands Dependencies and British Antarctic Territory is supplied.

> *"The basis of British sovereignty over these territories was conveniently summarised in the application made to the International Court of Justice in May 1955 by HMG. ... (i) the claim to sovereignty over the Falkland Islands Dependencies was separate from and independent of the British title to the Falkland Islands themselves. ... the title to sovereignty was based on discovery accompanied by a formal claim in the name of the British Crown and occupation of the various parts of the Falkland Islands Dependencies. ...*
>
> *Argentina's claims were made at different dates. It was only in 1925 that she first claimed the South Orkneys and in 1937 that the claim was extended to cover the South Shetlands and Graham Land (formally defined in 1946). ...*

3567 *The Reagan Revolution II: Rebuilding the Western Alliance* R. C. Thornton 2004

3568 *Guerra Fría e intervención estadounidense en Malvinas (1982)* Ana Laura Bochicchio 2021 in *Quinto Sol: Revista de Historia* vol.25 no.1

3569 Elgood 2025 citing Dalyell 1982 Appendix A p.131. Franks being the Franks Committee which investigated the causes of the 1982 Falklands War.

3570 ESMA = Escuela Superior de Mecánica de la Armada. The school held a notorious reputation as a clandestine detention centre where more than 5,000 dissidents were held, tortured and eliminated.

3571 Yofre 2011

Clearly, we have a good, separate root of title to the BAT and each FI Dependency. ... it is the opinion of legal advisers that the sovereignty of the Crown over the British Antarctic Territory would not be prejudiced in any way were HMG to cede or to offer to cede sovereignty over any part of the Falkland Islands and their dependencies to Argentina." [3572]

On the same day, Robin Fearn (South America Department), writes to Ambassador Williams in Buenos Aires.[3573]

"1. ... Research Department have now completed their paper (on which we were consulted while it was in draft) and I enclose a copy.

2. Our original intention had been, ... to produce a classified paper and an accompanying sanitised version for use with suitable contacts. However, ***the nature of the paper and its conclusions have led us to decide to have the whole classified secret*** *and not to produce any companion unclassified paper. The facts would seem to be that our case rests almost entirely on 148 years of continuous settlement, and that while the Law Officers have previously been relatively certain that this would be sufficient in International Law to uphold our claim, there is certainly some risk in putting the contention to the test, particularly given the probable in-built anti-colonial bias of most of the international institutions which might be involved if the case went to arbitration.*

3. This paper, then, is for the information of you and your staff only: I do not need to stress how potentially damaging the consequences would be if the Argentine's came to suspect that we doubted our ability to justify our claim to sovereignty before 1833." [3574]

In Buenos Aires, Davidoff puts his final plans together for the dismantling of the scrap metal on South Georgia.

"... in late November, two high-ranking naval officers and two foreign office officials met with Constantine Davidoff at a restaurant in Calle Florida a popular shopping district in down town Buenos Aires. One of the navy men was Captain Adolpho Palau, of naval transport command, and the other was Captain Cesar Trombetta, of the navy's Antarctic Squadron.... the purpose of their meeting was for the navy officers to tell Davidoff that the Argentine navy was now prepared to transport him free of charge to South Georgia and for the foreign office officials to confirm that the scrap metal he brought back would enter duty-free, increasing his profit margin... Davidoff, never having been to South Georgia, proposed to make a brief trip to inspect the whaling stations. Trombetta agreed; it would provide an opportunity to take a closer look at the island and test the likely British reaction." [3575]

December 2nd, in the UK, Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington writes to the Prime Minister.

"... talks are due to be held on 17 and 18 December in Geneva;... Islander opinion is even more strongly opposed to any 'deal' with the Argentines over sovereignty. ... We therefore have little room

3572 *FCO to UKE Buenos Aires November 26, 1981* in *ALW 040/325/5*

3573 *Fearn to Williams November 26, 1981* in *AW 040/325/1.* My emphasis. The attachments are closed for 47 years under exemption 27(1)(c) dated August 28, 2012. Likely to include both the legal opinions of 1947 and 1966; despite the 1947 opinion being available at the Public Records Office at Kew. *cf.* 1947

3574 Such doubts manifest themselves from time to time, most frequently during the first 30 years of the 20th century. It should be noted that the information supplied for this paper was generated by the FCO (see 1911). It is unfortunate that while legal opinions regarding the UK's title to the Falklands have been appeared occasionally since 1833, there have been no similar considerations of Argentina's titles which are based almost solely upon a claimed inheritance from Spain. Not recognised by the UK and Argentina has not demonstrated any willingness to have its theory of inheritance tested by an international court or tribunal. See Vol.2 (1816) for a consideration of the theory of *uti possidetis juris.*

3575 Thornton 2004. There are different versions of this story; none of which can be confirmed.

for manoeuvre,... Argentines have requested this meeting, so we can allow them to make the running."[3576]

"According to the declassified evidence he (Carrington) gave to the Franks Committee he merely talked of "having to keep the ball in the air with the Argentines. That was our object. We did not have any cards in our hands"." [3577]

December 3rd, in Buenos Aires, President Viola is once again hospitalized following a suspected heart attack.

"As we had already anticipated, between today and the beginning of next week the definitive departure of General Viola will be resolved." [3578]

"Before waiting for the medical tests, the President of the Nation was considered displaced, not for clinical reasons but for political and economic reasons." [3579]

December 4th, Admiral Jorge Anaya attends the last of the Navy Mechanics School debates.

"Anaya improvised some words in which he spoke of the value of the Malvinas and the changes that were in the air, about to happen." [3580]

December 8th, in London, Robin Fearn, Head of the Foreign Office's South American Department, informs the US Embassy that two days of negotiations with Argentina over the Falkland Islands are due to resume; with two representatives from the Islands in attendance.

"HMG views Argentina as the proposer and HMG as the responder in the upcoming talks. The sovereignty issue remains central, and the Islanders seem more determined than ever to remain British. HMG's position is straightforward: It seeks a resolution of the issue, but will not agree to a settlement "over the heads of the Islanders". HMG is pessimistic about possibilities for any dramatic breakthroughs. The Islanders have rejected the lease back arrangement, and few options seem available. ... It is easy to understand, he said, why those currently in charge in Buenos Aires are not well loved. The Falklanders argue with considerable effect in London that they do not wish to become "1800 more disappeared persons"." [3581]

December 9th, from Port Stanley, Governor Hunt sails in HMS *Endurance*; to visit the Dependencies.

In Argentina, in the evening, following press reports of Viola's deteriorating health, Galtieri and Anaya meet.

"There are those that maintain that at a dinner held on December 9, 1981, with their wives present, Admiral Anaya convinced Galtieri (he would) help him overthrow Viola if in exchange he (would) support a joint military operation to recover the Malvinas Islands ..." [3582]

December 11th, in Buenos Aires, it is announced that General Leopoldo Galtieri will assume the Presidency on December 22 - to complete Viola's term. [3583]

3576 *ALW 040/325/2 Part E 301.* US sources refer to the talks being scheduled for December 18/19.
3577 Elgood 2025
3578 Journalist Jesus Iglesias Rouco in *La Prensa* December 3, 1981. Quite how ill President Viola was, is much disputed.
3579 Yofre 2011
3580 *Ibid.*
3581 *Telegram from the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the Department of State December 10, 1981 in Foreign Relations of the United States, 1981–1988, vol. xiii, Conflict in the South Atlantic, 1981–1984*
3582 Yofre 2011
3583 President Viola refused to offer his resignation. He was dismissed on the grounds of ill health.

Galtieri controversially retains his position as head of the Army. [3584]

"Seeing the Argentina flag fly over the Malvinas was the life-long dream of Admiral Jorge Isaac Anaya, commander-in-chief of the navy and the driving force behind Argentina's policy on the sovereignty dispute. In December 1981 he supported his boyhood friend Leopoldo Galtieri's bid for the presidency on the condition that Galtieri would secure sovereignty over the disputed islands once and for all." [3585]

"It is said by associates of both men that this agreement ... involved assurances on a number of policy issues. One of these was an understanding that the recovery of the Falklands should be achieved within the two years of Galtieri's presidency term, preferably before January 1983..." [3586]

"(Anaya) was an ardent 'Malvinist', but the suggestion that he made the recovery of the islands a condition of his support for the new President is not supported by senior Argentine Admirals. They believe that when Galtieri became President he asked Anaya and Brigadier Lami Dozo, the air Force member of the junta, what future plans the old junta had been developing ... the head of the list for foreign policy was the resolution of the 'Malvinas problem.' ..." [3587]

"Contrary to popular impression, however, Galtieri obtained neither a mandate nor a full term of office, and would be required to relinquish his army command in a year. In short, as president, Galtieri could count on exercising considerable power for a year, after which the junta would be enlarged by an additional member, Galtieri's replacement as army chief. This arrangement was clearly an incentive for Galtieri to take action while his power was relatively unconstrained." [3588]

From the Embassy, Ambassador Williams telegrams the FCO in London; *"... what I would stress is that I doubt whether, from our point of view, any change is going to make a vast difference."* [3589]

December 12th, at South Georgia, Governor Hunt speaks to the BAS base commander, Peter Witty and visits the old whaling station at Grytviken.

December 14th, in London, dealing with a question regarding the occupation by Argentina of Morrell Island in Southern Thule, Lord Carrington states; *"... if my noble friend is suggesting the use of force, he will recollect that international law and the United Nations Charter require disputes to be settled by peaceful means. That is what we have been trying to do,.."* [3590]

December 15th, Argentina requests a postponement of the negotiations due to start on the 17th. Britain agrees.

From Buenos Aires, Admiral Jorge Anaya flies to Puerto Belgrano.

3584 Military governments had tended to comprise the Head of State (President) and the heads of the three services; a four-man junta (board). Galtieri appears to have negotiated this concession on the basis that he would voluntarily 'retire' once he had completed his predecessor's term at the end of 1982.

3585 Welch 1997

3586 Jenkins & Hastings 1997

3587 *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* Martin Middlebrook 2003

3588 Thornton 2004

3589 *Williams to FCO December 3, 1981 FCO 12/384 f29*

3590 *HL Deb 14 December 1981 vol.426 cc5-6.* At this time, Argentina's meteorological station on Southern Thule was staffed by seven naval scientists and four civilians, of which three were radio technicians.

"... Anaya flew from Buenos Aires to the main Argentine naval base at Puerto Belgrano, 280 miles away to the south-west. He went there to perform the official installation of Vice-Admiral Juan Lombardo as the new Chief of Naval Operations; ... After the ceremony, Anaya surprised Lombardo by quietly telling him to prepare a plan to occupy the Falkland islands: to "take them but not necessarily to keep them" are the words Lombardo remembers." [3591]

From the Rio de la Plata, on the same day, an Argentine naval transport - *Almirante Trizar* (Capt. Cesar Trombetta) - sails for South Georgia with Constantino Davidoff is on board. [3592]

"178. Once the transfer of Davidoff and a small group of people have been agreed to evaluate the work to be carried out, on 15-DEC-81 the ARA "Almirante Trizar" set sail from Buenos Aires." [3593]

"Davidoff and his men were issued with the 'white cards' that served as bilateral documentation in the dealings of both countries in the South Atlantic region as per the 1971 Communication Accords." [3594]

"... Davidoff's enterprise lay dormant until activated on late 1981. At that point scrap metal prices began to plummet from $93 to $63 per ton, suggesting that profit was not necessarily the reason for the venture..." [3595]

"The business was inviting. It was estimated according to The Sunday Times that (for) those 35,000 tons of metal Davidoff had paid £115,000, when in 1979 a tonne of scrap was sold at £214, representing a profit of £7 million." [3596]

"On board the icebreaker Almirante Irízar, the Grupo Alfa sailed to Tierra del Fuego in order to train in cold weather areas. Having nothing to do with them, Davidoff and six other people were also on board the Irízar heading for South Georgia Island in order to survey the terrain for scrapping." [3597]

December 16th, in London, the House of Lords debates the "South West Atlantic". [3598] Lord Shackleton speaks:

> *"But I want to repeat something of which no Government will ever take cognisance, although it is in my report, which was rather long, and I shall not blame the noble Lord, Lord Skelmersdale, if he has not had time to read it. But the fact is that over the 23 years up to 1973, the Falklands effectively contributed to the United Kingdom Exchequer—that is, out of profits repatriated to this country—more than twice what they received by way of assistance at current prices. In certain years, it may have been the other way round. I am not making a racist point, but if the inhabitants had been not British but Indian, coloured or black, there would have been a howl at the United Nations, because this is a classic example of colonial exploitation.*
>
> *I say that without any hesitation. The British have failed to repay a debt which they owe to the Falklands. The fact is that at the moment the people there, for good or for ill, are totally opposed to the idea of being joined up with the Argentine.*

3591 *Argentine Fight for the Falklands* M. Middlebrook 2003. In *El fracaso de la cumbre entre argentinos y británicos que decidió la guerra: "En un mes tomamos las Malvinas"* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre March 1, 2022 the date is given as December 22, 1981.

3592 General Benjamin Rattenbach 1983 Other sources suggest the 16th.

3593 *Ibid.*

3594 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.42. Neither South Georgia, nor any of the Dependencies, had been included within the 'white card' scheme as agreed in 1971.

3595 Thornton 2004. There are different versions of this story. None can be confirmed.

3596 *Malvinas: las causas inmediates de la Guerra* M. Meneghini 2015

3597 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 20233. See August, 1981, above, and February, 1982, below.

3598 See - https://hansard.parliament.uk/lords/1981-12-16/debates/cc6d37d9-cf28-46a2-8ece-879f0d4b9f09/South-WestAtlanticDevelopmentOpportunities

But it is not only the Falkland Islands. There are the dependencies. There is that marvellous island of South Georgia, one of the most beautiful islands in the world, which is on the other side of the Antarctic convergence. Although it is only the same latitude South as Manchester is North, it is very sub-arctic. It has marvellous wildlife, abandoned ghost towns from the days of the whaling stations, tens of thousand of pounds worth of equipment. It is the centre of one of the richest fishing areas in the world.

These ports are properly British. We have developed them. Although at the moment there is only a British Antarctic survey base, it would be intolerable if the Falkland Islands were leased or given away and if South Georgia should also go that way. " [3599]

Representing the Government, Lord Skelmersdale adds:

"My noble friend Lord Buxton asked why we are talking to the Argentines at all. The claim of the Argentines simply will not go away. As long as the dispute continues, it will remain difficult for the islands to be developed properly and there will be a shadow of uncertainty over the islanders' daily lives. That is why successive British Governments have held talks with the Argentines, and we are continuing to do so. But the wishes of the islanders themselves are paramount. No solution could be approved which was not acceptable both to them and to Parliament." [3600]

During the course of the debate, the expected withdrawal of HMS *Endurance* is mentioned sixty-five times.

"... around mid-December 1981, at the request of the Legislative Council at Stanley, the Parliament called for an increased naval presence in the area, aiming at the Antarctic projection. The authors of this initiative, who were deeply reluctant to negotiate sovereignty, were part of the most recalcitrant group of islanders. They, together with the British corporations having economic interests in the islands, who were afraid of losing their privileges, prevented Argentina from consolidating her bonds with the islanders and demanded military protection from the United Kingdom, that would dissuade any armed actions. The members of the UKFIC saw in this demand the best excuse to create lobby groups in the British Parliament. The Houses, made up of Members of Parliament with radicalized ideas, the far-right press and the admiralty itself, joined forces to ensure sovereignty was not handed over to Argentina. On the pretext that they aimed at protecting the natives' wishes, they coerced both the UK Government and public opinion. Moreover, they counted on Governor Rex Hunt's collaboration." [3601]

In Buenos Aires, the British Embassy receive a letter from Constantino Davidoff. [3602]

"We have received a letter from Davidoff, whose name will be familiar to you, informing us that he intends to visit the installations at Leith, Stomless (sic) and Husvic, accompanied by seven or eight civilian assistants, to take an inventory of the equipment. He does not say how he is getting there,... This is the first we have heard of Davidoff for some time. We have since tried to contact him by telephone, so far unsuccessfully, so he may have departed already." [3603]

3599 *Hansard: Lords: 16 December 1981: South-West Atlantic Development Opportunities vol.426 col.211*
3600 *Ibid. col.232*
3601 Fuerza Aérea Argentina 2023
3602 In correspondence with the British Ambassador dated March 25, 1982, Davidoff would claim that this letter was delivered to the Embassy on December 11, 1981
3603 *UKE Buenos Aires to Governor Falkland Islands December 18, 1981* in *FCO12/384 f43*

"Although Davidoff had permission for the visit, the manner in which he was taken by the Argentine Navy was not calculated to ease British suspicions. He notified the British Embassy in Buenos Aires of his date of sailing, but the letter arrived after he had left and it was vague in detail and did not ask for diplomatic clearance for the Almirante Irizar." [3604]

"Davidoff deliberately delayed sending the letter to the embassy, on Trombetta's advise, who intended it as a "provocation"." [3605]

In Buenos Aires, a group of politicians sign a declaration calling for unconditional democratic elections. [3606]

December 17th, in Argentina, Basilio Arturo Lami Dozo is promoted to head the Air Force.

On the same day, the company of 'Christian Salvesens Ltd' informs the Governor of the Falkland Islands that Davidoff and seven others are sailing for South Georgia; *"to photograph and inventory scrap. BAS commander Grytviken and BAS Cambridge have been informed through BAS channels."* [3607]

"... Davidoff also sent a telex to Christian Salvesens in Edinburgh, informing the company of his trip, and Salvesens had promptly informed the Foreign Office. London had thus been informed of Davidoff's visit well in advance of his arrival." [3608]

December 18th, in Buenos Aires, the new three-man junta meet to discuss their objectives in international relations. These, for the Argentine government 1981-1984, are identified as:

> *"Contribute to the solution of the conflict with Chile by developing actins established by a military committee.*
>
> *Defend and control Argentine interests in the Southern Cone.*
>
> *Preserve Argentina's Antarctic rights and develop the Argentine presence in the region*
>
> *Intensify all necessary and appropriate courses of action to obtain recognition of Argentine sovereignty over the Falkland Islands, South Georgia and South Sandwich Islands."* [3609]

"(ex Chancellor Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez) ... briefed the Junta ... as to the dismal state of negotiations with Britain and the need to develop a policy prior to the resumption of talks in the coming February. ... From the Argentine perspective serious discussions, addressing the sovereignty issue, only took place for two short periods during ... sixteen years: between 1966 and 1967, and from 1977 to 1980. For the rest of the time the Falkland Islands lobby undermined the flexibility of the Foreign Office and its conduct of the negotiations. ... The immediate Argentine objective was to return to the original negotiating framework of 1966-7." [3610]

"In the 19th and 20th centuries Argentine elites deliberately used irredentism to cultivate an Argentine national identity among a diverse immigrant population. By all indications this was enormously successful: to this day Argentine nationalism is an unusually potent strain. The Junta that came to power in 1982 was the first to have passed through Argentine schools after the claim to the Malvinas gained prominence in the textbooks. In

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3604 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.42
3605 Thornton 2004
3606 Yofre 2011
3607 *FCO12/384 f41*
3608 Thornton 2004
3609 Yofre 2011
3610 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990. For Chancellor, read Foreign Minister. Costa Méndez had been Foreign Minister under President Ogania 1966 to 1969.

this sense the moral claim itself has a domestic political explanation. Nevertheless, the Junta's perception of historical injustice was sincere." [3611]

"Why Malvinas? ... it contained that element that would guarantee, in some way, unquestionable support from Argentine society as a whole. But in addition, it had the potential capacity to transform the character of the Armed Forces, since for the latter it could mean – in the words of Leon Rozitchner – to move from "dirty internal war to external clean war", by recovering that part of a formerly usurped country, finally re-establishing true national integrity, and at the same time making the "enemy" of the Argentine people to England and not the Military Junta. In this way, what was intended was to "reconquer" the Falkland Islands to "conquer" the Argentine people." [3612]

"In reality, Galtieri did not have a plan for the Malvinas because the Army (had) never worked on it as a conflict hypothesis. The one that did have a plan that was permanently updated was the Navy." [3613]

December 19th, arriving in Buenos Aires, Argentina's ambassador to Peru, Luis Sánchez Moreno, is updated in a meeting with Admiral Anaya.

"Anaya told Vice Admiral Luís Sánchez Moreno, ..: "The National Reorganization Process has deteriorated greatly and we have to look for an element that brings society together. That element is Malvinas". Sánchez Moreno answered: "I have studied several years in an English school. I know the English as much as you do, Margaret Thatcher is not going to let herself be carried away by a military government. The English are like bull dogs, when they bite their prey they don't let go". .., the head of the Navy (promptly) ended the meeting. He assumed his role as Commander and with a formal "that's all Sánchez Moreno" dismissed him." [3614]

"(Admiral Anaya) ... told a retired admiral on 19 December that the military government faced collapse and had to find an element "to bring cohesion to the country and that element is the Malvinas"..." [3615]

December 20th, at Stromness Bay in South Georgia, *Almirante Irizar* anchors. [3616]

"En route the Almirante Irizar maintained radio silence and did not notify the Magistrate (the designation given the commander of the British Antarctic Survey to indicate Crown authority) at King Edward Point, Grytviken, to notify him of the arrival. King Edward Point was the official point of entry where Customs and Immigration clearance was obtained." [3617]

"Trobetta traversed the 1,650-mile passage in four days maintaining radio silence, an unusual procedure, and without radioing the magistrate at Grytviken, the official port of entry, of his impending visit. Upon arrival on December 20 (?), Trombetta declined to follow prescribed landing procedures by obtaining clearance at Grytviken. Instead he proceeded directly to Leith,.." [3618]

3611 Welch 1997
3612 Carbone 2008
3613 Yofre 2011
3614 *El día que la Flota de Mar cortó las comunicaciones y no hubo vuelta atrás en la recuperación de Malvinas* Juan Bautista Tata Yofre in *Infobae* March 30, 2024
3615 Briley 2022
3616 According to General Benjamin Rattenbach (1983), the ship arrived on the 18th. However, four days from Buenos Aires is unlikely. This Report also states that the Argentine vessel stayed only a few hours before leaving for Ushuaia, from where Davidoff flew to Buenos Aires. Other sources suggest that the vessel remained three days.
3617 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.42
3618 Thornton 2004.

"There he inspected the material that (he) had purchased: 30 fuel storage tanks, cooking plant, diesel power plant of 1,500kw, boiler and machinery, in Leith; other facilities in Husvik and Stromnes, plus two floating docks of 700 and 1,000 tons in the latter port." [3619]

December 22nd, in Buenos Aires, during his inauguration speech at the National Congress Building, General/ President Galtieri surprisingly makes no reference to the Islands. Admiral Anaya passes a hand written message to his Chief of Staff, Vice-Admiral Alberto Gabriel Vigo.


1.- MALVINAS
1.1.- El CON presentará su plan actualizado.
1.2.- Enviar personal seleccionado para reconocimiento.
1.3.- Plan después de ocupación.
1.3.1.- Efectivo para personal a STANLEY.
1.3.2.- Apoyo a dicha efectivo.
1.3.3.- Logística para STANLEY.
1.3.4.- Defensa de STANLEY.

"It was the first order of the armed conflict that was approaching: 1.1.- The NOC (Commander of Naval Operations) will present me with an updated plan. 1.2- Send selected personnel for recognition. 1.3.- Plan after occupation. 1.3.1. - Effective to stay in Stanley. 1.3.2. - Support for these troops. 1.3.3. – Logistics for Stanley. 2.- Super Etendard. They must be brought into the country with all their weapons as they are ready. Before 01 Jun '82. 3.- P-3 Before 01 Jun '82." [3620]

On the same day, Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez is appointed as Argentina's Foreign Minister.

"According to the Rattenbach report, when he took over the Chancellery, Dr. Nicanor Costa Méndez had two meetings with Galtieri in which he was given the directive of activating as much as possible the diplomatic negotiations aimed at the recognition of Argentine sovereignty in Malvinas, adding that he would not rule out the need to reach something more than diplomacy in the event that Britain once again attempted to delay the resolution of the question. Thus, during the months that followed, the Junta appealed to both formal and informal channels to make British diplomats understand that the option of the invasion was a reality and not a mere bluff to coerce them to sit down and negotiate." [3621]

"The new Junta updated its invasion plans and gave public clues as to its intentions. Galtieri appointed Dr. Nicanor Costa Meńdez as Foreign Minister, a diplomat obsessed with seizing Falklands sovereignty. Galtieri made a speech saying he wanted to create a 'Greater Argentina', which, my Argentine contacts told me, meant getting possession of the Falkland Islands and the Beagle Channel from Chile." [3622]

December 23rd, from South Georgia, *Almirante Irizar* sails for Tierra del Fuego. At Leith, after the ship has disappeared from view, a member of the BAS checks the station; finding the phrase – '*Las Malvinas son Argentinas'* – scrawled on the walls. Governor Hunt is informed by radio.

"By the time that the BAS discovered that the visit had been made, the Almirante Irizar had gone. The Magistrate visited Leith on 23 December to find traces of the Argentine visit including a wall defaced with the slogan 'Las Malvinas son Argentinas', helpfully dated 20 December. The news of the visitation was passed on to Governor Hunt, who in turn passed it to London on 31 December." [3623]

3619 Meneghini 2015

3620 Yofre 2011. The *Dassault-Breguet Super Éntendard* was a French built carrier born strike fighting aircraft. In 1981, Argentina had ordered five of these aircraft, together with five Exocet missiles. The *Lockheed P-3 Orion* was a maritime patrol aircraft.

3621 Carbone 2008

3622 Briley 2022

3623 Freedman & Gamba-Stonehouse 1990 p.43

In Argentina, during the evening of the same day, Vice-Admiral Vigo issues written instructions to Vice-Admiral Juan José Lombardo to; *"personally prepare and deliver to me the updated Plan for the recovery of the Malvinas."* [3624]



ARMADA ARGENTINA

Nº 326 "S" /81

Letra JEOP, PI4

ALBERTO CARRIEGO
VICEALMIRANTE

SECRETO

BUENOS AIRES, 23 diciembre de 1981.

OBJETO: S/PLAN.

AL SEÑOR COMANDANTE DE OPERACIONES NAVALES VICEALMIRANTE
Dn. JUAN JOSE LOMBARDO

Por orden del Señor COAR debera elaborar personalmente y entregarme a la mano, el Plan actualizado para la recuperacion de MALVINAS.

A tal efecto dispondra el envio de personal seleccionado para efectuar los reconocimientos necesarios con la adecuada cobertura.

El citado plan debera incluir el desarrollo en detalle de los aspectos siguientes a la ocupacion :

1- Efectivos que deberan permanecer en Puerto Stanley
2-Apoyo a dichos efectivos
3-Defensa de Puerto Stanley
4-Logistica de apoyo de Puerto Stanley

Fecha de entrega del Plan: 31 MAR 82

"(Admiral) Lombardo, who commanded the South Atlantic operations, had a series of meetings with the head of Marine Special Forces who was to lead the invasion, Admiral Carlos Bűsser..." [3626]

In Buenos Aires, a number of discreet press briefings take place at the Foreign Ministry.

"... the task of preparing the Argentine people for the possible military operation to be carried out, was also in the hands of the Minister for Foreign Affairs. This task had begun in late December 1981 when Costa Méndez began to inform a select group of journalists about the government's intentions. He told them that Argentina was determined to recover the Malvinas by the end of 1982, through diplomatic channels if possible, by force if necessary." [3627]

December 29th, in Argentina, the bulk of the conscript army are demobilized at the end of the year. [3628]

"From 1901 to 1996, Argentina required universal military service for all males. After 1976, eighteen year-olds were inducted into service. Of the total available pool, some received exemptions on the basis of being unable to meet physical requirements or having dependency considerations. The total number of conscripts was then determined by the current training budget. All males of the total pool were assigned by lottery to the Army, Navy, or Air Force, and the conscripts served for only one year. The principal advantages of such a conscript system are, first, that it provides a large standing force of young men. Second, as soon as conscripts finish their period of active duty, they became part of a reserve. Third, the system provides the state with substantial, immediately usable forces, at a fairly cheap cost. Finally, it provides a state with the means for quick mobilization in wartime." [3629]

3624 Yofre 2011
3625 *Armada Argentina No. 326 "S"/81 JEOP, PI4*
3626 Briley 2022
3627 Carbone 2008. Unconfirmed. In view of the secrecy, and uncertainty, surrounding the plan, this seems unlikely.
3628 The 'Class of '62' having finished their required service, were in the process being demobilised. The 'Class of '63' were in the process of being called up. Untrained conscripts.
3629 *Reassessing the Fighting Performance of Conscript Soldiers during the Malvinas/Falklands War (1982)* A. L. Carbacho 2004.

December 30th, in London, the Argentine Ambassador, Ortiz de Rozas, calls for a new round of negotiations early in the New Year. [3630]

December 31st, from Port Stanley, London is informed of the unauthorised visit of the *Almirante Irizar*.

> *"Davidoff is required by Dependencies legislation to obtain entry clearance at Grytviken. He knows this and cannot plead ignorance. If he did land at Leith both he and master of vessel have placed themselves open to prosecution under the Immigration Ordinance 1965 and may, if found guilty, be fined or imprisoned for six months. Base commander wants guidance on action to be taken if Davidoff should appear at Grytviken, we advise him to institute proceedings."* [3631]

From London, responding immediately, Lord Carrington telegrams the Falkland Islands' Governor.

> *"1. It seems to us that any attempt to institute proceedings against Davidoff and/or Master of Argentine naval vessel would risk provoking a most serious incident which could escalate and have an unforeseeable outcome. ...*
>
> *2. Base commander should therefore NOT, repeat NOT, attempt to institute proceedings. Instead: a) If Davidoff and party present themselves at Grytviken and request entry clearance in appropriate manner, Base commander should grant clearance subject to fulfilment of normal entry requirements. b) if Argentine vessel is naval, then unless party also formally seek clearance for her, Base commander should deliver a formal written protest against her unauthorised entry into British territorial waters. c) if Davidoff and party attempt to land at Grytviken without proper clearance, they should be ordered to depart immediately, but without using threats. d) if they refuse to comply, incident should be reported immediately to FCO for further instructions.*
>
> *3. Base commander may at his discretion also question Davidoff about the reported landing at Leith. If Davidoff admits the offence, but is otherwise complying with immigration requirements, Base commander should admonish him not to repeat the offence but take no further action.*
>
> *4. We shall probably wish in due course to make a protest to the Argentine Government about this incident ... but will first wish to see what transpires at Grytviken and have as full a report as possible of the facts."* [3632]

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Bibliography

https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/bibliography/

For the full research

https://falklandstimeline.wordpress.com/

https://independent.academia.edu/RogerLorton

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3631 *Governor Falkland Islands telegram to FCO December 31, 1981* in *FCO12/384 f45*
3632 *Carrington to Hunt December 31, 1981* in *FCO12/384 f46*